1、 BELT AND ROAD ECONOMICS 1 BELT AND ROAD ECONOMICS Opportunities and risks of transport corridors 2 BELT AND ROAD ECONOMICS The text of this advance edition is a work in progress for the forthcoming book, Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors (DOI: 10.1596/978-1-464
2、8-1392- 4). A PDF of the final book, once published, will be available at https:/openknowledge. worldbank.org/ and http:/documents.worldbank.org/, and print copies can be ordered at . Please use the final version of the book for citation, reproduction and adaptation purposes. 2019 International Bank
3、 for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW , Washington, DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org Some rights reserved This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions exp
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13、nk.org. BELT AND ROAD ECONOMICS 3 Acknowledgments This study has been written by Michele Ruta (Team Leader; Lead Economist, Macroeconomics, Trade the Russian Federation and Turkey in Europe and Central Asia; Israel and United Arab Emirates in Middle East and North Africa. Together, these countries a
14、ccounted for almost 80 percent of the total FDI to corridor economies in 2017. In contrast, for many corridor economies, FDI is less than 1 percent of GDP. This group includes Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Kenya, Nepal, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, and Uzbekistan. The concentration of direct investment outf
15、lows is even starker: just eight economies accounted for 87 percent of the total flows out of corridor economies in 2017. Five of these eight are from East Asia and Pacific: China; Hong Kong SAR, China; Singapore; Taiwan, China; and Thailand. The others are India, the Russian Federation, and United
16、Arab Emirates. At the other extreme, five of 13 corridor economies in East Asia and Pacific and the majority in the other regions invested less than US$1 billion abroad in 2017. The majority of corridor economies FDI inflows come from non-corridor economies (figure 1.4). Yet, as for trade, the share
17、 of corridor economies is growing, in great part due to investment from China, which has picked up since the mid-2000s. Furthermore, China started to gain share in 2008, on the back of the significant drop in investment from developed countries during the global financial crisis. Chinese firms seize
18、d the opportunities to invest while firms from developed countries pulled back (Chen and Lin 2018). Source: UNCTAD. Figure 1.3: Belt and Road corridor economies direct investment, by region 25 CHAPTER 1 / Connectivity, trade, and debt in the Belt and Road corridor economies Source: Chen and Lin 2018
19、. Figure 1.4: Foreign direct investment to Belt and Road corridor economies, by source Participation in global value chains Belt and Road corridor economies have increased their GVC participation and are moving up the value chain (figure 1.5).5 Backward participation of corridor economies, as proxie
20、d by the total foreign value added embodied in their exports, amounted to about 24 percent of gross exports in 2015, down 4 percentage points from the average for corridor economies during the pre-crisis 2000s. Forward participation, measured as the domestic value added embodied in other countries g
21、ross exports, stayed at around 28 percent since 2011, having increased steadily from about 22 percent in the early 1990s. Corridor economies in East Asia and Pacific and Europe and Central Asia are highly integrated via backward participation and drive the BRI average due to a large trading scale. B
22、ut a closer look at country data shows that for both regions, GVC backward participation is driven by few economies, such as China, Malaysia, and Singapore in East Asia, and Czech Republic, Estonia, and Hungary in Europe and Central Asia. GVC participation of corridor economies in other regions is s
23、ubstantially lower. Middle East and North Africa and Europe and Central Asia have higher forward participation, but this mostly reflects important commodity exporters such as Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Saudi Arabia. 5 Given data limitations, the importance of GVCs for all corridor econo
24、mies is hard to gauge with accuracy (Boffa 2018). 26 BELT AND ROAD ECONOMICS Backward and forward linkages of corridor economies are still dominated by non-Belt and Road countries, but the share of corridor economies has been gradually increasing over time. For backward participation, corridor econo
25、mies accounted for 33 percent of the total foreign value added embodied in corridor economies gross exports in 2011, up from 24 percent in 1995. For forward participation, the domestic value added originating in corridor economies embodied in the exports of other corridor economies represented 43 pe
26、rcent of the domestic value added embodied in the exports of both other Belt and Road and non-Belt and Road economies in 2011, up from 36 percent in 1995. Over time, China has established itself as a more central player in the GVC network linking corridor economies. All regions experienced a gradual
27、 rise in the share of Chinese value added in their own imports, and a rise in the share of China in their domestic value added embodied in other economies exports (Boffa 2018). Moreover, judged by the number of countries ranking China among the three most important sources of foreign value added use
28、d to produce exports, it had grown into a significant gravitational center for corridor economies already by 2010 (figure 1.6). Consistent with this finding, trade and investment relations of China with corridor economies started intensifying well before the formal announcement of the BRI in 2013 (b
29、ox 1.1). Source: Eora MRIO (multiregional input-output table). Note: Gross exports and backward and forward participation encompass both goods and services. Figure 1.5: Belt and Road corridor economies participation in GVCs, by region 27 CHAPTER 1 / Connectivity, trade, and debt in the Belt and Road
30、 corridor economies Source: Boffa (2018) based on OECD TiVA database. Note: Exports refer here to both goods and services. The size of the node is the total number of times for which the economy was among the top three sources of value added for each of its partners. The thickness of the edges repre
31、sents the strength of the link in value added. Figure 1.6: The centrality of China as a source of foreign value added in Belt and Road corridor economies gross exports Box 1.1: How old is the BRI? The Belt and Road Initiative was officially announced in 2013 during President Xi Jinpings visits to Ka
32、zakhstan in September and Indonesia in October. Trade data show that Chinas exports, particularly of infrastructure-related goods, had started flowing to Belt and Road corridor economies for a decade before the official launch of the Initiative. Moreover, by 2013, China was already actively engaged
33、in construction contracts in corridor economies. The 2013 announcement of the BRI was not a dramatic shift, but it brought new energy to ongoing trends in Chinas trade relations. First, trade data indicate that the group of corridor economies as a whole had already seen more than a decade-long stead
34、y rise in importance as a destination for Chinese exports (box figure 1). They accounted collectively for about 40 percent of Chinas overall merchandise exports in 2017, up almost 9 percentage points since 2001. Gains in the share of corridor economies in Chinas exports of infrastructure-related goo
35、ds amounted to 11 percentage points, and gains in corridor economies share of iron and steel exported from China were 16 percentage points. The gains were driven mostly by corridor economies where BRI transport infrastructure projects are being built or planned (called the BRI “core” in box figure 1
36、).1 In 2017, these countries accounted for 27 and 37 percent of Chinas exports of infrastructure-related goods and of iron and steel respectively, and had already gained 15 and 17 percentage points in these respective shares by 2013. Moreover, at least for some of these economies (not only those in
37、developing East Asia), trade data show an increased dynamism of Chinas exports of infrastructure-related goods around 2013 (Constantinescu and Ruta 2018). 28 BELT AND ROAD ECONOMICS Box figure 1: Share of Belt and Road corridor economies in Chinas exports, by type of goods, 200117 Box figure 2: Tren
38、ds in Chinas outward investment and construction contracts Second, corridor economies accounted for a larger share of Chinese construction investment than nonBelt and Road countries even before 2013 (Chen and Lin 2018). Chinas overall outward investment in corridor economies increased substantially
39、after 2013, but the volume of Chinas outward investment in non- Belt and Road countries increased more rapidly than the volume of investment in corridor economies. Yet for Chinas construction contracts abroad, the picture is different. They show a similar upward trend, but corridor economies account
40、 for a much larger share in Chinas construction contracts overseas than in Chinas FDI. Since 2009, the share of corridor economies has systematically exceeded the share of non-Belt and Road countries in Chinas construction projects (box figure 2). Source: Constantinescu and Ruta 2018. Source: Chen a
41、nd Lin 2018. 29 CHAPTER 1 / Connectivity, trade, and debt in the Belt and Road corridor economies Missing trade and FDI Belt and Road corridor economies have trade and FDI relations below their potential. Corridor economies undertrade with each other and with the rest of the world by 30 percent on a
42、verage (Baniya, Rocha, and Ruta 2018).6 And as recipients of FDI, corridor economies fall short of their absorptive potential by 70 percent (Chen and Lin 2018). These findings suggest that barriers to trade and FDI in the form of infrastructure or policy gaps reduce the potential trade and FDI flows
43、 that could be realized by corridor economies. These gaps are analyzed in the rest of this chapter. The estimates of missing trade and FDI for corridor economies are considerable. An important question is how much improvements in transportation infrastructure and other policy reforms that reduce tra
44、de times could boost trade and FDI for corridor economies. A one-day decrease in trading times would increase exports among corridor economies by 5.2 percent on average (Baniya, Rocha, and Ruta 2018). And a 10 percent decrease in trading time is associated with a 12 percent increase in FDI flows to
45、corridor economies (Chen and Lin 2018). These findings suggest that infrastructure improvements and policy reforms that can alleviate impediments to trade and FDI could have a big impact on integrating corridor economies with world markets. 1.2 INFRASTRUCTURE AND POLICY GAPS Physical and policy barr
46、iers may constrain the connectivity of many Belt and Road corridor economies. Transport and digital connectivity Transport and digital connections complement each other in allowing people from different locations to exchange goods, ideas, and knowledge through physical and virtual interactions. With
47、out efficient transport connections, the potential of e-commerce would be greatly diminished. Just-in-time supply chains rely as much on the timely transmission of information as on the timely transportation of inputs and outputs. Transport infrastructure and services The quality of road and rail in
48、frastructure presents contrasting patterns across Belt and Road corridor economies. Countries to the north and northwest of China are perceived to have very low-quality roads, while China, and the countries to 6 The estimates for missing trade and FDI were obtained by comparing actual trade and FDI
49、values with potential ones, given the predictions of the gravity model, a tool strongly endorsed for analyzing trade and FDI due to its predictive power (Head and Mayer 2014). 30 BELT AND ROAD ECONOMICS its southwest form a “corridor” of relatively good road quality (figure 1.7a). Some Southeast Asian countries are also perceived as having relatively good road quality. But only Malaysia and some Gulf countries are perceived as having high-quality roads, as in Western European countries. The quality of rail infrastructure mirrors the quality of road infrastructur
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