1、 World Employment and Social Outlook:May 2024 Update 1 World Employment and Social Outlook:May 2024 Update The global unemployment rate is projected at 4.9 per cent in 2024,slightly lower than in 2023(5.0 per cent)and a downward revision from the previous projection of 5.2 per cent(see World Employm

2、ent and Social Outlook Trends 2024 report),but the trend is now flat.The lack of progress in further reducing labour underutilisation is worrying as employment deficits are still large.The latest ILO estimates of the jobs gap show that 402 million persons are without a job but wanting to work in 202

3、4.This includes the 183 million who are counted as unemployed.Moreover,these deficits are unevenly distributed,with larger gaps in developing countries and for women.Whats holding women back?In 2024,the ILO estimates that 45.6 per cent of women(aged 15 and above)are employed,compared to 69.2 per cen

4、t of men,a gap of 23.6 percentage points.Novel ILO evidence suggests that this gap mainly stems from family responsibilities(marriage and parenthood),indicating that womens disproportionate share of unpaid care work plays a major role in shaping gender employment gaps globally.Even when women are em

5、ployed,they receive sizeably lower labour income than men especially in the developing world.In high-income countries,employed women earn 73 cents to the dollar compared to employed men.In low-income countries,women earn just 44 cents to the dollar.Measuring what matters.GDP growth is important,but

6、it is not a panacea for sustainable development.Global trends show that progress in reducing poverty and informality has slowed down since 2015 and the relationship between these indicators and GDP has weakened.Moreover,formal job creation has not kept pace with a growing working-age population.The

7、number of workers in informal employment has grown from approximately 1.7 billion in 2005 to 2.0 billion in 2024.This indicates that the promise of the 2030 agenda will require more than“growing out”of poverty and informality.The level of economic growth cannot be the sole focus,but rather how susta

8、inable,inclusive growth can be achieved.Key messages World Employment and Social Outlook:May 2024 Update 2 Macroeconomic developments Economic growth during the first months of 2024 has been broadly consistent with expectations at the start of the year.Recently revised estimates project global GDP g

9、rowth of 3.2 per cent in 2024,a 0.1 p.p.upward revision since January.1 Global inflation is decreasing,which will tend to mitigate the erosion of real wages seen in recent years.2 This stabilisation in the macroeconomic environment is translating into a relatively stable labour market outlook.Noneth

10、eless,the latest estimates show that real wages remain slightly below 2019 levels globally,but with observed real increases in some major emerging economies.3 In the medium run the situation remains uncertain,with significant monetary and fiscal policy adjustments expected at a global scale.This is

11、particularly relevant for employment,as labour market conditions tend to react with a sizeable lag to output.4 Hence,restrictive macroeconomic policies will have a delayed effect on the labour market.Moreover,although aggregate global economic growth remains relatively robust and aggregate global in

12、flation is falling,many countries in a vulnerable situation face multiple challenges including conflict,food insecurity,cost of living crises,rising debt,and fiscal constraints.5 These vulnerabilities are limiting the prospects for broad based improvements in labour market outcomes.The jobs situatio

13、n Given the recent macroeconomic stability and taking into account the latest incoming labour market data,the ILO has revised its projections of global unemployment in 2024,to 4.9 per cent(vs 5.2 per cent projected in November 20236)(Figure 1.a).This revision derives mainly from lower-than-expected

14、unemployment rates in China,India,and high-income countries.7 Global unemployment in 2024 is projected to remain below the 2019 level,before the COVID-19 pandemic and the inflationary period that ensued in its aftermath.The same trends are seen in the latest high-frequency data(see Figure 1.b).While

15、 labour markets are tight in certain countries,incoming data show that job vacancies have returned to prior trends following their unusual increase in the aftermath of the pandemic.Overall,the data point to a stable situation.Hence,there is no evidence of overly tight labour markets that could resul

16、t in inflationary pressures,even in the mainly high-income countries for which the data is available.8 1 International Monetary Fund,World Economic Outlook,April 2024,January 2024.2 ILO,Global Wage Report 2022-23:The impact of COVID-19 and inflation on wages and purchasing power.3 See ILO,World Empl

17、oyment and Social Outlook:Trends 2024,and for recent trends,ILO Global Wage Report 2024-25(Forthcoming).4 See ILO Monitor 10th edition.5 See World Bank.6 See the World Employment and Social Outlook Trends 2024 report.It is important to note that estimating and forecasting global labour statistics is

18、 an exercise subject to considerable uncertainty.In any given year,data is missing for a sizeable share of countries,which requires imputation of historical data,adding modelling uncertainty to the nowcasting and forecasting exercises.Additionally,for countries with reported observations,sizeable da

19、ta revisions and breaks in series can and do occur.This combined uncertainty should be taken into account when analysing labour market trends.7 Additionally,the incorporation of newly available data for some African countries led to a downward(level shift)revision of between 0.2 and 0.3 percentage p

20、oints throughout the period analysed.8 This does not imply a universal absence of inflationary pressures stemming from the labour market,but on average there is no such evidence.See for instance IMF WEO April 2024,where the authors report that labour market tightness does not account for a sizeable

21、share of inflation in either the European Union or the United Kingdom.Even in the United States,where,according to the authors,labour market tightness has been playing an inflationary role,its contribution to inflation has been declining.World Employment and Social Outlook:May 2024 Update 3 Figure 1

22、 Stable labour market outlook Notwithstanding the relatively benign cyclical outlook in predominantly high-income countries,labour underutilisation remains pervasive around the world.An unemployment rate of 4.9 per cent means that 183 million persons are unemployed in 2024.Moreover,criteria to be co

23、nsidered unemployed are quite strict.Hence,global World Employment and Social Outlook:May 2024 Update 4 employment needs are greater than what a narrow reading of the unemployment rate would suggest.For this reason,it is important to also consider broader measures of labour underutilisation.9 Two ad

24、ditional measures of underutilization are assessed,the jobs gap and LU3 indicators.The latest estimates of the jobs gap shows that 402 million persons are without a job but wanting to work in 2024(see Table A1 in the statistical appendix).Of these,183 million are unemployed(they meet the two technic

25、al criteria:being available at short notice and actively searching for work),137 million are in the potential labour force(they meet one of these criteria,but not both)and 82 million are willing non-jobseekers(they meet neither criterion but are willing to work).Hence,the latest ILO estimates show t

26、hat global labour markets are still characterised by sizeable employment deficits,though this is manifested across different degrees of labour market attachment in the categories above.In terms of dynamics,a similar picture of stability is seen for the unemployment rate,LU3(combined rate of unemploy

27、ment and the potential labour force)and the jobs gap rate(see Figure 2).According to the latest projections,this trend is expected to persist through 2025,as the unemployment rate is expected to remain at 4.9 per cent.Disaggregating the labour underutilisation rates by region shows substantial heter

28、ogeneity(see table A2).In 2024,the Arab States region is estimated to have the highest jobs gap rate,at 20.5 per cent,followed by Africa(17.4 per cent).In contrast,the jobs gap rate for Asia and the Pacific is estimated at 7.5 per cent.Finally,in all regions except the Arab States,which has an unemp

29、loyment rate of 10.3 per cent,unemployment rates are in a narrower range of between 4.2 per cent(Asia and the Pacific)and 6.3 per cent(Africa).9 Please see this resolution of the 19th International Conference of Labour Statisticians(ICLS),that provides guidance on the topic of labour underutilisatio

30、n.World Employment and Social Outlook:May 2024 Update 5 Uneven employment deficits,with larger gaps in developing countries and for women Disaggregating global data reveals highly unequal employment deficits around the world.The figure below presents the estimates of the jobs gap rate,LU3 and the un

31、employment rate by gender and country income group.The lowest jobs gaps are in high-income countries,where men register a rate of 7.3 per cent and women 9.7 per cent.However,in developing and emerging economies,the jobs gap tends to be far higher,particularly for women.In low-income countries,the jo

32、bs gap rate for women stands at a striking 22.8 per cent and 15.3 per cent for men.Results for middle-income countries present an intermediate picture,with women registering sizeably higher jobs gap rates than men.The rates of LU3 present a similar pattern as the jobs gap,though the differences in u

33、nderutilisation by gender and country income group are smaller.In contrast,the unemployment rate behaves very differently,as rates barely vary across income groups and gender.This is due to the more restrictive nature of the unemployment indicator as compared to LU3 and the jobs gap.Overall,the esti

34、mates point to sizeable employment deficits in the developing world,particularly for women.World Employment and Social Outlook:May 2024 Update 6 Whats holding women back?In 2024,the ILO estimates that 45.6 per cent of women(aged 15 and above)are employed,compared to 69.2 per cent of men,a gap of 23.

35、6 percentage points.This gap is much larger than what the labour underutilisation indicators would imply,including the most broadly defined jobs gap indicator.A novel empirical ILO analysis shows that family responsibilities are a key driver of the gender gap in employment rates(see Figure 4).10 The

36、 contributions of family responsibilities to the observed gender gaps in employment are generally large and follow an inverse U-shape across country income groups.In low-income countries they stand at 14 percentage points and in lower-middle-income countries at 21 percentage points.In upper-middle-i

37、ncome and high-income countries,the contributions are 18 and 13 percentage points respectively.It must be highlighted that family responsibilities explain a large share of the observed gender employment gap across all income groups.In low-income countries,the estimated effect of family responsibilit

38、ies accounts for 62 per cent of the gender employment gap.In high-income countries this share reaches 80 per cent and it is close to 76 per cent in middle-income countries.Given these results,it seems likely that social norms concerning the organisation of unpaid care work,coupled with deficits in c

39、are services,are critical factors behind the 10 Leveraging data from the ILO Harmonised Microdata collection,the contribution of family responsibilities to employment gaps are estimated across a sample of 96 countries.This follows an empirical specification analogous to Klaven,Landais and Leite-Mari

40、ante(2024)and provides similar results.We combine the effect of marriage and child rearing because if we established the effect of marriage independently,this could be capturing anticipation of childcare needs or persistent effects of women disproportionately exiting the workforce to undertake child

41、care.See annex for more details.observed employment penalties.First,women generally bear disproportionate childcare responsibilities.Moreover,the effect of this can become entrenched World Employment and Social Outlook:May 2024 Update 7 through a deterioration of job prospects that can last well bey

42、ond the first few years of a childs life.Second,even in the absence of children in the household,women devote a disproportionate amount of time to unpaid care work compared to men.In ILO 2018 the authors find in a sample of 11 countries that daily hours spent in unpaid care work by women in househol

43、ds with no children average 3.7,which increase to 6.1 daily hours in households with small children.For men,daily hours on unpaid care work are 1.7 with no children and 2.2 with small children in the household.This suggests a disproportionate share of time devoted to unpaid care work beyond childcar

44、e,whether for household upkeep or care of relatives other than children.The importance of unpaid care work for gender equality has been repeatedly stressed by the ILO,see the VI report of the forthcoming International Labour Conference,112th Session,2024 for a contemporary discussion.Even when women

45、 are employed,they face stark gender inequalities particularly in the developing world.This can be seen in ILO estimates of differences in labour income by sex(see annex for details on the methodology).This indicator includes the labour related earnings of employees and the self-employed,and hence c

46、an give a comprehensive picture of the average gender earnings gap in developing countries where self-employment is typically prevalent.11 We find that employed women earn 73 cents to the dollar compared to employed men in high-income countries.In low-income countries,women earn just 44 cents to the

47、 dollar.This reflects severe deficits in employment quality for women,who are over-represented in vulnerable jobs.For instance,the global incidence of contributing family work is 16 per cent for women compared to only 6 per cent for men.12 The drastic widening of gender labour income gaps as nationa

48、l income declines points to severe gender inequalities in developing countries.Given the high prevalence of informal employment in those countries,much of this inequality must materialize in the informal 11 This measure is different than the more widely used gender wage gap,which is based on wage di

49、fferences among employees only.For an in-depth analysis of gender wage gaps,please see the Global Wage Report 2018/19.12 Estimates for 2022,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023 edition.13 See Resolution I of the 21st International Conference of Labour Statisticians for guidance on the definition of

50、informal employment.economy,which is characterized by persistent inequities,the prevalence of low productivity activities,and,often,poor working conditions.13 Indeed,in ILO 2023 it can be seen that gender differences in wages are larger in informal employment than in formal employment.This World Emp

51、loyment and Social Outlook:May 2024 Update 8 issue is further analysed by leveraging the ILO Harmonised Microdata collection(see annex for more details).Wages of employees typically increase sizeably as tenure increases(i.e.how long an individual has been working in their current job),due to skills

52、accumulation and on-the-job learning.Over time,this can be an important driver of unequal outcomes.Analysing a sample of 20 countries with the required data(and excluding the agricultural sector)we find the following:First,women in informal employment tend to have shorter job tenures than men,wherea

53、s in the case of formal employment the difference is much smaller.This implies higher job separation rates for women in informal employment compared to men.Second,we find that although increases in tenure translate into substantial wage gains for both women and men employed formally,this is not the

54、case for informal workers.For women in informal employment,returns to tenure are substantially lower.Women in formal employment register wage increases14 of 2.1 per cent per year of tenure,while in informal employment they can expect gains of only 0.8 per cent.15 In contrast,the return to tenure for

55、 men is close to 1.5 per cent for both formal and informal workers.This means that women who enter an informal job can expect to be on a flatter long-run income trajectory than both women employed in formal jobs and men employed either formally or informally.Not only that,women employed informally a

56、lso accumulate less tenure as a function of age than men employed informally.Both of these could be linked to family responsibilities and a lack of access to adequate,affordable care services.16 Measuring what matters Economic growth is an important driver of labour market conditions,such as unemplo

57、yment,and sustainable development.In this sense,the recent resilience in economic growth is to be welcomed.However,as the UN Secretary Generals report“Our common agenda”acknowledges,there is also an urgent need to find complementary measures beyond GDP.Since 2015,the year the Sustainable Development

58、 Goals were adopted,global GDP per capita has grown at a yearly rate of 1.8 per cent.17 This represents a moderate slowdown compared to the period from 2005 to 2015,of approximately 0.4 p.p.(see table 1a),which can be fully explained by the pandemic,as the growth rate of 2015-2019 was in line with t

59、he longer-run historical trend.According to the latest IMF projections,the expected pace of per capita GDP growth going forward,2.2 per cent for both 2024 and 2025,is in line with the longer run trend.Hence,output growth with the exception of the pandemic is expected to be similar during the 2015-20

60、25 period as during the prior decade,2005-2015.14 The increase is in nominal terms,comparing a person with a given tenure to a person of similar characteristics but with an additional year of tenure.15 This could also have an impact at the macroeconomic level.As argued by Jedwab et.al.(2023),on-the-

61、job skills accumulation is a key source of economic growth,which can account for a significant share of the differences in GDP levels between advanced and developing economies.16 See for instance ILO 2007 where the authors find evidence that care responsibilities reduce returns to informal economic

62、activity.17 Annual population growth over the same period has been 1 per cent.World Employment and Social Outlook:May 2024 Update 9 Table 1 Trends in economic growth,poverty,and informality In contrast,trends in other indicators point to a decoupling from GDP during the last decade.Since 2015,povert

63、y reduction has slowed down compared to the decade prior to the establishment of the SDGs,from 5.7 per cent annually to only 1.4 per cent.Although the COVID-19 pandemic played a large role in this slowdown,this remains worrying for three reasons:First,it shows that the pandemic produced much larger

64、scarring effects for poverty than for economic output(in fact the poverty headcount in 2022 was 712 million,above the 689 million estimated in 2019).Second,even before the pandemic,World Employment and Social Outlook:May 2024 Update 10 the slowdown was already apparent.18 Third,in the pandemics wake

65、,rising geopolitical instability has impacted on food and energy prices,increasing food security risks and vulnerabilities.Overall,the disappointing progress since 2015 in all likelihood puts the 2030 poverty target out of reach(see World Bank).Progress on informality has also been disappointing.The

66、 share of informal employment was 61.4 per cent in 2005(see Table 1b)and by 2015 this had decreased to 58.4 per cent.Since then,the pace of progress has been considerably slower:In 2024 the estimated share stands at 57.8 per cent.This represents a clear slowdown in the pace of progress.Informal empl

67、oyment has been growing at 1 per cent annually since 2015,0.3 percentage points higher than the growth registered over the prior decade.In contrast,formal employment has grown at an annual rate of 1.4 per cent,0.6 percentage points lower than during the period from 2005 to 2015.19 Moreover,informal

68、employment has increased in absolute levels due to insufficient formal job creation alongside the growth in the working-age population.The number of persons informally employed,and hence working under more vulnerable conditions,continues to grow substantially year after year.In 2005,there were appro

69、ximately 1.7 billion workers employed informally.By 2015,the number had increased to 1.83 billion.The latest estimates for 2024 point to almost 2.03 billion workers employed informally.These findings indicate that a strategy of simply“growing out”of poverty and informality,even if faster growth mate

70、rialised,is extremely unlikely to fulfil the promise of the 2030 agenda.Conclusions Despite a decrease in unemployment compared to pre-pandemic levels and previous projections,recent trends indicate a levelling off.However,labour underutilization remains a major concern,with large employment deficit

71、s remaining.These are particularly pronounced in developing countries and among women.Gender disparities in employment rates are found to be linked to family responsibilities and womens disproportionate share of unpaid care work coupled with major deficits in care policies and services.Even when emp

72、loyed,women face notable gaps in labour income,which are especially stark in developing economies.While GDP growth remains crucial for development,it is essential to measure and monitor social progress indicators beyond economic activity alone.Global trends suggest a slowdown in progress towards red

73、ucing poverty and informality since 2015.Moreover,the link between these indicators and economic growth has diminished.This highlights the need for a comprehensive approach to achieve the objectives of the 2030 agenda,including social dialogue at all levels,aimed at promoting inclusive,equitable,and

74、 effective public policies that resonate with societal needs and promote human dignity for all.18 See this World Bank paper for an analysis of the growing decoupling between global growth and poverty.The authors find that it is not that the elasticity at the country level between growth and poverty

75、has reduced,rather it is that the bulk of remaining extreme poverty is increasingly concentrated in countries where growth historically had lower poverty reduction effects.Hence this compositional effect can result in a decoupling of poverty and growth at the global level.For instance,China,which hi

76、storically had a high incidence of extreme poverty,now has a very low headcount of people living in extreme poverty.Hence,even if the country continues to contribute sizeably to global growth,its global contribution to extreme poverty reduction will be far lower.This results in a weaker global corre

77、lation between the variables.19 Excluding the pandemic period in this case does not sizeably alter the results.World Employment and Social Outlook:May 2024 Update 11 Statistical Annex World Employment and Social Outlook:May 2024 Update 12 World Employment and Social Outlook:May 2024 Update 13 Techni

78、cal annex The technical annex is available at:https:/www.ilo.org/publications/technical-annex-world-employment-and-social-outlook-may-2024-update World Employment and Social Outlook:May 2024 Update 14 Acknowledgements This report was prepared by the Data Production and Analysis Unit of the ILO Depar

79、tment of Statistics,under the direction of Rafael Diez de Medina,with contributions from the ILO Research Department,led by Richard Samans.The report was written by Roger Gomis,Steven Kapsos,Paloma Carrillo,Avichal Mahajan,and Stefan Pauly.Miguel Snchez Martnez was responsible for the production of

80、unemployment forecasts.The underlying database of international labour market indicators used to produce the estimates was prepared by the Data Production and Analysis Unit.The authors especially acknowledge the contributions of the ILOSTAT microdata team,including Yves Perardel,David Bescond,Vipasa

81、na Karkee,Donika Limani,and Quentin Mathys.The authors wish to thank Laura Addati,Maria Helena Andre,Samuel Asfaha,Patrick Belser,Sara Elder,Ekkehard Ernst,Deborah France-Massin,Lawrence Jeff Johnson,Chidi King,Stefan Khn,Khalid Maman Waziri,Emanuela Pozzan,Richard Samans,Miguel Snchez Martnez,Dorothea Schmidt,Rosalia Vazquez-Alvarez,and Michael Watt for their helpful comments and suggestions.Contact details International Labour Organization Route des Morillons 4 CH-1211 Geneva 22 Switzerland W:https:/ilostat.ilo.org/E:statisticsilo.org International Labour Organization 2024