1、?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024Promoting decent work and social justice to manage ageing societies?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024Promoting decent work and social justice to manage ageing societies International Labour Organization 2024First published 2024 Attributio

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7、s and digital products can be found at:www.ilo.org/publns.ISBN:9789220407806(web PDF);9789220407790(print)DOI:https:/doi.org/10.54394/EZFF3499?13.01.3?The designations employed in ILO publications and databases,which are in conformity with United Nations practice,and the presentation of material the

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9、in Thailandiii?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024?has experienced the fastest reduction of working poverty and rise of labour incomes worldwide.Despite this impressive achievement there is no room for complacency,?loom on the horizon.Progress in dimensions such as informality,gender equ

10、ality and income inequality is too slow,meaning that?fair share in the wealth created by the rapid economic transformation.In addition,Asia?see a very rapid shift from relatively young to aged societies.Addressing these challenges?global economic environment,which is also?rates below those achieved

11、over the past two decades.?Outlook 2024 analyses in detail the existing and upcoming challenges for the region and its countries.Furthermore,the topic of ageing receives special attention in this editions thematic chapter.The report resonates with the Singapore Statement adopted by ILO?Regional Meet

12、ing in December 2022.This?as a priority,national action related to life transitions and demographic shifts.Decent work and social protection for all,including the old-age population,are an essential part of the architecture of social?Coalition for Social Justice the aim of which is to?of the Sustain

13、able Development Goals.The coalition is a call for universal human rights,equal access to opportunities,a fair distribution of resources,and strengthening?To meet the aims of the Global Coalition,governments,workers and employers will need to work together to reinvigorate and strengthen measures to

14、promote decent work and social protection.Such action,as this report shows,will allow countries not only to?to navigate the challenges related to ageing societies.Chihoko Asada-MiyakawaAssistant Director-General and?International Labour OrganizationForeword?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook

15、 2024 ivContent?Foreword iii?Acknowledgements viii?Executive summary ixIntroduction ixLabour market trends ixTrends and challenges of ageing xiPolicy considerations xii?1.Key labour market trends in Asia and the Pacific 1Key findings 11.1 Macroeconomic background 11.2 Quantity of employment 41.3 Lac

16、k of access to employment 81.4 Quality of employment 121.5 Labour productivity and labour income 171.6 Risks to the outlook 21?2.Population ageing:trends and challenges in Asia and the Pacific 22Key findings 222.1 Introduction 232.2 Trends 242.3 Challenges associated with an ageing population 31?3.P

17、olicy implications 523.1 Promoting full and productive employment and decent work for all 533.2 Achieving redistribution for adequate old-age incomes 563.3 National policies to address the challenges of ageing 57?References 60?Appendix A:List of countries and economies in Asia and the Pacific by 66

18、subregion and income group?Appendix B:Long-term trends and projections of labour force participation 67 rate,labour force and population,Asia and the Pacific and subregions v?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024?Figure 1.1.Real GDP growth,19902025,Asia and the Pacific and subregions(per c

19、ent)2Figure 1.2.Exports of goods and services,annual growth,200019 and 2024(per cent)3Figure 1.3.Gross government debt as share of GDP,201019 and 2024(per cent)3Figure 1.4.Employment-to-population ratio and labour force participation rate,19912026,5 Asia and the Pacific(per cent)Figure 1.5.Labour fo

20、rce participation rate by sex,in the Asia-Pacific region 6 and subregions,1993 and 2023(per cent)Figure 1.6.LFPR in selected demographic groups,and population aged 15 6 to 64 years as share of total(15+)population,change 19932023(percentage points)Figure 1.7.Mean weekly hours worked per person emplo

21、yed,200524,Asia and the Pacific,7 by subregion Figure 1.8.Mean weekly hours worked per worker,by sex,2023 8Figure 1.9.Youth population in employment,in education or training,or not in either,10 by sex,2023,Asia and the Pacific(per cent and millions)Figure 1.10.Share of youth not in employment,educat

22、ion or training,2023,by sex(per cent)11Figure 1.11.Jobs gap and its components,by sex,2023,Asia and the Pacific(millions)11Figure 1.12.Informality,working poverty,own-account and contributing family work,13 agricultural and elementary occupations as a share of total employment in Asia and the Pacifi

23、c,19912023(per cent)Figure 1.13.Share of formal employment and population covered by social protection,15 Asia and the Pacific,2023(or most recent available year)(per cent)Figure 1.14.Index of dissimilarity of employment between men and women by economic 17 activity,2021 Figure 1.15.Labour income pe

24、r worker,2004 and 2021(US$thousands PPP)18Figure 1.16.Average annual growth of GDP per worker,and decomposition into 18 growth of labour income and excess growth of capital income,200421(per cent)Figure 1.17.Annual growth of GDP per worker and contribution of within-sector productivity 20 growth and

25、 structural transformation,19922022(per cent)Figure 2.1.Old-age dependency ratio,2023 and 2050,by income group 24Figure 2.2.Old-age dependency ratio,2023 and 2050,countries and subregions in 25 Asia and the Pacific Figure 2.3.Labour force participation rates over the life course,by sex and country 2

26、6 income group in Asia and the Pacific,average since 2016(per cent)Figure 2.4.?by sex and age(per cent)?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 viFigure 2.5.?age and subregion(percentage points)Figure 2.6.Economic dependency ratio(aged 15 years and over),2023 and 2050 31Figure 2.7.Contributi

27、ons to average annual growth of GDP per capita,Asia and the Pacific and 32 subregions,200023 and 202350(percentage points)Figure 2.8.Annual labour productivity growth required to achieve high-income 34 status by 2050,average labour productivity growth 201323,and demographic contribution,by country i

28、n Asia and the Pacific(per cent)Figure 2.9.Value added per worker relative to developed economies in rest of the world,36 by country income group and economic activity,2022(per cent)Figure 2.10.Long-term care need in old age(60+),and number of workers to meet that need,39 2023 and 2050 Figure 2.11.R

29、atio of long-term care workers to required long-term care workers,most recent 39 available year,23 countries in Asia and the Pacific with available data(per cent)Figure 2.12.Difference in incidence of employment types of older workers relative to those 43 aged 2554,by sex and age,Asia and the Pacifi

30、c,most recent available year(percentage points)Figure 2.13.Average change in incidence of employment type for the cohort aged 65 years 44 and above,latest year available relative to 10 years earlier,countries in Asia and the Pacific (percentage points)Figure 2.14.Public social protection expenditure

31、 for older persons(percentage of GDP)47 and Sustainable Development Goal indicator 1.3.1 on effective coverage for old-age protection:Percentage of persons above statutory retirement age receiving an old-age pension,in Asia and the Pacific,2020 or latest available year Figure 2.15.Share of workers w

32、ith labour income below half the average wage,2019,50 percentiles across countries,by region(per cent)Figure 3.1.Pillars to boost productivity growth 55List of boxesBox 1.1.Labour market in the Sri Lankan economic crisis 4Box 2.1.?Box 2.2.Shifting population weights within and between countries impa

33、ct aggregate LFPRs 28Box 2.3.Estimating long-term care needs and professional long-term care workers required 38Box 2.4.Elder care in Thailand 40Box 2.5.The circular flow:equality of earned incomes,consumption and production 49vii?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 List of tablesTable 1

34、.1.Unemployment rates and unemployment numbers,by sex and age,200025,9 Asia and the Pacific and subregions Table 1.2.Extreme working poverty,informality,own-account work and contributing family 14 work,by sex and age,Asia and the Pacific and subregions,2023(or most recent available year)Table 3.1.Ex

35、amples of policies and strategies to address the challenges of ageing in 58 countries in Asia and the Pacific Table B1.Asia and the Pacific 67Table B2.East Asia 67Table B3.South-East Asia 68Table B4.South Asia 68Table B5.Pacific 69?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 viiiThis report is a

36、n output of the Regional Economic and Social Analysis Unit of the International Labour Organizations Regional?Chamuva Shawa.The principal author of the report is Stefan Khn,under guidance of Ken Chamuva Shawa.Rebecca Napier-Moore and Jenna Holiday authored the box on care work in Thailand.Christina

37、Behrendt and colleagues from the ILO department?and feedback on the topic of old-age social protection.The foundation of the report is labour market information.The ILO modelled estimates presented in this report were produced by the Data Production and Analysis Unit,led by Steven Kapsos,in the ILO

38、Department of Statistics and by the Macro-economic Policies and Jobs Unit of the ILO Research Department.The authors especially acknowledge the modelling work carried out by Evangelia Bourmpoula,Paloma Carrillo,?and Miguel Sanchez Martinez.The underlying database of international labour market indic

39、ators used to produce the estimates and other analysis was prepared by the Data Production and Analysis Unit of the ILO Department of Statistics.The authors also?Bescond,Vipasana Karkee,Quentin Mathys,Yves Perardel and Mabelin Villarreal-Fuentes.The team wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments an

40、d suggestions on the draft provided by Andr Picard,Christian Viegelahn,Christina Behrendt,Daniel Samaan,Ekkehard Ernst,Helmut Schwarzer,Kieran Walsh,Miguel Sanchez Martinez,Roger Gomis,Sara Elder and Steven Kapsos.The report?the following regional technical specialists Kenichi Hirose,Marielle Phe Go

41、ursat,Phu Huynh,Simon Brimblecomb,Tite Habiyakare and Xavier Gonzalo Estupian.Sarah Whitehouse edited the report,and Nattawarath Hengviriyapanich organized the graphic design and layout.Hatairat Thongprapai provided administrative support throughout the process.Finally,we extend our thanks to collea

42、gues in the Regional Department of Communication and Public Information for their collaboration and support in the dissemination of the report.?viii?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 ix?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 Executive summaryIntroductionThe Asia-Pacific region

43、 faces enormous existing and emerging challenges for labour markets and social justice.Despite strong economic growth and steady improvements in some key labour market indicators over several decades,progress in several crucial dimensions of decent work is too slow,with large gaps?to have one of the

44、 worlds most rapidly ageing populations.Implementing policies that address decent work deficits will not only alleviate existing challenges but will also render upcoming challenges from ageing more manageable.Labour market trendsReal GDP growth in the region is projected at 4.4 per cent in 2024,more

45、 than 1 percentage point below its 200019 average and is projected to fall to 4.2 per cent in 2025.The slowdown in economic growth has been?growth performance.Driven by falling labour productivity growth,this slowdown also reduced growth in labour incomes.In the short term,growth prospects are restr

46、ained by lower growth of international trade(a very important factor in a region focusing heavily on export-led growth),continued tight monetary policy in developed?space owing to high debt levels and debt servicing costs.States will need to revitalize productivity growth to tackle poverty,boost lab

47、our income and prepare to meet the challenges of an ageing population.The experiences of some countries show that the region should,broadly,be able to achieve this.The regions employment-to-population ratio is in long-term decline,projected to continue over the coming years,falling from 58.2 per cen

48、t in 2023 to 57.4 per cent in 2026.Equally,?to fall by 0.8 percentage points between 2023 and 2026,from 60.9 per cent to 60.1 per cent.The increase in persons aged 65 years and above as a share of the total population,as well as a declining youth participation rate are the main causes of the long-te

49、rm downward trend in aggregate participation rates.In absolute numbers,the regions total employment of?around 15 million per year owing to growth in the working age population.The labour force participation rate in the region had a large gender gap of 28 percentage points in 2023,which has reduced o

50、nly marginally over the past three decades.Womens labour force participation and?2019 and 2023,which lowered the regional gender gap and pushed the aggregate regional employment rate above its 2019 level.The regions unemployment rate is projected to remain roughly unchanged in 2024 and 2025,at 4.2 p

51、er cent,which corresponds to 87.8 million unemployed in 2024.While the unemployment rate remains below the 2019?variation between subregions and countries.Compared with 2019,unemployment rates in East Asia are up,but are down by more than?unemployment trends for women and men?the only region in the

52、world where womens unemployment rate is lower than that of men.In contrast to adults,the regions youth unemployment rate has hardly fallen below its 2019 level,in a trend driven strongly by the?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 x?Asia.The youth unemployment rate is now more than three

53、times the adult rate,at 13.7 per cent in 2024.The regions jobs gap,which shows the total unmet need for employment,amounted to 164 million in 2023.?the unemployed and a further 76 million people who want employment but are not considered economically active.Their absence from active participation in

54、 the labour market,which might arise from discouragement or lack of availability to work,owing to care obligations,means that they place less immediate pressure on the labour?gap rate stood at 9.4 per cent for women versus 6.9 per cent for men,showing that the percentage of women who are not in empl

55、oyment but would like to be is higher than that of men.Young women in the region are particularly affected by not being in employment,education or training(NEET),compared to young women in the rest of the world and to young men in the region.More than 100 million young women aged 15 to 24 years are

56、NEET,which corresponds to 32.1 per cent.This is around 2.5 percentage points above the global average.In contrast,only 12.2 per cent of young men in the region are NEET,which is around 2 percentage points below the global average.The NEET rate has reduced by 4 percentage points since 2005 owing to a

57、 notable increase in educational enrolment.Interestingly,the share of young people in education or training while not being in employment was quite similar for women and men in 2023,at 43 per cent and 47 per cent,respectively.While the region has achieved great success in reducing working poverty ov

58、er the past three decades,other indicators related to quality of work show much less progress,or even stagnation.Two in three workers were in informal employment in 2023,an improvement of only 2 percentage points over the course of 10 years.The proportion of own-account and contributing family work,

59、which is frequently associated with low quality activities and low pay,has remained essentially unchanged at 42 per cent over the past decade.On a related note,only 44 per cent of the population was covered by at least one form of social protection.Trends in gender gaps in relation to indicators?ind

60、icators.In South Asia,women face higher rates of working poverty,informality and own-account and contributing family work than in other subregions,while men face higher rates of informality in East Asia and are much more likely to be in agricultural or elementary occupations in South-East Asia.Persi

61、stent gender gaps regarding pay and employment,however,highlight the disadvantaged position of women in labour markets.Owing to strong average annual labour productivity growth(4.3 per cent)between 2004 and 2021,labour income per worker has doubled from US$7,700 per year in purchasing power parity(P

62、PP)terms to US$15,700(PPP)between 2004 and 2021.Yet,labour income growth in the region could have been higher had it not fallen as a share of national income.Labour incomes have grown most in East Asia.They are lowest in South Asia and highest in the?are dominated by Australia and New Zealand.Labour

63、 productivity growth in the region fell from 4.8 per cent in the decade 200212 to 3.7 per cent per year in the decade 201222.The region seems to be experiencing diminishing?economic activities generating higher value added.The lack of job opportunities that meet decent work criteria,including good i

64、ncomes,not only jeopardizes social justice in the region,but it also presents a risk factor for the labour market outlook.The region faces additional risks to its labour market outlook from,among others,trade disruptions due to geopolitical xi?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024?crisis a

65、mid high debt servicing costs,driven by high debt and high interest rates.Rising incomes would reinforce domestic demand for more sophisticated products and services,leading to a virtuous cycle of technological upgrading,rising productivity and rising incomes.Tackling informality and improving oppor

66、tunities for investment,not only in capital but also in people,is therefore paramount to improve the outlook and lower threats to it.?The rate of population ageing in Asia and the?is projected to age as much over the next 27 years as the populations in high-income countries in the rest of the world

67、have aged over the past 60.The ratio of population aged?to double in the region from 0.15 in 2023 to 0.31?experience age-dependency ratios above 0.29 by 2050,which is equal to that recorded in high-income countries in the rest of the world in 2023.The highest ratios are expected in Japan and the Rep

68、ublic of Korea,with the largest increases expected in the Republic of Korea,Singapore and Thailand.The economic dependency ratio,defined as the ratio of those not employed to those employed among the regions working-age population(aged 15 years and above),is projected to rise from 0.72 in 2023 to 0.

69、90 in 2050.This means that each worker will need to produce more to maintain the average standard of living per head in the working age population.The dependency ratio is predicted to rise because?labour force participation rate from 60.9 per cent in 2023 to 54.9 per cent in 2050.This fall is driven

70、 mainly by a growing proportion of older people,who tend to have much lower labour force participation rates.Despite ageing populations,the region should be able to achieve continued growth of income per capita over the coming decades if strong productivity growth can be maintained.Average growth of

71、 GDP per worker in the region between 2000 and 2023 was 10 times greater?capita due to the rising dependency ratio of adults.Nevertheless,only three of the emerging and developing economies in the region are on track to achieve high-income status by 2050,with a further seven requiring a modest incre

72、ase in productivity growth rates and more than half of the economies requiring a large increase.While the region has a large pool of workers who are ready to take up better jobs at higher productivity and pay,structural barriers and a lack of training opportunities could cause labour shortages,at le

73、ast in certain sectors.Enterprises in multiple countries and sectors?those could increase with population ageing.For example,the regions demand for long-term?between 2023 and 2050.Yet labour productivity?stands at less than a third of that in high-income countries in many sectors,showcasing the?Unde

74、reducation is a problem,with 34 per cent of workers having too low a level of education for their occupation in the region,compared to only 18 per cent in high-income countries.?higher productivity,quality and pay is vital for a structural transformation towards higher value-added activities to succ

75、eed,and not face labour shortages along the way.Such an endeavour needs to be supported by social dialogue;workers,employers and governments need to work together to set out the way forward.As the average age of the labour force increases,the prospects for older workers in the labour market will nee

76、d to improve.Older workers are considered a vulnerable?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 xiigroup,meaning that in competitive labour markets their labour market prospects are lower along the dimensions of decent work.The latest available data shows that,on average,older workers are in

77、employment types associated?to 54 years,and that those employment types become more prevalent as cohorts become?and pay.Older workers are also much less likely?training by human resources departments.Age discrimination is rooted in the perception that older workers are more expensive and less produc

78、tive.Yet,the image of older workers is changing,thanks to research and because businesses face the reality of an increasing need to rely on them,owing to demographic change.Improving the labour market prospects of older workers would enable them to maintain?of their career and would raise national i

79、ncome through better and longer utilization of older workers productive capacity.In many countries in the region,efforts to guarantee the right to universal and adequate pensions for older persons face the double challenge of inadequate coverage and?projected rise in the economic dependency ratio.Wh

80、ile most older persons in Asia and the?or other provisions for old age,coverage rates?levels of universal non-contributory schemes tend to be very low.Contributory systems are challenged by the fact that many workers earn a very low income relative to the national average,owing to the high prevalenc

81、e of informal and low-productivity self-employment in the region.?needs of old-age pension schemes even further;the establishment of sustainable and equitable?ensures income security for older persons is a key policy challenge in the region.Policy considerationsTackling existing decent work deficits

82、 is vital to advance social justice and meet the challenges posed by ageing populations.Productivity growth,reduction of income inequalities,formalization and elimination of discrimination of all kinds form key components in enlarging the contributory base and raising incomes,which increases potenti

83、al contribution to pensions schemes.Removing barriers to employment,particularly for disadvantaged groups,raises the employment rate.Social protection gaps in the region need to be closed,including for old age pensions.In addition,labour and capital incomes alike should contribute to?across society.

84、Social dialogue is key to tackling the challenges,which require concerted action by workers,employers and governments in multiple dimensions.Applying existing international labour standards and recommendations and implementing existing policy initiatives,such as the Global Accelerator on Jobs and So

85、cial Protection for Just Transitions,would go a long way?Singapore Statement,adopted at the 17th Asia and?accentuates the commitment by ILO Constituents?in the region.1?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 Key labour market trends?.The report also uses the term“emerging and developing”cou

86、ntries to denote low-and middle-income countries.?growth rate in 2024 being at least 20 per cent above(below)the historical average,and also at least 0.5 percentage points above(below).?Against a backdrop of relatively subdued economic growth,the labour market in Asia?with employment growing at its

87、long-term average rate and the unemployment rate remaining nearly unchanged.?Employment rates for women are much lower than for men,especially in certain parts of the region.Gender inequalities are already present among young people,with young women almost three times more likely not to be in employ

88、ment,education or training(NEET)than young men.?The regions unemployment rate(4.2 per?in 2023)are low in global comparison.This corresponds to 88.5 million unemployed and 164 million persons wanting employment but not having it.Contrastingly,the regions youth unemployment rate(13.9 per cent in 2023)

89、is problematically high.?requires stronger labour market performance than has been observed.Progress in reducing informality is very slow,and in some subregions,over recent years,progress to reduce working poverty has slowed.?From 2004 to 2021,while robust productivity growth contributed to a strong

90、 average increase in labour income in the region,growth performance was unequal across countries and subregions.Furthermore,most workers in the region are still far from achieving the average labour income levels of high-income countries.?Over the past decade,however,labour productivity and labour i

91、ncome growth rates have declined,compared with the previous?workers moving to more productive sectors is?growth overall requires revitalizing structural transformation and supporting within-sector productivity growth,for example through investment in physical and human capital and technological prog

92、ress.?work criteria,including good incomes,not?but also puts the labour market outlook at risk.1.1 Macroeconomic?region,with various economic models in which growth is driven predominantly by manufacturing exports,tourism,extractive resources or domestic demand.The region includes not only the two m

93、ost populous countries in the world,but also small island States that account for only a tiny fraction of the regions population.Countries in the region are at various stages of development:?19 lower-middle-income,six upper-middle-income and 12 high-income.1 In 2024,seven?rates notably above their h

94、istorical average,16 around average and another 16 notably below.2 Worryingly,half of the economies experiencing 1?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 2lower than historical growth are low-or lower-middle-income,which does not bode well for?countries,and indeed meeting the Sustainable De

95、velopment Goals.Aggregate real GDP growth for the region is projected at 4.4 per cent in 2024 and 4.2 per cent in 2025,more than 1 percentage point below the average growth rates in 200019?The drop in growth compared to historical averages is most pronounced in East?the event that supply from that s

96、upplier becomes disrupted.Sectors such as electronics,motor vehicles and other transport equipment were highly vulnerable to supply chain disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic(ILO 2020a).The term“China?and boasts the highest growth rates in the region,which is good news since more than?growth sur

97、passes the global aggregate of 3.1?showing that growth in the region as a whole is resilient.Principal factors inhibiting a stronger performance are the slowdown in global trade growth,tight global monetary conditions,rising debt levels and a structural slowdown in China.?123454.75.65.54.84.44.24.75

98、.95.74.43.93.54.55.25.44.14.64.75.05.85.76.35.95.83.73.12.71.91.52.1?East AsiaSouth-East AsiaSouth Asia?Average 199099Average 200009Average 2042025Note:GDP growth rates are aggregated using purchasing power parity exchange rates.Source:ILO calculations based on World Bank World Developmen

99、t Indicators and IMF World Economic Outlook Database,April 2024.Growth of exports of goods and services in the region is projected to be 4.3 per cent in 2024,around 1.8 percentage points below the long-?1.2).Export growth is well below the historical average in East Asia,but it also falls short in S

100、outh?the historical average,not only in 2024 but also beyond.The falling export growth in East Asia,in particular China,and the rising export growth in South-East Asia are related:global supply chains are shifting away from China towards the latter(Mackintosh 2024).Reasons for this include the risin

101、g standard of living in China,brought about by higher wages,geopolitical considerations as companies pursue a“China plus one”strategy,3 and an improved overall attractiveness of South-East Asia for investors.3?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024?200019?East AsiaSouth-East AsiaSouth Asia?

102、02462024Source:ILO calculations based on IMF World Economic Outlook Database,April 2024.?2010192024?East AsiaSouth-East AsiaSouth Asia?050100Source:ILO calculations based on IMF World Economic Outlook Database,April 2024.?Afghanistan,Lao Peoples Democratic Republic,Maldives,Marshall Islands,Micrones

103、ia,Papua New Guinea,Samoa and Tuvalu to be at high risk or in debt distress.In addition,Bangladesh and Pakistan required International Monetary Fund assistance to obtain a loan,while Sri Lanka aims to enter debt restructuring.?in most countries of the region,global monetary tightening increased borr

104、owing costs and led?also transmitted into capital markets in Asia and?The rising cost of capital subdued investment demand,with investment growth lagging behind GDP growth in 2023.Expected loosening of?the share of investment in GDP,albeit slightly,in all subregions except South-East Asia.Higher int

105、erest rates also increase the debt servicing cost for governments causing potential problems in a region with gross government debt levels?11 countries in the region face,or are at high risk of,debt distress.4 High debt servicing costs can limit governments ability to obtain new loans,?a potentially

106、 severe impact on employment and incomes(box 1.1).?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 4?GDP contracted by 2 per cent over 2023,the employment-to-population ratio fell by 0.8 percentage points from 2021,and the unemployment rate rose by 1.3 percentage points.Joblessness is not the only c

107、onsequence of the crisis:the informal employment rate in 2023 surpassed the 2019 level by 0.8 percentage points,after having fallen by half a percentage point per year between 2009 and 2019.?single digits,a slight GDP expansion and a plan to restructure debt.While this is welcome news,?5 The standar

108、ds adopted by the Thirteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians have been superseded by standards?Nineteenth International Conference.See also the Resolution to amend the 19th ICLS resolution concerning statistics of work,employment and labour underutilization.6 The number of women in

109、employment rose from 93 million in 2019 to 149 million in 2023,an increase of 60 per cent.By comparison,over the same period,employment of men rose by 12 per cent.In 2023,the regions tourism industry was still 35 per cent below pre-pandemic levels,by far the worst performance globally(UN Tourism 202

110、4).Tourism arrival numbers were particularly low in North-East Asia,and relatively high in?region expected in 2024,driven by spare capacity and easing of travel restrictions,could provide a?employment growth.1.2 Quantity of employmentThis section presents statistics on the quantity of work done,by e

111、mployment and hours of work per person employed.It also presents statistics on labour supply.In this report,the?Thirteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians,meaning activities conducted for?services,recognised as economic activity within the United Nations System of National Accounts,

112、for example the production of goods for own use(ILO 1982).5?in the text is sourced from ILOSTAT.Overview?population ratio(EPR)was 58.2 per cent in?1.4).?employment among Indian women.Without the?dropped by 0.2 percentage points between 2022 and 2023.6 The EPR has an inherent downward trend,which acc

113、elerated around 2000.In 2020,employment fell further with the COVID-19 pandemic,although it subsequently recovered and by 2022 had surpassed pre-pandemic levels.Once again,this is due to strong employment gains in India;if India is excluded from the?its pre-pandemic trend by 0.2 percentage points in

114、 2023.The regions long-term downward EPR?reaching 57.4 per cent by 2026.5?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024?52002556.058.060.062.064.066.0Employment-to-population ratioLabour force participation rate60.157.4Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.7 Sec

115、tion 1.3 shows trends in youth in education while not in employment.In East,South-East and South Asia,enrolment in tertiary education increased from 36 million in 2000 to 137 million in 2022(UNESCO,n.d.)The regions labour force participation rate(LFPR)fell from 67.0 per cent in 1991 to 60.9 per cent

116、 in 2023 and is projected to decline further over coming years.Increased educational attainment and ageing populations are among the main drivers.In absolute terms,however,employment levels have been steadily growing,reaching 2 billion in 2023.A further increase of?owing to the growing working-age p

117、opulation.Labour force participationIn 2023,the aggregate LFPR stood at 54 per?and 66 per cent in East-and South-East Asia?The South-Asian aggregate LFPR is much lower than that of the other subregions due to the large gender gap:while mens LFPR,at 77 per cent,is among the highest in the region,wome

118、ns LFPR was only 31 per cent in?at 9 percentage points,and in East Asia,at 12 percentage points.In 2023,the region had a gender gap of 28 percentage points.Over the past 30 years,gender gaps in LFPR have declined by 2 percentage points in the region as a whole and have declined consistently across a

119、ll subregions.The largest declines have occurred in South Asia,where the gap has narrowed by?percentage points.In both subregions,mens LFPR has declined,while the LFPR of women has increased.The decline in overall LFPR in the region over the past three decades can largely be attributed to falling la

120、bour force participation among young people aged 15 to 24 years and to the ageing of the population.From 1993 to 2023,higher educational enrolment rates in the region led to labour force participation of young people dropping by 19.3 percentage points.This varied between subregions,from 23.5 percent

121、age points in East Asia to 8.7 percentage?7 The share of the population aged 65 years and above,who tend to be retired and therefore have a much lower LFPR than younger generations,has risen by 5.6?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 6percentage points in the region,driving down the aggr

122、egate LFPR(see chapter 2 for an in-depth analysis on ageing).The older population has increased most in East Asia(plus 9.8 percentage points)and least in South Asia(plus 2.5 percentage points).While the LFPR of women aged 25 to 64 years has been quite stable in the region overall and in East-and Sou

123、th-East Asia,it has risen by 9.4 percentage points in South?aggregate LFPR.?impact of declining youth LFPR and ageing population.Across all subregions,employment gender gaps in the 25 to 64 years age bracket have declined substantially over the past 30 years.Across the region,the gender gap has decl

124、ined by“only”3 percentage points,owing to?8?TotalWomenMen?East Asia 1993East Asia 2023South-East Asia 1993South-East Asia 2023South Asia 1993South Asia 2023?2030405060708090675698366607269578795435968Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.?LFPR Total(age

125、d 15+)LFPR Youth(aged 1524)LFPR Women(aged 2564)LFPR Men(aged 2564)Population aged65+as share ofages 15+?0.6?5.6East Asia?9.8South-East Asia?1.5?4.0South Asia0.8?9.42.62.5?9.4?4.3Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.7?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 Hours workedIn 2023

126、,people in employment in Asia and?week,which despite coming down from 47.4 in 2005,remains the most hours worked per?This long-term decline can be observed in all subregions,although it has been particularly pronounced in South Asia in recent years,falling from 48.7 to 45.8 hours per week between 20

127、19?expansion of womens employment in the 9 In India,the average weekly hours worked by women in employment fell from 42.4 in 2019 to 36.1 in 2023,a 15 per cent drop.?10?work.Women tend to spend a lot more time than men in unpaid work.See https:/ilostat.ilo.org/millions-of-hours-spent-daily-?.subregi

128、on,particularly in India,suggesting that?9 Despite the recent drop,South Asia still has the highest mean weekly hours,followed by East Asia(43.9 in 2023)and South-East Asia(39.9 in 2023).Workers in those subregions also work more hours than their counterparts in emerging and developing economies in

129、the rest of the world?much lower mean weekly hours(34.5 in 2023),similar to those in high-income countries in the rest of the world.?34.036.038.040.042.044.046.048.050.0Pacific 34.4South Asia 45.8South-East Asia 39.9East Asia 43.9Asia and the Pacific 43.8Emerging and developingeconomies in rest of t

130、he world 38.9200620082000222024Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.While women have fewer weekly hours of?substantially more time on unpaid work.10 Although weekly hours worked are similar in East?in South Asia,where,in 2023,women were working an average of 36 h

131、ours a week,which was roughly two-thirds of mens 50 working hours.In 2023,men in South Asia were working the most hours of anyone in all subregions,while?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 8?TotalWomenMen?East AsiaSouth-East AsiaSouth Asia?30354045504440464443454039438Source:

132、ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.11 The standard deviation of the annual change in unemployment rate,a measure of stability over time,is 0.22 for Asia and the?the world.12 Had unemployment rates remained at their 2019 level in South Asia,the number of unemployed in 2023 would have surpas

133、sed the observed level by 13.2 million.13 In emerging and developing economies in the rest of the world,womens unemployment rate is 7.4 per cent,as opposed to 5.8 per cent for men,while in high-income countries in the rest of the world,the rate of unemployment rate for women is 5.2 per cent as oppos

134、ed to 4.6 per cent for men.North America is the only other ILO subregion where the rate of womens unemployment is lower than that of men.1.3 Lack of access to employmentUnemploymentIn 2023,around 88.5 million people were unemployed in Asia and the Pacific,corresponding to an unemployment rate of 4.2

135、 per cent(table 1.1).This is 0.6 percentage points lower than in 2019,and close to the rate observed in 1997.The overall unemployment rate in the region has been relatively stable over time,compared with the rest of the world.11 The?remain unchanged in 2024 and 2025.The apparent stability in the reg

136、ional aggregate hides divergent evolutions across the subregions.The unemployment rate in East Asia stood at 4.4 per cent in 2023,up from 4.3 per cent in 2019 and 3.4 per cent in 2000(table?saw large declines in unemployment in 2023 compared with pre-pandemic level of 2019.Notably,the number of unem

137、ployed reduced by 7 million in South Asia between 2019 and 2023,despite a growing labour force.12 A slight increase?high-income countries in the region.?as unemployment among women is lower than unemployment among men.13 The gap is substantial in East Asia:3.9 per cent for women and 4.9 per cent for

138、 men.Unemployment rates for women and men across the region are?years.9?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024?Region?200020025200020025Asia and?Total4.64.84.24.24.276.094.588.587.888.5Women4.14.34.04.04.025.531.631.731.431.6Men5.05.14.44.34.350.662.956.856.456.9Youth9

139、.814.013.913.713.732.836.635.835.035.2East AsiaTotal3.44.34.44.44.429.039.640.540.340.2Women3.03.83.93.83.811.415.616.015.915.8Men3.84.84.94.84.817.623.924.524.424.3Youth7.010.214.514.314.310.79.512.912.712.7?AsiaTotal3.92.42.52.52.59.68.08.78.68.6Women4.02.32.42.42.34.13.23.53.43.4Men3.82.52.62.62.

140、55.54.85.35.25.2Youth11.08.810.09.89.76.14.44.74.64.6?Total7.06.44.84.74.736.646.038.538.138.9Women7.56.85.25.35.39.612.411.811.711.9Men6.86.34.64.54.527.033.626.726.426.9Youth12.519.515.114.914.915.722.318.017.417.6?Total5.84.73.63.93.90.91.00.80.90.9Women5.54.63.63.83.80.40.40.40.40.4Men6.14.73.73

141、.94.00.50.50.40.50.5Youth11.010.38.29.19.20.30.40.30.30.3Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,May 2024.?peopleThe regions youth unemployment rate has increased dramatically over recent years to 13.9 per cent in 2023,amounting to 35.8 million young people who are not employed but who are available f

142、or work and looking for a job(table 1.1).Since 2017,the regions youth unemployment rate has been above the global average.East Asia experienced a persistent rise in youth unemployment rates,which more than doubled between 2000 and 2023.There was a dramatic rise in youth unemployment rates in South A

143、sia between 2000 and 2019,from 12.5 per cent to 19.5 per cent,which has since fallen to 15.1 per cent.Nevertheless,those values are the highest of any subregion.Youth unemployment rates in East Asia and South-East Asia remain above pre-pandemic level;in South?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlo

144、ok 2024 10Around 22 per cent of youth in the region are NEET.In 2023,this equated to 144 million?These young people are deprived of the possibility to learn important?education or training system,which lowers their future labour market prospects.While most unemployed young people are also NEET,14 th

145、ere are also many young people who are not in education but are not seeking employment.15 NEET rates have declined from 26 per cent in 2005,with similar relative declines for men and women.Over the same period,the share of youth in education or training has increased significantly.Falling NEET rates

146、 and rising 14 The?shows that,in countries with available data,an average of 20 per cent of unemployed young people are in education.15?educational enrolment imply that the declining EPR between 2005 and 2023 was strongly driven by an increased availability of and capacity to engage in education and

147、 training.In 2023,NEET rates were much higher for young women(32 per cent)than for young men(12 per cent).This shows that the factors driving gender gaps in LFPRs are already present at a young age and will likely propagate.Interestingly,the gender gap for young persons in education while not in emp

148、loyment is relatively small(5 percentage points in 2023),suggesting that young women are less disadvantaged in terms of access to education than access to employment.?In employmentIn education or training,not in employmentNot in employment,education or trainingTotal20052023Women20052023Men2005202345

149、%(309)29%(201)26%(181)33%(221)45%(300)22%(144)35%(118)26%(88)38%(128)25%(78)43%(138)32%(102)53%(191)32%(114)15%(53)41%(143)47%(163)12%(43)Notes:Youth refers to young people aged 1524 years.Number in parenthesis shows millions.Some youth in employment are also in education or training(see ILO 2022a).

150、Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.NEET rates vary widely between subregions,from 12.1 per cent in East Asia to 27.8 per cent?These large variations?womens NEET rates:44.5 per cent in South Asia as opposed to 13.6 per cent in East Asia.Indeed,NEET rates among young men are relativel

151、y low on a global scale and quite similar in East,South-11?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 East and South Asia,although slightly higher in?are around 3 percentage points lower than those of emerging and developing economies in the rest of the world,but more than twice as high as in d

152、eveloped economies in the rest of the world.South Asia and South-East Asia need to tackle gender inequality to have any chance of substantially reducing NEET rates.?TotalWomenMen?East AsiaSouth-East AsiaSouth Asia?Emerging and developing economies in rest of the worldDeveloped economies in rest of t

153、he world54045Notes:“Youth”refers to young people aged 1524 years.Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.?Unemployment only partially covers the extent of unmet employment needs in the region.In addition to the 88.5 million unemployed,there are 76 million people who want emplo

154、yment but are either not looking for a job,or not available to take up employment,or both?These people are therefore not classed as economically active,not part of the labour force and hence not counted as unemployed.They would like to be employed but are not in the labour market for various reasons

155、,such as discouragement or not being available to work owing to care obligations.They therefore place less immediate pressure on the labour?comprises the unemployed and the economically inactive who want employment,amounted to 164?that could be created in an economy if the factors?were eliminated.?U

156、nemployed(want employment,in labour force)Want employment,not in labour forceTotal164Women76Men88887632445731?Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,May 2024.?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 12In Asia and the Pacific,women wanting?jobs than men:the jobs gap rate for women was 9.4 per

157、cent in 2023,as opposed to 6.9 per cent for men.?is larger for men than for women in the region:88 million and 76 million,respectively,in 2023.?gap and a lower unemployment rate because a much larger share of the women who wanted a?force.Potential reasons for this include women being more likely to

158、become engaged in domestic?while men continue to actively seek employment,hence having a higher unemployment rate.The jobs gap rate in the region is low by global comparison,in particular for women.South?gap rate(12.9 per cent)still has a much lower rate than emerging and developing economies in the

159、 rest of the world(21.6 per cent in 2023).In the region as a whole and in all other subregions,?less than the global averages and even less than?is doing well by global comparison with respect to providing employment opportunities for those who want employment.These indicators do not,?quality of emp

160、loyment being provided.A lack of social protection could force people to take up any kind of activity,irrespective of working conditions or pay(ILO 2021a;ILO forthcoming a).1.4 Quality of employmentOverview?incomes have been increasing,allowing many to escape extreme and moderate poverty,other indic

161、ators of job quality show much less progress.The region has made great strides in reducing working poverty over the past three decades,with the share of workers living in conditions of extreme or moderate working poverty(below US$3.65 per day in purchasing power parity(PPP)terms),falling from 78.0 p

162、er?The concurrent reduction in the share of workers?workers,including subsistence farmers,and elementary workers from 55.1 per cent to 39.8 per cent from 1991 to 2022,likely contributed to?typically not well paid.Nevertheless,the share of workers in skilled agricultural,forestry and?high compared wi

163、th high-income countries,which stands at around 12 per cent.While the proportion of informal employment in the region fell from 72.7 per cent in 2005 to 66.0 per cent in 2023,progress in reducing informal work,which often lacks rights,access to social protection and is associated with poverty,has be

164、en painstakingly slow.Own-account and contributing family work,which accounted for 42.3 per cent of labour in 2022 with minimal progress over the past?work comprises subsistence activities,with high rates of informality;all contributing family work is informal.13?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social O

165、utlook 2024?520.020.040.060.080.0Informality66.0Own-account andcontributing family work42.3Agricultural andelementary workers39.8Extreme and moderateworking poverty17.4?ISCO group 9.Workers in extreme and moderate working poverty live in households with a per-person income of l

166、ess than US$3.65 per day in purchasing power parity terms.Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.16 The unweighted average rate of informal employment across 39 countries in the region is 55.8 per cent for both men and women.A lack of well-paid jobs of good quality can lead to outward m

167、igration,with mixed consequences for the sending country.In 2022,a total of 4.6 million persons migrated?had data available,most of whom left the region(ADBI,ILO and OECD 2023).While outward labour mobility could cause a shortage of skilled workers,it could potentially raise the skill levels?US$340

168、billion of the worlds US$794 billion total remittance flows(World Bank 2023a).Remittances accounted for more than 7 per cent?Island states.This highlights the importance of labour migration for the region,particularly?provides a detailed analysis of labour markets in the subregion,with a particular

169、focus on island States(ILO 2024a).Informality and social protectionIn 2023,around 1.3 billion workers were in?corresponding to 66.0 per cent of workers.Informality rates range from 34.7 per cent in?regional level,womens informality was 62.5 per cent,as opposed to 68.1 per cent for men.This apparent

170、gender gap is the result of a?gaps in employment tend to have higher rates of informality.Across countries,informality rates for women and men are,on average,very similar.16 South Asia is the only subregion where the rate of informal employment among women is around 5 percentage points higher than f

171、or men.?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 14?Region?Total?MenYouthTotal?MenYouth?3.63.74.65.972.526.555.112.8East Asia0.40.30.30.73.11.31.50.6?2.22.92.94.07.43.95.41.6?8.011.79.311.160.920.847.710.3?4.95.74.49.11.10.50.50.3Region?Total?Men?Total?Men?66.062.568.1?1319.0476.5842.5?East A

172、sia46.845.647.8?410.2181.3228.8?69.869.570.0?234.397.5136.8?87.290.785.9?667.2194.2473.0?34.734.834.7?7.43.53.9?Region?Total?MenYouthTotal?MenYouth?39.130.244.421.012.020.96.724.9East Asia29.224.832.911.09.414.94.918.2?34.332.435.712.213.020.87.425.7?53.840.758.433.015.034.48.230.3?18.816.420.99.84.

173、16.12.311.6Region?Total?Men?Total?39.840.539.4?44.1?East Asia29.931.228.8?64.1?40.035.143.5?33.2?52.565.547.9?22.8?17.715.819.3?77.3?Note:Estimates for extreme working poverty among total employment refer to 2023,while estimates for women,men and youth refer to 2021.Estimates for own-account workers

174、,contributing family workers and agricultural and elementary workers refer to 2022.Estimates for social protection coverage refer to 2020.Estimates of status in employment are based on the International?Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023;ILOSTAT,ILO Social Security Inquiry Database.

175、15?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 Informally employed are typically characterized by a high incidence of poverty and severe decent?protection(ILO 2023b).17 Countries with a higher rate of formality tend to have a higher proportion of the population covered by at least one form?count

176、ries have some social protection coverage for large parts of the population while still having 17?relatively large informal economies,no country with less than 35 per cent formal labour has social protection coverage above 60 per cent.In 2020,at the regional level,only 44.1 per cent of the populatio

177、n had access to at least one form of social protection.This varied at subregional level,from 22.8 per cent in South Asia to 77.3 per cent?0204060800100Share ofpopulation with atleast 1 form ofsocial protectionShare ofpopulation with atleast 1 form ofsocial protectionShare of formal worker

178、sShare of formal workersNote:The social protection coverage estimates are for the most recent available year,no later than 2020.The solid line is the line of?listed in Appendix A.Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023;ILOSTAT,Social Security Inquiry Database.?Asia-Pacific Employment and

179、 Social Outlook 2024 16?In 2023,72.5 million workers in Asia and the?a household income of less than US$2.15 in PPP per person(table 1.2).This corresponds to 3.6 per cent of all workers in the region,which?living in extreme poverty in the region lived in South Asia,the subregion with the highest inc

180、idence of working poverty(8.0 per cent).This means that any further meaningful progress in reducing working poverty across the region can only occur through substantive progress in South Asia.China will not continue to be a main driver of poverty reduction in the region(or globally)as its extreme wo

181、rking poverty rates are close to zero.In 2021,womens working poverty rates were at least as high as mens in all subregions,with South Asia featuring the largest gender gap(2.4 percentage points).For the region overall,however,the working poverty rate for women is lower than for men owing to the same

182、?the large gender gap in employment in South Asia lowers the share of women working in a region of higher poverty.Young people have a notably higher rate of extreme working poverty at the regional aggregate(5.9 per cent in 2021)and in all subregions.The greater need for young people living in poor h

183、ouseholds to commence employment rather than continuing education could be a reason why young people from poor households are over-represented among the employed youth.Young people who do not face poverty enter the labour market at a later stage.This phenomenon could perpetuate and even exacerbate i

184、nequalities to the next generation.18 On average,across 27 countries in the region with available data,the mean monthly earnings of employees in subsistence farming and farm day labour are 68 per cent of the national average.While subsistence farmers are self-employed,they are unlikely to have highe

185、r earnings than wage workers in those occupations.Occupation,status and economic activityThe share of workers who have skilled?and elementary occupations ranges from?in South Asia(table 1.2).Those occupations include subsistence farming activities and farm day labourers,which tend to have low income

186、s and are generally not categorized as decent work.18 Improved working conditions could result in a drop in the employment share in those occupations.While women and men are almost equally likely to be in those occupations at the?across the subregions.The number of women in those occupations is much

187、 higher than men in South Asia,but much lower in South-East Asia.In 2022,own-account and contributing family work still was the dominant status in employment at the regional level(51.1 per cent)and in South Asia(68.8 per cent)(table 1.2).In most parts of the region,those workers are more likely to b

188、e informal and to live in poverty(ILO 2009).While employees can also?employment relationships and have precarious?A large gender gap exists within these employment statuses,with women being 14 percentage points more likely than men to be contributing family workers but 14 percentage points less like

189、ly to be own-account workers(table 1.2).This highlights?labour markets and societies in the region;they are much less likely to be running the business 17?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 and more likely to be delegated a contribution role.19 In South and South-East Asia women face a

190、disproportionately high incidence of contributing family work,making them also much less likely than men to be employees.20Some economic activities(sectors)have a higher prevalence of labour market indicators commonly related to decent work(formal employment arrangements,occupations of high skill or

191、 higher pay)than others(ILO 2022b).?in respect of quality of work owing to its structural transformation.Yet,more remains to be done,and a sectoral approach can support this(ILO 2022b).19 In 2022,the proportion of self-employed workers running businesses with employees(employers)was 4.1 per cent for

192、 men?20 At the global level,the share of women in wage employment is 2 percentage points higher than the share of men.In Sout East Asia the share is 8 percentage points lower,and 5 percentage points lower in South Asia.21 Labour income is the part of national income,derived from labour as opposed to

193、 capital.Labour income comprises wage income(compensation of employees in national accounts)and the share of mixed incomes of the self-employed that can be attributed to labour inputs.The ILO has developed a methodology to estimate the labour income of the self-employed and?Given the relationship be

194、tween economic activities and decent work,gender equality will also depend on the sectoral segregation of employment between men and women.Compared to the rest?have,on average,a more equal employment structure for men and women,as measured by?Asia in particular stands out as having a relatively low

195、index of dissimilarity(0.30),compared to the global average(0.36).Sectoral segregation by sex increased by 0.03 points(10 per cent)in the region between 1991 and 2021,which could potentially also widen gender inequality in relation to working conditions.?World0.36?0.33East Asia0.31South-East Asia0.3

196、South Asia0.37?0.350.250.30.350.4?43 economic activities(at the one-or two-digit level of the?(ISIC),Rev.4).The index is calculated for each country;the unweighted average across countries within each region is displayed in?therefore indicates full equality,while a value of one indicates full segreg

197、ation.Source:ILO calculations based on ILO estimates of employment in 43 economic activities(ILO 2022b,Appendix 2).1.5 Labour productivity and labour incomeBetween 2004 and 2021,average labour income per worker in the region has increased from around US$7,700 PPP per year to around?Labour incomes in

198、clude wages and the part of income of self-employed workers that can be attributed to their labour input.21 The largest increase,in both absolute and relative terms,was observed in East Asia,rising from 8,400 to 20,500.South-East Asia and?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 18South Asia

199、saw similar increases of around 4,000?by Australia and New Zealand,saw the smallest increase,but its level(41,100 in 2021)is much higher than other subregions.?7.715.7East Asia8.420.5South-East Asia7.612.8South Asia5.710.2?39.941.12004|2021|5.010.015.020.025.030.035.040.045.0?Source:ILOSTAT,ILO mode

200、lled estimates,November 2023.Labour income per worker grew at an annual?Growth has been strongest in East Asia,followed by South Asia and South-East Asia.While in 2004,labour income per worker was similar in East and South-East Asia,by 2021 a large gap had opened between the two subregions.Despite t

201、he sizable growth,most workers are still far from earning the average labour income earned by workers in high-income countries.Average incomes in South-East Asia and South Asia,which account for almost 60 per cent of the regions population,?at current growth rates,would take around 40 years to reach

202、 the average income level of the?Growth of labour income per workerExcess growth of capital income?4.3East Asia5.4South-East Asia3.1South Asia3.6?0.74.35.43.13.50.5Notes:The numbers in front of the bars show the average annual growth rate of GDP per worker.Excess growth of capital income implies a f

203、alling labour income share.Source:ILO calculations based on ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.19?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 A falling labour share of income,from 52.6 per cent in 2004 to 52.1 per cent in 2021,caused labour income growth to fall behind?The?amounted to

204、less than half of growth of labour productivity as measured by GDP per worker.22 Capital income grew by more than it would have,had the shares of labour and capital in national income remained unchanged.The falling labour income share has accumulated to equate to losses of labour income of 0.5 per c

205、ent in East Asia and 1.5 per cent in South-East Asia over the past 17 years.Using GDP per hour worked as a measure of labour productivity for the period 200523 gives a higher annual growth rate(4.4 per cent)than the measure of GDP per worker(4.0 per cent)for the same period.23 Declining?GDP growth p

206、er worker by between 0.4 and 0.5 percentage points across all subregions.While there is some evidence that hourly productivity per worker increases when the number of hours worked declines,the trends seen in the region could also be driven by technological progress increasing productivity(Collewet a

207、nd Sauermann 2017).Therefore,the lower hours do not translate directly into lower GDP.The following analysis takes GDP per worker as a measure for labour productivity since adequate data on hours worked are not available.22?23 Global and regional estimates of hours worked are only available from 200

208、5.The relatively short timeframe for which data is available makes GDP per hour worked less suited to analyse long-term trends in labour productivity.24?needs is presented in UNESCAP(2024).Labour productivity growth has declined?201222(from 4.8 per cent to 3.8 per cent per year)compared to the previ

209、ous decade?This shows that the region is not immune to the worldwide observed trend of declining productivity growth rates(ILO 2023c).Nevertheless,labour productivity growth in the period 201222 was still higher than in the decade 19922002 in all subregions except the?Compared with the previous deca

210、de,over the past 10 years,structural change as a driver of productivity growth has lost importance relative to productivity growth within economic sectors.This is evidenced by the larger relative fall of the contribution of structural change to overall productivity growth between the periods 200212

211、and 201222,as opposed to?1.17).24 This means that productivity growth now relies more on productivity improvements in existing activities,rather than the movement of workers into sectors of higher productivity.Revitalizing productivity growth requires?structural transformation,as well as fostering w

212、ithin-sector productivity-enhancing measures,such as investment into human and physical capital,technological progress and institutions of work.?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 20?Within-sector growthStructural changeAsia and the Pacific212201222East Asia2122012

213、22South-East Asia212201222South Asia212201222Pacific2345002.01.03.51.33.00.82.41.44.21.73.61.01.50.92.61.02.20.81.40.73.21.02.60.51.70.31.00.3?-culture(ISIC Rev 3.1 A and B);mining and utilities(ISIC C and E);manufacturing(ISIC D);con

214、struction(ISIC F);wholesale and retail trade,restaurants and hotels(ISIC G-H);transport,storage and communication(ISIC I)and remaining activities(ISIC J-P).Were a more detailed sectoral breakdown available to conduct the analysis,it would likely show a larger contribution of the structural change co

215、mponent(as in ILO 2022b).Source:ILO calculations based on ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023;United Nations Statistics Division estimates of national accounts,December 2023.21?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 1.6 Risks to the outlook The regions economic outlook faces the sa

216、me upside and downside risks as the global economic outlook,although of varying potential impact.Upside risks include?of monetary policy,a slower-than-anticipated?recovery in China and unexpected productivity boosts from artificial intelligence(AI)and improvement in investment conditions(IMF 2024).D

217、ownside risks include commodity price spikes amid geopolitical tensions and extreme weather events,higher persistence of core?faltering growth in China and a disruptive turn?Risks particularly relevant to labour markets and peoples livelihoods in the region are major fiscal contractions and rapid te

218、chnological change,including faster adoption of AI.Given high debt levels in the region,continued monetary tightening in high-?overspill,by raising the risk of debt distress?tightening.This in turn would lead to cuts in social spending and public sector employment.In contrast,monetary loosening coul

219、d provide relief.Rapid technological change,including faster adoption of AI,is a double-edged sword for the region:while it could raise the income of workers whose productivity increases,it could also lead to the loss of relatively good quality?caused by displacement of workers in the region and shi

220、fting supply chains towards suppliers in high-income countries using AI rather than?labour costs(Parkin and Kay 2024).The lack of job opportunities satisfying decent work criteria,including good income,not only jeopardizes social justice in the region,but it is also a risk factor for the labour mark

221、et outlook.Rising incomes would reinforce domestic demand also for more sophisticated products and services,leading to a virtuous cycle of technological upgrading,rising productivity,and rising incomes.Tackling informality and improving opportunities for investment,not only in capital but also in pe

222、ople,is therefore paramount to improve the outlook and lower threats to it,for instance by reducing reliance on export demand.?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 22?fastest-ageing population in the world.?The populations of emerging and developing economies in the region will age by as

223、much over the next 27 years as the populations of developed economies in the rest of the world have aged over the past 60 years,while not yet having the institutions or the income level that developed economies had.?The labour force participation rate is?to 55 per cent in 2050 owing to the rapidly i

224、ncreasing number of people aged 65 years and above as a share of the total population.?The economic dependency ratio of?rise to 0.90 by 2050,which will translate as almost one dependent per employed person in the region.?Ageing will lower GDP per capita growth by 0.2 percentage points per year compa

225、red with the period 200023.This drag will have to be redressed by higher productivity growth if GDP per capita growth rates are to be maintained.In most countries,the demographic drag on growth is relatively little compared to historically achieved growth rates.?productivity growth is realized,most

226、countries in the region will fail to achieve high-income status by 2050.?In most countries in the region,current and looming labour shortages are the result of misallocation of productive resources.The region still has huge potential for upskilling,productivity?can alleviate demographic pressures on

227、 the labour market.?demand for health workers and care workers.The required number of long-term care workers will double to 90 million by 2050.However,unmet care demand is more likely to be rooted in a lack of funding than a lack of potential workers.?Declining prospects for good quality employment

228、with good incomes for older workers,stemming from age discrimination,creates a challenge to maintain productive labour market attachment of older workers that is needed to counter the demographic pressure.?A lack of coverage and adequacy of pension schemes,coupled with high income inequality,mean th

229、at many workers will likely not receive an?escape poverty.Further investments into social protection schemes are?and raising labour incomes represents?adequate social protection schemes.223?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 2.1 IntroductionAround the world,countries are experiencing?Th

230、e population ages when birth rates decline or life expectancy increases.There have?decades.While Japans large proportion of older people is well known,several other countries in the region are also experiencing rapid ageing.Indeed,the speed at which populations in Asia?those countries much less time

231、 than high-income countries in the rest of the world had(and still have)to adapt to the implications and?makes ageing a pressing issue in the region,for which States need to start preparing sooner rather than later.Ageing causes major shifts in the age structure of the population and by extension in

232、 the age structure of the labour force.The latter is also?In general,ageing populations mean that older?requirements than younger workers,become?part of this chapter presents trends in the age structure of the population and the labour force.An ageing population increases the share of older persons

233、in the population and in the labour force,which causes multiple challenges for labour markets,its institutions and social protection systems.These can be summed up in three fundamental questions:1.Can economies produce enough goods and services to maintain and raise the average standard of living wh

234、en the economically active share of the population is shrinking?25 The declining number of children in relation to the total active population lowers the total economic dependency ratio,which can create a demographic dividend.This chapter looks mostly at the working-age population aged 15 and older,

235、and the consequences of its trends.2.Can the blow to the economic dependency ratio be cushioned by raising labour market attachment,for instance of older workers and women?3.Can adequate incomes be provided for an ever larger economically dependent population that is not living in households with an

236、 income from economic activity?While the theoretical answer to these questions?given political,economic and human constraints?productive resources alike.The second part of this chapter explores four?one to the third question.First,the old age economic dependency ratio the relation of those not activ

237、e in the labour market due to old age to those active in the labour market increases.25 This requires an ever-shrinking share?to maintain,or increase,the standard of living per capita.This is a serious labour supply and productivity challenge.In addition,older workers,who will become much more impor

238、tant for economic growth,face multiple disadvantages in the labour market,which creates a challenge for ageing with decent work in productive employment.Finally,a rising dependency ratio requires a functioning redistribution(through social protection schemes)so that the retired population can escape

239、 poverty.This constitutes a distribution challenge.?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 242.2 Trends?The ratio of the population aged 65 and above to those aged 15 to 64 is rising faster in Asia?(Figure 2.1).In 2023,developed economies in?26 already faced a much higher old-age dependency

240、 ratio27 than developed economies in the rest of the world(0.38 and 0.29,?to increase to 0.66 and 0.45,respectively.26?27 For the purposes of brevity,the term“old-age dependency ratio”is used to denote the ratio of the population aged 65 and above to those aged 15 to 64.Emerging and developing econo

241、mies in Asia and?of 0.14 in 2023,compared to 0.10 in the rest of?in the rest of the world were experiencing in 2023.In contrast,emerging and developing economies in the rest of the world will continue to face only a relatively low age dependency ratio of 0.16 by 2050.?0.140.29?0.380.66Emerging and d

242、eveloping rest of the world0.100.16Developed rest of the world0.280.452023|2050|0.100.200.300.400.500.600.70Notes:Emerging and developing economies comprise low-and middle-income countries.The income grouping aggregates for?reached“high-income”status by 2050.?By 2050,old-age dependency ratios are pr

243、ojected to be highest in East Asia(0.53)and in some countries of South-East Asia(Figure 2.2).?old-age dependency ratio of 0.30,followed by South-East Asia(0.25)and South Asia(0.21).The Republic of Korea will have the most dramatic demographic change of all countries globally,?climb to 0.75 by 2050,w

244、hich will be the highest in the world.That increase will be the largest in the world,up from 0.26 in a timespan of only 27?age dependency ratio in 2050;it already had the worlds highest ratio(0.51)in 2023.China also has a rapidly ageing society,which is driving up regional aggregates due to the coun

245、trys size.?see old-age dependency ratios above 0.5 in 2050,more than doubling from their 2023 levels.The speed at which populations are ageing?60 years for the age structure in developed economies in the rest of the world to change to the degree that is projected for Asia and?The region as a whole a

246、nd 16 individual countries in the?dependency ratios in 2050 that surpass current levels in developed economies in the rest of the 25?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 world(0.28 in 2023).This means that economies,labour markets,social security systems and societies in general will have

247、 much less time to adapt to the change in circumstances than their global counterparts that are already navigating the challenges related to ageing populations.?Asia and the Pacific0.150.31Mongolia0.080.21Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea0.180.35China0.210.51East Asia0.230.53Japan0.510.73Republic

248、 of Korea0.260.75Timor-Leste0.090.10Lao Peoples Democratic Republic0.070.15Philippines0.090.16Cambodia0.090.20Myanmar0.100.20Indonesia0.100.23South-East Asia0.120.25Malaysia0.110.26Viet Nam0.140.32Brunei Darussalam0.090.33Thailand0.230.55Singapore0.220.61Afghanistan0.040.06Pakistan0.070.10Nepal0.090

249、.15South Asia0.100.21India0.100.22Bhutan0.090.23Bangladesh0.090.23Sri Lanka0.180.35Islamic Republic of Iran0.120.36Maldives0.070.37Vanuatu0.070.10Solomon Islands0.060.10Papua New Guinea0.050.11Samoa0.090.14Fiji0.090.15Tonga0.100.15Pacific0.210.30Guam0.200.31New Caledonia0.170.36Australia0.270.39New

250、Zealand0.260.40French Polynesia0.150.422023|2050|0.000.200.400.600.80?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 262.2.2 Labour force and economic dependency ratioAs people get older,they become less likely to be economically active(meaning no longer?an ageing population raises the economic dep

251、endency ratio(the ratio of those aged 15 years and above who are not employed to those who are employed).28 The LFPR declines rapidly from the age of 55 years both for men and for women as they enter retirement.While some retirees receive a retirement income,others will depend on their family or oth

252、er social structures for support.The latter group does not necessarily stop working altogether 28 Children are also economically dependent.Since this report focuses on trends related to the working-age population(aged 15 years and above),children are excluded from the dependency ratio.but might inst

253、ead conduct activities in the household that do not constitute employment,with the younger generation attempting to earn a living on the labour market.The LFPR of men in high-income countries declines faster with age than in middle-income countries.On average,women in middle-income countries include

254、d in the sample tended to have a lower LFPR at prime age than women in high-income countries,while?high-income countries,there is a dip in womens LFPR at around 30 years,which could be due to life choices,such as childcare responsibilities,or could be a generational phenomenon,leading to a higher fu

255、ture womens LFPR throughout the entire age spectrum.?(a)Men(b)Women57585020406080Lower-middle-income countriesUpper-middle-income countriesHigh-income countries57685020406080Lower-middle-income countriesUpper-middle-income countriesHigh-income countries?of local means.The bandw

256、idth for age has been set to two,and the bandwidths for the remaining variables are derived optimally?Source:ILO calculations based on ILO harmonized microdata repository.27?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 Trends in labour force participation ratesLFPR trends at different ages are a

257、key determinant for the economic dependency ratio.An increasing participation rate by any age group will,to some degree,balance the impact of a growing population aged 65 and above on 29?the economic dependency ratio.This section analyses past trends in the LFPR for four age?and the factors driving

258、them,will continue to shape trends in LFPR until 2050(see box 2.1).?LFPRs have strongly persistent trends,meaning that a certain change over a certain period is likely followed by a similar change over the next period.This characteristic gives a reasonable?important role;the decision to participate

259、in the labour force is based on considerations such as macroeconomic conditions,social security systems and cultural determinants.Cultural determinants,for example,is a very important factor in driving trends in gender gaps.While?of GDP,are available,existing social security systems are too diverse

260、and complex to quantify them consistently for use in an econometric set up for all countries in the region.?This extrapolation is made within certain boundaries.Besides the obvious boundary that the LFPR needs to lie between 0 and 100,the approach establishes maximum allowed changes with respect to

261、the last observed value,based on past observed changes in data.29 The LFPR?2554 years,5564 years and 65 years and over.Each of these demographic groups has distinct features and trends.?has declined from 67.0 per cent in 1991 to 60.9 per cent in 2023 and is projected to drop further to 54.9 per cent

262、 in 2050(Figure 2.4).LFPRs reduced by more than 20 percentage points for young people aged 1524 from?around a further 6 percentage points by 2050,to around 32 per cent.The LFPR of prime-age?by around 2 percentage points by 2050,but it will nevertheless remain high at around 75 per cent.The LFPR for

263、older workers aged 55-64 is?percentage point by 2050,following an increase of almost 4 percentage points from 1991 to 2023.?to remain roughly stable,having declined slightly between 1991 and 2023.Around half the decline in the aggregate LFPR is caused by the increasing share of older people in the p

264、opulation,who have a lower LFPR(box 2.2).?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 28?TotalTotal465+199167.059.878.457.025.1202360.938.877.760.824.3205054.932.375.261.223.9WomenTotal465+199151.851.261.135.611.5202346.628.361.345.716.9205041.023.357.746.218.0MenTotal15242

265、554556465+199181.867.994.978.541.7202374.948.393.376.333.3205068.740.791.576.030.9Note:Appendix B presents this data also for the subregions.Source:ILO estimates.?LFPRsAggregate LFPRs,whether at country or regional level,are calculated by summing the total labour force and dividing by the total popu

266、lation,which is equivalent to averaging the LFPRs of subgroups(countries or age groups)using the subgroups population as a weight.Changes in aggregate LFPR can be driven by changes in subgroup LFPR,or by changes in the relative population weight.?aggregate LFPR are driven by movements in LFPRs of su

267、bgroups.Over a longer period,however,?(in particular in South-East Asia,which have higher population growth).29?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 Trends in aggregate LFPR are similar for women and men,with declines of 5 and 7 percentage points,respectively,between 1991 and 2023,and a f

268、urther decline of around just below 6 percentage points for women and just above 6 percentage points for men projected until 2050(figure 2.4).?however.The LFPR for young women fell by 23 percentage points between 1991 and 2023,while falling only 20 percentage points for young men over the same perio

269、d.Young women,however,already had a lower LFPR to start with.For 2050,the gender gap could close slightly,but young?likely as young men to be in the labour force by 2050.The LFPR of women aged 55 and over has increased,whereas the LFPR of men of that age group has fallen.For those aged 65 and above,

270、?that of men has decreased,and those trends?female participation rates,which in 1991 was 3.6?1.7 by 2050,a ratio similar to that for all other age groups.30?Between 2023 and 2050,the LFPR for the population aged 15 years and over is projected?a drop of more than 9 percentage points?In the other subr

271、egions,decreases range from 2.8 to 4.1 percentage points.Youth?substantially(by more than 5 percentage points)in all subregions.LFPRs of prime-age workers?in South Asia.LFPRs of workers aged 55 to 64?South Asia.The declines in aggregate LFPR are strongly driven by the demographic shift;the increased

272、 proportion of older people,who have a lower LFPR,lowers the aggregate LFPR.30?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 30?TotalTotal465+?0.4?East Asia?4.20.7South-East Asia?0.30.7South Asia?0.4?7.95.6WomenTotal465+?0.41.1East Asia?8.33.0South-East Asia?0.10.6South Asia?

273、1.70.3?11.56.2MenTotal465+?East Asia?South-East Asia?0.4South Asia?4.15.0Source:ILO estimates.Men are generally projected to experience larger declines or smaller increases in?particularly marked among those aged 55 and?to close based on the assumption that they will follow past trends.Th

274、e rate at which the gender gap is closing,however,is slow,meaning that sizeable gender gaps are expected to persist in the region in 2050.Furthermore,future progress to close gender gaps will not be automatic but will require policy action.Economic dependency ratioThe economic dependency ratio(ratio

275、 of those aged 15 years and above not in employment to those in employment)is the key determinant of potential standard of living and GDP per capita,together with labour productivity.In essence,while output is produced by those in employment,GDP per capita takes account of the entire population.This

276、 section focuses only on the population aged 15 years and over to zoom in on the impact of ageing through the lens of labour force participation.Including the entire population(published as the“labour dependency ratio”on ILOSTAT)would mix the dynamics of old-age populations with those of a declining

277、 number of children.Section 2.3.1 31?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024?dependency ratio can be lowered by raising LFPR and reducing unemployment.31?is projected to rise from 0.72 in 2023 to 0.90?This means that for almost every worker there is one person aged 15 or 31 While unemploymen

278、t is cyclical,some countries seem to have structurally lower unemployment rates than others.It is?32 Labour productivity as measured by GDP per worker(ILO 2024b).above not in employment.The dependency?to have the lowest dependency ratio by 2050,at 0.65 dependent persons per worker.South Asia depende

279、ncy ratio,which was already very high in 2023 owing to the very low female LFPR,is?0.720.90East Asia0.590.83South-East Asia0.550.65South Asia0.941.05?0.640.72?0.730.91Emerging and developing rest of the world0.760.832023|2050|0.500.600.700.800.901.001.10?Source:ILO calculations.The large gender gap

280、in LFPR in South Asia means that the subregions economic dependency ratio of 0.94 presents quite a?dependency ratio of 0.83 in East Asia.In 2023,dependent adults in South Asia were,to a large extent,women of prime working age conducting large amounts of unpaid work,living in the same household as an

281、 employed person who earned an income for the household.Dependent adults in East Asia in 2050 will,to a large extent,comprise older people who do not have a partner in employment,thereby creating households without an active income earner,which relies on external transfers and services.?GDP per capi

282、ta is one key metric to gauge a countrys success with regard to economic development.It is also a key determinant for a wide variety of metrics determining human development(ILO 2023c).?has been the region with the worlds most rapid GDP growth per capita over several decades.Per capita growth compri

283、ses two components:the contribution of labour productivity growth,and the growth of labour input relative to the population.32 Since only persons aged 15 years and above are of working age,the growth of labour input should be divided into the contribution of the growth of the ratio of employment to

284、the population aged 15 years and over,and the contribution of the?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 32declining share of the population aged under 15 years.The positive impact that a rising share of the population of working age can have on GDP per capita is known as the demographic di

285、vidend.?projected to lower GDP per capita growth by 0.2 percentage points per year for the period?2.7).?in South Asia(minus 0.5 percentage points per year),and least prominent in East Asia(minus 0.1 percentage points).South Asia,on the other hand,33?East Asia,however,GDP per capita will decline by 0

286、.3 per cent per year due to demographics if it is not redressed by labour productivity growth.Even small annual declines in growth of GDP per capita will add up to large gaps in standards of living by 2050.For example,in South Asia the?the demographic dividend would lower GDP per capita by 11 per ce

287、nt compared to the per capita growth of 200023.33?Asia and the PacificEmployment rateDemographicdividendTotal demographic?Labour productivity200023?0.50.14.1202350?0.2?East AsiaEmployment rateDemographicdividendTotal demographic?Labour productivity200023?0.4?5.1202350?0.2?South-East AsiaEmployment r

288、ateDemographicdividendTotal demographic?Labour productivity200023?0.40.43.1202350?0.30.0South AsiaEmployment rateDemographicdividendTotal demographic?Labour productivity200023?0.60.63.4202350?0.30.1PacificEmployment rateDemographicdividendTotal demographic?Labour productivity200023?0.20.20.9202350?0

289、.20.0Note:Scales are independent across columns.?.33?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 If the strong labour productivity growth of the past two decades in Asia continued,GDP per capita growth would remain positive,?However,labour productivity growth rates have been declining as“low-han

290、ging fruit”for raising productivity are becoming scarcer(ILO 2023c;ILO 2022b).Poverty rates and working poverty rates remain high across the region,and many countries require continued strong GDP per capita growth to achieve high-income status.Only three of the emerging and developing?2.8).While Mal

291、aysia and China do not require large annual labour productivity growth rates to achieve this,Viet Nam would require at least 4.5 per cent annual productivity growth.A further seven countries would require an acceleration of productivity growth by 2 percentage points or less to achieve high-income st

292、atus.Except for Bangladesh,those countries would require lower annual productivity growth rates than those achieved by China and Viet Nam over the past?half of the emerging and developing economies?growth acceleration of more than 2 percentage points per year,with many countries requiring growth rat

293、es in excess of 6 per cent annually.This is a very tall order,given that not even China has achieved that degree of productivity growth over the past decade.?to experience a demographic drag on per-capita GDP growth in excess of 0.4 per cent annually,meaning that their per capita growth will fall by

294、 that amount compared to the 201323 period.In the Maldives and Thailand,the demographic drag is large relative to required productivity growth;without the drag they would get much closer to achieving high-income status by 2050.In many other countries,the demographic contribution pales in comparison

295、to the required productivity growth rates.Maintaining and accelerating labour productivity growth is key to navigating the?some discussion on this.?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 34?Demographic contributionAchieved productivity growth towards targetProductivity growth shortfallProdu

296、ctivity growth surplusLikely achieve high-income statusMalaysiaChinaViet NamSmall acceleration of productivity growth neededMaldivesThailandFijiIndonesiaMongoliaPhilippinesBangladeshMajor acceleration of productivity growth neededTongaSamoaVanuatuSri LankaBhutanIslamic Republic of IranTimor-LesteInd

297、iaSolomon IslandsLao Peoples Democratic RepublicPapua New GuineaCambodiaPakistanNepalMyanmar0.02.04.06.08.00.02.04.06.08.00.02.04.06.08.01.85.34.51.00.81.71.22.11.52.71.32.41.92.61.84.11.50.92.64.95.00.74.11.04.2?4.90.83.72.63.23.2?8.03.23.21.15.52.64.80.71.85.61.96.33.55.5Required productivity grow

298、thNotes:Demographic contribution plus required productivity growth gives annual GDP per capita growth required to achieve?countries where the average labour productivity growth rate of 201323 exceeds the required growth rate(thereby creating a sur-?Source:ILO calculations.35?Asia-Pacific Employment

299、and Social Outlook 2024?Labour shortage is one of the major fears related to population ageing.Labour?openings owing to lack of suitable candidates.This can occur because of an overall shortage of workers,a mismatch between required skills?workers expectations and the characteristics of?(ILO 2024b).

300、In general,labour shortages in a particular sector or occupation can be alleviated through appropriate training to raise the pool?higher pay and better working conditions to attract more workers.The time and cost required to resolve labour shortages for a given sector or occupation will depend on th

301、e training requirements and value of alternatives?and activities outside the labour market).Since providing training and improving working conditions can improve workers productivity,these measures do not necessarily raise unit labour cost and could be a sensible business decision.34A general labour

302、 shortage would only occur if all productive resources were already used at their optimum,resulting in sectors and enterprises taking workers from each other?labour shortages.Businesses would respond to rising labour costs by cutting output or 34 The ILOs Better Work programme brings together all le

303、vels of the garment industry to improve working conditions,respect workers rights and boost the competitiveness of apparel and footwear businesses.streamlining productivity,which could reduce the need for labour(to the extent possible in a sector)thereby alleviating the shortages.Consequently,no gen

304、eral labour shortage would?improvements and reallocation of workers are feasible across a wide range of sectors.Nevertheless,a shortage of workers with certain?be neither quick nor cheap to resolve.With so many workers still employed in low-productivity,low-paying jobs,Asia and?shortage of labour if

305、 appropriate measures are taken,such as improving training,pay and working conditions.In 2022,the share of employment in agriculture in the region was 29.4 per cent,the share of own-account and family workers was 51.1 per cent and the share of informal workers was 65.7 per cent.Those areas?productiv

306、ity increases,thereby“freeing”those workers to take up activities with a growing labour demand.In emerging and developing economies in the region,the greatest productivity gaps in relation to developed economies exist in agriculture,followed by construction and wholesale and retail trades and hotels

307、 and?the allocation of productive resources can be improved well or swiftly enough to prevent labour shortages from occurring in the region,especially in countries with high dependency ratios.?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 36?05010018.171.628.296.824.085.028.267.131.469.439.983.0Ag

308、ricultureManufacturingConstrcutionTrade andhotelsTrasportOther servicesEmerging?Developed?Note:Trade and hotels includes the activities of wholesale and retail trades and repair of motor vehicles,as well as the activities of hotels and restaurants.Source:ILO calculations based on ILOSTAT,ILO modelle

309、d estimates,November 2023,and United Nations estimates of national accounts.35?Countries in the region face labour shortages?sectors,indicating that labour markets fail?on their own.For example,by September 2023,Thailands electric vehicle industry was facing?44,000 required vocational training and t

310、he remainder required higher education(Apisitniran 2023).In India,76 per cent of manufacturers reported skilled labour shortages hurting their profitability(Bhattacharyya 2023).Japanese businesses have deemed employment conditions to be at their worst in three decades,35 and 85 per cent of them(the

311、highest rate in the world)?Group 2024).As a consequence,more than 40 per cent of Japanese businesses now accept workers aged over 70 years(Motokazu 2023).Despite the large pool of potentially available workers in the region,there are various?The most obvious reason is skill mismatch and skill defici

312、ency;firms claim to be unable to find suitable candidates.There could also be a lack?seeking,or being able to seek,employment in sectors facing shortages.Workers who already?conditions might not wish to take the risk of switching to sectors with labour shortages,?retraining without the promise of hi

313、gh reward.?risk-averse and unlikely to change sector(Farber 1999),despite the fact that a switch would likely result in higher wages(Faberman and Justiniano 2015).37?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 Skill mismatch and shortage is not easy to measure.?including their evolution over tim

314、e(Bennett et al.2022),workers true skill set can only be established using extensive(and expensive)testing.36 Educational mismatch provides a widely available but very imprecise measure,as it only takes account of level of education(primary,?higher average rate of mismatch(52 per cent)than high-inco

315、me countries(39 per cent).37 Undereducation is a problem in the region,with 34 per cent of workers having an educational level that is too low for their occupation.This compares to only 18 per cent in high-income countries.Low levels of education are particularly prevalent among informal workers(ILO

316、 2023b).Automation,computerization and the use of AI can potentially turn a situation of labour shortages into one of technological unemployment.In the ASEAN-5 countries,nearly?(Chang and Huynh 2016)when using Frey and Osbornes classification approach(Frey and Osborne 2013).Automation,though,is cost

317、ly,?not necessarily mean it will be.Newer research on the disruptive potential of generative AI has found that only a small number of occupations face a high risk of being largely replaced by AI(Gmyrek,Berg and Bescond 2023a).Most?be done by AI so that the occupations themselves will not be replaced

318、.The main impact of AI will likely therefore be one of augmentation,36 Skill measurement surveys include the OECD Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies(PIAAC)survey and the World Bank STEP survey.37?normative measure of educational mismatch.38?might be unwilling or unable

319、to share the care responsibility for their parents that,in the past,when birth rates were higher,might have been shared between four siblings.whereby some tasks will be done by AI,and the remainder will be done by workers.In Asia?has automation potential,while 13.4 per cent has augmentation potentia

320、l(Gmyrek,Berg and Bescond 2023b).Women are more likely than men to be in occupations with a higher potential for automation and augmentation,meaning that a larger percentage of women workers will be?productivity,it can alleviate worker shortages for?and automation is still unknown.Massive need for c

321、are workers In Asia and the Pacific,the share of the population comprising those aged 60 years and above who require long-term care is projected to increase from 2.9 per cent in?2.3).?long-term care tasks would depend on country-?provided.In many emerging and developing countries,most long-term care

322、 is provided in private households,either by family members or by domestic workers,owing to the lack of?(box 2.4).Changing household composition means that reliance on paid care work is likely to rise,which will also include residential long-term care.38 The following analysis assumes that one long-

323、term care worker can take care of between 2.5 and 3 care receivers(box 2.3).A heavy reliance on domestic care workers,where the carer to recipient ratio would be lower,would raise the number of required long-term care workers.?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024 38?The number of persons

324、aged 60 years and over requiring long-term care can be approximated using the healthy life expectancy(HALE)at age 60 and the life expectancy(LE)at age 60 indicators(De Henau 2022).39 This method also underpins the ILO Care at work report(ILO 2022c).The World Health Organization provides estimates fo

325、r HALE and LE for the years 2000,2010,2015?approximated by the formula?=0.6(1-?)/?.The indicator of interest,?,changes very little over the period 200019,showing that care requirements among the elderly change very little despite ageing.Longer healthy life expectancy seems to correlate with longer l

326、ife?for 2050 for all countries.The required recipient-to-carer ratio is assumed to be 2.5:1 in upper-middle-and high-income countries and 3:1 in low-and lower-middle-income countries(De Henau 2022).The full-time?to mean weekly hours worked in full-time employment.?surveys.This report considers all w

327、orkers having care-related occupations in the residential care sector(activity 87 of ISIC Rev.4)to be long-term care workers.40 In addition,domestic workers(activity 97 of ISIC Rev.4)who are personal care workers(53 in ISCO-08)are considered to be core long-term care workers.This latter group,howeve

328、r,does not exist in some countries labour force surveys(for example in India),meaning that the survey underestimates the number?Statisticians discussed the need for improved statistics on care work in October 2023 and recommended that a new framework should be developed.This process is commencing in

329、 2024 for discussion and possible adoption of new standards at the next Conference.39 Taking Japan as an example,the calculation method implies around 6 million people requiring long-term care,while in reality the number of people requiring long-term care or support in 2022 was approximately 6.9 mil

330、lion,while the number of long-?40 For a complete description of care employment see ILOSTAT.The number of workers required to provide long-term care for persons in old age is projected to double between 2023 and 2050,from 46 million to 90 million(Figure 2.10).This corresponds almost to a doubling of

331、 the share of workers providing long-term care for older persons in total employment,from 2.3 per cent to 4.3 per cent.East Asia is the subregion?care workers in total employment,at 6.3 per cent,versus 3.1 per cent for South Asia.39?Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2024?2023 and 2050Asia a

332、nd the Pacific20232.92.346.3Asia and the Pacific20504.94.390.3East Asia20233.63.026.1East Asia20506.56.245.8South-East Asia20232.51.86.2South-East Asia20504.03.112.2South Asia20232.41.813.4South Asia20504.13.231.1Pacific20233.63.10.7Pacific20504.74.21.1Persons aged 60+requiring long-term careRequire

333、d long-term care workersRegionYearShare of populationShare of employmentMillionsSource:ILO calculations using methodology in De Henau(2022).In 2022,an estimated 49 million workers were employed in all activities related to health and?for 2.6 per cent of total employment.In addition,around 22 million people were domestic workers(employed by households).Around 51 million of those 71 million workers