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1、December 2022Global Energy&Materials Practice and McKinsey SustainabilityThe energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term action Jackyenjoyphotography/EyeEm/Getty ImagesMcKinsey&CompanyDoluptatio volles consequi dolenis nonsequiatio erunt aciunt veliquam harum dolupta essinciur aribus,o
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9、nsequis et andene molupta temporem fugit poremos ea doluptio.Ut quia eiume sam,sum am,vendaec toreces vella int que dis dolorunt doluptat et landerr orest,voluptatem.At velecea ruptaeped et maion pedit est laborem ra acimagn atemod essint omnihic aborehe nitibusciti dit incia iurit,corepedi alias au
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11、ransition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionAuthorsHumayun Tai,New YorkHamid Samandari,New YorkDaniel Pacthod,New YorkEvan Polymeneas,ChicagoAlex Bolano,San FranciscoMadelina Pozas Pratt,Los AngelesFilippo Lodesani,Los AngelesDecember 2022PrefaceThe Sharm El-Sheikh Climate Change Confere
12、nce(COP27)concluded last month with an initial agreement to create a“Loss and Damage”fund that would help the worlds most vulnerable nations address the adverse consequences of climate change.Although the fund has yet to be capitalized and its operating rules must still be defined,its creation has b
13、een hailed as a milestone in the effort to ensure a just transition.For all the progress achieved in November,including a landmark partnership announced at the G-20 summit to accelerate the energy transition in Indonesia,among other agreements,global commitments to reduce emissions remain largely at
14、 the same level as a year ago.At the same time,the path to achieving those commitments has been complicated by the war in Ukraine,which has heightened geopolitical tensions and deepened the global,post-pandemic macroeconomic challenges.Indeed,the events of the past year have brought into sharp focus
15、 renewed concerns about energy resilience and affordability for almost every country in the world.These concerns have led some to question the feasibility,or even the advisability,of a net-zero transition by 2050.There is no doubt that short-term risks and challenges to energy systems have to be squ
16、arely addressed.But this response must also be balanced with an equal focus on the longer-term risks of unabated climate changes.Compromising either of these objectives will likely result in major setbacks in addressing the looming climate(and natural capital)crisis,and represent unacceptable risks
17、to global prosperity and stability.Central to the efforts to mitigate the risk of unabated and possibly catastrophic climate change is a transformation of the energy sector,as energy-related emissions contribute to more than 80 percent of total greenhouse-gas emissions.Such a transformation will be
18、both massive and complex.It will require a rework of the energy mix across countries and changes in end-use of energy,while minimizing disruption to the global economy.In this report,which builds on a body of McKinsey research on climate risk and the net-zero transition,we aim to focus on practical,
19、near-term actions that could help countries advance the energy transition while pursuing in parallel shorter-term energy resilience and affordability Given important differences among countries and regions with respect to their starting point for the energy transition,we take a region-by-region view
20、 highlighting both challenges and opportunities.The actions suggested amount to a nuanced global agenda to accelerate the energy transition and ensure that it proceeds in a more orderly and resilient fashion.Underlying the research are insights into the energy transition developed by our McKinsey co
21、lleagues worldwide.Our findings and suggestions are not exhaustive and,in attempting a region-by-region approach to such a complex global topic,we acknowledge that there are gaps in our findings.By focusing on regions and archetypes,we may have omitted some of the specificity needed for individual c
22、ountries.Nonetheless,we hope the research will contribute to the worldwide debate about the energy transition and spur action to accelerate its implementation.iiThe energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionThe report is joint research by McKinseys Global Energy and Materials P
23、ractice and McKinsey Sustainability.McKinsey has long focused on issues of environmental sustainability,dating to client studies in the early 1970s.We developed our global greenhouse gas abatement cost curve in 2007,updated it in 2009,and have since conducted national abatement studies in countries
24、including Brazil,China,Germany,India,Russia,Sweden,the United Kingdom,and the United States.Recent research on which we build in this report includes the publications The net-zero transition:What it would cost,what it could bring(January 2022)and Solving the net-zero equation:Nine requirements for a
25、 more orderly transition(October 2021),as well as McKinseys annual Global Energy Perspective.The research was led by Humayun Tai,Hamid Samandari,and Daniel Pacthod,McKinsey senior partners in New York;Evan Polymeneas,a partner in Chicago;and Alex Bolano,an associate partner in San Francisco.The rese
26、arch team was led in different periods by Filippo Lodesani and Madelina Pozas Pratt.Team members were Daniel Csonth,Dani Ebersole,Francisco Galtieri,Karina Gerstenchlager,Katherine Hosie,Ujwal Kollur Murali,Gi Lee,Michele Mauceri,Yufei Su,and Anna Weegels.We would like to thank many colleagues at Mc
27、Kinsey who provided valuable insight and support.They are:Vishal Agarwal,Marcelo Aude,Mohammad Ayub,Deston Barger,Frdric Blas,Gracie Brown,Giovanni Bruni,Tommaso Cavina,Henrique Ceotto,Nadia Christakou,Xavier Costantini,Sarah Coupland,Graeme Cuthbert,David Dyer,Hauke Engel,Lucas Gastaldi,Mohamed Gho
28、nima,Joo Guillaumon,Rajat Gupta,Sarvesh Gupta,Sheng Hong,Blake Houghton,Avelina Ivaldi,Yutaro Kakimoto,Adam Kendall,Amit Khera,Mekala Krishnan,Peter Lambert,Luis Miguel Lopez,Spencer Liu,Rachid Majiti,Ketav Mehta,Lorenzo Moavero Milanesi,Clemens Mller-Falcke,Hernan Negri,Kevin Nobels,Jesse Noffsinge
29、r,Oliver Onyekweli,Dickon Pinner,Sid Ramtri,Ricardo Reina,Benjamin Sauer,Rafael Scott,Suvojoy Sengupta,Suzane Simes de S,Bram Smeets,Yoshitaka Uriuda,Lindsey Waller,Raffael Winter,Yuito Yamada,and Haimeng Zhang.December 2022iiiThe energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionThe c
30、urrent state 17ContentsPreface iiIn brief vExecutive summary 1Countries fall into five main archetypes with respect to their opportunities and priorities for a more orderly energy transition 25Globally,eight sets of common actions are needed for a more orderly energy transition 39Region-specific act
31、ions needed to address local characteristics and socioeconomic differences 47Key stakeholders can accelerate action to promote a more orderly transition 149Chapter 1Chapter 2Chapter 3Chapter 4Chapter 5Affluent,energy-secure regions 48Affluent,energy-exposed countries 74Large,emissions-intensive econ
32、omies 94Developing,naturally endowed economies 112Developing,at-risk economies 125ivThe energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionIn briefAs 2022 comes to a close,the energy transition seems more disorderly than ever.A world economy shaken by a global pandemic and the surging i
33、nflation that has accompanied the subsequent recovery has had to contend with a tragic conflict in Ukraine and its aftermath of human suffering,rising energy costs,and declining energy security.The immediate response has meant more short-term reliance on fossil fuels and less available resources for
34、 the transition,not to mention additional challenges to regional and global coordination,As we look toward 2023 and COP28,the dual imperatives of ensuring energy resilience and affordability and of reducing emissions appear equally inescapable.Instead of delaying action,we believe these imperatives
35、emphasize the importance of accelerating coordinated,long-term action,at the same time as taking short-term measures.This report,which builds on our prior work identifying requirements for the net-zero transition,highlights a range of near-term actions that countries and regions around the world cou
36、ld take to ensure they transition their energy system while maintaining focus on the immediate needs of energy resilience and affordability(a less disorderly,and hence“more orderly,”transition).The key findings:The need for accelerated and sustained action is pressing,as physical climate risk and it
37、s visible manifestations continue to grow.To bridge a gap between the current emissions trajectory and a path that would limit global warming to 1.7C by 2030,annual solar and wind installed capacity would need to almost triple over the coming decade,to more than 520 gigawatts(GW)average yearly insta
38、lled capacity,from an average of about 180 GW from 2016 to 2021.As the world seeks to move toward cleaner energy,a nuanced view of the role of fossil fuels and of the path to reducing their use is needed.Even though renewable energy production doubled in the past decade,fossil fuels still represent
39、about 82 percent of primary energy consumption in 2021.Moreover,residual reliance on fossil fuels is assumed in all net-zero scenarios by and beyond 2050.As further investments in fossil-fuel production will likely be needed to meet current or future residual needs and demand,it will be critical to
40、aim for lower-emissions,high-efficiency,and highly flexible sources and production approaches.A key concern should be to avoid an accumulation of stranded assets.At the same time,the transition means that fossil fuel producers will need to adjust to an environment of declining volumes of output.The
41、retirement of emissions-intensive fossil-fuel extraction and power generation operations,such as coal plants,will also need to be accelerated.Three main factors influence each countrys ability to achieve a more orderly energy transition.Two are linked with energy resilience and the third with afford
42、ability.Opportunities,challenges,and risks from the transition are unevenly distributed because of three principal factors.On the dimension of energy resilience,the two factors are a)the presence(or lack)of natural resources,such as the potential for wind and solar generation as well as the availabi
43、lity of transition critical minerals;and b)a countrys economic reliance on energy imports and emissions intensive industries.On the dimension of affordability,a countrys disposable financial resources and its ability to leverage capital to support the energy transition are critical.vThe energy trans
44、ition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionFor the transition,countries can be grouped into five principal archetypes,with differing prospects:1.Affluent,energy-secure countries,including Australia,Saudi Arabia,and the United States,which have abundant domestic production of energy and high
45、 GDP per capita.As the energy transition unfolds,they are likely to remain energy exporters but will need to reconsider energy sources to meet emissions targets.2.Affluent,energy-exposed countries,including Germany,Italy,and Japan,which face energy-security challenges.The transition could represent
46、an opportunity for them to pivot toward domestic clean-energy production,reducing dependence on fossil fuel imports.3.Large,emissions-intensive economies,including China,India,and South Africa,which are faced with the challenge of meeting growing energy demand with cleaner resources,at the same time
47、 as addressing their reliance on high-emissions fuels,particularly coal.4.Developing,naturally endowed economies,including Brazil,Mexico,and Indonesia,which have significant power potential from solar or wind sources and critical natural resources such as rare metals.Their natural priority will be t
48、o set up the framework to develop these resources and move to a sustainable mode of production.5.Developing,at-risk economies,which include parts of Africa and Southeast Asia,along with several island nations.These economies are mainly agricultural and have a disproportionate exposure to climate ris
49、k.Some have limited potential for renewables development,either because of financial constraints or because of limited natural endowments.Their transition will need to be coupled with the establishment of basic infrastructure services and investment in climate adaptation.All countries,irrespective o
50、f archetype,need to take actions that meaningfully advance decarbonization while ensuring energy security and affordability.There is,therefore,a premium on actions that take into account the current position,momentum,and constraints of each region,and that are relatively easier to implement(even tho
51、ugh nothing is truly easy).This is precisely the focus of this report,with the full awareness that the actions it suggests are only a step in the transition journey.In addition to these regional actions,eight actions are globally applicable and would need to be accelerated:(1)streamlining access to
52、land,accelerating permitting,and simplifying processes to accelerate time-to-deployment for renewables and cleantech;(2)modernizing and repurposing grid and other legacy infrastructure and developing new assets to accelerate the integration of renewables and cleantech into the energy system;(3)stren
53、gthening global supply chains to secure critical raw materials,components,and labor competencies;(4)decarbonizing the industry and transportation sectors by investing in new technologies such as hydrogen and carbon capture,utilization,and storage,alongside electrification and energy efficiency;(5)li
54、miting and mitigating emissions-intensive generation,to reduce the carbon footprint of fossil fuels and lower the risks of stranded assets;(6)managing economic dislocations to promote energy affordability and create fair opportunities for affected and at-risk communities;(7)developing stable and att
55、ractive remuneration frameworks,market designs,and offtake structures to encourage investments in renewables and cleantech;and(8)scaling frameworks and standards to measure the carbon intensity of energy and final products and develop a global,new carbon economy.viThe energy transition:A region-by-r
56、egion agenda for near-term actionKey stakeholders will need to accelerate action to promote a more orderly energy transition by 2030.The risk of a disorderly transition,which has always been high,has become even more so over the past year.This makes greater public and private collaboration,as well a
57、s genuine cross-regional and global cooperation,even more critical.Governments and multilateral institutions have a central role in implementing policies and measures to encourage carbon standards and promote investment in renewables,as well as managing dislocations and affordability issues.Financia
58、l institutions are instrumental in rethinking investment horizons and risk-return profiles,disclosing and measuring their portfolio exposure in the near term,and quickly deploying capital to clean energy projects,while ensuring appropriate support for traditional energy sources to support redundancy
59、 and resilience.Companies would gain from focusing on developing net-zero strategies and action plans,prioritizing innovation in green business models and technologies,and securing a sustainable supply chain.Energy providers,including utilities and transmission and distribution companies,could focus
60、 on managing stranded risks for their carbon intensive assets,securing the supply chain,prioritizing innovation in business models and technologies,and developing manufacturing for clean technologies.Companies in energy-intensive industries such as mining,cement,and oil and gas extraction could cons
61、ider setting time-bound initiatives for decarbonization,investing in energy supply and developments,transitioning assets and operations toward a net-zero world,and developing a procurement and energy-risk management strategy to mitigate energy-security and volatility risks.Individuals,too,have a rol
62、e to play.To manage a transition that combines emissions reductions with energy security and affordability,they have the ability to participate in the climate-change conversation,make informed trade-offs,and demand increased transparency and accountability from their leaders.viiThe energy transition
63、:A region-by-region agenda for near-term action Yaorusheng/Getty ImagesviiiThe energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionEnergy represents 83 percent of global emissions of carbon dioxide(CO2).1 No wonder,then,that the sector has long been recognized as being at the very heart
64、of the transition to net-zero greenhouse-gas emissions.The conclusion of COP27 has brought renewed uncertainty on the path to this transition.While progress was made in pursuing global co-operation,through the establishment of“Loss and Damage”funding arrangements for particularly vulnerable countrie
65、s,progress on emissions mitigation remained largely elusive.Emission mitigation commitments remained essentially the same as before COP27,despite some hopeful developments such as the expansion of the global methane pledge to 150 countries and the G-20 Summits announcement of a$20 billion plan to su
66、pport Indonesias transition from coal to renewables.2 According to our analysis,achieving national commitments could lead to significant progress toward a 1.5C pathway.However,after COP27 it is less obvious whether these critical targets will be met.Finally,there is an increasing recognition that th
67、e current emissions trajectory would lead to an increase of 2.4C to 3.5C in average global temperatures by 2100,which would have significant and potentially catastrophic consequences.3 COP27 came at a time of global macroeconomic and geopolitical turbulence,which has led many to doubt whether a 1.5C
68、 pathway is feasible(or,according to some,even advisable).Industry observers remark that the energy transition is already“disorderly.”It will be made even more so if the imperatives of energy resilience and affordability are not addressed in parallel to bringing about the net-zero transition.It is i
69、mportant to recognize that while these two imperatives appear in contention with each other in the short term,they are highly self-reinforcing in the longer term.There is therefore no case for slowing down the transition but rather for accelerating action and developing nuanced,near-term plans to ad
70、dress these challenges.Such plans need to balance the pace of the necessary phasing down of fossil fuels with the ramping up of renewables,remove obstacles such as land constraints and financing hurdles,and manage the fallouts,such as stranded assets,employment consequences,and potential cost increa
71、ses.Such plans must also encompass careful consideration of both shorter-and longer-term risks,such as the economic impact on emissions-intensive industries,the(regressive)burdens placed on certain countries and populations,and fair allocation of opportunities and burdens.Despite the evident challen
72、ges,we believe that bold and decisive action can make a difference in bringing about this transition.In fact,undertaking a carefully thought and calibrated set of actions today can avoid mounting risks in the future.In this report,we focus on near-term and enabling actions for countries and regions
73、that would be the foundations of any transition plan and that would help these countries progress along a path toward an affordable,resilient,and timely energy transition.4 We look at these actions through three different lenses.First,we describe eight actions that apply across countries and regions
74、 and,when taken,will guide the world toward a more orderly transition.Second,we consider ten regions that together represent a total of 86 percent 1 Insights on Sustainability,2022,McKinsey;EMIT database of Insights on Sustainability;Global Energy Perspective 2022,McKinsey,April 26,2022;The net-zero
75、 transition:What it would cost,what it could bring,McKinsey,January 2022;International Energy Agency(IEA)data for 2019.2“COP27 reaches breakthrough agreement on new Loss and Damage fund for vulnerable countries,”United Nations Climate Change press release,November 20,2022;“The EU and international p
76、artners launch ground-breaking Just Energy Transition Partnership with Indonesia,”European Commission,November 15,2022.3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC).The warming estimate is an indication of a global rise in temperature linked to the emissions levels expected by 2100 versus preind
77、ustrial levels,based on IPCC assessments.4 While we believe that climate adaptation will prove increasingly critical around the world,and particularly for the most vulnerable countries and communities,adaptation(whether for energy systems or more broadly)is not a focus of this report.Executive summa
78、ry1The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionof the worlds population and 86 percent of global emissions.5 For each of these regions,we identify the specific actions that apply,by bringing to bear local needs and nuances on the global actions.We are aware that an ideal anal
79、ysis would be on a country-by-country level but believe that the focus on these ten regions allows us to do a more manageable analysis(while enabling us to make distinctions among countries in each region as well).Third,we look at taking action from the perspective of various stakeholders and specif
80、ically what governments,institutions,companies,and individuals could do to find a path to a more orderly transition.For this report,we use 2030 as the time horizon.We are aiming to describe neither a longer-term(hypothetical)path with its implications(we have done so in a previous report6)nor what t
81、he current momentum may imply(as we do in our energy insights report7).Our focus is on near-term,critical action.Three factors motivate this choice.First,the need to move from commitments to clear plans and actions.Second,the recognition that transitioning our energy system is a slow-moving process
82、and that actions taken now could take years to have the desired consequences.And third,the sense that time is running out.Momentum toward renewables is growing but without a corresponding decrease in global emissions The worlds progress toward cleaner energy has been accelerating.Over the past decad
83、e,the production of renewable energy has more than doubled globally,and its share of total primary energy consumption has grown from 9 percent in 2011 to 13 percent in 2021.8 While renewables broadly defined include a range of energies including hydropower and geothermal energy,we focus in this repo
84、rt mainly on solar and wind energy.Despite the growth in renewable energy,the use of fossil fuels is also expanding to meet growing demand for energy.Global energy demand grew by 14 percent from 2011 to 2021,driven mainly by emissions-intensive sources.As a result,global energy-related emissions hav
85、e increased in the past decade by about 5 percent,or 1.7 gigatons(Gt)of CO2,9 and the current share of primary energy from fossil fuels remains preponderant,at 82 percent.Prescriptions for the role of fossil fuels cannot be overly simplistic,given this continued reliance.The net-zero transition requ
86、ires steep and decisive declines in fossil fuel consumption by 2050.At the same time,in one scenario of our analysis,global demand for natural gas could be higher in 2030 than 2021,while oil consumption would decline by less than 5 percent in the same timeframe.Securing this supply would require jud
87、icious investments in fossil fuels to secure energy resilience and affordability(in parallel to much larger investments in renewables and electrification).Achieving a more orderly transition will likely require balancing the accelerated decommissioning of inefficient and highly polluting assets such
88、 as coal or oil power generation with incremental investments in lower-emissions fuel production.To the extent that fossil fuel investments are made,they should be directed towards lower emissions options and flexible assets that can rapidly adjust their production as demand decreases to meet net ze
89、ro goals(see Box E1,“Reducing the use of fossil fuels”).Investments and action to reduce the carbon intensity of fossil fuels,such as addressing methane emissions and electrifying oil and gas operations,will also be needed.The socioeconomic context has become at once more precarious and more recepti
90、ve to the energy transition.The war in Ukraine has,beyond its incalculable human cost,significantly increased energy and food costs and exacerbated the inflationary trends that were already 5 Namely Africa,Australia,China,the European Union,India,Japan,Latin America,the Middle East,Southeast Asia,an
91、d the United States.6 The net-zero transition:What it would cost,what it could bring,McKinsey,January 2022.7 Global Energy Perspective 2022,April 26,2022.8 BP energy outlook:2022 edition,BP,2022.9 Global Energy Review 2021,International Energy Agency(IEA),April 2021.2The energy transition:A region-b
92、y-region agenda for near-term actionmanifest in the post-pandemic recovery.It has also made energy resilience and affordability a much more pressing concern.In addition,the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted global supply chains and inflated,among others,the costs of energy-project construction.These chall
93、enges have heightened awareness and spurred new actions toward an energy transition,particularly in Europe.Physical climate risk and its visible manifestations are also continuing to grow.Specifically,according to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC)sixth assessment rep
94、ort,extrapolation of current policies would lead to a median global warming of 2.4C to 3.5C by 2100 and put limiting global warming to 1.5C beyond reach.Past McKinsey analysis indicates that there could be an annual 2.4 Gt carbon dioxide equivalent(CO2e)gap(7 percent of 2021 energy-related emissions
95、)between the current trajectory and the trajectory of an“achieved commitments”scenario.To bridge this gap,the annual solar and wind installed capacity would need to nearly triple,from approximately 180 gigawatts(GW)of average yearly installed capacity from 2016 to 2021 to more than 520 GW over the c
96、oming decade,with different accelerations required across global regions.10 10 Renewable energy capacity statistics,International Renewable Energy Agency(IRENA),2022;Global Energy Perspective 2022,McKinsey,2022,data for Achieved Commitments scenario,2030.Box E1 Reducing the use of fossil fuelsThe us
97、e of fossil fuels for energy production will decline sharply if the world advances along the path of the net-zero transition.Our estimates indicate that in an“achieved commitments”scenario,oil demand for primary energy would more than halve,from about 30 billion barrels in 2021 to about 12 billion i
98、n 2050,while gas demand would fall by about 35 percent,from about 3,800 billion cubic meters(bcm)in 2021 to about 2,500 bcm in 2050.1 Oil and gas producers will need to adjust to a world of declining oil and gas output and,eventually,to a reduction of capital invested in upstream assets.However,dema
99、nd for oil and gas would continue to exist for the next few decades,including for uses beyond energy production.For example,under an“achieved commitments”scenario,demand in 2030 could be about 28 billion barrels of oil and about 4,000 bcm of gas.It would thus be important to assess and minimize the
100、emissions associated with oil and gas production.Investments in fossil fuels will be needed,but they will have to be carefully managed with the right 1 See Global Energy Perspective 2022,“achieved commitments”scenario,McKinsey,April 26,2022.2 Such coal for natural-gas replacements might not always b
101、e prudent or economical.incentives(for example,natural gas replacing more intensive fuels like coal).2Given the gradual nature of the transition from fossil fuels,an optimal solution would be to produce from basins that are cheaper,carry lower emissions,and can more flexibly ramp production up or do
102、wn,thereby minimizing the risk of stranded assets.The most attractive and least carbon-intensive regions might need capital investments to counteract the natural declines in the rate of production,modernize operations,and continue to mitigate emissions.Conversely,higher cost and emission basins woul
103、d need to be retired.In the end state,production would naturally fall even in the most carbon-efficient basins.One natural area of focus to achieve this outcome would be to establish mechanisms that reward oil and gas that is sourced from lower-emissions operations and,conversely,discourage operatio
104、ns that have a heavier emissions intensity.Another focus area would entail payment mechanisms that reward upstream operators for investing in flexible production capacity rather than reward them for the volume of their fossil fuel output.3The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term
105、 actionCountries fall into five main archetypes with respect to their opportunities and priorities for a more orderly energy transition The opportunities,challenges,and risks associated with a more orderly energy transition are not distributed evenly around the globe.Some countries can count on high
106、er financial or natural resources,and not all economies are equally equipped to address the challenge of transforming their energy mix.It is therefore useful to identify the primary archetypes,or groupings,into which countries would fall in the context of the energy transition and the corresponding
107、opportunities and challenges.Considerations of affordability and resilience will shape each countrys ability to achieve a more orderly transition.The following three factors are critical in understanding each countrys ability to make the transition:Related to energy resilience1.The countrys short-te
108、rm economic reliance on energy imports and emissions-intensive industries.Some countries rely on imported energy,frequently fossil fuels,for energy security.These include several European countries such as Germany,which are exposed because of their high level of dependence on imported fuels,and coun
109、tries like India and China,which represent the worlds largest population centers and have both high energy needs and carbon-intensive energy-consumption profiles.2.The countrys access to favorable natural resources.Some countries have limited natural domestic potential for the development of clean e
110、nergy,such as the required levels of sunshine or wind,suitable land for new projects,or abundant reserves of minerals such as copper and nickel that are critical to the energy transition.Related to affordability The countrys disposable financial resources and ability to leverage capital to support t
111、he energy transition.The net-zero transition would require an additional$1 trillion to$3.5 trillion in average annual capital investment globally through 2050,according to our estimates.11 Renewable energy and grid improvements require up-front capital investment.These capital investments pay off ov
112、er various time horizons in the form of reduced operating expenses and improved energy resilience and cost.The transition would also require addressing,where necessary,the risk of stranded costs in fossil-fuel assets,conducting at-scale R&D,retraining the workforce,offering safety nets to vulnerable
113、 groups,and funding early-stage infrastructure deployment to initiate“learning-curve”effects.Both more and less affluent countries find themselves under budget constraints these days,but the former have many more resources and face fewer trade-offs than the latter in making these investments.The exa
114、mination of these three dimensions leads us to define five main archetypes of countries,each grouping with similar challenges and opportunities in the net-zero transition(Exhibits E1 and E2).While each country is different,we believe these archetypes naturally lend themselves to a similar or compara
115、ble set of actions and priorities for a more orderly energy transition.This categorization of countries reveals that the burdens of the energy transition,and each regions ability to meet the challenges of adaptation and mitigation,will not be evenly distributed.Moreover,global cooperation and coordi
116、nated collective action beyond current levels will be needed:for example,while significant progress has been made in mobilizing public and private financing for developing countries,OECD analysis indicates that the$100 billion target for 2020,set at COP15 in Copenhagen,was likely not met.12 The path
117、way to mobilizing global financial flows from more affluent to more at-risk countries is still unknown,but our analysis indicates that developing countries can benefit from readily 11 Estimates are based on the“net zero 2050”scenario of the Network for Greening the Financial System(NGFS).Our researc
118、h is not a projection or prediction and does not claim to be exhaustive.See The net-zero transition:What it would cost,what it could bring,January 2022.12 Aggregate trends of climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries in 2013-2020,OECD,2022.4The energy transition:A region-by-regio
119、n agenda for near-term actionavailable solutions such as abatement and avoidance of coal expansion or methane emissions,which increased financing flows can catalyze.Similarly,affluent countries would benefit from greater availability of critical natural resources from developing countries,which woul
120、d require investment in the sustainable extraction and processing of these resources.13 The Just Energy Transition Partnership between Indonesia and a number of developed countries,announced in November,is an example of positive efforts in this direction that will need to be replicated and multiplie
121、d at scale.14 13 See,for example,Marcelo Azevedo,Nicolas Goffaux,and Ken Hoffman,“How clean can the nickel industry become?,”McKinsey,September 11,2020;and Henry Legge,Clemens Mller-Falcke,Tomas Nauclr,and Erik stgren,“Creating the zero-carbine mine,”McKinsey,June 29,2021.14“The EU and international
122、 partners launch ground-breaking Just Energy Transition Partnership with Indonesia,”European Commission,November 15,2022.Exhibit E1Source:McKinsey analysistransition characteristics.Short-term risk:Relative energy security;CO2 intensitySoutheast AsiaIndiaJapanAfricaLatin AmericaNorth AmericaMiddle E
123、astEuropeAustraliaChina60,00010,00040,00020,000050,00080,00070,00030,000IndiaQatarItalySouth KoreaCanadaChileKuwaitHungaryUnited Arab EmiratesChinaPolandSingaporeJapanIsraelCzech RepublicUnited KingdomUnited StatesDisposable fnancial resources and capital,GDP per capita,$SpainAustraliaGermanyBelgium
124、SwedenNetherlandsDenmarkAustriaGreeceFranceFinlandSouth AfricaSaudi ArabiaPortugalHigher Lower Deep dive to follow2.Afuent,energy exposed3.Large,emissions-intensive economies 1.Afuent,energy secureSize of bubble:PopulationShort-term fossil reliance and emission intensityCountries can be divided into
125、 five main archetypes based on key energy transition characteristics.5The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionExhibit E2Source:McKinsey analysistransition characteristics.Long-term opportunity:Relative potential from wind and solar;presence of critical materials18,00012,0
126、006,000010,0004,0002,00014,00016,0008,000MalaysiaUruguayNigeriaColombiaBulgariaIndonesiaPanamaMoroccoDisposable fnancial resources and capital,GDP per capita,$BrazilMexicoEgyptPhilippinesBoliviaRomaniaEcuadorArgentinaCosta RicaThailandHondurasSenegalVietnamPeruGhanaKenyaLow natural resources potenti
127、al High natural resources potential Latin AmericaEuropeSoutheast AsiaAfricaSize of bubble:Population4.Developing,naturally endowed 5.Developing,at riskAccess to favorable natural resourcesCountries can be divided into five main archetypes based on key energy transition characteristics.6The energy tr
128、ansition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionThe five archetypes are:1.Affluent,energy-secure countries.These countrieswhich include Australia,Saudi Arabia,and the United Statestogether have 8 percent of the global population and account for 22 percent of global greenhouse-gas(GHG)emission
129、s.They have abundant domestic production of energy and high GDP per capita(as a proxy for the amount of available financial resources and capital).They are likely to remain energy exporters in the near term,as long as fossil fuel consumption remains relevant,but could reconsider their energy sources
130、 to meet emissions targets.2.Affluent,energy-exposed countries.These countrieswhich include Germany,Italy,and Japanrepresent 7 percent of the global population and 13 percent of global emissions.They have high GDP per capita but are exposed to energy-security concerns.The transition could represent
131、an opportunity for them to pivot to domestic clean-energy production;some of the more manufacturing-intensive countries could incorporate more green manufacturing practices.3.Large,emissions-intensive economies.China,India,and South Africa are among the countries with large,emissions-intensive econo
132、mies.Altogether,they are home to 37 percent of the global population and generate 40 percent of global emissions.For these economies,a net-zero transition would naturally focus on finding a balance between meeting growing energy demand with cleaner resources,on the one hand,and addressing the relian
133、ce on the most emissions-intensive fuel,which has historically been relatively low-cost,domestically produced coal,on the other.4.Developing,naturally endowed economies.Brazil,Indonesia,and Mexico are among the countries with developing,naturally endowed economies.Altogether,they represent 9 percent
134、 of the global population and 5 percent of global emissions.These countries have significant potential for power from solar or wind sources or critical natural resources,such as rare metals,to support the energy transition.A natural priority for these countries would be setting up the framework to d
135、evelop these resources and attract domestic and international capital.5.Developing,at-risk economies.The countries with developing,at-risk economies include parts of Africa,Southeast Asia,and Latin America,as well as several island nations.Altogether,they are home to 11 percent of the global populat
136、ion and generate 5 percent of global emissions.They are characterized largely by agricultural economies,a disproportionate exposure to climate risk.Some have limited potential for renewables development,either because of financial constraints or because of limited natural endowments.Their transition
137、 would likely be coupled with the establishment of basic infrastructure services and investment in climate adaptation,and likely possible only with foreign support.Globally,eight sets of common actions are needed for a more orderly transition All countries have the opportunity to take eight sets of
138、actions that are necessary in the near term to make the energy transition more orderly.The extent to which these actions are relevant to a given country,and the specifics of their implementation,would of course vary.We have prioritized these actions based on two criteria.One is relative ease of impl
139、ementation.The second is the need to ensure energy resilience and affordability along the way.We recognize that any such articulation would fall short of the ideal that would be pursued in the absence of constraints.7The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionWhile these act
140、ions address the entirety of the global energy system,most of them focus on energy production rather than consumption.Indeed,while promoting the adoption of green technology on the demand side will be important,we believe that many of the actions to be taken in the near term will interest the supply
141、 side,where addressing the scalability of assets and infrastructure and moving energy production toward a smaller carbon footprint will likely be priorities.This analysis builds on a previous article outlining nine requirements for a more orderly transition,which are grouped into three categories:ph
142、ysical building blocks;economic and societal adjustments;and governance,institutions,and commitments.15 We note that these actions are well known in many cases.We believe it is possible and critical to make meaningful progress on all of them within the 86 months remaining in this decade.Physical bui
143、lding blocks1.Streamlining access to land,accelerating permitting and simplifying processes to accelerate time to deployment for renewables and cleantech.16 Streamlining the permit process and limiting the number of required project-approving entities could accelerate project execution.Access to lan
144、d could be simplified by advancing projects that benefit local communities and by developing land-efficient solutions such as offshore wind.The use of alternative landsfor example,wastelands,which is land degraded by human activities,or agrivoltaic land,land used for both agriculture and solar photo
145、voltaic energy generationand out-of-the-box solutions like floating solar photovoltaics(PVs),could help expand the area suitable for renewable installation.2.Modernizing and repurposing legacy infrastructure and creating new assets to accelerate the integration of renewables and cleantech into the e
146、nergy system.Investing in developing and modernizing the power grid will be crucial to ensuring that areas with high potential for renewables generation are integrated and connected with demand centers.Also important would be the development of new flexibility solutions such as batteries and better-
147、matching supply and demand through demand-response programsthat is,incentives and technology solutions to adjust distributed energy demand and generation whenever the grid needs support.Conventional assets such as gas plants or pipelines might still be important to ensure an adequate supply,but they
148、 would need to be adjusted to decreasing utilization or repurposed to use a cleaner fuel mix,such as hydrogen.3.Strengthening global supply chains to secure critical raw materials,components,and labor competencies.Countries will need to develop a resource strategy to match their needs for components
149、 and materials with the supply that is either available or could be made available.This could include investing in product redesign to promote the substitution of constrained or at-risk materials.Promoting recycling and reuse could help limit the demand for critical resources.The selective adoption
150、of reshoring could promote the development of local supply chains.Setting up long-term agreements and partnerships with suppliers can be a hedge against variations in critical supply.15 Mekala Krishnan,Tomas Nauclr,Daniel Pacthod,Dickon Pinner,Hamid Samandari,Sven Smit,and Humayun Tai,“Solving the n
151、et-zero equation:Nine requirements for a more orderly transition,”McKinsey,October 27,2021.16 Cleantech refers to clean climate and energy-related technology solutions,including advanced building technologies,biopower,grid analytics,next-generation vehicles,solar photovoltaics(PVs),unconventional na
152、tural gas,wind,advanced biofuels and bio-based chemicals,carbon capture and storage,grid-scale storage,and intelligent transport.8The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term action4.Decarbonizing the industry and transportation sectors by investing in new technologies such as hydro
153、gen and carbon capture,utilization,and storage(CCUS),alongside electrification and energy efficiency.Incentivizing investments in hydrogen and CCUS solutions could help increase demand in hard-to-abate sectors and,in turn,promote the growth of a green-product industry.Investing in electrification an
154、d energy efficiency could boost the decarbonization of light industry.17 The transportation sector could address its carbon footprint through incentives for the uptake of light-duty transportation.Technological acceleration could reduce the cost difference between fuel-cell electric vehicles and con
155、ventional internal-combustion-engine vehicles for heavy-duty transportation.Economic and societal adjustments5.Limiting and mitigating emissions-intensive generation,to reduce the carbon footprint of fossil fuels and lower the risk of stranded assets.Measures to limit the addition of new fossil asse
156、ts could be introduced to avoid the further expansion of fossil plants,particularly highly intensive assets such as coal.Fossil-fuel generation would progressively shift toward balancing intermittent renewables while storage systems are brought to scale.Mechanisms to value flexibility and capacity o
157、f“firm”power generation assetsthat is,sources that provide controllable and reliable energycould be introduced,even as the utilization rates of some of these assets decline.To the extent that fossil-fuel extraction is necessary,basins with the lowest carbon intensity could be prioritized(see Box E1,
158、“Reducing the use of fossil fuels”).6.Managing economic dislocations to promote energy affordability and create fair opportunities for affected and at-risk communities.The introduction of compensation mechanisms such as subsidies would likely be required to ensure energy affordability for most vulne
159、rable consumers.Regions,especially those more dependent on fossil fuels,would need to accelerate diversification of their GDP and industrial footprints.Workers in at-risk industries such as fossil mining would need safety nets.Skills programs could be developed to create a new generation of competen
160、cies that can respond to the needs of the energy transition.Governance,institutions,and commitments7.Developing stable and attractive remuneration frameworks,market designs,and offtake structures to encourage investments in renewables and cleantech.Lower-risk frameworks for offtake,such as virtual p
161、ower purchase agreements(PPAs),could be applied on a global scale to renewables and to an even broader universe of technologies.18 In addition,establishing and scaling capacity markets could be a measure to reward flexibility and contribute to attracting investments in storage solutions like batteri
162、es and hydrogen.8.Scaling frameworks and standards to measure carbon intensity of energy and final products and develop a global,new carbon economy.Developing the right carbon standards,incentives,and markets will be important to accelerating the transition.Further,beyond voluntary carbon markets,se
163、tting the right carbon pricing could play an essential role in driving the fossil-to-green switch and promoting the viability of business cases for low-carbon technologies.Carbon transparency could ultimately lead to the pricing of carbon contents and the creation of low-carbon or green premiums for
164、 various fuels like hydrogen and commodities like steel and cement.In parallel to these actions,immediate and sustained efforts toward energy efficiency can help ease the burden of this transformation.17 Based on the IEA definition,light industry describes a range of sectors with lower absolute ener
165、gy use than heavy industry such as steel and cement.Light industry includes,among other industries,consumer goods,food,and construction.See Alexandre Gouy and David Hodgson,Light industry,IEA,September 2022.18 Virtual-power purchase agreements do not involve the physical delivery of energy.9The ener
166、gy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionRegion-specific actions will be needed to address local characteristics and socioeconomic differencesThe just-discussed global actions will play out differently across regions and countries and will need to be combined with region-specific
167、actions to enable a more orderly transition.We provide here a brief overview for each of the ten regions,recognizing that there are differences among the countries(and different archetypes)in each region and,therefore,additional nuances.These are addressed in greater detail in chapters of the full r
168、eport.Each region is presented here under its dominant archetype.As we consider these region-specific actions,it is important to bear in mind that securing energy resilience and affordability remains a key priority of governments across the world.This report focuses therefore on more feasible action
169、s that could materially advance the energy transition.We recognize that further innovation and cost declines in clean technologies are needed to bring down the cost of meeting net-zero goals,but we believe the actions outlined here are mostly possible with the technologies available today.Affluent,e
170、nergy-secure regionsUnited States.The United States has a highly developed economy,with a relatively high penetration of renewables and resources to scale green solutions.The country could move closer to a having more orderly energy transition by committing to six high-priority measures:(1)designing
171、 and deploying a capital-efficient and affordable energy system;(2)strengthening supply chains to provide stable access to raw materials,components,and skilled labor(for example,developing resilience plans to maintain access to critical materials and technologies);(3)securing access to land with str
172、ong renewables potential and proximity to transmission lines for the deployment of renewables(through better valuation,technological innovation,and strategic site selection,for example);(4)reforming transmission development to include proactive planning,fast-track permitting,and systematic considera
173、tion of transmission alternatives(for example,deploying distributed energy resources like rooftop solar panels,behind-the-meter storage,and demand-side management);(5)creating market mechanisms for expanding firm capacity to ensure a reliable and adequate clean energy supply;and(6)accelerating techn
174、ological innovation to ensure timely deployment of new clean technologies.Australia.With its significant renewables potential and large-scale reserves of critical materials,Australia could prosper in the energy transition.It could,for example,export green fuels and critical minerals to support the t
175、ransition beyond its borders.As a fossil-intensive economy,Australia has a significant abatement opportunity and could focus on:(1)expanding firm capacity and transmission to accelerate coal retirements(for example,taking a sector-wide approach to managing the exit of coal capacity)and investing in
176、green alternatives;(2)securing power supply by strengthening natural gas supply capacity;(3)building infrastructure and implementing incentives to spur investments aimed at decarbonizing industry;(4)mitigating economic and social impacts on local communities affected by the energy transition(for exa
177、mple by developing sector-and region-specific economic transition plans for workforces and communities).10The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionThe Middle East.The Middle East accounts for the largest share of global oil production today,but it has the potential to beco
178、me an exporter of clean,sustainable energy such as hydrogen and green products.Key priority actions to do so include:(1)promoting investments to scale the supply of CCUS,low-carbon hydrogen and ammonia while stimulating demand domestically and internationally;(2)boosting renewables development and f
179、acilitating renewable integration by upgrading supporting infrastructure(for example,transmission grids and long-duration storage);(3)incentivizing electrification and energy efficiency in buildings,industry,and the transportation sector;and(4)promoting green businesses that are building new energy
180、solutions in order to diversify the local economy and capture new economic opportunities from the transition.Affluent,energy-exposed regionsEurope.Europe has invested significantly in decarbonization efforts.However,given its heavy reliance on fuel imports and recent energy-security disruption,it wo
181、uld need to further accelerate its adoption of renewables.A successful energy transition would require:(1)Creating resilient,at-scale supply chains for key decarbonization technologies(for example,by diversifying the supplier base or securing long-term partnerships);(2)Building out energy grid infra
182、structure to support resilience and reduce barriers to in-region renewables(for example,increasing the regasification capacity of liquefied natural gas);(3)Overcoming land-use,societal,and regulatory constraints to accelerate development of renewables(for example,by simplifying and streamlining perm
183、itting processes to shorten time lines);(4)Redesigning power markets in line with decarbonization and affordability objectives(which could include tapping into the market for PPAs and negotiating contracts directly with renewable energy sources);(5)Ensuring affordability of clean technologies to fos
184、ter their adoption and accelerate the energy transition(for example,by subsidizing the adoption of clean technologies that are not yet cost competitive,such as EVs and heat pumps).Japan.Although Japan relies largely on imported fossil fuels,it has a strong technological and innovation base for devel
185、oping new green technologies.To accelerate its energy transition,Japan could prioritize:(1)developing solutions to overcome land constraints,such as offshore wind and rooftop solar,to maximize renewables penetration;(2)scaling infrastructure and the supply chain(including developing infrastructure t
186、o transport liquefied hydrogen)to enable hydrogen and ammonia imports that can help meet total energy demand;(3)establishing the value chain for CCUS,including developing equipment and facilities(for example,by finalizing the research and selection of carbon-storage sites);(4)enhancing transmission
187、capacity and grid resilience through improved developer economics and power sharing by regions;and(5)enhancing the current carbon pricing and trading scheme(for example,considering standards and rules for heavy emitters to incent the power and industry sectors more effectively).11The energy transiti
188、on:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionLarge,emissions-intensive economiesChina.Although China accounts for the largest share of global emissions,it also leads in the development of renewable capacity.To accelerate its transition,China could consider the following priorities:(1)limiting an
189、d mitigating coal emissions in the power and industry sectors and substituting coal with renewables;(2)enabling and scaling grid connectivity between demand centers and renewable capacity,which would involve streamlining permitting and cooperation across regions to promote the coordinated developmen
190、t of transmission systems;(3)promoting development of renewables and flexibility solutions while considering enhancements to market structures(for example,companies could be enabled to sign green-power deals quickly and efficiently through flexible PPAs);(4)scaling up hydrogen-based fuels and carbon
191、 capture,utilization,and storage,which would amount to a transition of the existing hydrogen production from gray to green;and(5)enabling greater carbon transparency and incentivizing the private sector to pursue more ambitious targets(for example,China may consider extending its emissions-trading s
192、ystem to nonpower sectors).India.Indias projected rapid demographic and economic growth will increase energy demand significantly,heightening the importance of an affordable,renewable energy supply.Key opportunities for India are:(1)expanding land availability and reducing acquisition barriers for r
193、enewable deployment(for example,the country could use geospatial technology to identify sites suitable for renewables development and prioritize wasteland and other readily available land);(2)streamlining the contracting process through state utility buy-in to facilitate state and corporate PPAs;(3)
194、creating new financial mechanisms to de-risk projects and improving the financial and operational health of distribution companies,including through green bonds and sustainability funds;(4)accelerating the development of green manufacturing capacity and promoting access to raw materials and local su
195、pply-chain opportunities;and(5)reducing the carbon intensity of high-emissions power and industrial sites(for example,by setting up hydrogen targets in preidentified sectors and providing gap funding to encourage green hydrogen expansion).Developing,naturally endowed economiesLatin America.This regi
196、on holds significant potential to drive the energy transition given its high availability of natural resources,which can contribute to the energy transition globally.Latin American countries have a few opportunities to consider:(1)streamlining,accelerating,and increasing certainty of project permitt
197、ing,and promoting simpler frameworks for public-private collaboration;(2)improving and stabilizing pricing schemes,market designs,and guarantees to de-risk energy transition investments and improve access to domestic and international capital;(3)introducing demand-side measures to promote the switch
198、 from fossil to electric and other energy-efficient alternatives in transportation;(4)developing regulated carbon tracking mechanisms and markets,and driving green incentives to decarbonize industry footprints;(5)promoting local manufacturing of parts and equipment,and exporting clean energy commodi
199、ties and products;and(6)developing a qualified regional workforce to support the transition and create socioeconomic benefits.12The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionDeveloping,at-risk economies Africa.The African continent is hugely diverse,and while several countries
200、are vulnerable to energy risks,the energy transition creates an opportunity to accelerate economic growth,expand access to energy and clean cooking,create jobs,and improve health and quality of life.African countries would benefit from:(1)ensuring attractive returns on green development projects to
201、mobilize capital(for example,setting up electricity tariffs that reflect costs and implementing managerial reforms could improve the financial viability of utilities);(2)deploying green off-grid solutions at scale to provide universal access to energy(for example,by supporting commercial players to
202、build regional isolated grid projects called“metrogrids”in Africa)to improve energy access and affordability;(3)establishing infrastructure,supporting environment,and regulations,to build green industries and realize export opportunities(for example,African nations could consider implementing enviro
203、nmental,social,and governance standards and creating special economic zones);and(4)expanding gas pipeline capacity and downstream infrastructure to shift to clean cooking and balance the grid.Southeast Asia.A rapidly developing region with slow deployment of renewables and a strong reliance on coal,
204、Southeast Asia faces many obstacles in the energy transition.To manage rapid development and a large emissions footprint,the region might prioritize several steps:(1)creating the conditions for bankable renewables projects and advancing national and regional plans to minimize new coal development,an
205、d improving efficiency of the existing coal fleet(for example,rethinking subsidies and regulatory frameworks to close the cost gap between coal and renewables);(2)electrifying and improving efficiency across sectors to temper growing demand(for example,private financing could be encouraged to invest
206、 in the energy-efficiency value chain);(3)adapting local economies to take full advantage of the transition,driving employment and socioeconomic growth across the region;and(4)developing standards and practices for emissions transparency to enable carbon tracking for multinational manufacturers in t
207、he region(which could include,for example,establishing region-wide carbon markets).As we consider the actions listed here,it is important to recognize that the burdens of the transition will not be felt evenly.Developing countries face unique challenges related to transitioning their energy systems.
208、Three stand out:difficulty accessing private capital markets;constraints on public spending(particularly if government tax revenues from emissions-intensive industries fall);and challenges related to bearing any impact of rising energy costs,given the limited safety nets and the imperative in these
209、regions to expand energy access and enable development.A more orderly transition will therefore need to be a just transition,one that recognizes the specific challenges that developing countries experience and that responds with collective,global,and unified action.This could take various forms,incl
210、uding the expansion of North-South financial transfers,measures to de-risk lending to developing countries(for instance,via a greater role for multilateral development banks),and broader capital-market access.13The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionKey stakeholders can
211、accelerate the action to promote a more orderly transition by 2030Meeting the moment of global orderly energy transition will require decisive,coordinated action by all global stakeholders.It will also require global coordination to ensure an equitable and affordable transition,while not compromisin
212、g the need for energy security.Recent events have set the world on the path to an even more disorderly transition than was expected in early 2022.Global stakeholders will need to consider several key priorities:Governments and multilateral institutions have a central role to play in implementing pol
213、icies and measures to encourage carbon standards and promote investment in renewables,with the objective of translating net-zero goals into an integrated energy plan that combines emissions reductions,resilience,affordability,and energy security and mitigates uneven impacts on communities at risk.Go
214、vernments will need to work together with the private sector to promote measures that accelerate green technologies and mobilize key resources,such as the domestic labor force and supply chain.Financial institutions are instrumental in rethinking investment horizons and risk-return profiles(for exam
215、ple,derisking lending to drive demand for net-zero technologies),disclosing and measuring their portfolio exposure in the near term and quickly deploying capital toward clean energy projects while supporting broader energy resilience.Financial institutions can further contribute“beyond money,”by len
216、ding their expertise and guidance to drive the success of green initiatives.Companies would gain from focusing on developing net-zero strategies and action plans,prioritizing innovation in green business models and technologies,deploying energy efficiency solutions to limit demand,and securing a sus
217、tainable supply chain.For energy providers such as utilities and transmission and distribution companies,priorities will be defining a strategy for carbon intensive assets to manage stranded-asset risks without compromising energy security;derisking and securing the supply chain for raw materials,la
218、bor and components;prioritizing innovation in business models and technologies;and developing the manufacturing footprint for clean technologies.Companies in energy-intensive industries,such as mining,cement,and oil and gas extraction,could consider setting targets for energy decarbonization,linked
219、to specific,time-bound initiatives such as power-purchase agreements and energy-efficiency programs,which would also improve their resilience to commodity market fluctuations;investing in energy supply and developments,usually with partners;creating an asset transition strategy to promote a transiti
220、on of portfolio and operations toward a net-zero world;and developing a procurement and energy risk management strategy to mitigate energy security and volatility risks.Individuals could participate in the climate change dialogue,make informed tradeoffs and behavioral changes that may be required,an
221、d demand increased transparency and accountability from their leaders to manage a transition that combines emissions reductions with energy security and affordability.14The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term action15The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term
222、 action AerialPerspective Works/Getty Images16The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionThe current state1The growth of renewable energy production has been strong in the past decade,and a growing number of governments and companies are committing to meet net-zero targets.A
223、t the same time,demand for energy continues to rise and fossil-fuel production has also risen to meet that demand.Fossil fuels still account for more than 80 percent of the worlds primary energy.Momentum toward renewables is growing but without a corresponding decrease in global emissions The worlds
224、 progress toward cleaner energy has been accelerating.Over the past decade,the global production of renewable energy such as wind,solar,and hydro has more than doubled,and its share of total primary energy consumption has increased from 9 percent in 2011 to 13 percent in 2021.19 Installed wind and s
225、olar capacity has risen fourfold in the same period(Exhibit 1).20 Recent public-and private-sector commitments,particularly after the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties(COP26)in Glasgow in 2021,suggest investment in renewables will continue.As of June 2022,economies that have set natio
226、nal net-zero targets in domestic legislation or public policy documents accounted for 65 percent of global greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions,up from 10 percent in December 2020.21 In the private sector,more than 1,800 companies had put in place science-based targets,up from the just more than 1,000 compa
227、nies that had done so at the end of 2021.22At the same time,the need to meet growing energy demand continues to drive the expansion of fossil fuel use.Global energy demand grew by 14 percent in the decade from 2011 to 2021,driven in large part by growth in both population and economic activity.The d
228、emand was fueled mainly by emissions-intensive sources,which have in turn hindered progress on emissions reduction:of the incremental 74 exajoules(EJ)of growth in energy demand over the past decade,61 percent was met by an increase in carbon-emitting fuels.As a result,while energy efficiency has imp
229、roved,global energy-related emissions have nonetheless increased in the past decade by about 5 percent,or by 1.7 gigatons(Gt)of carbon dioxide(CO2).23 The current share of primary energy from fossil fuels remains predominant and has dropped only slightly,to 82 percent from 85 percent.For example,coa
230、l production in India and China alone has grown by 600 million tons since 2011,as growing energy needs in the two countries have led to an increase in coal production of 10 percent in China and nearly 30 percent in India.Indonesia,meanwhile,has produced an additional 260 million tons of coal in the
231、past decade.2419 BP energy outlook,2022.20 Renewable energy capacity,2022.21“Net Zero Tracker,”Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit,Data-Driven EnviroLab,NewClimate Institute,Oxford Net Zero,2022.22 Science Based Targets initiative(SBTi),data as of September 2022.23 Global Energy Review 2021,IEA.24
232、BP energy outlook,2022.17The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionThe current renewables development rate may not suffice to meet global warming-reduction targetsAs a result,a major gap remains between renewables on one hand and fossil fuel production and consumption on th
233、e otherand the need for bold,decisive,and carefully considered climate action is stronger than ever.Despite the planned growth in renewables,the world is not on track to meet net-zero requirements.According to McKinseys Global Energy Perspective 2022,the current rate of renewable development would n
234、ot be sufficient to maintain global warming within the worldwide targets set by the Paris Agreement adopted at COP21 in 2015(see Box 1,“Scenarios exploring technological progress and policy enforcement”).25 25 Global Energy Perspective,April 26,2022;the report was developed as a collaboration betwee
235、n McKinsey Sustainability and McKinseys Global Energy and Materials and Advanced Industries practices.Exhibit 1Primary energy consumption,exajoulesSource:BP Global Energy Outlook,2022;International Renewable Energy Agency(IRENA)Renewable Capacity Statistics,2022fuels still predominate.Note:Figures m
236、ay not sum to 100%,because of rounding.24%23%22%Natural gas27%30%5954%31%Coal201634%201111%4%28%5%33%Nuclear energy521RenewablesOil9%202155613%Installed capacity,gigawattsTotal renewable1Solar and wind1,3302,0103,064294(22%)767(38%)1,674(55%)1Includes wind,solar,hydropower,marine,bioenergy,and geoth
237、ermal energy.The share of renewables in primary energy consumption has risen,but fossil fuels still predominate.18The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionAccording to the sixth assessment report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC),extrapo
238、lation of current policies would lead to median global warming of 2.4C to 3.5C by 2100.Limiting global warming to 1.5C by 2100 would be beyond reach,absent scenarios in which immediate action is taken.26 Indeed,past McKinsey analysis indicates that the world would need to“bend the curve”for energy e
239、missions to,by 2030,bridge a yearly gap of 2.4 Gt carbon dioxide equivalent(CO2e)(7 percent of 2021 energy-related emissions)that exists between our“current trajectory”scenario and our“achieved commitments”scenario(Exhibit 2).26 Climate Change 2022:Impacts,Adaptation and Vulnerability,the sixth asse
240、ssment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC),February 2022.Exhibit 2Net energy-related annual emissions by scenario,Metric gigatons(Gt)of CO2 equivalent per year,202230Source:McKinsey Global Energy Perspective 2022The world needs to bend the curve to achieve net-zero emission
241、s.1Includes members of the EU27 only;other European countries have been included in Other.Includes Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS)and other countries in Europe and Asia.The Current Trajectory would imply a 2.4C rise in global temperatures by 2100,while an Achieved Commitments scenario would
242、lead to a rise in global temperatures of 1.7C by 2100(see Exhibit 3 for more details on our scenarios).35.034.531.532.032.533.035.533.534.036.031.020302022202242025202620272029Current trajectory3Achieved Commitments scenario32.4Gt/year CO2Projected gap between Achieved Commitments and Cur
243、rent Trajectory scenario by 2030 Middle EastJapanChinaLatin AmericaUnited StatesSoutheast AsiaOthers2Europe1AfricaAustraliaIndiaThe world needs to bend the curve to achieve net-zero emissions.19The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionExhibit 3Source:McKinsey Energy Insigh
244、ts;McKinsey Global Energy Perspective 2022realized.1Global average CO2 prices required in 2030 and 2050 to trigger decarbonization investments sufcient to fulfll the scenario.Prices are weighted by country and sector emissions and are holistic in that they include both explicit costs(eg,carbon tax o
245、r emission trading system)and implicit costs(eg,subsidies or feed-in tarifs)to incentivize abatement.Warming estimate is an indication of the global rise in temperature by 2100 versus preindustrial levels(median,17th and 83rd percentile)based on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC)assessm
246、ents given the respective emission levels and assuming a continuation of trends after 2050 but no net-negative emissions.Scenarios focus on the pace of technological progress and level of policy enforcementSlowerModeled from the bottom up as part of GEP 2022FasterSpeed of energy transitionScenario d
247、escriptionFading MomentumCurrent TrajectoryFurther AccelerationAchieved Commitments1.5PathwayFading momentum in cost reductions,climate policies,and public sentiment will lead to prolonged dominance of fossil fuelsCurrent trajectory of declining cost of renewables continues,though active policies cu
248、rrently remain insufcient to close gap to ambitionFurther acceleration of transition driven by country-specifc commitments,though fnancial and technological restraints remainNet-zero commitments achieved by leading countries through purposeful policies;followers transition at slower paceA 1.5 pathwa
249、y is adopted globally,driving rapid decarbonization investment and behavioral shiftsRequired CO2price1/metric ton CO2,203050 200+Median global temperature increase linked to expected emission levels2 2.4C 2.4C(1.92.9C)1.9C(1.62.4C)1.7C(1.42.1C)1.5CCO2CO2CO2CO2CO2The speed of the energy transition wi
250、ll differ based on which scenario is realized.Box 1 Scenarios exploring technological progress and policy enforcementIn our Global Energy Perspective 2022,we explore different scenarios for the pace of technological progress and the level of policy enforcement,including the“current trajectory”scenar
251、io and the“achieved commitments”scenario,both referred to in this report.Exhibit 3 describes all five scenarios.In the“current trajectory”scenario,the global median rise in temperature by 2100 is forecast to be about 2.4C,1 and the cost of renewables continues to decline.However,policies that are ac
252、tive in this 1 Warming estimates are an indication of global rise in temperature by 2100 versus pre-industrial levels(median-17th/83rd percentile),based on IPCC assessments,given the respective emission levels and assuming continuation of trends after 2050 but no net-negative emissions.scenario are
253、insufficient to close the gap to the net-zero goal.In the“achieved commitments”scenario,the global median rise in temperature by 2100 is expected to be about 1.7C,because of more aggressive policies,including a higher carbon price.Leading countries would achieve their net-zero commitments through pu
254、rposeful policies,while other countries would make the transition at a slower pace.20The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionAmid these conflicting trends,the socioeconomic context has become at once more precarious and more receptive to the energy transition.Todays macro
255、economic conditions are further highlighting the importance of a functioning energy system.The disruption in global supply chains has increased concerns about energy security,inflated the costs of energy-project construction,and sharply increased the cost of energy globally.The same challenges have
256、spurred renewed awareness and actions toward a more orderly energy transition,particularly in Europe.Nonetheless,the potential to reach net-zero GHG emissions and a feasible pathway do exist.As shown in Exhibit 4,there are significant naturally endowed areas across the globe where solar and wind pot
257、ential could be exploited for a transition to a renewable system.What will be needed to bridge the gap?To bridge this gap,significant changes will be needed to a variety of factors,which are explored more in depth throughout this report.For example,development of renewable energy will require signif
258、icant acceleration.We estimate that the average yearly installed capacity will need to nearly triple in both wind and solar energy,from 181 gigawatts(GW)of average yearly installed capacity between 2016 and 2021 to 524 GW over the next decade,to meet an“achieved commitments”scenario(a 1.7C average g
259、lobal temperature rise by 2100).For example,that will require the Middle East,Africa,and India to increase solar and wind deployment by a factor of eight(Exhibit 5).Ultimately,a successful transition would require significant rebalancing.It would require new investments,including in grids that conne
260、ct remote locations to demand and storage centers.Such centers would allow consumers to use energy from renewables and excess generated energy to be stored or released in storage solutions that would balance and stabilize the system.Some countries would become exporters and others would become impor
261、ters of raw materials as well as energy.The transition would affect traditional jobs and create new ones where new skills are required.To avoid extreme impacts on economies and societies,such as growth impairment,public resentment,and political challenges,the transition would need to be balanced and
262、 avoid becoming disorderly.In a more orderly transition,access to energy would be secure,resilient,and affordable and would consider the current macroeconomic conditions,such as high inflationary pressure,supply-chain bottlenecks,and growing economic disparities.A major gap remains between renewable
263、s on one hand and fossil fuel production and consumption on the otherand the need for bold,decisive,and carefully considered climate action is stronger than ever.21The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionExhibit 4Source:The Global Solar Atlas;The Global Wind Atlasaccelera
264、te a transition to a renewable-energy system.Note:The boundaries shown on maps do not imply ofcial endorsement or acceptance by McKinsey&Company.1Photovoltaic power output.2Kilowatt-hours/kilowatt peak.Daily totals:2.42.83.23.64.04.44.85.25.6 6.0Long-term average photovoltaic power potential(PVOUT1)
265、Photovoltaic power potential,kWh/kWpkWh/kWp2Wind power density at 100 meters,watts per square meter(W/m2)0500600700800900 1,000Wind power density potential,watts per square meterThere are various areas around the world where solar and wind potential could accelerate a transition to a rene
266、wable-energy system.22The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionExhibit 5Average yearly installed capacity of solar,gigawatts,206534914202640Southeast AsiaJapanIndiaUnited StatesLatin AmericaChinaEurope1AustraliaMiddle EastAfrica2021 to 20302016 to 202
267、3292427United StatesLatin AmericaJapanChinaAustraliaSoutheast AsiaMiddle EastIndiaEurope1Africa2021 to 20302016 to 2021Acceleration required in installations to be“on track”Average yearly installed capacity of wind,gigawatts,201630 x 11.0 x 2.5x 3.7x 1.7x 8.5x 1.4x 2.8x 7.6x 6.
268、4x 3.3x 16.0 x 3.9x 2.3x 1.8x 5.7x 8.3x 2.3x 9.0 x 3.9x 2.6Source:McKinsey Global Energy Perspective 2022(Achieved Commitment scenario);International Renewable Energy Agency(IRENA)Renewable Capacity Statistics,2022commitments varies among regions.1Includes members of the EU27 only.The acceleration i
269、n renewable-energy installations required to achieve commitments varies among regions.23The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term action Andy A.Widmer/EyeEm/Getty Images24The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionCountries fall into five main archetypes
270、with respect to their opportunities and priorities for a more orderly energy transition2The opportunities,challenges,and risks associated with a more orderly energy transition are not distributed evenly throughout the world.Some countries can count on greater financial or natural resources than othe
271、rs,and not all economies are equally equipped to address the challenge of transforming their energy mix.It is therefore useful to identify the primary archetypes,or groupings,into which countries fall in the context of the energy transition and the corresponding opportunities and challenges.Three di
272、mensions will likely shape each countrys ability to achieve a more orderly transition Geography will affect how the energy transition plays out from country to country and from region to region.While our perspectives can be synthesized in several ways,organizing insights into geographical clusters h
273、elps us assess unique energy opportunities based on the intrinsic characteristics of countries(such as natural endowment)and overall geopolitical profiles.We identify three main dimensions that we believe will influence each countrys ability to achieve a more orderly transition:long-term risk and po
274、tential,relating to the presence of or lack of favorable natural resources;short-term risk and potential,driven by the economic reliance on energy imports and emissions-intensive industries;and disposable financial resources and the ability to mobilize capital to support the energy transition.Long-t
275、erm risk and potential,relating to the presence of(or lack of)favorable natural resourcesSome countries have limited natural domestic potential for developing clean energy,such as abundant sunshine or wind,suitable land for new projects,or abundant reserves of minerals critical to the energy transit
276、ion,such as copper and nickel.Naturally endowed countries are those with significant potential for solar and wind development as well as opportunities to establish a role in new-materials trading and the related manufacturing supply chains.In our analysis,long-term opportunity comes primarily from a
277、 combination of potential for renewable generation and the availability of materials that are critical to the transition.25The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionPotential for renewables generation.Wind and solar power potential vary across the globe.For example,Africa,A
278、ustralia,and the Middle East have significant solar-generation opportunities,while North and South America and northern Europe have strong wind-power density(Exhibit 6).The shift toward renewables will,in all likelihood,favor naturally endowed countries,provided that the countries will be able to bu
279、ild on their potentialby,for example,developing attractive remuneration frameworks or power purchase agreements(PPAs),setting tariffs,and streamlining permitting and grid interconnection processes.Exhibit 6Source:Global Solar Atlas;Global Wind AtlasCountries have signifcant diferences in the potenti
280、al for renewable power.1Photovoltaic power output.2Kilowatt-hours/kilowatt peak.6503.404.26001502004.43.63.24002505.08003004502.85003.02.67007503503.82.44.0550504.85.41004.65.2GreeceCanadaFranceIndonesiaMean wind power densityat 100m height,watts per square meter(W/m2)BulgariaDenmarkCzech RepublicGh
281、anaSwedenPhilippinesBelgiumUnited StatesHungaryPolandNigeriaSenegalChinaFinlandIrelandItalySouth AfricaAustraliaNetherlandsUnited KingdomPortugalRomaniaVietnamCosta RicaIsraelBoliviaKuwaitAustriaKenyaJapanPanamaOmanChileUnited Arab EmiratesIndiaSingaporeArgentinaBrazilColombiaSolar average practical
282、 potential (PVOUT1Level 1,kWh/kWp2per day),long termMoroccoThailandVenezuelaGermanyEcuadorQatarHondurasBahrainMexicoPeruMalaysiaSlovakiaSaudi ArabiaUruguayEgyptSpainEuropeJapanChinaNorth AmericaLatin AmericaAustraliaMiddle EastIndiaSoutheast AsiaAfricaRenewable-power potential by countryCountries ha
283、ve significant differences in the potential for renewable power.26The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionAvailability of raw materials.The energy transition is expected to lead to a significant increase in the“material intensity”of energy resources.For example,a solar pl
284、ant is about four times as material-intensive as a gas-fired plant producing the same amount of energy.27 Materials critical for the transition include cobalt,nickel,and lithium,which are used in batteries and electric vehicles;copper,used in the grid and transformers;and rare-earth elements,which a
285、re critical for wind-turbine generators.Reserves of these materials are typically concentrated in a handful of countries around the world(Exhibit 7).28These producing countries are typically not the final users for critical materials(Exhibit 8).For instance,the Democratic Republic of the Congo produ
286、ces 75 percent of todays cobalt,while 78 percent of the demand comes from China.Indonesia produces almost 30 percent of nickel today but is not among its top ten users.We also estimate how some of these markets are or will be short on supplies.For example,the current demand for copper and nickel is
287、larger than the actual production,and this is expected to hold true also for the 2030 scenario.Tight markets will put further pressure on final-destination countries to secure key materials,even as they strengthen the role of producing countries in commodity trading.27 Information is in tons of copp
288、er equivalent per terawatt hour.See Marcelo Azevedo,Magdalena Baczynska,Patricia Bingoto,Greg Callaway,Ken Hoffman,and Oliver Ramsbotto,“The raw materials challenge:How the metals and mining sector will be at the core of enabling the energy transition,”McKinsey,January 10,2022.28 Mineral commodity s
289、ummaries 2022,US Geological Survey(USGS),2022.The opportunities,challenges,and risks associated with a more orderly energy transition are not distributed evenly throughout the world.Some countries can count on greater financial or natural resources than others,and not all economies are equally equip
290、ped to address the challenge of transforming their energy mix.27The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionExhibit 7Source:Mineral commodity summaries,US Geological Survey(USGS),2022in a few countries.Note:Figures may not sum to 100%,because of rounding.1Democratic Republic
291、of the Congo.Total expressed in thousand metric tonnes.New Caledonia(France).Rare earth oxide.Cobalt(Co)reserves,%of Co contained22,425Argentina12BrazilOther1025Portugal0United StatesChile3AustraliaChina041ZimbabweTotal217124,9903AustraliaIndiaUnited StatesRussia1735GreenlandBrazil6118Vietnam17China
292、12Total2Other5Mexico741132United StatesDRC1Australia6RussiaPeruPoland4Chile23Total29Other875,800Copper(Cu)reserves,%of Cu containedLithium(Li)reserves,%of Li containedNickel(Ni)reserves,%of Ni containedRare earth elements(REE)reserves,%of REO4equivalent98,740ChinaOther3New Caledonia3Philippines2185T
293、otal2221CanadaRussiaBrazil16Australia3Indonesia217,649MadagascarPhilippines333IndonesiaCubaRussia7111Other8Total2Canada1846AustraliaDRC1Reserves of key commodities for the energy transition are highly concentrated in a few countries.28The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term act
294、ionExhibit 8ProductionTop 5 producers,2021,%75264529328582636985985Lithium68NickelCopperCobalt7734398791649439LithiumCopperCobalt731005765Nickel17210821,16722,996109932,4152,734DRC1ChinaChilePeruAustraliaChileIndonesiaPhilippinesChinaUnited StatesChinaUnited StatesChinaUnited S
295、tatesChinaChinaFrance(New Caledonia)RussiaJapanJapanFranceChinaNorth AmericaEuropeMiddle EastIndiaLatin AmericaSoutheast AsiaAfricaJapanAustraliaAustraliaCuba CanadaRussiaDRCUnited StatesArgentinaBrazilAustraliaOther AsiaNorth AmericaEuropeIndiaGermanyIndiaGermanyIndiaTotalThousand metric tonnesDema
296、ndTop 5 end users,2021,%GermanyRussiaSource:McKinsey MineSpansmost part,not the fnal users.Note:Figures may not sum,because of rounding.1Democratic Republic of the Congo.Countries that produce critical materials for the energy transition are,for the most part,not the final users.29The energy transit
297、ion:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionShort-term risk and potential,driven by the economic reliance on energy imports and emissions-intensive industriesIn our analysis,short-term risk is driven primarily by a combination of energy security and carbon intensity.Energy securitythat is,the
298、relationship between internal energy production and consumptionexpresses the exposure of countries to current market instabilities such as commodity-price volatility and the state of global markets for fossil fuel.The greater this dependence,the more pressing the need is for domestic fossil-to-renew
299、able substitution to limit exposure to imports.Carbon intensity is a proxy for the level of complexity in todays decarbonization efforts:the higher the intensity,the more likely a country is to have a fossil-fuel-oriented energy mix and a low deployment of energy-efficiency measures.Some countries r
300、ely on energy imports,frequently of fossil fuels,for energy security.These include several European countries,such as Germany,which are exposed due to high dependence on imported fuels.Countries like India and China,which are the worlds largest population centers,have high energy needs and carbon-in
301、tensive energy consumption profiles.The interplay of energy security and carbon intensity could play out differently for different countries.For heavy importers of fossil fuel,including Europe and Japan,the deployment of renewables is not only a matter of decarbonization but also of energy security.
302、The use of renewable sources could protect against global commodity market swings and uncertainties in fossil fuel supplies.Renewables could therefore help to narrow the gap between imports and exports.However,the energy gap to be filled is significant and would require multiples of todays renewable
303、 generation to fully bridge the import-export gapwith the multiple being as high as 33 in Japan and 27 in India(Exhibit 9).A massive increase in deployment would thus be needed if renewables are to propel import-dependent regions toward energy security.As noted,the share of fossil fuels in primary e
304、nergy consumption averages 82 percent across regions,rising to as much as 99 percent in the Middle East and 90 percent in Africa,India,and Southeast Asia(Exhibit 10).The higher the dependence,the higher the bar for decarbonizationand the more complicated it will be to push for renewables substitutio
305、n and reduce the fossil fuel footprint.30The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionExhibit 96.042.3130.4101.3Import/ExportAfricaProduction12.3ConsumptionAustraliaProduction13.5ConsumptionEurope1Production36.3ConsumptionChinaProduction29.1ConsumptionIndiaProduction15.8Consum
306、ptionJapanProduction15.1ConsumptionLatin AmericaProduction1.3ConsumptionMiddle EastProduction45.5ConsumptionSoutheast AsiaProduction2.9ConsumptionUnited StatesProduction0.5Consumption76.137.482.927.515.10.016.075.731.724.626.024.55.018.018.530.3CoalGasOilUnmet local fossil energy defcitSolarWindOthe
307、r renewablesTotal generation for import parity vs todays renewables generationProduction vs consumption for key commodities,exajoules per year,2021Renewables generation by source today vs fossil fuel defcit,exajoules per year,2021Source:BP statistical review of world energy 2022,BP,2022gaps between
308、energy production and consumption.Note:For regions that are dependent on fossil imports,such as China,Europe,India,and Japan,the development of renewables can provide increased energy resiliency,but signifcant acceleration is required to fll the fossil dependency gap.1Includes members of the EU27 on
309、ly.15.815.1Japan16.4IndiaEurope115.6Chinax 8x 14x 26x 3229.136.338.933.3A massive increase in deployment of renewable energies will be needed to fill gaps between energy production and consumption.31The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionDisposable financial resources an
310、d the ability to leverage capital to support the energy transitionThe availability of capital to finance the transition will affect the extent to which countries could mobilize capital toward cleaner energy sources.The net-zero transition would require an additional$1 trillion to$3.5 trillion in ave
311、rage annual capital investment globally through 2050,according to our estimates.29 Renewable energy and grid improvements require up-front capital and pay off over various time horizons in the form of reduced operating expenses and fuel costs.The transition will also require investments to address s
312、tranded costs in fossil fuel assets,conduct at-scale R&D,retrain the workforce,and fund early-stage infrastructure deployment.Many countries find themselves under budget constraints these days,but more affluent ones have more resources and face fewer trade-offs than poorer ones.We use GDP per capita
313、 as an indicator of access to financial resources.To make these investments effectively,countries would need to address stranded costs,find ways to prevent or mitigate the premature obsolescence of technologies,rethink fossil subsidies,and potentially create new incentives for clean tech.For all cou
314、ntries,whether affluent or not,the path will be demanding.29 Estimates based on the Net Zero 2050 scenario from the Network for Greening the Financial System(NGFS).Our research is not a projection or prediction and does not claim to be exhaustive.See The net-zero transition:What it could cost,what i
315、t could bring,McKinsey,January 2022.Exhibit 10Primary energy consumption by fuel,exajoules,2021Source:BP statistical review of world energy 2022,BP,2022;McKinsey Energy Insights;McKinsey Global Energy Perspective 2022;McKinsey analysisprevalent source of primary energy.1Includes members of the EU27
316、only.Metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent per dollar.356Middle EastLatin AmericaUnitedStatesJapanIndiaSoutheastAsiaEurope1AfricaChina18Australia9335HydroelectricNuclear energyNatural gasOilRenewablesCoalFossil fuel share,%Emissions per GDP,tCO2e/$2830.59900.51700.16990.85900.80700.278
317、10.20900.36850.21870.24The energy mix of regions differs substantially,although fossil fuels remain the prevalent source of primary energy.32The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionFive country archetypes highlight different opportunities and priorities for a more orderly
318、 transition The examination of these three dimensions leads us to define five main archetypes of countries that face similar challenges and have analogous opportunities in the net-zero transition(Exhibits 11 and 12).While each country is different,we believe these archetypes naturally lend themselve
319、s to a similar set of actions and priorities for the energy transition.Each of these archetypes will have a different set of actions to take to accelerate the transition toward a pathway that leads to net zero.We touch on these potential actions only briefly and at a high level here,as we describe t
320、hem in detail in the individual country and region sections in Chapter 4 of this report.The five archetypes follow.1.Affluent,energy-secure countriesThe countries that fall into the affluent,energy-secure archetype have 8 percent of the global population and account for 22 percent of global emission
321、s.These countries,which include Australia,Saudi Arabia,and the United States,have abundant domestic production of energy and high GDP per capita.Typically,we find here countries that are net fossil fuel exporters,including Australia,Qatar,and the United States,and can use domestic production to cove
322、r demand against market volatility.Some countries that fall into this archetype are net importers but have high levels of domestic security through nuclear power(France and Belgium,for example)or fossil fuels(the Netherlands and the United Kingdom,for example).This archetypes countries are affluent,
323、with substantial purchasing power and investment resources.They are likely to remain energy exporters as the energy transition unfolds but will need to reconsider their energy sources to meet emission targets.These countries likely will focus during the transition on accelerating the deployment of c
324、lean resources.Key priority measures could be to scale proven clean solutions for such renewables and storage by ensuring that their transmission capacity and market structures are adequate.Countries with this archetype could also promote a strong local supply chainas the United States is doing to r
325、e-shore domestic silicon-wafer production for solar photovoltaics(PVs),for exampleand work to develop and retrain their workforce.Other potential actions include creating a new supply chain and bankable returns for new energy innovationsfor example,for hydrogen in Australia and CCUS in the Middle Ea
326、stto tackle hard-to-abate sectors and promoting opportunities to diversify their economies away from fossil fuels.The latter is especially pertinent in the Middle East,where one-quarter to one-half of GDP is linked to fossil fuel sectors like oil exploration.2.Affluent,energy-exposed countriesGerman
327、y,Italy,and Japan are among the countries that fall into the affluent,energy-exposed archetype,which account for 7 percent of the global population and 13 percent of emissions.These countries are also affluent,as measured by GDP per capita,but will be increasingly exposed to energy security concerns
328、 as the transition unfolds.Several European countries,especially the ones more exposed to fossil importsfor example,Germany and Italyas well as Japan,are included in this archetype because of their high volume of energy imports and the risk that implies for their energy security.Some Middle Eastern
329、countries,including Oman and Kuwait,belong to this archetype because of the risks they face from carbon intensity.For these countries,the transition could represent an opportunity to pivot toward domestic clean-energy production.For the more manufacturing-intensive countries,the transition could als
330、o represent an opportunity to incorporate more green manufacturing practices.33The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionExhibit 11Source:McKinsey analysistransition characteristics.Short-term risk:Relative energy security;CO2 intensitySoutheast AsiaIndiaJapanAfricaLatin Am
331、ericaNorth AmericaMiddle EastEuropeAustraliaChina60,00010,00040,00020,000050,00080,00070,00030,000IndiaQatarItalySouth KoreaCanadaChileKuwaitHungaryUnited Arab EmiratesChinaPolandSingaporeJapanIsraelCzech RepublicUnited KingdomUnited StatesDisposable fnancial resources and capital,GDP per capita,$Sp
332、ainAustraliaGermanyBelgiumSwedenNetherlandsDenmarkAustriaGreeceFranceFinlandSouth AfricaSaudi ArabiaPortugalHigher Lower Deep dive to follow2.Afuent,energy exposed3.Large,emissions-intensive economies 1.Afuent,energy secureSize of bubble:PopulationShort-term fossil reliance and emission intensityCou
333、ntries can be divided into five main archetypes based on key energy transition characteristics.34The energy transition:A region-by-region agenda for near-term actionThe near-term focus for these countries will likely be on energy security.Key actions could include deploying green technologies at an accelerated rate and streamlining land availability;ensuring grid efficiency;rethinking the demand s