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1、X World Employment and Social OutlookTrends2023 ILO Flagship ReportX World Employment and Social OutlookTrends 2023International Labour Office GenevaProduced by the Publications Production Unit(PRODOC)of the ILO.The ILO endeavours to use paper sourced from forests managed in an environmentally susta
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9、to rightsilo.org.ISBN 9789220372913(print);ISBN 9789220372920(web PDF)ISSN 2709-7080(print);2709-7099(online)DOI:https:/doi.org/10.54394/SNCP1637labour market/unemployment/employment creation/inflation/COVID-19/report13.01.2ILO Cataloguing in Publication DataDOI:https:/doi.org/10.54394/SNCP1637Also
10、available in French:Emploi et questions sociales dans le monde:Tendances 2023,ISBN 9789220372937(print),9789220372944(web PDF);and in Spanish:Perspectivas Sociales y del Empleo en el Mundo:Tendencias 2023,ISBN 9789220372951(print),9789220372968(web PDF).The designations employed in ILO publications,
11、which are in conformity with United Nations practice,and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the ILO concerning the legal status of any country,area or territory or of its authorities,or concerning the delimitation of its frontier
12、s.The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles,studies and other contributions rests solely with their authors,and publication does not constitute an endorsement by the ILO of the opinions expressed in them.Reference to names of firms and commercial products and processes does not im
13、ply their endorsement by the ILO,and any failure to mention a particular firm,commercial product or process is not a sign of disapproval.Information on ILO publications and digital products can be found at:www.ilo.org/publns.3PrefaceThis years World Employment and Social Outlook:Trends provides a co
14、mprehensive assessment of current decent work deficits and how these have been exacerbated by multiple,overlapping crises in recent years.It analyses global patterns,regional differences and outcomes across groups of workers.The report provides labour market projections for 2023 and 2024 and present
15、s trends in labour productivity growth,analysing the factors contributing to its decline.By the end of 2022,the recovery from the COVID-19 crisis was still incomplete and highly uneven across the world,particularly in low-income and middle-income countries,and was further hampered by the consequence
16、s of the conflict in Ukraine,accelerating climate change and unprecedented humanitarian challenges.Projections of a slowdown in economic and employment growth in 2023 imply that most countries will fall short of a full recovery to pre-pandemic levels in the foreseeable future.Worse still,progress in
17、 labour markets is likely to be far too slow to reduce the enormous decent work deficits that existed prior to,and were exacerbated by,the pandemic.Lack of access to employment,poor job quality,insufficient pay and major inequalities are only some of the challenges that undermine social justice.The
18、globally observed slowdown in productivity growth is likely to make those challenges even more difficult to address.In times of crisis,international solidarity is more critical than ever.A new global social contract is needed to narrow the existing deficits in decent work and social justice.To this
19、end,in 2023 the ILO will launch a Global Coalition for Social Justice aimed at strengthening global solidarity and improving policy coherence,in order to bring about action and investment for decent work and social justice.More than ever,the convergence of crises and the associated uncer-tainties ar
20、e fuelling the sources of inequalities and undermining the already endangered social contract.Beyond the individual human tragedies they have caused,and their impact on the world of work,these crises have highlighted the interlinkages and dependencies of economies and societies around the world and
21、have shown the crucial need for concerted,coordinated action at all levels.We need both awareness of the necessity to act and new ways of translating this awareness into resolute action without further delay.Gilbert F.Houngbo ILO Director-GeneralContents5Preface 3Acknowledgements 9Executive summary
22、111.Stalled labour market recovery undermines social justice 19Overview 19A challenging macroeconomic environment for labour markets 23The cost-of-living crisis is eroding disposable incomes 23Options for fiscal and monetary policy are limited 24Short-term economic outlook 25Long-term trends affecti
23、ng labour market dynamics 27Labour supply,employment and shortage of jobs 28Labour supply 28Quantity of work:Employment and working hours 31Unemployment 37The jobs gap,beyond unemployment 39Workers are likely to face deteriorating working conditions 41Work incomes and inequality 41The changing compo
24、sition of employment growth 43Risks to the outlook 47Renewing the social contract and advancing social justice 49References 502.Employment and social trends by region 57Overview 57Africa 59Labour market trends in North Africa 60Labour market trends in sub-Saharan Africa 60Job creation potential from
25、 climate change adaptation 62Americas 64Labour market trends in Latin America and the Caribbean 64Quality of employment remains a concern in Latin America and the Caribbean 66Labour market trends in North America 67Labour and skill shortages are widespread in North America 68ContentsXWorld Employmen
26、t and Social Outlook|Trends 20236Arab States 69Labour market trends in the Arab States 70Jobs in the just transition to a green economy in the Arab States 70Asia and the Pacific 72Labour market trends in Asia and the Pacific 73Ongoing shortages of migrant workers in Association of Southeast Asian Na
27、tions(ASEAN)countries of destination 75Europe and Central Asia 77Labour market trends in Europe and Central Asia 78Labour force growth is a significant challenge in the region 80References 823.Global productivity trends:Reviving growth through the digital economy?87Macroeconomic challenges in a glob
28、al environment of low productivity growth 87Productivity trends across the globe and structural shifts 90Technology and labour market linkages 100What else explains the productivity slowdown?107Policy options 109Creating an environment for sustainable productivity growth 109Productivity ecosystems f
29、or decent work and just transition 111Institutional arrangements to promote productivity and decent work 112References 114Appendices 127A.Groupings of countries and economies by region and income level 128B.ILO modelled estimates 130C.Tables of labour market indicators,world,by country income group
30、and by region or subregion 138D.Estimates of jobs in global supply chains 176E.Productivity measurement and data 179F.Productivity growth and structural change 183Contents7List of boxes1.1.Food price explosion causes rise in food insecurity 421.2.Accounting for GSC-related jobs 453.1.Productivity:Me
31、asurement and key concepts 913.2.The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 993.3.Productivity growth and automation 101List of figures1.1.Overview of deficits in decent work and social justice,2022 or latest year available 211.2.Food and energy prices indices 231.3.Median consumer and business confidence
32、indicators(standard deviation from mean)and policy uncertainty,February 2004 to September 2022 261.4.Growth of GDP per capita,201023,world and country income groups(percentages)271.5.Old-age dependency ratio and labour force participation rate(percentages)of people aged 2564,19912021,world and by co
33、untry income group 291.6.Labour force participation rate,2022,by sex,world and by subregion(percentages)301.7.Youth aged 1524 not in employment,education,or training,2022,by sex,world and by subregion(percentages)311.8.Job vacancies(standard deviations from mean),June 2001 to September 2022 321.9.Av
34、erage annual employment growth,201024,world and by country income group(percentages)331.10.Revision to employment growth projection in 2023,world,country income groups and regions(percentage points)341.11.Weekly hours worked per employed person,201024,world and by country income group 361.12.Weekly
35、hours worked per employed person,2022,by sex,world and by subregion 361.13.Youth unemployment rates,2019 and 2022,world and country income groups(percentages)391.14.Unemployment rate and jobs gap,2022,by gender and country income group(percentages)401.15.Index of informal employment incidence,200422
36、,by sex(2004=100)441.16.Weighted incidence of employment characteristic in middle-income countries,activities relating to GSCs linked to high-income countries,and all activities,2019(percentages)461.17.Share of type of workers by economic activities,2021,by country income group(percentages)471.18.Ev
37、olution of economic,financial and social globalization,1970-2022 482.1.Climate change resilience(ND GAIN scores)and informal employment rate(percentages)632.2.Change in the share of informal employment in total employment,201922(percentage points)672.3.Employment levels in North America,seasonally a
38、djusted(January 2021=100)682.4.Number of job vacancies per person unemployed 692.5.Outflows of documented migrant workers,selected ASEAN Member States,201020(thousands)762.6.Projected labour force participation rates by ILO region and subregion,2024(percentages)81XWorld Employment and Social Outlook
39、|Trends 202382.7.Projected labour force growth between 2022 and 2024 by ILO region and subregion(percentages)813.1.Labour productivity convergence across geographic regions,China and country income groups 923.2.Long-term labour productivity growth:G7 countries versus Brazil,China and India(percentag
40、es)933.3.Average labour productivity growth in different ILO regions and countries,selected periods(percentages)943.4.Labour productivity,informality,and working poverty 953.5.Labour productivity and investment(percentages)983.6.Skills mismatches by country income group(percentages)1023.7.Working-ag
41、e population trajectories in some of the worlds most populous countries,1980-2030(percentages of total population)106E1.Breakdown of growth in GDP per worker into growth in GDP per hour and in hours worked per worker(percentages)180F1.Average labour productivity growth in the main economic sectors,1
42、9922018(percentages)183F2.Decomposition of labour productivity growth,selected economies(percentages)184F3.Real value added and employment shares across sectors(percentages)185List of tables1.1.Employment and employment-to-population ratio,201924,by sex,world and by country income group 351.2.Weekly
43、 hours worked relative to the fourth quarter of 2019,percentages and FTE,202024,world and by country income group 371.3.Unemployment and unemployment rate,201924,by sex,world and by country income group 381.4.Extreme working poverty,200022,world and by country income group 432.1.Estimates and projec
44、tions of working hours,employment,unemployment and labour force,regional and subregional,Africa,201924 612.2.Estimates and projections for working hours,employment,unemployment and labour force,regional and subregional,Americas,201924 652.3.Estimates and projections of working hours,employment,unemp
45、loyment and labour force,regional and subregional,Arab States,201924 712.4.Estimates and projections for working hours,employment,unemployment and labour force,regional and subregional,Asia and the Pacific,201924 742.5.Estimates and projections for working hours,employment,unemployment and labour fo
46、rce,regional and subregional,Europe and Central Asia,201924 799AcknowledgementsWorld Employment and Social Outlook:Trends 2023 was prepared by the Macro-economic Policies and Jobs Unit of the ILO Research Department,led by Ekkehard Ernst.The report was written by Daniel Samaan,Ekkehard Ernst,Miguel
47、Sanchez Martinez,Richard Horne and Stefan Khn,under the overall coordination and leadership of Stefan Khn.Roger Gomis provided an exten-sive contribution.Ekkehard Ernst supervised the process and provided decisive contributions.The report was produced under the overall guidance of Richard Samans,Dir
48、ector of the ILO Research Department.The authors are grateful for all the input and suggestions received from the ILO Regional Offices for Africa,the Arab States,Asia and the Pacific,Europe and Central Asia,and Latin America and the Caribbean.The ILO modelled estimates presented in this report were
49、produced by the Data Production and Analysis Unit,led by Steven Kapsos,in the ILO Department of Statistics and by the Macro-economic Policies and Jobs Unit of the ILO Research Department.The authors especially acknowledge the modelling work carried out by Evangelia Bourmpoula,Paloma Carrillo,Roger G
50、omis,Stefan Khn and Avichal Mahajan.The underlying database of international labour market indicators used to produce the estimates was prepared by the Data Production and Analysis Unit of the ILO Department of Statistics.The authors also wish to acknowl-edge the efforts of David Bescond,Vipasana Ka
51、rkee,Quentin Mathys,Yves Perardel and Mabelin Villarreal-Fuentes.Excellent comments and suggestions were provided by James Howard,Senior Adviser to the ILO Director-General.The ILO Research Department wishes to acknowledge the comments and suggestions provided by the following ILO colleagues:Catheri
52、ne Saget,Christian Viegelahn,Dorothea Schmidt-Klau,Dorothea Hoehtker,Elisenda Estruch-Puertas,Franz Ebert,Hannah Liepman,Ira Postolachi,Kee Beom Kim,Kieran Walsh,Marie-Claire Sodergren,Marva Corley-Coulibaly,Nicolas Maitre,Pelin Sekeler,Phu Huynh,Rebecca Napier-Moore,Roger Gomis,Roxana Maurizio,Saji
53、d Ghani,Sara Elder,Shane Niall OHiggins,Sher Verick,Simon Boehmer,Steven Kapsos,Syed Mohammad Afsar,Valeria Esquivel,William Boschetti,Yashiko Kamakura and Yves Perardel.The authors also thank colleagues from ACTEMP and ACTRAV for their excellent comments and suggestions.We would like to express our
54、 gratitude to Judy Rafferty and our colleagues in the Publications Production Unit for assisting with the production process,and to our colleagues in the ILO Department of Communication and Public Information for their continued collaboration and support in disseminating the report.11Executive summa
55、ryLabour markets face enormous challengesThe global outlook for labour markets deteriorated signifi-cantly during 2022.Emerging geopolitical tensions,the Ukraine conflict,an uneven recovery from the pandemic,and ongoing bottlenecks in supply chains have created the conditions for a stagflationary ep
56、isode,the first period of simultaneously high inflation and low growth since the 1970s.Policymakers face a challenging trade-off as they deal with elevated inflation in an environment of incomplete jobs recovery.Most countries have not yet returned to the levels of employment and hours worked seen a
57、t the end of 2019,before the outbreak of the COVID-19 health crisis.Yet,a series of supply shocks,predominantly in food and commodities markets,have raised producer prices,causing spikes in consumer price inflation and pushing major central banks into a more restrictive policy stance.In the ab-sence
58、 of corresponding increases in labour incomes,the cost-of-living crisis directly threatens the livelihoods of households and risks depressing aggregate demand.Many countries have accumulated a significant amount of debt,in part to address the severe fallout from the pandemic.The risk of a global deb
59、t crisis therefore looms large,jeopardizing the fragile recovery in many frontier markets.In the midst of these challenging circumstances,major decent work deficits persist around the world,undermining social justice.Hundreds of millions of people lack access to paid employment.Those who are employe
60、d all too often lack access to social protection and fundamental rights at work,the majority of workers being informal or unable to express their interests through social dialogue.Incomes are distributed highly unequally,such that many workers fail to escape poverty.Labour market prospects are highl
61、y unequal,not only across but also within countries.Gender gaps exist in all areas of the world of work,and young people face par-ticular challenges.Informality and working poverty rose further with the COVID-19 crisis.Despite the recovery that started in 2021,the on-going shortage of better job opp
62、ortunities is likely to worsen with XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202312the projected slowdown,pushing workers into jobs of worse quality and depriving others of adequate social protection.Real labour incomes fall when prices outpace nominal incomes.The resulting downward pressure on d
63、emand in high-income countries impacts low-and middle-income coun-tries through global supply chain(GSC)linkages.In addition,persistent disruptions to supply chains threaten employment prospects and job quality,especially in frontier markets,further reducing their prospects of a swift labour market
64、recovery.In sum,an environment of high and persistent uncertainty has emerged globally,depressing business investment,especially of small and medium-sized enterprises,eroding real wages and pushing workers back into informal employment.Progress in poverty reduction achieved over the previous decade
65、has largely faltered and con-vergence in living standards and work quality is coming to a halt as productivity growth slows worldwide,making decent work deficits more difficult to overcome.Challenging labour market conditions undermine social justiceDecent work is fundamental to social justice.House
66、holds rely overwhelmingly on labour income generated by decent work opportunities that offer a fair income,security in the workplace and social protection.The global jobs gap stood at 473 million people in 2022,corresponding to a jobs gap rate of 12.3 per cent.The global jobs gap is a new measure of
67、 the unmet need for employment in the world.It consists of the 205 million un-employed corresponding to an unemployment rate of 5.8 per cent and 268 million people who have an unmet need for employment but are out-side the labour force because they do not satisfy the criteria to be considered unempl
68、oyed.This jobs gap is particularly large for women and in developing countries.Although men and women currently face similar global unemployment rates,the jobs gap for women is 15.0 per cent,compared with 10.5 per cent for men.Personal and family responsibilities(including unpaid care work),discoura
69、gement by the lack of decent employment opportunities,and scarcity of possibilities for(re)training can prevent many people from seeking employment or limit their availability to work at short notice.Low-income and lower-middle-income countries present high job gap rates,between 13 and 20 per cent,w
70、hereas upper-middle-income countries show a gap of around 11 per cent and high-income countries register a gap of only 8 per cent.Globally,around 2 billion workers were in informal employment in 2022.The incidence of informal employment declined by 5 percentage points between 2004 and 2019.Employmen
71、t recovery from the COVID-19 crisis has been driven mainly by informal employment,which has caused a slight increase in the incidence of informality.Informality lacks many characteristics of the formal employment relationship that are important to advancing social justice.For example,the jobs are mu
72、ch less likely to give access to social protection systems than their formal counterparts.Overall,only 47 per cent of people worldwide are effectively covered by at least one social protection benefit,meaning that more than 4 billion people still lack any social protection.In 2022,an estimated 214 m
73、illion workers were living in extreme poverty(earning less than US$1.90 per day per person in purchasing power parity PPP terms),corresponding to around 6.4 per cent of employed people.Low-income countries are estimated to have the same rate of extreme working poverty as in 2019,and a rising number
74、of working poor.Without significant pro-gress to break this stagnation,the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal(SDG)1 the eradication of poverty in all its forms will be impossible.As nominal labour incomes fail to keep up with inflation,the cost-of-living crisis risks putting more people int
75、o absolute or rela-tive poverty where“relative poverty”equates to falling below a national poverty line.This risk is particularly elevated for those at the bottom of the highly unequal income distribution;the lower half of workers globally earn only about 8 per cent of total labour income.Women and
76、young people fare significantly worse in labour markets,a fact indicative of large inequalities in the world of work in many countries.Globally,the labour force participation rate of women stood at 47.4 per cent in 2022,compared with 72.3 per cent for men.The gap of 24.9 percentage points means that
77、 for every economically inactive man there are two such Executive summary13women.Young people(aged 1524)face severe difficulties in securing decent employment.Their unemployment rate is three times as high as that of adults(aged 25 or more).More than one in five 23.5 per cent of young people are not
78、 in education,employment or training(NEET).Multiple crises are impeding employment growthThe ongoing impact of the COVID-19,cost-of-living and geopolitical crises is weighing heavily on labour market prospects.Supply and demand shocks have triggered price increases,leading to the highest inflation r
79、ates in decades.The Ukraine conflict and other geopolitical conflicts are worsening supply shortages and raising uncer-tainty.The ensuing cost-of-living crisis is eroding the purchasing power of household disposable income and reducing aggregate demand.Tightening of monetary policy is squeezing fina
80、ncing conditions not only in advanced economies but also through spillovers to emerging and developing economies.In the absence of proper policy coordination,the risk is that the dominant economies will pursue a policy agenda primarily catering to their domestic challenges without due regard for the
81、 potential collateral impacts.Job vacancies have started to fall sharply in those countries that have reported them;however,they are falling from record levels and in October 2022 remained high from a histor-ical perspective.Beyond these immediate challenges,longer-term structural changes in global
82、labour markets are increasingly being felt.For example,climate change is contributing to a higher incidence of natural disasters and extreme weather events,including flooding,drought,land degradation,soil erosion,heatwaves and unpre-dictable rainfall.Adjusting to these new realities will require maj
83、or adaptation initiatives,including significant infrastructure investment in highly affected regions.Yet,these adaptation meas-ures also present opportunities for job creation,particularly in some of the poorest areas of the world,including in Africa.Meanwhile,population ageing in almost all advance
84、d and many emerging countries has accelerated,causing a depression of labour supply that is unlikely to be offset by outward migration from demographically more dynamic regions.At the same time,technological change,pertaining especially to new digital de-vices and tools such as artificial intelligen
85、ce,has yet to live up to earlier optimistic projections about its potential to increase productivity growth and alleviate much of the drudgery of work,but such innovations are needed to address some upcoming labour shortages resulting from demographic shifts.The interaction of macroeconomic factors,
86、long-term trends and institutional settings varies and affects employment growth differently across country income groups.First,the macro-economic outlook is pessimistic for high-income countries,whereas many other countries are likely to see a normalization of growth after the higher growth rates o
87、f 2021 and 2022.Second,low social protection coverage in low-income and lower-middle-income countries means that many workers wont stop working but will be forced into the informal economy as economic activity slows.By contrast,countries with tried-and-tested employment retention schemes most of whi
88、ch are high income will make use of them again,thereby limiting employment losses.Third,enterprises in high-income countries could face labour shortages in an ensuing upswing because of an ageing and contracting labour force,which will motivate them to hold on to their workers if they can.Employment
89、 growth is likely to slow significantlyGlobal employment is projected to expand by 1.0 per cent in 2023,a significant deceleration from the 2.3 per cent growth rate of 2022.This projection for 2023 is a notable downward revi-sion of 0.5 percentage points from the previous projection.No major improve
90、ment is projected for 2024,when employment growth is expected to have edged up to 1.1 per cent.The outlook is pessimistic for high-income countries,with close to zero employment growth.By contrast,low-income and lower-middle-income countries are projected to see employment growth surpassing their pr
91、e-pandemic growth trend.XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202314The slowdown in employment growth means that gaps opened up by the COVID-19 crisis,globally,are not projected to be closed in the next two years.Strong employment growth in 2022 raised the global employment-to-population ratio
92、 to 56.4 per cent,up from 54.5 per cent in 2020 but still almost half a percentage point below the level of 2019.Total weekly hours worked in 2022 remained shy of their level in the fourth quarter of 2019 by 1.4 per cent when adjusted for population growth;this figure translates into the equivalent
93、of 41 million full-time jobs(at 48 hours per week).Average weekly hours worked per worker are projected to decline slightly in 2023 as a result of the economic slowdown,to remain at just above 41 hours per week.This reduction in activity limits the earnings potential of workers and in all like-lihoo
94、d lessens opportunities for transitions into better-quality,well-paying jobs.Employment growth in 2021 was robust as key sectors of the economy reopened,and labour market conditions continued to improve in 2022.The employment-to-population ratio surpassed its pre-crisis level in Europe and Central A
95、sia in 2022 and has recovered the majority of its losses in the other regions.Women,disproportionately affected by employment losses in 2020,have seen particularly strong employment growth.By 2022 their employment-to-population ratio had recovered to within 0.3 percentage points of the pre-crisis le
96、vel,compared with a gap of 0.6 percentage points for men.However,this stronger recovery was mainly driven by informal employment:four out of five jobs created in 2022 for women were informal,versus only two out of three for men.The labour market outlook for 2023 varies con-siderably by region.Africa
97、 and the Arab States should see employment growth in the order of 3 per cent or more.However,with their growing working-age populations,both regions are likely to see unemployment rates decline only modestly(from 7.4 to 7.3 per cent in Africa and from 8.5 to 8.2 per cent in the Arab States).In Asia
98、and the Pacific and in Latin America and the Caribbean,annual employment growth is projected to be in the order of 1 per cent.In North America,there will be no employment gains in 2023 and unemployment will pick up.Europe and Central Asia are particularly hard hit by the economic fallout from the Uk
99、raine conflict;employment is projected to decline in 2023,but unemployment rates should increase only slightly against the backdrop of limited growth in the working-age population.Indeed,in Europe and Central Asia the labour force is set to decline in 2023.Regardless of these trends in headline labo
100、ur market indicators,each region will continue to face a myriad of decent work deficits that are likely to worsen in the face of global economic conditions and long-term challenges like climate change.Global labour supply growth is likely to con-tinue its deceleration,which will contribute to substa
101、ntial labour shortages in advanced economies in particular.Part of this deceleration is to be expected because over the past decade both developing and emerging countries have experienced rising income levels that have allowed many younger citizens to extend their time in education.Nevertheless,a la
102、rge share of young people remain outside employment,education or training(the so-called NEET rate),which will adversely affect their future labour market opportunities.Reducing these NEET rates continues to be a significant challenge that needs to be addressed if the global economy is to benefit fro
103、m the youth bulge in the demographic profile of many developing countries.Even partially closing the global jobs gap by expanding gainful employment would reduce decent work deficits and boost economic activity.Advanced economies have made considerable progress in this regard,offering opportunities
104、for older workers in par-ticular to remain attached to the labour market;this is the only group of countries where labour force participation rates have increased over the past decade rather than declined.Global unemployment is projected to edge up slightly in 2023,by around 3 million,to reach 208 m
105、illion.This corresponds to an unemployment rate of 5.8 per cent.Despite the negative global economic outlook,global unemployment is pro-jected to increase only moderately,since a large part of the shock is being absorbed by rapidly falling real wages in an environment of accelerating inflation.Howev
106、er,although global unemployment declined significantly in 2022,down to 205 million from 235 million in 2020,it still remained 13 million above the 2019 level.In 2022,unemployment rates fell below their pre-crisis level only in the Americas and in Europe and Central Asia;they remain above that level
107、in the other regions.Executive summary15Job quality is under pressure as wellBeyond the gap in employment,job quality remains a key concern.Without access to social protection,many people simply cannot afford to be without a job.They often accept any kind of work,often at very low pay and with incon
108、venient or insufficient hours.The projected slowdown is therefore likely to force workers to accept jobs of worse quality than they might enjoy in better economic conditions.Furthermore,with prices rising faster than nominal wages,workers will experience rapidly declining disposable incomes even whe
109、n they can keep their current jobs.Such decent work deficits vary by region in form and severity,yet they are widespread.In the Arab States,North Africa and South Asia,gender-related differences in labour market indicators,including labour force participation rates,are substantial.In Latin America a
110、nd the Caribbean,and sub-Saharan Africa,elevated rates of informality inhibit access to social protection and fundamental rights at work.All regions are afflicted by one or another form of decent work deficit.The current deterioration in global economic conditions is likely to reverse past progress
111、and worsen these deficits in several directions.Inflation has a strong impact on the distribution of real incomes.Many workers and enterprises are unable to increase their income in line with inflation and they hence suffer real income losses.However,some workers and enterprises for example,those op
112、erating in the energy sector experience income gains higher than the inflation rate,which thus raise their real income.Falling real incomes are particularly devastating for poorer households,which risk slipping into poverty and food insecurity.In sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia,respectively,60.8 p
113、er cent and 34.7 per cent of the employed population in 2021 were considered to be working poor at the US$3.10 per day(PPP per capita)level.Global supply chain linkages are propagating to low-and middle-income countries the slow-down in demand in high-income countries.An estimated average of 11.3 pe
114、r cent of jobs in the sample of 24 middle-income countries with avail-able data excluding those in agriculture and non-market services are dependent on GSC linkages to high-income countries(see Appendix D).In some smaller economies,the proportion well exceeds 20 per cent.In middle-income countries,s
115、ectors with higher GSC integration tend to have a larger share of wage and salaried employment,a lower incidence of informality and a lower proportion of low-paid employees and hence in principle a higher quality of employment.Since a slump in demand in high-income countries is likely to shift emplo
116、yment growth in middle-income countries to activities not linked to GSCs,the average quality of employment may then decline.Productivity growth remains vitally importantThe long-term slowdown in productivity growth in advanced economies has spread to major emerging economies.This is a matter of much
117、 concern,since growth in productivity is key to addressing todays multiple crises in purchasing power,well-being and ecological sustainability.To address threats to decent work and well-being,including widespread poverty,informality,and lack of safe and secure workplaces,will require invest-ment,inn
118、ovation and the diffusion of technological progress.For example,investment in peoples skills and capabilities is widely recognized as a central factor in labour productivity growth.Moreover,the climate goals of the Paris Agreement require an acceleration of technical progress to enable economies to
119、grow while using energy and other natural resources much more efficiently and generating dramatically lower greenhouse gas emissions.The last two decades,however,have seen a gradual deceleration in productivity growth,most pronounced in advanced economies but in-creasingly evident in major emerging
120、economies as well.Not only has productivity growth slowed but the fruits of such growth are also being shared less equally.The global labour income share was on a declining trend in the decade and a half preceding the COVID-19 crisis.Decades of falling(real)minimum wages,erosion of once strong labou
121、r market institutions,and failure to revive social dialogue on a larger scale have prevented labour from participating more fully and equitably in the benefits of economic growth.Rising indus-trial concentration in certain sectors is further XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202316fuelling
122、 inequality and hindering economic dyna-mism,especially among small and medium-sized enterprises.Worsening inequality and slowing productivity growth reinforce each other because they concentrate income gains in a way that fails to stimulate investment.The pace of technological innovation in the dig
123、ital economy is high but the benefits are not being shared widely.Industry concentration is particularly prevalent in the digital economy because of the substantial role of intangible assets in the business model,causing productivity growth to diverge between a few leading companies and the rest.Dig
124、ital innovations have yet to produce economy-wide spillovers in productivity that would boost jobs and growth.Rather,concentrated productivity gains have skewed the distribution of high-skilled job opportunities towards a few tech-based industries,exacerbating both inequality and the(aggregate)produ
125、ctivity slowdown.Technological breakthroughs are still missing that bring with them society-wide benefits,for instance in mobility management or grid management for the transition to sustainable energy.Other opportunities could arise to facilitate the shift towards remote and hybrid work and to addr
126、ess the need for innovative solutions to support col-laboration in an ever more diverse labour market.Regulatory and policy innovation is needed to strengthen technological development in areas with high social returns,using a mix of stand-ard-setting and public procurement approaches and productivi
127、ty-enhancing collaborations among social partners.Productivity growth has suffered from weak-ening investment,partly owing to high levels of economic uncertainty.Ever since the global financial crisis,economic uncertainty has been pervasive,hindering investment notwithstanding the low level of inter
128、est rates.This investment slowdown has often been accompanied by a shift from business to residential investment,which is less conducive to rapid productivity im-provements.Part of the reason is the volatility of general economic conditions stemming from recent crises,which have made businesses relu
129、c-tant to expand capacity or start new ventures.Movement towards a more stable macroeconomic environment would probably help to close some of the investment gap that the pandemic has magnified.Stronger action to address inequalities would also help to stimulate investment activity by leading to more
130、 broadly based increases in disposable incomes.A deteriorating labour market outlook and increases in informal employment have further undermined incentives for productive invest-ment.Given the substantial rise in uncertainty re-garding the future course of the global economy,employment expansion is
131、 fastest among informal workers.This will have knock-on effects on invest-ment rates that have continued their long-term decline,at least in advanced economies and re-gardless of the short-term direction of interest rates.Moreover,increases in this type of work are associated with lower wage growth
132、and reduced incentives for employers to invest in workforce upgrading and upskilling.With weakened labour market institutions,many countries lack mech-anisms to limit or prevent further erosion of real wages and hence to support aggregate demand and balanced and inclusive economic growth.Downside ri
133、sks are therefore significant in 2023The labour market outlook is characterized by multiple downside risks.Todays“polycrisis”could push global economic growth in 2023 below 2 per cent,with serious implications for employment creation.Even without such further deceleration of growth,labour market pro
134、spects could deteriorate if for example businesses were unable to hold on to workers owing to financing constraints,or governments found themselves in a debt crisis and unable to support labour markets.In low-and middle-income countries,inequality and declining real incomes in the face of rising pri
135、ces could suppress demand for domestically produced goods and services,thereby further reducing employment growth,particularly in the formal sector.Despite the overall slowdown in employment growth,shortages of qualified labour remain a risk in certain countries and sectors.A major increase in inves
136、tment in education and training is necessary to unlock the full potential of the global labour force.Currently,two thirds of Executive summary17the global youth labour force remain without a basic set of skills,a circumstance that restricts their labour market opportunities and easily pushes them in
137、to lower-quality forms of employment.Indeed,the expansion of labour force partici-pation in advanced economies often came at the price of a gradual decline in the average quality of education over the past decade,thereby contributing to the deceleration of productivity growth.In the current environm
138、ent of challenges to both productivity and employment,a broad-based labour market initiative focusing on both employment and skills is necessary to make the labour market work for all.Global policy space is fragmentedThe coronavirus pandemic has created sig-nificant capacity challenges for major pol
139、icy-making institutions.Central banks around the world face difficult trade-offs between further supporting recovery from the pandemic and addressing elevated inflation.Although many countries have not yet recovered to pre-pandemic levels in terms of hours worked,shocks to energy and food prices hav
140、e brought a need to normalize policy and reduce the emergency measures intro-duced during the pandemic.Governments that have accumulated a significant amount of debt to support local businesses and households now find themselves under pressure to phase out some of their support measures,if they have
141、 not done so already.Just as the recovery from the pandemic has remained uneven across countries,so has the exposure to geopolitical tensions and price hikes stemming from supply disruptions.European countries are facing substantial and sudden rises in energy costs which are contributing to a stag-f
142、lationary dynamic.Among African countries,the food price increases experienced in previous years have worsened;many sub-Saharan countries are not self-sufficient in food production and their food imports are not well diversified.Around the world,ensuring access to basic goods and ser-vices at reason
143、able prices has become a national preoccupation,sometimes without regard for the international spillover effects of such action.In the response to multiple economic and geopolitical crises,international solidarity is more critical than ever.Strong commitment to initiatives such as the UN Global Acce
144、lerator on Jobs and Social Protection for Just Transitions as well as the close involvement of social partners in all areas of policymaking at national and international levels are key measures that will strengthen policy coherence and partnerships to tackle current challenges and respond to long-te
145、rm trends in the future of work.Amidst large deficits in decent work and social justice,a new global social contract is needed to enhance the resilience of economies and societies in the face of todays multiple crises.The ILOs 2019 Centenary Declaration and 2021 global call to action for a human-cen
146、tred recovery from the COVID-19 crisis which is inclusive,sustainable and resilient frame the core elements of such a strategy at the national and international levels.To this end,in 2023 the ILO will promote a Global Coalition for Social Justice aimed at strengthening global solidarity and improvin
147、g policy coherence in order to bring about action and investments in decent work and social justice.Accelerated progress in reducing the global jobs gap,strengthening the quality of jobs and pro-tecting real incomes will require renewed policy coordination and social dialogue.A strengthened global s
148、ocial contract will also need to integrate longer-term objectives,addressing threats from climate change while resolving deficits in develop-ment and living standards,in part through faster productivity growth.Governments and social partners should seize the moment to deepen their collaboration to t
149、his end.1 XOverview1 By September 2022,the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index had started to fall back to levels seen before the pandemic(Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2022).In contrast,the indicator of shortage of intermediate inputs among German manufacturers remained,in the third quarter of 20
150、22,at the high levels experienced during the pandemic,far above shortages experienced during previous business cycles(DESTATIS 2022).A worsening global economic outlook threatens to exacerbate decent work deficits.Rising geopolitical tensions,an uneven recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic,and bottlen
151、ecks in supply chains that are only slowly easing have created conditions for“stagflation”,the first period of high inflation coupled with low growth since the 1970s.1 The large swings in consumption and disruptions in supply chains that accompanied the pandemic led to asymmetric demand and supply s
152、hocks,causing labour shortages and rising prices in a number of sectors.Inflation in particular,high food and energy prices is eroding disposable income,with repercussions for aggregate demand and the ability of the poorest in the world to maintain adequate living standards.Stalled labour market rec
153、overy undermines social justiceXWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202320These inflationary pressures have prompted major central banks to take a more restrictive monetary policy stance.The ensuing increases in interest rates,compounded by the conflict in Ukraine,are slowing economic activit
154、y and raising the spectre of financial instability in highly indebted countries.2 This is significantly increasing uncertainty and deterring the busi-ness investment on which continued reduction in unemployment and working poverty depends.In short,the progress in decent work and social justice that
155、many countries achieved in recent decades is at risk of being eroded for many years to come.Decent work deficits remain very large in the midst of such challenging circumstances(figure 1.1).About 473 million people around the world are deprived of earning an income through employment.They include 20
156、5 million unemployed those who satisfy the requirements of having recently searched for a job and being available at short notice.Thus there are 268 mil-lion people who do not satisfy these requirements but have an unmet need for employment.3 Two billion of those who are employed have an in-formal j
157、ob,meaning that they are significantly less likely to have rights at work,to have a voice through social dialogue or to enjoy the benefits of social protection systems.This is particularly true in rural areas(ILO 2022a).Furthermore,214 mil-lion people are in employment but are unable to escape extre
158、me poverty they and their families live on less than US$1.90 per person per day in purchasing power parity(PPP)terms.4 Global labour income is distributed highly unequally,the bottom 50 per cent of workers earning only around 8 per cent of global labour income.This inequality is partly driven by a v
159、ast gap in labour productivity:gross domestic product(GDP)per worker in high-income countries is 18 times that in low-income countries.Access to income support for those who fall out of employment is also highly unequal across the world,only 47 per cent of the 2 The Capital Flows Tracker of the Inst
160、itute of International Finance shows large net capital outflows from emerging markets in the first half of 2022,but some reversal in August to October 2022(https:/ As the 19th International Conference of Labour Statisticians(ICLS 2018)established,labour underutilization implies an unmet need for emp
161、loyment of which unemployment is one of the measures.4 The World Bank revised the threshold for extreme poverty to US$2.15 per day(PPP)during 2022.This change could not yet be taken into account in the production of estimates for this report,but it will be taken into account in future editions.popul
162、ation being covered by social protection(ILO 2021a).In 2020,around 160 million children in the world were in child labour,most of them working in agriculture(ILO 2021b).This,together with the around 28 million people in forced labour(ILO 2022b),means that a total 188 million people are in forms of w
163、ork that should be abolished.Women and young people fare significantly worse in labour markets,an indication of the large inequalities within the world of work in many countries.Globally,the labour force partici-pation rate(LFPR)of women stood at 47.4 per cent in 2022,compared with 72.3 per cent for
164、 men.The gap of 24.9 percentage points means that for every economically inactive man there are two such women.Young people(aged 1524)face severe difficulties in securing and keeping decent employment.Their unemployment rate is three times as high as that of adults(aged 25+).More than one in five 23
165、.5 per cent of young people are not in education,employment or training(NEET).Longer-term trends show progress on re-ducing decent work deficits on some fronts,but that this is not fast enough.Although the decline in the extreme working poverty rate from 35 per cent in 1991 to 6.4 per cent in 2022 i
166、s a notable success,the absence of further progress in low-income countries means that the num-bers of working poor in those countries are on the rise.The decline of the informality rate by 5 percentage points over the past 18 years is too slow for widespread formalization to be expected any time so
167、on.The gender gap in the LFPR has remained essentially unchanged over the past three decades.The NEET rate among young men has increased over the past 17 years,while it has declined among young women.The global labour income share has declined since 2004.Meanwhile,unemployment is generally a cyclica
168、l phenomenon,without a clear long-term trend.1.Stalled labour market recovery undermines social justice21Jobs gap473 million want employment 205 million of them are unemployed(meaning actively looking for work)473 millionWorking poverty214 million workers in extreme poverty(US$1.90 PPP per day)214 m
169、illionGender gap Twice as many women as men are outside the labour force2timesYoung people23.5%of youth are not in education,employment or training23.5per centEmployment to be abolished160 million children in child labour and 28 million workersin forced labour188 millionProductivity gapLabour produc
170、tivity is 18 timesgreater in high-income countriesthan in low-income countries18 timesSocial protectionOnly 47%of the population are covered by at least one form of social protection47per centInequalityHalf of workers earn only8%of global labour income8per centInformal employment2 billion informal w
171、orkers with limited rights at work or access to social protection2billion X Figure 1.1.Overview of deficits in decent work and social justice,2022 or latest year availableNote:Estimates for labour income refer to 2019,estimates for child labour to the beginning of 2020.Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled es
172、timates,November 2022;ILO social protection database;ILO(2021b).XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202322The COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated decent work deficits that existed before the pan-demic(ILO 2021c).In 2020,total hours worked fell short by an estimated 8.7 per cent relative to the f
173、ourth quarter of 2019,corresponding to the equivalent of 252 million full-time jobs(at 48 hours per week).Although losses of working hours and therefore also of income occurred worldwide,the unequal provision of income support measures reinforced ex-isting income inequalities across countries,since
174、these inequalities depended on the scale of existing and emergency social protection systems.Within countries,too,inequalities rose,since women,for instance,and also workers in low-and medium-skill occupations suffered greater losses of employment(ILO 2022c).Downward trends in the incidence of infor
175、mality and working poverty have been halted and reversed in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis.With a few exceptions,most countries have not yet returned to the employment and working hours levels once adjusted for population growth seen at the end of 2019,before the outbreak of the health crisis.Recov
176、ery has been lagging behind in low-income and lower-middle-income countries where many indicators of decent work are particularly worrisome.Global employment growth is projected to decline drastically in 2023 following the rapid expansion in 2022.This will entrench the di-vergence in recovery,making
177、 it very difficult for low-income and lower-middle-income countries to close the gaps with respect to high-income countries which opened during 2021 and 2022.The reduction in global unemployment achieved in 2021 and 2022 will also stall;a mod-erate increase is projected for 2023 and 2024.Hours worke
178、d per person employed are also projected to decline amidst slowing economic activity and remain significantly below their pre-pandemic level.5 Many countries conduct labour force surveys infrequently.The missing values are imputed to obtain global estimates of labour market indicators,published in t
179、he ILO modelled estimates.In normal times,the imputed values of labour market indicators for years when no survey was conducted have relatively small error bounds thanks to the econo-metric techniques used to produce the ILO modelled estimates.Owing to the size and nature of the COVID-19 shock,the p
180、recision of the labour market estimates has declined.6 Regions that are composed mainly of countries with good coverage through labour force surveys have a small error for indicators up to and including 2021.These include the Americas and Europe.7 See Appendix B for details on the ILO modelled estim
181、ates series.This chapter presents trends and projections of key labour market indicators globally and by country income group.First,the chapter discusses the multiple crises that have created such a challenging environment for labour markets.Next,the key indicators of quantity of work are presented:
182、labour force,employment,working hours and labour underutilization.The chapter subsequently investigates trends in the types of jobs that people have,and the impli-cations for social justice,and then concludes with some policy implications.The accumulation of risk factors has resulted in a highly unc
183、ertain labour market outlook.This comes on top of uncertainty about the impact the COVID-19 crisis has had on the world of work.5 Consequently,the labour market indicators presented in this report are subject to substantial uncertainty.6 The term“employment”as used here applies to activities within
184、the production boundary defined by the United Nations(UN)System of National Accounts and follows the definition established by the 13th International Conference of Labour Statisticians(ICLS).The term“work”,according to the more recent standards(adopted by the 19th ICLS),is defined as any activity pe
185、rformed by persons of any sex and age to produce goods or to provide services for use by others or for ones own use.This distinction is important because more people are engaged in work(19th ICLS concept)than are in employment(13th ICLS concept).Women in particular do large amounts of work,such as u
186、npaid care work,that is not captured by the reported employment figures(ILO 2022d).In this report,however,the term“work”is used on occasion as a synonym for“employment”for ease of exposition.All statistics presented in the text without an explicit reference are published in the ILO modelled estimate
187、s repository of ILOSTAT;7 many can also be found in the WESO Data Finder.1.Stalled labour market recovery undermines social justice23 XA challenging macroeconomic environment for labour markets8 In a sample of 35 countries,median core inflation rates started to increase in the second quarter of 2021
188、,from around 2 per cent,to reach 6.5 per cent in the third quarter of 2022(IMF 2022).The cost-of-living crisis is eroding disposable incomesA combination of asymmetric demand and supply shocks has increased core inflation rates.8 Part of these problems stems from the large swings in consumption obse
189、rved during the pandemic when demand shifted away from ser-vices towards(electronic)goods in 2020,to swing back to services in the course of 2021 as economies around the world gradually lifted workplace and travel restrictions.Supply adjustments did not take place at the same speed,however.Especiall
190、y the rising demand for goods together with the simultaneous decline in maritime transportation capacity led to significant disruptions in global supply chains(GSCs)(Rees and Rungcharoenkitkul 2021).With the gradual opening that began in 2021,activity resumed quickly,thanks to pent-up demand stimula
191、ted by forced savings built up at the beginning of the pandemic.As a conse-quence,several sectors,including aviation and tourism,experienced serious capacity shortages.Surprisingly,the strength of these shocks seems to have been underestimated by policymakers despite them having been fully anticipat
192、ed(Ernst 2020;OECD 2020).Rising prices for energy and food,driven by cyclical factors and reinforced by supply dis-ruptions caused by the conflict in Ukraine,pose existential threats for the poor.By March 2022,the global food price index had reached 159.7 points,the highest level since the start of
193、the series in 1990(figure 1.2).Thereafter,prices eased,but in September 2022 they were still 43 per cent higher than the average of 2019 and 2004200620082000220500300350400FAO food price indexEnergy index X Figure 1.2.Food and energy prices indicesNote:Food and Agric
194、ulture Organization(FAO)food price index with average price of 201416 equalling 100.Source:International Monetary Fund(IMF)primary commodity price system;FAO.XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202324stood at similar levels as during the last global food price crisis,in 2011.Energy prices ha
195、d risen to three times the average price of 2019 by August 2022,surpassing the price level of the last high-price period,201114,by 60 per cent.The combination of high energy and food prices is causing a cost-of-living crisis for many households,which may become existential for poorer ones that tend
196、to spend a larger share of their income on food and energy.9 Many enterprises too in particular,small and medium-sized ones without much market power to pass on cost increases to consumers face an existential threat from rising energy prices(Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition 2022).The energy pr
197、ice index is a global average;the regions have a varying energy mix,and some energy markets such as electricity and to some degree natural gas are local and hence exhibit large price variations around the world.As a result,double-digit inflation rates are affecting more than 2 billion people worldwi
198、de(UNCTAD 2022),deepening inequalities within countries and lowering aggregate demand.Energy producers and enterprises with market power are earning record profits while other enterprises are struggling to pass on cost increases to their customers or are feeling the crunch of reduced demand.10 Worke
199、rs are already experiencing a significant decline in real income and often lack bargaining power to seek compensation for these losses or are employed by struggling enterprises that are unable to raise their pay.The Global Wage Report 202223 shows that global real wages are estimated to have decline
200、d by 0.9 per cent in 2022(ILO 2022e).Even among low-wage service workers in advanced economies,who have seen the fastest increase in wages in decades owing to a shortage of labour,wage growth is barely keeping par with inflation.Labour market and social protection reforms,9 Price indices show the no
201、minal changes in prices.The evolution of incomes needs to be considered as well to evaluate the impact of price changes on households.10 In 2021 and 2022,price hikes amidst still strong consumer demand meant that many companies were able to increase their profits margin.In the United States,corporat
202、e profits before tax as a proportion of gross national product rose from an average of 10.7 per cent in 201819 to an average of 13.4 per cent in 2021 and the first two quarters of 2022(calculations based on https:/fred.stlouisfed.org/).11 On the evolution of trade unionization rates and collective b
203、argaining arrangements see Visser(2012)and ILO(2022h).12 The terms-of-trade effect lowered real incomes by 1.3 per cent in the euro area in the fourth quarter of 2021(ECB 2022).Energy prices have risen significantly since then.13 Even in developed economies with well-integrated financial markets fis
204、cal policy can become constrained through financial markets requesting significantly higher risk premiums,as shown by events in the United Kingdom in October 2022 surrounding the proposed large fiscal deficits that necessitated intervention by the Bank of England.the gradual erosion of trade union m
205、embership and a fall in industrial employment have led to a phasing out of automatic indexation of wages and other nominal anchors,preventing real wages from fully reflecting increases in productivity.11 The unexpected acceleration of inflation came to the detriment of workers,who find themselves on
206、 the losing side of surprise inflation.Meanwhile,the decline of unionization rates and collective bargaining coverage has reduced the power of social dialogue to elicit a fair sharing of the cost of inflation(ILO 2017a).In the absence of redistributive efforts,the majority of households will see dec
207、lining real incomes,which will cause aggregate demand to fall.Countries that are experiencing deteriorating terms of trade face additional declines in real incomes as a result of inflation.These countries need to spend significantly more on imports of food and energy,thereby transferring purchasing
208、power to net exporters of those items.12 This in-creased spending can cause balance-of-payment crises for developing countries with limited op-portunities to borrow internationally,thereby worsening financing conditions for governments and enterprises.13Options for fiscal and monetary policy are lim
209、itedGlobal policy space is limited and fragmented.The COVID-19 pandemic has left a large dent in the capacity of major policymaking institutions.Central banks around the world have exhausted their capacity to support the recovery.Similarly,fiscal policymakers have accumulated a substantial amount of
210、 debt in order to support local businesses and households and are increasingly compelled to phase out some of the support measures,if 1.Stalled labour market recovery undermines social justice25they have not done so already.Rising interest rates,along with a strong US dollar,threaten the ability of
211、countries to refinance debt,especially when coupled with capital flight.Between 2019 and 2022 the proportion of low-income countries experiencing debt distress or facing a high risk of debt distress increased from 49 per cent to 56 per cent.It is of utmost importance to ensure that governments conti
212、nue to have access to finance,since the implementation of austerity measures,or a situation of being forced to implement them by financial market distress during an economic downturn,would be catastrophic for labour markets.Fiscal policy needs to balance conflicting goals.On the one hand,countries s
213、hould avoid a gen-erally expansionary fiscal stance that would run counter to the efforts of monetary policy.On the other,hard-hit enterprises and households do re-quire support to weather the crisis.Consequently,support needs to become more targeted at low-income households,vulnerable workers and s
214、truggling small and medium-sized businesses.14Given the current economic policy consensus,the process of keeping inflation under control will be painful for households and many enter-prises.Although inflation is driven more by supply than by demand factors(IMF 2022),most policy action has focused on
215、 demand-side management to counter expectations of rising inflation.In par-ticular,the current policy response in advanced economies relies very much on monetary policy causing a contraction in aggregate demand,as evidenced by the record pace of interest rate hikes.Workers will experience pressure o
216、n incomes under such a policy,either because of reduced jobs growth,or job losses,or because of falling real wages for those who remain employed.Reduced aggregate demand also raises competitive pressure on firms,thereby limiting price hikes and potentially reducing their profit margins.15 A more bal
217、anced approach is needed to limit the economic and social pain,focusing on measures to bolster supply including accelerated investment in sustainable energy production.14 Untargeted or poorly targeted support can enable low-productivity enterprises to survive(“zombie firms”),thereby locking in resou
218、rces and reducing potential for productivity growth(see Chapter 3).In developing countries,though,many micro,small and medium-sized enterprises would continue operations anyway but would likely fall into the informal sector.15 Profit margins are generally procyclical(Macallan,Millard and Parker 2008
219、).High levels of inequality that have built up over the past few decades are compounding challenges for central bankers in their attempt to bring down inflation rates.With an ever larger proportion of aggregate consumption driven by well-to-do households that are insensitive to interest rate hikes,t
220、here is a risk that a monetary policy much tighter than in the past will be perceived as necessary in order to produce a significant impact on inflation(Pereira da Silva et al.2022).This will disproportionately raise the cost for poorer households and also for businesses with high levels of external
221、 financing.In the absence of proper policy coordination,the risk is that large advanced and emerging economies will pursue a policy agenda primarily catering to their own domestic challenges,without regard for the wider global spillovers.Monetary policy tightening,in particular,seems to be reacting
222、to immediate inflation concerns without sufficient consideration of intertemporal and international spillovers(Obstfeld 2022).This may be creating an overly tight global macroeco-nomic environment that will have an unduly severe impact on the real economy and labour markets around the world.Alternat
223、ive policy responses that balance demand-and supply-side measures and protect the most vulnerable through targeted interventions could offer a more effective means of combating inflation while sustaining economic growth and development.Short-term economic outlookThe multitude of challenges are causi
224、ng a slump in confidence accelerated by the Ukraine con-flict which will feed into economic contraction.GDP-weighted policy uncertainty across 21 coun-tries has been found to have risen since 2021 and is at levels far above the long-term average,although not quite reaching the uncertainty ex-perienc
225、ed during the early phases of the pandemic(figure 1.3).Median consumer confidence has fallen to its lowest level in the past two decades in a sample of 44 countries(figure 1.3),highlighting the severe impact of the cost-of-living crisis on households.Median business confidence across XWorld Employme
226、nt and Social Outlook|Trends 20232614 countries is equally on a downward trend,but in September 2022 the median confidence level was just below the long-term average.The more positive feeling among businesses is good news for labour markets,since employers are less likely to lay off staff,at least f
227、or now.The global economy is forecast to grow a mere 2.7 per cent in 2023,far below the 3.6 per cent average annual growth between 2000 and 2021(IMF 2022).This prediction is down by 0.9 per-centage points since April 2022,highlighting the marked deterioration of economic conditions.The slowdown mean
228、s that,instead of a recuperation of the output losses incurred during the pandemic,the output gap relative to the pre-crisis trend is widening again.The significant slowdown in the worlds three largest economies China,the euro area and the United States of America is a major contributor to the globa
229、l downturn.In low-and middle-income countries,excluding China,projected per capita growth is the same as or even larger than the average growth achieved from 2010 to 2019(figure 1.4).Low-income countries in particular are projected to achieve significantly higher per capita growth than in the previo
230、us decade.Moreover,the pro-jected global growth in 2023 still exceeds the rate recorded during the financial crisis of 2009.Thus,although the current slowdown in growth will seriously damage efforts to recuperate the output losses incurred through the pandemic,it does not imply that a major global r
231、ecession is in store,especially outside the high-income countries.There is a risk,though,that the global economy will enter a recession if a number of risk factors materialize(Gunette,Kose and Sugawara 2022;IMF 2022).The labour market projections in this report are based on the baseline projection o
232、f World Economic Outlook,October 2022(IMF 2022).Consumer confidenceBusiness confidencePolicy uncertainty2004200620082000222310123 X Figure 1.3.Median consumer and business confidence indicators(standard deviation from mean)and policy uncertainty,February 2004 to September 2022N
233、ote:The figure shows the median of the standardized consumer confidence indicator across a sample of 44 countries,and the median of the standardized business confidence indicator across a sample of 14 countries.The policy uncertainty index is a GDP-weighted average across 21 countries.The original s
234、eries has been rescaled for display in this figure by dividing the policy uncertainty index by 100 and subtracting 1.All series have been converted to show the three-month rolling average.The vertical line marks the start of the Ukraine conflict.Source:Tradingeconomics;http:/.1.Stalled labour market
235、 recovery undermines social justice27Long-term trends affecting labour market dynamicsUnderneath these short-term developments run larger tectonic shifts that are increasingly being felt.Population ageing is exacerbating labour shortages in some countries,while countries with still rapidly expanding
236、 populations face challenges to provide the young generation with sufficient opportunities for productive decent work.Productivity growth faces severe headwinds,which threaten the prospects of eliminating working poverty,reducing global labour income inequality and allowing countries to cope with ag
237、eing populations while maintaining standards of living(see Chapter 3).A changing world of work driven also by digitalization and the growing needs of the care economy is altering enterprises skills requirements and hence producing skills mismatch when skills needs are not properly addressed through
238、the education system and lifelong learning(ILO 2021d;Carolina Feijao,van Stolk Flanagan and Gunashekar 2021).Climate change and mitigation policies are likely to impact living standards.The past year has seen a series of climatic exceptions that have reminded the global community that climate change
239、 is accelerating,causing rising and sizeable costs even though the global temperature has not yet reached the threshold of a 1.5 C increase(IPCC 2018).Several climatic tipping points seem to be near.The crossing of these will significantly increase adaptation costs.Irreversible loss of biodiversity
240、or melting of permafrost could ac-celerate the rise in temperature,causing large output and employment losses,especially in countries with already fragile ecosystems and high average temperatures.By 2030 an estimated 2.2 per cent of global working hours could be lost to heat stress,mostly in agricul
241、ture and construc-tion(ILO 2019a).The transition to net-zero carbon emissions may not come cheap but it will also create opportunities.The current energy price crisis may worsen as societies shift towards local green technologies.Moreover,as advanced economies move away from fossil fuels,the price o
242、f these fuels is likely to drop,creating an incentive for less developed countries to rely more rather than less on carbon-driven energy production.However,evidence abounds that a faster transition to a net-zero carbon emission economy will be beneficial not only from an ecological but also from an
243、economic point of view(Way et al.2022;IMF 2022).Such a transition could create a net 18 million jobs worldwide(ILO 2018a).A just transition will involve a(moderate)reduction in living standards which will need to be shared equitably,internationally,within countries and across generations.Delaying th
244、e necessary adjustment will simply increase the costs without making the distributional consequences any less complicated.Social protection measures and targeted income support,alongside skills policies to support transitions from“brown”to green jobs,will need to be stepped up,in particular 20101920
245、20202120222023World2.14.15.02.21.7Low-income countries0.73.21.71.02.4Lower-middle-income countries3.54.54.43.63.7Upper-middle-income countries(excluding China)1.15.95.51.61.1High-income countries1.44.85.02.30.8 X Figure 1.4.Growth of GDP per capita,201023,world and country income groups(percentages)
246、Source:ILO calculations based on IMF(2022)and UN population prospects,2022 revision.XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202328in countries that have the financial means to do so.16 To create more space,especially in low-income countries,new forms of international climate agreements need to b
247、e found that will channel part of the climate-related funds levied among high-income polluters to strengthen investment in 16“Brown”refers to tasks and activities that inhibit environmental protection,further unsustainable solutions or have a large negative impact on the environment(Bohnenberger 202
248、2).17 Rising labour productivity growth is only a necessary condition to maintain standards of living when there is an ageing popu-lation.Equally important is the redistribution of incomes meaning the design of pension systems to allow everyone to actually experience this standard of living.carbon s
249、inks in the Global South(Barga 2022).Such programmes need to be designed with a labour market angle in mind in order to facilitate decent work creation aligned with payment for ecosystem services,for instance(ILO 2018a).XLabour supply,employment and shortage of jobsIn the coming years,employment gro
250、wth will stall,workers will have a harder time finding quality employment and real incomes are likely to fall.The reasons for these developments are to be found in the dynamics of labour supply and demographic change,in the structure of labour markets and in the institutional context of employment c
251、reation and destruction.These determinants differ across countries;differences in the interplay of labour demand and supply and in worker remuneration will lead to differences in labour market outcomes.Labour supplyThe global LFPR is estimated to have recovered to close to 60 per cent in 2022,slight
252、ly below its level in 2019.It is projected to continue its long-term downward trend through 2023,declining by 0.2 percentage points till 2024.In total,around 3.6 billion people are estimated to have been part of the labour force in 2022,a figure that is projected to increase by around 35 million per
253、 year thanks to the growth of the working-age popu-lation.Economic inactivity,meaning not being in the labour force,can result from positive but also negative factors.The long-term decline in the LFPR is to some degree driven by the younger generation spending more time in education and the older ge
254、neration enjoying longer periods of retirement achievements made possible by economic development.However,economic in-activity also arises from a lack of labour market opportunities for certain groups,discouragement,gender discrimination and other factors that inhibit participation meaning that lowe
255、r participation rates are not a good thing per se.The working-age population has started to shrink in a number of high-income countries.Among emerging economies,China saw a first reduction in its working-age population in 2015,and this reduction is projected to accelerate.Demographically induced lab
256、our shortages have been compounded by health-related increases in inactivity rates.According to estimates by the World Health Organization(WHO),approximately 20 per cent of those infected by COVID-19 will suffer from some form of longer-term health con-sequence(Cox 2021;Stulpin 2022;Van Beusekom 202
257、2).Estimates of the impact on labour supply vary;studies for the United States suggest that 300,000600,000 workers(Sheiner and Salwati 2022)or even 24 million people(Bach 2022)have been out of work because of long COVID.These figures represent a range of between 0.2 and 2.2 per cent of the labour fo
258、rce.Maintaining or raising standards of living in a context of rising old-age dependency ratios will require faster productivity growth,increased LFPR,or inward migration of young workers.This is because,on average,every worker will need to produce ever more output,since that output will need to be
259、sufficient for ever more people who are not economically active.17 Old-age dependency ratios defined as the ratio of the population aged 65 and above to the population aged 15 to 64 1.Stalled labour market recovery undermines social justice29have risen significantly over the past decade in high-inco
260、me countries and also in upper-middle-income countries(figure 1.5).Chapter 3 shows that labour productivity growth has in fact slowed down over the past decade,thereby threatening the ability to maintain the average standard of living.Anticipating these trends,several countries have long undertaken
261、measures to increase participation rates.In many high-income coun-tries,retirement age limits have been raised and incentives for older workers to remain employed have been increased.In these countries,rising LFPRs among those aged 25 to 64,as well as increased participation by those aged 65 and abo
262、ve,have balanced to some degree the falling productivity growth,thereby maintaining the potential growth of GDP per capita(figure 1.5).However,there is a limit to how much such policies can contribute to overcoming structural shortages in labour supply.In simple terms of numbers,the old-age dependen
263、cy ratio is rising too fast for a rise in LFPR to compensate.Moreover,despite being a long-standing policy objective,lifelong-learning policies have been introduced only sparingly,given the high opportunity costs of retraining for older workers.Experience acquired over ones working life is often not
264、 fully reflected when a worker tran-sitions to a different occupation or sector,such that they may lose a significant portion of their seniority-linked wage premium(McKinsey 2022).Finally,more effort could be made to bring more women and marginalized groups into the labour market through appropriate
265、 policies.Employers in countries with ageing popula-tions will face a shrinking labour force and hence a dwindling pool of talent as raising participation rates further becomes ever more difficult.The LFPR of those aged 25 to 64 in high-income countries is already 7 percentage points above the globa
266、l average,and further increases will face limits.The labour force is projected to shrink in 2024 in high-income countries.In 2022,three quarters of surveyed companies reported 0.100.2Old-age dependency ratio0.3646668707274Labour force participation rate(ages 2564)76788082112021
267、20299921WorldLow-income countriesLower-middle-income countriesUpper-middle-income countriesHigh-income countries X Figure 1.5.Old-age dependency ratio and labour force participation rate(percentages)of people aged 2564,19912021,world and by country income
268、groupNote:The old-age dependency ratio is the ratio of those aged 65 and above to those aged 2564.Source:World Population Prospects 2022 of UN Population Division;ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2022.XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202330having difficulties finding the talent nee
269、ded to fill positions(ManpowerGroup 2022).Globally,in 2022,the number of working-age women outside the labour force surpassed that of men by 750 million a consequence of womens LFPR being 24.9 percentage points below that of men(figure 1.6).Gender gaps in LFPR,though a global phenomenon,occur highly
270、 unequally across the world;in areas such as North Africa,the Arab States and South Asia,women are only a third as likely as men to be economically active.Deep structural barriers in these areas,often rooted in social norms,hinder womens par-ticipation in labour markets(ILO 2019b;2017b).18Low-income
271、 and lower-middle-income countries benefit from low old-age dependency ratios but face the challenge of integrating a large youth population into the labour market.Those two country income groups are projected to see their combined labour force increase by around 18 These factors may include discrim
272、ination,fragmented and segregated labour markets,the unequal distribution of unpaid care work and care responsibilities between men and women and between families and the State,gender-based violence and harassment,prevailing gender stereotypes and socio-cultural norms,and the limited voice and repre
273、sentation of women in collective decision-making processes.19 Many African youth entering the labour market are located in rural areas(ILO 2022a).30 million per year until 2024,mostly as a result of young people entering the labour market.Africa is projected to account for almost half of the global
274、labour force expansion(16 million workers per year)while accounting for only a fifth of the global labour force.The large number of young people projected to enter the labour market poses its own challenges,since young people face par-ticular difficulties in this process.19In 2022,more than one in f
275、ive of young people aged 15 to 24 were NEET.This amounts to 289 million young people who were deprived of opportunity to obtain valuable skills through early work experience or some form of training or education(ILO 2022f).Young women are twice as likely as young men to be NEET,which means that gend
276、er gaps in terms of LFPR are likely to perpetuate.Indeed,regions with large gender participation gaps also show large gender gaps in NEET,which underlines the need for trans-formative policy approaches to resolve gender 72.347.467.519.872.962.274.351.067.756.976.019.272.560.277.254.874.524.866.959.2
277、64.053.467.152.064.348.5500100WorldNorth AfricaSub-Saharan AfricaLatin America and the CaribbeanNorth AmericaArab StatesEast AsiaSouth-East AsiaSouth AsiaPacificNorthern,Southern and Western EuropeEastern EuropeCentral and Western AsiaWomenMen X Figure 1.6.Labour force participation rate,2022,by sex
278、,world and by subregion(percentages)Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2022.1.Stalled labour market recovery undermines social justice31inequalities and prevent their perpetuation across generations.It is encouraging,though,that gender gaps in NEET rates have fallen over the past 16 year
279、s:NEET rates of young women have fallen by 2 percentage points whereas NEET rates of young men have slightly increased.There are large variations in NEET rates across regions,which are partly explained by the gender gaps and partly by the difficulties young people face in entering the labour market.
280、For instance,just over 10 per cent of young European men are NEET,versus almost 20 per cent of young men in the Arab States(figure 1.7).Aside from those NEET,many young people are economically inactive because they are pursuing an education(ILO 2022f).The LFPR of young people was around 40 per cent
281、in 2022,much lower than that of adults.Thanks to the increasing ability of young people to pursue an extended education,particu-larly in middle-income countries,that figure has come down significantly,having stood at around 56 per cent three decades ago.In 2022,around 268 million people were not in
282、the labour force but were nevertheless interested in obtaining employment.This group includes workers who are discouraged because they dont see any possibility of obtaining profitable employment and also those who are not currently available to take up employment.(See“The jobs gap,beyond unemploymen
283、t”below for an extensive analysis of this unmet demand for employment.)Unlocking this potential could raise labour supply and thereby alleviate labour shortages.Quantity of work:Employment and workinghoursDeterminants of employment growth differ across country income groups.First,the macro-economic
284、outlook differs across countries;some countries are projected to enter a recession whereas others are likely to see a normalization of growth after the higher growth rates of 2021 and 2022.Second,institutions differ widely across countries,including in coverage of social protection systems,extent of
285、 social bargaining,employment protection legislation and government labour market policies.Third,countries are at different stages of demographic change.In low-income and lower-middle-income countries,employment reacts only modestly to swings in economic activity,since most WomenTotalMenWorld32.123.
286、515.4North Africa39.028.017.3Sub-Saharan Africa31.425.720.1Latin America and the Caribbean26.920.313.9North America11.611.311.0Arab States47.232.919.5East Asia18.515.613.1South-East Asia21.818.314.9South Asia49.531.715.3Pacific19.017.416.0Northern,Southern and Western Europe9.79.89.9Eastern Europe14
287、.312.410.5Central and Western Asia27.522.016.8 X Figure 1.7.Youth aged 1524 not in employment,education,or training,2022,by sex,world and by subregion(percentages)Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2022.XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202332workers are informal and/or self-em
288、ployed.In the absence of social protection systems,workers in the informal economy continue with some type of survival economic activity.In these coun-tries,employment growth is strongly driven by the number of people who reach working age.Equally,unemployment does not react very much.On the other h
289、and,incomes will react to an eco-nomic downturn,as will,to some degree,hours worked,especially for employees without fixed jobs(for example,day labourers).In upper-middle-income countries the situation is more complex.One of them,China,accounts for the majority of workers in this income group and wi
290、ll likely face much lower economic growth than in the past while its strategy to handle COVID-19 is reducing working hours and while investment excesses in particular in the real estate sector are being corrected(Pettis 2022).However,the government is determined to maintain growth and will likely ap
291、ply many levers to avoid a large impact on the labour market.Quite a few other upper-middle-income countries are net commodity exporters that have benefited from a large terms-of-trade boost from the commodity price boom.This may bolster government finances and domestic consumption,thereby supportin
292、g employment growth.However,higher revenues arising from the terms-of-trade boost are likely to be concentrated among fewer households,whereas the rising cost of living affects everybody.In the absence of appropriate government intervention this state of affairs will increase inequality,which could
293、have a depressing effect on employment growth and aggregate demand.In high-income countries with ageing popula-tions,employment evolution is also determined by more medium-term strategic decisions by firms that need to balance laying off workers during a downturn against the risk of labour shortages
294、 during the recovery.Job vacancies in a sample of 18 mostly high-income countries have seen a steep decline since June 2022,but in September 2022 were still at historically high levels(figure 1.8).Vacancies fluctuate with the business cycle and hence are expected to decline further as firms stop exp
295、anding their workforce.However,companies will need to balance the short-term need for profitability and in some cases sur-vival with the medium-term challenge to obtain and maintain talented staff.This raises the likeli-hood that companies operating in countries with ageing populations will resort t
296、o labour hoarding 20022004200620082000221.01.50.500.51.01.52.02.525th percentileMedian75th percentile X Figure 1.8.Job vacancies(standard deviations from mean),June 2001 to September 2022Note:The figure shows the median and the 25th and 75th percentiles of the three-month rolli
297、ng average of standardized job vacancy postings across 18(mostly advanced)economies.Countries covered:Austria,Cyprus,Czechia,Estonia,Finland,France,Germany,Japan,New Zealand,Poland,Portugal,Slovenia,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,Thailand,United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,United States.
298、Source:Tradingeconomics.1.Stalled labour market recovery undermines social justice33during an economic downturn,avoiding lay-offs of staff they fought so hard to attract throughout 2021 and 2022.Many firms may lack the resources to main-tain staff,especially ones already hit hard by the COVID-19 cri
299、sis and ones with higher financing costs.Small and medium-sized enterprises in particular may not be able to survive a large reduction in aggregate demand.Insolvencies may rise,especially given the fact that a substantial insolvency backlog probably exists after two years of exceptionally low number
300、s of insolvencies(Allianz Research 2022).Nevertheless,numbers of insolvencies are projected to remain moderate,and not surpass their pre-pandemic level,thanks to continued state support(Allianz Research 2022).Consequently,employment losses in high-income countries in the next two years will be limit
301、ed relative to the extent of economic downturn.Global employment is projected to expand by 1.0 per cent in 2023,a marked deceleration following 2.3 per cent growth in 2022(figure 1.9).There is a significant dichotomy between country income groups:employment in low-income and lower-middle-income coun
302、tries is projected to expand at rates seen before 2020,but upper-middle-income and high-income countries will see much slower employment growth.Employment 20 Quarterly employment data are available for 37 high-income countries.growth in high-income countries was positive in 2022 only because of stro
303、ng employment growth in the first half of the year.The projected(unweighted)average employment growth in 2023 with respect to the third quarter of 2022 is essentially zero in those high-income countries with available quar-terly data,and employment growth in high-income countries is projected to con
304、tinue to be close to zero in 2024.20 All other country income groups are projected to see employment growth in 2024 similar to that in 2023.The multiple crises hitting the world of work have caused projected employment growth in 2023 to be 0.5 percentage points below what was projected in the previo
305、us edition of this report one year ago(figure 1.10).This slowdown will significantly delay the recovery of employment losses incurred during the COVID-19 crisis in those countries where gaps persist.The downward re-vision is relatively small in lower-middle-income countries;it is largest in the Amer
306、icas.In the latter region,though,employment recovery in 2022 was very strong,capturing some of the recovery that was previously expected to occur in 2023.Employment growth is hardly sufficient to match the growth of the working-age popu-lation,causing a stabilization of employment-to-population rati
307、os(EPRs)across all country income groups.The global EPR reached 56.4 per cent 20022202320241.10.22.31.01.12.82.43.73.33.31.60.43.01.81.80.50.01.20.10.31.20.63.30.70.81.10.62.70.20.1WorldLow-income countriesLower-middle-income countriesUpper-middle-income countriesUpper-middle-income count
308、ries(excluding China)High-income countries X Figure 1.9.Average annual employment growth,201024,world and by country income group(percentages)Source:Authors calculations based on ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2022.XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 202334in 2022,a strong improveme
309、nt on the low of 54.5 per cent in 2020,but still half a percentage point below the rate in 2019(table 1.1).The EPR gap in 2022 relative to the pre-crisis level was 0.7 percentage points in low-income countries,whereas high-income countries managed to exceed the pre-crisis EPR,which highlights the la
310、rge divergence in recovery that took place.The EPR is projected to fall slightly in 2023 and 2024.Women experienced a much stronger employment recovery than men,their EPRs approaching the rates of 2019.This stronger re-covery was mainly driven by informal employment,though;four out of five jobs crea
311、ted for women in 2022 were informal,versus only two out of three for men.In high-income countries,womens EPR was up by half a percentage point in 2022 com-pared with 2019,versus a decline of 0.3 percentage point for men.Lower-middle-income countries have had a similar experience,womens EPR having la
312、rgely recovered while mens EPR has remained 0.9 percentage points below the 2019 level.Women in low-income and upper-middle-income countries have similar employment deficits relative to 2019 as men.Despite the improved labour market developments for women over the past three years,they nevertheless
313、remain less likely than men to be in employment.Similarly to the LFPR,the gender gap in the global EPR stands at 23.5 percentage points,with a regional pattern similar to that shown in figure 1.7.The employment outlook for men and women is fairly similar:employment growth for both men and women is p
314、rojected to slow down at roughly the same pace.Youth employment has been hit particularly hard during the pandemic and its recovery re-mains far behind that of adults(ILO 2022f).In 2022 the global EPR of young people aged 15 to 24 was 34.5 per cent,0.7 percentage points below the level of 2019.For a
315、dults,the gap was 0.5 per-centage points.Since the EPR of young people is much lower than that of adults,the relative shortfall is also much larger for youth almost 2 per cent,versus 0.7 per cent for adults.Gender gaps in employment rates are equally present among young people,highlighting the stron
316、g persistence of the factors that drive gender gaps(ILO 2017b,2019b and 2022f).Young workers also have different types of jobs from older workers,including a higher likelihood of a temporary con-tract(ILO 2022g and 2022f).WorldLow-income countriesLower-middle-income countriesUpper-middle-income coun
317、triesHigh-income countriesAfricaAmericasArab StatesAsia and the PacificEurope and Central Asia0224WESO Trends 2023WESO Trends 20220.50.60.30.60.80.61.30.50.30.6 X Figure 1.10.Revision to employment growth projection in 2023,world,country income groups and regions(percentage points)Source:ILOSTAT,ILO
318、 modelled estimates,November 2022;ILO modelled estimates,November 2021.1.Stalled labour market recovery undermines social justice35Total hours worked recovered less well from the COVID-19 crisis than did employment:hours worked per worker have persistently declined.Whereas in 2019 the average weekly
319、 hours per worker,globally,was slightly above 42 hours,the figure was only 41.4 hours per week in 2022(figure 1.11).The decline is most significant in lower-middle-income countries(minus 1 hour per week),but also sizeable in low-income and high-income countries(about minus 0.5 hours per week).This d
320、ecline in hours will have reduced income per worker where workers have been unable to raise their hourly earnings.Weekly hours worked per worker are projected to decline in all country income groups,with the largest decline(of 0.4 hours per week)in high-income countries.The low level of hours worked
321、 per worker in low-income countries is directly related to the lack of decent work opportunities.Although the EPR is the highest among all the country income groups,the low average number of hours worked indicates a high degree of time-related underemployment,which also depresses labour incomes and
322、raises the risk of poverty.High labour productivity allows workers in high-income coun-tries to work relatively few weekly hours while maintaining a good income.Contrastingly,workers in middle-income-countries worked more than 42 hours per week on average in 2022.Globally,women in employment work ar
323、ound seven paid hours per week less than men,with large variations of that gender gap by region(figure 1.12).The fewer hours that women spend in paid employment compound the already large gender gaps in employment rates.The unequal burden of unpaid work that falls on women hence impacts not only the
324、ir participation in the labour market but also their hours of work when they are employed.Interestingly,women in South Asia and Central and Western Asia both subregions with large gender gaps in employment rates do not work very low hours in global comparison.Country groupSexEPR(percentages)Employme
325、nt(millions)20022202320242002220232024WorldTotal56.954.555.756.456.356.83335933933430Women45.043.044.044.744.544.460Men68.866.167.568.268.168.02202420462070Low-income countriesTotal62.060.761.061.361.461.4242245254263272281Women53.151
326、.852.252.152.152.13117121Men71.269.870.170.870.971.00155160Lower-middle-income countriesTotal52.049.850.651.451.551.636Women33.732.332.833.533.633.7388378390405413421Men69.967.168.269.069.269.28859875Upper-middle-income countriesTotal61.058.060.
327、160.460.059.833Women53.250.452.352.752.452.45545546Men68.865.767.968.167.867.6686659685692694696High-income countriesTotal58.156.357.058.257.957.7602585594610611610Women51.049.350.251.451.150.9267259264272273272Men65.463.363.965.164.864.6335326329338338338Source:ILOS
328、TAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2022.X Table 1.1.Employment and employment-to-population ratio,201924,by sex,world and by country income group XWorld Employment and Social Outlook|Trends 2023362000222024353436373839404142434445WorldLower-middle-income countriesUpper-middle-
329、income countriesLow-income countriesHigh-income countriesUpper-middle-income countries(excluding China)X Figure 1.11.Weekly hours worked per employed person,201024,world and by country income groupSource:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2022.WorldNorth AfricaSub-Saharan AfricaLatin America an
330、d the CaribbeanNorth AmericaArab StatesEast AsiaSouth-East AsiaSouth AsiaPacificNorthern,Southern and Western EuropeEastern EuropeCentral and Western AsiaWomenMen37.344.136.343.034.638.735.942.132.537.833.945.343.446.438.940.634.249.730.437.232.339.034.036.833.247.93035404550 X Figure 1.12.Weekly ho
331、urs worked per employed person,2022,by sex,world and by subregionSource:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2022.1.Stalled labour market recovery undermines social justice37However,men in these two regions have the highest numbers of weekly hours,hence large gender gaps in terms of hours as well
332、.Hours worked per worker declined massively in 2020.One of the defining features of the COVID-19 crisis with its workplace closures was the relatively limited impact on employment despite the significant decline in work activity.Total hours worked,which track the level of work activity in an economy
333、,declined by almost 9 per cent relative to the fourth quarter of 2019 when adjusted for population growth(table 1.2).In line with the in-complete employment recovery and lower hours worked per worker,total hours worked(adjusted for population)in 2022 were 1.4 per cent lower than their level in the fourth quarter of 2019;this gap corresponds to the equivalent of 41 million full-time jobs.21 The rec