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1、The International Institute for Strategic StudiesEurope and the Indo-Pacific:Convergence and Divergence in the Digital OrderMeia Nouwens,Senior Fellow for Chinese Security and Defence Policy;Francesca Maremonti,Research Assistant,European Security and Defence;Mariko Togashi,Research Fellow for Japan

2、ese Security and Defence Policy;Hannah Brandt,Research Analyst,European Security and DefenceDecember 20232 The International Institute for Strategic StudiesContentsExecutive summary 3Introduction 5Section 1:Supranational Policy Approaches in the European Union 7National Critical Infrastructure 7Nati

3、onal AI Strategies 8The Protection of National Innovation Ecosystems 9Countering Disinformation in the Cyber Domain 10Section 2:National Policy Approaches in the Indo-Pacific 12National Critical Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific 12National AI Strategies 17Protecting National Innovation Ecosystems 2

4、3Who manages investment-screening regulations?27Disinformation in the Cyber Domain 30Section 3:Comparisons between Europe and the Indo-Pacific 36National Critical-infrastructure Protection 36National AI Strategies 38Protection of National Innovation Ecosystems 39Disinformation in the Cyber Domain 41

5、Conclusion 44Appendix 46Notes 47CoverThree-dimensional render of global communications and networking in big city from an aerial view.Europe and the Indo-Pacific:Convergence and Divergence in the Digital Order 3 Executive summaryEuropean and Indo-Pacific countries are caught in the middle of the mou

6、nting systemic rivalry between the United States and China.The growing competition between these two countries in the digital domain is manifesting in different areas,including export controls,technological standards and national industrial poli-cies.However,considering the technological-innovation

7、debate solely through the lens of USChina competition risks overlooking the approaches and responses that other actors namely the European Union and Indo-Pacific countries are pursuing to enhance and safe-guard their national digital ecosystems.Shifting the focus away from USChina technologi-cal com

8、petition,this IISS research paper looks at the approaches of the EU and Indo-Pacific countries in selected domains of the digital order,identifying pat-terns of convergence and divergence in this space.Locating common practices and bringing to light gaps in policy regulation could delineate key area

9、s for further cooperation between the EU and Indo-Pacific countries.Therefore,the purpose of this report is to bring atten-tion to how the EU and Indo-Pacific countries have responded and continue to respond to four key areas of strategy,regulation and international cooperation within the digital or

10、der:1)the protection of national critical infrastructure(NCI)2)harnessing AI 3)the pro-tection of national innovation ecosystems 4)and coun-tering cyber disinformation.These areas were selected as they are particularly revelatory in terms of indicating countries approaches to national resilience,com

11、peti-tiveness,prosperity and security.For each of the four domains,the analysis poses a number of questions in order to draw out key aspects of countries approaches,such as each countrys policy development;the govern-mental authorities and stakeholders involved;domestic debates over national securit

12、y or prosperity;and part-nerships and cooperation with other regional and inter-national actors.After examining EU responses in the four areas of policy regulation,the report studies those of 41 countries,overseas territories and entities in the Indo-Pacific,excluding China.To facilitate comparison,

13、the countries analysed are grouped into four subregions:Southeast Asia,Northeast Asia,South Asia and Oceania.The assessment of these countries responses relies on primary government-policy documents and second-ary sources.The analysis also draws on insights from a workshop organised by the IISS,held

14、 in Singapore in Spring 2023,which brought together government offi-cials and leading experts in this field.With regards to the four domains,this report finds policy divergence in line with the examined countries diversity of economic growth and levels of technologi-cal development and connectivity.

15、Nevertheless,trends can be identified for Indo-Pacific countries at the subre-gional and regional levels,as well as similarities with the EU in several of the areas considered.Regarding NCI,the report highlights discussions currently taking place at the minilateral level.These include only a minorit

16、y of Indo-Pacific states.On the other hand,out of necessity the EU takes a supranational approach,having made progress on transboundary critical-infrastructure protection among member states.The EU and Indo-Pacific countries could exchange best practices for the protection of cross-border infrastruc

17、-ture and in order to enhance the resilience and protec-tion of their NCI.Concerning AI governance and the development of national AI strategies,several countries in the Indo-Pacific and the EU have made significant progress in AI regulation in recent years and are seeking cooperation in this domain

18、 with other governments at a regional and international level while also pursuing a leader-ship role in standard-setting.As several emerging and developing countries in the Indo-Pacific lag behind in regulating AI,this could provide an opportunity for EU and more developed Indo-Pacific countries to

19、share best practices to facilitate the process towards AI regulation and the development of national AI strategies.To ensure wider inclusivity in the adoption of AI technology and 4 The International Institute for Strategic Studiespromote whole-of-society approaches to AI strategies,the EU and like-

20、minded countries in the Indo-Pacific could build stronger ties with those countries predomi-nantly concerned with prosperity(rather than security or ethical concerns).Additionally,while some obsta-cles to AI-strategy implementation derive from local contexts,countries across the analysed regions see

21、m to share common challenges,such as unequal access to data,data security and national government-systems digitalisation,which points to the need for increased cooperation in this sphere.Protection of national innovation ecosystems is a further area where the EU and Indo-Pacific countries present bo

22、th similarities and differences.Like the EU,most Indo-Pacific countries participate in export-control regulation,and some have indicated their commitment to harmonise trade policies with international standards or in minilateral agreements on restricting exports of advanced technological components.

23、On the other hand,Indo-Pacific governments approaches to investment-screening mechanisms are less homogeneous than that of the EUs supranational regulations,targeting a range of different sectors but in some cases failing to thoroughly address critical sectors.The EU and more developed Indo-Pacific

24、countries could redress the discontinuity of foreign direct investment-screening mechanisms by exchanging best practices with the regional countries that take a predominantly prosperity-focused approach to national innovation and critical-infrastructure devel-opment,in order to help them develop nat

25、ional policies that can both protect national innovation strengths and support national socio-economic development.Lastly,disinformation in the cyber domain is a phe-nomenon faced by all EU and Indo-Pacific countries.However,governments responses differ greatly,rang-ing from fact-checking initiative

26、s,legislation and the involvement of civil society and the private sector,to harsher measures like strengthening state control over the online domain.A further difference between the countries analysed is the origin of disinformation cam-paigns and fake-news proliferation:these activities can be tra

27、ced back to domestic state and non-state actors in some instances,and to foreign perpetrators in oth-ers.To tackle this widespread and multifaceted phe-nomenon,states must first agree a clear definition of disinformation in the cyber domain.A definition could be the building-block of the necessary l

28、egislative and policy approaches to adopt effective countermeasures,facilitating a joint effort that would encompass the best practices from both the EU and Indo-Pacific countries.Europe and the Indo-Pacific:Convergence and Divergence in the Digital Order 5 IntroductionThe systemic rivalry between t

29、he United States and China is increasingly expressed in the digital domain on a global basis,whether through export controls,competition over technological standards or national industrial policies.European and Indo-Pacific states currently find themselves in the middle of this com-petition.The Euro

30、pean Union perceives its strengths as lying within the development of ethical technology and as a regulatory powerhouse focused on ensuring that digital and technological standards meet ethical requirements.While EU member states still retain some control over issues like investment-screening mecha-

31、nisms,the EU has passed at an increasingly signifi-cant rate regulations that seek to protect European digital and technological strengths.However,these regulations do not always align with those of like-minded countries,which,although in agreement with the EU on many matters,still weigh the importa

32、nce of national security or prosperity differently in their policy decision-making.There also remains friction between the US and EU over certain approaches to technology regulation and competition.Indo-Pacific states lack a homogenous approach even more.This is unsurpris-ing the numerous countries

33、that make up the region vary widely in their economic growth,demographics and levels of technological development and connectiv-ity.States in Southeast Asia,Northeast Asia,South Asia and Oceania all differ in their national strategies,regu-lations and willingness to cooperate internationally on issu

34、es related to technology and the digital order.As such,there is a risk that viewing the global digi-tal order solely through the lens of USChina relations and their respective approaches to digital and techno-logical strategy,regulation and alignment overlooks the diverse set of responses from vario

35、us countries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.This reports purpose,therefore,is to examine how the EU and individual Indo-Pacific countries have and continue to respond to four main areas of strategy,regulation and interna-tional cooperation within the digital order:national critical-infrastructure pr

36、otection;harnessing AI;the protection of national innovation ecosystems;and com-batting cyber disinformation.This report takes a limited approach to aspects of the global digital order due to limitations in scope.The four areas identified were cho-sen due to their importance to national resilience,c

37、om-petitiveness,prosperity and security.In order to research these four topics for each coun-try,the report examines the key policies and legislation in place and their associated definitions,the primary stakeholders involved and whether governments are currently cooperating with like-minded counter

38、parts in particular,European and Indo-Pacific states in these areas of policy development.The research relies on primary government-policy documents and second-ary sources where necessary.It also draws on insights from a closed-door workshop with government and expert participants from Europe and th

39、e Indo-Pacific,which was organised by the IISS in Singapore in 2023.The report examines European policy through the lens of EU regulations in order to facilitate clearer cross-examination.Though the authors of this report acknowledge that in some instances EU regulation only provides guidelines or v

40、oluntary mechanisms for EU member states,these sources still indicate a gen-eral policy trend across the EUs 27 member states.For the Indo-Pacific,the report examines 41 countries and overseas territories policies related to the four catego-ries,excluding China.These are grouped per chapter into fou

41、r subregions to facilitate inter-subregional com-parisons:Northeast Asia,Southeast Asia,South Asia and Oceania.In Northeast Asia,the report focuses on Japan,South Korea and Taiwan.In Southeast Asia,Brunei,Cambodia,Indonesia,Laos,Malaysia,Myanmar,the Philippines,Singapore,Thailand and Vietnam are exa

42、mined.The report does not examine the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)as an entity,nor other Indo-Pacific subregional or regional groupings,in order to limit the reports scope.An exception is made 6 The International Institute for Strategic Studiesfor references to the participation of

43、individual coun-tries in minilateral groupings.In South Asia,the report examines Bangladesh,Bhutan,India,the Maldives,Nepal,Pakistan and Sri Lanka.Among the many dif-ferences that characterise these countries,one is the national approach to critical infrastructures.Oceania refers to Australia,Cook I

44、slands,Fiji,French Polynesia,Guam,Kiribati,Marshall Islands,Micronesia,Nauru,New Caledonia,New Zealand,Palau,Papua New Guinea,Samoa,Solomon Islands,Timor-Leste,Tonga,Tuvalu and Vanuatu.The report is divided into three sections.Firstly,in order to provide the European perspective,it examines the EUs

45、response to these four areas of policy and reg-ulation.It then compares developments between Indo-Pacific subregions on the four areas in order to draw conclusions about the variety of developments across the region.It does this via four sections,each dedicated to one area of policy and regulation e

46、xamined in this report.Lastly,it offers comparisons between Europes and the Indo-Pacifics current policy and regulatory approaches to the global digital order in the policy areas identified.The report also identifies gaps in current cooperation,as well as convergences and divergences in policy appro

47、aches,in order to help improve European and Indo-Pacific digital cooperation.Europe and the Indo-Pacific:Convergence and Divergence in the Digital Order 7 National Critical InfrastructureHow is National Critical Infrastructure defined?The process of defining critical infrastructure at an EU-wide lev

48、el began in 2004.Since then,the European Union has provided a definition for national critical infrastructures(NCIs)as well as for European Critical Infrastructures(ECIs).The first is defined as asset,system or part thereof located in member states which is essential for the maintenance of vital soc

49、ietal func-tions,health,safety,security,economic or social well-being of people,and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a member state as a result of the failure to maintain those func-tions.1 The definition of ECI adds the clause that the disruption of such inf

50、rastructure would impact at least two member states.2 The first pillar of the EUs efforts in ECI regulation is Council Directive 2008/114/EC on European Critical Infrastructures,which only included the energy and the transport sectors as critical infra-structures.To this day,the Commission has propo

51、sed a list of 11 critical sectors;member states are required to identify critical entities for each sector by 2026.3Which part of government is responsible for NCI policy and protection?The approach adopted by the EU for the regulation and protection of NCI is one that merges the efforts of EU-desig

52、nated authorities,member states and the pri-vate sector.The Commission established the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection(EPCIP)in 2005.4 Today,this authority has been coupled with the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network and the European Reference Network for C

53、ritical Infrastructure Protection(ERNCIP).5 Member states and private owners or operators are considered to be the primary actors and bear ultimate respon-sibility for protecting ECIs.Cooperation between national authorities and the private sectors is therefore recommended to enhance the resilience

54、of critical infra-structures.6 Member states are also required to cooper-ate through bilateral schemes to ensure the protection of transboundary critical infrastructures.Do domestic debates about NCI lean more towards prosperity or security?Across the level of the EU Community,the definition of crit

55、ical infrastructures has been intertwined with security concerns from the outset.The EPCIP was ini-tially established to enhance the resilience of critical infrastructures against terrorist threats.Today,the spectrum of potential hazards has expanded to include human-made threats,technological threa

56、ts and natural disasters,and debate remains heavily centred around security priorities,with an emphasis on the protection of the public.7 Heightened concern over dependencies on for-eign sources,from non-liberal states in particular,and potential supply-chain points of failure also influenced the de

57、bate upon protecting critical infrastructure at the EU and at the member-state level.For example,with regards to European 5G national networks,the EU published The EU Toolbox for 5G Security.8 Though the EUs approach does not focus on any one country,the purchase of and investment in European port i

58、nfra-structure by Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs),Huaweis rollout of 5G network technology,Chinese private-sector acquisition of European businesses in key strategic industries(such as robotics)and dependence on Russia for energy supplies heightened European concerns about potential state inte

59、rference in European critical infrastructure.9Chinese investment in the EUs digital infrastructure and technology sectorsAs shown in the IISS China Connects database,Chinese SOEs and private-sector companies are heav-ily invested in EU member states critical digital infra-structure and strategic tec

60、hnology industries.From 1.Supranational Policy Approaches in the European Union8 The International Institute for Strategic Studies200114,Chinese companies undertook 154 digital and technology-related projects and investments in Europe,ranging from national telecommunications-network infrastructure,t

61、o data centres,to cooperation in aca-demic programmes.Following Chinas announce-ment of its Digital Silk Road initiative,between 2015 and March 2023 this number rose to 440 new projects and investments.However,a closer look shows that new investments and projects by Chinese technology companies in E

62、urope have been declining since 2019.Whereas in 2019,activity peaked with 124 new projects and investments,in 2022 only 19 were recorded in the IISS China Connects database.This decline in activity is partly attributable to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on global trade and investment.However,

63、the pandemic also heightened European governments criticism of Chinese foreign policy and concerns over Europes over-reliance on Chinese technological sup-ply chains.10 Since then,the EU has announced a policy of de-risking from China.11National AI StrategiesDo countries have national AI strategies?

64、EU member states(in addition to Norway and Switzerland)signed the Declaration of Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence in 2018,with the EU adopting the Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence in the same year and then reviewing it in 2021.12 Although the strat-egy emphasised the need to strengt

65、hen cooperation on AI at an EU-wide level,member states were still recom-mended to develop their national AI strategies.Today,the EU is proposing a new AI-regulations package,including an updated version of the Coordinated Plan and,most importantly,the first-ever legal framework for AI the AI Act wh

66、ich is expected to be enacted by the end of 2023.The proposed regulatory system aims to set requirements and defining obligations for the application of AI,listing AI categories following a risk-based approach.13What are the main ambitions behind national AI strategy?With this newly proposed package

67、,the EU aims to be at the forefront of AI regulation in order to establish a technology-neutral,uniform definition for AI that could be applied to future AI systems.14 The regulatory frame-work prioritises the safety and fundamental rights of people and businesses,while enhancing cooperation,innovat

68、ion and investments across the EU.The goal is to ensure AI systems are safe,transparent,traceable,non-discriminatory and environmentally friendly.15 Hence,with this regulatory package,the EU aims to safeguard key principles like inclusivity(extended to area of growth),sustainability and accountabili

69、ty,as well as a human-centred approach in the application of AI.16 Which part of government is responsible?The Commission is responsible for the legislation of the AI Act and the negotiation process is carried out through tri-alogue meetings,bringing together European Parliament representatives,the

70、Council and the Commission.17 The AI Act is conceived as a horizontal legislative instrument applicable to all AI systems placed on the market or used in the Union,and envisions national authorities enact-ing it.According to the proposed legislation,a new body should be established the EU AI Office

71、in order to support and harmonise the application of the AI Act and coordinate cross-border investigations.18 Who are the main stakeholders in developing and managing the strategy?The EU promotes a whole-of-society approach along the legislative process,as well as for impact assessment of AI.The EU

72、Parliament recommends a multistakeholder governance approach.Stakeholders include the EU AI Office,European standardisation organisations and bodies and expert groups established under relevant sectorial EU law,as well as partners in industry,small and medium-sized enterprises,start-ups,civil societ

73、y and the research sector.19 According to the AI Act,this approach should enable cooperation beyond European borders,promoting a model for global cooperation on standardisation in the field of AI,which remains con-sistent with EU values.20Does the government seek partnership with other countries?The

74、 EU approach to AI regulation and implementa-tion has consistently stressed the need for cooperation both between member states and beyond.For example,Europe and the Indo-Pacific:Convergence and Divergence in the Digital Order 9 the EU is a member of the Global Partnership on AI(GPAI)and the Europea

75、n Council has established the Committee on Artificial Intelligence,which brings together member states,the private sector,civil soci-ety and regional and international organisations,such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)and the Organization for Security and Co-opera

76、tion in Europe,as well as non-EU countries as observers(such as Japan and the US).21 The EU has also engaged in bilateral partnerships with international organisations,such as the United Nations Educational,Scientific and Cultural Organizations ini-tiative to support low-income countries develop the

77、ir AI strategies.22 International cooperation has also been improved in the research sector,such as through the EUUS Administrative Arrangement,which was signed to enhance research on AI that addresses global chal-lenges such as climate change,healthcare and natural disasters,among others.23 What ar

78、e the main challenges to execution of the strategy?Providing legal framework in such an innovative set-ting is challenging for the EU.Besides this overarch-ing issue,which itself is nested within the oft-changing field of technological innovation,conceiving a func-tioning enforcement structure is th

79、e main challenge to the current AI regulatory package.The AI Act sets the ground for an ecosystem of independent AI assessment.Individuals and private organisations can submit com-plaints about AI applications to the responsible authori-ties.However,there is still a lack of clarity regarding the mec

80、hanisms that will integrate the efforts of inde-pendent assessments and member states authorities,with the end result of merging them into a risk-based regulatory framework at the EU level.24The Protection of National Innovation EcosystemsAre export-control regulations in place?In the EU,export-cont

81、rol regulations have been in place since the late 1990s and have been continuously strengthened in order to adhere to changing politi-cal and legal landscapes.As such,the EU developed a strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction(WMD)in December 2003 and the United Nations Secu

82、rity Council(UNSC)adopted Resolution 1540 in 2004,which sought to prevent WMD prolifera-tion to non-state actors.25 The first complete EU regula-tion on export controls,Regulation(EC)No 428/2009,was adopted in 2009 in adherence to the 2004 UN stand-ards.26 Since then,this regulation has been amended

83、,the latest version being Regulation(EU)2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council,dating back to May 2021,which not only takes into account the EU and its member states international obligations,including UNSC Resolution 1540,the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,the Chemical Weapons Con

84、vention and the Biological Weapons Convention,but also commitments agreed via multilateral export-control regimes,such as the Australia Group,the Wassenaar Arrangement,the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.27 The EUs export-control regulations were further centralised

85、 on 20 October 2023,with the publication of the first compilation of EU member states national export-control lists.28 This publication enhances coordination of actions between member states.Furthermore,export restrictions(sanctions)can apply to dual-use exports and sensitive technology,such as the

86、restrictive measures imposed on Russia in light of its actions in Ukraine since February 2022.29 Lastly,some member states have also agreed to US-led export restrictions against China on core technology components,such as AI-related semiconductors.30Who manages export-control regulations?Export-cont

87、rol regulations in the EU remain nationally enacted.The Commission,in close consultation with member states and stakeholders,develops guidelines and/or recommendations for best practices to support practical application of controls.31 Member states estab-lishing lists informed by these Commission gu

88、idelines,in turn,should inform the Commission and other member states of such lists as well as of all decisions to refuse an authorisation for an export for which an authorisa-tion is required on the basis of a national control list.32 Hence,member states may allow the export of dual-use items,as lo

89、ng as the export destination and object are consistent with the EUs General Export Authorisations.33 10 The International Institute for Strategic StudiesCompetent authorities may also provide global and indi-vidual licences to one exporter that may cover exports of one of multiple items to multiple

90、countries or end users,or to one consignee in a third country,respectively.34What is considered in export-control regulations?Via Regulation(EU)2021/821,the EUs export-control regime includes a list of dual-use items that could be used in connection with a WMD programme or for human-rights violation

91、s.Individual EU member states may introduce additional controls on non-listed dual-use items because of public security of human rights consid-erations.35 Since the publication of the first compilation of member states national export-control lists,this list also includes items such as machines that

92、 produce semicon-ductors(the Dutch control list),quantum computing and additive manufacturing devices(the Spanish control list).36Are investment-screening mechanisms in place?Regulation(EU)2019/452 established a framework for the investment screening of foreign direct investment(FDI)within the EU.Ho

93、wever,national screening sys-tems are not harmonised across EU member states.37 The Commission plans to present a report to the European Parliament and to the European Council by the end of 2023 with an evaluation of the functioning and effec-tiveness of this regulation.38Who manages export-screenin

94、g mechanisms?Due to these national screening-system practices not having been harmonised across the EU,member states retain the competency to maintain,amend or adopt FDI-screening mechanisms,as long as they are trans-parent,protect sensitive information and do not dis-criminate between non-EU countr

95、ies.39 Information on new FDI-screening mechanisms must be shared with the European Commission annually,as well as within 30 days of application.Regulation(EU)2019/452 lists cooperation procedures between the member states and the European Commission and gives the Commission the option to issue opin

96、ion and member states,the ability to issue comment on these investments.40 Which technologies are considered in investment-screening regulations?Investment-screening regulations in the EU are based nationally.As per Regulation(EU)2019/452,the EU Commission publishes an up-to-date list of national sc

97、reen-ing mechanisms of EU Member States and details what each national mechanism applies to.The latest version of this report has been updated as of 13 October 2023.41 Items of critical importance in investment screening include criti-cal infrastructure,critical technologies,supply of critical input

98、s,such as energy and raw materials,access to sensi-tive information and the ability to control information.42Does the government seek partnership with other countries?The EU is currently engaged in a number of partnerships with other countries in the area of investment screen-ing and critical-infras

99、tructure protection.As such,the EUUS Trade and Technology Council(TTC)was estab-lished in 2021 to cooperate on export controls,includ-ing on information-sharing,legislative and regulatory developments,good practices,industry compliance and enforcement.43 Additionally,on 26 October 2021,the Commissio

100、n hosted an export-control dialogue with the six Western Balkan countries to enhance their policy alignment with the EUs acquis Communautaire.44 In the FDI-screening domain,cooperation with like-minded third countries and entities is encouraged.As such,the EU supports the OECDs ongoing work on inves

101、tment policies related to national security and public order.45 Within the EUUS TTC,the virtual space FUTURIUM provides room for businesses,public authorities,innova-tors,researchers,civil society and policymakers to shape the debate on investment screening.46Countering Disinformation in the Cyber D

102、omainWhat are the main concerns about disinformation in the cyber domain?In the cyber domain,election interference is a lead-ing concern,with 73%of internet users worried about online disinformation in the pre-election period for the European Parliament in 2019,according to the 477 Special Eurobarom

103、eter survey.Cyber attacks,elite Europe and the Indo-Pacific:Convergence and Divergence in the Digital Order 11 capture of former senior politicians and the advance-ment of polarisation in public debates are among the main concerns within the EU.47 Loopholes in existing EU and national legislation an

104、d the lack of a common strategy to challenge disinformation further complicate the EUs response to disinformation threats.48 However,the EU lacks a common definition or authority to deter-mine what counts as disinformation,as it is not directly covered in the Digital Service Act or other secondary l

105、egislation.49 Instead,fact-checking organisations,such as CORRECTIV and Facebook/Meta,engage in the evaluation of websites and advertisement in cyberspace as well as countering disinformation within the EU.50 Lastly,there is no explicit sanctions regime within the EU that would sanction disinformati

106、on attacks.51 Who are considered the main perpetrators?In 2022,the European Parliaments Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the EU,including Disinformation(INGE)conducted an in-depth inquiry into malicious foreign powers activi-ties within European cyberspace.It

107、concluded that for-eign interference and information manipulation was overwhelmingly carried out by Russia and China.52 What resources have been dedicated to countering disinformation?To counter disinformation,the EUs European External Action Service(EEAS)established the EUvsDisinfo flagship project

108、 within the EEAS East StratCom Task Force in 2015.The team of journalists,communications specialists and experts on Russia attempts to forecast,address,and respond to the Russian Federations ongo-ing disinformation campaigns affecting the EU,its mem-ber states,and countries in the shared neighbourho

109、od.53 Legislative frameworks and communications on disinformation were passed in the following years.This includes the April 2016 Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats,the September 2018 Communication on securing free and fair European elections,the September 2018 Code of Practice on Disinfor

110、mation,and the December 2018 Action Plan against Disinformation.The 2018 Action Plan was adopted by the EEAS,which prioritised improved detection,coordinated response,private-sector mobilisation to tackle disin-formation,raising awareness and empowering citi-zens.It also included a Rapid Alert Syste

111、m to combat disinformation,which was launched in March 2019.The following year,the EU passed the Spring 2019 Communication on Tackling Online Disinformation:a European Approach.54 Additionally,the EU introduced an EU-wide ban on Russian propaganda outlets,such as Sputnik TV and RT(Russia Today),in M

112、arch 2022,in reaction to disinformation on the Russian war of aggres-sion in Ukraine.55Does the government seek partnership with other countries?The EU cooperates with a host of governments on tack-ling disinformation.There is strong cooperation with Taiwan,given the latters experience with Chinese

113、disinformation.Additionally,the Council of Europe adopted the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime,allowing for sharing of best practices and creating rela-tionships for cooperation on combatting cyber crime.56 It comprises 68 countries,including EU member states,countries of the EUs Partnership for th

114、e Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership,as well as Indo-Pacific states,such as Australia,Japan,the Philippines and Sri Lanka,with further signatories and countries invited to accede,including Fiji,Kiribati,South Korea,New Zealand,Timor-Leste and Vanuatu.57 12 The International Institute for Strategi

115、c StudiesNational Critical Infrastructure in the Indo-PacificHow is National Critical Infrastructure defined?Northeast AsiaIn Northeast Asia,Japan defines critical infrastructure(CI)as the backbone of peoples living and economic activities formed by businesses providing services that are extremely d

116、ifficult to be substituted;If the function of the services is suspended,deteriorates or becomes unavailable,it could have a significant impact on the peoples living and economic activities.58 The 14 CI sec-tors are information and communication services,finan-cial services,aviation services,airport

117、services,railway services,electric-power supply services,gas-supply ser-vices,government and administrative services(includ-ing local government),medical services,water services,logistics services,chemical industries,credit-card ser-vices and petroleum industries.The Republic of Korea(ROK)defines Cr

118、itical Information Infrastructure(CII)as industrial control systems or information systems related to national security,administration,defence,pub-lic safety,finance,communications,transport,energy and so on in the Act on the Protection of Information and Communications Infrastructure.59 Taiwan,as o

119、f yet,does not have national legislation that defines criti-cal infrastructure,and a recent conference of Taiwanese legal and technology experts urged the government to create legal definitions for these technologies,pass legis-lation to protect them and promote greater cooperation with the public a

120、nd private sector.60 Broadly speaking,the Executive Yuans Guidance on National Critical Infrastructure Security Defense divides National Critical Infrastructure(NCI)into eight fields:energy,water resources,telecommunications,transportation,banking and finance,emergency aid and hospitals,central and

121、local governments and high-tech parks.61 In September 2023,Taiwans national Cybersecurity Management Law legislated that companies that provide critical infra-structure and are government-owned or government-funded must install a cyber-security chief.62Southeast AsiaAmong the Southeast Asian states,

122、only the Philippines and Indonesia feature a distinct definition for NCI in their policy documents.The Indonesian definition is based on threat,naming Critical National Infrastructures as assets,services,objects in the form of physical or logical that involving the livelihood of many people,national

123、 interests and/or revenue of country that are strategic,in case of threats and attacks cause more loss of lives,destabilizing political,social,cultural and national economy as well as the sover-eignty of the nation.63 The Philippines definition includes a threat,a growth and a development angle:Crit

124、ical Infrastructures arekey infrastructures not only for economic growth and development but also as societal instruments for the conduct of everyday activities.Hence,any threat posed against these infra-structures would be threats to national security.64 As such,relevant sectors for protection rang

125、e from gov-ernment,transportation(land,sea and air),energy,water,health,emergency services and disaster response to banking and finance,telecommunications,media and business-process outsourcing.65 However,most Southeast Asian countries do not have any pol-icy documents on NCI,including Laos,Myanmar

126、and Vietnam.Brunei,Malaysia,Singapore and Thailand have definitions for National Critical Information Infrastructure(NCII)and Cambodia is developing a cyber crime law that will foreseeably mention NCII.66 South AsiaAcross the region,definitions of NCI are blurred and often linked to the identificati

127、on of specific critical sec-tors or to the definition of NCII.The Nepalese govern-ment provides a clear definition under its Cybersecurity Policy,identifying NCI as the essential services that 2.National Policy Approaches in the Indo-PacificEurope and the Indo-Pacific:Convergence and Divergence in t

128、he Digital Order 13 underpin society and serve as the backbone of Nepals economy,security and health.67 India defines critical sectors as those whose incapacity or destruction will have a debilitating impact on national security,econ-omy,public health or safety.68 Bangladesh,India and Pakistan have

129、identified the sectors considered crucial to economic and societal security in their respective cyber-security strategies.69 The three countries define the six sectors that most countries point to as critical:information and communications technology(ICT),energy,finance,health,transport and water.70

130、While Bangladeshs list is limited to these sectors(with the addition of monuments and buildings as NCI),Indias and Pakistans list goes further.The list of NCI released by Indian authorities in 2015 added new sec-tors to the previous version,such as defence,space,law enforcement,security and intellig

131、ence,sensitive gov-ernment organisations and critical manufacturing.For the rest of the countries in the region,development in this sphere is in progress.According to the Information and Cyber Security Strategy of Sri Lanka 20182023,a Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy currently being develop

132、ed to safeguard and protect national security.Similarly,Bhutans first National Cybersecurity Strategy,which would identify CII,is undergoing the cabinets approval after the first draft was released in 2020.71 OceaniaIn Oceania,both Australia and New Zealand have clear definitions for NCI.In its 2023

133、 Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy,Australia defines critical infra-structure as those physical facilities,supply chains,information technologies and communication net-works,which if destroyed,degraded or rendered una-vailable for an extended period,would significantly impact the social or

134、 economic wellbeing of the nation,or affect Australias ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security.72 In New Zealand,the Cyber Security Strategy defines critical infrastructure as physical and digital assets,services,and supply chains,the disruption(loss,compromise)of which woul

135、d severely impact the maintenance of national security,public safety,fundamental rights,and well-being of all New Zealanders.73 In the meantime,its Infrastructure Strategy calls for the need for the definition to be developed to align with international best practice.74In Kiribati,NCI is linked with

136、 cyber.75 In the other countries,when NCI is debated,it is mostly applied to the security of human-made physical and organisa-tional structuresdisruption of which can seriously and negatively affect the countries ability to func-tion as a successful society,including infrastructure as diverse as sch

137、ools,homes,medical facilities,roads,ports,coastal protection,power,water and modern telecommunications services,maritime connectivity,ports,airports,energy,communication,utilities,sports facilities and environmental-management infrastruc-ture.Only Guam an organised,unincorporated US territory and Fr

138、ench Polynesia and New Caledonia overseas collectivities of France focus on physical and virtual assets.76 Which part of government is responsible for NCI policy and protection?Northeast AsiaIn Japan,the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters under the cabinet is responsible for NCI policy.The Nationa

139、l Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity(NISC),the secretariat of the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters,oversees coordinating cyber-security policy and formulating key documents,such as the Cybersecurity Strategy and the Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protec

140、tion.77 The NISC was established in 2015 and was formerly called the National Information Security Center,which was founded in 2005.At the working level,NISC and respective ministries for each CI cooperate for CI protection.The ministries in charge of CI include the Financial Services Agency;Ministr

141、y of Internal Affairs and Communications;Ministry of Health,Labor and Welfare;Ministry of Economy,Trade and Industry;and Ministry of Land,Infrastructure,Transport and Tourism.In the ROK,the Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Committee under the prime ministers office is responsi-ble for

142、NCI policy.The implementation is split between two organisations.The National Intelligence Service oversees the public sector,and the Ministry of Science and ICT oversees the private sector.78 Under Taiwans 14 The International Institute for Strategic StudiesCybersecurity Management Law,the Executiv

143、e Yuan can stipulate guidelines that restrict ICT product usage that might endanger national cyber security.79 It is also given the power to announce a list of banned brands of ICT products and services that relevant entities cannot procure or use.The Administration for Cyber Security within the Min

144、istry of Digital Affairs manages the implementation of the Cybersecurity Law.80 Taiwans National Information and Communication Security Taskforce within the Executive Yuan oversees the joint national cyber-security defence mechanism and links the central government responsible entity with the releva

145、nt industry entities,as well as the national-level Information Sharing and Analysis Center,a Computer Emergency Response Team(CERT)and the Security Operation Center(SOC).81Southeast AsiaIn Cambodia,Indonesia and the Philippines,the respec-tive departments responsible for ICT oversee NCI(including cy

146、ber in Cambodia)policy and protection.82 In Indonesia,no structures for strategic and tactical protection of NCI have been developed;bodies for NCI protection(ID-SIRTII,GovCert and ID-Cert)have been created only at the operational level.83 For those countries that feature definitions for NCII in the

147、ir respective cyber strategies,the relevant cyber-security agency is respon-sible for NCII policy and protection,complemented by the Ministry of Transport and Infocommunications in Brunei,the Ministry of Homeland Affairs in Singapore and the Digital Economy Promotion Agency in Thailand.South AsiaMos

148、t South Asian countries have set up departments and units to strengthen the resilience and protection of their digital infrastructure.Despite the different pace in recognising and defining CII,national gov-ernments are investing in building up government mechanisms for CII protection.The Indian gove

149、rn-ment established the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre in 2014,which released the consequent Guidelines for the Protection of National Critical Information Infrastructure.84 In the same year,Bangladesh set up an ICT division within the Ministry of Posts,Telecommunicat

150、ions and Information Technology.More recently,Pakistan has constituted the Cyber Governance Policy Committee,as part of the Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunication,which released the National Cyber Security Policy 2021.85 For other countries in the region,the process is ongoing,havi

151、ng designated units and working groups within their governments but not yet having approved national strategies.Bhutan is combining the efforts of the Bhutan Computer Incident Response Team(BtCIRT)and the Ministry of Information and Communications Department of IT and Telecom to define CII and devel

152、op national strategies.Nepal created a draft of the National Cybersecurity Policy released in 2016,highlighting the governments commitment to strengthening NCI pro-tection.Sri Lanka put in place the Digital Infrastructure Protection Agency,which,to this day,is still more focused on increasing connec

153、tivity than implementing regulations.86 The Maldivian government has not yet dedicated a working unit to CII protection.OceaniaIn Oceanian countries,no single entity is generally responsible for NCI policy and protection.In Australia,the Minister for Home Affairs has regulatory and authorisation res

154、ponsibilities,granted by amendments to the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018,which are supported by the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre.87 In New Zealand,the National Security Group of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet published the Cyber Security Strategy 2019.88

155、The National Cyber Security Centre and the Government Communications Security Bureau(GCSB)share respon-sibility for implementing the 2019 strategy.89 The Infrastructure Commission,which is an Autonomous Crown Entity,is in charge of the Infrastructure Strategy.90In the Pacific Islands,various ministr

156、ies are respon-sible for NCI policy and protection.Palau and Vanuatu focus on the hard security of infrastructure;in the for-mer,periodical condition assessments are conducted by the Bureau of Public Utilities,while in the latter,protec-tion is provided by the National Security Forces.The Ministry o

157、f Home Affairs assures NCI protection in Fiji,while in Kiribati the CERT contains the different policy understandings and priorities for all four examples.91 Europe and the Indo-Pacific:Convergence and Divergence in the Digital Order 15 Do domestic debates about NCI lean more towards prosperity or s

158、ecurity?Northeast AsiaIn Northeast Asia,Japan seems to have put more emphasis on prosperity than the ROK.In the latter,the government can implement NCI policy without major pushbacks from the private sector as the state operates most NCIs centrally.92 On the other hand,in Japan the private sector is

159、 more involved in NCIs.The domestic debate on how it could balance prosperity and security was at its most heated when the government passed the Economic Security Promotion Act in 2022,which included the security of core infrastructure.During the Diet session on the passage of this act,economic pros

160、perity and business activities were two of the main concerns.Due to Taiwans extensive experience of cyber-security attacks on its NCI,domestic debate there leans heavily towards security considerations and Taiwan increasingly requires private-sector companies to improve their security practices.93So

161、utheast AsiaDiscourses in Southeast Asian countries on NCI seem to be split between those countries seeing their potential for prosperity,and those that approach NCI through a security prism and focus on the risks attached to a limited protection of NCI.The first group of countries includes Indonesi

162、a,Laos,Myanmar and Vietnam.In Myanmar,infrastructural development is seen as a great enabler for trade,mobility,productivity and,subsequently,economic growth.94 Massive scale-ups of the electrical grid under the National Electrification Plan,as well as road-network developments and other infrastruct

163、ural investments,are to be undertaken under the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan.95 Nonetheless,the mili-tary coup on 1 February 2021,coupled with the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing internal conflict,has led to a deteriorated economic situation,with the World Bank asserting that nearly a decade o

164、f progress on poverty reduction has been undone.96 Political volatility and uncertainty continue to limit Myanmars development of critical infrastructure.Conflict,electricity outages,trade and foreign-exchange restrictions and frequent changes to rules and regulations also continue to disrupt busine

165、ss operations.97 In Indonesia,the government has undertaken dialogues with the private sector and has reformed its regulations to create a more conducive environment for private-sector participation in infra-structural development,which is seen as a key priority for the government and highlighted by

166、 a 51%increase in government infrastructure spending in 2015.98 The second group of countries includes Brunei,Malaysia and Singapore.Infrastructure and tech-nology therewith are set on par with major power dynamic,regional and global instability,terrorism and violent extremism.and natural disasters.

167、99 In the Philippines and Cambodia,the discourse seems to be split evenly.As part of its counter-terrorism strategy,in 2017 Singapore passed the Infrastructure Protection Act to protect NCI,complimented by the 2021 Strategy on Secure Critical Infrastructure,both highlighting the urgency of protectio

168、n against possible threats.100 South AsiaIn many South Asian countries,the debate about NCI revolves around the potential to increase connectivity in the country and to address development challenges.In the Maldives,for example,national infrastructures are still very fragmented,given the nature of t

169、he countrys territory.As such,the concern about security does not feature in the domestic debate.For many South Asian governments,the priority is the protection of NCI from natural disasters,rather than the exposure to security threats.On the other hand,India and Nepal integrate security objectives

170、with the development of their NCI.OceaniaIn Oceania,both Australia and New Zealand seek to balance security and prosperity,with Australia working collaboratively with stakeholders,includ-ing critical-infrastructure owners and operators.101 The Cyber Security Strategy 2019 states that strong cyber se

171、curity practices result in businesses remain-ing productive,profitable and transparent to cus-tomers and shareholders.102In the Pacific Islands,domestic debates about NCI fall into four categories.Firstly,there are those states that focus on security and third-entity threats to their NCI,such as Fij

172、i,Guam(through its US connection),16 The International Institute for Strategic StudiesVanuatu,and to some extent,Kiribati and Tonga.Secondly,states such as French Polynesia,Nauru,Palau and Tuvalu view their infrastructure security as fac-ing harm from climate change and national disaster.Thirdly,deb

173、ates in Marshall Islands,Micronesia,Papua New Guinea,Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste and,to some extent,Kiribati,Tonga and Tuvalu,revolve mostly around the positive impacts of infrastructural devel-opment for their economic development and human prosperity.Lastly,Cook Islands recognises both the cha

174、llenges and advantages of technological develop-ments.As such,its Cyber Security Review states that if the government wants to continue harnessing the development potentials of digitization,it must ensure citizens wellbeing,national emergency responses and critical infrastructure.103What is the expo

175、sure to Chinese-technology investments according to IISS China Connects?Northeast AsiaNortheast Asian states,even with attentive govern-ments in place,remain highly exposed to poten-tial threats from Chinese technologies.Japan is exposed to Chinese 5G networks,telecommunica-tions,e-commerce,fintech(

176、financial technology),data centres and fibre-optics networks.In Japan,the only cancelled project related to 5G networks was Huawei and NTT Docomos large-scale 5G field trial.The ROK has allowed Chinese 5G technology in its national network rollout.The ROK has,however,taken the approach of segmenting

177、 its national net-work from any network used by the United States Forces Korea.No 5G project in the ROK has been cancelled.Taiwan has long been wary of Chinese-origin ICT technology and has not integrated this into its ICT networks.However,some Taiwanese energy installations of national importance d

178、o use Chinese surveillance technology to secure their sites,and civilians use Chinese technology.Nevertheless,the greatest threat to Taiwans NCI is its proximity to China,and the risk of physical and cyber-security interference regardless of the origin of Taiwans digi-tal infrastructure and technolo

179、gy.Southeast AsiaAll Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)countries are exposed to Chinese telecommunications and 5G networks,except for Laos and Vietnam in the case of the latter.Indonesia,Myanmar,Thailand and Vietnam also cooperate with China on fibre-optics cables.No projects in any of th

180、e countries have been halted or cancelled.South AsiaIn a region that India has traditionally considered to be its strategic backyard,Beijings technological outreach in South Asia has been modest when compared to other regions.Chinas technology investments have increased overall over the past decade

181、but have seen a recalibration in recent years.Pakistan,being the recipient of vast Chinese investments in its digital sector,represents an exception to the block of countries analysed.Nevertheless,some common trends can be observed among the countries in the region.South Asian countries have been ex

182、posed to Chinese investments in the sector of fibre-optics network technology,with three projects in Pakistan(Peace,Africa-1 and Pak-China Cable),the Maldives Sri Lanka Cable and the cross-border internet cable with Nepal.Smart-city pro-jects have been carried out in several regional countries,for e

183、xample,in Sri Lankas logistical hub in Colombo Port.104 Further initiatives include a safe-city project in Lahore,Pakistan,and several data centres across the region.In all South Asian countries except for Bhutan Chinese companies have been involved in the delivery of 3G,4G and 5G networks over the

184、past 15 years.Despite Huaweis predominance in most of these countries,in India,telecommunications company ZTE was a more significant investor in the sector,although both com-panies presence in India has shrunk dramatically since 2020.Overall,the Maldives,Pakistan and Sri Lanka have been more recepti

185、ve to Chinese technological invest-ments,but Bangladesh less so.On the other hand,the Bhutanese,Indian and Nepalese markets appear to be less exposed to Chinese technological outreach.OceaniaIn Oceania,Australia is highly exposed to Chinese tech-nologies and investments.Such technologies in Australi

186、a include security-information systems,telecommunications,Europe and the Indo-Pacific:Convergence and Divergence in the Digital Order 17 data centres,e-commerce,fintech,5G networks,power gen-eration,and fibre-optics network technology.Moreover,China has acquired several ports and invested in raw min

187、-erals in Australia.The only project that was cancelled due to security concerns was the majority acquisition of Ausgrid,which is categorised as energy-transmission infrastructure.New Zealand is less exposed to Chinese technologies but the exposure still includes telecommunications,fintech and e-com

188、merce.New Zealand cancelled Huaweis 5G trial with telecommunications company Spark.Only a small number of Pacific Islands states are exposed to Chinese technology investments,such as Vanuatu with an e-governance collaboration,Solomon Islands on telecommunications and Papua New Guinea on 5G,telecommu

189、nications,e-governance and fibre optics.No projects in any of the countries have been halted or cancelled.National AI StrategiesDo the countries in question have national AI strategies in place?Northeast AsiaIn Northeast Asia,both Japan and the ROK have national AI strategies.Japan published its fir

190、st AI Strategy in 2019 and has updated it since then.105 The latest strategy is the AI Strategy 2022,published in April 2022.106 The ROK published the National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence in 2019.107 In June 2023,Taiwans Executive Yuan published its second national AI plan,having published

191、its first in 2018.108 Southeast AsiaIndonesia,Singapore,Thailand and Vietnam have national AI strategies in place.109 Malaysia and the Philippines each launched national AI roadmaps in 2021 and Cambodia created a national AI assessment in 2023 on which it plans to build its AI strategy.110 Conversel

192、y,Brunei,Laos and Myanmar do not have any national AI strategies in place.South AsiaAmong South Asian countries,India is the only one to have approved a national AI strategy,while Pakistan and Bangladesh have proposed drafts.India published its National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence in 2018 a

193、fter several rounds of discussion.111 Bangladesh has released its National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence for 201924.112 In 2022,the Pakistani Ministry of Information and Telecommunication published the draft of its National Artificial Intelligence Policy,which was met with criti-cism due to t

194、he lack of a whole-of-society approach along the drafting process.113 In Bhutan and Nepal,there is a domestic debate on the need for their respec-tive governments to develop and implement national AI strategies.Sri Lanka and the Maldives have digital strategies but lack a national approach to AI.Oce

195、aniaIn Oceania,Australia already has an AI strategy and New Zealand has laid groundwork for its own.Australia has the AI Action Plan,which is a key com-ponent of its Digital Economy Strategy.114 Although still not in a complete form,New Zealand suggests six cornerstones for a future strategy:Uniquel

196、y New Zealand,Human centred and trusted AI,Investment in AI economy,Preparing the workforce and Our place in the world,with all of the above supported by enabling foundations.115Among the Pacific Islands states,French Polynesia,New Caledonia and Guam have access to AI strategies thanks to their resp

197、ective connections to France and the US;however,these strategies are not specifically dedicated to these collectivities or territories.Kiribati has highlighted a need for AI development in its 2019 National ICT Policy;Timor-Leste has a Strategic Plan for Digital Development,and Solomon Islands has a

198、 National E-commerce Strategy.116What are the main ambitions behind national AI strategies?Northeast AsiaJapan,the ROK and Taiwan have somewhat similar AI objectives,focused on improving industrial com-petitiveness and harnessing the positive aspects of AI for economic growth and addressing demograp

199、hic changes.However,Japan also seeks address natural dis-asters through AI while Taiwan seeks to use it to com-bat climate change.Japans AI Strategy 2022 lays out 18 The International Institute for Strategic Studiesits five strategic objectives:(1)to deal with imminent crises,such as pandemics and n

200、atural disasters;(2)to develop and attract human resources for the AI era;(3)to improve industrial competitiveness;(4)to establish technological systems;and(5)international cooperation in the AI field.117 The ROKs ambitions are to achieve digital competitiveness,create huge economic effect of AI,and

201、 improve quality of life for people by 2030.118 Taiwans initial four-year Taiwan AI Action Plan in 2018 sought to attract global top-tier technology companies working on AI,like Google and Microsoft,to Taiwan.Taiwans second National AI Plan aims to increase the value of Taiwans AI industry to over U

202、SD8.16 billion,focusing on developing talent and industry,improving work environments and increasing Taiwans technolog-ical influence and participation in overseas markets.119 In general,the government is currently examining how AI could impact Taiwans society,resolve labour short-ages,address issue

203、s such as a rapidly ageing society and achieve net-zero greenhouse-gas emission goals.120 Southeast AsiaAll six Southeast Asian countries AI strategies are development-and prosperity-related with ambitions of transforming their respective infrastructure,workforce and economic models.In this regard,A

204、I shall assist Vietnams Fourth Industrial Revolution,or lead to inclu-sive sustainable industrial development in the case of the Philippines.121 Additionally,all countries focus on research and development,particularly on AI talent.122 This focus on prosperity through AI is not surprising.Recent stu

205、dies,including the 2020 EDBI and Kearney study,assess that by 2023,AI technologies could unlock USD1 trillion to Southeast Asian GDPs.123 Indonesia,the Philippines and Singapore further focus on regulatory developments,on a global scale and in partnership with third countries.Only Singapores AI stra

206、tegy clearly out-lines the need for the country to adapt to new and dis-ruptive technologies.124 As such,Singapores AI vision for 2030 is best outlined via the following statement:Domestically,our private and public sectors will use AI decisively to generate economic gains and improve lives.Internat

207、ionally,Singapore will be recognised as a global hub in innovating,piloting,test-bedding,deploy-ing and scaling AI solutions for impact.125South AsiaAmong the three countries in South Asia that have approved or proposed AI strategies Bangladesh,India and Pakistan different stands on digitalisation a

208、nd AI adoption can be observed.One difference emerges from the slogans that India and Bangladesh have circulated to promote their AI strategies,respectively#aiforall and AI for Innovative Bangladesh.126 While for India the emphasis is on society and connectivity,for Bangladesh the goal is innovation

209、 and development.These concepts are cemented in the respective AI strategies.From the text of the Indian AI strategy,it appears that the gov-ernment aims to leverage AI not only to foster economic growth,but also to increase social inclusion and address a number of issues related to AI implementatio

210、n,such as ethics and privacy.127On the other hand,in recent years Bangladesh has made striking developments towards digitalisation and promotes AI as an accelerator of this process,one which will transform the country into a technologi-cally advanced state.128 The Pakistani AI draft strategy seems t

211、o encompass both stands in its strategic objec-tives,stressing Pakistani societys need to evolve effi-ciently in the age of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.129 Technological competitiveness boosted by AI is pre-sented throughout the document as intertwined with the livelihoods of Pakistani citizens

212、.To some degree,the list of sectors prioritised by governments in their national AI policies reflects the national approach to AI strategy.Indian policy has the most limited list of areas of intervention and is focused on sectors with greater societal impact,such as educa-tion,healthcare,agriculture

213、 and food security,mobil-ity and a unique case smart cities.130 Pakistans and Bangladeshs lists of drafts add fields closer to their economic-development goals,such as the finance sector,trade,commerce and manufacturing.131 Among South Asian countries,Pakistan is the only one to include the defence

214、sector,echoing other countries beyond the region like China,France and the US.OceaniaIn Oceania,increasing productivity and problem-solving seem to be the biggest objectives.Australias strategic goal is to establish itself as a global leader in developing and Europe and the Indo-Pacific:Convergence

215、and Divergence in the Digital Order 19 adopting trusted,secure and responsible AI.132 Australia aims to drive productivity and prosperity,create jobs,solve current real-world problems and grow new busi-nesses and sectors by developing emerging technologies,including AI.133 New Zealand also has objec

216、tives focused on increasing productivity and developing new products and markets.The country also aims to solve cross-border problems through international collaboration.134For those Pacific Islands states that have digital strategies(Kiribati,Solomon Islands,Timor-Leste),the economic potential of d

217、igital technologies is the main driver for development in this domain.Which part of government is responsible for AI strategy design and implementation?Northeast AsiaIn Japan,the Cabinet Office is responsible for AI strategy design,with various ministries in charge of implementa-tion.These include t

218、he Ministry of Education,Culture,Sports,Science and Technology;the Ministry of Economy,Trade and Industry;the Ministry of Health,Labour and Welfare;the Ministry of Land,Infrastructure,Transport and Tourism;the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications;and the Ministry of the Environment.135 Si

219、milarly,in the ROK,a pan-government committee is responsible for AI strategy,and the implementation is divided into respective ministries.136 The key difference between the two countries approaches is that the ROKs has a clear role for the Ministry of National Defense in establishing an intelligent-

220、defence platform and establish-ing a defence-intelligence data centre and developing the intelligent supporting command centre,whereas in Japan,no MoD personnel are involved in AI-strategy design,etc.137 Taiwans Ministry of Digital Affairs is largely in charge of Taiwans national AI strategy and is

221、mandated to establish an AI-evaluation centre,which is intended to draft acts for AI regulation and provide a legislative basis for AI usage.Cross-agency meetings are held to consider AI-generated context and AI-related ethics.138Southeast AsiaAmong Southeast Asian countries,Singapore is the only on

222、e to have a dedicated National AI Office under the Smart Nation and Digital Government Office.139 In Indonesia,the Philippines and Thailand,ministries related to technology and/or innovation have designed the AI strategies.In Vietnam,most ministries seem to have been involved in design and implement

223、ation.South AsiaLooking at the three countries that have pioneered AI strategies in the South Asian region,India is the only case where a specific committee was created within the government to develop an AI programme.In fact,the Ministry of Electronics&Information Technology allo-cated USD54 millio

224、n to create the National Institution for Transforming India(NITI Aayog),responsible for the research and development of new and emerging technologies in India.140 Mandated by the government in 2019 to develop an AI strategy,NITI Aayog delivered it after collaborating with leading experts in the sec-

225、tor and stakeholders.In Bangladesh,the government has appointed the Information and Communication Technology Division to draft a national AI policy.141 In Pakistan,the draft of national AI strategy was released under the Ministry of Information Technology&Telecommunication.In the draft it is stated

226、that the min-istry aims to set up a national AI fund.142OceaniaIn Australia,while the Department of Industry,Science and Resources is leading the coordination of AI policies,other departments are also involved in the process.In New Zealand,the Ministry of Business,Innovation and Employment is leadin

227、g the process with The AI Forum,a purpose-driven NGO.143Though Kiribati does not have an AI strategy,it has established the position of Chief Information Security Officer,following its 2019 Cyber Strategy.144Who are the main stakeholders in developing and managing the strategy?Northeast AsiaIn North

228、east Asia,both Japan and the ROK emphasise the importance of engaging with various stakeholders.Specifically,both countries focus on the private sector as the primary actor to lead innovation.In addition,academia is key in both countries AI strategies,given the urgent need 20 The International Insti

229、tute for Strategic Studiesfor AI talent to be nurtured.145 In Taiwan,a variety of stake-holders are consulted through specially created channels.For example,Taiwans National Science and Technology Council has launched a Taiwan AI Center of Excellence,which serves as a platform to centralise the effo

230、rts by vari-ous government agencies to formulate the rules governing AI applications and to facilitate collaborations with inter-national partners on AI projects.146 Taiwans government also supports incubator projects to help develop start-ups in Taiwan working on AI-technology application.147Southe

231、ast AsiaAmong Southeast Asian countries,Singapore and the Philippines have a unique approach to AI that features all echelons of society.148 This is a product of the expan-siveness and ambition of their AI strategies,which feature not only goals around domestic prosperity,research and development an

232、d talent acquisition,but also ambitions to become AI hubs and regulatory front runners.Thailand has a national AI committee that is the driver behind the development of its AI strategy.This body was appointed in August 2022 following Thailands acknowledgement that it was lagging behind other regiona

233、l states in terms of providing a vision on how to harness the powers of AI.149 Development in Vietnam is driven mainly by ministries and institutions related to the research and development of AI,as is the case in Indonesia,where the government and tech firms cooperate.150 South AsiaIndia identifies

234、 stakeholders as research organisations,trade bodies,the tech-related private sector and venture-capital firms.151 The national AI strategy stresses the need for the government to strengthen ties and boost cooperation with these actors.Similarly,in Bangladesh,the stakeholders involved in the AI-stra

235、tegy develop-ment are several government ministries,academia and the tech-related private sector.Bangladesh delineates a roadmap,available in its national AI policy,with specific development milestones for the years to come.Among these is a goal to expand the range of stakeholders into an internatio

236、nal network of partnerships that cooperate with Bangladesh on AI development and application.152 On a different note,in Pakistans policy the definition of the stakeholders cooperating for a national approach to AI is less clear.Throughout the document,academia and private industry are identified as

237、stakeholders and as the key partners with which the government should engage to boost the digital ecosystem in Pakistan.The national AI Policy even includes a few cases of success-ful public-private cooperation,such as National Center of Artificial Intelligence(NCAI).153 OceaniaIn Oceania,both Austr

238、alia and New Zealand take a whole-of-society approach.In its AI Action Plan,Australia emphasises coordination with businesses,researchers and the community.New Zealands work-ing vision also involves citizens,academia,start-ups and industry.154Does the government seek partnership with other countries

239、 in aligning AI strategy?Northeast AsiaIn Northeast Asia,countries are actively seeking mini-lateral and multilateral partnerships both within the region as well as with other countries.One of the most significant developments in the region was the Camp David Summit held in August 2023.The three att

240、end-ing countries Japan,the ROK and the US commit-ted to trilateral cooperation in AI.155 The three countries are Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)members,which is the key plat-form for analysing AI policy developments,and found-ing members of the Global Partnership on AI(

241、GPAI),which is a critical body for policy implementation.156 Japan led the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023,which called for establishing global standards for AI and established the Hiroshima AI Process.157 Japan is also part of the effort to use AI to make progress on the UN Sustainable Development

242、Goals.158 Bilaterally,Japan is also strengthening AI cooperation with partners,such as the EU,the United Kingdom and the US.USJapan cooperation is at an advanced stage,and the two coun-tries are discussing AI cooperation both at a high and a working level.159 Japan and the EU confirmed their coopera

243、tion in AI research and governance.160 Japan and the UK cooperate to establish AI principles and governance under the Digital Partnership.161 The ROK Europe and the Indo-Pacific:Convergence and Divergence in the Digital Order 21 is also strengthening cooperation and policy coordina-tion with the US

244、and the EU.162 Following disruptions to supply chains caused by the COVID-19 pandemic,Western governments have increased their collabora-tion on technology with Northeast Asian actors.This has largely centred around semiconductors and strat-egies to friendshore Taiwanese manufacturing to Europe,Japa

245、n and the US.However,in some instances,European governments have agreed to deepen their cooperation on scientific research with Taiwan,includ-ing on AI.163 Southeast AsiaAmong Southeast Asian countries,Singapore seeks not only to develop its national AI,but also to be at the forefront of regulation

246、and standard-setting in inter-national organisations,such as the World Economic Forum,the OECD,the International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission.164 It cooperates on bilateral and multi-national AI research,including with France(as does Vietnam).Vie

247、tnams top three international priorities are the implementation of bilateral and multilateral scientific-research cooperation programmes and pro-jects on AI;the exchange of experts,researchers and students;and the improvement of institutions to attract foreign direct investment(FDI)and encourage mul

248、ti-national high-tech corporations to build centres for AI research,development and application in Vietnam.165 Indonesia has encouraged investments from Chinese,Japanese and Korean tech firms in its domestic AI land-scape,while also attempting to balance an influx of Chinese and American investments

249、.166South AsiaThe Indian government has tried to promote AI regula-tion at both the regional and international level.With its national AI strategy,India hopes to be able to define a roadmap as a model for other emerging and developing countries.At the same time,India engages in partnerships with oth

250、er like-minded countries at the international level as a founding member of GPAI.The next GPAI sum-mit will take place in New Delhi in December.167 Within the framework of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue(Quad),India also cooperates with Australia,Japan and the US in the domain of new technologie

251、s and AI.168 The Quad aims to promote a human-centric approach to AI,in compliance with human rights and shared demo-cratic values.169 While India plays an active role at the international and multilateral tables,other countries in the region have engaged in bilateral partnerships.The Maldives,for i

252、nstance,has cooperated with Singapore on an AI project for healthcare,while Pakistan looks at Chinas AI-strategy model,with the collaboration on the Sino-Pak Center for Artificial Intelligence.170 OceaniaIn Oceania,both countries seek partnerships and coordi-nation with other countries.Australia and

253、 New Zealand are founding members of GPAI.171 Australias key partners in AI are the AUKUS countries.The AUKUS Advanced Capabilities Pillar(Pillar Two)pursues USUKAustralia trilateral cooperation in cutting-edge technologies.In May 2023,the first AI and autono-mous trial was held.172 Most recently,in

254、 October 2023,Australia launched new AI cooperation with the US for research into AI solutions for societal challenges,includ-ing pandemics and droughts.173 The private sector is also active in the USAustralia cooperation in AI,which includes Microsofts investment in AI infrastructure in Australia.1

255、74 New Zealand also showed interest in join-ing Pillar Two of AUKUS.175What are the main challenges to execution of the strategy?Northeast AsiaJapan recognises the challenges in its AI Strategy 2022,such as the delay in digitalisation and use of AI(par-ticularly in government),the lack of AI talent,

256、the lack of trust in AI and the narrow scope of AI application.176 The ROK states that the main challenges include a lack of data available to companies and individuals and a closed distribution system,a technology gap between leading countries,a potential gap between the existing legal system and n

257、ew technologies,a low level of investment,a lack of AI talent,deteriorating competitiveness in traditional industries,an ageing system of government,and potential inequal benefits from the spread of AI.For Taiwan,the challenge will 22 The International Institute for Strategic Studiesbe navigating po

258、litical sensitivities as it deepens its cooperation with European partners on AI.This last one will particularly be true considering the United States heightened export controls on AI-related chips to China.Southeast AsiaIn Southeast Asia,with the exception of Singapore,investments in AI solutions l

259、ag behind other Indo-Pacific regions.As such,the Philippines per-capita investment is less than USD0.01;in Vietnam,it is USD0.03;in Indonesia,it is USD0.20;in Malaysia,USD0.23 and in Thailand it is USD0.37,compared to Singapores USD68 per capita,or the United States USD155 per capita.177 Additionall

260、y,the Philippines internet quality and speed are half the global average for mobile internet in 2020(17.83 megabits per second(Mbps)vs 39.18 Mbps),and just over one-quarter of the 2020 average when it comes to fixed broadband(27.07 Mbps vs 87.84 Mbps).178 Additionally,Thailand does not currently hav

261、e a regulatory framework for AI use.179 In Vietnam,the lack of funding for AI develop-ment,as well as the lack of a strong AI expert com-munity,leads to a heavy reliance on FDI and the outsourcing of Vietnamese and Vietnam-based AI and tech companies.180 Singapores regulatory and invest-ment climate

262、 for AI development far outweighs that of the other ASEAN countries.In a next step,in June 2023 the government identified the following six generative AI risks hallucinations,privacy and confidential-ity,accelerated disinformation,copyright challenges,embedded biases,and impersonation and deepfakes

263、and subsequently set up a foundation to develop tool-kits to mitigate these challenges in cooperation with the open-source community.181South AsiaThe challenges that Bangladesh,India and Pakistan face in the implementation of their respective national AI strategies are similar and can be grouped int

264、o three macro-categories.The first is the lack of an enabling data ecosystem.In Bangladesh,for example,the limit is the lack of available AI technology and the lack of the necessary infrastructures.182 The second challenge shared by the three countries is the lack of clarity over privacy,security an

265、d ethical regulations.As a way for-ward,both Bangladesh and Pakistan suggest turning towards models adopted by countries that have made progress in this sphere.Their interest,however,lands on different actors:Bangladesh points to an EU General Data Protection Regulation approach,whereas Pakistan lea

266、ns towards models implemented by China,Estonia and the UK.183 Lastly,a common concern for India,Pakistan and Bangladesh when looking at the integration of AI tech-nologies in their economic sectors is the risk of employ-ment disruption.In countries where the manufacturing sector is a pillar of the n

267、ational economy,the spread of automatised work might have a major impact on their workforce,if not accompanied with a necessary process of reskilling.Another specificity that Bangladesh and Pakistan point to as a challenge is digital literacy and the need to boost it a societal level.On the other ha

268、nd,India highlights the low intensity of AI research as one of its current challenges,with a research community confined to a few academic institutions and meagre investments coming from the private sector.184OceaniaIn Oceania,both Australia and New Zealand see themselves as well-positioned to lead

269、in the AI field.Australia notes its leading position in academia and strategic fields of AI,such as computer vision,deep learning,field robotics,neural networks and machine learning.Another strength comes from the whole-of-economy settings,including a competitive,market-driven economy with free and

270、open trade,strong digital infrastructure and an established skills pipe-line.185 New Zealand refers to the quality of the gov-ernment,a collaborative culture,multiculturalism,good infrastructure,a high education level,an open business environment,the level of research and the ability to commercialis

271、e research.186 That being said,challenges remain in areas such as forming a compre-hensive AI strategy and fully collaborating with the private sector.In most Pacific Islands states,digital infrastructure and technical expertise are lacking and their develop-ment is not yet a priority for the mostly

272、 economically less prosperous governments.Europe and the Indo-Pacific:Convergence and Divergence in the Digital Order 23 Protecting National Innovation EcosystemsAre export controls in place?Northeast AsiaIn Northeast Asia,both Japan and the ROK have export controls in place.The Foreign Exchange and

273、 the Foreign Trade Act provides the legal framework for export controls in Japan.The ROKs relevant laws in export controls include the Foreign Trade Act,the Defense Acquisition Program Act,the Nuclear Safety Act and the Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons Act.187 Taiwan is not a member of

274、 the Australia Group,the Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR),the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG)or the Wassenaar Arrangement.188 However,Taiwans Foreign Trade Act provides the legal basis for managing the trade of Strategic High-tech Commodities and has a catch-all control measure to strengthen end

275、-user and end-uses con-trols.Taiwan adopted the EUs Community Regime for Control of Exports of Dual Use Items and Technology and the Common Military List of the EU in 2009.189Both Japan and South Korea actively seek partnerships with other countries in export controls.In May 2023,Japan,with other G7

276、 countries(Canada,France,Germany,Italy,the UK and the US)and the EU,announced a joint state-ment which affirmed the importance of export-controls cooperation on critical technologies.190 One of the most recent major developments in the region was the joint statement at the Camp David Summit in Augus

277、t 2023,which emphasised the importance of the USJapanROK trilateral cooperation on export controls.191 Taiwan has independently stated that it will coop-erate with US export controls on AI-related semicon-ductors to China.192 It has also followed US and EU regulations on export controls.It also hold

278、s dialogues with foreign countries on trade and investment that include discussions on FDI-screening and export con-trols.For example,the EU and Taiwan held a second annual Trade and Investment Dialogue in 2023.193Southeast AsiaAll Southeast Asian states except Cambodia and Laos have export-control

279、regulations.However,these regu-lations mostly concern agricultural and environmental products.Only Singapore,Malaysia,the Philippines and Thailand have implemented in 2002,2010,2015 and 2019,respectively strategic trade-management acts,including export-control regulations based on the US Commerce Co

280、ntrol List.194 Singapore has imple-mented regulation in line with both the US Commerce Control List and the EUs control list.Myanmars government has export-control regulations,also for arms and ammunitions,though not adopted in coop-eration with any third country or international entity.195 Vietnam

281、requires exporters to obtain a licence for chem-icals,explosive pre-substances and industrial explo-sives.196 In 2022,Taiwans Ministry of Economic Affairs expanded the scope of export restrictions to 57 products that fell within Export Control Classification Number Categories 39.In 2023,the list was

282、 further expanded to cover new products in categories 02,in line with EU and US regulations.197 Though Malaysia has modelled its export-control regulations on the EUs control list,it is not a member of any of the four multilateral regimes governing export controls for conventional arms and dual-use

283、goods and technologies(the Australia Group,the Wassenaar Arrangement,the MTCR or the NSG).South AsiaAll the countries in the South Asian region have export controls in place,although they vary greatly in restric-tions,formulations(law and regulations in place)and responsible authorities.Several coun

284、tries maintain their respective export policies,which have been enforced for decades,and regularly provide revised versions.India has the Foreign Trade(Development and Regulation)Act of 1992,integrated with the Foreign Trade Policy of 201520.198 Additionally,a new Foreign Trade Policy 2023 has been

285、announced.199 Likewise,Bangladesh updates the 1950 Import and Export(Control)Act every three years(most recently in a 202124 version)and Sri Lanka recently amended its 1969 Imports and Exports(Control)Act.200 Pakistan relies on the more recent Export Control on Goods,Technologies,Material and Equipm

286、ent related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act(2004),since then amended five times,with the latest version released in 2022.201 Bhutan and the Maldives,similarly,have published 24 The International Institute for Strategic Studiesexport-control policies in recent years u

287、nder the cus-tom general regulations.202 India is the only regional country participating in bilat-eral and multilateral fora and is inscribed in international control mechanisms.The country first joined the MTCR in 2016,joining the Wassenaar Arrangement one year later,signalling a strong commitment

288、 to multilateral coop-eration on export regulations and control over dual-use technologies.More recently,in 2023,India strengthened its ties with the EU,establishing the EUIndia Trade and Technology Council.This bilateral platform is forged over a common interest in ensuring security,prosperity and

289、sustainable development based on shared values and aimed at strengthening strategic cooperation among two like-minded actors,against the background of rival gov-ernance models.203 It entails three working groups respon-sible for:trade,investment and resilience of supply chains for strategic technolo

290、gies;green and clean energy tech-nologies;and digital governance and digital connectivity.Pakistan,although not a member of multilateral-regulation frameworks,has over the years made efforts to align with international export-control regimes.According to the Pakistani government,export-control lists

291、 have been harmonised with Wassenaar Arrangement guidelines,the NSG,the MTCR and the Australia Group.204OceaniaIn Oceania,both Australia and New Zealand have export controls in place.Australias export controls are regulated by legislation,including the Defence Trade Control Act,the Customs Act and t

292、he Weapons of Mass Destruction(Prevention of Proliferation)Act.205 In New Zealand,the Customs and Excise Act provides the legal basis for its export controls.206Among the Pacific Islands states,only Cook Islands,Palau,Samoa,Tuvalu and Vanuatu have indigenous export-control regulations.207 French Pol

293、ynesia,New Caledonia and Guam feature these as well to a cer-tain extent,as an extension of French and US policies,respectively.Fiji,Kiribati,Marshall Islands,Micronesia,Nauru,Papua New Guinea,Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands do not have export-control regulations.The US recognised Cook Islands as an

294、 independ-ent state on 25 September 2023,which will allow for expansion of military and diplomatic relations,which date back to the Second World War.208 In Oceania,there is a high level of coordination on export controls.In June 2023,the Five Eyes countries Australia,Canada,New Zealand,the UK and th

295、e US committed to coordinating export-control enforcement.209Who manages export-control regulations?Northeast AsiaIn Japan,the Ministry of Economy,Trade and Industry manages export-control regulations.In the ROK,the Ministry of Trade,Industry and Energy is in charge of export controls.In Taiwan,the

296、Ministry of Economic Affairs Bureau of Foreign Trade manages the list and decides whether or not to grant export licences.210 A num-ber of other entities help regulate commodities,includ-ing the Industrial Development Bureau,the Atomic Energy Council,the Ministry of National Defense,the National Pol

297、ice Agency and the Ministry of Finance.211Southeast AsiaIn Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore and Thailand,sub-sections of the respective ministries of trade and commerce manage export-control regulations.212 As such,the Singapore Customs organisation fulfils these tasks,whereas in Malaysia it is th

298、e Strategic Trade Secretariat.In Thailand it is the Department of Foreign Trade.In the Philippines,the Department of Trade and Industry is the executive and technical agency for the management of the strategic-goods trade,while the National Security Councils Strategic Trade Management Committee has

299、the central author-ity over export-control regulations.In Myanmar,the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regulates arms and ammu-nitions exports.213South AsiaThe government units and agencies responsible for export-control regulations vary across South Asian countries.India and Pakistan have created ad-hoc

300、 units,although each have taken a different approach.Pakistans Strategic Export Control Division falls under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,whereas the Indian gov-ernment has created the Interministerial Cooperation Europe and the Indo-Pacific:Convergence and Divergence in the Digital Order 25 Grou

301、p,which operates at the intersection of various ministries and government departments.214In Bangladesh and Nepal,export controls are man-aged by Bangladeshs Ministry of Commerce and Nepals Ministry of Industry,Commerce and Supplies,which Nepal has coupled with a dedicated Trade and Export Promotion

302、Centre.In Bangladesh,export con-trols are managed by the Ministry of Commerce.In Nepal they are managed by the Ministry of Industry,Commerce and Supplies,which it has coupled with a dedicated Trade and Export Promotion Centre.215 Similarly,in Sri Lanka and Bhutan,export controls fall under the respo

303、nsibility of their finance ministries.Like Nepal,Bhutan has introduced an additional unit,the Department of Revenue and Customs.216 In Bhutan,government agencies enforce export restrictions.For example,arms and ammunition restrictions are under the control of Royal Bhutan Police or aircraft systems

304、under the Civil Aviation Authority.217 The Maldives,under the Custom Act of 2011,has mandated a sepa-rate legal entity responsible for managing import and export controls.218OceaniaAustralias and New Zealands export controls are respectively managed by the Defence Export Controls in the Ministry of

305、Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,depending on the nature of the exports.Although French Polynesia and New Caledonia have the right under the French division of compe-tency law for collectivities to define their own security and defence policies,the relevant French authori-ties s

306、eem to be in charge of managing export-control regulations.219 This applies to the US and Guam in a similar fashion.Though export controls for dual-use or strategic goods do not apply in the other Pacific Islands states,in Tuvalu the minister responsible for customs defines policies on exports of ot

307、her goods;in Samoa,the Central Bank is tasked with ensuring that revenues from exports are repatriated to the island;the Ministry of Health and Medical Services controls Cook Islands exports;and in Vanuatu,the respective ministry under which category the item to be exported falls regulates exports.2

308、20What is considered in each countrys export-control regulation?Northeast AsiaJapan controls exports of both arms and dual-use items.221 The Ministry of Trade,Industry and Energy controls defence,nuclear-related,dual-use and other strategic items in the ROK.222 Taiwans legislation covers dual-use an

309、d military end-use commodities,software and technology.223Southeast AsiaAmong Southeast Asian states with export-control regu-lations in place,in Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore and Thailand,military and dual-use goods are included in export-control regulations.224 In Myanmar,arms and ammunitions

310、 complement the list of agricultural,min-eral,marine and forestry products.225 Vietnam requires exporters to obtain government permits for goods subject to export control in accordance with interna-tional treaties to which Vietnam is a contracting part-ner as well as chemicals,explosive pre-substanc

311、es and industrial explosives.226 In Indonesia,rice,animal and bird products,wildlife,diamonds,tin,as well as metal scraps,are under export controls.227 In Brunei,export controls are exercised on items such as rice,sugar,tim-ber,prawn refuse and palm oil.228South AsiaIn its national export policy,Ind

312、ia provides a list of restricted goods under the acronym of SCOMET:special chemicals,organisms,materials,equipment and tech-nologies.229 Pakistan has dedicated a specific legislation to Export Control on Goods,Technologies,Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their De

313、livery Systems.230 Both Bhutan and Bangladesh include arms and ammunitions in their national export policies.While Bangladeshs list is then limited to petrol and edible goods,Bhutan adds uninhabited aircraft systems/drones and wireless and remote sensing telecom-munication,and broadcasting equipment

314、.On the contrary,dual-use technology and arms and ammu-nitions are not included in the export-control lists of the Maldives,Nepal or Sri Lanka,which enumerate 26 The International Institute for Strategic Studiesmostly edible,animal,agricultural and pharmaceuti-cal products.OceaniaAustralia regulates

315、 military and dual-use goods and technology in the items on the Defence and Strategic Goods List(DSGL).The DSGL covers 1)defence and related goods,software and technologies that are designed or adapted for use by the armed forces,and non-military goods that are inherently lethal,and 2)non-lethal dua

316、l-use goods,software and technolo-gies.231 Similarly,New Zealand controls exports on items on the New Zealand Strategic Goods List,which includes controlled military and dual-use goods,soft-ware and technology.232The export regulations of French Polynesia,Guam and New Caledonia are in line with eith

317、er the EUs strategic-goods list including dual-use and military items or the US Export Administration Regulations,for the case of the US military facilities on Guam.Among the other Pacific Islands states that have(indigenous)export-control regulations,none feature goods listed by the US or the EU.In

318、 Tuvalu,sensitive government data is included,whereas Vanuatus policies revolve around cultural items,agricultural goods and those that contribute to climate change,such as ozone-depleting substances.233 Cook Islands,whose economy is heavily reliant on fishing,has export-control regulations on fish;

319、and Samoa features a regulation by which all export rev-enues must be repatriated to the island.234 Are investment-screening mechanisms in place?Northeast AsiaBoth Japan and the ROK have investment-screening mechanisms in place.The principal laws in this area are the 1949 act(for Japan),and the 1998

320、 act(for the ROK).Both countries are moving in the direction of tightening investment screening to protect sensitive technologies.One of the major shifts in Japans screening was the 2019 amendment of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act.As a result,foreign investors must notify the govern-ment

321、 in advance when they are acquiring 1%or more of Japanese stocks in the designated sectors(previously,the threshold was 10%or more).235 The ROK enacted the Regulations on Operation of Security Review Procedures for Foreign Investment,which requires foreign investors to indicate whether they are acqu

322、iring de facto control of a company and whether a purchase is related to certain criteria which pertains to national security.236 While under President Tsai Ing-Wens leadership Taiwan has sought to attract investment,it has also tightened its FDI-screening mechanism since 2022 in order to prevent Ch

323、inese firms circumventing US export controls.237 The 1997 Statute for Investment by Foreign Nationals governs FDI in Taiwan,while the Measures on Investment Permits for people of the Mainland Area specifically outlines restrictions for nationals from the Peoples Republic of China.238 There is no gui

324、dance on the interpretation of national security when deciding on foreign investment cases,and invest-ments are decided on a case-by-case basis.239 Reaction from the general public could also influence a decision.240 No monetary or market share-based threshold is required to trigger a foreign-invest

325、ment review.241Southeast AsiaIndonesia(with the exception of technological goods),Laos,Myanmar,the Philippines and Vietnam have investment-screening mechanisms.242 However,in Indonesia,the government has shifted its approach from a negative-investment list to a positive-investment list.Now only six

326、sectors are closed or restricted to invest-ment from domestic and foreign entities,which are all linked to illegal drugs,gambling,endangered fishing,chemical production for warfare or related to climate change.The change was made due to the fact that the negative-investment list was deemed to dampen

327、 FDI and economic growth.Thailand and Malaysia have foreign-ownership restrictions in banking,insurance and tele-communications.However,there are no national-security screening mechanisms.243 In Brunei and Cambodia,there are no provisions for investment screening.Without a formal foreign-investment

328、screening-mechanism in place,Singapore currently maintains oversight and con-trol over FDI by way of legislative restrictions,though its conditions are generally favourable to foreign direct investment.Licensing regimes work through seeking approvals from sector regulators for any foreign invest-men

329、t in energy,telecommunications,broadcasting,the Europe and the Indo-Pacific:Convergence and Divergence in the Digital Order 27 domestic media sector,financial services,legal services,public accounting services,ports and airports and prop-erty ownership.244South AsiaAmong South Asian countries,most h

330、ave regulatory frameworks to screen foreign investments that might hinder national security.India has an FDI-screening mechanism in place and,in 2020,the government issued a note adding a further layer to investment restric-tions.245 With this amendment,the government imposed the need for prior auth

331、orisation by the government for investments coming from non-resident entities located in countries that share land borders with India.This action was aimed at curbing opportunistic takeovers/acquisi-tions of Indian companies due to the current COVID-19 pandemic.246 The regulation applies to all sect

332、ors and all sizes of investment.247 Pakistan has investment-screening mechanisms for FDIs.To preserve public safety and national secu-rity,it enforces restrictions on some investment sec-tors,such as arms and ammunitions,high explosives and radioactive substances.It also puts a threshold on foreign

333、ownership for investments in specific sectors,including airlines,banking,agriculture and the media.Furthermore,Pakistani law imposes restrictions on investments coming from Indian and Israeli citizens.In Nepal,foreign investments are regulated by a combi-nation of several laws,such as the Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act of 2019,rather than by national-security screenings.Similarly,B