1、Two decades since we first set out long-term growth projections for the BRI Csneconomies,we are updating and expanding those projections to cover 104countries out to 2075.We identify four major themes for the global economy:Theme#1:Slower global potential growth,led by weaker populationngrowth.Our p

2、rojections imply that global growth will average a little under 3%per year over the next ten years and will be on a gradually declining path,primarily reflecting slower labour force growth.Global population growth hashalved over the past 50 years,from 2%per year to less than 1%,and isexpected to fal

3、l to close to zero by 2075.Theme#2:EM convergence remains intact,led by Asias powerhouses.nAlthough real GDP growth has slowed in both developed and emergingeconomies,in relative terms EM growth continues to outstrip DM growth.Ourprojections imply that the worlds five largest economies in 2050(measu

4、red inreal USD)will be China,the US,I ndia,I ndonesia,and Germany(with I ndonesiadisplacing Brazil and Russia among the largest EMs).By 2075,with theappropriate policies and institutions,Nigeria,Pakistan and Egypt could be amongthe worlds largest economies.Theme#3:A decade of US exceptionalism that

5、is unlikely to be repeated.nThe USs relative performance has been stronger than expected over the pastdecade.However,history suggests it is unlikely to repeat this over the nextdecade.US potential growth remains significantly lower than that of large EMeconomies,and we expect some of the US Dollars

6、exceptional strength ofrecent years to be unwound over the next 10 years.Theme#4:Less global inequality,more local inequality.Twenty years of EMnconvergence has resulted in a more equal distribution of global incomes.However,while income inequality between countries has fallen,incomeinequality withi

7、n countries has risen.This poses a major challenge to the futureof globalisation.Kevin Daly+44(20)7774-5908| Goldman Sachs I nternational Tadas Gedminas+44(20)7051-6015| Goldman Sachs I nternationalGlobal Economics Paper The Pat h t o 2075 Sl ower Gl obal Growt h,But Convergence Remai ns Int act6 De

8、cember 2022|10:18AM GMTI nvestors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.For Reg AC certification and other important disclosures,see the Disclosure Appendix,or go to following is a redacted version of the original report published December 6,2022 45

9、pgs.1.Four Major Themes for the Global Economy 3 2.Back to the Future Lessons from the Past for What Lies Ahead 8 3.Our Long-Term Projections The Rising I mportance of Major EMs 17 4.Global I mplications Slower Global Growth,Reduced Global I nequality 27 5.I nvestment I mplications EM Unlikely to Co

10、ntinue to Underperform 31 Appendix 1:Our Methodology in Detail 33 Appendix 2:Forecast Summary 39 Bibliography 42 Disclosure Appendix 43 6 December 2022 2Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperTable of Cont ent s 1.Four Major Themes for t he Global EconomyI t is almost twenty years since we first set out

11、 long-term growth projections for the BRI Cs economies and a little over ten years since we updated and expanded those projections to cover 70 emerging(EM)and developed(DM)economies.1 Eleven years on,we are updating,expanding and extending our long-term projections,incorporating new data and new met

12、hods.Our revised projections now cover 104 countries,and we have extended our projection horizon from 2050 to 2075.I n the period since our 2011 projections,the global economy has been buf f eted by a number of secular challenges and economic shocks:disappointing productivity growth in the af termat

13、h of the Global Financial Crisis(GFC),a rise in global protectionism,the Covid-19 pandemic and,more recently,the war in Ukraine.Despite these headwinds,most of the key f eatures of both our 2003 and 2011 projections have remained intact.However,others now need to be re-visited.I n our updated projec

14、tions,we identify four major themes for the global economy:Theme#1:Slower global potential growth,led by weaker population growth.Global growth has slowed from an average of 3.6%per year in the 10 years to the Global Financial Crisis,to 3.2%per year in the decade prior to the Covid pandemic(measured

15、 on a market-weighted basis).The slowdown has been relatively broad-based,affecting both developed and emerging economies.I t has reflected a combination of both slower global population growth and weaker productivity growth,with the latter appearing to be linked to a slowdown in the pace of globali

16、sation.2 Our projections imply that we have passed the high-water mark of global potential growth,with global growth averaging 2.8%between 2024 and 2029 and on a gradually declining path thereafter(Exhibit 1).Most of this projected slowdown is due to demographics.Global population growth has halved

17、over the past 50 years,from around 2%per year to less than 1%currently,and UN population projections imply that it will fall to close to zero by 2075(Exhibit 2).While some of this slowdown had previously been anticipated,population projections are also being revised lower(the global population is no

18、w expected to peak at around 10 billion people,having previously been expected to rise to more than 11bn).This is a good problem to have,in that global population control is a necessary condition for long-term environmental sustainability.Nevertheless,this adjustment to weaker population growth and

19、ageing populations presents a number of economic challenges(most notably,from rising healthcare and retirement costs).The number of DM and EM countries for which population ageing represents a serious economic challenge is likely to rise steadily over the coming decades.1The BRI Cs acronym was coine

20、d by Jim ONeill,our former Chief Economist,in the 2001 publication(“Building Better Global Economic BRI Cs”,GS Global Economics Paper,30 November 2001).However,the first set of long-term growth projections for the BRI Cs and other economies didnt appear until 2003(“Dreaming with BRI Cs:The Path to 2

21、050”,GS Global Economics Paper,1 October 2003).These projections were then updated and extended to include 70 economies in 2011(“The BRI Cs 10 Years On:Halfway Through the Great Transformation”,GS Global Economics Paper,7 December 2011).2“I s the World Deglobalizing,Slowbalizing or Newbalizing?”,Glo

22、bal Economics Comment,18 April 2022.6 December 2022 3Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperWe thank Jan Hatzius,Andrew Tilton,Kamakshya Trivedi,Hui Shan,Andrew Matheny,Goohoon Kwon and Santanu Sengupta for their helpful comments.Theme#2:EM convergence remains intact,led by Asias powerhouses.While real

23、GDP growth has slowed in both developed and emerging economies,in relative terms EM growth continues to outstrip DM growth(Exhibit 3).The pace of this convergence has slowed slightly relative to the 2000s but is significantly faster than in the decades prior to this(when cross-country income converg

24、ence was the exception rather than the norm).Maintaining income convergence implies that the share of global GDP accounted for by EMs will continue to rise over time3;their incomes will converge slowly towards developed economy levels;and the distribution of global income will shif t towards this gr

25、owing group of middle-income economies.3The slowdown that we expect in global potential GDP growth would be larger were it not for the increasing share of global GDP accounted for by(relatively fast-growing)EMs.Exhibit 1:Global Pot ent ial Growt h on a Gradually Declining Pat h Global GDP growt h;so

26、lid line-5Y cent red average;dot t ed line-annual growt h-2-10123456-2-00202020302040205020602070PPP WeightedMarket FX WeightedGlobal GDP Growth(%)ForecastSource:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research,IMFExhibit 2:Global Populat ion Growt h Has Halved Since t he 1960s/70s

27、and The Project ed Peak Populat ion is Now Falling UN global overall populat ion and working-age populat ion project ions 23456789789101112Actual20222017UN Global Population Projections(bn)-10123-10123Population growthWorking age ratioWorking age population growth%Source:Uni t ed Nat i on

28、s(UN),Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 4Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperAlthough GDP growth disappointed our 2011 projections in the majority of economies,the pattern was far from uniform.China,I ndia,and I ndonesia all slightly outperformed our forecasts,while Russia,Br

29、azil,and Latin America more generally significantly underperformed our projections.As a consequence,we expect that the weight of global GDP will shif t(even)more towards Asia over the next 30 years.I n 2050,our projections imply that the worlds five largest economies(measured in USD)will be China,th

30、e United States,I ndia,I ndonesia,and Germany(with I ndonesia displacing Brazil and Russia among the list of largest EMs over this horizon;Exhibit 4).I f we extend the projection horizon to 2075,the prospect of rapid population growth in countries such as Nigeria,Pakistan and Egypt imply that with t

31、he appropriate policies and institutions these economies could become some of the largest in the world(Exhibit 5).Exhibit 3:Alt hough Growt h Has Slowed in Bot h DMs and EMs,EM Income Convergence Remains Int act EM vs.DM growt h comparison(LHS);scat t erplot of GDP per capit a versus gap vs.US(LHS)-

32、6-4-20246810-6-4-202468995200520045205520652075EMDMProjectionGDP Growth(%)Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment ResearchExhibit 4:Our Project ions Imply t hat China,t he Unit ed St at es,India,Indonesia,and Germany Will be t he Worlds Five Largest Economies in 2050 Worlds l

33、argest economies(measured in USD)Ranking2205020751United StatesUnited StatesUnited StatesChinaChina2JapanJapanChinaUnited StatesIndia3GermanyGermanyJapanIndiaUnited States4FranceUnited KingdomGermanyIndonesiaIndonesia5United KingdomFranceIndiaGermanyNigeria6ItalyChinaUnited KingdomJapanPa

34、kistan7ChinaItalyFranceUnited KingdomEgypt8CanadaCanadaCanadaBrazilBrazil9ArgentinaMexicoRussiaFranceGermany10SpainBrazilItalyRussiaUnited Kingdom11MexicoSpainBrazilMexicoMexico12NetherlandsKoreaKoreaEgyptJapan13IndiaIndiaAustraliaSaudi ArabiaRussia14Saudi ArabiaNetherlandsMexicoCanadaPhilippines15A

35、ustraliaAustraliaSpainNigeriaFranceSource:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 5Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperTheme#3:A decade of US exceptionalism that is unlikely to be repeated.Uniquely among large,developed economies,the US slightly outperformed our long-term real GDP

36、growth projections over the past decade.Moreover,with the Dollar also appreciating sharply over this period,the relative USD value of the US economy significantly outstripped our expectations.I t is not unusual for individual countries to significantly out-or underperform long-term projections of th

37、is type over 5-to 10-year periods indeed,other countries outperformed by more than the US.The question is whether this outperformance is likely to be repeated over the next decade.On balance,we think not.US potential growth remains significantly lower than that of large EM economies,including China

38、and(especially)I ndia.Moreover,the US Dollars exceptional strength in recent years has resulted in it rising significantly above its PPP-based fair value,and this deviation implies that it is more likely to depreciate over the coming 10 years.Theme#4:Less global inequality,more local inequality.Twen

39、ty years of EM convergence has resulted in a more equal distribution of global incomes.This has been an underappreciated benefit of globalisation over the past 20-25 years and our projections imply that it will continue.However,while income inequality between countries has fallen,income inequality w

40、ithin countries has risen.And,as governments are responsible for(and ultimately held accountable for)national rather than global developments,the global perspective is not well represented politically.This presents a major challenge to the process of globalisation.Exhibit 5:China t o Overt ake US in

41、 Around 2035,While India Should Cat ch up By 2075;EM Leaderboard t o Change Significant ly by 2075 GDP level project ions in Real(2021)USD t rillion 000080859095000554045505560657075USAEuro AreaJPNCHNINDReal US$2021 GDP trnProjection03695808590950005101520

42、2530354045505560657075BRAZAFTURMEXPAKNGAEGYRUSIDNReal US$2021 GDP trnProjectionSource:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 6Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperKey long-term risks:Protectionism and climate change.The future is uncertain,and the long-term future especially so.Of

43、the many risks to our projections,we view two as particularly important for world growth and income convergence.nFirst,the risk that populist nationalism leads to increased protectionism and areversal of globalisation.Populist nationalists have gained power in several countriesand the supply chain d

44、isruptions during the Covid pandemic have resulted in anincreased focus on on-shoring and supply chain resilience.At least to date,this hasled to a slowdown rather than a reversal of globalisation,in our assessment.However,the risk of a reversal is clear.Globalisation has been a powerful force inred

45、ucing income inequality across countries but,to ensure that it continues to do so,greater efforts need to be made to share its benefits more equally within countries.nSecond,the risk of environmental catastrophe presented by climate change.Wereject the view that economic growth and environmental sus

46、tainability areincompatible many countries have been able to de-couple economic growth fromcarbon emissions,so there is no practical reason why this should not be achievablefor the global economy as a whole.But achieving sustainable growth requireseconomic sacrifices and a globally coordinated respo

47、nse,both of which will bepolitically difficult to achieve.Exhibit 6:Cross-Count ry Inequalit y t o Cont inue Declining,While Wit hin-Count ry Inequalit y Remains High Global Lorenz Curve closer t o t he 45-degree line implies less inequalit y(LHS);GINI coefficient s for major economies(RHS)0%10%20%3

48、0%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%Share in Global GDP(%)Population Share(%)20752050202220004345252729343450520002005201020152020UKChinaGermanyIndiaUSGINI coefficientSource:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research,Worl d

49、 Bank6 December 2022 7Goldman SachsGlobal Economics Paper2.Back t o t he Fut ure Lessons from t he Past for What Lies AheadThe 10 years following the creation of the BRI Cs acronym in 2001 represented a golden era for emerging market economic and financial market outperformance.Between the early 200

50、0s and the 2007/08 Global Financial Crisis(GFC),growth was unusually strong in most economies and especially so in EMs,fuelled by exceptionally rapid globalisation.And,while the Global Financial Crisis drove developed economies into a deep and lengthy recession,the majority of EMs weathered that sto

51、rm relatively well.For most economies and in most respects,our first set of BRI Cs projections underestimated the speed of EM convergence over the subsequent 10 years.The same was not true for the 10 years after that.I n Exhibit 7 we compare actual GDP growth for the period 2010-2019 with our 2011 p

52、rojections.4 GDP growth has undershot our 2011 estimates by an average of 0.6 percentage points per year(based on a PPP-weighted average).The most notable underperformers have been Russia,Brazil,and Latin America more generally.That said,the cross-country performance has been mixed,with the worlds t

53、wo largest economies the US and China matching our projections and I ndia slightly surpassing them.4We run the comparison between 2010 and 2019(rather than between 2010 to 2020)to avoid capturing the effects of the Covid pandemic on GDP,most of which we expect to be recouped over time.6 December 202

54、2 8Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperA Smaller Gap Bet ween EM and DM Growt h To improve our projections of the future,we must first learn the lessons from the past.Exhibit 8 displays EM and DM annual GDP growth on a PPP-weighted basis since 1950.EM GDP growth only started to outstrip DM GDP growth

55、 consistently from the mid-1990s onwards.Prior to this,EM convergence was the exception rather than the rule.5 5I t is worth noting that there was no obvious pattern to our projection of hits and misses over the past 10 years.The cross-country growth performance was largely unrelated to income level

56、s(i.e.,it is not generally the case that DM countries did better on average than EM countries).Terms of trade developments were one partial differentiator:countries suffering from terms of trade deteriorations fared worse,on average.But,given the inherent uncertainty of commodity price developments,

57、it is difficult to draw lessons from this for our forecasts of future economic growth.Exhibit 7:GDP Growt h Has Averaged 0.6pp Weaker t han We Expect ed in 2011 Cross-Count ry Comparison of Forecast Errors(2010-2019,LHS);GDP Weight ed Forecast Errors(RHS)Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Res

58、earch6 December 2022 9Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperTo better understand the geographical drivers of EMs outperformance,Exhibit 9 plots GDP growth for China,emerging Asia ex.China,CEEMEA,Latin America and the DM aggregate on a 5-year rolling basis.By far the largest part of EMs GDP growth outpe

59、rformance vs.DM has been driven by Asian economies,and by China in particular.CEEMEA economies have also outperformed the DM average since 2000,albeit to a lesser extent,which represents a marked change from the late-1980s/early-1990s,when the CEEMEA region was the most prominent underperformer.6 La

60、stly,GDP growth in Latin America has fluctuated around the DM average,underperforming the DM aggregate in recent years,having outperformed in the late 2000s and early 2010s.6The collapse of the Communist regimes in Russia and CEE in 1989/1990 was the most important cause of CEEMEAs poor economic per

61、formance during this period.I n addition,growth was relatively weak in Africa and the Middle East during the 1980s and 1990s.Exhibit 8:EM Out performance Only Became t he Norm in t he lat e 1990s;The Gap Bet ween EM and DM Growt h Has Narrowed in Recent Years But Remains Subst ant ial GDP growt h ra

62、t es for EM and DM economies(solid line-5Y avg.,dot t ed line-individual years)0345678505560657075808590950005101520EMDMGDP Growth%,5Y avg.Source:IMF,The Conf erence Board,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 10Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperAsia Cont inues t o L

63、ead t he Way,But EM Convergence Has Become More Generalised Given the outsized role that Asian economies have played in the EM convergence story,it is tempting to conclude that the narrative of EM convergence is primarily,or even exclusively,a story of Asias convergence.However,convergence has becom

64、e more generalised across EMs since the turn of the century.Exhibit 10 plots average GDP per capita growth against initial GDP per capita levels for EM and DM economies across four separate decades(1980-1989,1990-1999,2000-2009,2010-2019).7 GDP per capita is measured relative to the US(US=100).We al

65、so show the population-weighted lines of best fit for all 122 economies(and separate regression lines that exclude China and I ndia).7Our sample for this comparison includes 122 DM and EM economies.We exclude GCC oil-exporting economies from our sample,due to distortions to productivity measures fro

66、m commodity price cycles.Exhibit 9:GDP Growt h in China and EM Asia Has Consist ent ly Out st ripped DM Growt h Since t he 1980s,CEEMEA Has Out performed Since 2000,While t he Performance of Lat Am Remains Mixed GDP growt h(%,5Y avg.)-3560657075808590950005101520Asia(ex.DM)ChinaLatA

67、mCEEMEADMGDP Growth(5Y avg.)Source:IMF,The Conf erence Board,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 11Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperThe 1980s and 1990s were characterised by weak average GDP per capita growth and an absence of economic convergence between developed and emerg

68、ing market economies(excluding China and I ndia,the line of best fit is slightly upward sloping,implying that relatively rich economies had faster GDP per capita growth).Among DM economies,economic growth was relatively strong in the US and Western Europe and,among EMs,growth was accelerating across

69、 East Asian economies.However,GDP per capita growth remained relatively weak in Latin America,Africa,Eastern Europe,Central Asia,and the Middle East during the 1980s and 1990s.The 2000s were characterised by strong average GDP per capita growth and income convergence between emerging market and deve

70、loped economies.While GDP per capita growth slowed in the US and Western Europe,this was more than of fset by an acceleration in Latin America,Africa,the Middle East and,in particular,in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.Growth in East Asian economies remained robust.The line of best fit of the relati

71、onship between GDP per capita growth and GDP per capita levels was strongly downward-sloping,implying that there was significant convergence between relative poor and rich economies.This is true both including and excluding China and I ndia.Over the decade prior to Covid(2010-19),there was a slowdow

72、n in average GDP per capita growth in both DM and EM economies.However,in contrast to the pre-2000 period,growth remained significantly faster in relatively poor EM economies than in relatively rich DM economies.Exhibit 10:GDP Per Capit a Growt h Has Been Fast er in Low-Income Economies t han in Hig

73、h-Income Economies,Especially Since 2000;China and India Have Displayed Rapid Convergence Scat t erplot s by decade of GDP per capit a vs.relat ive GDP per cait a t o US;bubble size-populat ion Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 12Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperThe

74、se two f eatures of the past decade ongoing convergence,but a downward shif t in average GDP per capita growth rates are evident in Exhibit 11,which displays how the relationship between GDP per capita growth and GDP per capita levels has changed over time.These two f eatures are especially relevant

75、 as we look to the future.First,there has been a generalised slowdown in economic growth in the past decade that has aff ected both DM and EM economies.Second,the process of EM-DM convergence has nevertheless remained largely intact.How rapid is this rate of convergence?Over the past two decades,GDP

76、 per capita growth in a country with 50%of the GDP per capita level of the US has been around 2.5pp higher than in an average developed economy with a productivity level close to that of the US.8 Over a 10-year period,productivity levels in such a country would rise from 50%of US levels to around 65

77、%of US levels.Slower Global Growt h Due t o Weaker Labour Force Growt h and Slowbalisat ion While EM convergence has remained intact,potential growth appears to have declined in both EM and DM economies over the past decade.As a consequence,global growth has slowed from an average of 3.6%per year in

78、 the 10 years to the Global Financial Crisis,to 3.2%per year in the decade prior to the Covid pandemic(measured on a market-weighted basis).This slowdown reflects a combination of demographic factors and a deceleration in global productivity growth.The slowdown in world labour force growth had been

79、underway since the early 1990s but the pace of this decline picked up af ter 2010.Looking forward,population projections suggest that demographics will remain a drag on global growth.8The slope of the regression line for 2000-2020 is around 0.05.Exhibit 11:GDP Per Capit a Has Converged Rapidly Since

80、 2000;But Per Capit a Growt h has Slowed Everywhere Since 2010 The relat ionship bet ween GDP per capit a growt h and GDP per capit a levels over t ime:t ot al sample(LHS);excl.China and India(RHS)Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 13Goldman SachsGlobal Economics Paper

81、The reason(s)for the deceleration in global productivity growth are more open to interpretation,with two explanations commonly proposed:A slowdown in the pace of technological progress,which is likely to be relativelynpermanent in nature and which policymakers can do little to alleviate.9A slowdown

82、in the pace of globalisation in the af termath of the Global FinancialnCrisis.I n our view,the cross-country data are more consistent with the second of these two explanations.I f the slowdown in global growth had been due to a reduction in the pace of technological innovation,one would expect it to

83、 have been f elt most acutely in the US and other economies at or close to the productivity/technological frontier.Farther away from the frontier,where there are substantial productivity gains to be made by simply implementing and replicating pre-existing technologies,one would expect productivity g

84、rowth to have continued relatively unimpeded.The fact that the slowdown has similarly af f ected EM and DM economies argues against the technological explanation.I nstead,the timing and ubiquity of the slowdown are more easily reconciled with it being caused by a stalling in the process of trade glo

85、balisation.Exhibit 12 displays global goods trade merchandise imports and exports as a share of GDP.This rose sharply from the mid-1990s to the Global Financial Crisis but has stalled since the GFC.10 9The leading proponent of the techno-pessimist view is the economic historian Robert Gordon.His arg

86、ument is essentially that,for all the technological wizardry of recent innovations(such as smart phones and social media),their contribution to productivity growth is more limited than the generation of innovations that preceded them.10We include a World ex-China series in this exhibit because devel

87、opments in Chinas trade have been sufficiently significant to materially affect the global aggregate.Chinas trade/GDP share has fallen from 64%to 34%over the past 10/15 years,reflecting its localisation strategy of onshoring a greater share of the inputs into production.Exhibit 12:Global Goods Trade

88、 Peaked as a Share of GDP in 2008 083050502025WorldWorld ex.ChinaMechandise Imports Plus Exports%of GDPCommodities super cycleGlobal financial crisisFall of the Soviet UnionEnd of Bretton WoodsEnd of WWIIEnd of WWIGreat DepressionSour

89、ce:IMF,Worl d Bank,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research,Fouqui n&Hugot (2016)6 December 2022 14Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperGlobalisation is not simply about goods trade it encapsulates the growth in the cross-border movement of goods,capital,people,technologies,data,and ideas.11 Broadl

90、y defined,we have argued that the term slowbalisation slowing growth in cross-border moves better describes trends for goods,capital,and people over the past 10-15 years than deglobalisation outright declines in cross-border flows and stocks.Nevertheless,with the period of rapid globalisation now be

91、hind us,it seems unlikely that the global economy will regain the rates of productivity growth achieved during the 2000-2010 decade.Moreover,the possibility of an outright reversal is a key risk to the global outlook.11One issue that we do not address in this piece is the increasing difficulty that

92、statisticians face in measuring GDP as output shifts away from tangible goods and towards technology and tech-related services.As technology becomes more important,these measurement issues are rising over time.Consequently,official data are likely to overstate the slowdown in productivity growth.12A

93、 key paper in this literature is Barro and Sala-i-Martin(1992),Convergence,Journal of Political Economy,Box 1:The Condit ions for Growt h Standard(neo-classical)growth theory suggests that relatively poor,low GDP per capita economies should grow at a faster rate than relatively rich,high GDP per cap

94、ita countries.This result follows directly from the assumption of diminishing marginal returns on capital:in less developed economies(where capital is scarce)the return on capital should be higher than in rich economies(where capital is plentiful);in turn,the relatively high returns on capital in le

95、ss developed economies should attract investment,increasing the capital stock and raising standards of living.However,prior to the late 1990s,cross-country studies found little evidence of poor countries growing faster than rich countries,irrespective of other factors i.e.,these studies found little

96、 evidence of absolute or generalised convergence.Rather,most studies of this type found that convergence only tends to occur among economies that exhibit certain common characteristics or conditions.12 Such convergence is said to be conditional.What conditions promote economic growth?Several ingredi

97、ents are repeatedly found to be critical13:Institutional quality:I nstitutions are broadly defined in this context to cover everything from1.well-defined property rights and fair tax systems to the consistent application of the rule of law.Simplyput,there is little incentive to invest if property ow

98、nership and/or revenues are at risk of being arbitrarilyexpropriated.14Openness to trade:Openness to trade and FDI provides access to larger markets and new technology,2.and is consistently found to be a necessary condition in driving long-term economic growth.Education:As economies grow rapidly,the

99、y require a steady supply of skilled workers,meaning that3.more years of schooling are a prerequisite for sustaining economic development.Macro stability:An unstable macro environment can hinder economic development by making future4.returns more uncertain and by distorting prices and incentives.Inf

100、rastructure quality:Transport infrastructure,reliable electricity supply and,increasingly,internet5.access are important elements in ensuring ongoing development.6 December 2022 15Goldman SachsGlobal Economics Paper100,2,223-251.13I t is also important to highlight the factors that do not appear to

101、play a role in driving long-term GDP growth.I n particular,it is difficult to discern any straightforward relationship between average tax levels and either GDP per capita levels or growth:there are rich economies with high taxes,poor economies with low taxes,and vice versa.14The importance of insti

102、tutions in economic development has been championed by the economist Daron Acemoglu.See,in particular,his 2012 book(with James Robinson)“Why Nations Fail:The Origins of Power,Prosperity,and Poverty”.While studies consistently find these conditions to be important determinants of growth,attempts to r

103、ank the relative importance of these factors of ten struggle to produce consistent results.I n our view,this is because economies need to meet a minimum threshold across a broad range of factors to successfully achieve convergence.And,until countries have met these minimum thresholds,it is not possi

104、ble to compensate for a missing factor with more of another.What explains the fact that economic convergence has become more generalised since the late 1990s?Our pref erred interpretation is that more economies began to implement the reforms required to bring about conditional convergence in other w

105、ords,the convergence is still conditional rather than absolute in nature,but the right conditions exist across more economies.6 December 2022 16Goldman SachsGlobal Economics Paper3.Our Long-Term Project ions The Rising Import ance of Major EMsEven incorporating all the lessons from past performance,

106、the risks involved in projecting far into the future remain substantial.We view the results of this process less as a forecast and more as a method of uncovering broad global dynamics and their long-term implications.Nevertheless,we think there is significant value in pinning down the main drivers o

107、f growth,gathering all the information we have on these,and incorporating that information into a coherent model.The forecast model that we use,together with the changes we have made relative to our previous projections,are discussed in Box 2 and set out in detail in an appendix.The outputs from thi

108、s exercise are based on a unified approach and,due to the absence of country-specific considerations,may dif f er from our country forecasts(although,in practice,our medium-term projections are typically close to our existing estimates of potential growth).Exhibit 13 provides a high-level summary of

109、 our projections for the major regional aggregates,broken down by decade.Because of the large swings in GDP growth generated by the Covid pandemic,the 2024-29 column provides the cleanest indication of what our model indicates for near-term potential growth.15 Our projections imply that global growt

110、h in 2024-29 will be faster than in 2020-24,but slower than in the 2010-19 decade(2.8%vs.3.2%,based on market FX weights).We project that EM growth will continue to outstrip DM(3.8%vs.1.8%),with more than half of this dif f erence due to(relatively predictable)demographic factors rather than(less pr

111、edictable)productivity growth dif f erentials.We expect Asia(ex-DM)to remain the fastest-growing region but,reflecting a marked slowdown in Chinese potential growth,it is also projected to see the largest deceleration relative to 2010-19.15We use estimated data for 2022 and GS or I MF forecasts for

112、2023.The model forecast then kicks in from 2024 and beyond.6 December 2022 17Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperExhibit 14 provides a breakdown for major economies.Our projections imply that China is undergoing a marked slowdown in potential growth(from 7.7%in 2010-19,to 4.0%in 2024-29,and 2.5%in 20

113、30-39).Most of this slowdown is driven by demographic factors,and it results in Chinas potential growth rate falling well below a number of its Asian peers(I ndia,I ndonesia,and the Philippines).Following a decade in which LatAm economies significantly underperformed their convergence potential,we e

114、xpect growth to gradually accelerate over the next 10 years before decelerating once again in the outer decades.Growth in CEEMEA is expected to remain relatively stable,aided over time by an increasing contribution from African economies.Exhibit 13:A Gradual Slowdown in Global Economic Growt h,Wit h

115、 EM Growt h Cont inuing t o Out st rip DM 2000-2009 2010-2019 2020-2029 2024-2029 2030-2039 2040-2049 2050-2059 2060-2069 2070-2079World2.73.22.42.82.52.12.01.81.7DM1.61.91.51.81.61.41.31.21.1EM5.75.13.63.83.22.62.32.11.9Asia(ex.DM)7.66.74.14.23.12.42.11.81.5CEEMEA4.83.52.63.23.33.13.02.92.7LatAm2.8

116、2.42.33.03.12.72.31.91.62000-2009 2010-2019 2020-2029 2024-2029 2030-2039 2040-2049 2050-2059 2060-2069 2070-2079World3.83.82.83.22.82.42.11.91.8DM1.61.91.41.81.61.41.21.11.1EM6.05.23.64.03.42.82.52.22.0Asia(ex.DM)7.66.64.24.43.32.62.21.91.6CEEMEA5.03.52.93.43.53.33.13.02.8LatAm3.02.52.33.03.12.72.3

117、1.91.62000-2009 2010-2019 2020-2029 2024-2029 2030-2039 2040-2049 2050-2059 2060-2069 2070-2079World4.12.12.74.23.62.92.52.32.0DM2.40.51.12.32.01.61.41.31.1EM8.95.04.56.24.93.83.12.72.3Asia(ex.DM)9.87.54.96.64.83.52.82.42.0CEEMEA10.62.34.65.95.44.43.83.53.2LatAm5.31.83.05.14.63.73.02.41.9Market FX W

118、eightedPPP WeightedReal US$GrowthSource:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 18Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperExhibit 4 and Exhibit 5 combine our GDP projections with our long-term real exchange rate projections,to project the real US Dollar value of major economies over ti

119、me.Our projections imply that China will overtake the US economy as the worlds largest economy around 2035.This is around 10 years later than our 2011 projections,primarily reflecting the downward revisions we have made to Chinese potential growth.Given the recent pessimism around Chinas growth pros

120、pects,some readers may be surprised that we expect China to overtake the US even at this horizon.However,three points are worth bearing in mind in this regard:First,China has already closed most of the gap with US GDP(Chinas GDP has risen from 12%of the US in 2000 to a little under 80%currently).Sec

121、ond,despite significant downward revisions,potential growth in China remains significantly higher than the US on our revised estimates(4.0%vs.1.9%for 2024-29).Third,in addition to dif f erences in potential growth,we expect some of the US Dollars real overvaluation vs.the Chinese Yuan to be unwound

122、over the next 10-15 years.I n 2050,we project that the worlds five largest economies will be China,the United States,I ndia,I ndonesia,and Germany(with I ndonesia displacing Brazil and Russia among the list of largest EMs over this horizon).Exhibit 14:Real GDP Growt h Project ions for Major Economie

123、s by Decade Real GDP growt h project ions(Market FX weight ed)2000-2009 2010-2019 2020-2029 2024-2029 2030-2039 2040-2049 2050-2059 2060-2069 2070-2079World2.73.22.42.82.52.12.01.81.7DM1.61.91.51.81.61.41.31.21.1 United States1.92.31.71.91.71.51.41.31.2 Germany0.82.00.71.21.31.10.90.91.0 Japan0.51.2

124、0.60.90.80.70.70.60.5 United Kingdom1.62.01.42.01.91.61.51.31.2 Canada2.12.31.72.12.01.91.71.61.6 Australia3.12.62.32.52.42.11.81.71.5Asia(ex.DM)7.66.74.14.23.12.42.11.81.5 China10.37.74.24.02.51.61.10.90.5 India6.96.95.05.84.63.73.12.52.1 Indonesia5.35.43.84.33.63.02.62.32.0 Korea4.93.32.01.91.40.8

125、0.3-0.1-0.2 Thailand4.33.61.92.82.41.91.41.10.9 Philippines4.56.44.46.04.94.13.53.12.7CEEMEA4.83.52.63.23.33.13.02.92.7 Russia5.52.10.31.21.61.21.21.31.1 Turkey4.05.94.23.52.92.11.71.41.1 Saudi Arabia3.53.52.82.93.22.52.01.71.4 Poland3.93.72.83.31.91.10.70.50.4 Egypt5.04.44.74.85.34.43.83.22.7 South

126、 Africa3.61.71.82.83.63.42.92.62.2LatAm2.82.42.33.03.12.72.31.91.6 Brazil3.41.41.92.42.82.52.11.71.5 Mexico1.52.71.83.03.02.62.21.71.4 Argentina2.61.42.63.33.12.62.21.81.5 Colombia3.93.73.43.43.32.72.21.71.4 Chile4.23.32.12.32.42.01.61.41.2 Peru5.04.53.34.24.03.52.92.52.1Real GDP Growth Projections(

127、%)Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 19Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperI f we extend the projection horizon to 2075,the worlds three largest economies are China,I ndia and the US,with I ndia(just)overtaking the US.I nterestingly,US potential GDP growth is expected t

128、o be materially faster than Chinas at that horizon,as a result of its better demographic outlook.The prospect of rapid population growth in countries such as Nigeria,Pakistan and Egypt imply that with the appropriate policies and institutions these economies could become some of the largest in the w

129、orld.16 Exhibit 17 sets out our 2075 GDP level projections,broken down by population and GDP per capita levels.Two points are notable:First,there is a large gap between the largest three economies(China,I ndia and thenUS)and all other economies(although the Euro area represents a fourth economicsupe

130、rpower,if it is treated as a single economy).Thus,although I ndonesia,Nigeriaand Pakistan are projected to be fourth,fif th,and sixth in the 2075 GDP rankings,16Note that this is true despite our projections factoring in a slower rate of absolute convergence than our 2003 or 2011 projections.Exhibit

131、 15:Our Project ions Imply t hat China,t he Unit ed St at es,India,Indonesia,and Germany Will be t he Worlds Five Largest Economies in 2050 Worlds largest economies(measured in USD)Ranking2205020751United StatesUnited StatesUnited StatesChinaChina2JapanJapanChinaUnited StatesIndia3Germany

132、GermanyJapanIndiaUnited States4FranceUnited KingdomGermanyIndonesiaIndonesia5United KingdomFranceIndiaGermanyNigeria6ItalyChinaUnited KingdomJapanPakistan7ChinaItalyFranceUnited KingdomEgypt8CanadaCanadaCanadaBrazilBrazil9ArgentinaMexicoRussiaFranceGermany10SpainBrazilItalyRussiaUnited Kingdom11Mexi

133、coSpainBrazilMexicoMexico12NetherlandsKoreaKoreaEgyptJapan13IndiaIndiaAustraliaSaudi ArabiaRussia14Saudi ArabiaNetherlandsMexicoCanadaPhilippines15AustraliaAustraliaSpainNigeriaFranceSource:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment ResearchExhibit 16:China t o Overt ake US Around 2035,While India Should Ca

134、t ch up By 2075;EM Leaderboard t o Change Significant ly by 2075 GDP level project ions in Real(2021)USD t rillion 000080859095000554045505560657075USAEuro AreaJPNCHNINDReal US$2021 GDP trnProjection0369580859095000554045505560657075BRAZAFTURMEX

135、PAKNGAEGYRUSIDNReal US$2021 GDP trnProjectionSource:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 20Goldman SachsGlobal Economics Papereach of them are projected to be less that one-third of the size of China,I ndia and the US.Second,while China and I ndia are projected to be larger tha

136、n the US by 2075,ournprojections imply that the US will remain more than twice as rich as both(and fivetimes as rich as countries such as Nigeria and Pakistan).Exhibit 18 sets out a decomposition of our growth projections by factor for the US,China,Brazil,and South Africa.Growth is projected to slow

137、 over time in most economies,owing to a smaller contribution from labour force growth,but this decline is expected to be particularly marked in China.Brazil and South Africas exceptionally weak performance in the past 10-15 years is expected to be partially reversed over time,as the significantly ne

138、gative contribution from productivity momentum is assumed to wane.Exhibit 17:China and India are Project ed t o be Larger t han t he US by 2075,But t he US Will Remain More t han Twice as Rich as Bot h Real GDP levels,populat ion and GDP per capit a at 2075 5752588877700Real GD

139、P trn US$20211.01.70.40.30.50.50.20.20.1 0.10.10.10.10.20.10.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.41.61.8RestWorking-AgePopulation(bn)55k31k132k43k27k 27k55k41k112k107k56k88k57k37k103k020406080100120140Real GDP ths US$2021 per capitaSource:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 21Goldman SachsGl

140、obal Economics PaperI n Exhibit 19 we compare our updated projections with our 2011 forecasts.I n almost all cases our projections are less optimistic than they were 11 years ago.However,the downward revisions are generally larger for LatAm economies than for Asia,while the pattern is mixed in CEEME

141、A(with large downward revisions in Russia and South Africa,but relatively limited revisions to projected growth in Poland and Turkey).Exhibit 18:Gradual Growt h Decline For Most Economies:Demographics a Large Drag for China,While Brazil and Sout h Africas Except ionally Weak Performance is Expect ed

142、 t o be Part ially Reversed Decomposit ion of growt h project ions by fact or Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 22Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperExhibit 19:Less Opt imist ic on t he Fut ure:A Decadal Analysis of Updat ed vs 2011 Forecast s for Average GDP Growt h

143、Rat es Old Forecast s are in bracket s,2010-2019 dat a refer t o realised growt h;Shading reflect s t he degree t o which forecast s/out t urns deviat e from previous project ions -20-2049DM United States2.3(2.2)1.7(2.1)1.7(2.2)1.5(2.2)Japan1.2(1.8)0.6(1.8)0.8(1.4)0.7(1.3

144、)Germany2(2)0.7(1.4)1.3(1.3)1.1(1.6)United Kingdom2(2.6)1.4(2.7)1.9(2.4)1.6(2.3)Australia2.6(3.3)2.3(3)2.4(2.8)2.1(2.5)Canada2.3(2.8)1.7(2.4)2(2.4)1.9(2.4)Asia China7.7(7.5)4.2(5.4)2.5(3.5)1.6(2.9)India6.9(6.9)5(6)4.6(5.7)3.7(5.1)Indonesia5.4(6)3.8(5.6)3.6(5)3(4.4)Korea3.3(3.4)2(2.2)1.4(1.7)0.8(1.5)

145、Thailand3.6(5.1)1.9(4.4)2.4(3.7)1.9(3.3)Philippines6.4(6.8)4.4(6.9)4.9(6.4)4.1(5.8)CEEMEA Russia2.1(5.3)0.3(4)1.6(2.8)1.2(1.8)Turkey5.9(5.4)4.2(4.7)2.9(3.9)2.1(3.1)Saudi Arabia3.5(4.7)2.8(4.6)3.2(4.1)2.5(3.1)Poland3.7(4.1)2.8(3.3)1.9(2.8)1.1(1.8)Egypt4.4(6.4)4.7(6.1)5.3(5.4)4.4(4.5)South Africa1.7(3

146、.8)1.8(3.8)3.6(4)3.4(3.8)LatAm Brazil1.4(5.4)1.9(4.7)2.8(4)2.5(3.1)Mexico2.7(5)1.8(4.6)3(3.9)2.6(3.2)Argentina1.4(4.8)2.6(4.1)3.1(3.8)2.6(3.1)Colombia3.7(5.1)3.4(4.9)3.3(4.3)2.7(3.8)Chile3.3(4.5)2.1(3.9)2.4(3.4)2(3)Peru4.5(5.8)3.3(5.3)4(4.6)3.5(3.9)Real GDP Growth Projections ComparisonSource:Gol dm

147、an Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 23Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperBox 2:Our Modelling Framework We use a simple but ef f ective model of economic growth in our projections,which we first introduced in 2003 and which we discuss in detail in the Appendix.I n this model,potentia

148、l GDP growth is a function of the number of people in the workforce,the amount of capital they have to work with and technical progress.I n addition to this growth process,we project that less developed countries can grow richer in part as their exchange rates appreciate towards purchasing power par

149、ity(PPP)levels.As part of our new projections,we have refined the details of each of these channels,drawing lessons from the experience of the past decade and before.These changes make the projections more intuitive and empirically plausible,without changing the basic elements.The main components ar

150、e:Labour Force Growth.Our labour force forecasts are based on United Nations population projections.nHowever,where we previously took growth in the working age population(those aged 15-64)as anapproximation for labour force growth,we now adjust for the fact that the link between working agepopulatio

151、n ratios and labour force participation ratios is far from one-to-one,because people tend toretire later as populations age.This adjustment is based on the historical relationship between changesin working age ratios and employment and,all else equal,it has the ef f ect of boosting projected labourf

152、orce growth in countries with ageing populations.Capital Accumulation.We explicitly calculate country-specific initial capital stock levels and modelneach countrys investment rate as a function of demographics and its own history,which allows forinvestment rates to vary over time.As previously,we us

153、e the fact that investment rates appear to belinked to dependency ratios the higher the share of working-age population relative to the young andthe elderly,the higher the investment rates.Exhibit 20:Labour Force Part icipat ion Is Weakly Relat ed t o Working-Age Populat ion Rat e,Which Implies Smal

154、ler Drag in Project ions Change in working-age rat io vs.change in employment rat io(bet ween 2000 and 2019,LHS);labour force cont ribut ion t o growt h in project ions(RHS)Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research,The Conf erence Board6 December 2022 24Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperTe

155、chnical Progress.We model technical progress(or total-factor productivity(TFP)growth)as anprocess of catch-up/convergence to the technological frontier,which we assume to be the US.For eachcountry,the pace of convergence reflects a combination of both absolute and conditional convergencefactors.Abso

156、lute convergence is modelled as a decreasing function of GDP per capita levels relative tothe US.The absolute convergence term is fitted to the cross-country experience over the past 40 yearsand lower than in our previous projections.For conditional convergence,we previously modelled thisexplicitly

157、as a function of economic,political and social factors in each country(as captured by ourGrowth Environment Scores(GES).However,we found that the out-of-sample performance of thesescores as predictors of future convergence was poor.We therefore take a more agnostic view of whichconditions are necess

158、ary to drive convergence and instead draw inf erence from the performance ofproductivity itself:while it is dif ficult to identify in real time whether the right factors are in place todrive future convergence,each countrys recent productivity performance reveals a lot about whether ithas the right

159、factors in place today.Consistent with this observation,we find that convergencemomentum plays an important role in determining future convergence(i.e.,if a country had theconditions in place to successfully converge over the previous decade,we find that it typically displaysa higher pace of converg

160、ence over the subsequent decade,all else equal).This momentum factor isthen modelled to decay over time.Exchange Rate Trends.We model real exchange rates as a function of relative productivity growthndif f erentials(the Balassa-Samuelson ef f ect),while also taking account of a countrys deviation fr

161、om PPPat the starting point.I n our model,a countrys real exchange rate path is determined by two processes:Exhibit 21:Invest ment Rat es Modelled as a Funct ion of Past Invest ment Rat es and Changing Demographics Act ual and project ed invest ment rat es(%of GDP)for select ed economies Source:Gol

162、dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research,IMFExhibit 22:We Model Technical Growt h as a Funct ion of Absolut e Convergence and Convergence Moment um Decomposit ion of t echnical product ivit y growt h relat ive t o US Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 25Goldman SachsGlo

163、bal Economics Paper(1)convergence towards its PPP equilibrium rate as it grows richer;and(2)convergence towardsthe normal deviation from PPP for a given relative income level(based on the historical andcross-sectional data).Over the past 10 years this model has worked relatively well,with one verypr

164、ominent exception:the US Dollar itself.However,the fact that the Dollar has been stronger overthe past 10 years than its PPP exchange rate would predict implies that it is more likely todepreciate over the coming 10 years.Exhibit 23:Exchange Rat es Have Converged Towards Their PPP Values,But Much Le

165、ss so vs.t he USD Realised vs.predict ed real FX forecast s(vs.USD and on t rade-weight ed basis,LHS);project ed real FX pat h(RHS,crosses are hist orical 10Y moving avg.pat hs)Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 26Goldman SachsGlobal Economics Paper4.Global Implicat io

166、ns Slower Global Growt h,Reduced Global Inequalit yGlobal growth has slowed from an average of 3.6%per year in the 10 years to the Global Financial Crisis,to 3.2%per year in the decade prior to the Covid pandemic,and the slowdown has been relatively broad-based.Our projections imply that global grow

167、th will average 2.8%between 2024 and 2029 and will be on a gradually declining path.Declining Global Populat ion Growt h A Good Problem t o Have The most important factor in this decline is demographics.Global population growth has halved over the past 50 years,from around 2%per year to less than 1%

168、currently,and UN population projections imply that it will fall to close to zero by 2075(Exhibit 24).While some of this slowdown had previously been anticipated,population projections are also being revised lower(the global population is now expected to peak at around 10 billion people,having previo

169、usly been expected to rise to more than 11bn).I n making its long-term population projections,the UN tends to be relatively conservative in incorporating recent demographic trends.Fertility rates f ell sharply in many economies during the Covid pandemic and have only partially recovered since then.I

170、 n our view,this skews the risks around the UNs projections to the downside.This slowdown in population growth is a good problem to have,in that global population control is a necessary condition for long-term environmental sustainability.Nevertheless,the adjustment to weaker population growth and a

171、geing populations presents economic challenges(most notably,from rising healthcare and retirement costs).The number of DM and EM countries for which population ageing represents a serious economic challenge is likely to rise steadily over the coming decades.Exhibit 24:Global Populat ion Growt h Has

172、Halved Since t he 1960s/70s and The Project ed Peak Populat ion is Now Falling UN global overall populat ion and working-age populat ion project ions 23456789789101112Actual20222017UN Global Population Projections(bn)-10123-10123Population growthWorking age ratioWorking age population gro

173、wth%Source:Uni t ed Nat i ons(UN),Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 27Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperReduced Global Inequalit y,Increased Local Inequalit y Between 2000 and 2022 there has been a significant reduction in global inequality reflected in a flattening of the

174、global Lorenz curve17 due to the income convergence of relatively poor economies.Our projections imply that income convergence will result in the curve becoming significantly less arched by 2050,as a growing group of middle-income countries account for a much larger share of global GDP(Exhibit 25).T

175、his is a surprising result for many and runs counter to the perception that globalisation has and will continue to drive rising inequality.18 These two views can be reconciled by the fact that,while income inequality between economies has been falling,income inequality within most economies has rise

176、n since the late 1970s.Moreover,these two trends are likely to be at least partly linked:globalisation has resulted in the increased integration of large EMs with large amounts of(relatively unskilled)labour and limited capital into the global economy,pushing up the price of labour in EMs but pushin

177、g down the price of unskilled labour in DM economies.Because political choices are set locally rather than globally,the rise in inequality at a national level presents a major policy challenge to the process of globalisation.17The Lorenz curve is constructed by mapping out the share of global GDP ac

178、counted for by the share of population of countries as we move from poorest to richest.The more bowed the curve is,the more unequal the distribution.The Gini coefficient the most used measure of income inequality measures the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line of perfect equality.1

179、8We first discussed this phenomenon in“The Expanding Middle:The Exploding World Middle Class and Falling Global I nequality”,Global Economics Paper,7 July 2008.19“How Fast Does the World Grow?”,GS Global Economics Analyst,27 October 2021.Exhibit 25:Cross-Count ry Inequalit y t o Cont inue Declining,

180、While Wit hin-Count ry Inequalit y Remains High Global Lorenz Curve closer t o t he 45-degree line implies less inequalit y(LHS);GINI coefficient s for major economies(RHS)0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%Share in Global GDP(%)Population Share(%)207520502022200019802

181、5272934345252729343450520002005201020152020UKChinaGermanyIndiaUSGINI coefficientSource:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research,OECDBox 3:How Fast Does t he World Grow?How fast does the world grow?The answer depends very much on how one weights countrie

182、s together to calculate global growth.19 Because countries report GDP in local currencies,it is not possible to sum the levels of GDP across a 6 December 2022 28Goldman SachsGlobal Economics Paper20A separate reason why the gap between global GDP growth calculated using PPP-based weights and market-

183、based weights has shrunk is because PPP exchange rates are now closer to market rates(i.e.,the weighting schemes are now more similar).number of countries(unless those countries use a common currency,as is the case in the Euro area).Rather,aggregate growth rates are calculated by weighting each coun

184、trys growth rate,with weights that reflect the relative size of economies.To calculate these weights,each countrys GDP needs to be converted into a common currency(in practice,the US Dollar).But what exchange rates should one use to make this conversion?Two dif f erent methodologies are typically us

185、ed:nOne approach is to use purchasing power parity(PPP)exchange rates,which calculate the rate atwhich the currency of one country would have to be converted into that of another country to buy thesame amount of goods and services in each country.PPP-based weights adjust for the fact that goodsand s

186、ervices are typically cheaper in relatively poor economies than in rich economies.For this reason,PPP-based weights are better designed to capture the welfare implications of global growth.nThe second approach is to use market exchange rates to convert each countrys GDP into a commoncurrency.This ap

187、proach makes no adjustment for differences in spending power across economies butthe weights accurately reflect the Dollar value of each economys GDP.For this reason,market FXweights are the more appropriate methodology from the perspective of financial markets and this is theweighting scheme that w

188、e now use in calculating global and regional aggregates.I mportantly,PPP-based exchange rates,in adjusting for cost of living dif f erences across economies,give a larger weighting to relatively poor(i.e.,EM and Frontier)economies than market-based weights.And,because EMs and Frontier economies have

189、 grown faster than DMs since the mid-1990s,global GDP growth calculated using PPP-based weights has been higher than growth calculated using market-based weights.Exhibit 26 compares the 5-year rolling averages of global GDP growth calculated using market-and PPP-based weights.The gap between the two

190、 measures increased to more than 1pp per year during the BRI Cs boom period(2000-2010)but has since fallen back.20 Between 2010 and 2019,global GDP growth calculated using market-based weights averaged 3.2%vs.3.8%using PPP-based weights.6 December 2022 29Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperKey Long-T

191、erm Risks:Prot ect ionism and Climat e Change Of the many risks to our projections,we view two as particularly important for world growth and income convergence.nFirst,the risk that populist nationalism leads to increased protectionism and areversal of globalisation.Populist nationalists have gained

192、 power in several countriesand the supply chain disruptions during the Covid pandemic have resulted in anincreased focus on on-shoring and supply chain resilience.At least to date,this hasled to a slowdown rather than a reversal of globalisation,in our assessment.However,the risk of a reversal is cl

193、ear.Globalisation has been a powerful force inreducing income inequality across countries but,to ensure that it continues to do so,greater efforts need to be made to share its benefits more equally within countries.nSecond,the risk of environmental catastrophe presented by climate change.Wereject th

194、e view that economic growth and environmental sustainability areincompatible many countries have been able to de-couple economic growth fromcarbon emissions,so there is no practical reason why this should not be achievablefor the global economy as a whole.But achieving sustainable growth requireseco

195、nomic sacrifices and a globally coordinated response,both of which will bepolitically difficult to achieve.This risk is especially relevant to the long-termeconomic outlook of low-income economies with geographies that are especiallyexposed to climate change.With limited financial means to protect t

196、hemselvesagainst the costs of climate change,out-migration from these economies coulddampen the demographic shifts that are projected to drive GDP growth.Exhibit 26:PPP-Based Weight s Typically Show Higher Global Growt h t han Market-Based Weight s Global GDP growt h using PPP and market-based weigh

197、t s 05605201020152020PPP WeightedMarket FX WeightedGlobal GDP Growth(%)Source:IMF,Worl d Bank,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 30Goldman SachsGlobal Economics Paper5.Invest ment Implicat ions EM Unlikely t o Cont inue t o UnderperformI n the

198、 period since our 2011 projections,GDP growth in EM economies has continued to outperform DM growth,albeit to a lesser extent than was the case in the 2000-10 decade.Yet,despite this growth outperformance,EM total equity returns have significantly underperformed DM equity returns in the past decade,

199、having significantly outperformed in the previous decade(Exhibit 27).What accounts for this underperformance over the past decade,and is it likely to be sustained over the next decade?I n our view,there are three contributing factors,only one of which is likely to continue to apply in the coming dec

200、ade:Financial markets reward and penalise unanticipated shifts in trends but are1.indiff erent to the predictable continuation of trends.The significantoutperformance of EM economies in the 2000s represented a marked shif t relativeto previous decades,surprising market participants in the process an

201、d resulting insignificant EM asset price outperformance.Although EM economies have continuedto outgrow DM economies over the past decade,they have done so by less than inthe 2000s,undershooting expectations in the process and contributing to EM assetprice underperformance.Now,however,following more

202、than a decade ofunderperformance,EM equity valuations look unusually cheap,both in absoluteterms and(especially)relative to their DM peers.21 This suggests that the bar forpositive surprises is lower than it was a decade ago(Exhibit 27).21Whether EM equities should trade at a P/E premium or a discou

203、nt to DM equities ultimately depends on the balance between the potential for superior earnings growth in EMs(which argues for a premium)vs.the additional risk/volatility associated with that growth(which argues for a discount).I n practice,apart from a brief period during the Global Financial Crisi

204、s,EM equities have traded at a significant discount to DM equities since the turn of the century.Exhibit 27:EM Equit y Ret urns Have Exceeded DM Ret urns Significant ly Over Time,But There Have Also Been Two Ext ended Periods of Underperformance MSCI EM Equit y Prices and Tot al Ret urns Relat ive t

205、 o MSCI World Developed Index 05003003504004500500300350400450707274767880828486889092949698000204060802224Total ReturnsPre-1987 Price EstimatePrice Index1987=100Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research,Ei kon Dat ast ream,Bl oomberg6 December 2022 31Goldma

206、n SachsGlobal Economics Paper2.Equity earnings growth is a function of both changes and levels of growth.Because margins are cyclical,earnings growth is as much a function of changes inGDP growth as it is a function of the level of GDP growth.One reason why EMequity earnings have underperformed DM e

207、quity earnings since 2010 is that,whileEM GDP growth has outpaced DM,it has done so by less than was the casebetween 2000 and 2010.We expect EM GDP outperformance to stabilise in thecoming years relative to DMs,contributing to a stronger EM EPS performance.3.EM earnings outperform by less than GDP,e

208、ven in the long run.I n previousresearch we analysed the long-term relationship between GDP and earnings growthacross EM and DM economies and found evidence that earnings growth for a givenrate of GDP growth is lower in EMs than in DMs.22 A key reason for this is that,while Foreign Direct I nvestmen

209、t(FDI)from DM to EM economies is an importantdriver of EM GDP growth,the earnings from that investment are repatriated back tothe DM investor companies(i.e.,the output of the investment counts as EM GDPbut the earnings from that investment are recorded as DM earnings).Nevertheless,although EM earnin

210、gs growth has failed to keep pace with its GDP outperformance,over longer horizons EM earnings have still outperformed significantly.Over the35-year history of the MSCI EM index,EM EPS growth(in real US Dollars)hasaveraged+5.0%per year vs.+2.7%in DM.Following more than a decade of DM equities outper

211、forming EM equities,one of ten hears that this trend(and US equity outperformance,in particular)represents a fixed fact.However,as Exhibit 27 shows,EM equities have tended to outperform over the very long run,and the past decade has been an exception rather than the norm.More specifically,there are

212、also reasons to believe that the factors that drove DM equity outperformance over the past decade are unlikely to persist over the next.22“EM Long-Term Growth and Equity Earnings Stronger Growth,(Somewhat)Better Earnings”,EM Macro Themes,25 May 2019.Exhibit 28:EM Equit ies Trade at a Discount t o DM

213、 Equit ies,Despit e St ronger Growt h Prospect s MSCI EM and MSCI World(DM)P/E Rat ios,Absolut e and Relat ive 0.40.60.81.01.21.41.61.88789903050709123MSCI-EM vs.DM P/E RatioRelative P/E ratio055404505540458789903050709123MSCI World(D

214、M)MSCI EMP/E ratioSource:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research,Ei kon Dat ast ream,Bl oomberg6 December 2022 32Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperAppendix 1:Our Met hodology in Det ail I n this section we describe in more detail our modeling approach and assumptions for constructing long-run p

215、rojections.The basic framework is identical to that set out in our original BRI Cs projections and our 2011 update.However,we have adjusted how we model the main inputs into that model labour,capital and TFP(Total Factor Productivity)to reflect new empirical observations and academic findings.The st

216、arting point is a simple Cobb-Douglas model of economic growth that is common in the academic literature,where GDP(Y)is a function of labour(L)and capital inputs(K),and level of technological progress(A).GDP growth is then simply a function of the growth rates of the inputs and productivity(technica

217、l)growth.I n the academic growth literature,some researchers expand this basic equation further,for example by explicitly modelling labour quality improvements(e.g.,via increasing educational attainment)or factoring in ef f ective utilisation of resources.However,for our purposes,we stick to the sim

218、pler formulation,as it provides a more parsimonious model of the main drivers of growth and experience suggests there is no forecasting advantage from breaking the inputs into narrower sub-components.Labour Force As before,we use the United Nations(UN)demographic projections in modeling labour input

219、s.The UN projections were last updated in August 2022 and they provide age-and gender-specific demographic projections for all countries to 2099.Previously,to link this to GDP growth,we assumed that labour grew in line with working-age population(15-64).This implicitly assumed that the share of work

220、ing-age people and participation in the labour force followed a one-to-one relationship.Over the past 20 years,however,we have found that employment rates as a share of total population have largely outperformed changes in working-age population ratios specifically,we find that a decline in the work

221、ing-age population ratio of 1pp was typically associated with a decline in the employment ratio of only 0.25pp(Exhibit 29,LHS).6 December 2022 33Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperOne of the main reasons for this is that,as lif e expectancy and health outcomes improve,people can choose to retire lat

222、er and therefore extend their participation in the labour force.For this reason,growth in the working-age population becomes too restrictive and pessimistic an assumption for labour force growth.23 Therefore,when modelling labour input growth,we take the growth rate of population above 15 years old,

223、and adjust the working-age population ratio impact by the empirical relationship.Ef f ectively,this implies that our labour input is modelled as:I n practice,this implies that the drag from deteriorating demographics in the projections is smaller for economies with ageing populations(Exhibit 29,RHS)

224、.Capit al and Invest ment We model the change in capital inputs as before,with the contribution to growth from capital depending on i)the initial stock of capital at the start of the projections,and ii)investment rates.Measuring the stock of capital and its ef f ective use is notoriously dif ficult.

225、While there some sources that provide annual estimates across countries(e.g.,Conf erence Board,Penn World Tables),we instead make our own estimates of capital 23Effective retirement ages(i.e.,the age at which workers actually exit the workforce on average)are typically much lower than statutory reti

226、rement ages.Much of the increase in effective retirement rates observed in the past 20 years across countries has come from a reduction in the early retirement rate,rather than from an extension of working lives beyond the statutory retirement age.Exhibit 29:Working-Age Populat ion and Employment We

227、akly Relat ed;Our New Assumpt ions Imply Smaller Drag on Growt h From Demographics Changes in working-age and employment rat ios(vs.t ot al populat ion),bet ween 2000-2019(LHS);comparison of labour impact on growt h under previous and new assumpt ions Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Resear

228、ch,Uni t ed Nat i ons(UN),The Conf erence Board6 December 2022 34Goldman SachsGlobal Economics Paperstock using what is ref erred to in the literature as an inventory-based approach.This relies on determining the initial stock of capital by assuming that capital stock(K)at the start depends on inves

229、tment(I),growth of capital(g)and the depreciation rate(delta):We then model total capital stock as a function of investment and depreciation rates:As discussed in the 2011 projections,a number of economies(notably,those that went through a post-communist transition),experienced episodes of significa

230、nt reductions in their capital stock.While this introduces complexities in accurately accounting for historical growth developments,the importance of the initial stock of capital declines over time and is thus less relevant in determining capital stock levels in our projections(Exhibit 30).This owes

231、 to the fact that,if the capital stock was underestimated at the starting period,the depreciation rate would penalise capital too little,and capital stock would rise more quickly,and vice versa if the capital stock was overestimated.The longer the period we use in calculating the capital stock,the l

232、ess important the initial capital stock calculation becomes.The second part of modelling capital input is the investment rate.Here we keep the previous modelling approach of assuming that investment rates depend on the dependency ratios(i.e.,the larger the share of children and the elderly in the po

233、pulation,the lower the investment rate).The only deviation from the previous approach is that we update sensitivities based on the empirical experience of the past 11 years.Exhibit 30:Wit h More Observat ions,t he Capit al-t o-Out put Rat ios Are Less Dependent on Init ial Capit al St ock Assumpt io

234、ns Hist ogram of est imat e capit al-t o-out put (K/Y)rat ios in 2019(LHS);est imat ed capit al-t o-out put rat ios under different init ial capit al st ock assumpt ions for Poland Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 35Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperProduct ivit y a

235、nd Convergence The last,but arguably most important,component in our growth modelling is technical progress or Total Factor Productivity growth,which we express as a function of i)absolute convergence,and ii)conditional convergence.As before,absolute convergence is modelled as a function of the dist

236、ance from the productivity frontier,which we assume to be the US,with countries with relatively low GDP per capita levels displaying faster productivity growth,all else equal.This term is fitted to the cross-country experience over the past 40 years and lower than in our previous projections.Previou

237、sly,we modelled conditional convergence as a function of a growth-friendly environment,which we measured using our proprietary Growth Environment Scores(GES).However,while the GES scores were relatively good at explaining past cross-country dif f erences in productivity growth,we found that their ex

238、 ante predictive power of future productivity growth was poor.Given the dif ficulties in identifying ex ante which factors are likely to determine future productivity growth,we now take a more agnostic approach and instead draw inf erence from the performance of productivity itself:while it is dif f

239、icult to identify in real time whether the right factors are in place to drive future convergence,each countrys recent productivity performance reveals a good deal about whether it has the right factors in place today.Consistent with this observation,we find that convergence momentum plays an import

240、ant role in determining future convergence(i.e.,if a country had the conditions in place to successfully converge over the previous decade,we find that it typically displays a higher pace of convergence over the subsequent decade,all else equal).Relative to the absolute convergence benchmark,our mod

241、el allows for countries to either be rewarded or penalised based on their recent productivity performance.This momentum factor then decays exponentially with a half-lif e of five years.Among the largest economies,at the start of our projections,the most positive convergence momentum was for I ndia a

242、nd China.By contrast,the most negative convergence momentum was by Brazil and South Africa(Exhibit 31).6 December 2022 36Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperExchange rat es I n modelling the level of GDP in real US Dollars,we also need to reflect the impact of real exchange rate changes over time.As

243、previously,we continue to think of long-term changes in exchange rates as being primarily a function of relative productivity growth dif f erentials.The idea is that countries exchange rates tend to approach their PPP equilibrium values as they grow richer over time(otherwise known as the Balassa-Sa

244、muelson ef f ect).Furthermore,we also factor in the deviation of exchange rates relative to predicted PPP levels.One important example where this modelling plays a significant role in our projections is China.Over time,we expect Chinas real exchange to appreciate,both because it isgrowing richer and

245、 because its current deviation from its PPP value is larger than onewould expect given its relative income level(i.e.,it is more undervalued relative to PPPthan other countries at a similar income level).Over the past 10 years,using PPP rates to forecast long-term real exchange rates in this way has

246、 worked well,but with one very important exception:the US Dollar itself(Exhibit 32).However,it is not unusual for individual exchange rates to deviate in this way over 5-or 10-year periods it just seems more notable when that country is the US.While we do not expect a reversal of the US Dollars stre

247、ngth in the short term,history suggests that a partial reversal(at least)is likely over the longer-term horizons(5 years)that are the focus of our projections.We therefore continue to think that the underlying framework is the right way to think about future changes in real exchange rates.Exhibit 31

248、:Our Convergence Framework Rewards Count ries That Have Out performed in t he Last 10 Years,and Penalises Underperformers Decomposit ion of product ivit y growt h relat ive t o US by different fact ors Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 37Goldman SachsGlobal Economics

249、PaperMore formally,real exchange rate appreciation is modelled as:Practically,this means that real exchange rates appreciate steadily over time,where the initial misalignments are low,but much faster or slower depending on the extent of the misalignment.Exhibit 32:Previous Model Has Done Reasonably

250、Well Aft er Adjust ing for Dollar Effect s Realised vs.predict ed real FX forecast s(vs.USD and on t rade-weight ed basis,LHS);project ed real FX pat h(RHS,crosses are hist orical 10Y moving avg.pat hs)Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 38Goldman SachsGlobal Economics

251、PaperAppendix 2:Forecast Summary 2000-2009 2010-2019 2020-2029 2024-2029 2030-2039 2040-2049 2050-2059 2060-2069 2070-2079World2.73.22.42.82.52.12.01.81.7DM1.61.91.51.81.61.41.31.21.1 United States1.92.31.71.91.71.51.41.31.2 Euro Area1.41.41.21.61.41.11.00.90.9 Germany0.82.00.71.21.31.10.90.91.0 Fra

252、nce1.51.41.21.71.51.31.21.21.1 Italy0.50.30.91.41.00.70.60.50.5 Japan0.51.20.60.90.80.70.70.60.5 United Kingdom1.62.01.42.01.91.61.51.31.2 Australia3.12.62.32.52.42.11.81.71.5 Canada2.12.31.72.12.01.91.71.61.6Asia(ex.DM)7.66.74.14.23.12.42.11.81.5 China10.37.74.24.02.51.61.10.90.5 India6.96.95.05.84

253、.63.73.12.52.1 Korea4.93.32.01.91.40.80.3-0.1-0.2 Bangladesh5.66.66.36.64.93.83.02.52.0 ASEAN4.95.23.23.93.42.92.52.11.9 Indonesia5.35.43.84.33.63.02.62.32.0 Thailand4.33.61.92.82.41.91.41.10.9 Philippines4.56.44.46.04.94.13.53.12.7 Malaysia4.75.42.93.63.52.92.21.81.5CEEMEA4.83.52.63.23.33.13.02.92.

254、7 Russia5.52.10.31.21.61.21.21.31.1 Turkey4.05.94.23.52.92.11.71.41.1 Kazakhstan8.64.42.73.13.22.82.82.82.5 CEE3.83.02.52.91.81.20.90.80.7 Poland3.93.72.83.31.91.10.70.50.4 MENAP4.73.83.33.63.93.43.12.82.5 Egypt5.04.44.74.85.34.43.83.22.7 Saudi Arabia3.53.52.82.93.22.52.01.71.4 Pakistan4.74.05.06.05

255、.95.34.74.03.4 SSA5.23.84.25.46.05.54.94.23.7 South Africa3.61.71.82.83.63.42.92.62.2 Nigeria8.33.83.64.66.36.15.44.63.9 Ghana5.36.74.35.05.24.94.54.13.6 Ethiopia8.69.68.610.78.26.65.54.74.0LatAm2.82.42.33.03.12.72.31.91.6 Brazil3.41.41.92.42.82.52.11.71.5 Mexico1.52.71.83.03.02.62.21.71.4 Argentina

256、2.61.42.63.33.12.62.21.81.5 Colombia3.93.73.43.43.32.72.21.71.4 Chile4.23.32.12.32.42.01.61.41.2 Ecuador3.92.82.23.33.33.22.82.52.1 Peru5.04.53.34.24.03.52.92.52.1Real GDP Growth Projections(%)Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 39Goldman SachsGlobal Economics Paper2000

257、200402050206020702075World50.379.486.6121.4171.6227.9291.4363.9402.5DM39.050.749.558.370.782.995.0107.5113.8 United States15.618.521.827.032.037.242.848.651.5 Euro Area9.815.513.515.819.622.925.928.830.3 Germany3.04.24.04.45.36.26.97.78.1 France2.13.32.73.23.94.65.46.16.5 Italy1.72.62.02.

258、32.73.13.43.63.8 Japan7.57.15.24.45.26.06.77.27.5 United Kingdom2.53.12.93.34.35.26.17.17.6 Australia0.61.51.41.82.32.83.33.94.3 Canada1.12.01.72.32.83.44.14.85.2Asia(ex.DM)5.014.124.240.964.590.6119.4150.9167.0 China1.87.415.524.534.141.948.654.857.0 India0.72.12.86.613.222.233.245.852.5 Korea0.91.

259、41.72.02.63.13.33.43.4 Bangladesh0.10.20.40.81.72.84.15.56.3 ASEAN0.92.22.74.88.613.318.624.627.8 Indonesia0.30.91.12.24.06.39.012.113.7 Thailand0.20.40.50.71.21.72.22.62.8 Philippines0.10.30.40.71.42.53.95.66.6 Malaysia0.20.30.40.61.21.82.53.23.5CEEMEA3.28.88.515.125.238.355.778.692.1 Russia0.42.01

260、.52.83.74.55.46.46.9 Turkey0.41.00.81.32.23.14.04.85.2 Kazakhstan0.00.20.20.30.60.91.31.82.1 CEE0.51.41.52.33.54.45.25.96.3 Poland0.30.60.61.01.51.92.22.42.5 MENAP1.22.42.85.29.314.922.331.636.9 Egypt0.20.30.40.81.93.55.88.810.4 Saudi Arabia0.30.70.71.52.43.54.55.66.1 Pakistan0.10.20.30.61.63.36.19.

261、912.3 SSA0.41.21.12.14.48.514.924.129.9 South Africa0.20.50.40.50.91.42.12.83.3 Nigeria0.10.50.40.81.63.46.210.413.1 Ghana0.00.10.10.10.30.50.81.21.5 Ethiopia0.00.00.10.30.71.62.94.96.2LatAm3.15.74.37.211.216.021.326.829.6 Brazil1.02.71.52.33.54.96.48.08.7 Mexico1.11.31.11.93.04.25.66.97.6 Argentina

262、0.50.50.40.71.01.41.82.22.4 Colombia0.20.40.30.50.91.41.92.42.6 Chile0.10.30.30.40.50.70.91.11.2 Ecuador0.00.10.10.20.20.30.50.60.7 Peru0.10.20.20.40.61.01.41.82.1Real GDP US$trn(2021)Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 40Goldman SachsGlobal Economics Paper2000201020202

263、03020402050206020702075World9.012.712.416.221.727.734.743.147.7DM44.554.350.658.470.282.495.6109.4116.4 United States55.159.564.876.787.399.2112.3125.5132.2 Euro Area30.846.639.946.958.970.983.597.2104.3 Germany36.351.548.653.265.978.690.7104.2111.6 France35.352.242.648.359.270.582.996.1102.8 Italy3

264、0.644.033.139.649.659.270.282.288.0 Japan59.455.341.836.847.057.568.981.287.6 United Kingdom42.948.942.947.960.272.585.799.8106.6 Australia31.970.155.164.475.186.798.8112.3119.4 Canada36.858.645.256.464.774.585.497.0103.1Asia(ex.DM)1.63.96.19.814.920.627.435.539.9 China1.45.510.917.324.731.940.350.4

265、55.4 India0.71.72.04.38.213.319.627.131.3 Korea18.728.833.039.353.667.781.895.2101.8 Bangladesh0.71.12.34.48.413.519.726.931.0 ASEAN2.35.05.58.915.122.531.141.146.6 Indonesia1.33.84.17.512.919.828.238.043.4 Thailand3.06.17.310.117.025.034.044.049.3 Philippines1.62.73.45.59.915.723.132.137.3 Malaysia

266、6.811.110.617.029.544.259.275.183.5CEEMEA3.07.15.78.812.917.623.330.634.8 Russia2.914.010.619.927.234.142.152.157.2 Turkey6.513.18.914.323.232.141.351.556.7 Kazakhstan1.811.09.416.125.535.447.462.570.5 CEE5.414.215.424.538.251.464.278.586.1 Poland6.815.316.325.640.254.166.480.087.4 MENAP3.96.46.29.8

267、15.322.030.240.345.9 Egypt2.23.23.76.312.922.033.547.154.6 Saudi Arabia13.322.120.436.154.271.990.2110.5120.6 Pakistan0.91.31.42.24.89.014.922.527.1 SSA1.43.02.33.36.09.915.422.827.2 South Africa4.99.96.08.012.919.327.337.242.6 Nigeria0.82.82.12.95.18.914.422.026.5 Ghana0.92.12.33.35.58.713.219.423.

268、1 Ethiopia0.20.40.91.94.07.311.818.121.9LatAm6.911.37.711.917.724.833.042.347.4 Brazil5.713.87.110.415.321.328.336.340.8 Mexico11.011.69.014.321.229.539.250.055.7 Argentina13.012.79.015.220.927.234.542.546.7 Colombia3.87.95.59.816.424.433.343.148.5 Chile7.715.713.618.326.235.044.054.259.8 Ecuador2.2

269、5.75.97.811.215.521.027.631.4 Peru2.96.36.49.815.522.731.141.046.5Real GDP per capita US$thsd(2021)Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research6 December 2022 41Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperBibliography Acemoglu,D.and J.Robinson,(2012),“Why Nations Fail:The Origins of Power,Prosperity,an

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274、d J.Ursa,“The BRI Cs 10 Years On:Halfway Through the Great Transformation”,GS Global Economics Paper,7 December 2011.6 December 2022 42Goldman SachsGlobal Economics PaperDisclosure Appendix Reg AC We,Kevin Daly and Tadas Gedminas,hereby certify that all of the views expressed in this report accurate

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