1、 G R O U P O F T W E N T Y G-20 REPORT ON STRONG,SUSTAINABLE,BALANCED,AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH 2022 Prepared by Staff of the I N T E R N A T I O N A L M O N E T A R Y F U N D*Does not necessarily reflect the views of the IMF Executive Board November 2022 2 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND CONTENTS EXECUTIVE

2、SUMMARY _ 3 THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IS WEAKENING _ 4 A.Multiple Shocks have Hurt Growth and Raised Inflation _ 4 B.Economic Scarring and Fragmentation Will Weigh on the Outlook _ 10 C.Downside Risks Dominate and Imperil the Growth Outlook _ 12 PRIORITIZE DISINFLATION AND EQUITABLE GROWTH _ 14 A.Macroecon

3、omic Policies Must Focus on Bringing Down Inflation _ 14 B.Complementary Reforms Can Support Near-and Long-Term Growth _ 19 C.A Robust Policy Package Would Help Tackle Global Challenges _ 20 HALT FRAGMENTATION AND NURTURE INTEGRATION _ 22 A.It is Essential to Continue Reaping the Gains from Globaliz

4、ation _ 22 B.Joint Action Can Support Both the Climate and Vulnerable Economies _ 23 FIGURES 1.Progress Toward Strong,Sustainable,Balanced,and Inclusive Growth _ 4 2.Economic Activity _ 5 3.Inflation _ 6 4.Commodity Prices and Energy Security _ 6 5.Food Insecurity _ 7 6.Monetary Policy Interest Rate

5、s _ 8 7.External Spillovers _ 9 8.Excess Current Account Balances _ 9 9.Economic Outlook _ 10 10.Output Losses After Recessions _ 10 11.Globalization Trends _ 12 12.Inflation Outlook _ 14 13.Monetary Policy _ 15 14.Fiscal Impulse _ 16 15.Fiscal Policy _ 17 16.Structural Reform Recommendations _ 19 1

6、7.Impact of Adjusting Policies to Recommendations:Real GDP and Spillovers _ 21 18.Impact of Adjusting Policies to Recommendations:Debt _ 21 19.Impact of Adjusting Policies to Recommendations:Demand and Current Account _ 22 20.Importance of Policy Credibility _ 23 21.Impact of Climate Policies _ 24 T

7、ABLES 1.Real GDP Growth _ 26 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The global economy has weakened amid a materializing of downside risks.Three key factors are weighing on the global growth outlook:(i)persistently high and broad-based inflation is necessitating a tightening of monetary pol

8、icy in many major economies;(ii)the growth momentum in China remains weak amid intermittent pandemic lockdowns and the worsening property market crisis;and(iii)Russias invasion of Ukraine and associated sanctions have contributed to continued supply disruptions,rising food insecurity,and energy conc

9、ernsparticularly in Europe amid a sharp reduction in Russian gas supply.At the same time,growing global fragmentation pressures are likely to destroy part of the gains from decades of increasing globalization.Add to this a confluence of downside risks.A worsening energy crisis in Europe would severe

10、ly harm growth and raise inflation.Prolonged high inflation could require larger-than-anticipated policy interest hikes,further tightening of global financial conditions,and increasing risks of a sovereign debt crisis for vulnerable economies.Increasingly severe weather events would continue to harm

11、 growth across the globe.Bringing down inflation is a key policy priority,as is addressing elevated debt levels while protecting the most vulnerable groups.The persistence of multiple global supply-side shocks also necessitates a tighter policy stance to facilitate adjustment to the new state of the

12、 world.Monetary policy is appropriately expected to continue to tighten in most G-20 countries,although the extent of tightening is country specific.Where inflation remains high and labor markets tight,higher interest rates are needed.In a few cases where inflationary pressures and signs of overheat

13、ing are absent,central banks can be more cautious and allow a more expansionary stance.In all economies,careful communication is crucial,especially amid the highly uncertainty outlook.Fiscal policy will need to tighten in many economies to address debt vulnerabilities and avoid working against monet

14、ary policy efforts to reduce inflation.Targeted support for vulnerable groups struggling with the surge in inflation and energy prices should be offset by savings elsewhere.A strong,sustainable,balanced,and inclusive recovery requires joint action by the G-20.The G-20 plays a crucial role in maintai

15、ning and improving global trade and investment linkages.Securing peace in Ukraine is essential.At the same time,the G-20 can take actions to address global challenges and help prevent further fragmentation.More open,stable,and transparent rules-based trade would help address global shortages of good

16、s.Strengthening the resilience of global value chains would help protect against future shocks.A durable recovery requires multilateral action on climate,debt,taxation,and pandemic preparedness.An effective policy package is crucial to reach climate goals under the Paris Agreement.In addition,greate

17、r progress is needed on efforts to tackle elevated debt levels amid high borrowing costs in several vulnerable emerging market and low-income economies,including by strengthening the G-20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments.Implementation of the agreement on international taxation should be acceler

18、ated.Multilateral action should continue to build on the progress made on pandemic preparedness._ This report discusses the G-20s progress during the past year towards the goal of strong,sustainable,balanced,and inclusive growth and provides policy recommendations to help reach this goal.The report

19、was prepared under the guidance of Shekhar Aiyar by a team led by Lone Christiansen and comprising Jared Bebee,Chanpheng Fizzarotti,Tryggvi Gudmundsson(co-lead),Ashique Habib,Jaden Kim,Kyuho Lee,Adil Mohommad,Chao Wang,and Bryan Zou.Ilse Peirtsegaele provided administrative support.Prepared based on

20、 information available as of November 3,2022.The report does not necessarily reflect the views of G-20 members.Past G-20 SSBIG reports are available on IMF.org.4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IS WEAKENING Multiple shocks are weakening global growth while inflation remains elevated.R

21、ussias invasion of Ukraine and associated sanctions have added fresh challenges to the continuing impact of the pandemic.Global fragmentation pressures are also darkening the outlook.Moreover,heightened inflation and debt levels are prompting policymakers to tighten monetary and fiscal policy,furthe

22、r weighing on growth.1.Since the 2021 G-20 Report on Strong,Sustainable,Balanced,and Inclusive Growth,the global recovery has weakened and inflation pressures have intensified,with the most vulnerable groups facing the largest impact.Following an initial recovery phase from the pandemic which saw a

23、robust increase in activity and strong gains in labor markets,growth moderated at the end of 2021 and inflation picked up.These trends have become even more pronounced this year amid Russias invasion of Ukraine and associated sanctions as well as lingering supply-demand imbalances(Figure 1).The nece

24、ssary withdrawal of monetary and fiscal policy support to rein in inflation and rebuild fiscal buffers have further weighed on activity.Despite efforts to help shield the most vulnerable people,the poorest are yet again bearing a disproportionate share of the burden from high food and energy prices.

25、Moreover,as borrowing costs have risen,vulnerabilities from elevated public and private sector debt levels have increased.In addition,the war in Ukraine,combined with sanctions and the continuing pandemic have increased global fragmentation pressures,threatening multi-decade gains from increased glo

26、balization and adding to downside risks to global growth.A.Multiple Shocks have Hurt Growth and Raised Inflation 2.While most economies continue to grow,the pace of growth has slowed,and some economies have fallen back into recession.Global growth is projected to slow to 3.2 percent this year and 2.

27、7 percent in 2023(from 6 percent in 2021)(Table 1).1 Notably,slower growth in the United States and China is having a large impact on global growth in 2022(Figure 2,left-hand panel).Economic activity is also weakening in the European Union(after a strong second quarter).While some moderation of grow

28、th following the initial bounce-back from the deep pandemic recession was inevitable,three additional factors have weighed on global output this year and will continue to shape 1 IMF,2022,World Economic Outlook,October.Figure 1.Progress Toward Strong,Sustainable,Balanced,and Inclusive Growth Source:

29、IMF staff assessment.Note:The assessment is relative to IMF,2021,G-20 Report on Strong,Sustainable,Balanced,and Inclusive Growth.StrongGlobal growth has slowed,inflation remains high,and risks are on the downside.SustainableExtent of scarring has increased during the year;weather-related disasters c

30、ontinue.BalancedExcess imbalances have declined slightly but high debt presents risks amid rising borrowing costs.InclusiveLabor market strength;but cost-of-living crisis is disproportionabtely affecting the poorest.GrowthSubstantial progressModerate progressBroadly unchangedModerate deteriorationSu

31、bstantial deterioration INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 5 the outlook:(i)Russias invasion of Ukraine and associated sanctions as well as reduced gas supply to Europe;(ii)necessary monetary policy tightening to bring down inflation and an accompanying tightening of global financial conditions;and(iii)the

32、 continuing impact of the pandemic,including lockdowns in China and supply disruptions,as well as troubles in the countrys real estate sector.In addition,economic momentum has been negatively affected by the hit to real wages following the global spike in inflation.Following a contraction in global

33、output during the second quarter of this yearwhen downturns in China and Russia weighed particularly heavily on global growthsome third-quarter GDP releases surprised on the upside.Nonetheless,recent monthly indicators of economic activity point to continued weakness in several economies.Economic ac

34、tivity in G-20 advanced economies is weakening.PMI data for recent months signal weakness,remaining in or falling into contractionary territory in most G-20 advanced economies(e.g.,Germany,Korea,United States;Figure 2,right panel).While industrial production and retail sales in the United States hav

35、e so far shown some resilience,interest-sensitive sectors(e.g.,housing)have deteriorated sharply.G-20 emerging market economies have also seen a moderation in growth,although with some economies displaying relatively more resilience.In China,renewed COVID-19 outbreaks and subsequent lockdowns as wel

36、l as ongoing challenges in the real estate sector contributed to a sizable slowdown in the second quarter,with investment,industrial production,and retail sales all disappointing.Data for August suggest that growth remains fragile,and trade has weakened,reflecting spillovers beyond China.Though PMIs

37、 have remained in expansionary territory in several economies(e.g.,Brazil,India,Indonesia,Russia,Saudi Arabia),they have recently worsened in some economies(e.g.,China,South Africa).Figure 2.Economic Activity Sources:Haver Analytics;IMF,World Economic Outlook;and IMF staff calculations.1/Manufacturi

38、ng PMIs for CAN,IDN,KOR,MEX,and TUR.Emerging excludes ARG due to data limitations.ESP:permanent invitee.3.Inflation remains stubbornly high and has become more broad-based.The surge in consumer prices that started last year has gathered pace in 2022,resulting in rates of inflation that have exceeded

39、 central bank targets in most G-20 economies.With some notable exceptions,including China where inflation remains low,headline inflation has approached or surpassed double-digit levels in several economies.While a large part of the rise in inflation in the euro area continues to be-212022

40、2023U.S.EUJapanOther G-20 AEChinaIndiaOther G-20 EMRoWRussiaGlobal growth contributionGlobal growth contribution(percent)3035404550556065USAITADEUKORJPNAUSFRAGBRCANESPTURMEXIDNZAFRUSCHNBRAINDSAUG-20 AdvancedG-20 EmergingJul-22Aug-22Sep-22Oct-22Composite Purchasing Managers Index 1/Composite Purchasi

41、ng Managers Index 1/(index;50+=expansion;sa)6 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND explained by food and energy price inflation,euro area inflation nonetheless rose to 9.9 percent in Septemberthe highest rate in euro area history.Overall,in many economies,the rise in inflation has broadened beyond food and e

42、nergy prices and led to elevated core goods and services inflation,and near-term inflation expectations have risen above central bank inflation targets(Figure 3).While wages have not kept pace with inflation,increased tightness in labor markets may be contributing to supply-demand imbalances and sub

43、sequently putting pressure on consumer prices(e.g.,Australia,Canada,United Kingdom,United States).4.Despite recent declines in commodity prices,energy concerns have become acute in some economies,in particular in Europe.The recent moderation in oil and other commodity prices has provided some relief

44、 to headline inflation.Yet,energy concerns have increased markedly.While gas prices,including in Europe,have recently declined markedly,significant concerns remain.The indefinite shutdown of the Nordstream pipeline as well as developments surrounding the G-7 proposal to cap the price of oil from Rus

45、sia have added to uncertainty.As gas supplies to the European Union were significantly reduced,natural gas prices surged in the third quarter(Figure 4).While estimates of the effects of the reduced gas supply are inherently uncertain,work by the IMF points to a material growth impact,particularly fo

46、r economies where the intensity of Russian gas use is high and alternative supplies are scarce.2 Figure 4.Commodity Prices and Energy Security Sources:European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas;Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine;Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note

47、:Last data point for right-hand chart is September 18.Recent data are provisional.2 IMF,2022,“How a Russian Natural Gas Cutoff Could Weigh on Europes Economies”,IMF blog,July 19.050030005001,0001,5002,0002,5003,0003,5004,000Jan-21 Apr-21 Jul-21 Oct-21 Jan-22 Apr-22 Jul-22 Oct-22Gas(Europe

48、)Gas(US)Oil(right scale)Wheat(right scale)Commodity pricesCommodity prices(index,end-January 2020=100)Feb.24,2022Invasion11/200500Jan-21May-21Sep-21Jan-22May-22Sep-22UkraineBelarusTurkStreamBaltics and FinlandNord Stream 1TotalRussian pipeline gas supplies to EU by routeRussian pipeline g

49、as supplies to EU by route(million cubic meters per day)Figure 3.Inflation Sources:Haver Analytics;IMF,World Economic Outlook;and IMF staff calculations.Note:G-20 AE:excludes AUS.G-20 EM core CPI:excludes ARG,SAU,TUR,and ZAF.024681012Jan-18 Sep-18 May-19 Jan-20 Sep-20 May-21 Jan-22 Sep-22G-20G-20:co

50、reG-20 AEG-20 AE:coreG-20 EMG-20 EM:coreG G-20:Headline and core CPI inflation20:Headline and core CPI inflation(percent;year-over-year)INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 7 5.High food price inflation has prompted a cost-of-living crisis.As prices of many food staples touched record highs in 2022 amid supp

51、ly shortages for global food commodities as well as fertilizers,food insecurity has risen markedly,in particular for the poorest people across the globe(Figure 5).While global wheat prices more recently have fallen back to levels seen prior to Russias invasion of Ukraine,challenges nonetheless remai

52、n.The poorest economies are especially exposed,as food in low-income countries accounts for 44 percent of consumption on average,compared to 28 and 16 percent in emerging market and advanced economies,respectively.3 Moreover,some economies with high risk of food insecurity also face high borrowing c

53、osts,highlighting the limited fiscal options for alleviating the pain to households.Trade restrictions on key food commodities in some economies are adding to the global challenges.6.Monetary policy accommodation has been decisively scaled back to tackle persistent inflation.Policy interest rates ha

54、ve been raised in most G-20 economies,with the notable exceptions of China and Japan(Figure 6,left-hand panel).Moreover,while the tightening cycle in emerging market economies was initiated earlier than in G-20 advanced economies on heightened inflation fears,the cycle has since become increasingly

55、synchronized across economies.Six consecutive interest rate hikes in the United States have lifted the U.S.Federal Reserves policy interest rate to a level not seen since before the Global Financial Crisis and has been accompanied by a sizeable strengthening of the US dollar.In July,the European Cen

56、tral Bank started hiking rates for the first time since 2011and has raised its key interest rates by a total of 200 basis points so farand ended its net asset purchases.Add to this that further monetary policy tightening is expected in major advanced economies over the coming months(Figure 6,right-h

57、and panel),and some central banks(e.g.,U.S.Federal Reserve,Bank of Canada)have started to reduce the size of their balance sheets.7.In turn,global financial conditions have tightened.The monetary policy pivot has prompted reductions in equity prices in both advanced and emerging market economies and

58、 wider credit spreadsin particular for frontier markets and other lower-rated borrowers.Sectors deemed to have particularly high asset valuations prior to the price correction have seen the largest declines(e.g.,information technology and consumer discretionary companies).4 In addition,the unusually

59、 high uncertainty regarding the global economic and inflation outlooks as well as forthcoming policy actions has contributed to continued heightened market volatility.At the same time,communications by central banks that price stability will be appropriately prioritized has pushed the path of expect

60、ed 3 IMF,2022,“Response to High Food,Energy Prices Should Focus on Most Vulnerable,”IMF Blog,June 7.4 IMF,2022,Global Financial Stability Report,October.Figure 5.Food Insecurity Sources:Bloomberg Finance,L.P.;The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification(IPC);United Nations Food and Agriculture

61、Organization;and IMF staff calculations.30040050060070080090040608000002040608022Real food price index(2014-16=100)Number of undernourished people(millions;rhs)Real food prices and globalReal food prices and global food insecurityfood insecurity 8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND in

62、terest rates higher and further contributed to volatility as well as renewed concerns over financial fragilities.In the United Kingdom,recent uncertainty over the path of fiscal and monetary policy contributed to sizable moves in bond markets.Figure 6.Monetary Policy Interest Rates Sources:Bloomberg

63、 Finance L.P.,Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Latest date as of Nov.3,2022.Market-implied policy rate paths:futures on US federal funds mid target rate and the ECB deposit facility rate.1/Euro area:The European Central Bank conducts monetary policy for the euro area as a whole,incl.f

64、or DEU,ESP,FRA,and ITA.8.Tighter global financial conditions have highlighted debt vulnerabilities and prompted spillovers,including to emerging market economies.Despite some reduction in debt levels,GDP-weighted government debt is projected at around 120 and 70 percent of GDP this year in G-20 adva

65、nced and emerging market economies,respectively.Global government debt is projected to remain about 7 percentage points of GDP above pre-pandemic levels.5 Additionally,some G-20 emerging market economies rely substantially on foreign currency borrowing(e.g.,Trkiye).Exchange rate depreciations have a

66、lso taken place,as global financial conditions tightened(e.g.,India,South Africa),and interest rate spreads for high-debt vulnerable economies have widened.At the same time,the sharp strengthening of the US dollar has had significant spillovers,including to emerging market economies given the US dol

67、lars role as a global funding currency.In the private sector,corporate debt levels also remain high at a time when profit margins are declining,heightening challenges for emerging market and developing economies.In this respect,debt issuance among corporates and sovereigns in several emerging market

68、 economies has declined markedly,with primarily higher-rated issuers issuing new debt in recent months and at higher premiums and shorter maturities.Coupled with external pressures on capital flows,these developments have put high-risk sovereigns under pressure(Figure 7).Many frontier markets are fa

69、cing potential loss of market access,and more than half of all low-income economies are assessed to be in,or have a high probability of entering,debt distress.6 5 IMF,2022,Fiscal Monitor,October.6 IMF,2022,Global Financial Stability Report,October.-4-3-2-1012345JPNKOREA 1/GBRAUSCANUSARUSTURCHNBRAIDN

70、INDZAFMEXSAUG-20 AdvancedG-20 EmergingJan.1,2022-May 31,2022Jun.1,2022-Nov.3,2022G G-20:20:Change in policy interest rates in 2022Change in policy interest rates in 2022(percentage points)ARG(Jun.-latest:26,Jan.-May 22:11)-101234567Current1M3M6M1Y2Y3Y11/2/20228/2/20225/2/2022Implied policy curveImpl

71、ied policy curve(percent)FEDFEDECBECB INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 9 Figure 7.External Spillovers Sources:Bloomberg Financial,L.P.;IIF;and IMF staff calculations.Note for right-hand chart:COVID-19 initial date is March 2,2020.Ukraine war initial date is February 24,2022.Except for the COVID-19 line,a

72、ll data reflect cumulative flows since February 24,2022.9.Nonetheless,the worsening global outlook occurs on the back of somewhat smaller excess global imbalances last year.Global current account balances started widening in 2020 and continued to do so in 2021 on the back of the uneven impact of the

73、 pandemic,including shifts in consumption,effects on travel,transportation,and medical sectors,and differences in policy responses.Of course,wider global current account balances do not necessarily represent a negative trend if they are driven by developmental needs or deepening trade ties based on

74、evolving fundamentals.By contrast,excessive widening,beyond what can be accounted for by fundaments,can fuel trade tensions and increase the risk of disruptive currency and capital flow movements.In its latest analysis of economies external positions and the appropriateness of current account balanc

75、es,the IMF found that global excess current account balances narrowed in 2021 to 0.9 percent of world GDP(from 1.2 percent in 2020).Among G-20 economies,Canada,South Africa,and the United States recorded the largest excess current account deficits,while Australia,Germany,and Russia recorded the larg

76、est excess current account surpluses(Figure 8).7 At the same time,although external stock positions moderated from their peak in 2020,they remained elevated in 2021.7 IMF,2022,External Sector Report.005006007000.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.04.51819202122U.S.10-yr government bond yieldEMBIG sp

77、read(basis points;rhs)1010-yr government bond yield and EMBIG yr government bond yield and EMBIG globalglobal11/3-120-100-80-60-40-200200306090120150Business days since the onset of the crisisBrazilChinaIndiaSouth AfricaOtherCOVID-19Ukraine warCapital flows to Emerging Market EconomiesCapital flows

78、to Emerging Market Economies(cumulative;US billions;as of 11/3/2022)Figure 8.Excess Current Account Balances Source:IMF,External Sector Report,2022 and 2021.Note:Current account gaps are relative to IMF staff assessed current account norms.ESP:permanent invitee.-3-2-1012345DEUAUSEuro areaFRAESPGBRKO

79、RJPNITAUSACANRUSINDIDNTURMEXCHNBRAARGSAUZAFG-20 AdvancedG-20 EmergingCurrent account gapCurrent account gap(percentage points)10 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND B.Economic Scarring and Fragmentation Will Weigh on the Outlook 10.Permanent output losses are expected in many economies.G-20 economies,partic

80、ularly emerging market ones,are projected to incur medium-term output losses from the pandemic(Figure 9).In addition,adverse developments since the 2021 G-20 Report on Strong,Sustainable,Balanced,and Inclusive Growthnot least the war in Ukraineare expected to further reduce medium-term economic pros

81、pects.In this respect,IMF staff research highlights that medium-term output losses are common following recessionswith more severe losses following crisis episodes(Figure 10).Furthermore,even though economies often return to sustained medium-term positive output growth after a downturn,growth rates

82、tend to be slower than what was projected prior to the recession.8 11.Both human capital losses and weaker corporate balance sheets are likely to contribute to scarring through lower productivity and capital stock.Notably,school closures during the pandemic can result in significant scarring.For exa

83、mple,IMF staff estimates have shown that in a representative G-20 advanced economy,learning losses from education disruptions during the pandemic,if left unaddressed,could reduce long-run output by 3 percent relative to the pre-pandemic baseline.9 In addition,economies with lagging labor market reco

84、veries and prolonged unemployment and low participation rates may see adverse impacts on human capital.Capital may also be held idle for an extended period in economies with weak insolvency regimes.Conversely,the pandemic induced a sharp acceleration in investments in digitalization.Past experience

85、suggests that such investment in intangible capital is associated with greater labor productivity growth than investment 8 Cerra and others,2020,“Hysteresis and Business Cycles,”IMF Working Paper No.WP/20/73,May.9 IMF,2022,G-20 Background Note on“Minimizing Scarring from the Pandemic,”May.Figure 9.E

86、conomic Outlook Source:IMF,World Economic Outlook;and IMF staff calc.Note:Prior to last SSBIG report:difference in proj.real GDP in 2024 between Oct.2019 and Oct.2021 WEOs;Since last SSBIG report:difference in proj.real GDP in 2024 between Oct.2021 and Oct.2022 WEOs.ESP:permanent invitee.Figure 10.O

87、utput Losses After Recessions Sources:IMF,World Economic Outlook;Laeven and Valencia(2018);and IMF staff calculations.Note:Based on G19+ESP.Captures 45 recessions(o/w 23(23)in advanced(emerging market)economies,starting between 1991 and 2015;identified using Harding and Pagan(2002)algorithm.Output l

88、osses:difference between real GDP outturns and WEO projections from year prior to the recession,four years after the recession.Sample ends in 2015 to exclude COVID-19 recession.Recessions associated with crises are those where any of the following types of crises started within+/-two years of the be

89、ginning of the recession:banking,currency,and sovereign debt crises.Crisis commencement dates are from Laeven and Valencia(2018).-14-10-6-22610ESPGBRDEUFRACANEUKORAUSUSAITAJPNINDRUSIDNMEXCHNZAFBRAARGSAUTURG-20 AdvancedG-20 EmergingSince last SSBIG reportPrior to last SSBIG reportTotal impactProjecte

90、d output losses in 2024Projected output losses in 2024(percent)-18-16-14-12-10-8-6-4-20Non-crisisCrisisNon-crisisCrisisG-20 AdvancedG-20 EmergingOutput losses 4 years after the start of a recessionOutput losses 4 years after the start of a recession(percent)INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 11 in tangible

91、 forms of capital.Yet,whether this trend will continue is unclear,as investments in intangible capital is particularly sensitive to tightening financing conditions,and potential gains may not be broadly shared.10 The long-term productivity implications of a switch to greater use of remote work also

92、remains unclear.Remote work also carries the potential for outsourcing of skilled labor.12.The most vulnerable people and economies are likely to continue to be hit the hardest.More severe output and employment losses are often associated with greater increases in inequality,as the recession losses

93、tend to fall disproportionately on the most vulnerable.This is consistent with only partial labor market recoveries from the pandemic in several emerging market economies(e.g.,Indonesia,South Africa).The most vulnerable groups face adverse impacts from multiple additional shocks,both in the current

94、context and over the medium term.The United Nations forecasts that 75 million more people than expected prior to the pandemic will be living in extreme poverty this year.11 The disruptions to education have often been more severe for children from poorer households.As evidenced by test scores,school

95、 closures have had a measurable impact on student performance,with the impact more severe among younger students and students from more vulnerable households.Little or no access to the internet for the most vulnerable students also means fewer options for substituting for in-person learning.12 If le

96、ft unaddressed,this is likely to raise inequality.The effects of climate change are increasing,with the most vulnerable facing a relatively larger impact.Extreme temperatures and climate-related disasters(e.g.,extreme precipitation,droughts)are increasing in intensity and frequency in many regions.1

97、3 While all economies are impacted,poorer countries are often more vulnerable given their relatively higher reliance on climate-sensitive sectors(e.g.,agriculture),capacity constraints in responding to the impact of climate change14,and already high rates of food insecurity.12 percent of Sub-Saharan

98、 Africas population is projected to be acutely food insecure,and this will likely worsen with climate change.15 13.Adding to challenges,the pandemic and the war in Ukraine are further straining multilateral cooperation and threatening the gains from globalization.Increasing globalization has provide

99、d numerous benefits for the world economy,as trade has allowed economies to leverage their comparative advantages.As such,global imports increased markedly in the decade up to the Global Financial Crisis(Figure 11).Yet,the pace of globalization has slowed in recent years,and trade tensions have rise

100、n.While global value chains(GVCs)proved relatively resilient during the pandemic(and were instrumental in the global efforts to fight the pandemic and in meeting pandemic-specific 10 IMF,2021,G-20 Background Note on“Boosting Productivity in the Aftermath of Covid-19,”June.11 UNSTAT,https:/unstats.un

101、.org/sdgs/report/2022/Goal-01/.12 IMF,2022,G-20 Background Note on“Minimizing Scarring from the Pandemic,”May.13 Seneviratne and others,2021,“Weather and Climate Extreme Events in a Changing Climate,”Chapter 11 in Climate Change 2021:The Physical Science Basis.Contribution of Working Group I to the

102、Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC).Cambridge University Press,pp.15131766.14 OECD,2003,“Poverty and Climate Change.”15 Baptista and others,2022,“Climate Change and Chronic Food Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa,”IMF Departmental Paper No.DP/2022/026,Septemb

103、er.12 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND demands for goods),16 pressures to implement policies aimed at“reshoring”production and reducing GVC exposures also gained ground.Such global fragmentation pressures have further intensified with the supply chain disruptions resulting from the war in Ukraine and ass

104、ociated sanctionsnot least as Russia and Ukraine are important producers and exporters of certain metals,rare earths,and noble gases that are key inputs in global GVCs.Concerns have also arisen regarding several aspects of the international monetary system,such as cross-border payments systems.C.Dow

105、nside Risks Dominate and Imperil the Growth Outlook 14.Risks to the outlook are firmly on the downside,with the potential for several interrelated negative shocks.While a timely resolution of current challenges is possibleincluding those related to high inflation,the war in Ukraine and associated sa

106、nctions,the lingering effects of the pandemic,and the slowdown in Chinadownside risks predominate.An intensification of the war in Ukraine would have severe negative implications across multiple dimensions.The ongoing humanitarian crisis would deepen,with attendant threats to energy and food supply.

107、Further sanctions could also result in greater fragmentation(especially if applied to third-party economies)and a renewed increase in commodity prices.Disruptions to trademost notably in fossil fuels,but also in manufacturing owing to persistent supply chain disruptionswould further damage growth.Ex

108、amples include the production of semiconductors(given reliance on neon),automobiles(given reliance on palladium,platinum,and aluminum),batteries for electric vehicles(given reliance on nickel),as well as steel.Persistent,deep,and widespread energy shortages would involve large disruptions to everyda

109、y life.17 A further escalation of energy prices,including natural gas,could require drastic policy measures to ensure that households and businesses retain access to energy.Many European economies have already introduced substantial measures in response to the unfolding energy situation but face a c

110、hallenging trade-off between supporting households and businesses on the one hand and avoiding a boost to demand that would further raise inflation.Should the shortfall in the energy supply intensify,strict rationing measures may become necessary,with large disruptions to everyday lifealthough there

111、 are significant uncertainties surrounding the impact on activity.Persistently high inflation,coupled with an upward drift of inflation expectations,would require painful policy measures.If inflation were to remain at the currently elevated levels for longer than projected,the hit to real incomes co

112、uld become more pronounced(absent similarly large wage 16 IMF,2022,World Economic Outlook,Chapter 4,April.17 IMF,2022,“How a Russian Natural Gas Cutoff Could Weigh on Europes Economies,“IMF blog,July 19.Figure 11.Globalization Trends Source:IMF,World Economic Outlook.830323496980002040608

113、022Global importsGlobal imports(percent of GDP)2022 reflects projectionsRolling 5-yearaverage INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 13 increases),with an associated fall in consumption.A worsening cost-of-living crisis could also heighten the risk of unrest,and prolonged elevated inflation could ne

114、cessitate larger-than-anticipated rises in interest rates.The typical lags between monetary policy action and its impact on output and inflation further complicate policymakers tasks.Spillovers from tighter global financial conditions could lead to debt distress in a large set of economies.The rise

115、in policy interest rates has contributed to a significant tightening of global financial conditions.A further tightening of financial conditions amid elevated public and private debt levels in many economies could mean that debt servicing costs and rollover risks rise to dangerous levels in many cou

116、ntries,potentially resulting in defaults.Should a larger-than-expected rise in US interest rates become necessary,borrowing costs would likely increase globally and the US dollar would further strengthenwith a concomitant impact on balance sheets in economies highly dependent on dollar funding.These

117、 adverse effects could be especially prominent in economies already trading at distressed levels.Renewed severe outbreaks of COVID-19 and a further tightening of mobility restrictions in China would have global ramifications.Larger Covid outbreaks could trigger renewed widespread lockdowns under the

118、 countrys zero-Covid strategy,hampering activity.At the same time,vulnerabilities in the property sector could intensify and negatively impact both the real economy and the financial sector,with spillovers to trading partners.Further global fragmentation could lead to a reconfiguration of trade towa

119、rd suboptimal outcomes.Increasing fragmentation could heighten policy uncertainty and result in a split of the global economy into geopolitical blocs where trade,technology,and financial systems become more regionalized and siloed.Several adverse consequences would ensue,impacting trade in both good

120、s and services as well as in growing areas of trade.For instance,“technological decoupling”could hinder the growing trade in services,with negative effects on world GDP.18 Trade uncertainty would also directly weigh on investment.Heightened policy uncertainty would harm multilateral efforts to tackl

121、e global challenges,such as climate change and debt workouts.Climate change could cause increasingly severe disruptions.The World Meteorological Organization has estimated that one of the next five years is likely to experience the warmest temperature on record.There is now also a 50 percent chance

122、that the annual global temperature will temporarily reach 1.5 degrees Celsius above the average pre-industrial level for at least one of the next five yearsup from a 10 percent chance in the five years leading up to 2021.19 The result could be an intensification of extreme weather events(e.g.,heat w

123、aves).18 Cerdeiro and others,2021,“Sizing Up the Effects of Technological Decoupling,”IMF Working Paper No.WP/21/69.19 World Meteorological Organization(WMO)update,05/09/2022:50:50 chance of global temperature temporarily reaching 1.5C threshold in next five years.14 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND PRIO

124、RITIZE DISINFLATION AND EQUITABLE GROWTH The macroeconomic policy landscape has shifted rapidly during the past year,with policymakers facing an unusually uncertain environment.While monetary and fiscal policies have been tightened,more is likely to be needed to bring down inflation and debt vulnera

125、bilities.At the same time,structural reforms are crucial to boost potential growth and to make growth more inclusive.A.Macroeconomic Policies Must Focus on Bringing Down Inflation 15.The overarching priority for policymakers in most economies is to ensure price stability,while bringing down debt lev

126、els and protecting the most vulnerable.The current environment is particularly challenging amid slowing global growth and elevated inflation.Yet,while monetary policy tightening is under way in most economies and inflation is projected to gradually moderate,further tightening is expected and likely

127、to be needed if inflation pressures persist(Figure 12).At the same time,fiscal policy should be focused on addressing elevated debt levels,while protecting vulnerable groups with targeted,temporary measures.16.It is essential that fiscal policy does not work against monetary policy objectives.Within

128、 a well-coordinated policy mix,fiscal policy tightening would not only bring down debt levels but also help to reduce the overall amount of monetary policy tightening that is required.This would reduce the need for outsized rises in interest rates that would further increase borrowing costs and coul

129、d lead to excess volatility and endanger financial stability.Moreover,fiscal support for the vulnerable should be mindful that while many of the shocks that the global economy has faced recently can be broadly categorized as unprecedented supply shocks,their persistence and size mean that policies w

130、ill have to tighten to facilitate adjustment to a new equilibrium.At the same time,financial sector policies can help reduce risks from elevated vulnerabilities amid tightening global financial conditions.In contrast,should fiscal policy become expansionary,the fight to bring down inflation would on

131、ly be prolonged,further complicating the task of fiscal as well as monetary and financial authorities.Overall,given the unusually high uncertainty in the current environment,authorities must be ready to adjust policies depending on the evolving data and country characteristics,such as the availabili

132、ty of policy space and cyclical positions.Monetary Policy 17.Monetary policy is projected to appropriately further tighten in most economies.Despite sizable policy interest rate hikes in several economieswith hikes in Canada,the United Kingdom,and Figure 12.Inflation Outlook Sources:IMF,World Econom

133、ic Outlook;IMF staff calculations.Note:Projections through 2023Q4.AE:advanced economies;EM:emerging market economies.-20246801920212223G-20 AE(excl.US,UK)G-20 EM(excl.CHN,IDN)UKUSChinaIndonesiaG G-20:Headline CPI inflation20:Headline CPI inflation(year-on-year percent change)INTERNATIONAL

134、 MONETARY FUND 15 the United States representing the largest tightening moves in those economies in decadesthe monetary policy stance in most G-20 economies remains accommodative this year(e.g.,Australia,euro area,India,Korea,South Africa,United States;Figure 13).Some G-20 emerging market economiesw

135、hich started the tightening cycle earlier than G-20 advanced economies and aggressively removed accommodationcurrently have a tight monetary policy stance(e.g.,Argentina,Brazil,Mexico).Nonetheless,real interest rates remain low in many economies,owing to elevated rates of inflation.As such,most G-20

136、 central banks are expected to continue the current tightening cycle,in line with IMF staff recommendations(e.g.,Australia,Canada,euro area,India,Indonesia,Korea,South Africa,United States).18.However,the extent of additional tightening that would be appropriate differs across economies and depends

137、on economic fundamentals and the macroeconomic outlook.In economies exhibiting elevated price pressures,tight labor markets,and signs of considerable and continued demand-supply imbalances,a larger-than-projected tightening is warranted already this year(e.g.,Trkiye,United Kingdom;Figure 13).In seve

138、ral regions,central banks,including the European Central Bank and the U.S.Federal Reserve,have appropriately signaled that further tightening is likely.By contrast,where price stability is not under threat and signs of overheating are absent,central banks can allow for a somewhat more expansionary s

139、tance in the near term(e.g.,China where continued monetary support is appropriate).In all economies,careful communication by central banks will be crucial to limit adverse spillovers and to safeguard stability.Notably,this applies to communication regarding both guidance on the expected path of poli

140、cy interest rates as well as the process for setting balance sheet policies,which can affect market liquidity and broader financial conditions.Fiscal Policy 19.Fiscal policy has tightened but budgets continue to face spending pressures amid adverse shocks.After sizable policy support in response to

141、the pandemic,fiscal balances improved in 2021,as the recovery took hold and support measures were gradually withdrawn(Figure 14).Figure 13.Monetary Policy Sources:IMF staff estimates and recommendations.Note:As of Sept.29,2022.Recommended change to the policy stance:difference between the recommende

142、d and projected stance.Euro area:the ECB conducts monetary policy for the euro area as a whole(incl.DEU,ESP,FRA,ITA).ESP:permanent invitee.SAU:fixed exchange rate.20222022202320232022202220232023AUSAUSModerately expansionaryModerately contractionaryCANCANModerately expansionarySubstantially contract

143、ionaryEuro areaEuro areaModerately expansionaryModerately contractionaryJPNJPNModerately expansionaryModerately expansionaryKORKORModerately expansionaryNeutralUSAUSAModerately expansionarySubstantially contractionaryGBRGBRNeutralSubstantially contractionaryZAFZAFSubstantially expansionaryNeutralTUR

144、TURSubstantially expansionarySubstantially expansionaryCHNCHNModerately expansionaryModerately expansionaryINDINDModerately expansionaryNeutralIDNIDNModerately expansionaryNeutralARGARGModerately contractionaryModerately contractionaryMEXMEXModerately contractionaryModerately contractionaryRUSRUSMod

145、erately contractionaryBRABRASubstantially contractionaryModerately expansionaryProjected monetary Projected monetary policy stancepolicy stanceRecommended change Recommended change to monetary policy to monetary policy stancestanceNot AvailableSubstantially more expansionary:ir -100 basis pointsMode

146、rately more contractionary:0 100 basis pointsUnchanged:ir 0(approximately)Moderately more expansionary:-100 basis points ir 0 Key(difference)Key(difference)Substantially expansionaryModerately expansionaryNeutralModerately contractionarySubstantially contractionaryNot availableKey(stance)Key(stance)

147、16 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND Cyclically adjusted primary balances are expected to improve further this year in several G-20 advanced economies and to some degree in G-20 emerging market economies(e.g.,Canada,France,Indonesia,United Kingdom,United States).That said,the rise in inflationnotably soar

148、ing food and energy priceshas prompted some governments to respond with support measures to help shield vulnerable groups,partially offsetting the general tightening.In Europe in particular,many economies have announced large policies to reduce energy costs for businesses and householdsin some cases

149、 with extensive support and limited targeting.20.Fiscal policy should continue to bring down debt-to-GDP ratios,while prioritizing essential support for vulnerable people.Despite the slowdown in growth and the role of inflation in helping to contain debt as a share of GDP,high debt levels and the in

150、crease in borrowing costs nonetheless necessitate actions to reduce debt and support the fight against inflation.Implementing such measures will also support policy credibility and thereby help anchor inflation expectations.Where it is essential to provide support measures for the most vulnerable pe

151、ople who are struggling to deal with the sharp cost-of-living increase,such measures would need to be targeted and temporary and should not result in an overall expansionary fiscal stance.Notably,the policy response to support households and firms amid sharply higher energy prices in Europe should n

152、ot add significantly to demand,as this would exacerbate the energy shortage and fuel inflationary pressures.Support measures should be designed in a way that aims to preserve the price signal to encourage a reduction in energy use by end users.Targeted transfers through social safety nets can be hel

153、pful in this regard.Where this is not feasible,lump-sum bonuses for householdslinked to past energy consumptioncan be a useful alternative,while block pricing(e.g.,subsidizing energy consumption below a threshold at a guaranteed price)is a viable but less preferable option.Notably,as a non-trivial p

154、art of the rise in wholesale energy prices will likely not be temporary,prices for end-consumers need to be allowed to rise.In turn,this amplifies the need to take steps to secure future energy supply with a focus on renewable sources.Meanwhile,commodity exporters have benefited from elevated commod

155、ity prices(e.g.,Saudi Arabia)and should use the windfall gains to build buffers.21.In several economies,larger-than-projected deficit reductions are warranted.A larger-than-projected fiscal consolidation would be warranted this year or next in economies where the public debt ratio needs to be put on

156、 a firmly downward path(e.g.,Italy,South Africa;Figure 15).In contrast,in China,IMF staff recommends a looser-than-projected fiscal policy stance in 2023allowing for a larger-than-projected cyclically-adjusted primary deficitas inflation remains manageable and near-term support would put the recover

157、y on a firmer footing and ease the hand-off from public to private investment.Over the medium term,more ambitious debt reduction plans Figure 14.Fiscal Impulse Source:IMF,World Economic Outlook and IMF staff calc.Note:See note to Figure 15 for country-specific data details.EU:consists of both advanc

158、ed and emerging market economies.ESP:permanent invitee.-5-4-3-2-10123456USAGBRAUSCANFRAEUDEUESPITAJPNKORSAUIDNMEXZAFINDARGBRATURCHNRUSG-20 AdvancedG-20 Emerging20222023G G-20:Annual change in projected cyclically adjusted 20:Annual change in projected cyclically adjusted primary balances primary bal

159、ances (percentage point change in CAPB as a percent of fiscal-year GDP)INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 17 are desirable in several economies to rebuild fiscal buffers(e.g.,India,France,Italy,Japan,South Africa,Spain).In all economies,credible medium-term policy frameworks can help create space for neces

160、sary,targeted support for vulnerable people today,while ensuring the debt-to-GDP ratio is steadily brought down.Figure 15.Fiscal Policy Sources:IMF staff estimates and recommendations.Note:CAPB:cyclically adjusted primary balance.Includes crisis-related support and expiration on current policy setti

161、ngs.The recommended change to the policy stance reflects the difference between the recommended and projected change in the CAPB.The recommended path assumes that recommendations are implemented in each year(e.g.,recommended change in 2023 assumes that 2022 recommendations are implemented).Recommend

162、ed changes are relative to projected changes as of September 29,2022.CHN:augmented CAPB(incl.activity of local extra-budgetary units and government-guided investment funds).ESP(permanent invitee):primary structural balance(CAPB net of one-off spending).JPN:Projected path reflects staffs assessment o

163、f current policy settings;recommended path for 202427 entails that the zero primary balance target will be achieved later than FY2025,the governments target year.RUS:non-oil cyclically adjusted structural primary balance(percent of potential GDP).SAU:non-exported oil primary balance(percent of non-o

164、il GDP;not cyclically adjusted).EU:The IMF does not prescribe recommendations for the EU-wide fiscal stance.Entries for the EU thus represent the GDP-weighted average of the projected change and the difference between the recommended and projected changes in the CAPB in each EU country(excluding Gre

165、ece).Financial Sector Policy 22.As part of a well-coordinated policy package,financial sector policies should play a supporting role in containing inflation and safeguarding financial stability.While the primary burden of achieving disinflation will inevitably fall on monetary policy,financial secto

166、r policies can support these efforts.That said,implementing policies to ensure financial stability may be particularly challenging in an environment of monetary policy tightening,as reflected in recent bouts of volatility.Looking ahead,financial sector policies should safeguard financial stability a

167、nd tackle pockets of elevated vulnerabilities,including by adjusting selected macroprudential tools,as needed(e.g.,China,where reversing COVID-related financial policy flexibility should commence;Germany where macroprudential tightening should go further).In general,it will be important to strike a

168、balance between containing the buildup of vulnerabilities and avoiding procyclicality and a disorderly tightening of financial conditions.Developments in the housing market would also need to be carefully monitored on the back of sizable price increases in many economies.In the United Kingdom,Modera

169、telymorecontractionary:0.10.5ppt.ofpotentialGDPKey(difference)Key(difference)Substantiallymoreexpansionary or less contractionary:d(CAPB)-0.5ppt.ofpotentialGDPModeratelymoreexpansionary:-0.5d(CAPB)-0.1ppt.ofpotential GDPUnchanged:-0.1d(CAPB)0.1ppt.ofpotential GDPSubstantially expansionaryModerately

170、expansionaryNo differenceModerately contractionarySubstantially contractionaryNot availableKey(difference)Key(difference)Substantially expansionaryModerately expansionaryNeutralModerately contractionarySubstantially contractionaryNot availableKey(stance)Key(stance)202220232024-27 avg.202220232024-27

171、 avg.202220232024-27 avg.ITAITAS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e e x p a n s i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y

172、m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yJPNJPNS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e e x p a n s i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dMo d e r a t e l y m o r e e x p a n s i o n a r yMo d e r a t e l y m

173、 o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yKORKORS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e e x p a n s i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dESPESPU n c h a n g e dMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a

174、r yU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yDEUDEUMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yMo d e r a t e l y m o r e

175、c o n t r a c t i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dEUEUMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n

176、a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yAUSAUSS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a

177、 c t i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dCANCANS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e d

178、FRAFRAS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yMo d e r a t e l y m o r e e x p a n s i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yGBRGBRS u b s t a n t i a l

179、 l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dUSAUSAS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e e x p a n s i o n a r yU n c h

180、 a n g e dU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dCHNCHNS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e e x p a n s i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e e x

181、 p a n s i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dRUSRUSS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e e x p a n s i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yBRABRAMo d e r a t e l y m o r e e x p a n s i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l

182、l y m o r e e x p a n s i o n a r yMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yTURTURMo d e r a t e l y m o r e e x p a n s i o n a r yU n c h a n g e

183、dMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yARGARGU n c h a n g e dMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a

184、c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dINDINDMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yU n c

185、 h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yZAFZAFMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dS u b s t a n t i a l l y

186、 m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yIDNIDNS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dMEXMEXS

187、 u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yMo d e r a t e l y m o r e e x p a n s i o n a r yMo d e r a t e l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dSAUSAUS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i

188、a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yS u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e c o n t r a c t i o n a r yU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dU n c h a n g e dProjected change in CAPBProjected change in CAPBRecommended change to fiscal Recommended change to fiscal policy stancepolicy stanceDifference be

189、tween Difference between recommended and projected recommended and projected CAPB levels(percent of GDP)CAPB levels(percent of GDP)18 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND attention should be kept on stress testing in the housing sector,and macro-prudential settings should be adjusted if problems emerge.In ad

190、dition to the financial stability benefits of such measures,they can help reduce supply-demand imbalances in sectors that have seen significant volatility since the onset of the pandemic and sharp price increases in many cases(e.g.,United Kingdom,United States).23.Regulatory improvements should be s

191、ought in the non-bank financial sector.while significant progress has been made in improving the regulatory environment of non-bank financial intermediaries(NBFI),further action by regulators is warranted in this area,including by developing tools that strike a balance between containing vulnerabili

192、ties and avoiding procyclicality.In some economies(e.g.,United Kingdom,United States),increasing resilience(including for Central Counterparty Clearing houses)is a priority area,as is a reduction of data gaps and a strengthening of liquidity management tools.20 Efforts to introduce common standards

193、and oversight for crypto assets should also be intensified to ensure consumer protection and a level playing field while at the same time avoiding disruptive episodes.External Sector Policy 24.External risks will need to be carefully monitored and addressed,as needed,in the context of tighter polici

194、es and cross-border spillovers.Amid an expected further tightening in global financial conditions,as monetary policy in major advanced economies continue to tighten,emerging market economies are likely to continue to face risks from higher yields,capital flow reversals,and debt distress.To reduce th

195、ese risks and achieve more balanced growth,prudent policy settings will be essential.While policies will inevitably differ across economies depending on their external positions and economic fundamentals,for economies where excess current account deficits are a result of fiscal deficits that exceed

196、desirable medium-term levels,growth-friendly fiscal consolidation is key to achieving a balanced medium-term position.Conversely,encouraging private and public sector investment and discouraging excessive savings will be required for economies where excess current account surpluses persist.In many c

197、ases,flexible exchange rates can be the first line of defense,helping to cushion against shocks and facilitating the required adjustment.This is particularly the case in response to the recent strengthening of the US dollar,which has to a large extent been driven by economic fundamentals,including t

198、he rapid rise in US interest rates and more favorable terms-of-trade for the United States.21 However,severe disruptions in shallow currency markets could trigger large changes in currency hedging premia and local currency financing premia,and,in such cases,temporary foreign exchange intervention ma

199、y be appropriate.Temporary capital flow management measures on outflows may be useful to prevent a full-blown crisis.However,such measures should not substitute for needed macroeconomic policy adjustment.22 More broadly,it is 20 Cuervo and others,2022,“Strengthening Capital MarketsNational Progress

200、and Gaps,”IMF Departmental Paper No.DP/2022/012,June.21 Gopinath and Gourinchas,2022,“How Countries Should Respond to the Strong Dollar,”IMF Blog,October 14.22 See also the IMFs Integrated Policy Framework and the Review of the Institutional View on The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows

201、Background Note on Using the IPF Analytical Toolkit to Enhance Policy Assessments.INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 19 essential that policy settings are internally consistent across fiscal,monetary,financial,and external sector policies.B.Complementary Reforms Can Support Near-and Long-Term Growth 25.Ami

202、d a weak global economy,growth-enhancing structural reforms can help lift economic activity today in addition to boosting the medium-term growth potential.Structural reforms that help enhance confidence and investment would also help boost supply,thereby alleviating inflation pressures from supply-d

203、emand mismatches.The consensus assessment by IMF and OECD staff of structural reform needs highlights several areas of focus(Figure 16).In most G-20 economies,product market reforms remain the key structural policy priority,including to reduce inefficiencies associated with the sizable presence of s

204、tate-owned enterprises(e.g.,China,South Africa)and to lower regulatory barriers to entry(e.g.,China,France,Korea).In addition,labor market reforms can help facilitate reskilling of workers and reduce skills mismatches(e.g.,France,Germany,Italy).Support for high-quality,affordable childcare,parental

205、leave,and other reforms to boost womens participation in the labor market would not only help support inclusion but would also increase the labor supply,thereby alleviating potential tightness in the labor market and supporting growth(e.g.,Germany,India,Japan,Korea,Mexico,Saudi Arabia,Trkiye).In add

206、ition,it is important not to lose sight of the need to address learning losses from school closures during the pandemic.Figure 16.Structural Reform Recommendations Sources:Based on a consensus assessment by IMF and OECD staff.Note:Priorities are country specific and not comparable across countries.R

207、US:policy recommendations are not available.1/ESP:permanent invitee.2/EU:Degree of priority based on a simple average of priorities for EU member countries.For non-G-20 EU member countries:only IMF ratings used.EU-wide recommendations are not taken into account.EU consists of both advanced and emerg

208、ing market economies.3/Increase the share of consumption and property taxes in total tax revenues.4/FLFP:Female labor force participation.26.Strengthening trade policies and public investment can help prevent fragmentation and bolster growth.For a number of economies,trade policiessuch as a reductio

209、n in tariffs(e.g.,Canada,India,United States)and in non-tariff barriers(e.g.,Argentina,China)are key to facilitating international trade and alleviating global fragmentation pressures.Such policies could also support efforts to reduce inflation by reducing import costs.At the same time,streamlining

210、and improving public investment processes can add impetus to green investment,accelerate the green transition,1High1.5Medium2LowKeyKey 20 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND and support growth.Helpful actions in this regard include(i)reducing burdensome administrative and legal hurdles;(ii)improving coordin

211、ation across different levels of government;(iii)addressing limited planning capacity and labor and material shortages(e.g.,Germany);and(iv)enhancing transparency and accountability of public procurement(e.g.,Italy).27.In addition,minimizing scarring from the pandemic is critical to ensure strong an

212、d inclusive growth.As financial conditions continue to tighten and support measures are withdrawn,elevated corporate debt and deteriorated balance sheets in the most impacted sectors could result in failures of otherwise-viable firms,as well as reduced investment.Boosting the capacity of insolvency

213、regimes,including by ramping up the use of out-of-court restructuring mechanisms,would help address these challenges.Over the medium term,structural reforms and well-targeted fiscal measures can boost firms incentives to invest and support reallocation of capital and labor towards their most efficie

214、nt uses.Public investment,including in public R&D and workforce training,can boost private returns by providing necessary complementary inputs(e.g.,Germany).At the same time,public investment in infrastructure,such as broadband,can help ensure widespread and equitable access to opportunities(e.g.,In

215、donesia).In all economies,to minimize permanent learning losses from school closures during the pandemic,it is important to promptly assess the extent of learning losses and implement remedial measures to repair the damage incurred.These measures should include targeted tutoring for students,improve

216、d digital access and infrastructure(e.g.,Indonesia),training for teachers(e.g.,South Africa),and extended school years.C.A Robust Policy Package Would Help Tackle Global Challenges 28.Over the near term,adjusting macroeconomic policies to align with IMF staff recommendations would help bring down ne

217、ar-term inflation in some economies and lift growth in others.Where price pressures warrant,a tighter-than-projected monetary policy stance would help bring down inflation faster than projected under current policy settings(e.g.,Trkiye,United Kingdom).Moreover,fiscal policy can also support disinfla

218、tion,such as in France and Italy,where a slightly tighter-than-projected near-term fiscal stance would not only support the build-up of fiscal buffers but also help contain inflation.In contrast,in the context of slowing growth and manageable inflationary pressures,additional macroeconomy policy sup

219、port in China,beyond projections would increase growth by helping to boost domestic demand amid headwinds from the countrys lockdown policies and real estate challenges(Figure 17).While the direct effects of policy support capture the majority of the impact,spillovers would also help support demand

220、in trading partners.29.Over the medium and long terms,the implementation of structural reforms would have a sizeable effect on output in the G-20 while fiscal consolidation is carried out.The need for a faster-than-projected reduction of inflation and debt ratios in some economies would weigh on gro

221、wth in the years ahead.In this context,the growth-enhancing impact of implementing structural reform recommendations will be particularly helpful.Not only will they help lift output in individual economies,the increase in demand over time will also generate positive spillovers across the G-20.INTERN

222、ATIONAL MONETARY FUND 21 Figure 17.Impact of Adjusting Policies to Recommendations:Real GDP and Spillovers Sources:IMF,G-20 Model simulations;IMF,World Economic Outlook;and IMF staff calculations.Note:RUS:excluded from model simulations as policy recommendations are not available.1/Impact as of 2032

223、.Impact is reflected on the right-hand scale.30.Implementing the recommended policies would strengthen the outlook for public debt and reduce imbalances.The combination of tighter fiscal policy and structural reforms would serve to materially lower public debt burdens in the medium term.Notably,debt

224、-to-GDP ratios in economies with no fiscal space or fiscal space at risk would be brought down markedly over the next years(e.g.,India,Italy,South Africa,Spain;Figure 18).In addition to fiscal tightening,the growth benefits from structural reforms would also help reduce debt-to-GDP ratios.Moreover,s

225、tronger growth provides the opportunity to support more equitable outcomes.Adjusting the policy settings would also support rebalancing.Structural reform implementation and macroeconomic policy adjustment would serve to boost aggregate private demand,most notably private consumptionand in particular

226、 in economies exhibiting excess current account surpluses(Figure 19).In turn,this would rotate global demand,resulting in a reduction of current account surpluses and contributing to more balanced global growth.-101234-0.40.00.40.81.21.620232024-27(average)Long-term(rhs)1/Real GDP:AggregateReal GDP:

227、Aggregate(percent difference from baseline)Macro policiesStructural reforms012340.00.30.60.91.2G-20G-20 adv.G-20 emg.G-20G-20 adv.G-20 emg.G-20G-20 adv.G-20 emg.20232024-27Long-term(rhs)1/Real GDPReal GDP(percent difference from baseline)Impact from spilloversImpact w/o spilloversTotalFigure 18.Impa

228、ct of Adjusting Policies to Recommendations:Debt Sources:IMF,G-20 Model simulations;IMF,World Economic Outlook;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Latest available IMF staff fiscal space assessments.AUS,DEU,KOR,RUS:substantial;CAN,CHN,FRA,GBR,IDN,JPN,MEX,SAU,TUR,USA:some;BRA,ESP,IND,ITA:at risk;ARG,ZAF:

229、none.ESP:permanent invitee.FRA:fiscal space at risk if EU rules are taken into account.RUS:excluded from simulations as policy recommendations are not available.In most cases,lower government net debt corresponds to lower gross debt to GDP;in some,it corresponds to higher government assets to GDP.-8

230、-7-6-5-4-3-2-10Substantial fiscalspaceSome fiscalspaceFiscal space atriskNo fiscal spaceGovernment net debt,2027Government net debt,2027(percent of GDP;percentage point difference from baseline)22 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND Figure 19.Impact of Adjusting Policies to Recommendations:Demand and Curren

231、t Account Sources:IMF,G-20 Model simulations;IMF,World Economic Outlook;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Country groups are based on overall external balance assessments in IMF,2022,External Sector Report as follows:AUS,DEU,RUS:excess surpluses(i.e.,“stronger”or“moderately stronger”external balances)

232、;ARG,CAN,ZAF,USA:excess deficits(i.e.,“weaker”or“moderately weaker”external balances);BRA,FRA,CHN,IDN,IND,ITA,JPN,KOR,MEX,SAU,ESP,TUR,GBR:broadly balanced(i.e.,external balances are“broadly in line”).RUS:excluded from model simulations as policy recommendations are not available;as such,no results f

233、or emerging market excess surplus countries are shown.HALT FRAGMENTATION AND NURTURE INTEGRATION Determined execution of sound multilateral policies is crucial to tackle common problems facing the global economy.The gains from closer trade and investment ties during the past decades must be protecte

234、d and global economic fragmentation prevented.For sustainable and resilient growth,the gap between necessary and planned action on climate change must be reduced.Moreover,multilateral action is required to support the most vulnerable economies amid a period of significant stress.A.It is Essential to

235、 Continue Reaping the Gains from Globalization 31.Maintaining and improving global trade and investment linkages are a shared responsibility.End the war in Ukraine.Lack of progress in ending the war would prolong human suffering,food and energy shortages,and demand-supply mismatches.A lasting peace

236、between Ukraine and Russia would greatly improve the likelihood of preventing further geo-economic fragmentation and associated adverse global economic consequences.Remove recently imposed restrictions on food exports.While some economies have begun reversing these trade restrictions,further action

237、is needed.Authorities should prioritize policies that support the international supply of food and ensure that it is able to reach those most in need,including by keeping transport corridors open.Where there are legitimate food security concerns,domestic policies can promote food access,including th

238、rough the use of social safety nets,targeted food aid,and structural policies that enhance food supply.-6-4-20246ExcesssurplusExcessdeficitBroadlybalancedExcessdeficitBroadlybalancedG-20 AdvancedG-20 EmergingDemand side decomposition,2027Demand side decomposition,2027(contribution to GDP;ppt.differe

239、nce from baseline)GovernmentPrivate investmentPrivate consumptionNet exportsReal GDP-0.4-0.20.00.20.40.6ExcesssurplusExcessdeficitBroadlybalancedExcessdeficitBroadlybalancedG-20 AdvancedG-20 EmergingCurrent account balance,2027Current account balance,2027(percent of GDP;percentage point difference f

240、rom baseline)INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 23 Build resilience in GVCs against future shocks.The pandemic and the war in Ukraine have exposed vulnerabilities in GVCs.In this regard,recent IMF research shows that protectionism does not improve GVC resilience.Instead,diversifying a countrys sources of i

241、nputs internationallyreducing(rather than increasing)dependence on home-produced inputscan protect countries against supply shocks that hit key world suppliers of intermediate inputs.In addition,it can help reduce economic volatility in the face of more wide-spread,correlated supply shocks.By contra

242、st,actions to move production on-shore would increase concentration risks.23 While private firms would be at the forefront of measures to build resilience,governments can assist by addressing information gaps in GVCs,lowering trade tensions,and providing a stable,rules-based trade policy regime.In p

243、articular,WTO reforms to restore effective dispute settlement and strengthen trade rules would make a major contribution to the global economy by encouraging countries to maintain more open,stable,and transparent trade policies.B.Joint Action Can Support Both the Climate and Vulnerable Economies 32.

244、Achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement and effectively reducing carbon emissions require that the gap between ambition and action on climate change be reduced.A large gap persists between Nationally Determined Contributions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and what is required to limit gl

245、obal warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.An effective policy package to achieve long-term climate mitigation goals is essential.Carbon pricing should be the centerpiece of such a package,combined with green R&D incentives and investment in green infrastructure.As part of the p

246、ackage,redistribution of carbon pricing proceeds can help support vulnerable groups.24 To coordinate a scaling up of global climate mitigation,the IMF has proposed an international carbon price floor arrangement,with a price floor of US$25US$75,differentiated by countries level of development.25 Suc

247、h a policy would have the benefit of mitigating the need for border carbon adjustment policies,as it would limit competitiveness effects across countries in energy intensive 23 IMF,2022,World Economic Outlook,Chapter 4,April.24 IMF,2020,World Economic Outlook,Chapter 3,October.25 Parry and others,20

248、21,“Proposal for an International Carbon Price Floor among Large Emitters,”IMF Staff Climate Notes.Figure 20.Importance of Policy Credibility Source:IMF,2022,World Economic Outlook,Chapter 3,Oct.Note:The chart shows the difference in outcomes under(i)full and(ii)partial credibility of climate polici

249、es aimed at reducing greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions by 25 percent relative to current levels by 2030.(i):the private sector(firms and households)takes current and future policies,including the price path,into account to adjust decisions.(ii):each increment of the GHG tax is expected to remain in place

250、,but future increments come as a surprise.The policy package is based on benchmark elasticities and consists of a gradual GHG price increase from 2023 to 2030.2/3 of revenues is used to reduce labor taxes;1/3 is transferred to households.-4-3-2-101234-200-150-0200USAEAChina RoWUSAEAChi

251、na RoWGHG price(US dollars per metric tonof CO2 equivalent)Real GDP(percent deviation frombaseline;right scale)Fully crediblePartially credible same GHG reduction targetsImpact on greenhouse gas(GHG)price and real GDPImpact on greenhouse gas(GHG)price and real GDP 24 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND indu

252、stries.26 While decarbonization of the world economy would entail some near-term coststhough higher for fossil-fuel rich and carbon-intensive economiesthese should be manageable if action is not delayed.27 Commitment to a credible climate policy path also substantially reduces the required carbon pr

253、ice to meet emission reduction targets as well as the GDP costs,relative to a policy in which future increases in the price of carbon are not fully anticipated(Figure 20).Moreover,given near-term energy concerns related to the war in Ukraine,it will be important to avoid setting back the green trans

254、ition.Instead,governments should take the opportunity to invest in renewable energy rather than more fossil fuel-based sources and ensure that any interim measures,until sufficient green energy is on stream,remain temporary.Efforts are also needed to roll back fossil fuel subsidies and to extend tec

255、hnological and financial support for developing economies to achieve climate mitigation and adaptation goals,including by mobilizing private finance.28 33.Incorporating different types of climate policy into the design of an international climate policy agreement can be helpful in reaching a joint a

256、greement.Notably,where carbon pricing is not feasible,implementation of equivalent policies can in some cases be used to achieve mitigation at relatively modest economic cost.While a key strength of carbon pricing is that it optimally allocates mitigation to where abatement costs are lowest,in certa

257、in cases,regulations can be as effective as carbon pricing.For example,model simulations illustrate that in the electricity sector(a major source of carbon emissions),the availability of affordable substitutes to fossil fuel-based electricity implies that the macroeconomic costs of carbon pricing an

258、d regulation are broadly similar across key polluting economies(and relatively small)(Figure 21).By contrast,regulations are costlier than carbon pricing in terms of GDP losses in sectors where abatement costs are more heterogenous.This is because complying with a 26 Chateau and others,2022,“Economi

259、c and Environmental Benefits from International Cooperation on Climate Policies,”IMF Departmental Paper No.DP/2022/007,March.27 IMF,2022,World Economic Outlook,Chapter 3,October.28 Prasad and others,2022,“Mobilizing Private Climate Financing in Emerging Market and Developing Economies,”IMF Staff Cli

260、mate Notes.Figure 21.Impact of Climate Policies Source:Chateau and others,forthcoming;IMF staff calc.Note:Impact of implementing climate policies relative to a baseline of no policy change.All policy actions are budget neutral.Simulations are from the IMF-ENV model.Climate policies are incorporated

261、in(i)the power sector alone(purple section);or(ii)both the power and Energy Intensive and Trade Exposed(EITE)sectors(orange section).Purple diamonds:impact of regulatory policy requiring a 20 percent reduction in the share of fossil fuels-based power generation relative to 2030(except for FRA and CA

262、N,which have a high share of low-carbon energy and are assumed to reduce the share of fossil fuels-based power generation by 7 and 10 percentage points,respectively).Purple bars:impact of a carbon tax for the power sector that achieves the same CO2 emission reduction as the aforementioned regulatory

263、 policy.Orange diamonds:impact of a regulatory policy scenario,implementing(i)the same regulatory policy for the power sector as above,and(ii)a regulation on the“direct”emissions for each EITE sector,by reducing the emission intensity of each EITE sector linearly from 2022 so as to decline by 20 per

264、cent below the 2030 baseline emission intensity level.Orange bars:impact of a uniform carbon tax for the power and EITE sectors such that the joint annual emissions are identical to those in the regulatory policy scenario for the power and EITE sectors.EU:consists of both advanced and emerging marke

265、t economies.-1.2-1.0-0.8-0.6-0.4-0.20.00.2CHNROWDEUEUITACANGBRUSAFRAJPNINDCHNDEUROWEUITACANGBRUSAFRAJPNINDPower sectorPower and EITE sectorsImpactImpact of carbon pricing and equivalent regulationof carbon pricing and equivalent regulation(percent change in GDP relative to baseline of no policy acti

266、on)INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 25 common regulation is more difficult across heterogenous sectors(e.g.,Energy Intensive and Trade Exposed sectors).29 34.A joint approach is required to support vulnerable economies,implement international taxation,and enhance pandemic preparedness.Ensure support for

267、the most vulnerable economies amid high debt and borrowing costs.While the global financial safety net(including central bank swap lines and IMF-supported arrangements)provides a critical safety net for countries during periods of heightened risk,liquidity support alone may be insufficient for the m

268、ost vulnerable economies.The IMFs new Food Shock Window will help provide access to emergency financing to countries with urgent balance of payments needs that are suffering from acute food insecurity,a sharp food imports shock,or from a cereals export shock.30 The operationalization of the IMFs Res

269、ilience and Sustainability Trust will help countries build resilience to external shocks and ensure sustainable growth.31 However,several emerging market and low-income economies face high borrowing costs.Some economies are in complex defaults that are yet to be resolved.Greater progress towards ord

270、erly debt restructuring is therefore essential,as is improved debt transparency.The G-20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments offers guidance for restructuring,but the framework needs strengthening,and implementation should be accelerated.Helpful actions would include greater clarity and agreement f

271、rom official creditors on the different steps and timelines during the process,agreement on debt service standstills during the negotiation period,and an expansion of coordinated debt treatments to non-DSSI-eligible economies,including middle-income countries that also need debt treatment urgently.A

272、dvance progress on international taxation.Timely implementation of the historic agreement among members of the OECD-led Inclusive Framework on international corporate taxation is key,as implementing the G-20/OECD agreement would significantly improve international taxation and reduce both tax compet

273、ition between economies and profit shifting by multinationals.In this respect,Pillar One of the agreement is on track for delivery by mid-2023,and technical work under Pillar Two is largely complete.32 Continue to strengthen pandemic preparedness.Closing the Act-A grant financing gap for vaccines,di

274、agnostics,PPE,and oxygen remains vital to help protect against COVID-19 and end the pandemic.As the emphasis shifts from the COVID-19 emergency response to preparing for future pandemics,the establishment of the Financial Intermediary Fund for Pandemic Prevention,Preparedness,and Response is welcome

275、.In addition,investing in R&D,genomic surveillance,and health systems would further help prepare for the emergence of future threats.29 Chateau and others,forthcoming,“Climate Policy Options:A comparison of economic performance,”IMF Working Paper.30 IMF,2022,Press Release No.22/327,September.31 IMFs

276、 Resilience and Sustainabilty Trust website.32 OECD press release,“International tax reform:Multilateral Convention to implement Pillar One on track for delivery by mid-2023,”July 11,2022.26 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND Table 1.Real GDP Growth(percent change)Source:IMF,2022,World Economic Outlook,Oct

277、ober.1/G-20 aggregations exclude the European Union.2/Includes Australia,Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan Korea,United Kingdom,and United States.3/Includes Argentina,Brazil,China,India,Indonesia,Mexico,Russia,Saudi Arabia,South Africa,and Trkiye.4/Indias real GDP growth rates are calculated as per national accounts:with base year 2011/12.5/Permanent invitee.