1、AprOctA World Bank Group ReportAPRIL 2024Commodity Markets OutlookAPRIL 2024 Commodity Markets Outlook 2024 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank 1818 H Street NW,Washington,DC 20433 Telephone:202-473-1000;Internet:www.worldbank.org Some rights reserved.This work is a prod

2、uct of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions.The findings,interpretations,and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank,its Board of Executive Directors,or the governments they represent.The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy,

3、completeness,or currency of the data included in this work and does not assume responsibility for any errors,omissions,or discrepancies in the information,or liability with respect to the use of or failure to use the information,methods,processes,or conclusions set forth.The boundaries,colors,denomi

4、nations,and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.Nothing herein shall constitute or be construed or considered to be a limitation upon o

5、r waiver of the privileges and immunities of The World Bank,all of which are specifically reserved.Rights and PermissionsThis work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license(CC BY 3.0 IGO)http:/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo.Under the Creative Commons Attribution li

6、cense,you are free to copy,distribute,transmit,and adapt this work,including for commercial purposes,under the following conditions:AttributionPlease cite the work as follows:World Bank.2024.Commodity Markets Outlook,April 2024.Washington,DC:World Bank.License:Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0

7、IGO.TranslationsIf you create a translation of this work,please add the following disclaimer along with the attribution:This translation was not created by The World Bank and should not be considered an official World Bank translation.The World Bank shall not be liable for any content or error in th

8、is translation.AdaptationsIf you create an adaptation of this work,please add the following disclaimer along with the attribution:This is an adaptation of an original work by The World Bank.Views and opinions expressed in the adaptation are the sole responsibility of the author or authors of the ada

9、ptation and are not endorsed by The World Bank.Third-party contentThe World Bank does not necessarily own each component of the content contained within the work.The World Bank therefore does not warrant that the use of any third-party-owned individual component or part contained in the work will no

10、t infringe on the rights of those third parties.The risk of claims resulting from such infringement rests solely with you.If you wish to reuse a component of the work,it is your responsibility to determine whether permission is needed for that reuse and to obtain permission from the copyright owner.

11、Examples of components can include,but are not limited to,tables,figures,or images.All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to World Bank Publications,The World Bank Group,1818 H Street NW,Washington,DC 20433,USA;e-mail:pubrightsworldbank.org.The cutoff date for the data used in this r

12、eport was April 17,2024.iii Table of Contents Figures Acknowledgments .v Executive Summary.1 Commodity Market Developments and Outlook.9 Energy.11 Agriculture.20 Fertilizers.27 Metals and Minerals.29 Precious Metals.31 Special Focus Forecasting Industrial Commodity Prices:An Assessment.33 1 The stat

13、e of commodity markets.2 2 Commodity price outlook and risks.4 3 Oil market:price developments.11 4 Oil market:demand and supply developments.12 5 Outlook for oil markets.14 6 Natural gas markets.16 7 Coal markets.18 8 Agricultural prices.21 9 Supply conditions for grains and edible oils.22 10 Risks

14、 to agriculture markets.23 11 Food insecurity and inflation .24 12 Beverage markets.25 13 Agricultural raw materials markets.26 14 Fertilizer markets.27 15 Base metals and iron ore markets.30 16 Critical minerals markets.31 17 Precious metals markets.32 18 Commodity dependence and commodity price vo

15、latility.35 19 Directional accuracy of commodity price forecasts.37 20 Forecasts and realizations:2015Q1-2022Q1.40 Tables 1 World Bank Commodity Price Forecasts.7 2 Forecast bias.38 3 Model accuracy.39 v Many people contributed to the report.Carlos Arteta and Phil Kenworthy provided overall content

16、and editorial review.Section authors included Paolo Agnolucci(oil,natural gas,and coal),John Baffes(fertilizers,beverages,and agricultural raw materials),Phil Kenworthy(executive summary),Jeetendra Khadan(metals and critical minerals),and Dawit Mekonnen(food).Nikita Perevalov contributed with inflat

17、ion scenarios.The Special Focus on“Forecasting Industrial Commodity Prices:An Assessment”was prepared by Francisco Arroyo-Marioli,Jeetendra Khadan,Valerie Mercer-Blackman,Franziska Ohnsorge,and Takefumi Yamazaki.Kaltrina Temaj coordinated data analysis and provided research support.Lule Bahtiri and

18、Matias Urzua provided research assistance.Maria Hazel Macadangdang managed the database and forecast table.Adriana Maximiliano handled design and production.Graeme Littler produced the accompa-nying website,with assistance from the Open Knowledge Repository.Tommy Chrimes,Charles Collyns,Betty Dow,Gr

19、aham Hacche,Graeme Littler,and Prakash Loungani provided feedback on the report.Betty Dow and Shane Streifel provided input and reviewed the report.External affairs for the report were managed by Joseph Rebello and Nandita Roy,supported by Kristen Milhollin,Mariana Lozzi Teixeira,and Sandya Deviah.S

20、taff of the Translation and Interpretation Services unit provided translations of dissemination materials.The World Banks Commodity Markets Outlook is published twice a year,in April and October.The report provides detailed market analysis for major commodity groups,including energy,agriculture,fert

21、ilizers,metals,and precious metals.Price forecasts for 46 commodities are presented.Commodity price data updates are published separately at the beginning of each month.The data cutoff date of this report is April 17,2024.The report and data can be accessed at:www.worldbank.org/commodities For inqui

22、ries and correspondence,email:commoditiesworldbank.org Acknowledgments This World Bank Group Report is a product of the Prospects Group in the Development Economics Vice Presidency.Carlos Arteta managed the report under the general guidance of Ayhan Kose.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|A

23、PRIL 2024 1 The state of commodity markets Heightened geopolitical tensions in recent weeks have been exerting substantial upward pressure on the prices of key commodities.In early April,the price of Brent oil reached$91 per barrel(bbl),$34/bbl above its 2015-19 average.Gold prices extended a three-

24、year surge,reaching all-time highs amid safe-haven flows.Meanwhile,signs of resilience in global economic activity have also supported prices of other commoditiesincluding copper,which recently climbed to a two-year peak.These price increases followed notable fluctuations in oil prices and,more gene

25、rally,a plateauing of many commodity prices in the first quarter of the year(figure 1.A).Questions abound as to whether commodity pricesparticularly oil priceswill continue to climb given heightened concerns of a regional escalation of the Middle East conflict,with potentially consequential implicat

26、ions for global inflation.The World Bank commodity price index is expected to decline marginally this year and next,while remaining considerably above its pre-pandemic levels.That said,there are several upside risks to these projections,particularly concerning the effects of further conflict escalat

27、ion on energy supplies.Heightened tensions in the Middle East have been exerting upward pressure on prices for key commodities,notably oil and gold.Copper prices have also reached a two-year peak,reflecting supply concerns and signs of firmer global industrial production.In 2024 and 2025,overall com

28、modity prices are forecast to decline slightly but remain about 38 percent above pre-pandemic levels.Unlike prices for most other commodities,oil prices are set to increase in 2024,by 2 percent.Gold and copper prices are also set to rise this year,by 8 percent and 5 percent,respectively.In all,disin

29、flationary tailwinds from moderating commodity prices appear essentially over.The persistence of high commodity prices,relative to pre-pandemic levels,despite subdued global GDP growth indicates several forces at play:geopolitical tensions are pushing up prices,investments related to the clean-energ

30、y transition are bolstering demand for metals,and Chinas rising industrial and infrastructure investment is partly offsetting weakness in its property sector.Risks to the price forecasts are tilted to the upside,with the primary risk arising from a broadening of the conflict in the Middle East.A con

31、flict-driven rise in commodity prices could stoke stubbornly elevated global inflation,further delaying global monetary easing.Food insecurity,which worsened markedly last year reflecting armed conflicts and elevated food prices,could also rise further.Executive Summary Over the next couple of years

32、,the outlook is for sustained higher commodity prices relative to the half-decade before the COVID-19 pandemic,despite weaker global GDP growth(figure 1.B).The persistence of high commodity prices in a context of subdued global growth likely reflects several forces at play:Geopolitical tensions.Heig

33、htened geopolitical tensions are keeping upward pressure on prices of critical commodities and stoking risks of large price spikes(figure 1.C).Supply conditions.Given tight supply conditions for many industrial commodities,moderate upside surprises to economic activity may lead to notable price shif

34、ts.Signs of modest near-term firming in industrial demand have accompanied recent price increases(figure 1.D).China.The decline in property investment in China has not hurt commodity demand to the extent that many expected,especially for metals.In part,this reflects a concomitant rise in Chinas inve

35、stment in infrastructure and manufacturing capacity(figure 1.E).Climate change.The fight against climate change provides an increasingly important backdrop.Metals-intensive investment in clean energy technologies is growing at EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 2 double-digit rat

36、es,creating a sustained tailwind for base metals prices(figure 1.F).Outlook for commodity prices The World Bank commodity price index is projected to decline by 3 percent in 2024 and 4 percent(y/y)in 2025(figure 2.A).1 Although commodity prices are set to soften somewhat,they are expected to remain

37、about 38 percent above 2015-19 average levels.A relatively stable baseline forecast for many prices suggests tightly balanced markets.Commodity supply is generally set to improve,but commodity demand is also expected to pick upeven against a backdrop of still subdued global GDP growthbecause industr

38、ial activity and trade growth are set to firm after stagnating in 2023.In part,this reflects expectations for broad,albeit measured,global monetary easing.In China,demand for energy and base metals is supported by expanding investment in infrastructure and preferred industriesincluding renewable ene

39、rgy,electron-ics,and electric vehicleseven as the property sector continues to soften.More broadly,continued efforts to reduce global carbon emissions portend accelerating demand for various metals and minerals that are crucial to the energy transition.Energy prices The energy price index is expecte

40、d to edge down 3 percent(y/y)in 2024 and ease a further 4 percent in 2025.This trajectory is predicated on signifi-cant declines in coal and natural gas prices this year.In contrast,oil prices are projected to increase this year,with the Brent crude price averaging$84/bbl in 2024,up from$83/bbl last

41、 year,reflecting the recent ratcheting up of geopolitical tensions and a tight supply-demand balance.This forecast assumes no further conflict escalation and thus anticipates that the average oil FIGURE 1 The state of commodity markets Recent increases in the prices of some commodities followed nota

42、ble fluctuations in oil prices and,more generally,a plateauing of many commodity prices in 2024Q1.Commodity prices are projected to remain well above pre-pandemic levels,despite notably slower global GDP growth.Heightened geopolitical tensions have been exerting upward price pressures,as have recent

43、 signs of firming manufacturing activity.In China,expanding industrial capacity and infrastructure investment is partially offsetting weaker commodity demand due to the property sector slowdown.Rising metals-intensive investment in the clean energy transition is providing a tailwind for base metals

44、prices.B.Global growth and commodity prices in 2024-25,deviation from 2015-19 averages A.Commodity price indexes Sources:Bloomberg;Caldara,Dario,and Matteo Iacoviello(2021);Haver Analytics;International Energy Agency(IEA);World Bank.A.Monthly data in U.S.dollar terms,last observation is March 2024.B

45、.Deviation of the 2024-25 average global growth,nominal commodity index,oil,copper and gold prices from 2015-2019 averages.GDP growth forecast from the Global Economic Prospects,January 2024.C.Simple averages of daily values.“Latest”includes the data until April 15th,2024.D.Monthly average copper an

46、d oil prices indexed to May 2022=100,except for last observation which is the month-to-date average until April 15th,2024.Last PMI observation is March 2024.E.Average annual growth of property loans and medium-to long-term industrial loans by financial institutions in China.F.Total global investment

47、 in each three-year period.2023 values are estimated.Others=end-use renewable energy,electrification in building,transport,and industrial sectors,and battery storage.D.Global manufacturing PMI and commodity prices C.Geopolitical risk index,period averages F.Global clean energy investment E.Growth of

48、 industrial and property loans,China -0.6-0.4-0.200.20.40.6-60-40-200204060CommoditypricesOilCopperGoldGlobal growth(RHS)PercentPercentage points-100102030-202021-latestIndex,0=2010-19 average608048505254May-22Aug-22Dec-22Apr-23Aug-23Dec-23Apr-24Global manufacturing PMIOil(RH

49、S)Copper(RHS)Index,50+=expansionIndex,100=May 220510152025-202021-23Industrial lendingProperty lendingPercent05001,0001,5002,0002,5003,0003,5004,0-202021-23Renewable powerOthersGridsElectric vehicleTotal investmentUS$,billions5075100125150Jan-22Jun-22Nov-22Apr-23Sep-23Mar-2

50、4EnergyMetals and mineralsAgricultureCommodity price indexIndex,100 =Jan 20221 Throughout this document“(y/y)”refers to the change in quantity or average price in one year,compared to the previous year;“(q/q)”refers to the change in quantity or average price in one quarter,compared to the previous q

51、uarter.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 3 price for the remainder of 2024 will edge down from early April levels,as the recent risk premium increase abates.Next year,oil prices are expected to trend somewhat lower,averaging$79/bbl as supply conditions improve.Oil production is

52、expected to expand 0.8 mb/d this year,due mainly to increasing supply from the United States,while OPEC+production is set to decrease.Consumption is foreseen increasing about 1.2 mb/d this yeara notable deceleration from 2023with all the net demand growth in emerging market and developing economies(

53、EMDEs).Next year,oil demand growth is anticipated to slow further,with a contempora-neous reversal of OPEC+supply reductions pushing production higher,resulting in building inventories.Benchmark European natural gas prices are forecast to tumble 28 percent in 2024,due primarily to elevated inventori

54、es,before rebound-ing somewhat in 2025.U.S.natural gas prices are set to decline in 2024 before climbing sharply in 2025 as new LNG terminals facilitate increased exports.Coal prices are forecast to fall significantly in 2024-25.Agricultural and metal prices Non-energy commodity prices are forecast

55、to dip 2 percent(y/y)in 2024 and an additional 3 percent in 2025.Agricultural prices are expected to soften this year and next,reflecting increased supplies and moderating El Nio conditions,primarily affecting food crops.Accordingly,food commodity prices are set to decline by 6 percent in 2024 and 4

56、 percent in 2025,while a spike in beverage prices this yearreflecting supply constraints on Robusta coffee and,even more so,cocoais projected to partially retreat in 2025.Prices of agricultural raw materials,in contrast,are anticipated to remain stable.Fertilizer prices will likely continue a sharp

57、descent,driven by lower costs for inputs such as natural gas.The metals price index is expected to see little change in 2024-25.Base metal prices are forecast to edge up in both years and remain well above 2015-19 levels,reflecting a pick-up in global industrial activity and growing production of cl

58、ean energy technologies.In contrast,a further decline is projected in the price of iron ore,which is important for property starts,but less relevant to the green transition.Gold prices,which dominate the precious metals index,are assumed to plateau at their recent record highs for the rest of this y

59、ear,resulting in an 8 percent rise in the annual average price in 2024.Gold holds a special status among financial assets,often rising in price during periods of elevated geopolitical and policy uncertainty,including conflicts(figure 2.B).Such safe-haven demand looks set to strengthen in 2024.Prices

60、 have also been supported by strong demand,partly reflecting the reserves management strategies of several EMDE central banks.Gold prices are set to dip slightly next year but remain historically high,averaging 62 percent above 2015-19 levels.Key risks to commodity prices Risks to commodity prices r

61、emain tilted to the upside.The key upside risk relates to further escalation of the conflict in the Middle East,particularly if this leads to substantial disruptions to energy supply.Such disruptions could drive aggregate commodity prices materially higher,given the importance of energy in the produ

62、ction and transport of other commodities.Lower-than-expected U.S.energy production and weather-related disruptions globally could also exert upward commodity price pressures.Key downside risks include a faster unwind of OPEC+supply reductions as well as weaker-than-expected global growth.Upside risk

63、s Further confict escalation.Energy markets,especially for oil,are susceptible to the evolving circumstances of the conflict in the Middle East.Given elevated uncertainty following the recent increase in regional tensions,a range of adverse outcomes remains possible.Further conflict escalation invol

64、ving one or more key oil producers could result in extraction and exports in the region EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 4 nearly 10 percent above the baseline forecast(figure 2.C).A more severe disruption,involving substantial reductions in the production or export capacity of

65、 one or more oil producers,could initially lower supply by about 3 mb/d.With other oil exporters likely to expand output in response,the envisaged supply reduction declines to 1 mb/d by late 2024.In such circumstances,average oil prices could hit$102/bbl in 2024,more than 20 percent above the baseli

66、ne forecast.Escalation of the conflict in the Middle East could also drive up prices for natural gas,food,and fertilizers.The region is a crucial gas supplier20 percent of global LNG trade transits the Strait of Hormuz.Should gas supply be interrupted,fertilizer prices could in turn rise substantial

67、ly,likely also leading to higher food prices.More broadly,the confluence of geopolitical tensions and ongoing conflicts,including Russias invasion of Ukraine,could adversely affect staple food supplies.Intensified attacks on Ukraines export facilities could reduce grain supplies,while further aggres

68、sion toward ships in the Red Sea could force more Black Sea origin vessels to reroute,elongat-ing dry bulk supply routes.Lower U.S.energy supply.In addition to the potential for a conflict-driven supply shock,prices for oil and natural gas could turn out higher if U.S.energy production falls short o

69、f the expan-sion assumed in the baseline.U.S.oil production has stagnated recently in a context of elevated input costs.Moreover,rapid expansion of U.S.LNG terminals in 2024-25 might not proceed as planned,reducing LNG supplies.Weather-and climate-related disruptions.Unexpected weather patterns coul

70、d result in weather-related disruptions to commodity markets,leading to higher prices.Growing seasons could be compromised,leading to price spikes for agricultural commodities.Cold temperatures in major gas-consuming regions would raise natural gas prices.In addition,spells of unusually dry weatheri

71、ncreasingly common,given climate changecould adversely affect hydropower FIGURE 2 Commodity price outlook and risks Commodity prices are forecast to decline slightly,on average,in 2024 and 2025,though oil prices are set to increase this year.Gold prices have surged to record highs on the back of saf

72、e-haven flows and central bank buying.Conflict-driven supply disruptions could push average Brent oil prices up sharply,though an earlier-than-expected unwind of OPEC+supply cuts could see average prices dip below forecasts.Higher-than-expected oil prices could stoke stubbornly elevated global infla

73、tion.B.Gold prices and geopolitical events A.Commodity price projections Sources:Bloomberg;Oxford Economics;World Bank.A.Commodity prices refers to the World Bank commodity price index,excluding precious metals.Dashed lines indicate forecasts.B.Daily data,last observation is April 17,2024.Red vertic

74、al lines indicate adverse geopolitical events.C.D.The blue dashed lines indicate baseline forecasts for the price of Brent oil(panel C),and global consumer price inflation weighted by GDP(panel D).Oil prices and inflation are depicted as annual average values.The red,orange,and yellow lines indicate

75、 the possible ranges for the Brent oil price and global consumer price inflation in 2024 under different scenarios.The yellow line reflects a scenario in which OPEC+production cuts are reduced sooner than in the baseline.The orange and red lines depict outcomes under moderate and more severe conflic

76、t-related disruptions to oil supply,respectively.D.Model-based GDP-weighted projections of annual average country-level CPI inflation using Oxford Economics Global Economic Model,with oil prices as described in risk scenarios.D.Global inflation in 2024 under risk scenarios C.Brent oil prices in 2024

77、 under risk scenarios being curtailed,rapidly lessening global oil supply.The extent and duration of the impact on oil prices would depend on the scale of the initial shock,as well as the speed and size of the response of other producers to higher prices.Indicatively,however:A moderate conflict-driv

78、en disruption could initially reduce supply by about 1 mb/d.In a context of already tight markets,average prices in 2024 could rise by$8/bbl,to$92/bbl,05001,0001,5002,0002,500200020022004200620082000222024US$/toz9/11 attackLybian civil warU.S.airstrike on BaghdadRussian invasio

79、n of UkraineConflict in the Middle-East6070809020232024HistoricalBaselineIncreased supplyModerate disruptionMore severe disruptionUS$/bbl34567820224HistoricalBaselineIncreased supplyModerate disruptionMore severe disruptionPercent5002019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

80、EnergyMetals and mineralsAgricultureCommodity pricesIndex,100=2015-19 averageEXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 5 production,resulting in higher coal and natural gas prices.Downside risks Higher OPEC+oil supply.Oil prices could be driven lower by upside surprises to production.Th

81、e baseline forecast is predicated on OPEC+production cuts being maintained until next year.It is possible,however,that OPEC+could reverse supply reductions in the second half of 2024.In that case,1 mb/d could be returned to the market,augmenting the increase in non-OPEC+output already assumed in the

82、 forecast.Prices could accordingly turn out lower,averaging about$81/bbl in 2024,4 percent below the baseline.Weaker global growth.Demand for commodities could prove weaker than expectedresulting in price declinesif global growth is slower than assumed.This could be the case if elevated core inflati

83、on proves persistent,leading major central banks to delay interest rate cuts,or if latent financial vulnerabilities emerge,resulting in tighter global financial conditions.Intensifying economic challenges in China,in particular,could pose sizable downside risks to energy and metals prices.Key broade

84、r implications Prospective and potential developments in commodity markets have critical implications for key challenges in the global economy,including inflation and food security.Inflation and monetary policy.Declining commodity prices were critical to broad-based disinflation in 2023.Commodity pr

85、ices plunged nearly 40 percent between June 2022 and June 2023,driving a more than 2-percentage-point reduction in global inflation between 2022 and 2023.2 Those disinflationary tailwinds appear essentially overthe World Bank commodity index is close to unchanged from twelve months ago.The marginal

86、softening of average commodi-ty prices forecast for this year will do little to subdue inflation that remains above targets in many economies.Moreover,risks of higher commodity prices could materialize,posing a renewed source of inflation-ary pressure.If conflict-related disruptions push this years

87、average Brent oil price to$102/bbl,as discussed by the more severe scenario above,global consumer price inflation could be 0.8 percentage point higher than the baseline projection in 2024(figure 2.D).Central banks may be less inclined to look through a rise in non-core prices than in the past,reflec

88、ting concerns that,in the presence of heightened geopolitical tensions,elevated energy inflation could feed through to wider prices and inflation expectations.Monetary policy easing could therefore be delayed.Food inflation and insecurity.Global food price inflation decreased to 4.9 percent in 2024Q

89、1 from 5.7 percent in 2023Q4,partly attributed to declining international prices of agricultural commodities.However,about one in five emerging market and developing economies experienced higher food inflation in 2024Q1 than in 2022the peak year of the recent global inflation surge.Food inflation ex

90、ceeded 5 percent in half of countries in each of the Middle East and North Africa,Latin America and the Caribbean,South Asia,and Sub-Saharan Africa regions.After doubling between 2018 and 2022,acute food insecurity worsened further last year,despite moderating food inflation.The latest data for 48 h

91、ighly food-insecure countries indicate a 10-percent increase in acute food insecurity in 2023.While elevated commodity prices are a crucial factor,armed conflict is often the primary driver of food crises.The global rise in conflict and instabilityincluding conflicts in the Middle East and Sub-Sahar

92、an Africa,as well as Russias invasion of Ukrainehas substantially exacerbat-ed food insecurity.If conflicts escalate further,global hunger could rise substantially.2 Recent studies document the dominant role of energy and food prices in explaining global inflation movements over the past four years:

93、J.Ha,M.A.Kose,F.Ohnsorge,and H.Yilmazkuday,2023,“What Explains Global Inflation,”Policy Research Working Paper 10648,World Bank,Washington,DC.P.Amatyakul,D.Igan,and M.Jacopo Lombardi,“Sectoral Price Dynamics in the Last Mile of Post-Covid-19 Disinflation,”(BIS Quarterly Review,Bank for International

94、 Settlements,March 2024).EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 6 Special Focus Forecasting Industrial Commodity Prices:An Assessment The Special Focus of this edition evaluates the performance of five well-known approaches to forecasting the prices of three key industrial commoditie

95、saluminum,copper,and crude oilover the period 2015Q1 to 2022Q1.High short-term volatility and significant longer-term movements in commodity pricesboth features of commodity markets in recent yearspresent major challenges for policymakers in commodity-exporting EMDEs.Such challenges are easier to me

96、et the more accurately price changes can be forecast.The evaluation reveals four main results.First,there is no“one-approach-beats-all”for commodity price forecasting,as the forecast accuracy of approaches varies significantly across commodities and time horizons.Second,macroe-conometric models tend

97、 to be more accurate at longer horizons,partly because they can incorpo-rate the effects of structural changes on prices.Third,it is critical to complement forecasts by incorporating judgment(information that cannot be accounted for by statistical approaches),especially when confronted by unusual or

98、 unprecedented events.Finally,these results underscore the value of employing a range of approaches in forecasting commodity prices.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 7 TABLE 1 World Bank Commodity Price Forecasts Differences in levels from October 2023 projections Percent change

99、 from previous year Commodity Unit 2021 2022 2023 2024f 2025f 2023 2024f 2025f 2024f 2025f INDEXES(in nominal U.S.dollars,2010=100)Total 1 100.9 142.5 108.0 105.3 101.6-24.2-2.5-3.5 0.2-3.0 Energy 2 95.4 152.6 106.9 104.0 100.0-29.9-2.8-3.8 0.3-3.0 Non-Energy 112.1 122.1 110.2 107.9 104.9 -9.7-2.1-2

100、.8-0.1-2.9 Agriculture 107.7 119.3 110.9 109.4 104.8-7.1-1.4-4.2-2.8-4.9 Beverages 93.5 106.3 107.8 131.9 115.8 1.4 22.4-12.2 31.0 15.4 Food 120.9 138.1 125.4 118.5 113.9-9.2-5.5-3.9-10.6-10.8 Oils and Meals 127.1 145.2 118.9 110.2 104.9-18.1-7.3-4.9-7.1-9.2 Grains 123.8 150.4 133.0 118.0 113.6-11.5

101、-11.3-3.8-11.6-9.3 Other food 110.2 117.7 127.2 129.8 126.2 8.1 2.1-2.8-14.3-14.1 Raw Materials 82.9 80.3 77.1 75.8 77.1 -3.9-1.7 1.7-1.1-1.0 Timber 90.4 80.1 79.1 78.3 80.1 -1.2-1.0 2.2-2.9-2.4 Other raw materials 74.8 80.5 74.9 73.1 74.0 -7.0-2.4 1.2 0.9 0.8 Fertilizers 152.3 235.7 153.5 120.2 112

102、.9-34.9-21.7-6.1-12.2-6.6 Metals and Minerals 3 116.4 115.0 104.0 103.4 104.1 -9.6-0.6 0.7 6.8 1.5 Base Metals 4 117.7 122.4 109.0 109.9 111.5 -11.0 0.9 1.5 7.6 1.0 Precious Metals 5 140.2 136.8 147.3 158.9 156.8 7.7 7.9-1.3 13.8 25.3 PRICES(in nominal U.S.dollars)Energy Coal,Australia$/mt 138.1 344

103、.9 172.8 125.0 110.0 -49.9-27.7-12.0-5.0 0.0 Crude oil,Brent$/bbl 70.4 99.8 82.6 84.0 79.0 -17.2 1.7-6.0 3.0-1.0 Natural gas,Europe$/mmbtu 16.1 40.3 13.1 9.5 10.5 -67.5-27.6 10.5-3.0-2.5 Natural gas,U.S.$/mmbtu 3.9 6.4 2.5 2.4 3.5-60.1-5.4 45.8-0.9-0.5 Liquefied natural gas,Japan$/mmbtu 10.8 18.4 14

104、.4 12.5 13.5 -21.9-13.1 8.0-0.5-0.5 Non-Energy Agriculture Beverages Cocoa$/kg 2.43 2.39 3.28 5.00 4.00 37.1 52.4-20.0 2.10 1.10 Coffee,Arabica$/kg 4.51 5.63 4.54 4.40 4.35 -19.4-3.1-1.1 0.00 0.00 Coffee,Robusta$/kg 1.98 2.29 2.63 3.50 2.80 15.0 33.2-20.0 1.10 0.40 Tea,average$/kg 2.69 3.05 2.74 2.7

105、5 2.77 -10.2 0.4 0.8 0.00 0.00 Food Oils and Meals Coconut oil$/mt 1,636 1,635 1,075 1,185 1,100 -34.2 10.2-7.2 85 50 Groundnut oil$/mt 2,075 2,203 2,035 1,900 1,850-7.6-6.6-2.6-250-295 Palm oil$/mt 1,131 1,276 886 905 825 -30.5 2.1-8.8 5-25 Soybean meal$/mt 481 548 541 480 460 -1.2-11.3-4.2-40-61 S

106、oybean oil$/mt 1,385 1,667 1,119 1,130 1,150-32.9 1.0 1.8 2555Soybeans$/mt 583 675 598 500 475 -11.5-16.4-5.0-85-85 Grains Barley$/mt 195 185.-5.1 5-4Maize$/mt 260 319 253 200 196-20.7-20.8-2.0-30-24 Rice,Thailand,5%$/mt 458 437 554 595 550 26.8 7.5-7.6 00Wheat,U.S.,HRW$/mt 315 430 340 290 285-20.8-

107、14.8-1.7-45-35 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 8 TABLE 1 World Bank Commodity Price Forecasts(continued)Differences in levels from October 2023 projections Percent change from previous year Commodity Unit 2021 2022 2023 2024f 2025f 2023 2024f 2025f 2024f 2025f PRICES(in nomina

108、l U.S.dollars)Non-Energy Other Food Bananas,U.S.$/kg 1.21 1.49 1.60 1.65 1.61 7.2 3.3-2.1 0.00 0.00 Beef$/kg 5.34 5.62 4.90 5.20 5.30 -12.8 6.1 1.9 -0.10-0.10 Chicken$/kg 1.99 1.68 1.53 1.50 1.53 -8.9-2.2 2.0 -1.70-1.60 Oranges$/kg 0.65 0.92 1.57 1.65 1.50 71.2 4.8-9.1 0.30 0.10 Shrimp$/kg 13.70 13.

109、51 10.19 9.50 10.00 -24.6-6.7 5.3 -1.20-1.10 Sugar,World$/kg 0.39 0.41 0.52 0.50 0.46 26.6-3.2-8.0 0.00 0.00 Raw Materials Timber Logs,Africa$/cum 414 369 379 390 395 2.6 3.0 1.3 0 1 Logs,S.E.Asia$/cum 271 228 212 200 210 -6.8-5.8 5.0 -25-21 Sawnwood,S.E.Asia$/cum 750 675 678 680 690 0.5 0.3 1.5 -9-

110、9 Other Raw Materials Cotton$/kg 2.23 2.86 2.09 2.15 2.20 -26.9 2.6 2.3 0.00 0.00 Rubber,TSR20$/kg 1.68 1.54 1.38 1.55 1.60 -10.4 12.1 3.2 0.10 0.10 Tobacco$/mt 4,155 4,270 5,016 4,300 4,250 17.5-14.3-1.2 0-41 Fertilizers DAP$/mt 601 772 550 600 550 -28.8 9.1-8.3 150 150 Phosphate rock$/mt 123 266 3

111、22 165 170 20.9-48.7 3.0 -125-80 Potassium chloride$/mt 543 863 383 300 290 -55.6-21.7-3.3 0 15 TSP$/mt 538 716 480 450 380 -32.9-6.3-15.6 50 30 Urea,E.Europe$/mt 483 700 358 350 325 -48.9-2.2-7.1 35 25 Metals and Minerals Aluminum$/mt 2,473 2,705 2,256 2,300 2,400 -16.6 2.0 4.3 100 0 Copper$/mt 9,3

112、17 8,822 8,490 8,900 8,800 -3.8 4.8-1.1 1100 300 Iron ore$/dmt 161.7 121.3 120.6 110.0 105.0 -0.6-8.8-4.5 5 5 Lead$/mt 2,200 2,151 2,136 2,100 2,050 -0.7-1.7-2.4 50-50 Nickel$/mt 18,465 25,834 21,521 17,000 18,000 -16.7-21.0 5.9 -3000-2500 Tin$/mt 32,384 31,335 25,938 27,000 28,000 -17.2 4.1 3.7 200

113、0 1000 Zinc$/mt 3,003 3,481 2,653 2,500 2,600 -23.8-5.8 4.0 100 100 Precious Metals Gold$/toz 1,800 1,801 1,943 2,100 2,050 7.9 8.1-2.4 200 350 Silver$/toz 25.2 21.8 23.4 25.0 26.0 7.4 6.8 4.0 1.3 3.5 Platinum$/toz 1,091 962 966 1,000 1,050 0.5 3.5 5.0 -50-100 Source:World Bank.1.The World Banks com

114、modity total price index is composed of energy and non-energy prices(excluding precious metals),weighted by their share in 2002-04 exports.The energy indexs share in the overall index is 67 percent.2.Energy price index includes coal(Australia),crude oil(Brent),and natural gas(Europe,Japan,U.S.).3.Ba

115、se metals plus iron ore.4.Includes aluminum,copper,lead,nickel,tin,and zinc.5.Precious metals are not part of the non-energy index.f=forecast.Commodity Market Developments and Outlook ENERGY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 11 geopolitical tensions,developments in the Middle East and in Russias

116、refinery sector since mid-March have heightened concerns that the ongoing conflicts could materially affect oil supply.However,a sharp increase of tensions in the Middle East in mid-April was not followed by significant price changes,and risk premia subsequently declined as the perceived likelihood

117、of further near-term escalation diminished.Prior to the latest developments,the Brent oil price decreased 1 percent in 2024Q1(q/q),Energy Oil prices have climbed markedly in recent weeks,moving above$90 per barrel in early April for the first time in six months against a backdrop of intensifying con

118、cerns about the conflict in the Middle East,tight supply conditions reflecting OPEC+production cuts,and some recent signs that global industrial demand may be firming.Prior to the latest upswing in oil prices,the World Banks energy price index fell by 4 percent in 2024Q1(q/q),reflecting declines acr

119、oss all three index constituentsoil,natural gas,and coal.Assuming no escalation of ongoing conflicts in oil-producing regions,the energy index is projected to dip by 3 percent in 2024(y/y),as notably lower natural gas and coal prices offset higher oil prices,and then soften another 4 percent in 2025

120、.The Brent price is forecast to average$84 per barrel in 2024,up from$83 in 2023,before receding to$79 in 2025.European natural gas prices are expected to tumble by 28 percent in 2024,before rising in 2025,while U.S.gas prices are set to decline modestly this year before climbing sharply next year.M

121、eanwhile,coal prices are projected to fall in both years.Geopolitical tensions,which have escalated following mid-April developments in the Middle East,remain the key source of upside risk in the oil market.Other upside risks include the possibility that shale oil producers fail to meet production t

122、argets.Downside risks center on a faster-than-anticipated unwind of OPEC+supply reductions and disap-pointing global GDP growth.Crude Oil Recent developments Escalating geopolitical tensions and supply management measures have in recent weeks led to substantial increases in oil prices,pushing the Br

123、ent oil benchmark above$90 per barrel for the first time in six months(figure 3.A).In terms of market fundamentals,recent declines in U.S.inventories,combined with the International Energy Agencys switch in mid-March from projecting a sizable oil surplus this year to a slight deficit,have supported

124、bullish trading sentiment.In addition,key economic data releases in subsequent weeks suggested some firming of global industrial activity ahead.Regarding FIGURE 3 Oil market:price developments Brent crude oil prices increased markedly in recent weeks against a backdrop of heightened geopolitical ten

125、sions,signs of firmer industrial demand,and tight suppliesincluding due to the extension of OPEC+production cuts announced in March.These moves followed a marginal price decline in 2024Q1(q/q)amid slowing demand growth and record supply from the United States.Markets remain volatile amid concerns re

126、garding conflict escalation,uncertainty over the economic outlook,and attacks on ships in the Red Sea.B.Brent vs.Urals pricesA.Oil prices and key events Sources:Bloomberg;Caldara and Iacoviello(2022);International Energy Agency(IEA);PortWatch,International Monetary Fund;UN Global Platform;World Bank

127、.A.Daily Brent prices,last observation is April 17,2024.Yellow lines show the 1.3 and 2.2 million barrels per day(mb/d)cuts.Red lines indicate geopolitical events including the October 2023 events in the Middle East,the strikes on Houthis by the United States and United Kingdom,and the rejectionof t

128、he ceasefire in Gaza.B.Monthly data.Data for Russian Urals prices from IEAs Oil Market Reports.Last observation is March 2024.C.30-day rolling average of the deviations of the Geopolitical risk index(GPR)from its 2010-19 median.The GPR reflects automated text-search of electronic archives from 10 ne

129、wspapers,relatedto adverse geopolitical events.Last observation is April 15,2024.D.Weekly number of tankers through the Suez Canal and Cape of Good Hope.Last observation is April 6,2024.D.Oil transport disruptionsC.Geopolitical risk index 020406080100120Apr-20Sep-20Mar-21Sep-21Mar-22Sep-22Mar-23Sep-

130、23Mar-24UralsBrentPrice cap US$60/bblUS$/bbl-200204060800Sep-23Nov-23Jan-24Apr-24Index,0=2010-19 medianEscalation in the Middle EastOctober 2023 events in the Middle EastStrikes on Houthis04080120160200Oct-23Nov-23Dec-23Feb-24Mar-24Cape of Good HopeSuez CanalNumber of tankers7075808590951

131、00105Sep-23Oct-23Nov-23Dec-23Jan-24Mar-24Apr-24US$/bbl1.3 mb/doil cutOctober 2023 events in the Middle EastOPEC+2.2 mb/d cutStrikes on HouthisRejection of ceasefireOPEC+2.2 mb/d cut extension ENERGY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 12 FIGURE 4 Oil market:demand and supply developments Oil demand

132、 growth has been losing momentum,reflecting subdued global economic growth.In 2023,demand from China accounted for around four-fifths of the global increase in consumption.Future oil demand growth is anticipated to be driven by emerging market and developing economies,with oil demand set to outpace

133、supply in 2024.Global oil supply growth was boosted last year by record U.S.production but stagnated in 2024Q1 due to weather-related disruptions in North America and OPEC+supply cuts.The extension of these cuts in March tightened the demand-supply balance but also increased spare capacity,more than

134、 half of which is in Saudi Arabia.B.Change in Chinas oil demand by product A.Oil demand D.Changes in oil stock C.Changes in oil demand by region Sources:International Energy Agency(IEA);World Bank.Note:AEs=advanced economies;EAP=East Asia and Pacific;ECA=Europe and Central Asia;LAC=Latin America and

135、 the Caribbean;MNA=Middle East and North Africa;SAR=South Asia;SSA=Sub Saharan Africa.A.Dashed lines indicate IEA forecasts for 2024Q1 to 2025Q4.B.C.D.E.Data for 2024 and 2025 indicates IEA forecasts.C.Bars show the percent year-on-year change in oil demand.Green diamonds show demand for oil per reg

136、ion,in million barrels per day(mb/d).D.Stock change is the difference between supply and demand for each quarter.Data based on IEA Monthly report,April 2024 edition.E.Bars show the percent year-on-year change in oil supply.Green diamonds show supply of oil per region in million barrels per day(mb/d)

137、.F.Spare capacity for OPEC+members as reported in IEAs Oil Market Monthly reports.Other OPEC+includes Algeria,Azerbaijan,Bahrain,Brunei,Congo,Equatorial Guinea,Gabon,Iraq,Kazakhstan,Kuwait,Libya,Malaysia,Mexico,Nigeria,Oman,South Sudan,Sudan,and Venezuela.extending a 3-percent decline in 2023Q4(figu

138、re 3.B).In both quarters,oil markets were buffeted by counteracting forces,leading the Brent price to fall from$97/barrel(bbl)in September 2023 to as low as$73/bbl in December,before rebounding once again in mid-March.In 2023Q4,prices declined despite a perceived escalation in geopolit-ical risks in

139、 the Middle East,reflecting softening demand and record U.S.oil output.The OPEC+announcement on November 30 of a 2.2 million barrels per day(mb/d)production cut failed to arrest this fall but oil prices eventually started to rise as increasing attacks on ships in the Red Sea amplified geopolitical r

140、isks(figure 3.C).Despite the commencement of military operations by the United States and United Kingdom in January that were intended to safeguard shipping,about half of the tankers that would usually pass through the Suez Canal were diverted around southern Africa,leading to increased journey time

141、s and shipping costs(figure 3.D).Fluctuating expectations regarding the likelihood of a ceasefire in Gaza added further volatility to oil markets in February.On March 3,OPEC+extended its previously implemented 2.2 mb/d production cuts to 2024Q2;however,the Brent price was initially stable in respons

142、e.Growth in global oil demand softened in 2023Q4 and 2024Q1,with a 2 and a 1.6 percent increase(y/y),respectively,compared to the 3-percent rise in 2023Q3,as the post-pandemic rebound in consumption lost momentum.Despite a 0.5 mb/d fall in 2023Q4(q/q),demand in China increased by about 12 percent in

143、 2023(y/y),accounting for about four-fifths of the rise in global consump-tion,amid stagnating oil demand in advanced economies(figure 4.A).Chinas oil consumption growth was driven by a variety of factors,including a marked increase in naphtha usage,due to the countrys investments in petrochemical p

144、roduction(figure 4.B).Oil demand also firmed last year in other countries in East Asia and the Pacific,South Asia(especially India),and Latin America(especially Brazil),while it fell in the Middle East and remained stable in other regions(figure 4.C).F.OPEC+spare capacity E.Change in oil supply by r

145、egion -0.8-0.40.00.40.81.21.62.02022202320242025DieselGasolineJet fuel/keroseneNapthaMb/d-1001020ChinaEAP excl.ChinaSARLACSSAMNAAEsECA202320242025Demand(RHS)PercentMb/d-2-0022Q12022Q22022Q32022Q42023Q12023Q22023Q32023Q42024Q12024Q22024Q32024Q4Stock change(RHS)Dem

146、andSupplyMb/dMb/d-20-50-1.0-0.50.00.51.01.52.02.53.0AEsLACMNAOther2022202320242025Supply 2023(RHS)PercentMb/d012345678Jan-22Mar-22May-22Jul-22Sep-22Nov-22Jan-23Mar-23May-23Jul-23Sep-23Nov-23Jan-24Mar-24Other OPEC+Russian FederationSaudi ArabiaIranUAEMb/d70809002019Q12019Q32020Q

147、12020Q32021Q12021Q32022Q12022Q32023Q12023Q32024Q12024Q32025Q12025Q3ChinaAdvanced economiesEMDEs excl.ChinaIndex,100=2019Q4 ENERGY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 13 Global oil supply rose by about 1 mb/d in 2023Q4(q/q);however,this increase more than reversed in 2024Q1,due to OPEC+production cu

148、ts,reductions in global biofuel supply(counted within oil supply),and weather-related disruptions in North America,where an Arctic freeze in January 2024 significantly hampered production.The total reduction in 2024Q1 was the largest quarterly decline since the pandemic,but demand growth was also we

149、ak,resulting in no change in implied stocks(figure 4.D).In 2023Q4 and 2024Q1,changes in production among OPEC+members were all relatively small(figure 4.E).Oil production in Russia was little changed in 2023Q4 and 2024Q1,as diversion of exports to India and China continued.Ongoing supply restraint i

150、n OPEC+has resulted in increasing spare capacity,more than half of which is in Saudi Arabia(figure 4.F).Global oil inventories declined in January;however,they increased by about 40 mb in February.The rerouting of tankers from the Suez Canal to around southern Africa left an exception-ally large vol

151、ume of oil(about 1900 mb)in transit on water,which contributes to total global inventories.OECD countries industry stocks declined in 2023Q4,edging toward the bottom of their five-year range,but this reflected a fall in stocks of oil products,with crude oil stocks increasing.At the end of 2023,OECD

152、countries total stocks(both industry and government-controlled)could cover only about 90 days of their consumption,down from about 110 in 2020Q4.Refilling the United States Strategic Petroleum Reserve has progressed slowly,at a rate of about 3 million barrels per monthjust one-seventh of the pace at

153、 which stocks were depleted following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.Outlook The Brent oil price is projected to average$84/bbl in 2024,up$1 from 2023,before moving down to$79/bbl in 2025 as a gradual unwind of OPEC+production cuts more than counteracts increasing demand(figure 5.A).This projection

154、 is predicated on no escalation in ongoing armed conflicts or worsening of transportation bottle-necks,including with respect to the Suez Canal.Oil production is expected to increase 0.8 mb/d in 2024,less than half the increment in 2023,and reach a record high of about 103 mb/d.All this growth is ex

155、pected to come from non-OPEC+producers.The United States is expected to increase production by 0.6 mb/d this year,with Brazil,Canada,and Guyana continuing to add about 0.2 mb/d each.Supply from OPEC+is expected to shrink by 0.8 mb/d,although this is notably uncertain given that production cuts annou

156、nced in November 2023 were formally extended in early March only until 2024Q2.The price forecast assumes that current cuts will continue until 2024Q4,with a gradual reversal starting next year.Consequently,OPEC+production is expected to increase from 2025Q1 onwards,outpacing demand and therefore res

157、ulting in a buildup in inventories.Oil consumption is envisaged to rise by 1.2 mb/d in 2024,about half of the previous years increase,reflecting a challenging global macroeconomic environment,including slowing growth in China.About three-fourths of global demand growth is expected to be accounted fo

158、r by five countries(Brazil,China,India,Indonesia,and Saudi Arabia),while consumption in advanced econo-mies is expected to be marginally lower.Regarding product composition,Chinas demand for LPG,ethane and naphtha is expected to be buoyant over the forecast horizon,due to the expanding petrochemical

159、 industry.Consumption of LPG and ethane is also expected to be elevated in India due to government policies promoting clean cooking.In 2025,oil demand growth is expected to edge down in the context of still subdued global GDP growth,remaining concentrated in major EMDEs.As the adoption of electric v

160、ehicles grows,with recent estimates indicating they account for 16 percent of new light vehicle sales worldwide,global oil consumption is likely nearing its peak.Risks Risks to the oil price forecast remain tilted to the upside,with intensifying geopolitical challenges being a key factor.Other upsid

161、e risks include the ENERGY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 14 in light of the sharp increase of tensions in mid-Apriland is likely to set the tone for near-term movements in oil prices.In addition,aggression toward ships in the Red Sea,which caused substantial rerouting of oil cargoes in early

162、2024,has added a new dimension to geopolitical challenges.Recent attacks on refining facilities in Russia also underscore that unexpected events stemming from the Russian invasion of Ukraine could further stoke oil market volatility.The baseline forecast assumes that the conflict in the Middle East

163、does not significantly escalate,even as the region remains in a state of elevated tension.This assumption is highly uncertain,however,with a range of more adverse outcomes remaining possible.In particular,conflict-related events that curtail oil extraction and exports in the region could push prices

164、 higher.The extent and duration of the effect on oil prices would depend on the scale and type of initial shock,as well as the response of other producers to higher prices.A moderate conflict-driven disruption could initially reduce supply by about 1 mb/d.Such a scenario would be consistent with sub

165、stan-tial curbs on the exports of one or more oil producers,roughly equating with the additional supply that Iran has brought to the market since 2022.In a context of already tight markets,average prices in 2024 could rise by$8/bbl,to$92/bbl,10 percent above the baseline forecast(figure 5.B).3 A mor

166、e severe conflict-driven disruption,in which exports from the region are more broadly encumbered by a larger scale conflict,could initially lower supply by about 3 mb/d.With other oil exporters likely to expand output in response,the envisaged supply possibility that U.S.shale oil firms fail to meet

167、 production targets.On the downside,OPEC+production cuts could reverse sooner than forecast,while weaker-than-expected global growth could result in lower prices.Upside risks Geopolitical developments.The possibility of a broader conflict in the Middle East continues to represent a crucial risk to o

168、il pricesparticularly FIGURE 5 Outlook for oil markets Brent oil prices are forecast to increase to$84/bbl in 2024 before receding in 2025,assuming no escalation of ongoing armed conflicts.In case of a moderate conflict-driven supply disruption,the average Brent price for 2024 could reach$92/bbl,ris

169、ing up to$102/bbl in a more severe conflict-driven disruption.On the other hand,if OPEC+cuts are reversed in 2024Q3sooner than expectedthe average price could sink to$81/bbl.A more severe conflict-driven disruption in the oil market could almost entirely stall progress on global disinflation.Other u

170、pside risks to the forecast include lower-than-expected North American oil output.B.Brent oil prices in 2024 under risk scenarios A.Price forecast comparisons D.United States:Rig count and oil production C.Global inflation in 2024 under risk scenarios Sources:Baker Hughes;Bloomberg;Consensus Forecas

171、ts;Energy Information Administration(EIA);International Energy Agency(IEA);Oxford Economics;World Bank.A.Forecasts for 2024,and 2025 for Brent crude oil.Futures data as of April 17,2024.Consensus data as of April 2024 report.EIA data from Short-term Energy Outlook report April 2024.B.C.The blue dash

172、ed lines indicate baseline forecasts for the price of Brent oil(panel B),and global consumer price inflation weighted by GDP(panel C).Oil prices and inflation are depicted as annual average values.The solid lines indicate the possible values for the Brent oil price and global consumer price inflatio

173、n in 2024 under different scenarios.The yellow line reflects a scenario in which OPEC+production cuts are reduced sooner than in the baseline.The orange and red lines depict outcomes under moderate and more severe conflict-related disruptions to oil supply,respectively.C.Model-based GDP-weighted pro

174、jections of annual average country-level CPI inflation using Oxford Economics Global Economic Model,with oil prices as described in risk scenarios.D.3-month rolling average of U.S.oil rig count and oil production.Last observation is March 2024.3 Te impact of the moderate and more severe conflict-dri

175、ven disruptions is obtained by using the methodology in World Bank,Commodity Markets Outlook:Under the Shadow of Geopolitical Risks,October 2023(Washington,DC:World Bank),which incorporates impulse response functions from D.Caldara,M.Cavallo,and M.Iacoviello,“Oil Price Elasticities and Oil Price Flu

176、ctuations,”Journal of Monetary Economics 103(May 2019):1-20.6070809020232024HistoricalBaselineIncreased supplyModerate disruptionMore severe disruptionUS$/bbl34567820224HistoricalBaselineIncreased supplyModerate disruptionMore severe disruptionPercent892004006008001,

177、000202020224Rig countOil production(RHS)Rig countMb/d65758595202320242025World BankFuturesConsensusEIAUS$/bbl ENERGY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 15 reduction declines to 1 mb/d by late 2024.In such circumstances,average oil prices could average$102/bbl in 2024,more tha

178、n 20 percent above the baseline.An oil price shock of this size could almost entirely stall progress on global disinflation(figure 5.C).4 North American oil output.The forecast entails that U.S.oil production will grow by 0.6 mb/d in 2024.This may be challenging to achieve against a backdrop of risi

179、ng industry input costs,record-high but stagnating production,and a declining number of active wells and those drilled but uncompleted(DUC)(figure 5.D).Such head-winds to increasing production could be rein-forced by the shale industrys recent practice of returning an increased proportion of profits

180、 to shareholders rather than reinvesting into extrac-tion.A smaller production increase would create a significant shortfall in the market,especially assuming OPEC+cuts remain in force,although part of the gap could be filled by greater-than-expected production in Brazil,Canada,and Guyana.5 Downside

181、 risks Earlier unwind of OPEC+supply cuts.The forecast assumes voluntary OPEC+production cuts remain in place until the end of 2024,but they could instead be reversed in the second half of this year.This risk is supported by two factors:the likelihood that reduced oil exports would deepen Saudi Arab

182、ias fiscal deficit;and OPEC+members concerns over losing market share,given that OPEC+cuts have so far been met with production increases elsewhere.On the other hand,Saudi Arabias debt-to-GDP ratio,at 26 percent in 2023,remains benign,and OPEC+still commands a 48 percent share of global oil supply.W

183、ere OPEC+cuts to be reversed in 2024Q3,instead of 2025Q1,the Brent price could decrease to$81/bbl in 2024,somewhat below the baseline.Weaker global economic growth.Several downside risks could derail the prospect of slow but steady global economic growth assumed in the forecast.These include financi

184、al stress,persistently above-target inflation,and a further weakening of the outlook for Chinas economy.Even though headline inflation declined globally last year,disinflation has slowed,with core inflation still elevated in many advanced economies and EMDEs.Tighter-than-anticipated monetary policie

185、s in response to unexpectedly persistent inflation could dampen global growth,leading to lower oil demand.Similarly,a further deteriora-tion of house prices in China could damage consumer confidence and curtail construction activity,reducing oil demand.If the risk of weaker growth materializes,oil p

186、rices may be lower in 2024 and 2025 than in the baseline.Natural gas Recent developments The World Bank natural gas price index declined by 28 percent in 2024Q1(q/q)to a level 38 percent lower than a year earlier.The dynamics of the three benchmarks within the index differed in 2024Q1(figure 6.A).Th

187、e U.S.price fell by 22 percent(q/q)reflecting strong domestic produc-tion and soft demand due to mild winter temperatures.The European benchmark tumbled by about 35 percent in 2024Q1 amid steep demand reductions and high inventories,reversing a rise in the previous quarter.More recently,however,esca

188、lating geopolitical tensions have prompted a concerted increase in European prices,offsetting the previous downdraft since the beginning of the year.In contrast,Japans LNG prices increased by 4 percent owing to the lagged effect of oil prices on oil-indexed LNG contracts and higher import demand in

189、the regionespecially from China,which became again in 2023 the worlds largest LNG importer.4 A number of recent studies documents that declines in oil and food prices played a significant role in the disinflation observed over the past year.For the importance of these prices in driving global inflat

190、ion,see J.Ha,M.A.Kose,F.Ohnsorge,and H.Yilmazkuday,“What Explains Global Inflation”(Policy Research Working Paper 10648,World Bank,Washington,DC,2023)and P.Amatyakul,D.Igan,and M.Jacopo Lombardi,“Sectoral Price Dynamics in the Last Mile of Post-Covid-19 Disinflation”(BIS Quarterly Review,Bank for In

191、ternational Settlements,March 2024).For the dominant role of these prices in explaining the U.S.inflation,see S.Leduc,D.J.Wilson,and C.Zhao,“Will a Cooler Labor Market Slow Supercore Inflation?”(Economic Letter,Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,July 2023)and“PCE Inflation Contributions from Good

192、s and Services”(Data Indicators,Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,2024).5 U.S.Energy Information Administration,Short-Term Energy Outlook(Washington,DC:U.S.Energy Information Administration,February 2024).ENERGY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 16 Global gas demand stagnated in 2023 overall,

193、increasing by only 0.5%or 22 billion cubic meters(bcm,y/y),less than half the previous years fall(figure 6.B).Gas demand in the Asia Pacific region increased by about 24 bcm,driven by China and Indias power and industrial sectors.Consumption in North America increased marginally,but consumption in E

194、urope declined by 36 bcm,to its lowest level since 1996,and about 22 percent below its 2005 peak.The pullback in Europe reflected lower electricity consumption,increased penetration of renewable electricity,efficiency gains,policy directives,and a mild winter(figure 6.C).Global gas supply was little

195、 changed in 2023,with increased LNG production continuing to outweigh the decline in Russian piped gas exports.Production of natural gas in the United States increased by 40 bcm in 2023,from already record levels in 2022(figure 6.B).Supply of natural gas from Europe declined by 15 bcm reflecting hig

196、h storage levels and decreasing demand.Russias output decreased by 32 bcm as increased LNG exports,which are not affected by sanctions,only partly offset lower pipeline exports to Europe.The reconfiguration of natural gas trade patterns following the Russian invasion of Ukraine has continued,with th

197、e European Union absorbing about 70 percent of U.S.LNG exports in 2023(figure 6.D).Meanwhile,imports of LNG increased by 12 bcm in China,more than offsetting a sharp 8 bcm decline in Japan.The United States became the worlds biggest LNG exporter in 2023,overtaking Australia and Qatar.Large inventori

198、es contributed to downward pressure on prices.In the European Union,storage levels have been at the upper end of the pre-pandemic range since November 2022,due to weak demand and ample LNG imports(figure 6.E).Storage levels have also been elevated in the United States,Japan,and Korea.Outlook Natural

199、 gas prices are forecast to be significantly lower in 2024 than in the previous two years,but to recover in 2025.The decline in 2024 reflects FIGURE 6 Natural gas markets Natural gas prices declined sharply in 2024Q1,led by the European benchmark.In 2023,natural gas consumption increased in Asia Pac

200、ific,but European consumption fell compared to its 2015-19 average,supported by efficiency gains,renewable electricity penetration,and mild temperatures.Roughly 70 percent of U.S.LNG exports were directed to the European Union,continuing to offset reduced pipeline gas exports from Russia.Inventories

201、 remained high,especially in Europe.Major risks to the price outlook include delays in delivering new U.S.LNG export terminals.B.Changes in supply and demand by region A.Natural gas prices D.Destinations of U.S.LNG exports C.European natural gas consumption Sources:Gas Infrastructure Europe(AGSI+);B

202、loomberg;U.S.Energy Information Administration(EIA),Eurostat;International Energy Agency(IEA);World Bank.Note:AE=advanced economies;EAP=East Asia and Pacific;ECA=Europe and Central Asia;LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean;MNA=Middle East and North Africa;SAR=South Asia.A.Monthly data,last observatio

203、n is March 2024.B.2024 and 2025 indicate IEA forecasts.C.Shaded area indicates the 2015-19 range.Last observation is February 2024.D.Annual average using monthly data of U.S.LNG shipments.Last observation is January 2024.E.Gray area indicates 2017-21 range.Sample includes 20 EU countries and the Uni

204、ted Kingdom.Last observation is April 17,2024.F.2024 and 2025 are EIA estimates based on up-to-date project information.Last update is 2024Q1.F.Additional U.S.liquefaction capacity E.European inventories of natural gas -150-020222023202420252022202320242025DemandSupplyAsia PacificEuras

205、iaEuropeMiddle EastNorth AmericaOtherWorldBillion cubic meters5001,0001,5002,0002,500JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec2015-19 range2024Petajoules0204060802023Jan-24ChinaECA and MNALAC,EAP and SAR excl.ChinaAE(non EU)European UnionPercent012345JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepO

206、ctNovDec2017-21 range202220232017-21 average2024Trillion cubic feet05002242025Billion cubic feet020406080Mar-21Jul-21Nov-21Mar-22Jul-22Nov-22Mar-23Jul-23Nov-23Mar-24Natural gas,U.S.Natural gas,EuropeLiquefied natural gas,JapanUS$/mmbtu ENERGY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOO

207、K|APRIL 2024 17 high levels of storage worldwide and increasing supply,with the reconfiguration of trade flows initiated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine largely complete.The European gas price is expected to decline 28 percent in 2024(y/y),as increased quantities of natural gas in storage lessen

208、import needs,but to rise by 11 percent in 2025.The U.S.benchmark price is envisaged to be 5 percent lower in 2024 than last year before increasing by 46 percent in 2025,as exports of LNG step up due to new terminals becoming available.Movements in Japans LNG price are expected to broadly track those

209、 of the European benchmark,with the difference between the two influenced by traffic conditions through the Suez and Panama canals.The price forecast entails that global demand for natural gas will increase by about 100 bcm in 2024 and 80 bcm in 2025,after two years of stagnation(figure 6.B).The exp

210、ected expansion in 2024 is primarily driven by China,although demand is poised to strengthen in all regions as consumption in industrial and power sectors responds to materially lower prices.In 2025,stagnating gas demand in advanced economies will temper an expected rise in consumption in EMDEs.The

211、gas market is set to remain tight,with production increases no more than matching demand in 2024 and 2025.Supply is poised to expand somewhat in all the main producing regions,including Russia,where production has declined for the last two years.U.S.supply will be boosted by the completion of new pi

212、pelines and increased wet gas extraction,driven partly by relatively high oil prices.LNG trade growth in the next two years will be supported by demand growth mainly in East Asia and the Pacific(particularly China),met by rising exports from Africa and the United States.Risks Risks to the natural ga

213、s price forecast are tilted to the upside.Prices could be higher than projected due to conflict-and geopolitics-related develop-ments,lower U.S.exports,and weather events.On the downside,a weakening growth outlook globally,and particularly in East Asia and the Pacific,could result in lower prices.Up

214、side risks Conflict escalation and wider geopolitical developments.Rising geopolitical tensions could push prices higher,especially in the European and LNG markets.The potential for further escalation of the conflict in the Middle East represents a major risk factor,given the region is a key supplie

215、r of natural gas about 20 percent of global LNG supply transits the Strait of Hormuz.Rising tension could also affect renegotiation of pipeline Russian exports to Europe,as existing commercial arrangements are due to expire at the end of 2024.On the other hand,the impact of disruptions to shipping t

216、hrough the Suez and Panama canals has so far been limited to increased transport times and higher insurance costs,and is not expected to escalate further,even if rerouting continues.6 Lower U.S.exports.The forecast assumes a planned 50 percent increase in U.S.LNG export capacity by 2025(figure 6.F).

217、Any delay in this rise would put upward pressure on global LNG and European gas prices,with notable conse-quences for European economic activity and energy prices.7 However,lower US exports would also imply downward pressure on domestic U.S.prices.Weather events.Weather-related risks include cold wi

218、nters in major consuming countries,dry weather affecting hydropower production,and freezing conditions that prevent extraction.Dry weather conditions have become a more frequent occurrence in recent years in China,likely indicating a growing impact of climate change on the countrys power system.Down

219、side Risks Weaker growth in East Asia.As most growth in gas demand is expected to occur in East Asia and the Pacific,weaker-than-expected GDP growth in 6 J.Sharples,LNG Shipping Chokepoints:Te Impact of Red Sea and Panama Canal Disruption(Oxford:Oxford Institute for Energy Studies,2024).7 P.Alessand

220、ri and A.Gazzani,“Natural Gas and the Macroeconomy:Not All Energy Shocks Are Alike,”Temi di Discussione(Working Paper)No.1428(Roma:Banca dItalia,2023).ENERGY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 18 earlier,while the price of South African coal was 30 percent lower.Global coal consumption is estimate

221、d to have reached an all-time high in 2023,increasing by 120 million tons(Mmt)(1.4 percent)from 2022.Demand growth nonetheless slowed due to soft economic activity,the increased penetration of renewable electricity,and lower gas prices.Estimated demand decreased by about 100 Mmt in both the United S

222、tates and European Union,while increasing in China and India,by about 220 and 100 Mmt,respectively(figure 7.B).Global demand continued to shift toward Asia in 2023,with China and India accounting for 70 percent of total consumption.Global coal production is estimated to have risen by about 150 Mmt i

223、n 2023.Output rose by about 100 Mmt in India,but by only about 50 Mmt in China,partly owing to increased safety measures in domestic mines.Production declined in the United States and the European Union by about 50 and 70 Mmt,respectively,while stagnating in Australia owing to labor shortages and so

224、ft exports to China,which have not fully recovered follow-ing the lifting by China of a ban on Australian imports that was imposed in 2021(figure 7.C).Global coal trade is estimated to have reached an all-time high in 2023,increasing by 100 Mmt,largely due to a rise of 150 Mmt in Chinese imports,as

225、domestic production fell short of increasing consumption.Reflecting consumption patterns,the Asia Pacific region received about 80 percent of global coal exports.Outlook The Australian coal price is forecast to fall by 28 percent in 2024(y/y),and 12 percent in 2025,while remaining well above the 201

226、5-19 average.The forecast assumes that global coal consumption reached its high point in 2023,with widespread declines in 2024 and 2025(figure 7.B).Coal consumption is expected to decrease markedly in the European Union and United States,continu-ing recent trends,and to have peaked last year in Chin

227、a,with the prospective rise in renewable generation projected to exceed growth in electrici-that region,especially a worsening of recent headwinds in China,would pose a substantial downward risk to prices.Coal Recent developments Prices for Australian and South African coal fell by about 8 percent i

228、n 2024Q1(q/q),due to substitution away from coal in the power sector,and robust supply(figure 7.A).The price of Australian coal stood 47 percent lower than a year FIGURE 7 Coal markets Coal prices declined in 2024Q1,driven by record-high output and substitution from coal in the power sector.Consumpt

229、ion has continued to shift away from advanced economies,with China and India accounting for about 70 percent of global demand.Coal production is envisaged to diminish in line with demand in 2024 and 2025,due mostly to reductions in the United States and China.Coal prices are expected to decline shar

230、ply in 2024 and fall further in 2025 as renewable power generation meets additional electricity demand.Major risks to the price outlook include stronger-than-expected growth in power output in China,and shortfalls in output from hydropower.B.Changes in coal consumptionA.Coal pricesD.Changes in China

231、s power outputC.Changes in coal production Sources:International Energy Agency(IEA);National Bureau of Statistics of China(NBS);World Bank.Note:Mmt=million metric tons.A.Monthly data.Last observation is March 2024.B.C.Data for 2024 and 2025 are computed based on the IEAs forecast for the 2024-26 per

232、iod.Databased on IEA annual coal report,2023 edition.D.Composition of Chinas power output growth by generating source.Thermal includes oil,natural gas and coal.-600800202242025ChinaIndiaUnited StatesEuropean UnionRest of WorldWorldMmt-600800202242025

233、ChinaIndiaAustraliaIndonesiaUnited StatesRest of WorldEuropean UnionWorldMmt-20002004006008001,001252018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023Solar and windHydroThermalNuclearPower output(RHS)PercentTWh00500Mar-21Jul-21Nov-21Mar-22Jul-22Nov-22Mar-23Jul-23Nov-23Mar-24Coal,AustralianCoal,S

234、outh AfricanUS$/mt ENERGY COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 19 8 International Energy Agency,Coal 2023(Paris:International Energy Agency,2023).power generation,as in 2021,or shortfalls in output from hydropower,as in 2023(figure 7.D).Chinas government is developing new coal mines and approved abo

235、ut 110 GW of coal plants in 2023,which could signal that domestic coal consumption will grow further(Global Energy Monitor et al.2024).9 Electricity demand.Coal power plants are likely to be called upon in the event of excess power demand,such as was recently caused by heat waves in the United State

236、s and China.In addition,coal power stations have frequently made up for generation shortfalls arising from unplanned maintenance,or a lack of alternative resources(such as LNG,or sufficient water levels to support hydroelectric generation).The price effects of unexpected increases in coal demand for

237、 such reasons may be mitigated,however,by coal stocks held by utilities.Downside Risks Ample supply.Despite disruptions to production resulting from transport constraints(in South Africa and the United States)and flooding of coalmines(in Australia),global coal supply has exceeded demand in the last

238、two years.Prices might be lower than projected if this pattern continues.Economic activity.Lower prices than projected could result from weaker-than-anticipated economic growth,especially in China and India.ty demand.8 In India,increased power demand is set to continue driving coal consumption highe

239、r,though more slowly than in recent years.Global coal production is expected to diminish alongside consumption(figure 7.C).Declines are envisaged to be particularly sizable in the United States and China.Production is also poised to fall in Indonesia,the largest coal exporter,but increase in India t

240、o meet domestic demand.Coal trade is estimated to have peaked in 2023 and is projected to decrease faster than consump-tion and production.Declining demand in the European Union is likely to particularly affect coal producers that raised exports following the Russian invasion of Ukraine,including In

241、donesia,Colombia,and South Africa.Risks Risks to the coal price forecast are tilted somewhat to the upside,mainly due to the possibility of a continued rise in Chinas consumption in 2024.Upside risks also include various factors that could slow renewable electricity penetration,or otherwise affect c

242、oal demand and production.Downside risks include ample supply and weaker-than-expected global growth.Upside risks Chinese consumption.The baseline assumption that Chinas coal demand peaked in 2023 may be countered by stronger-than-expected growth in 9 Global Energy Monitor et al.,“Boom and Bust Coal

243、 2024,”available online at https:/globalenergymonitor.org/report/boom-and-bust-coal-2024.AGRICULTURE AND FERTILIZERS COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 20 Agriculture The World Banks agriculture price index edged up in early April,driven by pronounced spikes in cocoa and coffee prices.The index wa

244、s unchanged in 2024Q1(q/q),as a 4 percent decline in food prices offset a 22 percent increase in beverage prices.Favorable global supply conditions,including robust exports from the Black Sea region,weighed on food prices.In contrast,poor weather conditions,in part linked to El Nio,had pushed cocoa

245、and Robusta coffee prices to record highs by the end of Q1,a trend that extended further in early April.The agriculture price index is expected to decline modestly in 2024 and 2025(1 and 4 percent y/y,respectively)as supplies increase and El Nio conditions abate.The food price index is expected to s

246、teadily soften,by 6 percent in 2024 and 4 percent in 2025.In contrast,beverage prices are projected to increase by 22 percent in 2024 before declining by 12 percent in 2025.Raw material prices are forecast to decrease by 2 percent in 2024 before rising by 2 percent in 2025.Risks to the price forecas

247、t,which are tilted to the upside,relate to the path of input costs,trade disruption in the Red Sea,the potential emergence of La Nia,and,in the longer term,biofuel policies.Food commodities Recent developments The World Banks food price index eased in early April after falling by about 4 percent in

248、2024Q1(q/q),to a level 9 percent lower than a year earlier.Subcomponent indexes for grains,oils and meals,and other foods fell by between 2 and 5 percent(figures 8.A and 8.B).Maize prices tumbled by about 11 percent and wheat prices declined by 4 percent in 2024Q1,together driving the 4 percent redu

249、ction in the overall grains index(figure 8.C).Both wheat and maize prices hit three-year lows during the quarter,with the downtrend continuing in early April.The decline in maize prices was attributed to competitively priced offers from the Black Sea region,larger production in major exporters,and f

250、avorable prospects for the next harvest,with global maize production in the 2023-24 season expected to increase by 6 percent to an all-time high.Downward pressure on wheat prices derived from robust exports from Russia and Ukraine and the second-highest global production on record in 2023-24.The col

251、lapse of the Black Sea Grain Initiative had minimal fallout,as Ukraine has so far been able to continue exporting via seaborne corridors and new overland routes.Rice prices increased by about 4 percent in 2024Q1(q/q),standing 28 percent higher than a year earlier,reflecting supply concerns in major

252、exporting countries related to El Nio and continued export restrictions from India.However,prices retreated in February,March,and early April,reflecting the depreciation of Thailands baht and Viet Nams dong against the U.S.dollar,sluggish global rice demand amid increased prices,a seasonal supply in

253、crease from the harvest in Viet Nam,and ongoing offseason harvests of irrigated fields in India and Thailand(figure 8.D).The oils and meals price index declined by 5 percent in 2024Q1(q/q),reaching a level 17 percent lower than a year earlier.This decline was driven by a 14 percent fall in soybean o

254、il prices,a 13 percent drop in soybean meal prices,and a 5 percent decrease in soybean prices,partly offset by an 8 percent increase in palm oil prices.Downward pressures on soybean prices stemmed from near-record production in Brazil,a near-doubling of production in Argentina,and subdued Chinese de

255、mand.Global soybean production in 2023-24 is projected to increase by 5 percent,to a new record.The rise in palm oil prices reflected weakening production in Southeast Asia and declining global stocks.The other foods price index,encompassing sugar,meat,and fruits,fell by 2 percent in 2024Q1(q/q)but

256、remains 10 percent higher than a year earlier.The quarterly decline was due to a 10 percent fall in sugar prices,an 8 percent drop in orange prices,and a 6 percent decrease in chicken prices,partly offset by a 6 percent rise in beef prices.Sugar prices plummeted by 17 percent in December 2023(m/m)an

257、d remained at that level in 2024Q1,reflecting increased production in Brazil and dry weather that allowed cane processing to continue and sugar exports to leave ports faster than expected.AGRICULTURE AND FERTILIZERS COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 21 Outlook The World Banks food price index is

258、projected to decrease by 6 percent in 2024 and 4 percent in 2025,with lower prices for grains as well as oils and meals accompanied by price gains for other foods in 2024,followed by broad-based declines in 2025(figures 8.E and 8.F).The grains price index is expected to fall by 11 percent in 2024(y/

259、y)and 4 percent in 2025,driven by higher global grain supplies(figure 9.A).In 2024,wheat prices are forecast to decline by 15 percent,reflecting elevated production.In 2025,wheat prices are forecast to edge down by a modest 2 percent as the effects of strong export competition and marginally higher

260、production are tempered by somewhat greater consumption and the lowest end-of-season stocks-to-use ratio in eight years(figures 9.B and 9.C).Global maize production is set to reach an all-time high in the 2023-24 season,primarily reflecting increases in the United States and Argentina of 12 percent

261、and 47 percent(y/y),respectively.Maize prices are expected to decline by 21 percent(y/y)this year,amid the surge in supply.However,given that recent relative price movements and crop rotation preferences have favored soybean production,maize production is envisaged to grow only marginally in 2025,le

262、ading to a modest 2 percent price decline in 2025(figures 9.C and 9.D).Recent policy shifts in the European Union to curb agricultural imports from Ukraine(including maize),while also proposing a 95-per-metric-ton duty on grains from Russia and Belarus,may put upward pressure on EU grain prices and

263、downward pressure on prices in non-EU markets for Black Sea grains.Global rice production in 2023-24 remains flat,with the stock-to-use ratio falling to the lowest level in three years.Due to tight global markets and Indias export restrictions,rice prices are forecast to rise by 8 percent(y/y)in 202

264、4.With El Nio conditions expected to diminish by May 2024,production is set to increase thereafter.This,alongside the assumption that weather-induced trade restrictions will ease next year,underpins a projected 8 percent decline in prices in 2025.FIGURE 8 Agricultural prices Agricultural prices were

265、 unchanged in 2024Q1,as a 4 percent(q/q)decline in food prices offset a 22 percent increase in beverage prices.Grains and oils and meals prices decreased 4 and 5 percent,respectively,due to improved supplies and competitively priced offers from the Black Sea region.However,rice prices increased by 4

266、 percent,reflecting supply concerns and trade restrictions in major exporting countries.Food prices are forecast to decrease by 6 percent in 2024 and 4 percent in 2025,with lower prices for grains as well as oils and meals in 2024,followed by broad-based declines in 2025.B.Food price indexes A.Agric

267、ulture price indexes D.Rice prices C.Grain prices Sources:Bloomberg;S&P Global;World Bank.Note:mt=metric tons.A-D.Monthly data,last observation is March 2024.C.Wheat refers to US HRW benchmark.D.Thai and Vietnamese rice refers to the 5 percent broken ratio.E.F.2024 and 2025 numbers refer to forecast

268、s.F.Food price forecasts E.Agriculture price forecasts 60800180Mar-20Jun-20Sep-20Dec-20Mar-21Jun-21Sep-21Dec-21Mar-22Jun-22Sep-22Dec-22Mar-23Jun-23Sep-23Dec-23Mar-24GrainsOils and mealsOther foodUS$indexes,100=200800Mar-20Jul-20Nov-20Mar-21Jul-21Nov-21Mar-22Jul-22Nov-22Mar-23Ju

269、l-23Nov-23Mar-24WheatMaizeSoybeanUS$/mt0200400600800Mar-20Jul-20Nov-20Mar-21Jul-21Nov-21Mar-22Jul-22Nov-22Mar-23Jul-23Nov-23Mar-24Rice,ThaiRice,Viet NameseUS$/mt-20-100102030FoodBeveragesRaw Materials202320242025Percent,annual change-20-10010GrainsOils andMealsOther food202320242025Percent,annual ch

270、ange60800180Mar-20Jun-20Sep-20Dec-20Mar-21Jun-21Sep-21Dec-21Mar-22Jun-22Sep-22Dec-22Mar-23Jun-23Sep-23Dec-23Mar-24FoodBeveragesRaw materialsUS$indexes,100=2010The oils and meals price index is projected to fall by 7 percent(y/y)in 2024 and 5 percent in 2025,due to favorable global supplie

271、s(figure 9.E).Soybean prices are forecast to decrease by 16 percent in 2024 and 5 percent in 2025,reflecting record-high global production and the highest AGRICULTURE AND FERTILIZERS COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 22 FIGURE 9 Supply conditions for grains and edible oils In the 2023-24 crop yea

272、r,global output of grains and oilseeds increased by 2 and 4 percent,respectively,supporting price declines,with maize and soybean production forecast to reach record highs.Stock-to-use ratios are trending lower for rice and wheat,and higher for maize and soybean.Despite a slight dip,wheat production

273、 will remain at near-record levels in 2023-24.Global supplies in the 2024-25 crop year are projected to be lower for wheat and higher for maize,soybeans,and rice compared to 2023-24.Surveys in the United States for 2024-25 suggest that planted acreage for soybeans will increase by 3 percent(y/y)and

274、decrease by 4 and 5 percent for wheat and maize,respectively.Ample edible oil supply has created downward price pressures.B.Stock-to-use ratio for selected grains A.Grain supply growth D.Planting intentions in the United States C.Production estimates for selected grains Sources:International Grains

275、Council(IGC);U.S.Department of Agriculture;World Bank.Note:Years represent crop season(for example,2024 refers to 2023-24).The 2023-24 crop year will end on June 30th,2024,for wheat,August 31st,2024,for maize and soybean,and July 31st for rice.mmt=million metric tons.A.E.Supply is the sum of beginni

276、ng stocks and production.Data updated in April 2024.B.F.Stocks-to-use ratios is the ratio between domestic consumption and ending stocks.Data updated as of April 11,2024.C.Blue bar consists of the difference between 2024-25 crop seasons projected supply and 2023-24 supply estimates of selected grain

277、s.The 2024-25 projections are World Banks calculations based on data from IGC and USDA.The red bar shows the average year-on-year production change between 2018 and 2024.D.Data taken from the Prospective Plantings Report of the U.S.Department of Agriculture,released March 2024.F.Stock-to-use ratio f

278、or soybeans E.Edible oil supply growth stock-to-use ratio since 2018(figure 9.F).An anticipated increase in harvested area in 2025,driven by the relative attractiveness of soybean over maize production,will further contribute to declining soybean prices.Projected declines in soybean meal prices,by 1

279、1 percent in 2024 and 4 percent in 2025,also reflect these positive supply fundamentals.In contrast,soybean oil prices are expected to edge higher by 1 percent in 2024 and 2 percent in 2025,due to higher demand for biodiesel production in Brazil,India,Indonesia,Malaysia,and the United States.Palm oi

280、l prices are set to rise by 2 percent in 2024,given weakening production in Southeast Asia and tightening stocks,but to decline by 9 percent in 2025 as supplies improve following the weakening of El Nio.The price index for other foods is projected to increase by 2 percent(y/y)in 2024 and then fall b

281、y 3 percent in 2025.The expected weakening of El Nio in the first half of 2024 should alleviate sugar supply constraints in India and Thailand,the second and third largest sugar exporters globally,resulting in price declines of 3 percent and 8 percent(y/y)in 2024 and 2025,respectively.Orange prices

282、are forecast to rise about 5 percent in 2024,following a 71 percent spike in 2023.The forecast of sustained high prices reflects storm damage and citrus disease in orange-producing states in the United States,coupled with continued drought conditions in Spain,Europes largest orange producer.Orange p

283、rices are projected to decline by 9 percent in 2025 as these factors begin to subside.Risks Risks to the agricultural commodity price forecasts are tilted to the upside.Notable upside risks relate to weather,geopolitics,input cost dynamics,and potential maritime chokepoints.However,biofuel policies

284、that are less supportive of prices than currently envisaged pose a downside risk.Upside risks Disruptions to grain shipments.In 2023,more than 14 percent of global seaborne grains and oilseeds trade passed through the Suez Canal,00620082000222024RiceMaizeWheatRatio-1

285、001020304050WheatMaizeSoybeansRice-25mmt,annual change7075808590954850Wheat(RHS)MaizeSoybean202220232024eMillion acresMillion acres-3036922000022202320241990-2022 averagemmt,annual change06200820002220

286、24Soybean,OilSoybean,MealSoybean,OilseedRatio-02002502000020202241990-2022 averagemmt,annual change AGRICULTURE AND FERTILIZERS COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 23 FIGURE 10 Risks to agriculture markets Recent attacks on commercial vessel

287、s in the Red Sea have prompted significant rerouting from the Suez Canal to around the Cape of Good Hope,causing delays.Vessels originating from the Black Sea have continued using the Red Sea route;if intensified attacks pushed them also to reroute,significant upward pressure on food prices could re

288、sult.Unexpected increases in energy and fertilizer prices and growing biofuel demand could raise agricultural prices.B.Trade diversion from Suez Canal to Cape of Good Hope:transit delays A.Trade transit volumes around maritime disruptions in the Red Sea D.Biofuels production C.Energy and fertilizer

289、indexes Nio and the likely emergence of La Nia is anticipated to alleviate price pressures on commodities like cocoa,food oils,natural rubber,rice,and sugar in 2025.If these weather forecasts fail to materialize,prices may surpass expectations.Downside risks Biofuels.The International Energy Agency

290、predicts a 30 percent increase in biofuel demand from 2023-28 relative to the previous five years.Emerging and developing economies such as Brazil,India,Indonesia,Sources:International Grains Council;Statistical Review of the World Energy,Energy Institute;Kpler;Port Watch,International Monetary Fund

291、;Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD);World Bank.A.Bars show total trade transit volumes in million metric tons that pass through the Suez Canal,the Bab-el-Mandeb,and Cape of Good Hope in the first quarters of 2024(after the Red Sea maritime disruptions)and 2023(same quarter b

292、efore the disruption).Data updated as of April 2024.B.Bars show the additional transit days vessels need to reach their destination when they re-route from the Suez Canal and take the longer route via the Cape of Good Hope.C.Dashed lines indicate forecasts.D.Years 2023-25 include projections from OE

293、CD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2023-2032.a considerably higher share than for crude oil and metals.Recent attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea prompted significant rerouting from the Suez Canal to around the Cape of Good Hope(figure 10.A).During December and January,an estimated 4.3 million ton

294、s of grains and oilseeds were diverted in this manner,mostly affecting U.S.soybean exports and EU wheat exports to Asia.Thus far,however,grain and oilseed prices have not been significantly affected,perhaps partly because container ships originating from the Black Sea regiona major source of grain a

295、nd oilseedshave continued to take the Red Sea route.If attacks intensify,prompting vessels from the Black Sea to also divert,substantial delays,increased shipment costs,and higher prices could materialize(figure 10.B).Input costs.Energy and fertilizer costs are forecast to decrease by 3 and 22 perce

296、nt,respectively,in 2024,with further declines in 2025(figure 10.C).If these price declines do not materializefor instance,because of escalating geopolitical tensions that push up energy prices and adversely affect fertilizer productionfood prices will likely be higher than forecast.Moreover,fertiliz

297、er producers in the Black Sea region,the Middle East,and North Africa heavily rely on the Suez Canal for exports,and this route could become unviable if Red Sea shipping disruptions intensify,raising the cost of transporting fertilizers to end-users.La Nia.The U.S.National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad

298、ministration forecasts a weakening of El Nio weather conditions,with an 85 percent chance of transitioning to neutral conditions by April-June 2024.The probability of a subsequent La Nia onset between June and August 2024 has increased to 60 percent.La Nia conditions typically result in wetter than

299、normal conditions in Australia,northern Brazil,India,Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,and Southeastern Africa,while bringing unusually dry weather in the United States Gulf Coast,Southern Brazil,and Argentina.The weakening of El 0510152025Europe toAsiaUS Gulf toAsiaBlack Seato ChinaMideastGulf toE

300、uropeRussia toIndiaWheatSoybeansGrainsCrude oilNumber of extra transit days40608002019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025FertilizersEnergyIndex,100=20210.00.51.01.52.02.50200520025United StatesBrazilEuropean UnionOthersmb/d of oil equivalent00700Suez CanalBab-e

301、l-MandebCape of GoodHope2023Q12024Q1Millions of metric tons AGRICULTURE AND FERTILIZERS COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 24 and Malaysia are expected to drive over 60 percent of demand growth through supportive policies promoting biofuel adoption,rising demand for transport fuel,and ample availa

302、bility of feedstock,even though the majority of current production occurs in advanced economies(figure 10.D).The share of biodiesel demand in total palm oil production in Malaysia and Indonesia is projected to rise from 19 percent in 2022 to FIGURE 11 Food insecurity and inflation In 48 highly food

303、insecure countries,for which recent estimates are available,238 million people faced acute food insecurity in 2023a 10 percent increase from 2022,and up from 99 million in 2018.Armed conflict continues to be the primary driver of food insecurity.Global domestic food price inflation decreased to 5 pe

304、rcent in 2024Q1,from 6 percent in 2023Q4.However,numerous countries still grappled with very high food price inflation.A.Number of people with acute foodinsecurity in 48 highly vulnerable countries B.Number of people with food insecurity,2018-22 Sources:FSIN and GNAFC(2023);World Bank.Note:EAP=East

305、Africa and the Pacific;ECA=Europe and Central Asia;LAC=Latin America and Caribbean;MNA=Middle East and North Africa;SAR=South Asia;SSA=Sub Saharan Africa.A.Bars represent the sum of IPC Acute Food Insecurity phases 3(crisis),4(emergency),and 5(catastrophe/famine),as well as severely and modestly foo

306、d insecure categories.The chart includes 48 countries for which comparable data was available.B.Data are as reported in Figure 1.8 of Global Report on Food Crises 2023 by the Global Network Against Food Crises.C.Sample consists median value of food price inflation for 140 EMDEs,including 17 EAP,22EC

307、A,35 LAC,17 MNA,8 SAR,and 41 SSA.2024Q1 includes only January and February.D.Average food price inflation for the first quarter of 2024 including 8 countries with the highestrates.30 percent by 2028.Additionally,in the United States,eight midwestern states will be permitted to sell gasoline blended

308、with 15 percent ethanol year-round from April 2025.The forecasts assume that this policy-derived support for biofuel demand will continue.However,there may be downward pressure on prices for grains,vegetable oils,and sugar if such policies do not unfold as planned.Implications for food security and

309、inflation The number of people experiencing acute food insecurity has risen sharply in recent yearsfrom just over 100 million in 2018 to about a quarter of a billion in 2022and is estimated to have increased further last year,despite easing food inflation.Indeed,the latest available data for 48 out

310、of 73 economies where food crises exist indicate that 238 million people faced acute food insecurity in 2023a 10 percent increase from 2022,and up from 99 million in 2018(figure 11.A).10 Armed conflict is the primary driver ofglobal food insecurity,followed by economicshocks and extreme weather(figu

311、re 11.B).Assuch,the conflict in the Middle East and a wideruptick in instability and violence in fragile andconflict-affected economies has substantiallyexacerbated food insecuritywithout an urgentremedy,millions in Gaza,South Sudan,andSudan could face famine.More broadly,theseven countries with the

312、 highest numbers ofpeople experiencing acute food insecurity in2024accounting for more than two-thirds of thetotalare all afflicted by conflict.Nonetheless,the anticipated decline in food prices over the nexttwo years should attenuate food insecurity to somedegree.In 2024Q1,global domestic food pric

313、e inflation was 4.9 percent,down from 5.7 percent in 2023Q4.Decreasing international prices of various agricultural commodities contributed to the decline.Nonetheless,domestic food price inflation in 2024Q1 was higher than the 2022 C.Regional food price inflation,change from a year earlier D.Food pr

314、ice inflation for selectedcountries for 2024Q000022Conflict/insecurityEconomic shocksWeather extremesMillions of people0.01.53.04.56.07.59.0EAPECALACMNASARSSA2023Q42024Q1Percent0100200300ArgentinaLebanonVenezuela,RBZimbabweTrkiyeMyanmarEgypt,ArabRep.MalawiPercent0501

315、0002120222023Millions of people10 FSIN(Food Security Information Network),and GNAFC(Global Network Against Food Crises).2023.“Global Report on Food Crises:Joint Analysis for Better Decisions.”Mid-year update,Food Security Information Network,Rome.AGRICULTURE AND FERTILIZERS COM

316、MODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 25 percent in 2024(y/y),before weakening considerably next year.Cocoa prices continued to climb in 2024Q1,gaining nearly 45 percent(q/q),to stand 112 percent higher than a year earlier(figure 12.C).Prices exceeded$7/kg in March 2024 for the first time since high-fre

317、quency price records began,FIGURE 12 Beverage markets Sharply rising prices for cocoa and Robusta coffee drove the beverage price index to a nearly five-decade high in 2024Q1,a trend that continued in early April.The surge reflects supply shortfalls,mainly due to El Nio weather patterns,as well as s

318、trong demand.Tea prices have diverged across auctions reflecting production changes among suppliers.Beverage prices are expected to strengthen further in 2024 before weakening in 2025 as additional supplies reach the market.B.Changes in coffee production A.Coffee:Arabica and Robusta prices C.Cocoa p

319、rices Sources:Africa Tea Brokers Limited;International Cocoa Organization;International Tea Committee;Tea Board India;Tea Exporters Association Sri Lanka;U.S.Department of Agriculture;World Bank.Note:mt=metric tons.A.C.E.Monthly data,last observation is March 2024.B.Years represent crop seasons(for

320、example,2023,refers to 2022-23).Data updated through 2024.D.Data for 2024(2023-24)is ICCO forecast.E.12 month change in production from January 2023 to December 2023.D.Changes in cocoa production E.Tea prices F.Changes in tea production,2023 averagethe peak year of the recent surge in global inflati

321、onfor about one in five emerging and developing economies,and stands above 5 percent in half of countries in each of the Middle East and North Africa,Latin America and the Caribbean,South Asia,and Sub-Saharan Africa(figure 11.C).Several countries continue to experience very high food inflation in co

322、ntexts of generally rapid price growth.For example,food price inflation in 2024Q1 was close to 300 percent in Argentina,142 percent in Lebanon,and more than 50 percent in Myanmar,Trkiye,Venezuela,and Zimbabwe(figure 11.D).Beverages The World Banks beverage price index reached a nearly five-decade no

323、minal high in 2024Q1,driven by surging prices of cocoa and Robusta coffee,mostly in response to supply shortfalls partly linked to El Nio.The index is expected to gain more than 20 percent,on average,in 2024,but to decline by 12 percent in 2025 as additional supplies of coffee and cocoa reach the ma

324、rket.Risks to the outlook include potential supply disruptions should La Nia generate more volatile weather patterns than expected.Robusta coffee prices jumped by 24 percent in 2024Q1(q/q)to the highest level since 1994,and were more than 50 percent higher than a year earlier(figure 12.A).Although d

325、emand is growing,the price surge mainly reflects continuing concerns about supplies from key Robusta producers(including Indonesia and to a lesser extent Brazil),partly linked to the ongoing El Nio.Meanwhile,Arabica prices gained 5 percent in 2024Q1(q/q),also reflecting recent tightness in global su

326、pplies.The global coffee market anticipates significant supply growth of nearly 7 million bags in the current season,mainly from Brazil,Colombia,and Ethiopia,which dominate the Arabica market(figure 12.B).However,continuing production challenges loom in the Robusta market,as key suppliers,especially

327、 Indonesia and Viet Nam,grapple with poor yields.On the demand side,consumption is projected to reach record highs in 2023-24(up about 1 percent from last season).Due to these factors,Arabica prices are expected to soften this year and then stabilize in 2025,while Robusta prices are anticipated to i

328、ncrease by 33-15-10-5050020202242000-22 averageMillions of 60 kg bags,annual change2468Mar-20Jul-20Nov-20Mar-21Jul-21Nov-21Mar-22Jul-22Nov-22Mar-23Jul-23Nov-23Mar-24US$/kg-600800200022202320242000-22 averagemt,thousands,annual chan

329、ge12345Mar-20Jul-20Nov-20Mar-21Jul-21Nov-21Mar-22Jul-22Nov-22Mar-23Jul-23Nov-23Mar-24KolkataColomboMombasaUS$/kg-20-1001020UgandaNorth IndiaKenyaMalawiTanzaniaSouth IndiaSri LankaBangladeshmt,thousands,annual change1.31.72.12.52.93.33.74.1234567Mar-20Jul-20Nov-20Mar-21Jul-21Nov-21Mar-22Jul-22Nov-22M

330、ar-23Jul-23Nov-23Mar-24Coffee ArabicaCoffee Robusta(RHS)US$/kgUS$/kg AGRICULTURE AND FERTILIZERS COMMODITY MARKETS OUTLOOK|APRIL 2024 26 FIGURE 13 Agricultural raw materials markets Cotton prices have been relatively stable since 2022 amid subdued global consumption and rising stocks,while natural r

331、ubber prices have risen since 2023Q4 reflecting robust demand.The raw material price index is expected to be marginally lower,on average,in 2024 than last year,before edging up in 2025 amid increased demand.C.Changes in natural rubberconsumption A.Agricultural raw material prices D.Changes in natura

332、l rubberproduction B.Cotton end-year stocks Sources:Bloomberg;International Cotton Advisory Committee;International Rubber Study Group;World Bank.Note:mt=metric tons.A.Monthly data,last observation is March 2024.B.Ending stocks,2023-24 is ICAC projection.Years represent crop season(for example,2023r

333、efers to 2022-23 crop season).C.D.Changes from the same quarter in the previous year.Last observation is 2023Q3.rising as high as$10/kg by early April.The surge has been fueled by this seasons poor supply prospectsglobal cocoa production is anticipated to decline by 11 percent in 2023-24(from 4.87 to 4.32 mmt),reflecting reductions in Cte dIvoire and Ghana,which combined account for 55 percent of