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1、ASIA AND PACIFICREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKSteady Growth amidDiverging Prospects2024APRINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDASIA AND PACIFICREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDSteady Growth amidDiverging Prospects 2024APRCopyright 2024 International Monetary FundCataloging-in-Publication DataIMF

2、 LibraryNames:International Monetary Fund,publisher.Title:Regional economic outlook.Asia and Pacific:steady growth amid diverging prospects.Other titles:Asia and Pacific:steady growth amid diverging prospects.|Steady growth amid diverging prospects.|Regional economic outlook:Asia and Pacific.Descrip

3、tion:Washington,DC:International Monetary Fund,2024.|Apr.2024.|Includes bibliographical references.Identifiers:ISBN:9798400272349(paper)9798400272769(ePub)9798400272813(Web PDF)Subjects:LCSH:Economic forecastingAsia.|Economic forecastingPacific Area.|AsiaEconomic conditions.|Pacific AreaEconomic con

4、ditions.|Economic developmentAsia.|Economic developmentPacific Area.Classification:LCC HC412.R44 2024The Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific is published twice a year,in the spring and fall,to review developments in the Asia and Pacific region.Both projections and policy considerations are th

5、ose of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF,its Executive Board,or IMF Management.Publication orders may be placed online,by fax,or through the mail:International Monetary Fund,Publication ServicesP.O.Box 92780,Washington,DC 20090(USA)T.+(1)202.623.7430F.+(1)202.623.72

6、01publicationsIMF.orgwww.IMFbookstore.orgwww.elibrary.IMF.orgContentsAcknowledgments.vDefinitions.viExecutive Summary.viiAsia and Pacific:Steady Growth amid Diverging Prospects.1Recent Developments:Resilient Growth and Disinflation.1Factors Shaping the Outlook.5Risks Are Broadly Balanced.8Policies.1

7、0References.14BOXESBox 1.Transmission of Renminbi Shocks to Other Asian Economies.16Box 2.The Impact of Monetary Tightening on Corporate Interest Costs.19Box 3.Industrial Policies in Asia.21FIGURESFigure 1.Growth Outturns in the Second Half of 2023.1Figure 2.Contributions to Growth.1Figure 3.Growth

8、Drivers in Asia and the Pacific.2Figure 4.Recent Developments in China.3Figure 5.Drivers of Inflation.4Figure 6.Financial Sector Developments.5Figure 7.Exchange Rates.6Figure 8.Contributions to Growth.6Figure 9.Inflation Prospects.7Figure 10.Shipping Costs and Trade Disruptions.9Figure 11.Harmful Tr

9、ade Restrictions Imposed.10Figure 12.Monetary Policy.11Figure 13.Foreign Holding of Local Currency Bonds.11Figure 14.Fiscal Consolidation.12Figure 15.Debt at Risk.13Figure 16.Aging Population.13Box Figure 1.1.Exchange Rates of Asian Currencies.17Box Figure 1.2.Impulse Response of Asian Currency Exch

10、ange Rates after CNY Depreciation Shocks.17Box Figure 1.3.Impulse Response of Asian Export Volumes after CNY or JPY Depreciation Shocks.18Box Figure 2.1.Corporate Interest Costs and Savings.20Box Figure 3.1.Industrial Policies in Asia.22TABLESTable 1.Asia:Real GDP.24Contents April 2024 INTERNATIONAL

11、 MONETARY FUNDiiiAcknowledgmentsThis Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific was prepared by a team led by Johannes Wiegand,under the overall direction of Krishna Srinivasan and Thomas Helbling.The main authors are Tristan Hennig and Monica Petrescu(lead).Contributions were provided by Julia Este

12、fania Flores,Rahul Giri,Daniel Jimenez,Chris Redl,Vyshnavi Thumbala Saikrishnan,and Yizhi Xu.Lily Alvarado and Judee Yanzon assisted with the preparation of the report.Cheryl Toksoz of the IMFs Communications Department edited the volume and coordinated its publication and release.The report is base

13、d on data available as of April 2,2024,and includes comments from other IMF departments.AcknowledgmentsApril 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDvDefinitionsIn this Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific,the following groupings are employed:“ASEAN”refers to Brunei Darussalam,Cambodia,Indonesia,Lao P

14、.D.R.,Malaysia,Myanmar,the Philippines,Singapore,Thailand,and Vietnam,unless otherwise specified.“ASEAN-5”refers to Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore,and Thailand.“Advanced Asia”refers to Australia,Hong Kong SAR,Japan,Korea,New Zealand,Singapore,and Taiwan Province of China.“Emerging Asia

15、”refers to China,India,Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Thailand,and Vietnam.“Asia”refers to ASEAN,advanced Asia,Bangladesh,Bhutan,China,India,Maldives,Nepal,and Sri Lanka,and other Asian economies.The following conventions are used:In figures and tables,shaded areas show IMF projections.“Basis po

16、ints”refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point(for example,25 basis points are equivalent to of 1 percentage point).“Billion”means a thousand million;“trillion”means a thousand billion.As used in this report,the term“country”does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as unde

17、r-stood by international law and practice.As used here,the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND April 2024viExecutive Summa

18、ryWith rapid disinflation and resilient growth,Asia and the Pacific is closing in on a soft landing.At the same time,significant heterogeneity has emerged within the region regarding the pace of disinflation,the level and the drivers of growth,and the cyclical position.Hence,policies need to be care

19、fully calibrated to country-specific needs and circumstances.Economic activity in Asia and the Pacific outperformed expectations in the second half of 2023,despite a chal-lenging environment characterized by still-tight monetary policies and muted external demand.The region grew by 5.0 percent last

20、year,0.4 percentage point stronger than forecast in October.Upside surprises were concentrated in emerging markets,driven primarily by robust domestic demand.Still,headline inflation has continued to decline,especially in emerging Asia,reflecting timely monetary tightening in 2022 and early 2023,ret

21、reating commodity prices,lower global manufactured goods price inflation,and supply capacity coming back onstream following the COVID-19 pandemic.The pace and degree of disinflation has differed among Asian economies,however,with some still seeing sustained price pressures and others facing deflatio

22、nary risks.Most activity data for early 2024 have been encouraging.For the year as a whole,growth in Asia and the Pacific is projected to slow modestly to 4.5 percentan upward revision of 0.3 percentage point from last October,reflecting,among other things,carryover from stronger 2023 outturns and p

23、olicy support.The region is expected to remain the worlds most dynamic,contributing about 60 percent of global growth.Provided countries stay the course on macroeconomic policies,inflation trajectories are projected to converge:price pressures would ease in economies where inflation is above target

24、and pick up in economies where inflation is low.Growth in 2025 is projected to moderate further to 4.3 percent,with the structural slowdown in China a key factor.Near-term risks are now broadly balanced.Retreating inflation and,consequently,the prospect of earlier monetary easing have increased the

25、likelihood of a soft landing,both in Asia and globally.Stronger-than-expected growth in Europe and the United States is an upside risk for Asias exporters.At the same time,increased geoeconomic fragmentation and geopolitical tensions continue to pose serious downside risks to medium-term growth in t

26、he region.In China,a deeper-than-anticipated property sector correction is a downside risk,while greater-than-expected policy support is an upside riskboth could be sources of spillovers to Chinas neighbors.Japans exit from negative interest rate policy has proceeded smoothly thus far,easing previou

27、s concerns about spillovers from sudden repricing.Central banks should ensure that inflation returns smoothly to target,both in countries experiencing persistent price pressures and in countries facing deflationary risks.Policymakers should continue to focus firmly on domestic price stability and av

28、oid making policy decisions overly dependent on anticipated interest rate moves by the Federal Reserve.Higher debt levels and interest costs weigh on public balance sheetsa renewed effort to advance fiscal consolidation is thus in order,especially as addressing medium-term structural chal-lengesincl

29、uding from aging populations and climate changewill require additional fiscal space.As the tighter monetary policies of the last two years are still passing through to corporate and household balance sheets,supervisors should continue to vigilantly monitor the buildup of risks.Executive SummaryApril

30、 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDviiAsia and Pacific:Steady Growth amid Diverging Prospects Recent Developments:Resilient Growth and DisinflationAs in the rest of the world,growth in Asia and the Pacific has been surprisingly resilientdespite still elevated monetary policy rates,a feeble external en

31、vi-ronment,and the prospect of spillovers from Chinas property sector correction.The region remained the worlds most dynamic in 2023 and contributed nearly two-thirds of global growth,with domestic consump-tion remaining the main driver of activity,especially in emerging Asia.At the same time,inflat

32、ion has retreated,helped by timely monetary tightening in 2022 and early 2023 and by falling commodity and goods pricesalthough the speed of disinflation varied significantly between economies.For most countries,this conjuncture improves the prospects of a“soft landing”in 2024,by strengthening purch

33、asing power and paving the way for possible monetary easing later in the year.This said,some economies are now at risk of undershooting their inflation targets and need to watch potential deflationary pressures.Growth in Asia and the Pacific surprised on the upside in the second half of 2023,reachin

34、g 5.0 percent for the year as wholesignificantly stronger than the outcome in 2022(3.9 percent),and 0.4 percentage point higher than projected in the October 2023 Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific.Emerging Asia accounted for the bulk of positive growth surprises,including in Malaysia,the Ph

35、ilippines,Vietnam,and,most notably,India(Figure 1).By contrast,growth outturns in advanced economies were mostly in line with October projections,except in New Zealand,which has entered into technical recession.In emerging markets,growth was supported primarily by strong private demand(Figure 2).In

36、China and,especially,India,public investment made an important contribution.Countries in the region generally faced weak export demand,partly reflecting the normalization in the demand for goods relative to services after the COVID-19 pandemic(Figure3).Technology products from advanced Asia Negative

37、PositiveAustraliaNewZealandJapanKoreaChinaIndiaIndonesiaMalaysiaPhilippinesSingaporeThailandVietnamFigure 1.Growth Outturns in the Second Half of 2023(Year-over-year growth;percent)113579Projected real GDP growth(October 2023 WEO)157931Real GDP growth outturnsSources:Haver Analytics;IMF,World Econom

38、ic Outlook database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:WEO=World Economic Outlook.InvestmentPublic consumptionPrivate consumptionNet exportsStatistical discrepancyGrowthSources:Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:AE Asia includes Australia,Hong Kong SAR,Korea,New Zealand,Singapore,and Taiwa

39、n Province of China.EM Asia includes Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,and Thailand.Changes in inventories are included in the statistical discrepancy.AE=advanced economies;EM=emerging markets.Figure 2.Contributions to Growth(Year-over-year growth;percentage points)41220246810AE Asia(excl.Japan)EM

40、Asia(excl.China)and IndiaChinaIndiaJapan 2023:Q323:Q42023:Q323:Q42023:Q323:Q42023:Q32023:Q323:Q423:Q4Asia and Pacific:Steady Growth amid Diverging Prospects April 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND1were a notable exception,arguably benefiting from a surge in demand for high-end semiconductors related

41、to artificial intelligence applications in the fourth quarter.Consistent with these trends,service sector activity was generally stronger than industrial activity in emerging markets.In advanced economies,growth in services sector activity slowed,while industrial production began to pick up in the f

42、ourth quarter.In China,the economy struggled to sustain the post-reopening momentum of early 2023,as the property sector correction deepened(Figure 4).Housing starts and sales continued to decline.Broader activity indicators were also lackluster,with weak manufacturing and services purchasing manage

43、rs indexes in the second half of 2023.Outbound tourism remained significantly below prepandemic levels.Nonetheless,2023 growth,at 5.2 percent,was 0.2 percentage point higher than forecast in the October 2023 Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific,with activity benefiting from a fiscal stimulus p

44、ackage announced in October that will also carry over into 2024.Inventories to shipmentsInventoriesAsia EMDEAsia AEServices:Asia AEServices:Asia EMDE excluding ChinaIP:Manufacturing Asia AE IP:Manufacturing EMDE Asia excluding ChinaFigure 3.Growth Drivers in Asia and the PacificWeak demand from trad

45、ing partners depressedexports for most of 2023.Exports improved recently.1.Sequential Asia USD Export(FOB)Growth Rates(three month over three month,percent;annualized)305020.as demand for advanced semiconductor exportersstrengthened.2.Semiconductors Inventories(Index,2015=100)601808010012

46、0140160Strong demand for services supported growth inAsias emerging markets.3.Asia:Service Sector PMI(Diffusion index,50=no change)4565505560Sources:Haver Analytics;Markit Economics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Asia AEs include Australia,Hong Kong SAR,Japan,Korea,New Zealand,Singapore,and Taiwan

47、Province of China.Asia EMDEs include China,India,Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Thailand,and Vietnam.In panel 2,the sample includes Japan,Korea,and Taiwan Province of China.AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies;FOB=free on board;IP=industrial policies;PMI=purchasi

48、ng managers index.while manufacturing struggled to regainmomentum.4.Industrial Production(Year-over-year percent change)40Jan.2022Apr.22July 22Oct.22Jan.23Apr.23July 23Oct.23Jan.24Jan.2018May 18Sep.18Jan.19May 19Sep.19Jan.20May 20Sep.20Jan.21May 21Sep.21Jan.22May 22Sep.22Jan.23May 23Sep.2

49、3Jan.24Jan.2022Apr.22July 22Oct.22Jan.23Apr.23July 23Oct.23Jan.24Feb.2021June 21Oct.21Feb.22June 22Oct.22Feb.23June 23Oct.23Feb.24REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND April 20242For much of the region,prospects appear to have improved further in the early months of 20

50、24.Export growth has been picking up,benefiting,among other things,from stronger import demand from the United States.Industrial production has ticked up in emerging markets,and the services sectors has returned to positive growth rates in advanced economies.In China,equity markets picked up slightl

51、y in February following market interventions by the authorities,and purchasing managers index readings improved in March.Housing sector indicators have remained subdued.InflationPrice pressures in Asia and the Pacific are easing and remain lower than in the rest of the world(Figure 5).Post-COVID-19

52、inflation in the region peaked at around half the levels seen elsewhere,reflecting timely monetary tightening as well as temporary price controls and subsidies that contained commodity price pressures(see Chapter 2 of the October 2023 Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific).In 2023,headline infl

53、ation in the region fell sharply,especially in emerging Asia.A sustained decline in commodity prices helped,but core inflation also retreated despite robust domestic demand,as supply capacity came back onstream following the COVID-19 pandemic.Goods prices disinflated across the region,against the ba

54、ckdrop of mostly flat producer prices since early 2023except in China,where producer prices have been declining.Services inflation,on the other hand,displayed considerable stickiness in advanced economies and contributed to persistent price pressures.StartSaleReal estate investmentPMI:Manufacturing

55、activityPMI:Services business activityConsumer confidenceCSI 300CSI 300 Real EstateS&P China propertyJanuary 2023January 2024Amid a deepening property sector correction.1.Real Estate Sector Indicators(Percent,12-month moving average,year-over-year change)Jan.2022Nov.23Jan.24Sep.23May 23July 23Jan.23

56、Mar.23July 22Sep.22Nov.22Mar.22May 22Jan.2022Oct.23Jan.24July23Jan.23Apr.23July22Oct.22Apr.22.market confidence remains weak.2.China:Market Price Indices and Consumer Confidence(Index,January 2022=100)Figure 4.Recent Developments in China50100Services and manufacturing PMIs remain sluggis

57、h.3.China:Manufacturing and Services Indexes(PMI less than 50;positive=expansion)Sources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.;China National Bureau of Statistics;Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Data labels in panel 4 use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.PMI=purchasi

58、ng managers index.and outbound tourism is still far from a full recovery.4.Latest Monthly Chinese Tourist Arrivals(Percent of 2019 same month level)208450403020030405060708090PHL KHM LKA THA AUSFJI HKG JPN VNM SGP KOR MACAsia and Pacific:Steady Growth amid

59、 Diverging Prospects 3April 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDAt a more granular level,in one group of countries,including Australia,Korea,and New Zealand,inflation was still substantially above target in late 2023,owing in part to sustained price pressures from services.In a second groupconsisting of

60、 emerging markets and Japanheadline inflation has returned close to central bank target ranges and core inflation has been broadly contained.In a third group of countries,notably China and Thailand,falling commodity pricesand,in the case of Thailand,the extension of energy subsidieshave pushed consu

61、mer price inflation into negative territory,while core inflation has remained positive but is low.1Monetary and Financial ConditionsFinancial conditions in Asia and the Pacific eased in the second half of 2023(Figure 6).Expectations of monetary easing in both Asia and the United States supported a s

62、izable reduction in borrowing costs,while increased global appetite for emerging market assets reduced sovereign spreads,especially in frontier markets.By 1 In China,headline inflation turned negative in October 2023 but returned to positive territory in February,owing in part to an uptick in core i

63、nflation around the Lunar New Year.Other categories(core)FoodEnergy/fuel/transportHeadline CPIAsia EMDE servicesAsia AE servicesAsia EMDE other goodsAsia AE other goodsAsia AEAsia EMDE excluding ChinaChinaFigure 5.Drivers of Inflation1.Contributions to Headline Inflation(Percent)2120246810Sources:Ha

64、ver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:In panel 1,core refers to CPI basket excluding food and energy,fuel,and transport;the exact categories used in the decomposition of these categories varies across countries.Asia AE includes Australia,Hong Kong SAR,Japan,Korea,Macao SAR,New Zealand,Singap

65、ore,and Taiwan Province of China.Asia EMDE includes China,India,Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Thailand,and Vietnam.Rest of the world AE includes Belarus,Canada,France,Germany,Italy,The Netherlands,Sweden,Switzerland,the United Kingdom,and the United States;rest of the world EMDE includes Brazil

66、,Chile,Colombia,Hungary,Mexico,and South Africa.AE=advanced economies;CPI=consumer price index;EMDE=emerging market and developing economies.2.Asian Services and Other Goods Inflation(Percent;year over year)06123453.Asian Producer Price Index(Percent;year over year)EMDEAEChinaAsia excludi

67、ng ChinaRest of the worldJapanAsia excluding JapanRest of the world2022:Q122:Q222:Q322:Q423:Q123:Q223:Q323:Q42022:Q122:Q222:Q322:Q423:Q123:Q223:Q323:Q42022:Q122:Q222:Q322:Q423:Q123:Q223:Q323:Q42022:Q122:Q222:Q322:Q423:Q123:Q223:Q323:Q42022:Q122:Q222:Q322:Q423:Q123:Q223:Q323:Q42022:Q122:Q222:Q322:Q42

68、3:Q123:Q223:Q323:Q4Jan.2022Apr.22July22Oct.22Jan.23Apr.23July23Oct.23Jan.24Jan.2022Apr.22July22Oct.22Jan.23Apr.23July23Oct.23Jan.24REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND April 20244contrast,bank lending rates have been slow to follow and have remained close to the level

69、s reached during the peak of monetary tightening in the first half of 2023.Banks also increased the intermediation spread between lending and deposit rates,thus bolstering bank profitability.Policy rates in Asia have been unusually low relative to the United States,reflecting Asias more benign infla

70、tion outcomes.Together with shifting regional economic prospects,this has been a driver of sharp exchange rate movements vis-vis the US dollar(Figure 7).For example,depreciation pressures on Asian currencies abated in the fourth quarter,when the Federal Reserve signaled a shift to a more accommodati

71、ve policy stance,only to pick up again in the last few months,as strong employment and inflation figures in the United States dampened expectations of an imminent monetary loosening.Factors Shaping the OutlookMuch like in the rest of the world,economies in Asia and the Pacific are expected to benefi

72、t from continued disin-flation in the near term,as well as from gradually more accommodative monetary and financial conditions.In the medium term,growth in Asia and the Pacific is expected to slow,reflecting aging populations and subdued productivity growth.In 2024,growth in Asia and the Pacific is

73、projected to slow slightly to 4.5 percentan upward revision of 0.3 percentage point relative to the October 2023 Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific,which partially reflects carryover from strong growth outcomes in the second half of 2023.In China,an upward revision of 0.4 percentage point al

74、so reflects stimulus measures announced in October,with public spending forecast to be a significant contributor to growth(Figure 8).Investment remains an important growth driver in India.In emerging Asia outside China,growth is expected to be driven mainly by private consumption.The outlook for exp

75、orts is improving only gradually,owing to the shift in demand from traded goods to domestically produced services in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic,which constrains trade.For 2025,growth in the region is projected at 4.3 percentunchanged from October.January 2023 to October 2023October 2023

76、to January 2024January 2024 to dateDeposit ratesLending ratesPolicy ratesFigure 6.Financial Sector DevelopmentsSources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.;Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:In panel 1,data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.In p

77、anel 2,the sample includes Australia,Hong Kong SAR,India,Indonesia,Japan,Korea,Malaysia,New Zealand,the Philippines,and Singapore.EMBI=Emerging Markets Bond Index.1.EMBI Spreads on US-Dollar-Denominated Bonds(Change;basis points)2.Asia:Policy Rates and Bank Interest Rates(Percent;excluding China and

78、 Japan)003503002502001003,0002,5002,0001,5001,0005000500MNG INDPHL VNM IDN CHN MYS PNGLKADec.2018June19Dec.19June20Dec.20June21Dec.21June22Dec.22June23Dec.23Asia and Pacific:Steady Growth amid Diverging Prospects April 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND5Advanced AsiaGrowth in Asi

79、as advanced economies is projected to slow marginally to 1.6 percent in 2024,from 1.7 percent in 2023.In 2025,growth is forecast to pick up slightly to 1.8 percent.In Japan,growth is expected to slow from 1.9 to 0.9 percent in 2024,as one-off factors that boosted activity in 2023 fadenotably strong

80、exports and a surge in tourism.Robust wage settlements during the recent shunto wage negotiations are expected to support a recovery in consumption.In Australia and New Zealand,monetary policy may need to remain tighter for longer,given stubborn infla-tionary pressures.The stance is expected to cont

81、ribute to a growth decline from 2.1 percent to 1.5 percent in Australia and to subdued growth of about 1.0 percent in New Zealand in 2024.By contrast,in Korea and Singapore,inflation has declined more sharply,and demand is expected to strengthen.Growth is projected to increase from 1.4 to 2.3 percen

82、t in Korea and from 1.1 to 2.1 precent in Singapore.Both economies are also benefiting from the rebound in high-end electronics exports.Emerging AsiaGrowth in China is projected to slow from 5.2 percent in 2023 to 4.6 percent in 2024 and further to 4.1 percent in 2025,reflecting continued weakness i

83、n the property sector and declining potential growth amid subdued productivity growth and an aging population.India and the Philippines have been the source of repeated positive growth surprises,supported by resilient domestic demand.For 2024,growth projections have been revised upward relative to t

84、he October 2023 Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific by 0.5 percentage point to 6.8 percent for India and by 0.3 percentage point to 6.2 percent in the Philippines.There is substantial heterogeneity in the rest of Association of Southeast Asian Nations economies.Growth is expected to remain st

85、rong and steady in Indonesia(at 5.0 and 5.1 percent in 2024 and 2025,respectively)and in Malaysia(at about 4.4 percent),but to be more subdued in Thailand(at 2.7 percent in 2024),where prospects for the implementation of a fiscal stimulus package have dimmed.Private consumptionNet exportsGrowthPubli

86、c consumption InvestmentSources:IMF,World Economic Outlook database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:AE=advanced economies;EM=emerging markets.Figure 8.Contributions to Growth(Year-over-year growth;percentage points)28242025AEAsiaJapanEMAsiaChina IndiaAE AsiaJapanEMAsiaChina IndiaJanuary 2

87、023October 2023October 2023January 2024January 2024 to dateCumulativeSource:Bloomberg Finance L.P.Note:Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.AE=advanced economies;EM=emerging markets.Figure 7.Exchange RatesExchange rate movement against the US

88、 dollar(Percent)JPNKORNZLAUSSGPMYSTHAVNMCHNIDNPHLINDAsia AEAsia EM2520151050510REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND April 20246Frontier Markets and Small StatesGrowth in Bangladesh is projected to slow mildly to 5.7 percent this year(from 6 percent in 2023),reflecting

89、 a tighter policy stance.In Mongolia,growth for 2024 has been revised up to 6.5 percentfrom 4.5 percent forecast in Octoberreflecting strong coal exports and fiscal stimulus.The post-COVID-19 recovery in Pacific island countries was delayed relative to the rest of the region,but is finally underway

90、in all economies.Growth is forecast to strengthen to 4.0 percent in 2024,from 3.3 percent in 2023,supported by a continued rebound in tourism.There is significant divergence in prospects between economies,however,with the strength of the recovery depending on various one-off factors.InflationInflati

91、on is projected to converge to central bank targets by the end of 2024 in most of the region while output gaps are also expected to narrow(Figure 9).The forecast is conditional on macro-economic policies staying the course.In economies where inflation is still materially above central bank targets a

92、nd output gaps were positive at the end of 2023including Australia and New Zealanddisinflation is expected to be supported by tight monetary and fiscal policies and declining commodity prices,which are also expected to bring down output relative to potential.By contrast,in China and Thailand,where i

93、nflation is low and output gaps were negative at the end of 2023,an accommodative policy stance would boost demand,help close output gaps,and push inflation firmly back into positive territory.In emerging markets where inflation is already at or close to target,there is heterogeneity in inflation dr

94、ivers going forward.Core inflation is largely expected to remain contained.As for headline inflation,several economies may experience further reductions due to lower energy prices while in others(for example,India),food price pressuresespecially for ricemay slow headline disinflation.In Japan,inflat

95、ion is expected to stabilize about 2 percent in the coming years amid solid wage growth,which will partly offset downward pressures on the headline consumer price index from the phasing out of energy subsidies.Inflation-targeting range2024 WEO forecast(eop,headline)Late headline inflationInflation t

96、arget20242025AUSCHNJPNMYSTHAVNMKORNZLSGPAUSCHNJPNMYSTHAVNMKORNZLSGPFigure 9.Inflation Prospects1.Headline Inflation(Percent)2710123456Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:Data as of April 15,2024.Some countries do not have explicit inflation-targeting regimes or target,while target ranges apply to cor

97、e inflation in some countries.Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.eop=end of period;WEO=World Economic Outlook.2.Core Inflation and Output Gaps(Percent)2.02.01.51.00.50.00.51.01.5Source:IMF,World Economic Outlook database.Note:2025(2024)bubb

98、les=expected core inflation 2025(2024)and output gap 2024(2023).Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.NZLAUSKORINDJPNPHLIDNVNMTHASGPMYSHKGCHNExpected core inflationtargetLagged output gap(percent of potential GDP)Above targetAt or near targetB

99、elowtargetOthers(no target)1.81.51.31.00.80.50.30.00.30.50.81.01.31.5Asia and Pacific:Steady Growth amid Diverging Prospects April 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND7Risks Are Broadly BalancedNear-term risks have improved relative to October 2023 and are now broadly balanced.Disinflation has increased

100、 the prospect of more accommodative monetary policies and has made a soft landing more likely.Stronger growth momentum in China,Europe,or the United States would benefit Asian exporters.Risks Surrounding Chinas Property Sector Correction A larger and more prolonged slump in real estate investment co

101、uld diminish consumer confidence,intensify disinflationary pressures,and further compromise the balance sheets of local governments.As economic weakness becomes more entrenched,broader deflationary pressures could take hold,which would weigh on domestic demand and revalue debt levels.Weaker activity

102、 in China could trigger spillovers to the region along several dimensions.First,weaker demand from China would cloud prospects for the regions exporters.Second,declining Chinese export prices would put pressure on the profit margins of Chinas competitors and,potentially,provoke retaliatory measures.

103、IMF staff analysis suggests that price pressures from China reduce both export prices and export quantities of neighboring countries,especially in those with a similar export structure(Box 1).On the upside,greater-than-expected fiscal and monetary policy support could boost growth both in China and

104、in neighboring countries.Containing property sector risks calls for a comprehensive policy package that accel-erates the exit of nonviable property developers,promotes the completion of housing projects,and manages debt risks of local governments.Measures to support household income would be called

105、for if private domestic demand weakens further.By contrast,policies that further boost supplysuch as investment subsidies to specific firms and sectorswould contribute to overcapacity and therefore reinforce deflationary pressures.External Risks:Disruptions to Trade and Commodity Price ShocksAttacks

106、 on cargo ships in the Red Sea have provoked a rerouting of trade between Asia and Europe around the Cape of Good Hope,driving up shipping costs and increasing transport times,even though both have remained below previous surges(Figure 10).Continued disruptions could raise the costs of trade and com

107、plicate disinfla-tion(see Carrire-Swallow and others 2023).Longer shipping times could also reduce trade volumes,given that shipping capacity is rigid in the short term.Disruptions to shipping could be especially detrimental for Pacific island countries,which are both highly import dependent and poo

108、rly connected to global shipping networks.The spread of the GazaIsrael conflict to neighboring countries or a further escalation of Russias war in Ukraine could also trigger spikes in commodity prices.Disinflation and Monetary PolicySticky inflation in advanced economies.Slower-than-expected disinfl

109、ation in the United States could postpone policy rate cuts,which would increase borrowing costs in Asia and put pressure on equity valuations(Arbatli-Saxegaard and others 2024).It would also mean that policy rates in Asia remain unusually low relative to the federal funds rate,harboring the potentia

110、l for sharp exchange rate movements.External turbulence could affect domestic macroeconomic stability,including by potentially inducing Asian central banks to delay monetary easing.Inflation undershooting.In economies where inflation is already below central bank targets,a further weakening of exter

111、nal or domestic demand could lead to a period of prolonged low inflation or deflation.Deflationary pressures would,in turn,elevate real interest rates,weigh on growth,and increase debt burdens and real debt servicing costs.Timely macroeconomic policy easing would be essential if indications of under

112、shooting emerge.Full impact of monetary tightening yet to be felt.Staff analysis suggests that for many Asian firms,the impact of monetary tightening on debt service costs has been offset thus far by higher interest earnings on short-term corporate assets(Box 2).The full impact is likely to be felt

113、only in two to three years,given the maturity structure of corporate liabilitiesmany of them bank loans that are not benefiting from looser financial market conditions.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND April 20248Spillovers from Japans monetary policy normalization

114、.In mid-March,the Bank of Japan increased short-term rates,ending an eight-year period of negative interest rates.It also abolished yield curve control,transitioning back to a more standard monetary policy framework.Market reaction has been muted,with no significant repricing of Japanese bonds,as th

115、e policy shift was well communicated and widely anticipated.As a result,the risk of cross-border financial spillovers from Japans monetary policy normalization appears diminished relative to last October.Geoeconomic FragmentationRestrictions on trade and cross-border movements of capital and technol

116、ogy are a risk especially to Asia,given many economies deep integration into global value chains.Numerous new trade restrictions continue to be imposed both in the region and outside(Figure 11).Trade between China and the United States has declined,although there is evidence that some trade is being

117、 rerouted through other countries,resulting in an ineffi-cient and costly lengthening of supply chains(Alfaro and Chor 2023;Qiu,Shin,and Zhang 2023).IMF research suggests that a further acceleration in geopolitical fragmentation would reduce foreign direct investment and portfolio flows and slow the

118、 pace of innovation and technology adoption.The risk of geopolitical frictions is especially high in the current environment of political uncertainty,with many countries around the globe holding elections in 2024.Artificial IntelligenceWhile the potential consequences of artificial intelligence rema

119、in to be fully assessed,it is likely to bring both growth opportunities and economic and social challenges.IMF research suggests that Asias emerging markets may be somewhat better prepared for these challenges than peers in other regions,albeit with significant heterogeneity.This reflects,among othe

120、r things,a better digital infrastructure and innovation climate and a better equipped labor force.Drewry World Container IndexDrewry Shanghai to RotterdamDrewry Shanghai to GenoaDrewry Shanghai to New YorkDrewry Shanghai to Los AngelesFigure 10.Shipping Costs and Trade DisruptionsSources:Haver Analy

121、tics;UN Conference on Trade and Development;and IMF staff calculations Note:The Liner Shipping Connectivity Index captures how well economies are connected to global shipping networks based on number of ships,their container-carrying capacity,maximum vessel size,number of services,and number of comp

122、anies that deploy container ships in an economys ports.AE=advanced economies;EMDE=emerging market and developing economies.1.Container Prices(US dollars per 40-foot container)2.Liner Shipping Connectivity(Index,most connected country in 2023=100)02,0004,0006,0008,00010,00012,00014,00016,000Jan.2022A

123、pr.22July 22Oct.22Jan.23Apr.23July 23Oct.23Jan.2401020304050Asia AEAsia EMDEFrennchPolynesiaPapua NewGuineaNewCaledoniaFijiSolomonIslandsVanuatuMarshallIslandsKiribatiMicronesiaTimor-LestePalauTuvaluTongaAsia and Pacific:Steady Growth amid Diverging Prospects April 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND9P

124、oliciesThe near-term priority for central banks remains ensuring that inflation returns smoothly to target,both in countries experiencing persistent price pressures as well as in those facing deflationary risks.Moreover,a renewed effort to advance medium-term fiscal consolidation is in order.Monetar

125、y and Exchange Rate Policy With disinflation having made significant strides in 2023,the challenges for central banks now diverge(Figure12).In economies where core inflation remains above target,it may be necessary to keep policies tighter for longer,to achieve higher real policy rates that ensure a

126、 sustainable return to price stability.In economies where inflation is already at or close to target,near-term inflation expectations are stable,and real interest rates are elevated,room to shift monetary policy to a more neutral stance may emerge in the course of 2024.In economies where inflation i

127、s low,maintaining or moving to a less restrictive stance is called for to avoid deflationary expectations taking hold.Market expectations around central bank policies in 2024 and 2025 are broadly consistent with these objectives.Divergent monetary policy stances within Asia and vis-vis central banks

128、 in advanced economies could engender capital flow movements and exchange rate volatilitysimilar to the depreciation pressures on Asian currencies in 2022 and 2023.During these episodes,several Asian central banks allowed exchange rates to adjust and refrained from large foreign exchange interventio

129、ns.The increase in domestic investor participation in emerging Asian sovereign debt markets of recent years may have strengthened resilience to capital flow vola-tility and increased the degrees of freedom for central banks(Figure 13).Looking ahead,Asian central banks should continue to focus firmly

130、 on domestic price stability and avoid making policy decisions overly dependent on anticipated interest rate moves by the Federal Reserveeven if the latter could reduce exchange rate volatility.Expectations of Federal Reserve loosening have shifted repeatedly in recent months and in ways unrelated t

131、o Asian price stability needs.Tying domestic policy too closely to the Federal Reserve therefore risks that central banks fall behind(or move ahead of)the“curve”and de-anchor inflation expectations.Allowing exchange rates to adjust would also be an effective response to possible disin-flationary pre

132、ssures from China and other countries.Fiscal PolicyA renewed focus on fiscal consolidation is called for to curb public debt and rebuild buffers,after large fiscal policy interventions during the pandemic period.In 2023,consolidation in Asia and the Pacific fell well short of staff projections.Moreo

133、ver,as new debt was issued at higher interest rates in the past two years,interest payments are absorbing a growing share of revenues,which risks crowding out critical investments and other priority spending.Asia-PacificAfricaEuropeMiddle East and Central AsiaAmericasFigure 11.Harmful Trade Restrict

134、ions Imposed(Number,cumulative)Source:Global Trade Alert database.Note:Cumulative measures implemented since 2009.Measures bysupranational bodies with binding consequences for its member statesare counted only once and not as one measure per member.2009517010,00020,00030,00040,00050,000CO

135、VID-19REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND April 202410The adjustment implied in IMF staff projections for the next three years would suffice to stabilize debt-to-GDP ratios in most economiesexcept in countries where cyclical considerations may indeed suggest a more a

136、ccommodative stance in the near term(Figure 14).However,the outlook for fiscal policies remains highly uncertain,2 and even with the envisaged consolidation,government debt would remain well above prepandemic levelsespecially in Pacific island countries.Reforms that target revenue mobilization and e

137、xpenditure rationalizationincluding reductions in costly fuel subsidies(see the October 2023 Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific)are critical to reduce debt levels,contain debt service costs,and free up budgetary space to fund development needs,social safety nets,and climate adaptation.Financ

138、ial Supervision Financial supervisors should closely monitor the buildup of financial vulnerabilities.While banking sectors feature ample capital buffers and rising profitability,the full effect of post-COVID-19 monetary tight-ening has not yet passed through to most countries corporate sectorshence

139、 policymakers should stay vigilant 2 Fiscal deficits generally rise during election yearssee Brender and Drazen(2007)and de Haan,Ohnsorge,and Yu(2024).Elevated inflationAt or near target inflationLow inflationASEAN-5ChinaAE AsiaFigure 12.Monetary PolicySources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.;and IMF,World Ec

140、onomic Outlook database.Note:Simple average of real interest rates.“Elevated inflation”includes Australia,Korea,and New Zealand.“At or near target”includes India,Japan,and the Philippines.“Low inflation”includes China and Thailand.Shaded area is the start of projections and are based on market impli

141、ed policy rates.Data as of April 2,2024.Sources:Bank for International Settlements;Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:AE Asia excludes Singapore and Taiwan.Latest through February 2024.AE=advanced economies;ASEAN-5=Indonesia,Malaysia,Philippines,Singapore,and Thailand.1.Asia Ex Ante Rea

142、l Rates,Market Implied(Percent;policy rateheadline inflation)2.Interest Rate Differential versus the United States(Percent)32132022:Q122:Q323:Q123:Q324:Q124:Q3Jan.2022Apr.22July22Oct.22Jan.23Apr.23July23Oct.23Jan.24201519LatestFigure 13.Foreign Holding of Local Currency Bonds(Percent of t

143、otal government bonds)Sources:Asian Bonds Online;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Latest:China,Japan,Korea,and Thailand(September 30,2023);Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,and Vietnam(December 31,2023).Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.05

144、54045IDNMYSTHACHNPHLAsia and Pacific:Steady Growth and Diverging ProspectsApril 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND11and be ready to act if loan delinquencies increase.Moreover,debt-at-risk metrics remain above prepandemic levels for the real estate sector,where earnings have failed to keep

145、up with interest costs(Figure 15).3 While commercial real estate has not yet seen significant pressures,supervisors should continue to monitor the sector.Securing Durable Medium-Term Growth Asia and the Pacific is facing significant structural challenges in the years to come.Global economic fragmen-

146、tation is affecting many Asian economies disproportionately,given their deep integration into global trade and supply chains.Climate change is threatening activity in many sectors,and tends to affect emerging markets,low-income countries,andin particularsmall island economies disproportionately.In m

147、any Asian economies,populations are aging rapidly,exerting downward pressure on potential growth and stretching social security systems(Figure 16).New technologiessuch as artificial intelligencecome with new growth opportunities,but also with economic and social challenges.The adequate policies to a

148、ddress such challenges differ from country to country.However,key areas common to many countries include reducing inefficiencies in labor market and credit markets,entitlement reform and modernizing immigration policies,streamlining cumbersome business regulation and restrictions on trade,and transi

149、tioning to cleaner energy sources,including by raising the cost to fossil fuels.Harnessing the potential of artificial intelligence will require investment in capital and in workforce skills.As in other parts of the world,the use of industrial policies has greatly increased in Asia and the Pacific i

150、n recent years.Even though such measures tend to target broader policy objectives,they often contain trade-distorting elements,which may undermine policy effectiveness and reinforced fragmentation.Industrial policies can be appropriate measures when they address clearly identifiable externalities or

151、 important market failures;however,such policies need to be consistent with World Trade Organization rules(Box 3).3 Debt at risk is defined as the share of corporate debt held by firms with interest coverage ratios below one.Planned consolidation 202326Consolidation to stabilize debt in 2026Asia AE(

152、excl.Japan)Asia EM(excl.China)Asia PICsAsia LIDCsFigure 14.Fiscal ConsolidationSource:IMF,World Economic Outlook database.Note:Analysis incorporates staff projections based on announced policies.In panel 1,consolidation needed to stabilize debt at 2026 levels is illustrative and not intended as a po

153、licy recommendation.Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.AE=advanced economies;EMDE=emerging market and developing economies;EM=emerging markets;LIDCs=low-income and developing countries;PICs=Pacific island economies.1.Fiscal Consolidation an

154、d Debt(Cumulative rise in primary balance to GDP ratio between 2023 and 2026,percentage points)2.Debt Ratios(Percent of fiscal year GDP,weighted average)3075354045505560657059311357AE AsiaEMDE AsiaAUS HKG JPN KOR NZLIDNINDMYSPHLTHA VNM20COVID-19REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and

155、 PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND April 2024122023:Q32019:Q42023:Q32019:Q4Figure 15.Debt at RiskSources:Capital IQ;and IMF staff calculations.Note:ICR defined as the ratio of EBIT to net interest cost over the previous four quarters.State-owned enterprises are excluded from analysis.In panel 2,for

156、 each sector,the simple average of debt at risk in each country with data available is shown,and country sectors with fewer than 10 firms are excluded.Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.EBIT=earnings before interest and taxes;ICR=interest c

157、overage ratio.1.Debt at Risk,by Country(Share of total corporate debt held by firms with ICR 1)2.Debt at Risk,by Sector(Share of total corporate debt held by firms with ICR 1)0405503551015202530AUSHKGJPNNZLSGPKORCHNINDIDNMYSPHLTHAVNMCommunicationConsumer servicesConsumer staplesDurable go

158、odsEnergyHealth careIndustrialsInformation technologyMaterialsReal estateRetailTransportationAustraliaJapanVietnamChinaKoreaWorldIndonesiaThailandFigure 16.Aging PopulationShare of populations 65 or older(Percent)050554045Source:UN Population Division.020000708090210

159、0Asia and Pacific:Steady Growth and Diverging ProspectsApril 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND13ReferencesAiyar,Shekhar,Jiaqian Chen,Christian Ebeke,Roberto Garcia-Saltos,Tryggvi Gudmundsson,Anna Ilyina,Alvar Kangur,and others.2023.“Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism.”IMF Sta

160、ff Discussion Note 2023/001,International Monetary Fund,Washington,DC.Alder,Marie,Nuno Coimbra,and Urszula Szczerbowicz.2023.“Corporate Debt Structure and Heterogeneous Monetary Policy Transmission.”Working Paper Series 933,Banque de France,Paris.Alfaro,Laura,and Davin Chor.2023.“Global Supply Chain

161、s:The Looming Great Reallocation.”NBER Working Paper 31661,National Bureau of Economic Research,Cambridge,MA.Arbatli-Saxegaard,Elif,Davide Furceri,Pablo Gonzalez-Dominguez,Jonathan D.Ostry,and Shanaka Jayanath Peiris.2024.“Spillovers from US Monetary Policy:Role of Policy Drivers and Cyclical Condit

162、ions.”Journal of International Money and Finance 143:103053.Brender,Adi,and Allan Drazen.2007.“Why Is Economic Policy Different in New Democracies?Affecting Attitudes About Democracy.”NBER Working Paper 13457,National Bureau of Economic Research,Cambridge,MA.Carrire-Swallow,Yan,Pragyan Deb,Davide Fu

163、rceri,Daniel Jimnez,and Jonathan Ostry.2023.“Shipping Costs and Inflation.”Journal of International Money and Finance 130:102771.Cherif,Reda,Fuad Hasanov,Nikola Spatafora,Rahul Giri,Dimitre Milkov,Saad Quayyum,Gonzalo Salinas,and others.2022.“Industrial Policy for Growth and Diversification:A Concep

164、tual Framework.”IMF Departmental Paper 2022/17,International Monetary Fund,Washington,DC.Deb,Pragyan,Julia Estefania Flores,Melih Firat,and Davide Furceri.2023.“Monetary Policy Transmission Heterogeneity:Cross-Country Evidence.”IMF Working Paper 2023/204,International Monetary Fund,Washington,DC.de

165、Haan,Jakob,Franziska Ohnsorge,and Shu Yu.2024.“Election-induced Fiscal Policy Cycles in Emerging Market and Developing Economies.”CESifo Working Paper 10868,Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis,Crawford School of Public Policy,The Australian National University,Canberra.Evenett,Simon,Martin Fer

166、nando,Adam Jakubik,and Michele Ruta.2024.“The Return of Industrial Policy in Data.”IMF Working Paper 2024/001,International Monetary Fund,Washington,DC.Hassan,Tarek A.,Stephan Hollander,Laurence van Lent,and Ahmed Tahoun.2019.“Firm-Level Political Risk:Measurement and Effects.”NBER Working Paper 240

167、29,National Bureau of Economic Research,Cambridge,MA.International Monetary Fund(IMF).2024.“Industrial Policy Coverage in IMF SurveillanceBroad Considerations.”IMF Policy Paper 2024/008,International Monetary Fund,Washington,DC.Jord,scar.2005.“Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local P

168、rojections.”American Economic Review 95(1):16182.Juhsz,Rka,Nathan Lane,Emily Oehlsen,and Vernica C.Prez.2023.“The Who,What,When,and How of Industrial Policy:A Text-Based Approach.”STEG Working Paper WP050,Structural Transformation and Economic Growth,Center for Economic and Policy Research,Washingto

169、n,DC.Jungherr,Joachim,Matthias Meier,Timo Reinelt,and Immo Schott.2022.“Corporate Debt Maturity Matters for Monetary Policy.”CRC TR 223 Discussion Paper Series,University of Bonn and University of Mannheim.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND April 202414McDonald,Brad

170、 J.,Michele Ruta,and Elizabeth Van Heuvelen.2024.“Industrial Policy:Trade Policy and WTO Considerations in IMF Surveillance.”IMF How-To Note 2024/002,International Monetary Fund,Washington,DC.Qiu,Han,Hyun Song Shin,and Leanne Si Ying Zhang.2023.“Mapping the Realignment of Global Value Chains.”BIS Bu

171、lletins 78,Bank for International Settlements,Basel.Rotunno,Lorenzo,and Michele Ruta.2024.“Trade Spillovers of Domestic Subsidies.”IMF Working Paper 2024/041,International Monetary Fund,Washington,DC.Asia and Pacific:Steady Growth and Diverging ProspectsApril 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND15Box 1.

172、Transmission of Renminbi Shocks to Other Asian EconomiesThe importance of the Chinese renminbi in Asia has grown steadily,ever since the Chinese authorities allowed limited exchange rate flexibility starting around 2010.This raises the question of how important currency fluctuations of the renminbi

173、have become for neighboring countries.The box studies spillovers from large renminbi depreciation events to other Asian currencies and economies.Asian currencies depreciated sharply against the US dollar in 2023(Box Figure 1.1),triggered in part by monetary tightening of the Federal Reserve that inc

174、reased US interest rates relative to the interest rate levels prevailing in Asia.The Chinese renminbi also depreciated,although domestic factors may have been at play here that were absent in other countries,such as the contraction of Chinas real estate sector and rising geopolitical risks.The uncon

175、ditional correlation of most Asian currencies with renminbi is high,but this could reflect both spillovers between currencies and common factors,such as elevated US interest rates and heightened global uncertainty.This box seeks to estimate how shocks to the renminbi affect other Asian currencies an

176、d economies.We focus on episodes of large renminbi depreciations.Anecdotal evidence suggests that such depreci-ations relate predominately to domestic events in China.1 Moreover,they are typically short-lived,lasting only a few months.We use the local projections approach of Jord(2005)while controll

177、ing for a host of global factors.2 Our panel comprises currencies from nine emerging Asian economies plus Korea and Taiwan Province of China.It starts in 2010,when China started to allow for more exchange rate flexibility.The results suggest that large renminbi depreciations trigger substantial but

178、short-lived depreciation pressure on other Asian currencies.Our estimates indicate about 50 percent exchange rate pass-through in the short term on average(Box Figure 1.2).However,the impact fizzles out after about six months.This is markedly different from the adjustment of Asian currencies to depr

179、eciation shocks to the Japanese yen,which is followed by more permanent currency depreciations(not displayed here).One possible transmission channel is export competition:renminbi depreciations can worsen the terms of trade of Asian exporters and hence reduce demand for their currencies.To test whet

180、her this channel matters in practice,we construct an export similarity index following the same approach in the October 2011 Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific,which identifies Korea,Malaysia,and Vietnam as having the most similar export structure to China.Difference-in-difference local proj

181、ections show that these countries currencies come indeed disproportionately under pressure in the wake of renminbi depreciations(Box Figure 1.2).This box was prepared by Chris Redl and Yizhi Xu.1 Large depreciations are defined as larger than a standard deviation or 2.7 percent depreciations against

182、 the US dollar in a month.Such events occurred in response to the doubling of the renminbi trading band in June 2012,devaluation surprises by the Peoples Bank of China in 2014,the stock market crash of 2015,growth slowdowns and Peoples Bank of China devaluations in 2015,US-China trade disputes in 20

183、18,and real estate sector and domestic demand weakness in 202123.2 Global risk aversion as measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index,a US dollar index to control for global dollar strength,countries interest rate differentials with China and the United States,Chinas domestic in

184、flation rate,and lagged exchange rates for the past four quarters.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND April 202416Box 1.(continued)MYRCNYPHPTHBKRWVNDJPY1.Currency Value Changes Against USD(Indexed,January 1,2023=100)2.Correlation Between Asian Currencies and CNY(Agai

185、nst the US dollar;201523)Box Figure 1.1.Exchange Rates of Asian Currencies859095.00.20.40.60.8Jan.2023Feb.23Mar.23Apr.23May 23June 23July 23Aug.23Sep.23Oct.23Nov.23Dec.23Jan.24Feb.24Sources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.;and IMF staff calculations.Note:In panel 1,a value below 100 implies currenc

186、y depreciation.CNY=Chinese yuan;IDR=Indonesian rupiah;INR=Indian rupee;JPY=Japanese yen;KRW=Korean won;MYR=Malaysian ringgit;PHP=Philippine peso;THB=Thai baht;USD=US dollar;VND=Vietnamese dong.VNDMYRPHPKRWINRIDRTHBLow similarityHigh similaritySources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.;and IMF staff calculations

187、.Note:Dashed lines indicate 90 percent confidence interval.CNY=Chinese yuan;USD=US dollar.1.Change in Exchange Rate Against the USDafter Large CNY Depreciation Shocks2.Change in Exchange Rate Against the USDafter Large CNY Depreciation ShocksBox Figure 1.2.Impulse Response of Asian Currency Exchange

188、 Rates after CNY Depreciation Shocks(Percent)2.51.50.50.53678910Months0MonthsDepreciationAsia and Pacific:Steady Growth and Diverging ProspectsApril 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND17Box 1.(continued)We also test whether renminbi depreciation shocks affect the export volumes of

189、 neighboring countries.Export volumes tend to contract some six months after a large renminbi depreciation(Box Figure 1.3)thus,renminbi depreciations have a real economic impact.Again,this contrasts with Japan,where depreciation shocks appear to get absorbed largely by neighboring countries exchange

190、 rates,and not export prices or volumeshence yen depreciations do not generate significant negative spillovers to other countries exports.Sources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Dashed lines indicate 90 percent confidence interval.CNY=Chinese yuan;JPY=Japanese yen.1.Change in

191、Export Volume after Large CNYDepreciation Shocks2.Change in Export Volume after Large JPYDepreciation ShocksBox Figure 1.3.Impulse Response of Asian Export Columes after CNY or JPY Depreciation Shocks(Percent)6245320Months0MonthsREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and Paci

192、ficINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND April 202418Box 2.The Impact of Monetary Tightening on Corporate Interest CostsThe monetary policy rate hikes of 2022 and early 2023 have had,thus far,only a limited impact on corporate net interest costs in the Asia-Pacific region.In principle,Asian firms debt structu

193、res would predispose them to rapid monetary policy transmission:high reliance on short-term debt necessitates fast rollover,and limited capital market development makes firms more dependent on bank loans,precluding them from taking advantage of favorable global market conditions(Box Figure 2.1).Both

194、 factors suggest that firms in the region might see their interest costs react rapidly to changes in monetary policies(Alder,Coimbra,and Szczerbowicz 2023;Jungherr and others 2022).However,net effective interest ratesthat is,net interest costs as a share of the stock of debt1have increased by substa

195、ntially less than policy rates to date.The high corporate savings in the region is key to explaining this puzzle.First,firms can draw down cash reserves to avoid issuance of expensive new debt,at least temporarily.Second,corporate savings also generate interest earnings.In the last two years,corpora

196、te interest earnings(as share of liquid assets)have increased in advanced economies and in some emerging markets in the Asia-Pacific region;in many cases,these increases were greater than the increases in interest paid(as a share of debt).As corporate savings tend to have shorter maturities than cor

197、porate debt,they react more quickly to changes in borrowing costs.As a result,the cooling effects of the Asian monetary tightening cycle are still being passed through to the corporate sector.Firms have continued to gradually roll over debt while policy rates have remained elevated in much of the re

198、gion.Analysis using local projection methods from Jord(2005)suggests that the impact of a monetary policy tightening shock2 on gross effective interest rates is small and positive initially,and then peaks after one year.The impact on net effective interest rates,on the other hand,is negative at firs

199、t,turning positive only after around two years.This implies that the squeeze on corporate balance sheets from monetary tightening would still phase in over the coming monthseven if policy rates start to decline.3 As a result,financial supervisors in the region should continue to closely monitor high

200、ly leveraged sectors,and remain alert to the buildup of financial vulnerabilities within the corporate sphere.This box was prepared by Julia Estefania-Flores and Monica Petrescu.Analysis is based on publicly listed firms,which represent the largest and most systemic corporates.1 Net interest cost is

201、 defined as interest paid on liabilities less interest earned on assets.2 Monetary policy shocks as identified by Deb and others(2023).3 If policy rates decline,earned interest is also expected to decline rapidly.Asia and Pacific:Steady Growth and Diverging ProspectsApril 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY

202、 FUND19Box 2.(continued)Policy rateNet effective interest rateInterest paidInterest earned1.Corporate Bank Debt,Short-Term Debt,and Savings(Percent of total corporate debt,median firm,2023)2.Change in Interest Rates(2021:Q423:Q3)3.Change in Effective Interest Rate Earnedand Paid(Change from 2021:Q4

203、to latest)4.Monetary Policy Shocks Effect onInterest Rates(Percentage points;response to a 100 basispoint contractionary monetary policy shock)Box Figure 2.1.Corporate Interest Costs and SavingsAsiaAEAsiaEMROWAEROWEMAsiaAEAsiaEMROWAEROWEMBank debtShort-term debt020400Horizon:2410Horizon:2

204、410Gross effectiveinterest rateNet effectiveinterest rate1.00.400.80.60.20.20.40.60.822046AUSHKGJPNKORNZLSGPCHNINDIDNMYSPHLTHAVNM11023AUSHKGJPNKORSGPCHNINDIDNMYSPHLTHAVNMSources:Capital IQ;and IMF staff calculations.Note:In panel 3,gross and net interest costs as percent of debt;interest earned as p

205、ercent of cash and short-term assets.In panel 4,impulse response function based on local projection methods following Jord(2005)using firm-level quarterly data from 10 Asian countries for the period 1996:Q3 to 2023:Q2.Estimates based on the regression:gn,c,s,t+k gn,c,s,t 1=acsq+mk MP shockc,t+4=1 q

206、k MP shockc,t j+4=1 G k gn,c,s,tj+4=1 Y k cn,c,s,tj+en,c,s,t,for different horizons k,where gn,c,s,t is the gross(net)effective interest rate for firm n in country c and sector s at time t over the next k quarters,MP shockc,t are monetary policy shocks from Deb and others(2023),acsq are country-sect

207、or-quarter fixed effects and Y is a control for firm size.The regression is estimated separately for different horizons k over a 16-quarter period.The bars show the point estimate for mk for different horizons k,light shaded bars indicate that the effect is not significant at 68 percent confidence i

208、nterval.Standard errors are clustered by firm and country-time.Data coverage is limited to publicly listed firms.Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.AE=advanced economies;EM=emerging markets;ROW=rest of the world.k j j j j j j jkkREGIONAL EC

209、ONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND April 202420Box 3.Industrial Policies in AsiaThe last decade has seen a wave of“new”industrial policies(IP)across the globe,1 against a backdrop of complex challenges ranging from climate change,aging and automation,to rising geopolitical and

210、 geoeconomic rivalry(IMF 2024).Unlike the“old”IP,the new IP are,therefore,not exclusively driven by growth and development aspirations,but sometimes also by geopolitical and national security concerns,potentially linked to geoeconomic fragmentation processes.Newly available data allow for a systemat

211、ic characterization of IP across countries and over time.2 Comparing Asia-Pacific to the rest of the world reveals the following stylized facts(Box Figure 3.1):IP in Asia-Pacific have surged as in the rest of the world,as risks of geoeconomic fragmentation have ramped up.The data suggest that 2017 w

212、as an inflection point,thereafter the number of IP measures globally rose sharply.This coincides with the timing of the sharp increase in the risk of geoeconomic fragmentation.Furthermore,in Asia-Pacific,both advanced economies and emerging markets have been very active in deploying IP measures.This

213、 contrasts with the rest of the world,where advanced economies have taken a clear lead(Juhsz and others 2023).Most IP measures deployed recently for both the region and the rest of the world,regardless of the IP objective stated,are likely to distort trade,and hence may contribute to fragmentation.3

214、 Subsidies(for example,financial grants,state guarantees,loans,and aid)are the dominant class of IP instruments globally(consistent with findings of Rotunno and Ruta 2024).Asia-Pacific implements a larger share of IP measures via traditional trade tools(trade tariffs and nontariff barriers,including

215、 trade bans/quotas/licensing and localization requirements)than the rest of the world.Compared to the rest of the world,Asia-Pacific leans more toward IP that target critical minerals,semi-conductors,or advanced technology productsproducts that are often considered strategic and tend to be at the ce

216、nter of geoeconomic fragmentation concerns.Advanced technology products are the most targeted product class after military/civilian dual use and“other”products in Asia-Pacific,and are a close third in the rest of the world,accounting for about 15 percent of all IP measures in Asia-Pacific and a slig

217、htly lower 12 percent in the rest of the world.This box was prepared by Rahul Giri.1 Definitions vary,but,broadly,IP can be defined as targeted government interventions(“vertical policies”)aimed at supporting specific domestic firms,industries,or economic activities to achieve certain objectives(eco

218、nomic or noneconomic).2 We rely on data developed by Juhsz and others(2023)and on the New Industrial Policy Observatory database by Evenett and others(2024).Both databases are built from the Global Trade Alert database and provide a count of IP measures categorized by country/jurisdiction,sector,and

219、 policy tool.The“count”approach calls for caution on interpretation,including because it is difficult to assess the economic impact of each measure(and hence all measures are counted equally,even if their economic relevance may actually differ).Juhsz and others(2023)comprise annual data for 175 juri

220、sdictions(31 in the Asia-Pacific region)and allow for a long-term view(200922)of the evolution of IP.The New Industrial Policy Observatory database offers a monthly count for the period of January 2023 to January 2024 and documents measures implemented by 75 jurisdictions(14 in the Asia-Pacific regi

221、on),with details on targeted sectors,policy tools,and motives.3 The Global Trade Alert database records actions as either“distortive”to trade or of a“liberalizing”nature.Distortive measures generally discriminate against foreign commercial interests by restricting market access or by altering the co

222、nditions in favor of local firms.Liberalizing measures tend to enhance market access on a nondiscriminatory(that is,most favored nation)basis or improve the transparency of a relevant policy.The difference between Asia-Pacific and rest of the world is essentially attributable to the uncategorized mo

223、tive of“Other,”with Asia-Pacific and rest of the world looking remarkably similar for other motives.Asia and Pacific:Steady Growth and Diverging ProspectsApril 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND21 Box 3.(continued)Asia-PacificRest of the worldFragmentation risk(right scale)LiberalizingDistortive1.IP I

224、nterventions and Fragmentation Risk(Number of IP measures,2010=100,left scale;fragmentation index,201315=100,right scale)2.Trade Restrictive and Liberalizing IP,by Motive,2023(Percent of measures for each objective)3.IP Tools,2023(Percent of all measures by region)4.IP by Targeted Sector,2023(Percen

225、t of all measures by region)Box Figure 3.1.Industrial Policies in AsiaSources:Hassan and others(2019);Juhsz and others(2023);New Industrial Policy Observatory database;NL Analytics,Inc.;and IMF staff calculations.Note:In panel 1,fragmentation risk index measures the average number of sentences,per t

226、housand earnings calls,that mention at least one of the following keywords:deglobalization,reshoring,onshoring,nearshoring,friend-shoring,localization,regionalization.Direct trade tools and strategic sectors colored in dark blue.GVC=global value chain;IP=industrial policies;nes=not elsewhere specifi

227、ed.2051221,00002,0003,0004,0005,0006,000600310AllClimate mitigationGVC resilienceStrategic competitivenessGeopolitical concernNational securityOtherAllClimate mitigationGVC resilienceStrategic competitivenessGeopolitical concernNational securityOtherRest of worldAsia

228、-Pacific020406080 100Export taxImport licensing requirementTrade financePublic procurement localizationTax or social insurance reliefCapital and equity injectionFinancial assistance inforeign marketState aid,unspecifiedImport tariffFinancial grantCapital and equity injectionLoan guaranteeImport tari

229、ffControls ontransactions and investmentTrade financeTax or social insurance reliefPublic procurement localizationState aid,unspecifiedState loanFinancial grantRest of worldAsia-Pacific0102030SemiconductorsSteel and aluminumMedical productsCritical mineralsLow carbon technologyAdvanced technology(ne

230、s)OtherMilitary/civilian dual use(nes)Critical mineralsSemiconductorsMedical productsSteel and aluminumAdvanced technology(nes)Low carbon technologyMilitary/civilian dual use(nes)OtherRest of worldAsia-Pacific010203040REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND April 202422B

231、ox 3.(continued)Given the potentially large costs of geoeconomic fragmentation(Aiyar and others 2023;April 2023 World Economic Outlook;October 2023 Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific),these findings underscore the need to carefully consider the implementation of IP and prevent an adverse fee

232、dback loop between IP and geoeconomic fragmentation.New IP enacted as a defensive or adaptive measure may be perceived by others as an escalation and invite a counterresponse.Sound IP design should target well-identified market failures,be time-bound and cost-effective,and be anchored by cost-benefi

233、t analysis and strong governance,so as to minimize rent-seeking and resource misallocation(Cherif and others 2022).Horizontal structural reforms usually need to complement sound IP or even represent an alternative.A rapid pace of IP interventions that overlap several sectors,objectives,and policy to

234、ols is likely to provoke opacity and distortions,while making the cost-benefit assessment of IP more intractable.Importantly,IP will need to respect international obligations,including World Trade Organization rules(IMF 2024;McDonald,Ruta,and Van Heuvelen 2024).Asia and Pacific:Steady Growth and Div

235、erging ProspectsApril 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND23Table 1.Asia:Real GDP(Yearoveryear change;percent)Actuals and Latest ProjectionsDifference from October 2023 WEO202242025202320242025Asia7.03.95.04.54.30.40.30.0Advanced Economies4.31.81.71.61.80.00.10.2 Australia5.63.82.11.52.00.30.

236、30.0 New Zealand5.62.40.61.02.00.50.00.1 Japan 2.61.01.90.91.00.10.10.4 Hong Kong SAR 6.53.73.22.92.71.20.00.2 Korea 4.32.61.42.32.30.00.10.0 Taiwan Province of China16.62.61.43.12.70.60.10.1 Singapore 9.73.81.12.12.30.10.00.2Emerging Market and Developing Economies27.74.45.65.24.90.40.40.0 Banglade

237、sh6.97.16.05.76.60.00.30.0 Brunei Darussalam1.61.61.42.42.52.21.10.3 Cambodia3.15.15.06.06.10.60.10.3 China 8.43.05.24.64.10.20.40.0 India39.77.07.86.86.51.50.50.2 Indonesia 3.75.35.05.05.10.00.00.1 Lao P.D.R.2.12.33.74.04.00.30.00.1 Malaysia3.38.73.74.44.40.30.10.0 Myanmar10.54.02.51.52.00.11.10.5

238、Mongolia 1.65.07.06.56.01.52.02.5 Nepal4.85.60.83.15.20.01.90.0 Philippines 5.77.65.66.26.20.30.30.1 Sri Lanka 3.57.8 Thailand1.52.51.92.72.90.80.50.2 Vietnam 2.68.15.05.86.50.30.00.4Pacific Island Countries40.52.23.34.03.50.10.20.0 Fiji4.920.08.03.03.40.50.90.3 Kiribati8.53.94.25.84.11.63.41.8 Mars

239、hall Islands1.10.73.03.02.00.00.00.0 Micronesia3.00.90.81.11.71.82.00.2 Nauru7.22.80.61.61.30.10.31.1 Palau13.42.00.812.411.90.00.00.0 Papua New Guinea0.85.22.74.53.70.30.50.6 Samoa7.15.38.05.43.40.01.80.0REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND April 202424Actuals and La

240、test ProjectionsDifference from October 2023 WEO202242025202320242025 Solomon Islands2.62.43.02.42.50.50.00.5 Tonga52.72.02.62.52.40.00.00.2 Tuvalu1.80.73.93.52.50.00.00.1 Vanuatu1.61.92.23.03.50.70.40.0ASEAN63.45.54.24.64.80.00.00.0ASEAN574.15.54.14.54.60.10.00.1EMDEs excluding China and

241、 India3.45.44.64.95.20.00.00.0Sources:IMF,World Economic Outlook database;and IMF staff estimates and projections.Note:ASEAN=Association of Southeast Asian Nations;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies;WEO=World Economic Outlook.1 Taiwan Province of China forecast data source is Consensus F

242、orecast.2 EMDEs exclude Pacific island countries and other small states.3 Indias data are reported on a fiscal year basis.Its fiscal year starts on April 1 and ends on March 31.4 Pacific island countries aggregate is calculated using simple average;all other aggregates are calculated using weighted

243、average.5 Tongas data are reported on a fiscal year basis.Its fiscal year starts on July 1 and ends June 30.6 ASEAN comprises Brunei Darussalam,Cambodia,Indonesia,Lao P.D.R.,Malaysia,Myanmar,the Philippines,and Singapore.7 ASEAN5 comprises Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore,and Thailand.Table 1.Asia:Real GDPApril 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND25