《国际劳工组织:世界就业和社会展望:2024年趋势报告(英文版)(120页).pdf》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《国际劳工组织:世界就业和社会展望:2024年趋势报告(英文版)(120页).pdf(120页珍藏版)》请在三个皮匠报告上搜索。
1、 ILO Flagship Report ILO Flagship ReportX World Employment and Social OutlookTrends2024X World Employment and Social OutlookTrends 2024International Labour Office GenevaProduced by the Publications Production Unit(PRODOC)of the ILO.The ILO endeavours to use paper sourced from forests managed in an e
2、nvironmentally sustainable and socially responsible manner.Code:DESIGN/WEI/PMSERVPhoto creditsFront cover:KrulUA/iStockCopyright International Labour Organization 2024 First published 2024 Attribution 4.0 International(CC BY 4.0)This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Intern
3、ational.To view a copy of this licence,please visit(https:/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).The user is allowed to reuse,share(copy and redistribute),adapt(remix,transform and build upon the original work)as detailed in the licence.The user must clearly credit the ILO as the source of the mater
4、ial and indicate if changes were made to the original content.Use of the emblem,name and logo of the ILO is not permitted in connection with translations,adaptations or other derivative works.Attribution The work must be cited as follows:World Employment and Social Outlook:Trends 2024.Geneva:Interna
5、tional Labour Office,2024.ILO.Translations In the case of a translation of this work,the following disclaimer must be added along with the attribution:This is a translation of a copyrighted work of the International Labour Organization(ILO).Thistranslation has not been prepared,reviewed or endorsed
6、by the ILO and should not be considered an official ILO translation.The ILO disclaims all responsibility for its content and accuracy.Responsibility rests solely with the author(s)of the translation.Adaptations In the case of an adaptation of this work,the following disclaimer must be added along wi
7、th the attribution:This is an adaptation of a copyrighted work of the International Labour Organization(ILO).Thisadaptation has not been prepared,reviewed or endorsed by the ILO and should not be considered an official ILO adaptation.The ILO disclaims all responsibility for its content and accuracy.
8、Responsibility rests solely with the author(s)of the adaptation.Third-party materials This Creative Commons licence does not apply to non-ILO copyright materials included in this publication.If the material is attributed to a third party,the user of such material is solely responsible for clearing t
9、he rights with the rights holder and for any claims of infringement.Any dispute arising under this licence that cannot be settled amicably shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law(UNCITRAL).The parties shall
10、 be bound by any arbitration award rendered as a result of such arbitration as the final adjudication of such a dispute.Queries on rights and licensing should be addressed to the ILO Publishing Unit(Rights and Licensing)at rightsilo.org.Information on ILO publications and digital products can be fou
11、nd at:www.ilo.org/publns.ISBN 9789220400418(print);9789220400425(web PDF)ISSN 2709-7080(print);2709-7099(online)DOI:https:/doi.org/10.54394/HQAE1085labour market/labour shortage/economic conditions/inflation/wages/report/ILO pub13.01.2ILO Cataloguing in Publication DataAlso available in French:Emplo
12、i et questions sociales dans le monde:Tendances 2024,ISBN 9789220400432(print),9789220400449(web PDF);and in Spanish:Perspectivas Sociales y del Empleo en el Mundo:Tendencias2024,ISBN 9789220400456(print),9789220400463(web PDF).The designations employed in ILO publications and databases,which are in
13、 conformity with United Nations practice,and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the ILO concerning the legal status of any country,area or territory or of its authorities,or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundar
14、ies.The opinions and views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s)and do not necessarily reflect the opinions,views or policies of the ILO.Reference to names of firms and commercial products and processes does not imply their endorsement by the ILO,and any failure to mention a parti
15、cular firm,commercial product or process is not a sign of disapproval.3PrefaceThis years World Employment and Social Outlook:Trends provides a comprehensive assessment of the latest labour market trends,including unemployment,job creation,labour force participation and hours worked.Importantly,it al
16、so links these trends with their social outcomes,and it is these findings that are the most revealing when we assess the full significance of these developments for both policy formation and the lives of individuals.The report finds that although some of the data are encouraging notably on growth an
17、d un-employment a deeper analysis reveals that labour market imbalances are growing and that,in the context of multiple and interacting global crises,this is eroding progress towards greater social justice.So,although in 2023 global unemployment dropped to the lowest level since the start of the pan
18、-demic,and working poverty and informality approached pre-pandemic rates,the ILOs projections suggest that little positive change in these indicators can be expected in 2024.Productivity growth and living standards have also not improved,in spite of technological progress that was widely projected t
19、o give these a boost.Indeed,there are indications that the nature of the technology roll-out under way could widen rather than weaken disparities,nationally and globally.Measures to address insufficient pay,poor job quality,and major inequalities of gender,pay,skills are not just significant for our
20、 economic good;they are also essential components in building social justice.And without greater social justice we have little chance of tackling the major problems of our age.People will not support the hard choices that need to be made,on climate change,healthcare,technology and employment,if the
21、costs and opportunities are not seen to be shared equitably and if decent work is not available to give them the chance to build a better future.In this difficult context,policymakers are confronted with tough decisions.Boosting economic growth will be essential to escape from our current crisis vor
22、tex,but it must be quality economic growth that not only creates more jobs but also makes working conditions better,our societies more resilient and our future sustainable.What is clear from this report is that the problems we face are too large and complex for any one group,country or region to sol
23、ve alone.The policies and actions chosen need to be coordinated and mutually reinforcing,at both country and multilateral levels.Whats more,this coordination needs to extend to the allocation of financial and technological resources.A more effectively coordinated response will also help to put us on
24、 track to achieve both the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the commitments made at COP28 which,encouragingly and for the first time,included reference to the importance of labour rights,social dialogue,social protection and decent work in achieving the just transition we all need.The recent dec
25、ision by the ILOs Governing Body to endorse a Global Coalition for Social Justice will facilitate this coordination.The Coalition will bring together the knowledge and skills of a unique and diverse group of international bodies and stakeholders to promote coordinated responses,at national,regional
26、and global level.This will help to ensure a human-focused approach,and so ensure that social justice is recognized as the keystone of a sustainable global recovery.Gilbert F.Houngbo ILO Director-General5Preface 3Acknowledgements 9Executive summary:Job resilience amidst rising fragility 111.Labour ma
27、rket resilience will be tested in the near term 17Growth has proved to be resilient amidst rising fragility 17Economic resilience held labour market conditions steady in 2023 20Looking ahead,there are risks that job creation will deteriorate further 26Persistent decent work deficits are undermining
28、long-run progress 28References 332.Employment and social trends by region 35Overview 35Africa 36Labour market trends in North Africa 36Labour market trends in sub-Saharan Africa 37Data challenges for evidence-based labour migration governance in Africa 38Americas 40Labour market trends in Latin Amer
29、ica and the Caribbean 40Stagnating labour productivity growth in Latin America and the Caribbean 42Labour market trends in North America 42Arab States 43Labour market trends in the Arab States 43Labour market implications of forced displacements 45Asia and the Pacific 46Labour market trends in Asia
30、and the Pacific 47Informality and new forms of work in Asia and the Pacific 48Europe and Central Asia 50Labour market trends in Europe and Central Asia 50Mixed pictures of youth unemployment in Europe 52References 54ContentsXWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 20246List of boxes1.1.Investment
31、 levels fell modestly in the face of higher borrowing costs 181.2.Global spillovers:Risks of deteriorating GDP that could exacerbate employment challenges 191.3.Baby boom versus baby bust:The labour market impacts of inflation in the 2020s compared with the 1970s 322.1.Impact of the IsraelHamas conf
32、lict on total employment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 433.1.Dual-track global skills partnerships 72List of figures1.1.Projected GDP growth in 2023,comparing October 2022 and October 2023 outlooks(percentages)181.2.GDP growth outlook(percentage change)191.3.Recent and projected changes in i
33、nflation(percentages)201.4.Total labour force participation rates(percentage points)211.5.Unemployment rates(percentages)221.6.Employment growth,202023,by sex and country income groups(percentages)231.7.Mean weekly hours actually worked per employed person,2019 and 2023,by country income group and s
34、ex 241.8.Annual real wage growth in 2023(percentages)253.Labour shortages amidst unmet demand for decent work 59Overview 59A growing demand for labour 60Labour demand:Unfilled vacancies in advanced economies 60Local and global consequences of labour and skills shortages 62Labour supply 62Labour forc
35、e participation:Are fewer people working or looking for jobs?63Hours worked:Mean and total hours have diverged 65Do labour markets fail to adjust?67Labour shortages might become entrenched 70Concluding remarks:Priorities for action 71References 73AppendicesA.Groupings of countries by region and inco
36、me level 80B.ILO modelled estimates 83C.Tables of labour market indicators by regional groups 84Contents71.9.Employment growth,202325,by sex and country income groups(percentages)261.10.Gender gap in participation rates,2023 and 2025(percentage points)291.11.Youth and adult unemployment rates(percen
37、tages)291.12.Informal employment as share of total employment,200424(percentages)301.13.Growth of population aged 20 to 64,by time period and country income group(compound annual percentages)322.1.International stock of migrant workers,Africa and subregions,total and female share,201019 392.2.Averag
38、e annual productivity growth rate,201523(percentages)422.3.Gender disparities in labour market outcomes in the Arab States,2023 452.4.Informal employment rates,Asia and the Pacific and subregions,200423(percentages)492.5.Prevailing youth unemployment rates,compared with highs and lows between 2003 a
39、nd 2023,European Union(percentages)533.1.Channels of labour market adjustment and resulting imbalances 603.2.Job vacancies in selected(advanced)economies,January 2002 to September 2023(standard deviations from mean)613.3.Female labour force participation rates compared with the pre-pandemic historic
40、al trend(deviation from trend in percentage points)633.4.Youth labour force participation(percentages)643.5.Youth NEET,by sex and income group(percentages of the population aged 15 to 24)653.6.Total hours versus mean hours actually worked per employed person 663.7.Number of sick days per worker and
41、year and percentage increase,201922 67List of tables1.1.Jobs gap and jobs gap rate,201923,by sex,world and income group 231.2.Labour force participation rates by income group,201925 271.3.Unemployment and unemployment rate,201925,by sex,world and income group 281.4.Working poverty,202023,world and b
42、y country income group 302.1.Estimates and projections of working hours,employment,unemployment and labour force,regional and subregional,Africa,201025 372.2.Estimates and projections of working hours,employment,unemployment and labour force,regional and subregional,Americas,201025 412.3.Estimates a
43、nd projections of working hours,employment,unemployment and labour force,regional and subregional,Arab States,201025 442.4.Estimates and projections of working hours,employment,unemployment and labour force,regional and subregional,Asia and the Pacific,201025 472.5.Estimates and projections of worki
44、ng hours,employment,unemployment and labour force,regional and subregional,Europe and Central Asia,201025 519AcknowledgementsWorld Employment and Social Outlook:Trends 2024 was prepared by the Macro-economic Policies and Jobs Unit of the ILO Research Department,led by Ekkehard Ernst.The report was w
45、ritten by Steven Tobin,Richard Horne,Lisa Feist,Miguel Sanchez Martinez and Pascal Kampert,under the overall coordination and leadership of Ekkehard Ernst.The report was produced under the overall guidance of Richard Samans,Director of the ILO Research Department.The authors are grateful for all the
46、 input and suggestions received from the ILO Regional Offices for Africa,the Arab States,Asia and the Pacific,Europe and Central Asia,and Latin America and the Caribbean.The ILO modelled estimates presented in this report were produced by the Data Production and Analysis Unit,led by Steven Kapsos,in
47、 the ILO Department of Statistics and by the Macro-economic Policies and Jobs Unit of the ILO Research Department.The authors especially acknowledge the modelling work carried out by Evangelia Bourmpoula,Paloma Carrillo,Roger Gomis,Stefan Khn,Avichal Mahajan and Miguel Sanchez Martinez.The underlyin
48、g database of international labour market indicators used to produce the estimates was prepared by the Data Production and Analysis Unit of the ILO Department of Statistics.The authors also wish to acknowledge the efforts of David Bescond,Vipasana Karkee,Quentin Mathys,Yves Perardel and Mabelin Vill
49、arreal-Fuentes.Excellent comments and suggestions were provided by James Howard,Senior Adviser to the ILO Director-General.The ILO Research Department wishes to acknowledge the comments and suggestions provided by the following ILO colleagues:Yukiko Arai,Marie-France Auer,Tulio Cravo,Sukti Dasgupta,
50、Sara Elder,Elisenda Estruch-Puertas,Roger Gomis,Tite Habiyakare,Claire Harasty,Susan Hayter,Maren Hopfe,Aya Jaafar,Steven Kapsos,Stefan Khn,Jesse Mertens,Michael Mwasikakata,David Mosler,Yves Prardel,Gerhard Reinecke,Dorothea Schmidt-Klau,Oliver Liang,Juan Marcelo Cuautle Segovia,Ken Chamuva Shawa,S
51、ergei Suarez Dillon Soares,Theo Sparreboom,Juan Jacobo Velasco,Christian Viegelahn,Felix Weidenkaff.The authors also thank colleagues from ACTEMP and ACTRAV for their excellent comments and suggestions.We would like to express our gratitude to Judy Rafferty and our colleagues in the Publications Pro
52、duction Unit for assisting with the production process,and to our colleagues in the ILO Department of Communication and Public Information for their continued collaboration and support in disseminating the report.11Executivesummary Job resilience amidst rising fragilityThe economic recovery has slow
53、ed The macroeconomic environment deteriorated significantly over 2023.Ongoing geopolitical tensions as well as persistent and broadening inflation triggered frequent and aggressive moves by central banks.Monetary authorities in advanced and emerging economies implemented the fastest increase in inte
54、rest rates since the 1980s,with significant global repercussions.Large emerging economies such as China,Trkiye and Brazil slowed down considerably,causing adverse impact on global industrial activity,investment and trade.Growth in advanced economies was nearly halved.Given the significant and highly
55、 persistent deviation of inflation from targets,central banks are expected to maintain a tight stance on monetary conditions,at least until the end of 2024.Consequently,the post-pandemic economic and social recovery remains incomplete and new vulnerabilities are eroding progress in social justice.wh
56、ile job growth proved to be resilient and the unemployment rate continued to fall Despite the economic slowdown,global growth in 2023 was modestly higher than anticipated,and labour mar-kets showed surprising resilience.On the back of strong jobs growth,both the unemployment rate and the jobs gap ha
57、ve declined below pre-pandemic values.The global unemployment rate in 2023 was 5.1 per cent,a modest improvement on 2022.The global jobs gap also saw improvements in 2023,but,at close to 435 million,remained elevated.Moreover,in 2023,labour market participation rates had largely recovered from their
58、 pandemic lows,especially among lower-middle-income and high-income countries,although with large differences across labour market groups,which have contributed to labour market imbalances,notably in advanced economies.Average hours remain below their 2019 pre-pandemic levels,weighing on the overall
59、 available labour input and causing labour market imbalances,especially in key sectors in advanced and some emerging economies.Although the imbalances eased somewhat in 2023,concerns are rising that these labour market imbalances are structural,rather than cyclical,in nature.XWorld Employment and So
60、cial Outlook|Trends 202412 although real wages declined and working poverty hasbottomed outDespite lower unemployment and positive employment growth,real wages declined in the majority of G20 countries as wage increases failed to keep pace with inflation.Moreover,in 2023,the numbers of workers livin
61、g in extreme poverty earning less than US$2.15 per day per person in purchasing power parity(PPP)terms grew by about 1 million globally.A stronger pattern emerges when one looks at moderate working poverty,that is,earning less than US$3.65 per day per person in PPP terms.The number of workers living
62、 in moderate poverty increased by about 8.4 million in 2023;a decline in moderate poverty was observed only in upper-middle-income countries.On the positive side,informality rates have returned close to pre-pandemic levels,even though the number of informal workers reached 2 billion people in 2023 b
63、ecause of the growing global labour force.Financial conditions started to deteriorate,building up fragilityUnderneath benign trends in headline job numbers,fragility has started to emerge that is likely to first hit countries that were already struggling before the pandemic.Highly indebted developin
64、g countries are particularly at risk of quickly running into financial distress as global financial conditions tighten,with significant repercussions for jobs,working conditions and wage growth.So far,these problems have re-mained localized and have had few regional or global repercussions.However,s
65、hould finan-cial stress affect more systemically significant countries,another global financial crisis cannot be excluded.Investment remained resilient Global investment rates have recovered sig-nificantly since the historic low during the global financial crisis and continued to do so throughout th
66、e pandemic.Rising financing costs and a rise in the level of uncertainty have not prevented a return to higher investment activity,especially among European countries.Thanks to strong commodity developments,countries in sub-Saharan Africa have experienced significant acceleration in investment and a
67、re expected to sus-tain investment rates at one of the highest levels in that subregion in more than three decades.On the other hand,countries in East and South-East Asia have experienced moderate investment slowdown,albeit from very high levels.Overall,a temporary decline in investment is to be exp
68、ected,but global investment rates are expected to remain signifi-cantly above the levels seen during the 2010s.but productivity growth continued to decelerate amidst rising price pressuresAfter a short growth spurt as countries recov-ered from the pandemic,aggregate labour productivity growth quickl
69、y returned to the low pace observed over the previous decade.This slowdown happened despite the apparent acceleration of technological progress,especially that of digital technologies.In this regard,the rise in investment in many advanced and some developing countries does not seem to have lifted pr
70、oductivity growth,presumably because of strong investment growth in low-productivity services and construction.During periods of slow productivity growth,real disposable income and real wages are often vulnerable to sudden price shocks.As only a few firms have seen their profits accelerate,most work
71、ers have been unable to ask for stronger increases in their earnings,and so they and their households are facing an accelerating erosion of their real disposable income.Moreover,given the Executive summary:Job resilience amidst rising fragility13large sectoral heterogeneity of earnings,a further wid
72、ening of within-country income inequality has ensued.Macro-policymakers might welcome the absence of a wageprice spiral,but,in an envir-onment of already lacklustre growth and where earnings were lost during the pandemic,such an erosion of real disposable income bodes ill for aggregate demand and a
73、more sustained eco-nomic recovery.More importantly,when demand falters,productivity growth suffers as firms fail to generate enough revenue to invest in and adjust to the latest technological developments.Labour imbalances were compounded by weak productivity growth and lower average hours worked Co
74、ncerns about labour and skills shortages have remained high on the agenda of policymakers,at least in advanced economies and some emerging economies.Despite a quick recovery in aggregate labour force participation rates,sectors with essential workers have expressed difficulties in attracting people
75、to take up the rising demand for care,transportation and retail work.There have also been persistent shortages in other sectors such as manufacturing,construction and ICT.Part of the challenge with respect to shortages of essential workers has to do with the poor working conditions in these sectors.
76、Slowing productivity makes it difficult for employers in these sectors to offer higher wages.In addition,restructured demand across sectors and supportive fiscal policy have created a significant overhang in vacancies,in specific sectors,that are difficult to fill.Such sectoral mismatch has been oft
77、en compounded by low geographical mobility because workers have suffered from a lack of affordable housing.Although these shortages seem to have eased with tighter macroeconomic policies,labour market imbalances have persisted.The recovery in labour force participation rates to pre-pandemic levels h
78、as been uneven and has not benefited all labour market groups the same way.Female participation rates have recovered faster than expected but the gender par-ticipation gap remains large,especially in emerging and developing countries.Most concerning is the situation for young people.Although youth l
79、abour force participation has recovered above trend,a disproportionately large proportion of youth who dropped out of the labour market are not pursuing any form of training and continue to face significant obstacles to returning to work.The rate of those not in training,education or employment(NEET
80、)remains high across income levels and particularly among young women,causing sig-nificant challenges for individuals long-term labour market attachment.Although people have returned to the labour market,they tend not to be working the same numbers of hours as before the pandemic.Across countries of
81、 all income levels,average hours worked have expanded less than total hours worked;there are acute labour shortages in some contact-intensive sectors.These are partly related to ongoing longer-term health-related problems that have built up over the past three years.The numbers of sick days have inc
82、reased significantly from pre-pandemic levels,indicating ongoing COVID-19-related effects on peoples health.Policy measures to keep workers in jobs regardless of the number of hours worked are fading only slowly and have prevented a faster recovery of average hours worked.Finally,the increase in the
83、 incidence of part-time employment is contributing to longer-term reductions in average hours worked,since part-time employees often find it difficult to return to a full-time job.As the economy continues to slow down,part of these labour shortages will be absorbed by firms issuing fewer vacancies.N
84、evertheless,as productivity growth remains weak,labour short-ages are likely to persist.In countries where the population is ageing,employers will face increasing difficulties in filling their vacancies despite the slowing growth.Older workers tend to switch jobs less frequently;hence an older popul
85、ation means there will be fewer of the job hoppers who constitute many of the candidates for open vacancies.Improvements in working conditions and rising productivity could help address some of these labour market imbalances,as could more equitable distribution of job opportunities across countries
86、that have severe excess labour.XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202414 an indication of structural problems that affect labour market adjustmentAs the cyclical factors impacting on labour markets have slowly been absorbed,struc-tural issues in labour market adjustment have become more pre
87、ssing.Job retention schemes such as those put in place in many advanced economies proved essential to prevent firms and workers losing valuable experience and skills.However,these schemes made workers less likely to switch rapidly to new opportunities with the onset of the recovery.Moreover,long-ter
88、m trends in productivity and population ageing among advanced and some emerging economies have slowed down the adjustment necessary to absorb the pandemic-induced labour market imbalances.A workforce that is on average older and less mobile in part because of problems on the housing market as descri
89、bed above will have fewer opportunities to switch to alternative job opportunities.Such opportunities may simply not exist,owing to the generalized slowdown in productivity growth,and this will reduce pathways for transitions to better-paying jobs.Finally,despite the modest improvements in 2023,labo
90、ur market participation rates for both men and women are set to decline in 2024 and 2025 across most income groups,following their long-term trend.Accelerating technological progress is testing labour market resilienceLabour market adjustment will be further tested by accelerating technological prog
91、ress.The year 2023 saw the arrival of yet another wave of digital innovations involving generative artificial intelligence(AI).Despite this apparent techno-logical progress,living standards and productivity growth have not improved,a further indication of slow labour market adjustment.Lack of skills
92、 and the entry barriers for newcomers created by large digital monopolies have been significant obstacles to faster technological adoption,in par-ticular in low-productive sectors and developing countries.Geographical inequalities are likely to worsen because a small number of conglomerates continue
93、 to attract most of the investment in the digital sector.Many countries,including developing ones,have adopted policies to encourage the adoption of AI.However,in the current climate of geopolitical tensions,technological transfer seems to be facing intensifying barriers,which will hamper leapfroggi
94、ng strategies in developing countries to harness the benefits of these digital technologies.Broad-based skills initiatives require significant domestic fiscal resources,but these have been eroded by the pandemic,including in advanced economies.Countries longing for a faster digital transformation th
95、at will benefit society at large will need new policy approaches,including a more proactive approach to technological de-velopment,for instance through mission-oriented innovation policy and the mobilization of resources through sovereign wealth funds.Executive summary:Job resilience amidst rising f
96、ragility15Outlook remains cloudy as a poly-crisis worsens social justiceIn the near future,the labour market outlook is set to deteriorate,albeit only moderately.Global unemployment rates will notch up slightly over the forecast horizon,primarily because of increased joblessness in advanced economie
97、s.Unemployment is expected to rise modestly in 2024:as labour force participation rates decline and employment growth slows,global unemployment will rise by 2 million,pushing the global unemployment rate from 5.1 per cent in 2023 to 5.2 per cent in 2024.The global jobs gap,though improving,remained
98、elevated in 2023,at close to 435 million.The erosion of real wages and living standards by high and persistent infla-tion rates and rising costs of housing is unlikely to be compensated quickly.Youth unemployment continues to present a challenge to faster struc-tural and labour market adjustment,esp
99、ecially in countries with high NEET rates.The gap here opened by the pandemic needs to be closed quickly through targeted skills initiatives to pre-vent further erosion of job resilience.Informality rates are not expected to improve any further;around 58 per cent of the global employment will remain
100、 informally employed in 2024.Similarly,working poverty is likely to persist.Major challenges need to be addressed swiftly to accelerate movement towards achieving the UN sustainability goals.The current environment of geopolitical tensions bodes ill for rapid and effective international coordination
101、 to address major economic,ecological and social challenges.Governments need to strengthen their domestic economy through initiatives to raise productivity growth and living standards.To this end,gov-ernments and social partners could make use of existing international cooperation instruments to fos
102、ter regional productivity initiatives,for instance by strengthening global skills partner-ships.Although governments have returned to the commanding heights of the economy,their resources have been depleted,especially in low-and middle-income countries.Current work by the G20 to foster international
103、 cooperation to make better use of multilateral development funds should be encouraged and sped up to support the most fragile economies.1 XGrowth has proved to be resilient amidst rising fragilityGDP in 2023 proved to be more resilient than was anticipated.In October 2022,the International Monetary
104、 Funds(IMFs)outlook for GDP(gross domestic product)growth in 2023 was constrained by persistent increases in interest rates intended to bring inflation under control(IMF 2022).The frequent and rapid increasing of interest rates was expected to dampen global growth considerably.However,in October 202
105、3,the global GDP growth projection for 2023 was revised upwards by 0.3 percentage points from the previous years forecast,primarily because of stronger demand for services(IMF 2023).GDP growth was revised upwards by 0.4 per-centage points for advanced economies and 0.3 percentage points for emerging
106、 market and developing economies(figure 1.1).Some of the better than anticipated growth in 2023 was also the result of investment levels that remained high despite rising costs of borrowing(box 1.1).Labour market resilience will be tested in the near termXWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 2
107、02418Inflation pressures eased in 2023 but remained elevated.Rising prices in 2021 and 2022 came on the heels of strong fiscal stimulus by gov-ernments during the COVID-19 pandemic,and supply chain pressures exacerbated by geopolitical developments including the Russian Federations invasion of Ukrai
108、ne.Although all regions and economies have seen inflation rise since 2020,advanced economies have experienced lower levels of inflation than have emerging market and developing economies.Although inflation was down from its 2022 peak,it remained considerably above central bank target levels througho
109、ut 2023,averaging 4.6 per cent in advanced economies and 8.5 per cent in developing economies.This has had important negative consequences on real wage growth(see figure 1.8).The GDP outlook for 2024 is characterized by considerable heterogeneity across country groupings.The resilience in GDP growth
110、 in 2023 was most evident among lower-middle-and upper-middle-income countries(figure 1.2).High-income countries experienced a significant slowing of GDP growth in 2023 compared with 2022,and low-income countries also saw a marked slowdown.GDP is expected to remain stable in 2024,globally,relative t
111、o 2023,with low-income and lower-middle-income countries expected to see an improvement over this period(IMF 2023).However,owing to the presence and persistence of global spillovers,there are risks that growth will deteriorate in the near future(box 1.2)World2.73.0Advanced economies1.11.5Emerging ma
112、rket and developing economies 3.74.0IMF WEO Oct 2022IMF WEO Oct 202321034 X Figure 1.1.Projected GDP growth in 2023,comparing October 2022 and October 2023 outlooks(percentages)Source:IMF(2022 and 2023).XBox 1.1.Investment levels fell modestly in the face of higher borrowing costsAt the global level
113、,investment as a share of GDP in 2023 is estimated to have been 26.4 per cent,only 1 percentage point lower than in 2022(IMF 2023).The fall in advanced economies was even less pronounced(from 23.2 per cent in 2022 to 22.4 per cent in 2023).This pales in comparison,for instance,with the 3 percentage
114、point drop in advanced economies in 2009 at the height of the global financial crisis.Some of the recent underlying persistence in invest-ment may have been linked to anchored ex-pectations that inflation(and interest rates)would return to target levels(see box 1.3).This resilience in investment can
115、 also be attributed to swift policy action at the onset of the pandemic to bolster the uncer-tainty shock that the health crisis brought about.However,the current macro-economic environment,conditioned partly by rising geopolitical tensions,has altered the composition of investment away from highly
116、innovative investments to low-yielding ones.This has likely helped to bolster economic activity and employment in the short term,but an over-reliance on lower-productivity investments,such as retail trade,could dampen productivity and overall improvements in living stand-ards over the medium term.1.
117、Labour market resilience will be tested in the near term19Inflation though easing could become more widespread over 2024 and 2025.The better than anticipated economic growth outlook is partly a reflection of the fact that inflationary pressures are easing as cost shocks from energy and food price hi
118、kes dissipate(figure 1.3).However,as more and more sectors are affected by inflation,higher inflation could persist albeit at levels lower than the peaks reached in 2022(IMF 2023).Because inflation remains sticky,interest rates are expected to remain elevated over the forecast horizon.This could con
119、tinue to dampen real wage prospects.2020202242025World3.06.2Low-income countries0.52.20.6Lower-middle-income countries3.16.2Upper-middle-income countries1.37.3High-income countries4.35.61.51.62.03.42.95.13.13.02.94.64.02.93.75.13.53.25.15.43.5 X Figure 1.2.GDP growth outlook(percentage ch
120、ange)Note:GDP estimates are based on constant 2017 international USD.Source:Authors calculations based on IMF(2023).XBox 1.2.Global spillovers:Risks of deteriorating GDP that could exacerbate employment challengesThe outlook for GDP and employment is subject to several global risks.Foremost are the
121、eco-nomic,employment and social risks and related spillovers arising from the IsraelHamas conflict that erupted in October 2023,heightening tensions in the Middle East.Geopolitical factors and a prolonged or widened conflict in the Middle East could also have implications for,among other things,the
122、scale of refugee crises,impacting on neighbouring countries and other countries in Europe and beyond.Another risk of deterioration comes from potential disruptions in global value chains.A recent Bank of International Settlements(BIS)bulletin points to evidence that,although direct cross-country lin
123、ks fell significantly between December 2021 and September 2023,there was an increase in indirect cross-country links(Qiu,Shin and Zhang 2023).Thus,the global economy remains highly interconnected and contrary to“near-shoring”post-pandemic trade patterns is far from immune to regional developments.Fi
124、nally,if interest rates remain higher,and for longer,in the United States of America and other advanced economies,they could have ripple effects on global growth through higher levels of sovereign debt and other transmission channels in emerging market and developing economies.In sum,there are consi
125、derable downside risks to growth and employment in the near future.XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202420 XEconomic resilience held labour market conditions steady in 20231 Owing to the broad estimation method of the linear trend,only discrepancies beyond 0.5 percentage points are consid
126、ered off trend.On account of stronger than anticipated economic growth in 2023,total labour force participation rates moved above their long-term linear trend.1 Possibly buoyed by a stronger than anticipated job market,participation rates increased in several regions in 2023,notably in high-income c
127、ountries(by 0.3 percentage points)and lower-middle-income countries(by 1.5 percentage points)(table 1.2).In low-income and upper-middle-income countries labour force participation rates fell(by 0.1 and 0.3 percentage points,respectively).When 2023 participation rates are compared with the 19912019 l
128、inear trend,a number of observations can be made(figure 1.4).First,except in low-income countries,2023 participation rates were higher than the 19912019 linear trend,signalling that participation rates have largely recovered from their pandemic lows.Second,however,participation rates were lower in 2
129、023 than their linear trends in North Africa,Latin America and the Caribbean and to a lesser extent in South-East Asia and the Pacific.Indeed,there are notable differences across ILO subregions(see Chapter 2).More fundamentally,although labour market participation is above trend,a number of importan
130、t deviations have occurred that are masked when aggregate figures are examined.For instance,women,youth and migrants particu-larly hard hit by the pandemic continue to have comparably low participation rates(see Chapter 3).2020202242025024680222426WorldEmerging marketand develo
131、ping economiesEmerging and developing EuropeMiddle East and Central AsiaAdvanced economiesEmerging and developing AsiaLatin Americaand the CaribbeanSub-Saharan Africa X Figure 1.3.Recent and projected changes in inflation(percentages)Source:Calculations based on IMF(2023).1.Labour market resilience
132、will be tested in the near term21The downward trajectory in unemployment rates was maintained in 2023.Unemployment rates fell globally by 0.2 percentage points in 2023 to 5.1 per cent,with declines across most country groups except low-income countries,where rates ticked up,and high-income countries
133、,where unemployment remained stable(figure 1.5).Moreover,except in low-income countries,the unemployment rates in 2023 were consistently below the pre-pandemic levels of 2019.2 The“jobs gap”includes every person who wants employment,regardless of whether they are currently available or searching for
134、 a job.See ILO(2023).The jobs gap has improved in recent years,but in 2023 stood at nearly 435 million.2 Since the height of the pandemic in 2020,the jobs gap has continued to trend downwards and is now below its 2019 pre-pandemic level(table 1.1).Globally,the jobs gap is expected to have numbered 4
135、34.8 million persons in 2023,equating to a jobs gap rate of 11.1 per cent.This marks a 5.6 million decrease in the size of the jobs gap from 2022.Among women the jobs gap is expected to have Income level groupLower-middle income+1.5BRICS+1.5World+0.8High income+0.7Upper-middle income+0.3Low income0.
136、22023 linear trend2023ILO regionArab States0Europe and Central Asia+0.5Asia and the Pacific+1.5Africa+0.3Americas0.9ILO subregionNorth Africa 0.8Arab States0South Asia+2.4Central and Western Asia+3.1Eastern Europe+0.3Northern,Southern and Western Europe0.2North America0.1Latin America and the Caribb
137、ean1.6East Asia+0.8South-East Asia and the Pacific0.4Sub-Saharan Africa+0.2455055606545505560654550556065 X Figure 1.4.Total labour force participation rates(percentage points)Note:The linear trend is based on labour force participation rates in 19912019.Source:Authors calculations based on ILOSTAT,
138、ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202422been 220.7 million in 2023,and among men 214.1 million.The jobs gap rate for women in 2023 was 13.7 per cent,versus 9.3 per cent for men.Across all country income groups the jobs gap of women is higher than that o
139、f men,but the gender differences are most pronounced in low-income and lower-middle-income countries,where the jobs gap of women surpasses that of men by nearly 7 percentage points.In upper-middle-income and high-income countries in 2023,the jobs gap rate for women was higher than that of men by 3.0
140、 and 2.3 percentage points,respectively.In all country income groups the jobs gap rate has declined since 2020,the most pronounced decline(3.0 percentage points)having occurred in high-income countries.Employment growth remained positive across all income groups in the face of economic head-winds.In
141、 2023,the drop in unemployment rates was a consequence of employment growing faster than labour market participation.Nevertheless,since 2021,global employment growth has by and large decelerated(figure 1.6).In 2023,employment growth,while remaining positive,fell across most income groups(the excepti
142、on being lower-middle-income countries).At the global level,employment grew 2.2 per cent in 2023,compared with 2.8 per cent the previous year.The deceleration of employment growth was particularly pronounced in upper-middle-income and high-income countries.Although total employment growth decelerate
143、d in 2023,2002220234.64.84.45.05.25.45.65.86.06.26.46.66.87.0WorldHigh incomeLow incomeLower-middle incomeUpper-middle income5.15.04.55.55.7 X Figure 1.5.Unemployment rates(percentages)Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.1.Labour market resilience will be tested in the nea
144、r term23Country groupSexJobs gap rate(percentages)Jobs gap (millions)200222023200222023WorldWomen14.416.115.314.213.7219.7244.7238.0223.0220.7Men10.011.610.79.69.3219.3254.8238.3217.5214.1Total11.813.412.611.511.1439.0499.5476.4440.4434.8Low-income countriesWomen24.125.525.124.
145、424.331.734.735.234.935.7Men16.617.817.817.517.425.828.529.430.130.9Total20.021.421.120.620.557.663.364.565.066.6Lower-middle-income countriesWomen16.217.416.816.015.467.372.272.271.173.7Men10.111.610.59.18.984.097.390.179.679.5Total12.113.512.611.411.1151.3169.4162.3150.6153.2Upper-middle-income co
146、untriesWomen13.214.814.012.612.089.899.896.486.782.4Men9.611.110.29.49.081.293.286.680.277.3Total11.212.811.910.810.4171.0193.0183.0166.9159.7High income countriesWomen10.412.811.410.09.530.938.034.230.328.9Men7.89.98.97.67.228.235.932.327.626.4Total8.911.210.18.78.259.173.966.657.955.3Source:ILOSTA
147、T,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.X Table 1.1.Jobs gap and jobs gap rate,201923,by sex,world and income groupTotal200222023World1.32.02.82.82.2Low-income countries2.91.33.33.93.0Lower-middle-income countries2.11.13.34.34.5Upper-middle-income countries0.32.92.81.50.6High-income countr
148、ies1.32.81.62.51.1Male200222023World1.21.82.53.01.5Low-income countries3.01.43.24.62.9Lower-middle-income countries2.01.03.14.32.5Upper-middle-income countries0.12.72.41.60.6High-income countries1.12.81.12.30.9Female200222023World1.42.33.22.53.2Low-income countries2.81.13.43.13
149、.1Lower-middle-income countries2.21.23.94.38.6Upper-middle-income countries0.63.23.31.30.6High-income countries1.62.82.32.71.5 X Figure 1.6.Employment growth,202023,by sex and country income groups(percentages)Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|T
150、rends 202424female employment growth topped or equalled that of males across income groups.Despite a deceleration in job growth,notably in high-income countries,labour market and skills imbalances have persisted across several countries and sec-tors(see Chapter 3).However,mean hours worked have yet
151、to recover fully from the pandemic.Against the backdrop of positive employment growth,at the global level mean hours worked per week per person employed reached approximately 42(figure 1.7).Although in some instances low-income and upper-middle-income countries they are approaching 2019 levels,mean
152、hours worked remain consistently below their pre-pandemic levels,a circumstance that may adversely affect overall labour supply(see Chapter 3).They are especially so among lower-middle-income coun-tries.The recent trends in average hours worked are broadly consistent across genders.Despite low unemp
153、loyment and positive employment growth,in countries with available data,real wages have been declining.The vast majority of G20 countries with available wage data saw real wages fall in 2023,meaning that wage increases were unable to keep pace with inflation TotalWorld42.0Low-income countries34.6Low
154、er-middle-income countries46.1Upper-middle-income countries42.8High-income countries35.720232019MaleWorld44.6Low-income countries37.3Lower-middle-income countries49.0Upper-middle-income countries44.0High-income countries38.8FemaleWorld38.1Low-income countries31.1Lower-middle-income countries39.8Uppe
155、r-middle-income countries41.2High-income countries31.9303540455030354045503035404550 X Figure 1.7.Mean weekly hours actually worked per employed person,2019 and 2023,by country income group and sexNote:This indicator is based on the 13th International Conference of Labour Statisticians(ICLS)definiti
156、on.More information can be found in the ILO Modelled Estimates(ILOEST)database description(https:/ilostat.ilo.org/resources/concepts-and-definitions/ilo-modelled-estimates/).Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.1.Labour market resilience will be tested in the near term25(figure 1.8).O
157、nly China,the Russian Federation and Mexico enjoyed positive real wage growth in 2023.The strongest wages gains were in China and the Russian Federation,where labour productivity growth was among the highest in G20 countries in 2023.Real wage growth in India and Trkiye was also positive,but the avai
158、lable data refer to 2022 relative to 2021.The other G20 countries saw real wages fall;the declines were particularly pronounced in Brazil(6.9 per cent),Italy(5 per cent)and Indonesia(3.5 per cent).0101020BrazilItalyIndonesiaJapanSaudi Arabia*Republic of KoreaCanadaGermanyAustraliaSouth AfricaUnited
159、KingdomUnited StatesFranceArgentinaIndia*MexicoChinaRussian FederationTrkiye*20222023 X Figure 1.8.Annual real wage growth in 2023(percentages)Note:For 2023,data refer to the real wage growth in the first or second quarter compared with the same quarter in 2022.Data for 2022 refer to full-year real
160、wage growth compared with 2021.*Data for India,Saudi Arabia and Trkiye refer to changes between 2022 and 2021(rather than 2023 and 2022)and between 2021 and 2020(rather than 2022 and 2021).Source:ILO Global Wage Database.XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202426 XLooking ahead,there are ris
161、ks that job creation will deteriorate furtherThe economic slowdown is expected to finally catch up with job creation in 2024.Some of 2023s labour market resilience may have resulted from the fact that employment is typically a lagging indicator,so weaknesses in job creation are more likely to unfold
162、 some time after economic growth slows.Thus,globally,employment growth is ex-pected to remain positive in 2024,but at rates of only 0.8 per cent in 2024 and 1.1 per cent in 2025(less than half the employment growth of 2023)(figure 1.9).The situation is particularly concerning in high-income countrie
163、s,where employment growth is expected to turn negative in 2024 and only modest improvements are anticipated in 2025.Similarly,little gain in employment is anticipated among upper-middle-income countries over the next two years.In contrast,jobs gains in low-income and lower-middle-income countries wi
164、ll remain robust.Unlike in 2023,when female employment growth outpaced that of men,in 2024 employment growth among women is expected to be lower than among men.Despite modest increases in 2023,participation rates are set to decline in the coming years.Recent increases in labour market participation
165、rates are likely to have been buoyed by a stronger than anticipated job market.However,in 2024 and Total202320242025World2.20.81.1Low-income countries3.03.23.3Lower-middle-income countries4.51.22.0Upper-middle-income countries0.60.30.4High-income countries1.10.20.1Male202320242025World1.51.11.3Low-i
166、ncome countries2.93.23.3Lower-middle-income countries2.51.82.1Upper-middle-income countries0.60.40.4High-income countries0.90.00.2Female202320242025World3.20.30.9Low-income countries3.13.13.2Lower-middle-income countries8.60.11.7Upper-middle-income countries0.60.20.3High-income countries1.50.40.0 X
167、Figure 1.9.Employment growth,202325,by sex and country income groups(percentages)Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.1.Labour market resilience will be tested in the near term272025,participation rates are expected to decline across all income groups(except low-income coun-tries,wher
168、e they are set to remain stable in 2024 but then decline the following year)and for both men and women(table 1.2).The anticipated fall in participation rates is more pronounced among women,for whom between 2023 and 2025 it is expected to fall 0.7 percentage points globally,compared with 0.1 percenta
169、ge points among men.Unemployment is expected to rise modestly.Projections show that unemployment rates are set to remain broadly stable over the next two years(table 1.3).As labour force participation rates decline and employment growth slows,the global unemployment rate is expected to remain near c
170、urrent levels,edging up from 5.1 per cent in 2023 to 5.2 per cent in 2024 and remaining unchanged in 2025.This upward tick is primarily a result of the rising unemployment rates ex-pected among high-income countries(an increase of 0.2 percentage points from 2023 levels to reach 4.7 per cent in 2024)
171、.A modest uptick in unemployment is ex-pected to disproportionately affect men.The unemployment rate of women is set to remain stable at 5.3 per cent through the forecast period,whereas that of men is expected to rise modestly in 2024(by 0.1 percentage points)and then decline by the same magnitude i
172、n 2025.Global unemployment is projected to increase in 2024 by around 2 million.The modest increase in the unemployment rate will translate into an increase in global unemployment of 2 million in 2024,rising to 190.8 million from the 188.6 million in 2023.The outlook for unemployment in 2024 is broa
173、dly consistent across income groups,each country group being expected to see an increase in unemployment.The increase is expected to be highest(1 million in total)in high-income countries.Country groupSexYears20022202320242025WorldWomen48.046.8 47.6 47.9 48.7 48.2 48.0 Men73.071.7 72.2 72
174、.9 73.0 72.9 72.9 Total60.559.2 59.8 60.3 60.8 60.5 60.4 Low incomeWomen56.255.4 55.6 55.2 55.2 55.1 55.0 Men74.473.6 73.7 74.4 74.3 74.2 74.2 Total65.264.4 64.6 64.7 64.6 64.6 64.5 Lower-middle incomeWomen34.934.1 34.8 35.4 37.7 37.0 37.0 Men73.972.8 73.2 74.2 74.9 74.8 75.0 Total54.653.6 54.1 54.9
175、 56.4 56.1 56.2 Upper-middle incomeWomen56.454.6 55.8 55.9 55.7 55.4 55.1 Men74.272.3 73.1 73.5 73.3 73.0 72.7 Total65.263.3 64.4 64.7 64.4 64.1 63.8 High incomeWomen53.753.0 53.4 54.0 54.3 54.0 53.9 Men68.567.5 67.6 68.0 68.1 68.0 67.9 Total61.060.2 60.4 60.9 61.2 60.9 60.8 Source:ILOSTAT,ILO model
176、led estimates,November 2023.X Table 1.2.Labour force participation rates by income group,201925XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202428 XPersistent decent work deficits are undermining long-run progressDecent work deficits persist,with considerable heterogeneity across regions and groups.T
177、he decline in unemployment rates obscures a sig-nificant lack of decent employment opportunities.As highlighted in table 1.1,globally,the jobs gap stood at nearly 435 million in 2023,representing a jobs gap rate of 11.1 per cent.Moreover,many individuals in employment are confronted with several bar
178、riers to decent work,including declining real wages,elevated levels of informal employment and deteriorating working conditions.In other instances,barriers to labour market participation persist,notably for women,and for youth,who also continue to be confronted with higher levels of unemployment.Tog
179、ether,these factors are un-dermining long-run progress to improving decent work and social justice.Gender gaps in participation rates will persist.Over the forecast period,both male and female participation rates are expected to decline.Since the decline among women is anticipated to be more pronoun
180、ced than that among men,the gender gap in participation rates will rise modestly.In 2025,the global participation rates of men will exceed those of women by 25 percentage points(the gap will be noticeably elevated,at 38 percentage points,in lower-middle income countries)(figure 1.10).There are also
181、some important regional differences,as elaborated in Chapter 2.Youth unemployment rates are nearly 3.5 times higher than those of adults.Globally,in 2023,the youth unemployment rate,13.3 per cent,far exceeded that of adults,3.9 per cent(figure 1.11).Country groupSexUnemployment rate (percentages)Une
182、mployment(millions)2002220232024202520022202320242025WorldWomen5.76.6 6.2 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.3 78.590.0 87.0 79.2 77.9 78.5 79.4 Men5.56.6 6.0 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.0 115.9137.3 126.4 110.6 110.7 112.3 113.3 Total5.66.6 6.1 5.3 5.1 5.2 5.2 194.3227.3 213.4 189.7 188.6 190.8 192.7 Low income
183、Women5.46.1 6.3 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.76.6 7.0 6.5 6.7 6.9 7.0 Men5.16.0 6.0 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.6 7.08.3 8.7 8.4 8.9 9.2 9.3 Total5.26.0 6.1 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.6 12.715.0 15.7 14.9 15.6 16.1 16.3 Lower-middle incomeWomen6.16.8 6.6 5.8 5.4 5.4 5.4 22.525.2 25.2 22.7 23 22.9 23.5 Men5.76.9 6.1 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 45.65
184、4.8 49.5 39.8 40.7 41.4 42.1 Total5.86.9 6.2 5.1 5.0 4.9 4.9 68.280.0 74.7 62.5 63.7 64.4 65.5 Upper-middle incomeWomen5.76.4 6.1 5.7 5.4 5.4 5.4 36.139.0 38.4 36.1 34.5 34.5 34.5 Men5.86.6 6.1 5.7 5.5 5.5 5.5 47.252.6 49.3 47.2 45.7 45.8 45.8 Total5.86.5 6.1 5.7 5.5 5.5 5.5 83.391.6 87.7 83.3 80.2
185、80.3 80.4 High incomeWomen5.06.9 5.9 4.8 4.7 4.9 5.0 14.219.2 16.5 13.8 13.7 14.1 14.4 Men4.56.2 5.4 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.5 16.021.6 18.9 15.2 15.4 15.9 16.1 Total4.86.5 5.6 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.7 30.140.8 35.4 29.0 29.0 30.0 30.5 Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.X Table 1.3.Unemployment and un
186、employment rate,201925,by sex,world and income group1.Labour market resilience will be tested in the near term29The general pattern of higher youth unemployment holds across all country income groups.Upper-middle-income countries had the highest youth unemployment rate,15.5 per cent,in 2023.Informal
187、 employment is beginning to decline again but remains elevated.Since the global fi-nancial crisis,informality had been trending down-wards for both men and women(figure 1.12).After the onset of the pandemic,informal employment experienced a modest uptick,but in 2024 it is expected to resume declinin
188、g.However,as the working population grows,the number of informal workers continues to rise.Since 2019,the number of informal workers has risen by more than 120 mil-lion,bringing the total to over 2 billion in 2023 its highest level in two decades.This scale of informal work raises concerns about ove
189、rall job quality,since many of these workers lack adequate social and legal protection.Close to 241 million workers were living in ex-treme poverty in 2023.Between 2020 and 2021,the share and volume of workers living in extreme 20232025WorldLow incomeLower-middle incomeUpper-middle incomeHigh income
190、05540 X Figure 1.10.Gender gap in participation rates,2023 and 2025(percentage points)Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.YouthAdultHigh-income countriesUpper-middle-income countriesLower-middle-income countriesLow-income countriesWorld10.43.815.54.213.83.49.24.513.33.9 X
191、Figure 1.11.Youth and adult unemployment rates(percentages)Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202430poverty earning less than US$2.15 per day per person in PPP terms diminished(table 1.4).This was driven largely by significant reductions i
192、n working poverty among lower-middle-income countries.However,in 2023,although the overall incidence of working in extreme poverty remained relatively stable,even declining as employment grew,the numbers of workers in the world who were living in extreme poverty grew by around 1 million.A similar pa
193、ttern emerges when one looks at moderate working poverty,that is,earning less than US$3.65 per day per person in PPP terms.The number of workers living in moderate poverty increased by nearly 8.4 million in 2023.Only in upper-middle-income countries did the number of workers in moderate poverty decl
194、ine.20042006200820002220245556545758596061626463MaleFemale X Figure 1.12.Informal employment as share of total employment,200424(percentages)Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.Country groupWorking povertyRates(percentages)Numbers(millions)20202022020
195、2120222023WorldExtreme7.77.37.16.9248.0241.6240.1241.1Moderate12.512.112.212.2402.7401.4414.9423.4Low-income countriesExtreme38.938.538.739.090.592.796.7100.6Moderate26.626.426.526.761.963.566.368.9Lower-middle-income countriesExtreme12.811.810.910.2139.3132.0127.3124.7Moderate26.125.625.224.7283.72
196、87.6294.8302.1Upper-middle-income countriesExtreme1.41.21.21.117.916.715.915.6Moderate4.33.73.93.856.950.053.652.0Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.X Table 1.4.Working poverty,202023,world and by country income group1.Labour market resilience will be tested in the near term31Addres
197、sing labour market and skills imbalances could help tackle short-term labour market challenges and underlying structural issues.Despite some easing of labour market pressures as job vacancies have fallen from record highs,notably in high-income countries,labour market and skills imbalances are persi
198、sting in many re-gions and sectors.This suggests that the issue of labour market and skills imbalances is increas-ingly structural in nature as growth in the global labour force slows and the participation rates of under-represented groups remain suppressed.The persistence of labour market imbalance
199、s is also a reflection of how the labour market is substantially different today.As inflation rose over the course of 2021 and 2022 to levels not seen in 40 years,parallels were drawn with the 1970s:in both cases,geopolitical developments impacted on commodity prices,especially the price of oil,and
200、hence affected the economies of both advanced and developing countries.However,there are some striking differences(Allen and Ainsworth-Grace 2023).In 2023,the world managed to keep a recession at bay even in the context of high inflation in stark contrast to the recessionary conditions that accompan
201、ied inflation during the 1970s.The contrast reflects the relative speed with which central banks responded to inflation and also the structural differences between todays labour market and that of the 1970s(box 1.3).Policy action is likely to be constrained by the macroeconomic environment.The long
202、expan-sionary period in the 2010s with ultra-low interest rates allowed both advanced and emerging economies to stretch their borrowing capacity.Sovereign debt has increased to heights not seen since the post-1945 period.Several countries,including some advanced economies,have seen their debt rating
203、s decline as a consequence;this has increased borrowing costs for both public and private debtors.At the same time,few countries seem to have taken precautionary steps to lock in low interest rates and so they are now facing rapidly rising interest costs in their public budgets,whose capacity to pro
204、vide targeted support is thereby limited.Highly indebted developing countries are particularly at risk of quickly running into financial distress as conditions tighten,with significant repercussions for their labour market conditions,wage growth and jobs.As financial conditions deteriorate,this may
205、spell double trouble for both labour markets and public purses.First,rising unemployment will only further dampen revenues and compromise already fragile fiscal positions.Second,as unemployment increases,there will be limited fiscal space to provide much needed measures to keep workers attached to t
206、he labour market and provide upskilling and reskilling support both of which are central to encouraging a faster economic recovery.Yet,expenditure of this nature should be viewed as an investment and will help to bolster a more inclusive recovery and to address structural issues that are impeding lo
207、ng-run productivity growth and improvements in living standards.In fact,investments in well-targeted skills and training programmes and other related measures have lower opportunity costs during slowdowns.The remainder of this report will examine these decent work deficits in greater detail.Chapter
208、2 will analyse employment and social developments during 2023 and the future outlook.ILO-region-specific decent work deficits will be explored and key areas highlighted in each region that merit attention.Chapter 3 will examine labour market imbalances in more detail.XWorld Employment and Social Out
209、look|Trends 202432 XBox 1.3.Baby boom versus baby bust:The labour market impacts of inflation in the 2020s compared with the 1970sOne reason why the labour market impacts of inflation are moderate today in comparison with the 1970s is the fact the economy is less energy intensive than it was five de
210、cades ago.Rising oil prices have not challenged industrial output and related employment to the same extent.Recent supply shocks have been less substantial and more temporary than in the 1970s,and the recent inflationary period has been more affected by the positive demand shock following on the hee
211、ls of the pandemic(De Grauwe and Ji 2023).Another key difference is the speed and scale of monetary policy response.During the 1970s,monetary policy was not viewed by central banks as the most appropriate tool to confront the structural shock brought on by the oil embargo that began in 1973.Policyma
212、kers reactions during the 1970s have been deemed“too little too late”(Allen and Ainsworth-Grace 2023).In contrast,between the spring/summer of 2022 and autumn 2023,central banks launched a cycle of aggressive interest rate hikes the Federal Reserve and European Central Bank hiking rates by 525 and 4
213、50 basis points,respectively.The recent inflationary period was preceded by a prolonged period of low inflation,which helped anchor inflationary expectations at relatively low levels.Thus the disinflationary monetary policies rolled out by central banks were able to bring down inflation more swiftly
214、 than during the 1970s and without a corresponding surge in unemployment(De Grauwe and Ji 2023).There is also a marked difference in the structures of the working-age population.In 1970,36 per cent of the population of high-income countries were under the age of 19 and,over the course of the decade,
215、the largest cohorts of the baby boom generation came of working age and entered the workforce in large numbers.Between 1970 and 1980,the population aged 20 to 64 grew by 1.3 per cent per year in high-income countries(figure 1.13).This provided an ample supply of labour and likely exacerbated the imp
216、act of inflation on unemployment during the 1970s.In contrast,by 2021 the population was considerably older on average and many members of the baby boom generation(aged 57 to 75 in 2021)had begun to exit the labour market.In the decade preceding the recent inflationary period(the decade 201121),the
217、population aged 20 to 64 grew just 0.2 per cent per year in high-income countries.As a consequence,in the face of inflationary pressures and rising interest rates,employment growth only slowed in 2023 and labour shortages persisted across a number of countries and sectors(see Chapter 3).01231.30.22.
218、60.52.51.92.33.1High-incomecountriesUpper-middle-income countriesLow-middle-income countriesLow-incomecountries1970 to 19802011 to 2021 X Figure 1.13.Growth of population aged 20 to 64,by time period and country income group(compound annual percentages)Note:Country income groups are as per World Ban
219、k categorization.Source:Calculations based on UN Population Division estimates,World Population Prospects 2022 (https:/population.un.org/dataportal/).1.Labour market resilience will be tested in the near term33References XAllen,H.,and C.Ainsworth-Grace.2023.Stagflation in the 1970s:Is History Repeat
220、ing Itself in the 2020s?Deutsche Bank Research.XDe Grauwe,Paul,and Yuemei Ji.2023.“Inflation Then(197985)and Now(202023):Why It Is Easier to Fight Inflation Today”.Centre for Economic Policy Research,28 November 2023.https:/cepr.org/voxeu/columns/inflation-then-1979-85-and-now-2020-23-why-it-easier-
221、fight-inflation-today.XILO.2023.“ILO Modelled Estimates:Methodological Overview”,January 2023.https:/www.ilo.org/ilostat-files/Documents/TEM.pdf.XIMF(International Monetary Fund).2022.World Economic Outlook:Countering the Cost-of-Living Crisis.https:/www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/10/11
222、/world-economic-outlook-october-2022.XIMF.2023.World Economic Outlook:Navigating Global Divergences.https:/www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2023/10/10/world-economic-outlook-october-2023.XQiu,Han,Hyun Song Shin,and Leanne Si Ying Zhang.2023.“Mapping the Realignment of Global Value Chains”,BIS
223、Bulletin No.78,3 October 2023.https:/www.bis.org/publ/bisbull78.htm.2 XOverviewHeadline indicators show an improvement in most regions,with a slight deterioration for 2024 and considerable downside risk.Employment is growing in all regions,although often driven by growth in the working-age populatio
224、n.Employment-to-population ratios are also approaching pre-pandemic(2019)levels in most regions,except in some subregions,such as the non-GCC(Gulf Cooperation Council)Arab States,North America,East Asia and Eastern Europe,where employment-to-population ratios in 2023 were still below 2019 levels.Une
225、mployment rates are also recov-ering to pre-pandemic levels,with similar subregional exceptions,including non-GCC Arab States and East Asia,for which ratios remain above 2019 levels.Considerable heterogeneity remains across subregions and different labour market dimensions.Weaker job growth is expec
226、ted in 2024 owing to various geopolitical ten-sions and tighter global monetary conditions.With a return to pre-COVID-19-pandemic levels evident in head-line indicators in many regions,the focus is on strengthening long-standing decent work deficits.Despite progress in reducing informal employment,m
227、ore than eight in ten employed people in Africa were in informal employment in 2023,nearly two thirds in Asia and the Pacific,and more than half in Latin America and the Caribbean.In 2023,around a third of the employed population in sub-Saharan Africa were living in extreme poverty(in households sub
228、sisting on less than US$2.15 per day per person in PPP terms),and about 37 per cent of the employed population in South Asia and around 8 per cent of the employed population in Latin America and the Caribbean were living below the moderate poverty threshold(US$3.65 per day per person in PPP terms).I
229、n many regions women continue to be distinctly disadvantaged across labour market variables,particularly in the Arab States and North Africa.With improvements in headline labour market indicators such as employment and unemployment,countries are taking stock of pre-existing challenges and developing
230、 strategies to confront new forms of work and their implications for these decent work deficits.Employment andsocial trends by regionXWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202436 XAfricaAfricas GDP growth remains buoyant although impacted upon by oil and non-oil commodity prices,which slowed gr
231、owth in 2023.Africas GDP growth is estimated to have been 3.8 per cent in 2022,following the turmoil of the pandemic in 2020 and 2021.In 2023,growth is expected to have slowed to 3.1 per cent,reflecting a combination of factors,including the impact of global geopolitical tensions,such as the conflic
232、t in Ukraine and its impact on commodity markets.The outlook for Africa is mixed.In 2024,GDP growth is expected to pick up again to 3.8 per cent,bolstered in part by higher commodity prices supporting the re-gions commodity exporters.Downside risks,however,include inflationary pressure,ongoing commo
233、dity price fluctuations,and tensions in the Middle East.Long-term structural challenges continue to weigh on the regions economic potential;they include endemic working poverty,major population displacement and the impact of cli-mate change.Limited fiscal space affects African countries abilities to
234、 respond to exogenous shocks(IMF 2023a).Of continuing concern is the ability of these countries to be resilient to and rebuild from events resulting from climate change,such as pro-longed drought,crop failures,and storms,which can disrupt key economic drivers such as mining activity and agricultural
235、 production.An additional concern is that much existing growth in GDP is not accompanied by increases in per capita incomes,which are rising too slowly to reduce extreme poverty and working poverty.In sub-Saharan Africa alone,in 2023,145 million people were in extreme working poverty(at the US$2.15
236、per day threshold,in PPP terms),equating to a third of the employed population.Per capita incomes are expected to grow less than 1 per cent in 202324,and 40 per cent of sub-Saharan Africas popu-lation live in countries(including the three largest economies)where per capita incomes will be lower in 2
237、024 than at the start of the pandemic(World Bank 2023a).Several African countries also face continuing security risks that have the potential to depress growth and produce adverse spillovers into neighbouring countries.For example,all five Sahel countries(Mali,Niger,Burkina Faso,Chad and Mauritania)
238、are experiencing active conflict or confronted with security challenges.Such conflict impacts on livelihoods as well as diverting public funds away from growth-enhancing investment(World Bank 2022;AfDB 2023a).Labour market trends in North AfricaThis subregions growth has been undermined by a series
239、of exogenous shocks,including drought,flooding and earthquakes.North Africas GDP grew at 2.7 per cent in 2023,down from 3.7 per cent in 2022.GDP growth is forecast to rebound to 3.5 per cent in 2024 and 4.4 per cent in 2025.However,growth varies across the subregion.Ongoing conflicts continue to dis
240、rupt Libyas growth,as have recent flooding disasters,and drought and earthquakes have impacted on Moroccos growth(AfDB 2023b;Henson and Masters 2023).Meanwhile,tourism and trade resumption have benefited other countries in the region,including Egypt and Tunisia(AfDB 2023b).North Africa continues to
241、exhibit a low labour force participation rate driven by low levels of female participation.The labour force partici-pation rate in North Africa,around 45 per cent in 2023,is the second lowest of all the worlds sub-regions,higher only than in non-GCC Arab States(table 2.1).The female labour force par
242、ticipation rate,20 per cent,was 49 percentage points lower than for men(69 per cent)in 2023.This carries through to the employment-to-population ratio,also low at 40 per cent in 2023,again driven by ex-ceptionally low female rates(16 per cent compared with 63 per cent for males).This gender dimen-si
243、on is also visible in the share of the youth(aged 1524)population not in employment,education or training(NEET):the NEET share of female youth is 38.4 per cent compared with 17 per cent for males.Job creation has continued to recover since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.Mean weekly hours
244、 worked per person employed are still relatively high by global standards:44 hours in 2023.Despite this,mean weekly hours per person employed have only just returned to the pre-pandemic levels of 2019 and the long-term pre-pandemic average over 201019.Recent job 2.Employment and social trends by reg
245、ion37growth is likely to have been driven by service sector recovery,including jobs in tourism and trade,which have potential to increase further(ILO 2022a).Labour market trends in sub-Saharan AfricaGDP growth is expected to have slowed for a second year in a row in 2023,but a rebound in growth is e
246、xpected in 2024.Several factors have contributed to slower economic expansion in the subregion,including persistent inflation,the global fallout from geopolitical issues(including supply chain disruption),global declines in consumer confidence,and poor economic performances of a number of major econ
247、omies in the subregion(IMF 2023a).Nevertheless,oil exporters saw strong growth against the backdrop of strong oil price increases(IMF 2023a).This oil price boom will likely continue to drive the subregions growth in 2024,contributing to and combined with the strong growth of more than 5 per cent in
248、the majority of sub-Saharan African countries,offsetting the higher costs for oil importers in the subregion(AfDB 2023a).Sub-Saharan Africas labour force continues to be driven by population growth.The size of the Region/subregionMean weekly hours worked per person employedTotal weekly hours in full
249、-time equivalent jobs(FTE=48 hours/week)(millions)200232024200232024Africa38.839.039.139.039.0296372406418430North Africa44.744.044.044.044.05660646566Sub-Saharan Africa37.638.238.338.238.22463Employment-to-population ratio (percentages)Employment(millions)2010201920
250、222023202420252002320242025Africa59.558.258.458.658.758.8367458498514529545North Africa42.839.139.739.639.639.8606570717274Sub-Saharan Africa64.563.363.263.563.563.5307393429443457471Unemployment rate (percentages)Unemployment (millions)20023202420252002320242025Afri
251、ca6.76.86.76.66.66.526.233.235.836.437.137.7North Africa10.511.410.911.311.310.97.08.38.59.09.29.1Sub-Saharan Africa5.95.96.05.85.85.719.124.827.227.427.928.6Labour force participation rate (percentages)Labour force (millions)20023202420252002320242025Africa63.862.462.662.862.8
252、62.83934983North Africa47.844.144.644.644.644.7677378808183Sub-Saharan Africa68.567.367.267.467.467.43264500Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.X Table 2.1.Estimates and projections of working hours,employment,unemployment and labour force,regional and subregion
253、al,Africa,201025XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202438labour force increased by 3.3 per cent in 2023.This translates into an additional 53 million people of working age in the labour force in 2023 compared with 2019.The labour force participation rate re-mained around 67 per cent,approxi
254、mately the same as the pre-pandemic level in 2019 although marginally lower than the average of 68 per cent between 2010 and 2019.The labour force in sub-Saharan Africa is expected to increase by a further 14 million people in 2024.Unemployment has remained slightly elevated since the onset of the p
255、andemic,youth being particularly at risk.The average unemployment rate was estimated to be 5.8 per cent in 2023,compared with 5.9 per cent in 2019.This equates to a total of 27 million people.For youth,the rate is higher,8.9 per cent,accounting for 9.4 million people.In a context of growing working-
256、age population,young people are particularly at risk of disillusionment and labour market detachment as a result of being unable to secure decent and productive work on entry into the labour market.In 2023,around 62 million young people were esti-mated to be NEET,equating to 25.9 per cent of the you
257、th population,up from 22.2 per cent in 2013.Job creation is keeping pace with the rising labour force,but not necessarily involving im-provements in the quality of jobs.Total hours worked increased by 3.4 per cent in 2023,com-pared with 2.8 per cent growth in 2019.Job growth is keeping pace with the
258、 growing labour force.Mean hours worked per person employed are also in line with pre-pandemic levels:38.2 hours per week in both 2023 and 2019.The low average hours in the subregion,given that most countries in the subregion are low or middle income,point to likely underemployment.This illustrates
259、the need for new jobs to be decent and productive.Not all those in employment are in decent and productive jobs,decent work deficits being rife in the subregion.Informal employment accounted 1 Including,among others,the Community of SahelSaharan States(CED-SAD),the Southern African Development Commu
260、nity(SADC)the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa(COMESA),the Intergovernmental Authority on Development(IGAD)and part of the East Africa Community(EAC).2 For instance,the COMESA Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons,Labour,Services,the Right of Establishment and Residence was adopted i
261、n 2001 by the COMESA Authority of Heads and States and is in the process of being signed and ratified.COMESA Member States are still working towards the gradual relaxation and removal of visa requirements(COMESA 2023).A draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons within the SADC was introduced in
262、 1996 and replaced by a Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in 1997,which was revised in 2005 to allow visa-free entry for a maximum of 90 days.This has not been fully implemented only some Member States have signed it although most Member States exempt one another from visa requirem
263、ents(UNECA n.d.).for 86.5 per cent of total employment in 2023,almost the same as a decade earlier(87.2 per cent in 2013).In 2023,almost 60 per cent were employed but living in households below the“moderately poor”international poverty threshold of US$3.65 per person per day in PPP terms(down from 6
264、3.8 per cent in 2013).These challenges remain pervasive,particularly in rural areas.Meanwhile,in 2022,around 75.5 per cent of the employed population were own-account workers or con-tributing family workers employment statuses that typically are more precarious,have less job security and bring less
265、regular income than does more stable employee status.The combined share of own-account work and contributing family work has remained relatively unchanged over the past decade,from 76.1 per cent in 2012.Data challenges for evidence-based labour migration governance in AfricaAfrica is subject to many
266、 migration channels and contains countries of destination,transit and origin.There are multiple drivers and motives of migration,including conflict and security,cli-mate-change-related factors,family reunification,and seeking better opportunities and employment.Often there is no single driving facto
267、r and thus there are mixed migration flows.“Mixed migration”refers to all cross-border movements that encom-pass a range of driving factors and motivations(Migration Data Portal 2022).At the same time,the region has various regional economic communities(RECs).1 These RECs present different degrees o
268、f commitment and implementation with regard to the free movement of persons.2 Together with irregular migration,porous borders and high degrees of informality in the labour market,all these factors complicate the measurement and therefore understanding of regional migration,including labour migratio
269、n.2.Employment and social trends by region39Estimates of migrant workers vary signifi-cantly in the region.The ILO,African Union,and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa(COMESA)have all produced recent estimates of the total stock of international migrant workers within the region(and subre
270、gions).The ILO esti-mates the total stock of international migrant workers in the region to have been 13.7 million in 2019(ILO 2021a);the African Union,14.5 million in 2019(African Union Commission et al.2021);and COMESA,5.2 million for its Member States only(COMESA 2022).3 These figures all refer t
271、o migrant workers of working age(aged 15+).They are all likely to be underestimates given the extent of irregular migration in the region and the challenges of capturing such migration in official data.Of the 14.5 million migrant workers in Africa in 2019,4.3 million were estimated to be in West Afr
272、ica,4.1 million in East Africa and 3.5 million in Southern Africa(African Union Commission et al.2021)(figure 2.1(a).Estimates of immigra-tion are more common than estimates of emi-gration,since the underlying data sources include 3 The ILO is also involved in the African Union estimates.In future t
273、he numbers published by the African Union and ILO are likely to be aligned.labour force surveys and population censuses,both of which are used in most countries and provide estimates of international migrant stock in a country.Estimates of emigration are more difficult to obtain,as are estimates of
274、inflows and outflows of migrant workers,all of which rely more on administrative data sources such as work permit issuances,visas and border-crossing infor-mation and undercount total numbers because of the challenges of capturing irregular migration.The share of women in the total stock of mi-grant
275、 workers varies substantially by subregion and over time.In East Africa,for instance,the female share of total migrant stock decreased from 57.1 per cent in 2010 to 39 per cent in 2019(figure 2.1(b).In West Africa,over the same period,the female share increased from 27.8 per cent to 44.2 per cent.Su
276、ch sex-disaggregated data are fundamental to effective gender-responsive labour migration policymaking in the region,yet such data are often missing or lacking.A significant challenge is that even when there are data on migrant workers in official statistics,there is a lack of granularity on occupat
277、ion,skill levels,economic 0510152010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 200001820199.510.110.511.211.612.512.813.413.814.5West AfricaEast AfricaSouthern AfricaCentral AfricaNorth Africa00Africa(a)Total stock of migrant workers(millions)(b)Female share
278、 of migrant worker stock(percentages)West AfricaEast AfricaSouthern AfricaCentral AfricaNorth Africa X Figure 2.1.International stock of migrant workers,Africa and subregions,total and female share,201019Source:African Union Commission et al.(2021).XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202440a
279、ctivity and other characteristics.Furthermore,women migrant workers are predominantly en-gaged in the informal sector and therefore harder to measure(ILO 2020a).Despite shortfalls in available data on migrant workers,several labour migration policies are being formulated in the region in line with i
280、nter-national commitments including the African Union Revised Migration Policy Framework.A challenge for evidence-based effective labour migration policies arises when there is a lack of international labour migration statistics upon which to base them.In the Economic Community of West African State
281、s(ECOWAS),for instance,almost all Member States have developed or are planning to develop a national migration policy or something similar(ILO 2020a).In the Southern Africa subregion,too,a number of migration and labour migration policies and initiatives are under way or have recently been developed
282、,including the Southern Africa Development Community(SADC)Labour Migration Action Plan(SAMM 2021a).Recognition of womens increasing role in labour migration,and the promotion of equality of opportunity and treatment in these policies and initiatives are fundamental and require improved data on women
283、 migrant workers as well as measures to facilitate greater granularity of data for men and women(SAMM 2021b;ILO 2020a).Wider research into the working roles and economic contributions of migrants can facilitate evidence-based policymaking as well as more in-formed public opinion,as has happened in S
284、outh Africa and Ghana(OECD and ILO 2018a and 2018b).XAmericasEconomic growth continued to slow in 2023 in both North America and Latin American and the Caribbean.The average GDP growth rate in the Americas fell to 2.1 per cent in 2023 from 2.7 per cent in 2022(IMF 2023b).Weakness in the external env
285、ironment as well as tighter monetary policy to fight inflation contributed to the slowing of the economy across the region.The GDP growth rate is expected to fall below 2 per cent in 2024.Economies in Latin America and the Caribbean are still struggling to recover from the impact of the COVID-19 pan
286、demic.Latin America and the Caribbeans GDP growth rate fell by nearly 2 percentage points to 2.2 per cent in 2023.Despite the recent reductions in countries public debt,their overall debt-to-GDP ratio is still high,limiting their capacity for fiscal support(ECLAC 2023).Many countries in the subregio
287、n(aside from Brazil)have struggled with decreasing rates of private con-sumption.Household consumption levels have also been dampened by monetary policies that have tightened credit restrictions.The GDP growth rate is expected to remain at the same level as in 2023 in both 2024 and 2025(IMF 2023b).G
288、iven the growing populations in the subregion,this implies that per capita incomes will continue to decline.North Americas GDP growth remained resilient in 2023 but is expected to fall in 2024.North Americas GDP growth rate decreased by only 0.2 percentage points to 2 per cent in 2023(IMF 2023b).How
289、ever,projections show that this sub-regions growth rate will fall to 1.5 per cent in 2024.The United States GDP growth rate is expected to decline in 2024 given the headwinds upon con-sumer spending(Lundh 2023).The slowdown in the GDP growth rate has come from persistently high inflation and interes
290、t rates throughout 2023,which caused household debt to increase.The United States slowing economy has resulted in a decrease in Canadian exports thither,decelerating Canadas GDP growth.Labour market trends in Latin America and the CaribbeanLabour force participation rates in Latin America and the Ca
291、ribbean have not quite re-turned to pre-pandemic rates,but there has been a reduction in the gender gap.The labour force participation rate is estimated to have been 62.6 per cent in 2023,marginally lower than the 63.5 per cent in 2019(table 2.2).The reduction in the gender gap is largely driven by
292、a slightly stronger recovery for women than men in labour force participation,women being almost back to pre-pandemic labour force participation rates,but 2.Employment and social trends by region41men lagging behind.The gendered impact of the crisis has been well documented:women were more likely to
293、 leave the labour force(ILO 2021b and 2023a).Nevertheless,the gender gap still looms large,24 percentage points,between women with a labour force participation rate of 51.1 per cent in 2023 and men 74.6 per cent.Strong job growth has contributed to reductions in unemployment,but the outlook is weake
294、r.A reduction in the subregions unemployment rate to 6.2 per cent in 2023,compared with 8 per cent in 2019,before the pandemic,has been driven by employment growth and job creation(ILO 2023a).However,slowdowns in the subregions economy are likely to prevent further gains in the coming years;the unem
295、ployment rate is expected to remain around 6 per cent in 2024 and 2025.Youth unemployment remains a concern,being 13.6 per cent in 2023(aligned with the global average of 13.3 per cent)and expected to mar-ginally increase into 2025.Region/subregionMean weekly hours worked per person employedTotal we
296、ekly working hours in full-time equivalent jobs(FTE=48 hours/week)(millions)200232024200232024Americas38.338.138.138.138.87389Latin America and the Caribbean40.039.239.539.439.4209233242246249North America35.736.435.936.036.00140Employment-to-population ra
297、tio (percentages)Employment(millions)20023202420252002320242025Americas58.559.258.759.158.858.64490493Latin America and the Caribbean58.958.458.258.758.758.62504307North America57.860.559.559.859.058.77186187Unemployment rate (percentages)Unempl
298、oyment (millions)20023202420252002320242025Americas8.16.45.75.35.45.436.332.329.227.327.828.0Latin America and the Caribbean7.28.06.96.26.16.019.524.821.819.819.819.6North America9.53.93.83.84.24.316.87.47.37.58.18.4Labour force participation rate (percentages)Labour force (mil
299、lions)20023202420252002320242025Americas63.663.362.362.462.262.04485021Latin America and the Caribbean63.563.562.562.662.562.42703326North America63.862.961.962.261.661.35194195Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.X Table 2.2.Esti
300、mates and projections of working hours,employment,unemployment and labour force,regional and subregional,Americas,201025XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202442Stagnating labour productivity growth in Latin America and the CaribbeanLatin America and the Caribbean have stag-nated over the l
301、ast few decades.Figure 2.2 illustrates average annual productivity growth rates for subregions and selected economies in the Americas.For Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole,there was a drop in labour productivity between 2015 and 2023.In Argentina,over the same period,labour productivity is
302、estimated to have decreased by 1.7 per cent per annum,and in Mexico by 0.4 per cent per annum.Not all countries in the region experienced a decline;Brazil exhibited very slight productivity growth over this period,far less than its neighbours in North America.In Canada and the United States,labour p
303、roductivity grew 0.4 per cent per annum and 1 per cent per annum,respectively.Poor productivity growth has been a long-standing and complex issue in Latin America and the Caribbean.Several factors underlie the persistent low productivity growth in this sub-region,including regulatory regimes,infrast
304、ruc-ture investment and tax systems.Of particular concern,as highlighted in the previous World Employment and Social Outlook:Trends report,is the persistence of the informal sector,notably in services and in rural areas,which drives down overall productivity growth(ILO 2023b and 2021c).This is compo
305、unded by the dominance of micro and small enterprises,which typically have lower productivity growth(high-productivity economies typically have higher shares of large and middle-sized enterprises).Partly because of the enterprise composition,investment in research and development in Latin American c
306、ountries lags behind that in North America;this,combined with lower-quality education and training systems,further suppresses productivity growth.Labour market trends in North AmericaUnemployment rates remain low in the United States despite anticipated rises in the number of job seekers,owing to ti
307、ghter monetary policy conditions.In North America,total unemployment in 2023 was less than half its 2020 peak.In 2023,the unemployment rate is estimated to have been 3.8 per cent(accounting for 7.5 million people),compared with 8.2 per cent(accounting for 15.5 million people)in 2020.The rate in 2023
308、 was close to the pre-pandemic rate of 3.9 per cent in 2019.However,the unemployment rate is fore-cast to increase to 4.2 per cent and 4.3 per cent,respectively,in 2024 and 2025,on the back of tighter monetary conditions in the United States impacting on job growth and hiring.In Canada the unemploym
309、ent rate remains stable on the back of employment growth(Moosapeta 2023).Employment growth,having increased in 2023 by 1.4 per cent,is expected to decline in 2024 as the economy slows down.Total hours worked are also expected to decrease marginally in 2024,potentially representing a slowdown in job
310、growth.Mean weekly hours,at 36 hours,have returned to the long-term pre-pandemic average(201019)and are only marginally below the 2019 level of 36.4 hours.As mentioned above,monetary policy conditions are expected to impact on job growth,but this has yet to show in headline indicators.2.01.001.0Arge
311、ntinaLatin Americaand the CaribbeanMexicoBrazilCanadaUnited States1.70.50.40.10.41.0 X Figure 2.2.Average annual productivity growth rate,201523(percentages)Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.2.Employment and social trends by region43 XArab StatesGDP growth in the Arab States has de
312、clined considerably amidst multiple oil production cuts.The 2023 GDP growth rate in the Arab States fell short of previous predictions(IMF 2023b).After a substantial 7.2 per cent in 2022,GDP growth decelerated to a meagre 0.9 per cent in 2023.However,GDP growth is expected to bounce back in 2024,to
313、more than 3.5 per cent.Oil-exporting countries are seeing a shift to non-oil-sector activities as drivers of GDP growth,owing to multiple oil production cutbacks.Near the end of 2022,the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its allies(OPEC+)agreed to reduce 2023 oil production by 2
314、million barrels per day(bpd)from August 2022 production levels(Lawler and Edwards 2023).Further voluntary cuts were made on various occasions throughout 2023(Lawler 2023).Saudi Arabia expects its oil production to have fallen by 9 per cent in 2023,the highest reduction per annum in the past 15 years
315、(Saba and Uppal 2023).Kuwait,Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been able to offset oil production cutbacks with their growing retail and service sectors(IMF 2023c).However,studies have suggested that,to prevent GDP contracting,non-oil-sector growth needs to have averaged around 5 per ce
316、nt in 2023(Saba and Uppal 2023).The outlook is clouded by economic headwinds in a context of rising geopolitical tensions.The Hamas attack on Israel and the latters retaliation,in October 2023,have sparked uncertainty around,among other things,oil production in the Arab States.Within 48 hours of the
317、 initial attack,global oil prices experienced a short-term spike.This conflict is not expected to cause the same disruption in the oil industry as the RussiaUkraine conflict initially did,because it is not occurring in an oil-producing nation(Hale 2023).However,the possibility that the conflict coul
318、d spread to other countries in the region has increased the uncer-tainty of the outlook in the Arab States(see box 2.1).Labour market trends in the Arab StatesLimited growth of formal and productive job opportunities continues to be a major challenge for the region.In 2023,total hours worked in the
319、Arab States are expected to have increased by 2.3 per cent;this is forecast to increase by another 2 per cent in 2024(table 2.3).These growth rates are below employment growth expected to be 3 per cent and 2.5 per cent in 2023 and 2024,respectively as has been the case for the past decade.Mean hours
320、 per person employed are estimated to have been 38.4 hours per week in 2023,still below pre-pandemic levels(39.2 hours in 2019).Insufficient structural transformation and economic diversification owing to weak macro-economic,sectoral,industrial and investment policies have caused years of deficient
321、demand for labour,in which less than half of the total working-age population in the region have been employed(the employment-to-population ratio XBox 2.1.Impact of the IsraelHamas conflict on total employment in the Occupied Palestinian TerritoryThe ILOs first bulletin on the impact of the current
322、IsraelHamas conflict on the labour market and livelihoods estimates that at least 61 per cent of employment,accounting for 182,000 people,has been lost in the Gaza Strip since the start of the conflict(ILO 2023c).The conflict is also likely to have a spillover effect in neighbouring countries and th
323、e larger region.In the West Bank(the other area included in the Occupied Palestinian Territory),an estimated 24 per cent of employment has been lost,accounting for 208,000 people,since the start of the conflict.Gazas labour market was already characterized by working poverty,unemployment and other d
324、ecent work deficits.In the Occupied Palestinian Territory,and elsewhere in the region if other countries are drawn into the conflict,employment and economic losses are projected to increase if military operations in Gaza intensify and the humanitarian crisis in the enclave continues to unfold.XWorld
325、 Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202444is estimated to have been 44.5 per cent in 2023).The jobs created are often informal,especially in the non-oil-exporting countries in the region,and fail to provide decent working conditions,including social protection coverage and decent wages.Informal em
326、ployment remains elevated:51 per cent in 2023.Skills mismatch and weak education,training and skills development systems also contribute to the high levels of unemployment in the region.The skills supplied by the education and training institutions are failing to respond to the current and future ne
327、eds of the private sector,including with regard to soft and digital and green skills,among others.As a result,unemployment was elevated in 2023 to 9.9 per cent in the Arab States as a whole and a particularly high 16.1 per cent in non-GCC countries.Persistent high levels of unemployment,among youth
328、in particular,are driven by growth of the working-age population,combined with limited job opportun-ities and a disconnect between supply of and demand for skills(see Chapter 3 for more on the population impacts).Gender gaps in unemployment and labour market participation remain significant.Although
329、 the gender gaps in labour market out-comes in the Arab States have improved modestly in recent years,they remain elevated among both youth and adults.In 2023,the unemployment rate Region/subregionMean weekly hours worked per person employedTotal weekly working hours in full-time equivalent jobs(FTE
330、=48 hours/week)(millions)200232024200232024Arab States43.039.238.638.438.23743444546Non-GCC40.633.531.731.431.GCC45.643.944.544.544.42026272828Employment-to-population ratio (percentages)Employment(millions)20023202420252002320242025Arab States4
331、5.545.044.444.544.444.4425255565859Non-GCC37.033.032.332.532.632.72GCC59.264.065.465.765.665.62Unemployment rate (percentages)Unemployment (millions)20023202420252002320242025Arab States7.29.310.09.99.89.73.25.46.16.26.36.4Non-GCC10.115.316.116.116.015.82.
332、44.24.95.15.25.3GCC4.03.84.03.73.53.40.91.11.21.11.11.1Labour force participation rate (percentages)Labour force (millions)20023202420252002320242025Arab States49.049.649.449.449.349.66Non-GCC41.238.938.538.838.838.9232830313234GCC61.766.668.168.268.067.8223031313232
333、Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.X Table 2.3.Estimates and projections of working hours,employment,unemployment and labour force,regional and subregional,Arab States,2010252.Employment and social trends by region45in the Arab States was nearly 9 percentage points higher among adult women than among men(figure 2.3(a).This is much larger than the average global gap,of approximatel