1、 (ELECTRIC) SURGE! Carmakers electric car plans across Europe 2019-2025 July 2019 2 Transport rather it aims to give some insights on what can be expected from the EU vehicle market in the medium-term future based on the carmakers production plans known to date. The purpose of this report is to anal
2、yse the impact of current industrial plans and CO2 regulations on the European market - it should not be considered as a market forecast. 2. Carmakers EV plans across Europe: 2019 to 2025 2.1. Forecast data on EV production This report is based on the T a single common standard is applied. Light veh
3、icles have a Gross Vehicle Weight below 6 tons and combine the passenger car and small truck vehicle types. Micro cars and three wheelers are excluded. 6 Vehicles can be produced in Europe with part of the vehicle being imported from outside the EU (e.g. the powertrain or the battery). 7 In terms of
4、 industrial plans the 2030 timeframe is too distant to assess production plans as it is not within the timeframe of current product developments and would thus be highly speculative. 8 In practice the following countries marked as European in the database were excluded: Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekista
5、n, Ukraine, Serbia, Belarus and Turkey. Unless specified otherwise, Europe or EU is used to designate the EU region. 9 2.2. EV models coming to the market up to 2025 The number of BEV models available on the market has stayed consistently low in the past as carmakers saw them as compliance cars unti
6、l recently, producing the minimum needed to hit CO2 targets. Today, less than 40 battery electric car and van models are available on the market, and the supply of most of these vehicles is being surpressed as shown previously by T Volkswagen: 300,000; Porsche: 160,000; SEAT: 75,000 and Skoda: 50,00
7、0 15 MEB standards for Modularer E-Antriebs-Baukasten in German which translates into Modular E-drive construction kit. 16 While the forecast data acquired by T 2. The planned numbers actually exceed the minimum EV volumes needed to comply with the future 2025 CO2 standards, which T 3. A third concl
8、usion is that car manufacturers are putting their money and production effort into the clean technology of their choice, and it is electrification. Planned production of fuel cell vehicles in 2025 is negligible (9,000 units planned for 2025 vs 4 million EVs), and natural gas vehicles will remain a n
9、iche too, decreasing to 200k vehicles planned for 2025; 4. Most of the EV manufacturing in Europe is expected to be located in Germany, France, Spain and Italy (also the UK31), but parts of the future manufacturing are also expected to be located in central and eastern EU counties, notably Slovakia,
10、 Czech Republic and Hungary which rely on conventional car manufacturing today. 5. Whilst for the next few years Europe will have to import a part of the batteries required, in the medium-term Europes battery production capacity will likely be sufficient to support the vehicle production in Europe.
11、A dozen of the currently planned lithium-ion battery cell production factories will take a couple of years come online, but there is likely to be enough battery supply by early/mid 2020s. If production schedules are met, from 2023 these factories will account for a total of at least 131 GWh of annua
12、l battery production capacity, which is estimated to be around 15% more than the demand from electric cars and vans. Accounting for stationary storage (less than 10% of the total) and electric heavy-duty vehicles, the supply and demand of Li-ion batteries appears to be balanced and there should be n
13、o shortage of batteries in the medium-term future in the EU. The current shortage of battery supply is the consequence of late investments as manufacturers failed to anticipate the shift to EVs and to secure the supply on time. As a result, up to 2023 OEMs may have to rely on battery cell imports fr
14、om Asia. This report does not aim to predict the future there is always an inherent uncertainty in estimating future manufacturing volumes and locations that can be subject to unexpected economic and geopolitical changes (e.g. Brexit). What it does show is that the EU car CO2 requirements are finall
15、y driving industrys investment in emobility. The current forecast data is a sign that a rapid expansion of EVs is possible, that OEMs are already planning for it, and that the current favourable locations to conventional manufacturing in Central and Eastern Europe can also benefit from new productio
16、n opportunities. 31 But uncertain due to Brexit 34 5.2. Recommendations This analysis (backed by recent investment announcements) shows that Europes car industry now has a real chance to leave behind a 20-year long history of unfulfilled promises on CO2 emissions. T - Focus on high-mileage market se
17、gments such as corporate fleets and taxis to displace the maximum of fossil-driven kilometers. This can be done through employee-side measures (higher Benefit-in-Kind tax for ICE vehicles, lower for EV) and measures to reduce total cost of ownership (TCO) for employers via VAT/tax deductibility; - F
18、ocus on the quality of EVs, e.g. their range, resource circularity and real-world CO2 reduction (including maximum CO2 requirements in the case of plug-in hybrids); - Are socially equitable and promote affordable EVs to help consumers with lower purchase power. Incentives should not pay for luxury b
19、ut for necessity, e.g. by price caps (that could depend on range); - Are fiscally sustainable by balancing incentives for zero emission vehicles with increased taxes on polluting cars, preferably at the point of purchase to increase effectiveness and avoid adverse social impacts; - Are phased down a
20、s battery prices decrease and the market matures; one way of doing this is to link incentives to market success. Third, charging infrastructure needs to be effectively deployed in line with the growing EV uptake at all levels. While there is enough infrastructure for the early adopters today, much m
21、ore needs to be done as electric cars go mainstream. Providing easy home and workplace charging is a top priority. So is a ubiquitous, interoperable and convenient coverage of public charging infrastructure along highways and suburban/urban roads, with a focus on areas not served by the market i.e.
22、with lower utilization rates. Given the choice of EU carmakers to invest in electric cars, the review of the 2014 Alternative Fuels Infrastructure 35 Directive should follow the market and prioritise electric charging infrastructure for cars. It should also adopt the EU-wide “right to plug”, as well
23、 as channeling the EU Connecting Europe Facility and EU regional funds to provide seamless coverage. Fourth, the EU needs to put in place a comprehensive Green Industrial Agenda, by setting and implementing coherent policies aimed at emobility leadership in all fields: transport, industry, research,
24、 innovation, etc. This needs to support the EU carmakers to transform the way they make cars and keep jobs in Europe. Notably, the EU should set an ambitious battery manufacturing framework including environmental and social requirements and financial support that would encourage the development of
25、a sustainable and closed-loop battery production and recycling industry in Europe. Finally, this report has shown that the uptake in EV production has the potential to replace the declining diesel manufacturing, notably in less wealthy regions heavily reliant on traditional manufacturing today. Earl
26、ier work shows that the additional spending from reduced oil imports most of it spent in the service sector - more than offsets any job losses in the automotive industry. Still, some regions could be hit hard by the increasing automation in the automotive sector, of which electrification is one elem
27、ent. These should be able to benefit from a diesel transition fund to help retrain, upskill and adjust workforce. The German trade union IG Metallxxxvii has recently introduced an initiative whereby its employees would reduce working hours, but continue to receive the same salary and spend part of t
28、heir time training and acquiring new skills. Industry, EU and national governments can all part-fund initiatives of this kind to prepare workers for the future. Together, these measures are not only necessary to guarantee an effective, fast and socially just entry of electric vehicles into the mains
29、tream market, but they will also ensure the EU car industry once and for all commits to electrification and delivers on its promises. This report shows it is possible; and a successful transition to emobility is also imperative to Europes economic and industrial future. 36 6. Annexes 6.1. EV model a
30、nalysis: methodology and scope In section 2., the analysis of production volumes and locations in sections 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 is based on the IHS Markit production database purchased by T&E in early 2019. No adjustements or updates have been made to the data, therefore the results presented only
31、capture insights from the modelling of IHS Markit. On the other hand, in section 2.2 concerning EV models coming to market in the EU, additional analysis is undertaken by T&E. The global HIS Markit vehicle production database was used as a starting point for the expected carmakers product plans and
32、strategies which provided a skeleton for the analysis. Then, for each model, T&E experts translated production plans into expected availability on the European market based on knowledge of production plans, schedules, public announcements and uptaded information available. For some models there can
33、be a certain level of uncertainty for the availability of a model and/or for the year of availability. T&E experts have assessed global EV production data and public announcements made by the carmakers to carry out this analysis. Only models were the sales in Europe were deemed likely were taken int
34、o account (the model is ignored if there are no clear signals that the vehicle would be available in the EU). As a fall-back option when no market signals were available for the expected availability date in Europe (but sales were confirmed or very likely in Europe), the IHS Markit start of producti
35、on date was used with a delay of two months to account for the lag between start of production and start of deliveries. In the database some EVs are updated with only slight changes in the battery size or the engine/motor power. These vehicles were only counted once as this is not considered as a ne
36、w product. On the other hand, when a model is entirely upgraded (i.e. new model generation, which happen after around 7 years), then it is counted as a new model on the market but not as an additional vehicle available on the market as it replaces the previous version of the model. This analysis inc
37、ludes both cars and vans. The analysis of models expected on the market only cover the major carmakers, excluding small volume or niche manufacturers (e.g. Borgward, Bollore, e.GO), Chinese manfuacturers (BYD, Chery, etc.) or other foreign manufacturers with uncertain sales in Europe (Lucid Motor, D
38、yson, etc.), and sport/supercars cars (McLaren, Ferrari, Lamborgini). As a consequence, this analysis is conservative compared to the likely market growth in the next years. 6.2. EVs needed in 2025 & 2030 for CO2 compliance: Assumptions and methodology Calculation of the EV share in 2025 and 2030 ba
39、sed on the minimum requirement from the CO2 standard The Table 1 below details the main assumptions used in this model, they are briefly detailed in the text below. 37 Table 1: Scenario assumptions *ICE improvement: vs. 2021 ICE average 2021- EV share (%): 6% (T&E estimates the EU market will be bet
40、ween 5% and 7% in 202132, report). Sensitivity analysis is performed on this assumption and increasing (respectively decreasing) the 2021 EV share by 1% leads to an increase (respectively decrease) of the 2025 EV share of +/-0.9%. However, lower share of EVs in 2021 means lower ICE average emission
41、in 2021, which would in reality likely be balanced out by lower improvement on ICE in the following years. Therefore this assumptions was not considered key and is kept identical in all scenarios. BEV/PHEV split: as the market matures, BEVs take up a larger proportion of the mix (it was 50%/50% in 2
42、018). See Table 1 above for the assumptions in the different scenarios, base case assumptions are the following: 2021: 55 % BEV, 45% PHEVs 2025: 60%/40% 2030: 65%/35% PHEV CO2 average (g/km, WLTP): as battery technology prices continue to fall and density increases, PHEVs are likely to see their ran
43、ge increase which gives lower type-approved CO2 emission values. The zero and low emissions vehicle (ZLEV) benchmark sets a threshold at 50gCO2/km to qualify as ZLEV (and thus earn ZLEV credits), and some national taxation systems also use this threshold. This creates an incentive for carmakers to m
44、akes PHEVs that emit less than 50g/km but doesnt incentivise them to go much lower. In 2017, the average emissions for PHEVs was around 54g/km (NEDC). See Table 1 above for the assumptions in the different scenario, base case assumption are the following: 2021: 50 g/km 2025: 45 g/km 2030: 40 g/km WL
45、TP vs. NEDC gap in 2021: 20% (as supported by car industry estimates & Get Real EU testing programme). This value is used to calculate the 2021 baseline in WLTP which will be higher than the 95gCO2/km in NEDC. In sensitivity analysis, smaller gaps are modeled (e.g. 15%, see T&E report) but the effec
46、t of this parameter is minimal. Possible gap inflation, makes the 2021 WLTP baseline higher, therefore the CO2 reduction is easier to achieve as it would be easier for carmakers to reduce their CO2 value (higher starting point) and this would lead to lower necessary EV shares to reach the same emiss
47、ion reduction. This is captured in the scenarios with high or low improvement for the ICE vehicles. ICE improvement (vs. 2021): Analysis is performed to calculate the most likely values and three scenarios are modeled (basecase, high improvement and low improvement) based on assumptions detailed bel
48、ow. The outcome of this analysis serves as inputs for the main modeling of EV shares. To model the expected CO2 emission reduction from the average ICE, the following assumptions were used: 32 Netherlands expects 12% BEV market share of new cars in 2021. Input overview Scenarios WLTP vs. NEDC gap EV share (%) BEV/PHEV split PHEV average (g/km) ICE improvement* BEV/PHEV split PHEV average (g/km) ICE improvement* BEV/PHEV split PHEV average (g/km) Base20%6%55%50 7.3%60%40 12.4%65%30 High_ICE_improvement20%6%55%50 9.5%60%40 16.0%65%30 Low_ICE_improvement20%6%55%50 4.5%60%40 7.7%65%30
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