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1、WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK2023APRA Rocky RecoveryINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDWORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOKA Rocky Recovery2023APRINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND2023 International Monetary Fund Cover and Design:IMF CSF Creative Solutions DivisionComposition:Absolute Service,Inc.;and AGS,An RR Donnelley Company Catal
2、oging-in-Publication DataIMF LibraryNames:International Monetary Fund.Title:World economic outlook(International Monetary Fund)Other titles:WEO|Occasional paper(International Monetary Fund)|World economic and financial surveys.Description:Washington,DC:International Monetary Fund,1980-|Semiannual|So
3、me issues also have thematic titles.|Began with issue for May 1980.|1981-1984:Occasional paper/International Monetary Fund,0251-6365|1986-:World economic and financial surveys,0256-6877.Identifiers:ISSN 0256-6877(print)|ISSN 1564-5215(online)Subjects:LCSH:Economic developmentPeriodicals.|Internation
4、al economic relationsPeriodicals.|Debts,ExternalPeriodicals.|Balance of paymentsPeriodicals.|International financePeriodicals.|Economic forecastingPeriodicals.Classification:LCC HC10.W79HC10.80 ISBN 979-8-40022-411-9(English Paper)979-8-40023-813-0(English ePub)979-8-40022-442-3(English Web PDF)Disc
5、laimer:The World Economic Outlook(WEO)is a survey by the IMF staff published twice a year,in the spring and fall.The WEO is prepared by the IMF staff and has ben-efited from comments and suggestions by Executive Directors following their discussion of the report on March 30,2023.The views expressed
6、in this publication are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMFs Executive Directors or their national authorities.Recommended citation:International Monetary Fund.2023.World Economic Outlook:A Rocky Recovery.Washington,DC.April.Publication orders may be placed o
7、nline,by fax,or through the mail:International Monetary Fund,Publication Services P.O.Box 92780,Washington,DC 20090,USATel.:(202)623-7430 Fax:(202)623-7201E-mail:publicationsimf.orgwww.bookstore.imf.orgwww.elibrary.imf.org International Monetary Fund|April 2023 iiiCONTENTSAssumptions and Conventions
8、 ixFurther Information xiData xiiPreface xiiiForeword xivExecutive Summary xviChapter 1.Global Prospects and Policies 1A Rocky Recovery 1A Challenging Outlook 6Downside Risks Dominate 14Policy Priorities:Walking a Narrow Path 17Box 1.1.House Prices:Coming off the Boil 23Box 1.2.Monetary Policy:Speed
9、 of Transmission,Heterogeneity,and Asymmetries 25Box 1.3.Risk Assessment Surrounding the World Economic Outlook Baseline Projections 27Commodity Special Feature:Market Developments and the Macroeconomic Impact of Declines in Fossil Fuel Extraction 30References 42Chapter 2.The Natural Rate of Interes
10、t:Drivers and Implications for Policy 45Introduction 45Trends in Real Rates over the Long Term 47Measuring the Natural Rate 48Drivers of the Natural Rate 52The Outlook for the Natural Rate 55Policy Implications 57Conclusion 58Box 2.1.The Natural Rate of Interest and the Green Transition 60Box 2.2.Ge
11、oeconomic Fragmentation and the Natural Interest Rate 62Box 2.3.Spillovers to Emerging Market and Developing Economies 64References 66Chapter 3.Coming Down to Earth:How to Tackle Soaring Public Debt 69Introduction 69Macroeconomic Drivers of the Debt-to-GDP Ratio 72Debt Restructuring and Its Effects
12、77Going Granular:Case Studies of Debt Restructuring 81Conclusions and Policy Implications 83Box 3.1.Market Reforms to Promote Growth and Debt Sustainability 86Box 3.2.Monetary and Fiscal Interactions 87References 88WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A ROCKY RECOVERYiv International Monetary Fund|April 2023Chapt
13、er 4.Geoeconomic Fragmentation and Foreign Direct Investment 91Introduction 91Early Signs of FDI Fragmentation 94Which Host Countries Are More Vulnerable to FDI Relocation?97FDI Spillovers to Host Countries 99A Model-Based Quantification of the Costs of FDI Fragmentation 101Policy Implications 104Bo
14、x 4.1.Rising Trade Tensions 107Box 4.2.Balance Sheet Exposure to Fragmentation Risk 109Box 4.3.Geopolitical Tensions,Supply Chains,and Trade 110References 112Statistical Appendix 115Assumptions 115Whats New 116Data and Conventions 116Country Notes 117Classification of Countries 119General Features a
15、nd Composition of Groups in the World Economic Outlook Classification 119Table A.Classification by World Economic Outlook Groups and Their Shares in Aggregate GDP,Exports of Goods and Services,and Population,2022 120Table B.Advanced Economies by Subgroup 121Table C.European Union 121Table D.Emerging
16、 Market and Developing Economies by Region and Main Source of Export Earnings 122Table E.Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region,Net External Position,Heavily Indebted Poor Countries,and Per Capita Income Classification 123Table F.Economies with Exceptional Reporting Periods 125Table G.Ke
17、y Data Documentation 126Box A1.Economic Policy Assumptions Underlying the Projections for Selected Economies 136List of Tables 141Output(Tables A1A4)142Inflation(Tables A5A7)149Financial Policies(Table A8)154Foreign Trade(Table A9)155Current Account Transactions(Tables A10A12)157Balance of Payments
18、and External Financing(Table A13)164Flow of Funds(Table A14)168Medium-Term Baseline Scenario(Table A15)171World Economic Outlook Selected Topics 173IMF Executive Board Discussion of the Outlook,March 2023 183TablesTable 1.1.Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections 9Table 1.2.Overview of th
19、e World Economic Outlook Projections at Market Exchange Rate Weights 11Annex Table 1.1.1.European Economies:Real GDP,Consumer Prices,Current Account Balance,and Unemployment 36contents International Monetary Fund|April 2023 vAnnex Table 1.1.2.Asian and Pacific Economies:Real GDP,Consumer Prices,Curr
20、ent Account Balance,and Unemployment 37Annex Table 1.1.3.Western Hemisphere Economies:Real GDP,Consumer Prices,Current Account Balance,and Unemployment 38Annex Table 1.1.4.Middle East and Central Asia Economies:Real GDP,Consumer Prices,Current Account Balance,and Unemployment 39Annex Table 1.1.5.Sub
21、-Saharan African Economies:Real GDP,Consumer Prices,Current Account Balance,and Unemployment 40Annex Table 1.1.6.Summary of World Real per Capita Output 41Table 2.1.Required Fiscal Adjustment under Different Scenarios 58Table 3.1.Average Nominal Effective Interest Rate and Inflation during Reduction
22、 Episodes 73Table 3.2.Structural Vector Autoregression Sign Restrictions 74Table 3.3.Historical Decomposition of Debt Reduction 75Table 3.4.Summary Statistics of Restructuring 78Table 3.5.Restructurings with Face Value Reduction 80Table 3.6.Impact of Restructuring and Consolidation 81Table 3.7.Case
23、Study Summary 82Table 4.1.Modeled Fragmentation Scenarios 103Online TablesStatistical AppendixTable B1.Advanced Economies:Unemployment,Employment,and Real GDP per CapitaTable B2.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Real GDPTable B3.Advanced Economies:Hourly Earnings,Productivity,and Unit Labor C
24、osts in ManufacturingTable B4.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Consumer PricesTable B5.Summary of Fiscal and Financial IndicatorsTable B6.Advanced Economies:General and Central Government Net Lending/Borrowing and General Government Net Lending/Borrowing Excluding Social Security SchemesTabl
25、e B7.Advanced Economies:General Government Structural BalancesTable B8.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:General Government Net Lending/Borrowing and Overall Fiscal BalanceTable B9.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:General Government Net Lending/BorrowingTable B10.Selected Advanced Eco
26、nomies:Exchange RatesTable B11.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Broad Money AggregatesTable B12.Advanced Economies:Export Volumes,Import Volumes,and Terms of Trade in Goods and ServicesTable B13.Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region:Total Trade in GoodsTable B14.Emerging Market
27、and Developing Economies by Source of Export Earnings:Total Trade in GoodsTable B15.Summary of Current Account TransactionsTable B16.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Summary of External Debt and Debt ServiceTable B17.Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region:External Debt by Maturit
28、yTable B18.Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Analytical Criteria:External Debt by MaturityTable B19.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Ratio of External Debt to GDPTable B20.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Debt-Service RatiosTable B21.Emerging Market and Developing Economies
29、,Medium-Term Baseline Scenario:Selected Economic IndicatorsWORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A ROCKY RECOVERYvi International Monetary Fund|April 2023FiguresFigure 1.1.Broad Equity and Bank Equity Indices for Selected Major Economies 2Figure 1.2.Early 2023 Activity Indicators Strengthened but Confidence Remain
30、ed Depressed 2Figure 1.3.Inflation Turning Down or Plateauing?3Figure 1.4.Monetary Policy Tightening Rapidly across Many Economies 3Figure 1.5.Labor Markets Have Tightened in Selected Advanced Economies 4Figure 1.6.Wage-Price Spiral Risks Appear Contained So Far 4Figure 1.7.Anchored Inflation Expect
31、ations 4Figure 1.8.Shifting Market-Implied US Policy Rate Expectations by Vintage and Repricing Risks 5Figure 1.9.Sovereign Spreads in Emerging Market and Developing Economies Have Narrowed 5Figure 1.10.Chinas Reopening and Recovery 6Figure 1.11.Shares of Economies Total Exports Directed to China in
32、 2021 7Figure 1.12.Assumptions on Monetary and Fiscal Policy Stances 7Figure 1.13.Growth Outlook:Feeble and Uneven 8Figure 1.14.Projected Unemployment Rate Rises in Advanced Economies 8Figure 1.15.Real GDP Level in Plausible Alternative Scenario in 202324 12Figure 1.16.Inflation Coming Down over Tim
33、e 12Figure 1.17.Inflation Slowly Converging to Target 13Figure 1.18.Five-Year-Ahead Real Growth Projections by World Economic Outlook Forecast Vintage 13Figure 1.19.Current Account and International Investment Positions 14Figure 1.20.External Debt Vulnerabilities for Emerging Market and Developing E
34、conomies Are High 16Figure 1.21.Geopolitical and Trade Tensions Rising over Time 17Figure 1.22.Real Policy Rates in Selected Advanced Economies 18Figure 1.23.Is US Unemployment Unnaturally Low?18Figure 1.24.Sticky Inflation and Premature Easing:The US Experience in the 1980s 19Figure 1.25.US Dollar
35、Remains Strong Despite Some Moderation 20Figure 1.26.Europes Energy Crisis:Status and Costs of Fiscal Support in 202223 20Figure 1.27.Vulnerability to Food Insecurity:The Case of Wheat 21Figure 1.1.1.Global Average Real House Index 23Figure 1.1.2.Indicators of Housing Market Risk 23Figure 1.1.3.Hous
36、ehold Indebtedness Rates in Selected Economies 24Figure 1.2.1.Years-to-Trough Responses of Prices to Monetary Tightening 25Figure 1.3.1.Distribution of Forecast Uncertainty around World Growth and Inflation Projections 27Figure 1.3.2.Impact of Downside Scenario on GDP and Core Inflation 29Figure 1.S
37、F.1.Commodity Market Developments 30Figure 1.SF.2.EU Gas Storage and Futures Contract Prices 31Figure 1.SF.3.Global Fossil Fuel Production Declines 60 Percent in a Net Zero Emissions Scenario 32Figure 1.SF.4.Top Twenty Countries by Share of Fossil Fuel Production and Net Exports in GDP 33Figure 1.SF
38、.5.Episodes of Extraction Declines 33Figure 1.SF.6.Responses of Macroeconomic Variables to an Extraction Decline Shock 34Figure 1.SF.7.Response of Institutional Quality Interacted with Manufacturing Sector Size to an Extraction Decline Shock 34contents International Monetary Fund|April 2023 viiFigur
39、e 2.1.Real Interest Rate Trends 47Figure 2.2.(Ex Post)Real Interest Rates in Advanced and Emerging Market and Developing Economies 48Figure 2.3.Kalman Filter Estimates of the Natural Rate of Interest for Selected Advanced Economies 49Figure 2.4.Real Rates and Natural Rates:Contemporaneous and Curren
40、t Estimates for Selected Advanced Economies 50Figure 2.5.Measuring the Natural Rate:The Role of International Spillovers 51Figure 2.6.Natural Rate Estimates:Model Comparison 54Figure 2.7.Drivers of Natural Rate Changes from 197579 to 201519 for Selected Economies 54Figure 2.8.Simulated Path for Natu
41、ral Rate of Interest:Baseline and Scenarios 55Figure 2.1.1.The Global Natural Rate of Interest and the Green Transition 60Figure 2.2.1.Regional Impact of Trade Fragmentation Scenario 62Figure 2.2.2.Regional Impact of Financial Fragmentation Scenario 63Figure 2.3.1.Natural Rate Spillovers at Differen
42、t Horizons 64Figure 2.3.2.Estimated Impact of Capital Openness on Strength of US Spillovers 65Figure 3.1.Public Debt Trends 70Figure 3.2.Contribution to Change in Debt to GDP during Reduction Episodes 72Figure 3.3.Effect of Fiscal Consolidation on Debt to GDP 74Figure 3.4.Impulse Responses to a 1 Pe
43、rcentage Point of GDP Primary Balance Shock,Advanced Economies 75Figure 3.5.Factors Affecting the Probability of Consolidations Reducing Debt Ratios 77Figure 3.6.Share of Observations with Positive Change in Primary Balance to GDP 78Figure 3.7.Contribution to Change in Debt-to-GDP Ratio during Reduc
44、tion Episodes with and without Restructuring 79Figure 3.8.Risk of Restructuring 79Figure 3.9.Impact of Restructuring on Debt to GDP 80Figure 3.10.Decomposition of Cumulative Change in Debt to GDP 83Figure 3.1.1.Empirical Impulse Response upon Structural Reforms 86Figure 3.2.1.Estimated Response of E
45、ffective Real Interest Rate 87Figure 4.1.“Slowbalization”92Figure 4.2.Rising Geopolitical Tensions and Foreign Direct Investment Fragmentation 92Figure 4.3.Interest in Reshoring and Firm Characteristics 93Figure 4.4.Foreign Direct Investment Fragmentation 95Figure 4.5.Foreign Direct Investment Reall
46、ocation across Regions,2020:Q222:Q4 versus 2015:Q120:Q1 95Figure 4.6.Change in Outward US Foreign Direct Investment,2020:Q222:Q4 versus 2015:Q120:Q1 96Figure 4.7.Foreign Direct Investment between Geographically and Geopolitically Close Countries 96Figure 4.8.Gravity Model for Ideal Point Distance an
47、d Foreign Direct Investment 97Figure 4.9.Vulnerability Index 98Figure 4.10.Geopolitical Index and Strategic Index 99Figure 4.11.Vulnerability Index and Regulatory Quality 100Figure 4.12.Foreign Direct Investment and Growth:Horizontal versus Vertical 101Figure 4.13.Firm-Level Foreign Direct Investmen
48、t Spillovers:within Industries versus across Industries 101Figure 4.14.Impact of Investment Flow Barriers on GDP 104Figure 4.15.Long-Term GDP Losses,with Uncertainty for Nonaligned Economies 104WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A ROCKY RECOVERYviii International Monetary Fund|April 2023Figure 4.16.Impact on GD
49、P for Bloc Members:Tripolar World and Nonaligned Joining Blocs 105Figure 4.17.Impact on GDP for Bloc Members:Nonaligned Joining Blocs 105Figure 4.1.1.A Timeline of US-China Trade Tensions 107Figure 4.2.1.Gross Exposures to Fragmentation,Assets and Liabilities 109Figure 4.3.1.Impact of One-Standard-D
50、eviation Decrease in Geopolitical Alignment on Tariff-Equivalent Trade Barrier 110Figure 4.3.2.Change in Real Per Capita Income Due to Fragmentation 111 International Monetary Fund|April 2023 ixASSUMPTIONS AND CONVENTIONSA number of assumptions have been adopted for the projections presented in the
51、World Economic Outlook(WEO).It has been assumed that real effective exchange rates remained constant at their average levels during February 15,2023,to March 15,2023,except for those for the currencies participating in the European exchange rate mechanism II,which are assumed to have remained consta
52、nt in nominal terms relative to the euro;that estab-lished policies of national authorities will be maintained(for specific assumptions about fiscal and monetary policies for selected economies,see Box A1 in the Statistical Appendix);that the average price of oil will be$73.13 a barrel in 2023 and$6
53、8.90 a barrel in 2024;that the three-month government bond yield for the United States will average 5.1 percent in 2023 and 4.5 percent in 2024,that for the euro area will average 2.8 percent in 2023 and 3.0 percent in 2024,and that for Japan will average 0.1 percent in 2023 and 0.0 percent in 2024;
54、and that the 10-year government bond yield for the United States will average 3.8 percent in 2023 and 3.6 percent in 2024,that for the euro area will average 2.5 percent in 2023 and 2.8 percent in 2024,and that for Japan will aver-age 0.6 percent in 2023 and 2024.These are,of course,working hypothes
55、es rather than forecasts,and the uncer-tainties surrounding them add to the margin of error that would,in any event,be involved in the projections.The estimates and projections are based on statistical information available through March 28,2023.The following conventions are used throughout the WEO:
56、.to indicate that data are not available or not applicable;between years or months(for example,202223 or JanuaryJune)to indicate the years or months covered,including the beginning and ending years or months;and/between years or months(for example,2022/23)to indicate a fiscal or financial year.“Bill
57、ion”means a thousand million;“trillion”means a thousand billion.“Basis points”refers to hundredths of 1 percentage point(for example,25 basis points are equivalent to of 1 percentage point).Data refer to calendar years,except in the case of a few countries that use fiscal years.Please refer to Table
58、 F in the Statistical Appendix,which lists the economies with exceptional reporting periods for national accounts and government finance data for each country.For some countries,the figures for 2022 and earlier are based on estimates rather than actual outturns.Please refer to Table G in the Statist
59、ical Appendix,which lists the latest actual outturns for the indicators in the national accounts,prices,government finance,and balance of payments for each country.What is new in this publication:Beginning with the April 2023 WEO,ASEAN-5 comprises the five ASEAN(Association of Southeast Asian Nation
60、s)founding member nations:Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore,and Thailand.On January 1,2023,Croatia became the 20th country to join the euro area.Data for Croatia are now included in aggregates for the euro area and for advanced economies and relevant subgroups.For Ecuador,fiscal sector pr
61、ojections are excluded from publication for 202328 because of ongoing program discussions.In the tables and figures,the following conventions apply:Tables and figures in this report that list their source as“IMF staff calculations”or“IMF staff estimates”draw on data from the WEO database.When countr
62、ies are not listed alphabetically,they are ordered on the basis of economic size.Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals shown reflect rounding.WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A ROCKY RECOVERYx International Monetary Fund|April 2023 Composite data are provided for various groups of
63、 countries organized according to economic characteristics or region.Unless noted otherwise,country group composites represent calculations based on 90 percent or more of the weighted group data.The boundaries,colors,denominations,and any other information shown on maps do not imply,on the part of t
64、he IMF,any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.As used in this report,the terms“country”and“economy”do not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice.As used here,the term al
65、so covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.International Monetary Fund|April 2023 xiFURTHER INFORMATIONCorrections and Revisions The data and analysis appearing in the World Economic Outlook(WEO)are compil
66、ed by the IMF staff at the time of publication.Every effort is made to ensure their timeliness,accuracy,and completeness.When errors are discovered,corrections and revisions are incorporated into the digital editions available from the IMF website and on the IMF eLibrary(see below).All substantive c
67、hanges are listed in the online table of contents.Print and Digital EditionsPrintPrint copies of this WEO can be ordered from the IMF bookstore at imfbk.st/525724.DigitalMultiple digital editions of the WEO,including ePub,enhanced PDF,and HTML,are available on the IMF eLibrary at http:/www.elibrary.
68、imf.org/APR23WEO.Download a free PDF of the report and data sets for each of the charts therein from the IMF website at www.imf.org/publications/weo or scan the QR code below to access the WEO web page directly:Copyright and ReuseInformation on the terms and conditions for reusing the contents of th
69、is publication are at www.imf.org/external/terms.htm.xii International Monetary Fund|April 2023DATAThis version of the World Economic Outlook(WEO)is available in full through the IMF eLibrary(www.elibrary.imf.org)and the IMF website(www.imf.org).Accompanying the publication on the IMF website is a l
70、arger compi-lation of data from the WEO database than is included in the report itself,including files containing the series most frequently requested by readers.These files may be downloaded for use in a variety of software packages.The data appearing in the WEO are compiled by the IMF staff at the
71、 time of the WEO exercises.The histori-cal data and projections are based on the information gathered by the IMF country desk officers in the context of their missions to IMF member countries and through their ongoing analysis of the evolving situation in each country.Historical data are updated on
72、a continual basis as more information becomes available,and structural breaks in data are often adjusted to produce smooth series with the use of splicing and other techniques.IMF staff estimates continue to serve as proxies for historical series when complete information is unavailable.As a result,
73、WEO data can differ from those in other sources with official data,including the IMFs International Financial Statistics.The WEO data and metadata provided are“as is”and“as available,”and every effort is made to ensure their timeliness,accuracy,and completeness,but these cannot be guaranteed.When er
74、rors are discovered,there is a concerted effort to correct them as appropriate and feasible.Corrections and revisions made after publication are incorporated into the electronic editions available from the IMF eLibrary(www.elibrary.imf.org)and on the IMF website(www.imf.org).All substantive changes
75、are listed in detail in the online tables of contents.For details on the terms and conditions for usage of the WEO database,please refer to the IMF Copyright and Usage website(www.imf.org/external/terms.htm).Inquiries about the content of the WEO and the WEO database should be sent by mail,or online
76、 forum(telephone inquiries cannot be accepted):World Economic Studies DivisionResearch DepartmentInternational Monetary Fund700 19th Street,NWWashington,DC 20431,USAOnline Forum:www.imf.org/weoforum International Monetary Fund|April 2023 xiiiPREFACEThe analysis and projections contained in the World
77、 Economic Outlook are integral elements of the IMFs surveillance of economic developments and policies in its member countries,of developments in international financial markets,and of the global economic system.The survey of prospects and policies is the product of a comprehensive interdepartmental
78、 review of world economic developments,which draws primarily on information the IMF staff gathers through its consultations with member countries.These consultations are carried out in particular by the IMFs area departmentsnamely,the African Department,Asia and Pacific Department,European Departmen
79、t,Middle East and Central Asia Department,and Western Hemisphere Departmenttogether with the Strategy,Policy,and Review Department;the Monetary and Capital Markets Department;and the Fiscal Affairs Department.The analysis in this report was coordinated in the Research Department under the general di
80、rection of Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas,Economic Counsellor and Director of Research.The project was directed by Petya Koeva Brooks,Deputy Director,Research Department,and Daniel Leigh,Division Chief,Research Department.Shekhar Aiyar,Division Chief,Research Department,and Head of the Spillovers Task Fo
81、rce,supervised Chapter 4.The primary contributors to this report are JaeBin Ahn,Sakai Ando,Mehdi Benatiya Andaloussi,Tamon Asonuma,John Bluedorn,Philip Barrett,Rachel Brasier,Benjamin Carton,Giovanni Ganelli,Ashique Habib,Niels-Jakob Hanson,Christoffer Koch,Toh Kuan,Chiara Maggi,Davide Malacrino,Pra
82、chi Mishra,Dirk Vaughn Muir,Jean-Marc Natal,Diaa Noureldin,Nikhil Patel,Adrian Peralta Alva,Josef Platzer,Andrea Presbitero,Andrea Pescatori,Alexandre Balduino Sollaci,and Martin Stuermer.Other contributors include Silvia Albrizio,Michal Andrle,Carlos Angulo,Gavin Asdorian,Jared Bebee,Nina Biljanovs
83、ka,Lukas Boehnert,Christian Bogmans,Zhuo Chen,Shan Chen,Moya Chin,Yaniv Cohen,Gabriela Cugat,Allan Dizioli,Wenchuan Dong,Rebecca Eyassu,Angela Espiritu,Pedro Henrique Gagliardi,Giovanni Ganelli,Sergio Garcia,Francesco Grigoli,Shushanik Hakobyan,Ziyan Han,Jinjin He,Youyou Huang,Nicole Jales,Eduard La
84、urito,Jungjin Lee,Yang Liu,Rui Mano,Sergii Meleshchuk,Carlos Morales,Futoshi Narita,Cynthia Nyanchama Nyakeri,Emory Oakes,Augustus Panton,Ilse Peirtsegaele,Clarita Phillips,Carlo Pizzinelli,Rafael Portillo,Ervin Prifti,Evgenia Pugacheva,Damien Puy,Tianchu Qi,Aneta Radzikowski,Shrihari Ramachandra,Fr
85、ancisco Roch,Max Rozycki,Ariadne Checo de Los Santos,Muhammad Ahsan Shafique,Nicholas Tong,Petia Topalova,Christoph Ungerer,Isaac Warren,Yarou Xu,Chao Wang,Fujie Wang,Jiaqi Zhao,Canran Zheng,and Robert Zymek.Gemma Rose Diaz from the Communications Department led the editorial team for the report,wit
86、h production and editorial support from Michael Harrup,and additional assistance from Lucy Scott Morales,James Unwin,Nancy Morrison,David Einhorn,Grauel Group,and Absolute Service,Inc.The analysis has benefited from comments and suggestions by staff members from other IMF departments,as well as by E
87、xecutive Directors following their discussion of the report on March 30,2023.However,estimates,projections,and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff and should not be attributed to Executive Directors or to their national authorities.xiv International Monetary Fund|April 2023FOREWORDIt Wa
88、s Never Going to Be an Easy Ride On the surface,the global economy appears poised for a gradual recovery from the powerful blows of the pandemic and of Russias unprovoked war on Ukraine.China is rebounding strongly following the reopening of its economy.Supply-chain disruptions are unwind-ing,while
89、the dislocations to energy and food markets caused by the war are receding.Simultaneously,the massive and synchronous tightening of monetary policy by most central banks should start to bear fruit,with inflation moving back toward its targets.In our latest forecast,global growth will bottom out at 2
90、.8 percent this year before rising modestly to 3.0 percent in 2024.Global inflation will decrease,although more slowly than initially anticipated,from 8.7 percent in 2022 to 7.0 percent this year and 4.9 percent in 2024.Notably,emerging market and developing econo-mies are already powering ahead in
91、many cases,with growth rates(fourth quarter over fourth quarter)jumping from 2.8 percent in 2022 to 4.5 percent this year.The slowdown is concentrated in advanced economies,especially the euro area and the United Kingdom,where growth(also fourth quarter over fourth quarter)is expected to fall to 0.7
92、 percent and 0.4 percent,respectively,this year before rebounding to 1.8 and 2.0 percent in 2024.Below the surface,however,turbulence is building,and the situation is quite fragile,as the recent bout of banking instability reminded us.Inflation is much stickier than anticipated even a few months ago
93、.While global inflation has declined,that reflects mostly the sharp reversal in energy and food prices.But core inflation,excluding the volatile energy and food components,has not yet peaked in many countries.It is expected to decline to 5.1 percent this year(fourth quarter over fourth quarter),a si
94、zable upward revision of 0.6 percentage point from our January update,well above target.Activity too shows signs of resilience as labor mar-kets remain historically tight in most advanced econo-mies.At this point in the tightening cycle,we would expect to see stronger signs of output and employ-ment
95、 softening.Instead,both output and inflation estimates have been revised upward for the past two quarters,suggesting stronger-than-expected demand,which may require monetary policy to tighten further or to stay tighter for longer.Should we worry about the risk of an uncontrolled wage-price spiral?At
96、 this point,I remain uncon-vinced.Nominal wage inflation continues to lag far behind price inflation,implying a steep and unprec-edented decline in real wages.Given the tightness in labor markets,this is unlikely to continue,and real wages should recover.Corporate margins have surged in recent years
97、this is the flip side of steeply higher prices but only modestly higher wagesand should be able to absorb rising labor costs on average.As long as inflation expectations remain well anchored,that process should not spin out of control.It may well,however,take some time.More worrisome is that the sha
98、rp policy tightening of the past 12 months is starting to have serious side effects for the financial sector,as we have repeatedly warned might happen(October 2022 Global Financial Stability Report;January 2023 World Economic Outlook WEO Update).Following a prolonged period of muted inflation and ex
99、tremely low interest rates,last years rapid tightening of monetary policy has trig-gered sizable losses on long-term fixed-income assets.The stability of any financial system hinges on its ability to absorb losses without recourse to taxpay-ers money.The financial instability last fall in the gilt m
100、arket in the United Kingdom and the recent banking turbulence in the United States with the col-lapse of a few regional banks illustrate that significant vulnerabilities exist both among banks and nonbank financial institutions.In both cases the authorities took quick and strong action and have been
101、 able to contain the spread of the crisis so far(April 2023 Global Financial Stability Report).Yet the financial system may well be tested again.Once again,downside risks dominate.Nervous investors often look for the next weakest link,as they did with Credit Suisse,a globally systemic but ailing Eur
102、opean bank.Financial institutions with excess leverage,credit risk or interest rate exposure,too much dependence on short-term funding,or located in jurisdictions with limited fiscal space could become the next target.So could countries with weaker perceived fundamentals.A sharp tightening of global
103、 financial conditionsa“risk-off”shockcould have a dramatic impact on credit conditions and public finances especially in emerging market and developing economies,with large capital outflows,a sudden increase in risk premia,a dollar appreciation in a rush toward safety,and major declines in global ac
104、tivity amid lower confidence,household spending,and investment.In such a severe downside scenario,global GDP per capita could come close to fallingan outcome whose probability we estimate at about 15 percent.We are therefore entering a perilous phase during which economic growth remains low by histo
105、rical standards and financial risks have risen,yet inflation has not yet decisively turned the corner.More than ever,policymakers will need a steady hand and clear communication.The appropriate course of action is contingent on the state of the financial system.As long as the latter remains reasonab
106、ly stable,as it is now,monetary policy should stay firmly focused on bringing inflation down.A silver lining is that the banking turmoil will help slow aggregate activity as banks curtail lending in the face of rising funding costs and of the need to act more prudently.In and of itself,this should p
107、artially mitigate the need for further monetary policy tightening.But any expecta-tion that central banks will abandon the fight against inflation would have the opposite effect:lowering yields,supporting activity beyond what is warranted,and complicating the task of central banks.Tighter fiscal pol
108、icy can also play an active role.By cooling off economic activity,it would support monetary policy,allowing real interest rates to return faster to their low natural level(April 2023 WEO Chapter 2).Appropriately designed fiscal consolidations will also help rebuild much needed fiscal buffers and hel
109、p strengthen financial stability(April 2023 WEO Chapter 3;April 2023 Fiscal Monitor).Should a systemic financial crisis loom large,a careful and timely recalibration of policy will be needed to safeguard both the financial system and economic activity.It is important to stress that this is not where
110、 we are,even if more financial tremors are bound to occur.Regulators and supervisors should act now to ensure these do not morph into a full-blown financial crisis by actively managing market strains and strengthening oversight.For emerging market and developing economies,this also means ensuring pr
111、oper access to the global financial safety net,including the IMFs precautionary arrangements,and access to the Federal Reserve repurchase facility for Foreign and International Monetary Authori-ties or to central bank swap lines,where relevant.Exchange rates should adjust as much as possible unless
112、doing so raises financial stability risks or threatens price stability,in line with our Integrated Policy Framework.Finally,our latest projections also indicate an over-all slowdown in medium-term growth forecasts.Five-year-ahead growth forecasts declined steadily from 4.6 percent in 2011 to 3.0 per
113、cent in 2023.Some of this decline reflects the growth slowdown of previously rapidly growing economies such as China and Korea.This is predictable:Growth slows down as countries converge.But some of the more recent slowdown may also reflect more ominous forces:the scarring impact of the pandemic;a s
114、lower pace of structural reforms,as well as the rising threat of geoeconomic fragmenta-tion leading to more trade tensions;less direct invest-ment;and a slower pace of innovation and technology adoption across fragmented blocs(April 2023 WEO Chapter 4).A fragmented world is unlikely to achieve progr
115、ess for all or to allow us to tackle global chal-lenges such as climate change or pandemic prepared-ness.We must avoid that path at all costs.Pierre-Olivier GourinchasEconomic CounsellorFoReWoRD International Monetary Fund|April 2023 xvxvi International Monetary Fund|April 2023Tentative signs in ear
116、ly 2023 that the world economy could achieve a soft landingwith inflation coming down and growth steadyhave receded amid stubbornly high inflation and recent financial sector turmoil.Although inflation has declined as central banks have raised interest rates and food and energy prices have come down
117、,underlying price pressures are proving sticky,with labor markets tight in a number of economies.Side effects from the fast rise in policy rates are becoming apparent,as banking sector vulner-abilities have come into focus and fears of contagion have risen across the broader financial sector,includ-
118、ing nonbank financial institutions.Policymakers have taken forceful actions to stabilize the banking system.As discussed in depth in the Global Financial Stability Report,financial conditions are fluctuating with the shifts in sentiment.In parallel,the other major forces that shaped the world econom
119、y in 2022 seem set to continue into this year,but with changed intensities.Debt levels remain high,limiting the ability of fiscal policymakers to respond to new challenges.Commodity prices that rose sharply following Russias invasion of Ukraine have moderated,but the war continues,and geopoliti-cal
120、tensions are high.Infectious COVID-19 strains caused widespread outbreaks last year,but economies that were hit hardmost notably Chinaappear to be recovering,easing supply-chain disruptions.Despite the fillips from lower food and energy prices and improved supply-chain functioning,risks are firmly t
121、o the downside with the increased uncertainty from the recent financial sector turmoil.The baseline forecast,which assumes that the recent financial sector stresses are contained,is for growth to fall from 3.4 percent in 2022 to 2.8 percent in 2023,before rising slowly and settling at 3.0 percent fi
122、ve years outthe lowest medium-term forecast in decades.Advanced economies are expected to see an especially pronounced growth slowdown,from 2.7 percent in 2022 to 1.3 percent in 2023.In a plau-sible alternative scenario with further financial sector stress,global growth declines to about 2.5 percent
123、 in 2023the weakest growth since the global downturn of 2001,barring the initial COVID-19 crisis in 2020 and during the global financial crisis in 2009with advanced economy growth falling below 1 percent.The anemic outlook reflects the tight policy stances needed to bring down inflation,the fallout
124、from the recent deterioration in financial conditions,the ongoing war in Ukraine,and growing geoeconomic fragmentation.Global headline inflation is set to fall from 8.7 percent in 2022 to 7.0 percent in 2023 on the back of lower commodity prices,but underlying(core)inflation is likely to decline mor
125、e slowly.Infla-tions return to target is unlikely before 2025 in most cases.Once inflation rates are back to targets,deeper structural drivers will likely reduce interest rates toward their pre-pandemic levels(Chapter 2).Risks to the outlook are heavily skewed to the downside,with the chances of a h
126、ard landing having risen sharply.Financial sector stress could amplify and contagion could take hold,weakening the real econ-omy through a sharp deterioration in financing condi-tions and compelling central banks to reconsider their policy paths.Pockets of sovereign debt distress could,in the contex
127、t of higher borrowing costs and lower growth,spread and become more systemic.The war in Ukraine could intensify and lead to more food and energy price spikes,pushing inflation up.Core infla-tion could turn out more persistent than anticipated,requiring even more monetary tightening to tame.Fragmenta
128、tion into geopolitical blocs has the scope to generate large output losses,including through its effects on foreign direct investment(Chapter 4).Policymakers have a narrow path to walk to improve prospects and minimize risks.Central banks need to remain steady with their tighter anti-inflation stanc
129、e,but also be ready to adjust and use their full set of policy instrumentsincluding to address financial stability concernsas developments demand.Fiscal policymakers should buttress monetary and financial policymakers actions in getting inflation back to target while maintaining financial stability.
130、In most cases,governments should aim for an overall tight stance while providing targeted support to those struggling most with the cost-of-living crisis.In a EXECUTIVE SUMMARYsevere downside scenario,automatic stabilizers should be allowed to operate fully and temporary support measures be utilized
131、 as needed,fiscal space permitting.Medium-term debt sustainability will require well-timed fiscal consolidation but also debt restructur-ing in some cases(Chapter 3).Currencies should be allowed to adjust to changing fundamentals,but deploying capital flow management policies on out-flows may be war
132、ranted in crisis or imminent crisis circumstances,without substituting for needed mac-roeconomic policy adjustment.Measures to address structural factors impeding supply could ameliorate medium-term growth.Steps to strengthen multilateral cooperation are essential to make progress in creating a more
133、 resilient world economy,including by bolster-ing the global financial safety net,mitigating the costs of climate change,and reducing the adverse effects of geoeconomic fragmentation.executIve suMMaRy International Monetary Fund|April 2023 xviiInternational Monetary Fund|April 20231GLOBAL PROSPECTS
134、AND POLICIESA Rocky RecoveryThe global economy is yet again at a highly uncer-tain moment,with the cumulative effects of the past three years of adverse shocksmost notably,the COVID-19 pandemic and Russias invasion of Ukrainemanifesting in unforeseen ways.Spurred by pent-up demand,lingering supply d
135、isruptions,and commodity price spikes,inflation reached multidecade highs last year in many economies,leading central banks to tighten aggressively to bring it back toward their targets and keep inflation expectations anchored.Although telegraphed by central banks,the rapid rise in interest rates an
136、d anticipated slowing of eco-nomic activity to put inflation on a downward path have,together with supervisory and regulatory gaps and the materialization of bank-specific risks,con-tributed to stresses in parts of the financial system,raising financial stability concerns.Banks generally strong liqu
137、idity and capital positions suggested that they would be able to absorb the effects of monetary policy tightening and adapt smoothly.However,some financial institutions with business models that relied heavily on a continuation of the extremely low nom-inal interest rates of the past years have come
138、 under acute stress,as they have proved either unprepared or unable to adjust to the fast pace of rate rises.The unexpected failures of two specialized regional banks in the United States in mid-March 2023 and the collapse of confidence in Credit Suissea globally significant bankhave roiled financia
139、l markets,with bank depositors and investors reevaluating the safety of their holdings and shifting away from institutions and investments perceived as vulnerable.The loss of confidence in Credit Suisse resulted in a brokered takeover.Broad equity indices across major markets have fallen below their
140、 levels prior to the turmoil,but bank equities have come under extreme pressure(Figure 1.1).Despite strong policy actions to sup-port the banking sector and reassure markets,some depositors and investors have become highly sensitive to any news,as they struggle to discern the breadth of vulnerabilit
141、ies across banks and nonbank finan-cial institutions and their implications for the likely near-term path of the economy.Financial conditions have tightened,which is likely to entail lower lending and activity if they persist(see also Chapter 1 of the April 2023 Global Financial Stability Report).Pr
142、ior to recent financial sector ructions,activity in the world economy had shown nascent signs of stabilizing in early 2023 after the adverse shocks of last year(Figure 1.2,panels 1 and 2).Russias invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing war caused severe com-modity and energy price shocks and trade disru
143、ptions,provoking the beginning of a significant reorientation and adjustment across many economies.More conta-gious COVID-19 strains emerged and spread widely.Outbreaks particularly affected activity in economies in which populations had lower levels of immunity and in which strict lockdowns were im
144、plemented,such as in China.Although these developments imperiled the recovery,activity in many economies turned out better than expected in the second half of 2022,typically reflecting stronger-than-anticipated domestic conditions.Labor markets in advanced economiesmost notably,the United Stateshave
145、 stayed very strong,with unemployment rates his-torically low.Even so,confidence remains depressed across all regions compared with where it was at the beginning of 2022,before Russia invaded Ukraine and the resurgence of COVID-19 in the second quarter(Figure 1.2,panel 3).With the recent increase in
146、 financial market vol-atility and multiple indicators pointing in different directions,the fog around the world economic outlook has thickened.Uncertainty is high,and the balance of risks has shifted firmly to the downside so long as the financial sector remains unsettled.The major forces that affec
147、ted the world in 2022central banks tight monetary stances to allay inflation,limited fiscal buf-fers to absorb shocks amid historically high debt levels,commodity price spikes and geoeconomic fragmenta-tion with Russias war in Ukraine,and Chinas eco-nomic reopeningseem likely to continue into 2023.B
148、ut these forces are now overlaid by and interacting with new financial stability concerns.A hard landingparticularly for advanced economieshas become 1CHAPTERWORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A ROCKy RECOvERy2International Monetary Fund|April 2023a much larger risk.Policymakers may face difficult trade-offs to
149、 bring sticky inflation down and maintain growth while also preserving financial stability.Inflation Is Declining with Rapid Rate Rises but Remains Elevated amid Financial Sector StressGlobal headline inflation has been declining since mid-2022 at a three-month seasonally adjusted annual-ized rate(F
150、igure 1.3).A fall in fuel and energy com-modity prices,particularly for the United States,euro area,and Latin America,has contributed to this decline(see Figure 1.SF.1).To dampen demand and reduce underlying(core)inflation,the lions share of central banks around the world have been raising interest
151、rates since 2021,both at a faster pace and in a more synchronous manner than in the previous global mon-etary tightening episode just before the global financial crisis(Figure 1.4).This more restrictive monetary policy has started to show up in a slowdown in new home construction in many countries(s
152、ee Box 1.1).Infla-tion excluding volatile food and energy prices has been declining at a three-month ratealthough at a slower pace than headline inflationin most(though not all)major economies since mid-2022.Even so,both headline and core inflation rates remain at about double their pre-2021 levels
153、on average and far above target among almost all US S&P 500US S&P Banks SelectEuro Area EUROSTOXX 50Euro Area EUROSTOXX BanksJapan TOPIXJapan TOPIX BanksFigure 1.1.Broad Equity and Bank Equity Indices for Selected Major Economies(Index;January 1,2023=100)Sources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.;and IMF staff
154、calculations.Note:Latest data available are for March 28,2023.7080900Jan.2023Feb.23Mar.23WorldAEsEMDEsWorldAEsEMDEsWorldUnited StatesEuro areaChinaFigure 1.2.Early 2023 Activity Indicators Strengthened but Confidence Remained Depressed(Indices)40455055601.Manufacturing Output PMI(Above 50
155、 expanding;below 50 contracting)2.Services Business Activity PMI(Above 50 expanding;below 50 contracting)3.Consumer Confidence(September 2021=100)Sep.2021Jan.22May22Sep.22Feb.234045505560Sep.2021Jan.22May22Sep.22Feb.23Sep.2021Jan.22May22Sep.22Feb.238090100110Sources:Haver Analytics;IHS Markit;and IM
156、F staff calculations.Note:For AEs in panel 1,sample comprises AUS,AUT,CAN,CHE,DEU,DNK,ESP,FRA,GBR,GRC,ITA,IRL,JPN,NLD,NZL,and USA.Contribution to AE manufacturing GVA is used as weights.For EMDEs in panel 1,sample comprises ARE,BRA,CHN,CZE,COL,EGY,GHA,IND,IDN,KEN,LBN,MYS,MEX,NGA,PHL,POL,RUS,SAU,THA,
157、TUR,VNM,and ZAF.For AEs in panel 2,sample comprises AUS,DEU,ESP,FRA,GBR,ITA,IRL,JPN,NZL,and USA.Contribution to AE services GVA is used as weights.For EMDEs in panel 2,sample comprises BRA,CHN,CZE,COL,EGY,GHA,IND,IDN,KEN,LBN,MYS,MEX,NGA,PHL,POL,RUS,SAU,THA,TUR,VNM,and ZAF.Economy list uses Internati
158、onal Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies;GVA=gross value added.PMI=purchasing managers index.CHAPTER 1 GLObAL PROsPECTs AND POLICIEs3International Monetary Fund|April 2023inflation-targeting countries.Moreover,diffe
159、rences across economies reflect their varying exposure to underlying shocks.For example,headline inflation is running at nearly 7 percent(year over year)in the euro areawith some member states seeing rates near 15 percentand above 10 percent in the United Kingdom,leaving household budgets stretched.
160、The effects of earlier cost shocks and historically tight labor markets are also translating into more persistent underlying price pressures and stickier inflation.The labor market tightness in part reflects a slow post-pandemic recovery in labor supply,with,in particular,fewer older workers partici
161、pating in the labor force(Duval and others 2022).The ratios of job openings to the number of people unem-ployed in the United States and the euro area at the end of 2022 were at their highest levels in decades(Figure 1.5).At the same time,the cost pressures from wages have so far remained contained
162、despite the tightness of labor markets,with no signs of a wage-price spiral dynamicin which both wages and prices accelerate in tandem for a sustained periodtaking hold.In fact,real wage growth in advanced economies has been lower than it was at the end of 2021,unlike what took place in most of the
163、earlier historical episodes with circumstances similar to those prevailing in 2021,when prices were accelerat-ing and real wage growth was declining,on average(Figure 1.6).Inflation expectations have so far remained anchored,with professional forecasters maintaining their five-year-ahead projected i
164、nflation rates near their pre-pandemic levels(Figure 1.7).To ensure this remains the case,major central banks have generally stayed firm in their communications about the need for a restrictive monetary policy stance,signaling that interest rates will stay higher for longer than previously expected
165、to address sticky inflation.Euro areaUnited StatesMedianFigure 1.3.Inflation Turning Down or Plateauing?(Percent,three-month moving average;SAAR)1.Headline CPI Inflation0246810122.Core CPI InflationJan.2019Jul.19Jan.20Jul.20Jan.21Jul.21Jan.22Jul.22Jan.23Jan.2019Jul.19Jan.20Jul.20Jan.21Jul
166、.21Jan.22Jul.22Jan.23Sources:Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:The figure shows the distribution of headline and core CPI inflation developments across 18 advanced economies and 17 emerging market and developing economies.Core inflation is the percent change in the consumer price index
167、 for goods and services,but excluding food and energy(or the closest available measure).For the euro area(and other European economies for which data are available),energy,food,alcohol,and tobacco are excluded.The shaded band depicts the 25th to the 75th percentiles of the cross-economy distribution
168、 of the indicated inflation measure.The 35 economies in the sample for the figure account for about 81 percent of 2022 world output.CPI=consumer price index;SAAR=seasonally adjusted annualized rate.Interquartile rangeMedianPPPGDP-weighted average pace0.50.51.52.53.54.55.50.0AEspre-GFCEMDEspre-GFCAEs
169、post-COVIDEMDEspost-COVIDSources:Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:The figure shows the distribution(25th to 75th percentiles,median,and weighted average)of the annualized average percentage point change in policy rates by economy group over two episodes:May 2004 to July 2007(pre-GFC)a
170、nd Jan.2022 to Jan.2023(post-COVID).AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies;GFC=global financial crisis;PPPGDP=nominal gross domestic product in purchasing-power-parity international dollars.Figure 1.4.Monetary Policy Tightening Rapidly across Many Economies(Percentage
171、point change a year by episode,distribution by economy group)WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A ROCKy RECOvERy4International Monetary Fund|April 2023As of early 2023,however,financial markets antici-pated that less policy tightening would be needed than central banks suggested,leading to a divergence that rai
172、sed the risks for a significant market repricing.This is most clearly evident in the case of the United States(Figure 1.8,blue versus dashed black lines).A repricing materialized in early March,with the market-implied policy path shifting up to close much of the gap with the Federal Reserves announc
173、ed expected policy path as markets responded to news about inflation(Figure 1.8,green line).But recent financial sector turbulence and the associated tightening of credit conditions have pushed the market-implied policy rate path back down,reopening the gap in the United States(Figure 1.8,red line).
174、This may reflect in part the emergence of liquidity and safety premiums in response to financial market volatility rather than pure policy expectations.Nevertheless,the risks to financial 2010:Q120:Q12020:Q222:Q4Jan.2010Mar.2020Apr.2020Jan.20231.Euro Area(Quarterly job openings rate,percent)1.01.52.
175、02.53.03.54.02022:Q4678979Jan.20232.United States(Monthly job openings rate,percent)Sources:Eurostat;US Bureau of Labor Statistics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:The figure shows the evolution of the Beveridge curve in the indicated economy,before and after the start of the COVID-19 pand
176、emic.The relationship describes how the job openings rate(vacancies as a proportion of employment plus vacancies,y-axes)varies with the unemployment rate(number of unemployed as a proportion of the labor force,x-axes).Curves that are farther out from the origin may indicate greater labor market fric
177、tions.Labor markets are tight when the unemployment rate is low and the job openings rate is high.Figure 1.5.Labor Markets Have Tightened in Selected Advanced Economies246810121416United States,1979:Q2=0COVID-19 average,2021:Q4=0Median10th90th percentile rangePercentage point difference since episod
178、e start6420246810Quarters since episode startSources:International Labour Organization;Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;US Bureau of Economic Analysis;and IMF staff calculations.Note:The figure shows the evolution over time of historical episodes similar to 2021 in which three
179、of the preceding four quarters had(1)rising price inflation,(2)falling real wages,and(3)stable or falling unemployment.Twenty-two such episodes are identified for a sample of 30 advanced economies from 1960 to 2021.See Chapter 2 of the October 2022 World Economic Outlook for more details.The COVID-1
180、9 line shows the average behavior for economies in the sample starting in 2021:Q4.Figure 1.6.Wage-Price Spiral Risks Appear Contained So Far(Distribution of real wage growth across historical episodes similar to today)3036911Pre-pandemic(2019)surveyLatest survey(January 2023)Figure 1.7.Anchored Infl
181、ation Expectations(Percent,average five-year-ahead CPI inflation expectations)0123456Sources:Consensus Economics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:The figure shows the average five-year-ahead inflation expectation for the indicated economy group from the indicated survey vintage.The sample covers econ
182、omies in the indicated economy group for which Consensus Economics surveys are available.The pre-pandemic survey is from long-term consensus forecasts in 2019.AEs=advanced economies;CPI=consumer price index;EMMIEs=emerging market and middle-income economies;LIDCs=low-income developing countries.AEsE
183、MMIEsLIDCsCHAPTER 1 GLObAL PROsPECTs AND POLICIEs5International Monetary Fund|April 2023markets from sudden repricing due to policy rate expectation changesalso highlighted in the January 2023 World Economic Outlook(WEO)Updateremain highly relevant(see also Chapter 1 of the April 2023 Global Financi
184、al Stability Report).Indebtedness Staying HighAs a result of the pandemic and economic upheaval over the past three years,private and public debt have reached levels not seen in decades in most economies and remain high,despite their fall in 202122 on the back of the economic rebound from COVID-19 a
185、nd the rise in inflation(see Chapter 1 of the April 2023 Fiscal Monitor and Chapter 3 of this report).Monetary policy tighteningparticularly by major advanced economieshas led to sharp increases in borrowing costs,raising concerns about the sustainability of some economies debts.Among the group of e
186、merging mar-ket and developing economies,the average level and distribution of sovereign spreads increased markedly in the summer of 2022,before coming down in early 2023(Figure 1.9).The effects of the latest financial market turmoil on emerging market and developing economy sovereign spreads have b
187、een limited so far,but there is a tangible risk of a surprise increase in coming months should global financial conditions tighten further.The share of economies at high risk of debt distress remains high in historical context,leaving many of them susceptible to unfavorable fiscal shocks in the abse
188、nce of policy actions(see Chapter 3).Commodity Shocks Unwinding Even as Russias War in Ukraine PersistsThe shock of Russias invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 continues to reverberate around the world.Economic activity in Europe in 2022 was more resilient than expected given the large negative ter
189、ms-of-trade fallout from the war and associated economic sanctions.Large budgetary support mea-sures for households and firmson the order of about 1.3 percent of GDP(net budgetary cost)in the case of the European Unionwere deployed to help them weather the energy crisis.The stinging hike in prices g
190、alvanized a reorientation of gas flows,with marked increases in non-Russian pipeline and liquefied natural gas deliveries to Europe,alongside Jan.24,2023Mar.8,2023Mar.27,2023Federal funds target level,end-2023Figure 1.8.Shifting Market-Implied US Policy Rate Expectations by Vintage and Repricing Ris
191、ks(Annualized percent)Mar.2023Apr.23May23Jun.23Jul.23Aug.23Sep.23Oct.23Nov.23Dec.233456Sources:Federal Reserve Board;and Haver Analytics.Note:The three solid lines plot the market-implied federal funds rate expectations for the United States over the next months by vintage(indicated in the legend).E
192、xpectations are calculated based on federal funds futures and forward overnight index swaps.The dashed,black line is the median federal funds rate target level for end-2023,taken from the Federal Reserves Mar.22,2023 Summary of Economic Projections.US=United States.August 2021August 2022March 2023Fi
193、gure 1.9.Sovereign Spreads in Emerging Market and Developing Economies Have Narrowed(Basis points,distribution by economy group)05001,0001,5002,0002,500Sources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.;and IMF staff calculations.Note:The figure shows the distribution(box-whisker plot)by economy group and date of sover
194、eign spreads.Line in the middle is the median,upper limit of the box is the third quartile,and lower limit of the box is the first quartile.Whiskers show the maximum and minimum within the boundary of 1.5 times the interquartile range from upper and lower quartiles,respectively.A countrys sovereign
195、spread is the par-value weighted average of all a countrys bonds with more than one year remaining maturity.Y-axis is cut off at 2,500 basis points.The box-whisker plots for March 2023 are computed with daily data until March 17,2023.EMDE=emerging market and developing economy;LAC=Latin America and
196、the Caribbean;ME&CA=Middle East and Central Asia;SSA=sub-Saharan Africa.EMDE AsiaLACSSAME&CAEMDE EuropeWORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A ROCKy RECOvERy6International Monetary Fund|April 2023demand compression in the context of a mild winter and adjustments by industries to substitute for gas and to change pr
197、oduction processes where feasible.Oil and gas prices also began trending downward from their peaks in mid-2022.Together,these actions and channels have dampened the negative effects of the energy crisis in Europe,with better-than-expected levels of consumption and investment in the third quarter of
198、2022.Beyond Europe,a broad decline in food and energy prices in the fourth quarter of 2022although prices are still highhas brought some relief to consumers and commodity importers,contributing to the fall in headline inflation.Sustaining lower prices this year will depend on the absence of further
199、negative supply shocks.Chinas Economic ReopeningThe evolution of especially contagious SARS-CoV-2 variants kindled a surge in COVID-19 around the world in 2022.Eventually,these variants made their way to China,which had hitherto escaped much of the diseases spread,partly through strict contain-ment
200、measures.As the countrys COVID restrictions were ultimately lifted,multiple large outbreaks led to declines in mobility and economic activity in the fourth quarter of 2022 due to the diseases direct effects on human health and heightened fears of con-tagion(Figure 1.10).Supply disruptions also retur
201、ned to the fore,even if temporarily,leading to a rise in supplier delivery times.The surge in infections com-pounded the headwinds from property market stresses in China.Declining property sales and real estate investment posed a drag on economic activity last year.There remains a large backlog of p
202、resold unfinished housing to be delivered,generating downward pressure on house prices,which price floors have so far limited in some regions.The Chinese authorities have responded with a variety of measures,including additional monetary easing,tax relief for firms,new vaccination targets for the el
203、derly,and measures to encourage the comple-tion and delivery of unfinished real estate projects.As COVID-19 waves subsided in January of this year,mobility normalized,and high-frequency economic indicatorssuch as retail sales and travel bookingsstarted picking up(Figure 1.10).With China absorb-ing a
204、bout a quarter of exports from Asia and between 5 and 10 percent from other geographic regions,the reopening and growth of its economy will likely gener-ate positive spillovers(Figure 1.11;see also Srinivasan,Helbling,and Peiris 2023),with even greater spillovers for countries with stronger trade li
205、nks and reliance on Chinese tourism.A Challenging OutlookA return of the world economy to the pace of economic growth that prevailed before the bevy of shocks in 2022 and the recent financial sector turmoil is increasingly elusive.More than a year after Russias invasion of Ukraine and the outbreak o
206、f more conta-gious COVID-19 variants,many economies are still absorbing the shocks.The recent tightening in global financial conditions is also hampering the recovery.As a result,many economies are likely to experi-ence slower growth in incomes in 2023,amid rising joblessness.Moreover,even with cent
207、ral banks having driven up interest rates to reduce inflation,the road back to price stability could be long.Over the medium term,the prospects for growth now seem dimmer than in decades.This section first describes the baseline projec-tions for the global economy and the assumptions on which they a
208、re predicated.The baseline scenario Mobility indexRetail sales volumePlanned international flights(right scale)Sources:National Bureau of Statistics of China;Wind Data Service;and IMF staff calculations.Note:The blue line shows the percent deviation of the seven-day moving average of national averag
209、e mobility index from its average behavior over the lunar years 201719.The red line shows the percent deviation of the national retail sales volume index from its 201719 linear trend.The gold line shows the seven-day moving average of planned international flights into and out of China by day.Data f
210、or all series are as of February 16,2023.Figure 1.10.Chinas Reopening and Recovery(Percent deviation from trend;right scale is international flights a day)Jan.2022Apr.22Jul.22Oct.22Feb.232520000CHAPTER 1 GLObAL PROsPECTs AND POLICIEs7International Monetary Fund|April 2023assume
211、s that the recent financial sector turmoil is contained and does not generate material disrup-tions to global economic activity with widespread recession(a broad-based contraction in economic activity that usually lasts more than a few months).Fuel and nonfuel commodity prices are generally expected
212、 to decline in 2023,amid slowing global demand(see the Commodity Special Feature).Crude oil prices are projected to fall by about 24 percent in 2023 and a further 5.8 percent in 2024,while nonfuel commodity prices are expected to remain broadly unchanged.The forecasts are also based on the assumptio
213、n that global interest rates will stay elevated for longer than expected at the time the October 2022 WEO was published,as central banks remain focused on returning inflation to targets while deploying tools to maintain financial stability as needed(Figure 1.12).Governments are on average expected t
214、o gradually withdraw fiscal policy support,including,as commodity prices decline,by scaling back packages designed to shield households and firms from the effects of the fuel and energy price spikes in 2022.At the same time,in consideration of the elevated risks and uncertainties stemming from the r
215、ecent global financial market turmoil,this section also places strong emphasis on a plausible alternative scenario that illustrates the impact of downside risks materializing.Feeble and Uneven GrowthBaseline ScenarioThe baseline forecast is for global output growth,estimated at 3.4 percent in 2022,t
216、o fall to 2.8 percent in 2023,0.1 percentage point lower than predicted in the January 2023 WEO Update(Table 1.1),before rising to 3.0 percent in 2024.This forecast for the coming years is well below what was expected before the onset of the adverse shocks since early 2022.Compared with the January
217、2022 WEO Update forecast,global growth in 2023 is 1.0 percentage point Interquartile rangeMedianMeanFigure 1.11.Shares of Economies Total Exports Directed to China in 2021(Percent of total exports,distribution by economy group)05540East Asia&PacificSub-SaharanAfricaLatinAmerica&CaribbeanU
218、SA andCanadaEurope&CentralAsiaSouth AsiaMiddleEast&NorthAfricaSources:United Nations Comtrade Database;World Bank;and IMF staff calculations.Note:The figure shows the distribution(box-whisker plot)of total export shares to China in 2021 by geographic region.Line and diamond inside the box denote med
219、ian and simple mean,respectively;upper limit of the box is the third quartile,lower limit of the box is the first quartile.Whiskers show the maximum and minimum within the boundary of 1.5 times the interquartile range from upper and lower quartiles,respectively.Geographic groupings come from the Wor
220、ld Bank.United StatesEuro areaJapanOctober 2022 WEOJanuary 2022 WEO UpdateCyclically adjusted primary balance(percent of GDP)Figure 1.12.Assumptions on Monetary and Fiscal Policy Stances1.Policy Rates in Selected AEs(Percent,annualized;dashed lines are October 2022 WEO vintage)2024682022:Q123:Q124:Q
221、125:Q126:Q127:Q12.Fiscal Stance,202124(Change in structural primary fiscal balance,percent ofpotential GDP)02222324AEsEMDEsSource:IMF staff calculations.Note:In panel 2,cyclically adjusted primary balance is the general government balance(excluding interest income or expenses)a
222、djusted for the economic cycle.Structural primary fiscal balance is the cyclical adjusted primary balance corrected for a broader range of noncyclical factors,such as asset and commodity price changes.AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies;WEO=World Economic Outlook.WO
223、RLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A ROCKy RECOvERy8International Monetary Fund|April 2023lower,and this growth gap is expected to close only gradually in the coming two years(Figure 1.13).The baseline prognosis is also weak by historical standards.During the two pre-pandemic decades(200009 and 201019),world grow
224、th averaged 3.9 and 3.7 percent a year,respectively.For advanced economies,growth is projected to decline by half in 2023 to 1.3 percent,before rising to 1.4 percent in 2024.Although the forecast for 2023 is modestly higher(by 0.1 percentage point)than in the January 2023 WEO Update,it is well below
225、 the 2.6 percent forecast of January 2022.About 90 percent of advanced economies are projected to see a decline in growth in 2023.With the sharp slowdown,advanced economies are expected to see higher unemployment:a rise of 0.5 percentage point on average from 2022 to 2024(Figure 1.14).For emerging m
226、arket and developing economies,economic prospects are on average stronger than for advanced economies,but these prospects vary more widely across regions.On average,growth is expected to be 3.9 percent in 2023 and to rise to 4.2 percent in 2024.The forecast for 2023 is modestly lower(by 0.1 percenta
227、ge point)than in the January 2023 WEO Update and significantly below the 4.7 percent forecast of January 2022.In low-income developing countries,GDP is expected to grow by 5.1 percent,on average,over 202324,but projected per capita income growth averages only 2.8 percent during 202324,below the aver
228、age for middle-income economies(3.2 percent)and so below the path needed for standards of living to converge with those in middle-income economies.Plausible Alternative ScenarioRecent events have revealed how greater-than-expected fragilities in segments of the banking systems of the United States a
229、nd of other regions can cause financial sector turmoil.The fragilities come from a combination of unrealized losses,which reflect the speed and magnitude of monetary policy tightening,and reliance on uninsured or wholesale funding.Fur-ther shocks stemming from such fragilities are plausi-ble,with po
230、tentially significant impact on the global economy.This subsection uses the IMFs Group of Twenty(G20)Model to analyze the economic conse-quences of a scenario in which pertinent and plausible risks materialize.The plausible alternative scenario assumes a mod-erate additional tightening in credit con
231、ditions.The tightening stems from further stress in individual banks that are vulnerable on two metrics:share of nonretail or uninsured depositors and unrealized losses.Funding conditions for all banks tighten,due to greater con-cern for bank solvency and potential exposures across the financial sys
232、tem.Stricter supervision also adds to more cautious bank behavior.The overall impact is a decrease in the supply of credit and higher spreads for nonfinancial firms and for households.It is assumed that the stock of real bank lending in the United States WorldAdvanced economiesEmerging market and de
233、veloping economiesFigure 1.13.Growth Outlook:Feeble and Uneven(Percent;dashed lines are from January 2022 WEO Update vintage)01234567Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:The figure shows the projected evolution of real GDP growth for the indicated economy groups.WEO=World Economic Outlook.202122232425
234、Advanced EconomiesUnited KingdomUnited StatesJapanEuro areaCanadaFigure 1.14.Projected Unemployment Rate Rises in Advanced Economies(Percentage point difference from 2022 level)20222324252627280.50.00.51.01.52.02.5Source:IMF staff calculations.CHAPTER 1 GLObAL PROsPECTs AND POLICIEs9International Mo
235、netary Fund|April 2023Table 1.1.Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections(Percent change,unless noted otherwise)ProjectionsDifference from January 2023 WEO Update1Difference from October 2022 WEO242023202420232024World Output3.42.83.00.10.10.10.2Advanced Economies2.71.31.40.10.00
236、.20.2United States 2.11.61.10.20.10.60.1Euro Area3.50.81.40.10.20.30.4Germany1.80.11.10.20.30.20.4France2.60.71.30.00.30.00.3Italy3.70.70.80.10.10.90.5Spain5.51.52.00.40.40.30.6Japan 1.11.31.00.50.10.30.3United Kingdom4.00.31.00.30.10.60.4Canada3.41.51.50.00.00.00.1Other Advanced Economies22.61.82.2
237、0.20.20.50.4Emerging Market and Developing Economies4.03.94.20.10.00.20.1Emerging and Developing Asia4.45.35.10.00.10.40.1China3.05.24.50.00.00.80.0India36.85.96.30.20.50.20.5Emerging and Developing Europe0.81.22.50.30.10.60.0Russia2.10.71.30.40.83.00.2Latin America and the Caribbean 4.01.62.20.20.1
238、0.10.2Brazil2.90.91.50.30.00.10.4Mexico3.11.81.60.10.00.60.2Middle East and Central Asia5.32.93.50.30.20.70.0Saudi Arabia8.73.13.10.50.30.60.2Sub-Saharan Africa 3.93.64.20.20.10.10.1Nigeria3.33.23.00.00.10.20.1South Africa2.00.11.81.10.51.00.5MemorandumWorld Growth Based on Market Exchange Rates3.02
239、.42.40.00.10.30.2European Union3.70.71.60.00.20.00.5ASEAN-545.54.54.60.20.10.00.3Middle East and North Africa5.33.13.40.10.10.50.1Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies3.93.94.00.10.10.30.1Low-Income Developing Countries5.04.75.40.20.20.20.1World Trade Volume(goods and services)5.12.43.50.00.10
240、.10.2ImportsAdvanced Economies6.61.82.70.10.20.20.1Emerging Market and Developing Economies3.53.35.10.20.70.30.4ExportsAdvanced Economies5.23.03.10.40.20.50.3Emerging Market and Developing Economies4.11.64.30.60.41.30.2Commodity Prices(US dollars)Oil539.224.15.87.91.311.20.4Nonfuel(average based on
241、world commodity import weights)7.42.81.03.50.63.40.3World Consumer Prices68.77.04.90.40.60.50.8Advanced Economies77.34.72.60.10.00.30.2Emerging Market and Developing Economies69.88.66.50.51.00.51.2Source:IMF staff estimates.Note:Real effective exchange rates are assumed to remain constant at the lev
242、els prevailing during February 15,2023March 15,2023.Economies are listed on the basis of economic size.The aggregated quarterly data are seasonally adjusted.WEO=World Economic Outlook.1Difference based on rounded figures for the current,January 2023 WEO Update,and October 2022 WEO forecasts.2Exclude
243、s the Group of Seven(Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,United Kingdom,United States)and euro area countries.3For India,data and forecasts are presented on a fiscal year basis,and GDP from 2011 onward is based on GDP at market prices with fiscal year 2011/12 as a base year.Quarterly data are non-seas
244、onally adjusted and differences from the January 2023 WEO Update and October 2022 WEO are not available.4Indonesia,Malaysia,Philippines,Singapore,Thailand.WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A ROCKy RECOvERy10International Monetary Fund|April 2023Table 1.1.Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections(conti
245、nued)(Percent change,unless noted otherwise)Q4 over Q48ProjectionsDifference from January 2023 WEO Update1Difference from October 2022 WEO242023202420232024World Output2.02.93.10.30.10.2.Advanced Economies1.21.11.60.00.00.2.United States 0.91.01.30.00.00.0.Euro Area1.90.71.80.00.30.7.Germ
246、any0.90.21.80.20.50.3.France0.50.81.40.10.40.1.Italy1.40.41.10.30.10.1.Spain2.71.32.10.00.70.7.Japan 0.61.31.00.30.00.4.United Kingdom0.40.42.00.10.20.6.Canada2.11.41.80.20.10.1.Other Advanced Economies21.01.91.80.20.40.4.Emerging Market and Developing Economies2.84.54.40.50.30.6.Emerging and Develo
247、ping Asia3.85.85.30.40.41.6.China3.05.84.70.10.63.2.India34.56.26.4.Emerging and Developing Europe1.72.42.51.10.32.1.Russia4.00.91.40.10.60.1.Latin America and the Caribbean 2.51.22.10.70.21.0.Brazil2.30.92.00.10.20.2.Mexico3.71.21.90.10.00.0.Middle East and Central Asia.Saudi Arabia5.53.13.20.40.30
248、.6.Sub-Saharan Africa.Nigeria3.13.03.70.10.80.7.South Africa1.31.11.70.60.10.1.Memorandum World Growth Based on Market Exchange Rates1.72.42.60.10.10.3.European Union1.81.01.90.20.11.0.ASEAN-544.74.35.31.41.31.3.Middle East and North Africa.Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies2.74.54.30.50.20
249、.6.Low-Income Developing Countries.Commodity Prices(US dollars)Oil58.817.33.47.52.59.0.Nonfuel(average based on world commodity import weights)0.73.50.52.10.33.8.World Consumer Prices69.25.63.70.60.20.9.Advanced Economies7.73.22.20.10.10.1.Emerging Market and Developing Economies610.57.65.01.00.51.5
250、.Source:IMF staff estimates.Note:Real effective exchange rates are assumed to remain constant at the levels prevailing during February 15,2023March 15,2023.Economies are listed on the basis of economic size.The aggregated quarterly data are seasonally adjusted.WEO=World Economic Outlook.5Simple aver
251、age of prices of UK Brent,Dubai Fateh,and West Texas Intermediate crude oil.The average price of oil in US dollars a barrel was$96.36 in 2022;the assumed price,based on futures markets,is$73.13 in 2023 and$68.90 in 2024.6Excludes Venezuela.See the country-specific note for Venezuela in the“Country N
252、otes”section of the Statistical Appendix.7The inflation rates for 2023 and 2024,respectively,are as follows:5.3 percent and 2.9 percent for the euro area,2.7 percent and 2.2 percent for Japan,and 4.5 percent and 2.3 percent for the United States.8For world output,the quarterly estimates and projecti
253、ons account for approximately 90 percent of annual world output at purchasing-power-parity weights.For Emerging Market and Developing Economies,the quarterly estimates and projections account for approximately 85 percent of annual emerging market and developing economies output at purchasing-power-p
254、arity weights.CHAPTER 1 GLObAL PROsPECTs AND POLICIEs11International Monetary Fund|April 2023declines by 2 percent in 2023,relative to the baselineabout one-tenth of the decrease experienced during 200809 and equivalent to a 150 basis point increase in corporate spreads,on average,in 2023.The tighte
255、n-ing gradually dissipates after 2023.A similar decrease in credit and a similar increase in spreads occur in the euro area and in Japan.Other countries also experience a tightening in financial conditions,with the magnitude related to how closely correlated their respective finan-cial conditions ar
256、e with conditions in the United States.Countries are also affected through trade spillovers and the impact on global commodity prices.The scenario assumes that monetary policy responds to the resulting decline in economic activity and inflation-ary pressures,with policy rates lower than in the basel
257、ine.Regarding fiscal policy,it is assumed that automatic sta-bilizers operate but that there is no additional legislated stimulus.Balance sheet policies and other interventions by central banks and regulators,to preserve the stability of the financial system,are not explicitly modeled but are implic
258、itly assumed to help avert a larger crisis.Figure 1.15 summarizes the global effects of this plausible alternative scenario on the level of real GDP in 2023 and 2024.Results are presented as percent devia-tions from the baseline forecast.The moderate tightening in financial conditions leads to a dec
259、rease in the level of world output by 0.3 percent in 2023,implying real growth of about 2.5 percent instead of 2.8 percent in the baseline forecastthe lowest outcome since the global slowdown of 2001,excluding the initial COVID-19 crisis in 2020 and the global financial crisis in 2009.Real GDP is 0.
260、2 percent lower than the baseline in 2024 and gradually recovers thereafter.The effects are generally larger in advanced economies than in emerging market economies,with growth falling below 1 percent compared with 1.3 percent in the baseline forecast.The United States,the euro area,and Japan have t
261、he largest declines in growth compared with the baseline:about 0.4 percentage point lower in 2023.Countries with greater trade exposures to the United States(such as Mexico and Canada)experience a sharper impact;those with smaller exposures(such as China)are less affected.Inflation:Still High but Fa
262、llingThe baseline forecast is for global headline(consumer price index)inflation to decline from 8.7 percent in 2022 to 7.0 percent in 2023.This forecast is higher(by 0.4 percentage point)than that of January 2023 but nearly double the January 2022 forecast(Figure 1.16).Disinflation is expected in a
263、ll major country groups,with about 76 percent of economies expected to experience lower headline inflation in 2023.Initial differences in the level of inflation between advanced economies and emerging market and developing economies are,however,expected to persist.The projected disinflation reflects
264、 declining fuel and nonfuel commodity prices as well as the expected cooling effects of monetary tightening on economic activity.At the same time,inflation excluding that for food and energy is expected to decline globally Table 1.2.Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections at Market Exchan
265、ge Rate Weights(Percent change)ProjectionsDifference from January 2023 WEO Update1Difference from October 2022 WEO242023202420232024World Output3.02.42.40.00.10.30.2Advanced Economies2.61.21.30.00.10.10.2Emerging Market and Developing Economies3.64.04.00.10.10.40.0Emerging and Developing
266、Asia3.95.24.80.00.10.50.1Emerging and Developing Europe0.31.02.30.20.20.80.1Latin America and the Caribbean 3.71.52.10.20.10.10.2Middle East and Central Asia5.63.03.50.20.00.30.5Sub-Saharan Africa 3.83.44.00.30.10.20.2MemorandumEuropean Union3.50.71.50.00.20.10.5Middle East and North Africa5.83.13.3
267、0.10.00.10.4Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies3.53.93.90.10.10.40.1Low-Income Developing Countries4.94.75.40.10.10.10.0Source:IMF staff estimates.Note:The aggregate growth rates are calculated as a weighted average,in which a moving average of nominal GDP in US dollars for the preceding thr
268、ee years is used as the weight.WEO=World Economic Outlook.1Difference based on rounded figures for the current,January 2023 WEO Update,and October 2022 WEO forecasts.WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A ROCKy RECOvERy12International Monetary Fund|April 2023much more gradually in 2023:by only 0.2 percentage poin
269、t,to 6.2 percent,reflecting the aforementioned stick-iness of underlying inflation.This forecast is higher(by 0.5 percentage point)than that of January 2023.Overall,returning inflation to target is expected to take until 2025 in most cases.A comparison of official inflation targets with the latest f
270、orecasts for 72 infla-tion-targeting economies(34 advanced economies and 38 major emerging market and developing economies)suggests that annual average inflation will exceed tar-gets(or the midpoints of target ranges)in 97 percent of cases in 2023(Figure 1.17).The median deviation from target is exp
271、ected to be 3.3 percentage points.In 2024,inflation is still expected to exceed targets in 91 percent of cases,with an expected median deviation of about 1 percentage point.Among countries with an inflation target range,however,inflation is expected to be in the target range in about 50 percent of c
272、ases in 2024.By 2025,inflation is expected to be close to tar-gets(or the midpoints of target ranges),with a median deviation of only 0.2 percentage point.In the aforementioned plausible alternative scenario,with additional tightening in credit conditions,global headline inflation decreases by about
273、 0.2 percentage point more in 2023,partly on the back of lower global commodity prices.Oil prices decline by 3 percent more,on average,in 2023 than in the baseline.There is a modest additional fall in inflation excluding food and energy.The Medium Term:Not What It Used to BeThe world economy is not
274、currently expected to return over the medium term to the rates of growth that prevailed before the pandemic.Looking out to 2028,global growth is forecast at 3.0 percentthe lowest medium-term growth forecast published in all WEO reports since 1990(Figure 1.18).Forecasts of medium-term growth peaked a
275、t about 4.9 percent Figure 1.15.Real GDP Level in Plausible Alternative Scenario in 202324(Percent deviation from baseline)0.40.30.20.10.00.1WorldUnitedStatesAEs ex.USEMDEs ex.China ChinaWorldUnitedStatesAEs ex.USEMDEs ex.China China0.40.30.20.10.00.1Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:AEs ex.US=adva
276、nced economies excluding United States;EMDEs ex.China=emerging market and developing economies excluding China.1.Year 20232.Year 2024WorldAdvanced economiesEmerging market and developing economiesFigure 1.16.Inflation Coming Down over Time(Percent;dashed lines from January 2022 WEO Update vintage)1.
277、Headline Inflation02468324252.Core Inflation0246810Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:Inflation is based on the consumer price index.Core inflation excludes volatile food and energy prices.Emerging market and developing economies core inflation from January 2022 WEO Update is estimated us
278、ing available data.WEO=World Economic Outlook.202122232425CHAPTER 1 GLObAL PROsPECTs AND POLICIEs13International Monetary Fund|April 2023in 2008.The decline in medium-term global growth prospects reflects the progress that several economies,such as China and Korea,have made in increasing their livin
279、g standards and the associated decline in the rate of change(see Chapter 2 and Kremer,Willis,and You 2022).It also reflects slower global labor force growthUnited Nations medium-term population growth projections have declined since 2010 by about one-quarter of a percentage point.Geoeconomic fragmen
280、tation,including developments stemming from Brexit,ongoing US-China trade disputes,and Russias invasion of Ukraine(Aiyar and others 2023),has also contributed to the weaker outlook,as has a slower expected pace of supply-enhancing reforms.Dimmer prospects for growth in China and other large emerging
281、 market economies will weigh on the prospects of trading partners through the worlds highly integrated supply chains.It will also complicate the efforts of middle-and low-income countries seeking to converge to higher standards of living.Moreover,with global growth over the coming years not expected
282、 to overshoot pre-2022 shock forecasts,the level of global output is unlikely to recover to its previous path.The shortfall of global GDP in 2022 compared with January 2022 WEO Update forecasts is about 1 percent.By 2026,the output loss(cumulative growth gap)is projected to widen to 2.7 percent:more
283、 than double the initial impact.Persistent effects are consistent with economic fluctuations affecting investments in capital,training,and research and development.Global Trade Slowdown,with Narrowing BalancesGrowth in the volume of world trade is expected to decline from 5.1 percent in 2022 to 2.4
284、percent in 2023,echoing the slowdown in global demand after two years of rapid catch-up growth from the pandemic Advanced economiesEmerging market and developing economiesFigure 1.17.Inflation Slowly Converging to Target(Percentage point,distribution of gap from inflation target)3036912Sources:Centr
285、al banks websites;Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:The figure shows the distribution(box-whisker plot)for the indicated economy group by year.Line in the middle is the median,upper limit of the box is the third quartile,and lower limit of the box is the first quartile.Whiskers show th
286、e maximum and minimum within the boundary of 1.5 times the interquartile range from upper and lower quartiles respectively.The y-axis is cut at 12 percentage points.202223242526USChinaEuro areaIndiaOtherWorldUnitedStatesGermanyJapanUnited KingdomKoreaChinaBrazilIndiaRussiaFigure 1.18.Five-Year-Ahead
287、 Real Growth Projections by World Economic Outlook Forecast Vintage(Percent;unless noted otherwise)1.Economy Contributions to Five-Year-Ahead World Growth(PPP-weighted contributions;percentage points)0 62232.Selected Advanced Economies5681019909
288、520000568101214Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:In panel 1,US=United States and Other=all other economies excluding China,India,United States,and the euro area.Spring World Economic Outlook forecast vintages in the indicated years are used across all figures.PPP=purchasing power parity.
289、3.Selected Emerging Market EconomiesWORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A ROCKy RECOvERy14International Monetary Fund|April 2023recession and the shift in the composition of spend-ing from traded goods back toward domestic services.Rising trade barriers and the lagged effects of US dollar appreciation in 2022,wh
290、ich made traded products more costly for numerous economies given the dollars dominant role in invoicing,are also expected to weigh on trade growth in 2023.Overall,the out-look is for weaker trade growth than during the two pre-pandemic decades(200019),when it averaged 4.9 percent.Meanwhile,global c
291、urrent account balancesthe sums of absolute surpluses and deficitsare expected to narrow in 2023,following their significant increase in 2022(Figure 1.19).As reported in the IMFs 2022 External Sector Report,the rise in current account balances in 2022 largely reflected commodity price increases trig
292、gered by the war in Ukraine,which caused a widening in oil and other commodity trade balances.Over the medium term,global balances are expected to narrow gradually as commodity prices decline.Creditor and debtor stock positions remained histor-ically elevated in 2022,reflecting the offsetting effect
293、s of widening current account balances and the dollars strength,which caused valuation gains in countries with long positions in foreign currency.Over the medium term,elevated positions are expected to mod-erate only slightly as current account balances narrow.Downside Risks DominateRisks to the out
294、look are squarely to the downside.Much uncertainty clouds the short-and medium-term outlook as the global economy adjusts to the shocks of 202022 and the recent financial sector turmoil.Recession concerns have gained prominence,while worries about stubbornly high inflation persist.There is a signifi
295、cant risk that the recent banking system turbulence will result in a sharper and more persistent tightening of global financial conditions than anticipated in the baseline and plausible alternative scenarios,which would further deteriorate business and consumer confidence.Additional downside risks i
296、nclude sharper contractionary effects than expected from the synchronous central bank rate hikes amid historically high private and public debt levels(see Box 1.2).The combination of higher borrowing costs and lower growth could cause systemic debt distress in emerging market and developing economie
297、s.In addition,inflation may prove stickier than expected,prompting further monetary tightening than currently anticipated.Other adverse risks include a faltering in Chinas postCOVID-19 recovery,escalation of the war in Ukraine,and geoeconomic fragmenta-tion further hindering multilateral efforts to
298、address economic challenges.With debt levels,inflation,and financial market volatility elevated,policymakers have limited space to offset new negative shocks,especially in low-income countries.On the upside,the global economy could prove more resilient than expected,just as it did in 2022.With a sto
299、ck of excess savings from the pandemic years and tight labor markets in a number of econo-mies,household consumption could again overshoot forecasts,although this would complicate the fight against inflation.A renewed easing in supply-chain European creditorsUnited StatesChinaEuro area debtorsJapanO
300、thersOil exportersDiscrepancyFigure 1.19.Current Account and International Investment Positions(Percent of global GDP)Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:European creditors=Austria,Belgium,Denmark,Finland,Germany,Luxembourg,The Netherlands,Norway,Sweden,Switzerland;euro area debtors=Cyprus,Greece,Ire
301、land,Italy,Portugal,Slovenia,Spain;oil exporters=Algeria,Azerbaijan,Iran,Kazakhstan,Kuwait,Nigeria,Oman,Qatar,Russia,Saudi Arabia,United Arab Emirates,Venezuela.200507091232527 28200507091232527 282.Global International Investment Position3201020301.Global Current Ac
302、count BalanceCHAPTER 1 GLObAL PROsPECTs AND POLICIEs15International Monetary Fund|April 2023bottlenecksthe Federal Reserve Bank of New Yorks Global Supply Chain Pressure Index recently eased to more normal levels,for exampleand a cooling in labor markets from falling vacancies rather than rising une
303、mployment could allow for a softer-than-expected landing,requiring less monetary tightening.Overall,the estimated probability of global growth in 2023 falling below 2.0 percentan outcome that has occurred on only five occasions since 1970(in 1973,1981,1982,2009,and 2020)is now about 25 percent:more
304、than double the normal probability(see Box 1.3).Growth falling below 2.0 percent could occur in the case of a severe credit disruption or from a combination of shocks materializing together.A con-traction in global per capita real GDP in 2023which often happens when there is a global recessionhas an
305、 estimated probability of about 15 percent.Turning to prices,the probability of global headline inflation exceeding its 2022 level in 2023,is less than 10 per-cent,as Box 1.3 explains.However,for core inflation,which is set to decline more gradually in 2023,the probability is higher,at 30 percent.St
306、ickier services inflation,amid still-overheating labor markets,could push core inflation above its 2022 level.In what follows,the most prominent downside risks to the outlook are discussed.A severe tightening in global financial conditions:In many countries,the financial sector will remain highly vu
307、lnerable to the realized rise in real interest rates in the coming months,both in banks and in nonbank financial institutions(see Chapter 1 of the April 2023 Global Financial Stability Report).In a severe downside scenario in which risks stemming from bank balance sheet fragilities materialize,bank
308、lending in the United States and other advanced economies could sharply decline,with macroeconomic effects amplified by a number of channels.Household and business confi-dence would deteriorate,leading to higher household precautionary saving and lower investment.Depressed activity in the most affec
309、ted economies would spill over to the rest of the world through lower demand for imports and lower commodity prices.As in past episodes of global financial stress,a broad-based outflow of capital from emerging market and devel-oping economies could occur,causing further dollar appreciation,which wou
310、ld worsen vulnerabilities in economies with dollar-denominated external debt.The dollar appreciation would further depress global trade,as many products are invoiced in dollars.In an envi-ronment of elevated financial fragility,contagion could occur,with a sharp loss of investor appetite spreading a
311、cross geographic regions and asset types.The market for safe assets(such as US or German government bonds)could also seize up,with reduced ease of trad-ing amid a rush out of riskier assets.Box 1.3 provides a quantification of such a sce-nario of severe financial sector stress and concludes that,eve
312、n with monetary policy responding to the decline in economic activity and inflation and even with fiscal automatic stabilizers operating,global real GDP growth in 2023 could be 1.8 percentage points below the baseline.Such an outcome would imply near-zero growth in global GDP per capita.The downturn
313、 in global aggregate demand would have a strong disinflationary impulse,with global head-line and core inflation lower by about 1 percentage point in 2023.Sharper monetary policy impact amid high debt:The interaction between rising real interest rates and historically elevated corporate and househol
314、d debt is another source of downside risk,as debt servicing costs rise amid weaker income growth.This can lead to debt overhang,with lower-than-expected investment and consumption,higher unemployment,and widespread bankruptcies,especially in economies with elevated house prices and high levels of ho
315、usehold debt issued at floating rates(see Box 1.1).In such a case,inflation would decline faster and growth would be lower than in the baseline forecast.Stickier inflation:With labor markets remain-ing exceptionally tight in many countries,the incipient decline in headline and core infla-tion could
316、stall before reaching target levels,amid stronger-than-expected wage growth.An even-stronger-than-predicted economic rebound in China couldespecially if combined with an esca-lation of the war in Ukrainereverse the expected decline in commodity prices,raise headline inflation,and pass through into c
317、ore inflation and inflation expectations.Such conditions could prompt central banks in major economies to tighten policies further and keep a restrictive stance for longer,with adverse effects on growth and financial stability.Systemic sovereign debt distress in emerging market and developing econom
318、ies:Several emerging market and developing economies still face sovereign credit spreads above 1,000 basis points.The easing in spreads since October,which partly reflects the depreciation of the US dollar and lower import bills from declin-ing commodity prices,has provided some relief.WORLD ECONOMI
319、C OUTLOOK:A ROCKy RECOvERy16International Monetary Fund|April 2023But vulnerabilities remain high.About 56 percent of low-income developing countries are estimated to be either already in debt distress or at high risk of it(Figure 1.20,panel 3),and about 25 percent of emerg-ing market economies are
320、also estimated to be at high risk.While the level of external debt as a share of gross national income is on average one-third lower today than in the 1980s and 1990s(Figure 1.20,panel 1),some vulnerabilities are more acute.A higher share of external debt is now issued at variable interest rates and
321、 in US dollars,implying greater exposure to mone-tary tightening in advanced economies(Figure 1.20,panel 2).And for low-income countries,comparisons with the situation in the mid-1990s are increasingly rel-evant(IMF 2022a).A new wave of debt-restructuring requests could take place,but the creditor l
322、andscape has become more complex,making restructuring poten-tially more difficult than in the past(see Chapter 3).The share of external debt owed to Paris Club offi-cial bilateral creditors fell from 39 percent in 1996 to 12 percent in 2020,and that owed to nonParis Club official bilateral creditors
323、 rose from 8 percent to 22 percent;the share of private creditors doubled from 8 percent to 16 percent(IMF 2022a).Faltering growth in China:With a substantial share of economies exports absorbed by China,a weaker-than-expected recovery in China would have significant cross-border effects,especially
324、for com-modity exporters and tourism-dependent economies.Risks to the outlook include the ongoing weakness in the Chinese real estate market,which could pose a larger-than-expected drag on growth and poten-tially lead to financial stability risks(see Box 1.1 and IMF 2023).Escalation of the war in Uk
325、raine:An escalation of Russias war in Ukrainenow in its second yearcould trigger a renewed energy crisis in Europe and exacerbate food insecurity in low-income coun-tries.For the winter of 202223,a gas crisis was averted,with ample storage at European facilities thanks to higher liquefied natural ga
326、s imports,lower gas demand amid high prices,and atypically mild weather.The risks of price spikes,however,remain for next winter(see the Commodity Special Feature).A possible increase in food prices from a failed exten-sion of the Black Sea Grain Initiative would weigh further on food importers,part
327、icularly those that lack fiscal space to cushion the impact on households and businesses.Amid elevated food and fuel prices,social unrest might increase.Fragmentation further hampers multilateral cooperation:The ongoing retreat from cross-border economic inte-gration began more than a decade ago aft
328、er the global financial crisis,with notable developments including Brexit and China-US trade tensions.The war in Ukraine has reinforced this trend by raising geopolitical tensions(Figure 1.21,panel 1)and splitting the world economy into geopolitical blocs.Barriers to trade are steadily External debt
329、 over gross national incomeExternal debt over exports(right scale)Short termUS dollar denominated(right scale)Variable rateLowHighModerateIn debt distress0204060801001201.External Debt Measures(Percent)04506002.Selected External Debt Characteristics(Percent of total external de
330、bt,left scale;percent of total PPG external debt,right scale)0406080010203.Risks of Debt Distress in LIDCs(Percent of PRGT-eligible countries)020406080920212223Sources:IMF-World Bank LIDC Debt Sustainability Analysis Database;World Bank International Debt Statistics;
331、and IMF staff calculations.Note:X-axes show the calendar year across panels.Panels 1 and 2 show unweighted averages across emerging market and developing economies.For panel 3,details on the classification of debt riskiness in LIDCs can be found in IMF(2018).LIDCs=low-income developing countries;PPG
332、=public and publicly guaranteed;PRGT=Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust.Figure 1.20.External Debt Vulnerabilities for Emerging Market and Developing Economies Are High243438142510 101010CHAPTER 1 GLObAL PROsPECTs AND POLICIEs17International Monetary Fund|April 2023increasing(Fi
333、gure 1.21,panel 2).They range from the imposition of export bans on food and fertilizers in response to the commodity price spike following Russias invasion of Ukraine to restrictions on trade in micro-chips and semiconductors(as in the US Creating Help-ful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act)and on green investment that are aimed at prevent-ing the transfer of technology and incl