1、OECD Economic OutlookNovember 2022PRELIMINARY VERSIONOECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK112NOVEMBER 2022PRELIMINARY VERSIONThis document,as well as any data and map included herein,are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty overany territory,to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries

2、 and to the name of any territory,city or area.The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities.The use ofsuch data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights,East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements inthe West Ba

3、nk under the terms of international law.Note by the Republic of TrkiyeThe information in this document with reference to“Cyprus”relates to the southern part of the Island.There is no singleauthority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island.Trkiye recognises the Turkish Republ

4、ic ofNorthern Cyprus(TRNC).Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations,Trkiyeshall preserve its position concerning the“Cyprus issue”.Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European UnionThe Republic of Cyprus is recognised by al

5、l members of the United Nations with the exception of Trkiye.Theinformation in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.Please cite this publication as:OECD(2022),OECD Economic Outlook,Volume 2022 Issue 2:Preliminary version,No.112,OEC

6、D Publishing,Paris,https:/doi.org/10.1787/f6da2159-en.ISBN 978-92-64-90931-1(print)ISBN 978-92-64-96461-7(pdf)ISBN 978-92-64-69005-9(HTML)ISBN 978-92-64-39703-3(epub)OECD Economic OutlookISSN 0474-5574(print)ISSN 1609-7408(online)Photo credits:Cover Karabin/S.Corrigenda to publications may be found

7、on line at:www.oecd.org/about/publishing/corrigenda.htm.OECD 2022The use of this work,whether digital or print,is governed by the Terms and Conditions to be found at https:/www.oecd.org/termsandconditions.3 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Table of contents Ack

8、nowledgements 7 Editorial Confronting the Crisis 9 1 General assessment of the macroeconomic situation 13 Introduction 13 Growth is slowing and financial conditions have tightened 15 Global growth is projected to weaken further with inflation slowing gradually 29 Key risks and vulnerabilities 33 Pol

9、icy requirements 47 Bibliography 64 Annex 1.A.Policy and other assumptions underlying the projections 67 2 Developments in individual OECD and selected non-member economies 69 Argentina 70 Australia 73 Austria 76 Belgium 79 Brazil 82 Bulgaria 86 Canada 89 Chile 93 China 96 Colombia 100 Costa Rica 10

10、3 Croatia 106 Czech Republic 109 Denmark 112 Estonia 115 Euro area 118 Finland 122 France 125 Germany 129 Greece 133 Hungary 136 Iceland 139 India 142 Indonesia 146 Ireland 150 4 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Israel 153 Italy 156 Japan 160 Korea 164 Latvia 1

11、67 Lithuania 170 Luxembourg 173 Mexico 176 Netherlands 179 New Zealand 182 Norway 185 Peru 188 Poland 191 Portugal 194 Romania 197 Slovak Republic 200 Slovenia 203 South Africa 206 Spain 209 Sweden 212 Switzerland 215 Trkiye 218 United Kingdom 221 United States 225 FIGURES Figure 1.1.A variety of hi

12、gh-frequency indicators point to a slowdown 16 Figure 1.2.Commodity prices have diverged recently 17 Figure 1.3.Retail energy prices have increased much less than wholesale prices,especially in Europe 18 Figure 1.4.Contributions of supply-and demand-driven inflation to headline inflation in selected

13、 OECD economies 20 Figure 1.5.Some factors pushing up inflation prior to the war are now subsiding 21 Figure 1.6.Inflation has become increasingly broad-based 21 Figure 1.7.Short-term inflation expectations have risen in many economies 22 Figure 1.8.Labour markets are tight 23 Figure 1.9.Real wages

14、are declining in most economies 24 Figure 1.10.Unemployment and inactivity rates have fallen in most OECD economies 24 Figure 1.11.Global supply chain pressures have eased but new export orders are declining 25 Figure 1.12.Terms-of-trade losses have hit incomes in energy importing economies,especial

15、ly in Europe 26 Figure 1.13.Financial market volatility has increased 27 Figure 1.14.Real long-term interest rates have risen sharply in many countries 27 Figure 1.15.Financial market conditions have tightened significantly 28 Figure 1.16.Corporate bond yields have risen sharply 29 Figure 1.17.Globa

16、l growth is projected to slow and be increasingly imbalanced across regions 30 Figure 1.18.Current account imbalances are higher than immediately prior to the pandemic 33 Figure 1.19.Periods of high energy expenditures are often associated with a recession 35 Figure 1.20.Gas is an important energy s

17、ource for electricity generation in many European countries 36 Figure 1.21.Prolonged gas shortages and greater uncertainty would hit growth and raise inflation in 2023 and 2024 37 Figure 1.22.Debt service obligations could surge 39 Figure 1.23.Variable-rate mortgages can exacerbate financial risks 3

18、9 Figure 1.24.Amidst high and volatile sovereign credit risk,capital outflows from emerging-market economies have risen 41 5 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Figure 1.25.Indebtedness is high in many emerging-market economies 41 Figure 1.26.The appreciation of t

19、he US dollar could exacerbate financial vulnerabilities in emerging-market economies 43 Figure 1.27.The structure of many economies has changed considerably since the late 1990s 44 Figure 1.28.The impact of tighter monetary policy varies when all countries act together 45 Figure 1.29.Reduced uncerta

20、inty and lower commodity prices would strengthen growth and ease inflation 47 Figure 1.30.Monetary policy tightening has been fast and highly synchronised 48 Figure 1.31.Monetary policy tightening is projected to continue in the coming quarters 50 Figure 1.32.Projections of central bank balance shee

21、t reduction 52 Figure 1.33.Planned support to energy consumers is costly and largely non-targeted 54 Figure 1.34.Fiscal consolidation is projected to be moderate and uneven across countries 55 Figure 1.35.Public debt has increased and the cost of new debt is rising 56 Figure 1.36.Policy interest rat

22、es are expected to remain high in the near term in emerging-market economies to help reduce inflation 57 Figure 1.37.Public debt has risen less in commodity-exporting emerging-market economies 58 Figure 1.38.The stock of trade-restricting measures has continued to grow 60 Figure 1.39.Some structural

23、 policies have larger effects on disposable incomes than GDP 61 Figure 1.40.Many countries have considerable scope to improve employment rates for women 61 TABLES Table 1.1 Global growth is projected to slow further 15 BOXES Box 1.1.Supply-and demand-driven inflation in OECD economies 19 Box 1.2.Ene

24、rgy expenditures since the 1970s 34 Box 1.3.Projections of the pace of quantitative tightening 51 6 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Look for the 12 at the bottom of the tables or graphs inthis book.To download the matching Excelspreadsheet,just typethe link in

25、to your Internet browser or click on the link from the digitalversion.This book has.A service that delivers Excelfiles fromthe printed page!Follow OECD Publications on:https:/ OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Acknowledgements This edition of the OECD Economic O

26、utlook was prepared by the Economics Department under the general supervision of lvaro Pereira,Luiz De Mello,Isabell Koske,Vincent Koen and Alain de Serres,and managed by Nigel Pain.Chapter 1 was prepared in the Macroeconomic Policy Division,with Geoff Barnard and lvaro Pina as principal authors;and

27、 Catherine MacLeod,Patrice Ollivaud,Nobukazu Ono,Lucia Quaglietti,Elena Rusticelli,and Enes Sunel providing substantive contributions.Chapter 2 was prepared by the Country Studies Branch,with contributions from Michael Abendschein,Mge Adalet McGowan,Marius Bickmann,Hansjrg Blchliger,Martin Borowieck

28、i,Tim Bulman,David Carey,Steven Cassimon,Ben Conigrave,Federica De Pace,Dennis Dlugosch,Falilou Fall,Priscilla Fialho,Erik Frohm,Paula Garda,Daniela Glocker,Andrea Goldstein,Nicolas Gonne,Antoine Goujard,Robert Grundke,Philip Hemmings,Jens Hj,Hyunjeong Hwang,Nikki Kergozou,Eun Jung Kim,Caroline Klei

29、n,Michael Koelle,Vassiliki Koutsogeorgopoulou,Zeev Krill,lvaro Leandro,Timo Leidecker,Gabriel Machlica,Alessandro Maravalle,Margit Molnar,Kei Oguro,Alberto Gonzlez Pandiella,Jon Pareliussen,Bertrand Pluyaud,Axel Purwin,Adolfo Rodriguez-Vargas,Oliver Rhn,Cyrille Schwellnus,Patrizio Sicari,Urban Sila,

30、Zuzana Smidova,Donal Smith,Jan Strasky,Kosuke Suzuki,Tomomi Tanaka,Srdan Tatomir,Ania Thiemann,Elena Vidal,Ben Westmore,Yoonyoung Yang and Zvezdelina Zhelyazkova.The preparation of the country notes was supervised by Mge Adalet McGowan,Jens Arnold,Sebastian Barnes,Mame Fatou Diagne,Alberto Gonzlez P

31、andiella and Isabelle Joumard.Overall coordination and key editorial and statistical support was provided by Isabelle Fakih and Jrme Brzillon.Statistical support was given by Paula Adamczyk,Damien Azzopardi,Steven Cassimon,Corinne Chanteloup,Ane Kathrine Christensen,Vronique Gindrey,Federico Giovann

32、elli,Batrice Gurard,Mauricio Hitschfeld,Tony Huang,Eun Jung Kim,Seung-Hee Koh,Anne Legendre,Natia Mosiashvili and Axel Purwin.Editorial support for the country notes was provided by Jean-Rmi Bertrand,Nathalie Bienvenu,Emily Derry,Karimatou Diallo,Laura Fortin,Stephanie Henry,Robin Houng Lee,Sisse Ni

33、elsen,Michelle Ortiz and Heloise Wickramanayake.Background analysis and key database management was provided by the Macroeconomic Analysis Division,with contributions from Yvan Guillemette and Jeroen Meyer,under the supervision of David Turner.An initial draft of the report was discussed by the OECD

34、 Economic Policy Committee.This report is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD.9 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Editorial Confronting the Crisis The global economy is reeling from the largest energy crisis since the 1970s.Th

35、e energy shock has pushed up inflation to levels not seen for many decades and is lowering economic growth all around the world.In the new OECD Economic Outlook,we are now forecasting that world growth will decline to 2.2%in 2023 and bounce back to a relatively modest 2.7%in 2024.Asia will be the ma

36、in engine of growth in 2023 and 2024,whereas Europe,North America and South America will see very low growth.Higher inflation and lower growth are the hefty price that the global economy is paying for Russias war of aggression against Ukraine.Although prices were already creeping up due to the rapid

37、 rebound from the pandemic and related supply chain constraints,inflation soared and became much more pervasive around the world following Russias invasion.As a consequence of the unexpected surge in prices,real wages are falling in many countries,slashing purchasing power.This is hurting people eve

38、rywhere.If inflation is not contained,these problems will only become worse.Thus,fighting inflation has to be our top policy priority right now.Central banks around the world are increasing interest rates to curb inflation and anchor inflation expectations in their respective economies.This strategy

39、 is starting to pay off.For example,in Brazil,the central bank moved swiftly,and inflation has started to come down in recent months.In the United States,the latest data also seem to suggest some progress in the fight against inflation.Nevertheless,monetary policy should continue to tighten in the c

40、ountries where inflation remains high and broad-based.In the fight against rising prices,it is also essential that fiscal policy works hand-in-hand with monetary policy.Fiscal choices that add to inflationary pressures will result in even higher policy rates to control inflation.This means that poli

41、cy support to shield families and firms from the energy shock should be targeted and temporary,protecting vulnerable households and firms without adding to inflationary pressures and increasing public debt burdens.Governments have already done a lot to ease the economic pain from high energy and foo

42、d prices,including price caps,price and income subsidies and reduced taxes.However,since energy prices are likely to remain high and volatile for some time,untargeted measures to keep prices down will become increasingly unaffordable,and could discourage the needed energy savings.10 OECD ECONOMIC OU

43、TLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Energy markets remain among the significant downside risks around this outlook.Europe has gone a long way to replenish its natural gas reserves and curb demand,but this winter in the Northern Hemisphere will certainly be challenging.The situati

44、on might be even more complicated in the winter of 2023-2024,as replenishing gas reserves might prove more difficult next year.Higher gas prices,or outright gas supply disruptions,would entail significantly weaker growth and higher inflation in Europe and the world in 2023 and 2024.Rising interest r

45、ates will also pose many challenges and risks.Debt repayment will be more expensive for firms,governments and households who have variable rate debt obligations or when taking on new debt.We are particularly concerned about low-income countries,over half of which are already in(or at high risk of)de

46、bt distress and now face tightening financial conditions.Currency depreciation vis-vis the US dollar in many of these countries,and in emerging markets,adds to these risks.Russias war against Ukraine is also aggravating global food insecurity by putting pressure on prices,supplies,and food affordabi

47、lity.Some of the most vulnerable people around the globe face the highest risk of food insecurity,and many governments lack the means to address this problem.Keeping markets open and agricultural goods flowing,as well as providing well-targeted aid,should be the utmost priority to avoid further food

48、 disruptions and hunger in many of these countries.Policies for a stronger recovery Policymakers must take bold policy actions to confront these challenging times.In addition to monetary and fiscal policies,it is time for governments to go back to structural policies to tackle some of the most press

49、ing current issues.First,investing in energy security and diversifying energy supplies is imperative.To prevent energy disruptions,many countries are reverting temporarily to more polluting and carbon-emitting energy sources.However,high energy prices and concerns about energy security are also enco

50、uraging governments and firms to diversify energy sources and boost investment in renewables.Strengthening energy grids and investing in energy efficiency and green technologies will need to be high on political agendas to ensure that we reach our net zero emissions goals.The OECD aims to support th

51、is effort through its Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches(IFCMA),a forum of dialogue between countries at different stages of development that will allow us to better understand and analyse diverse policy approaches to carbon mitigation and their effects.Second,governments need to keep m

52、arkets open and international trade flowing.This will strengthen competitive pressures and will help alleviate supply constraints.In contrast,pursuing protectionist policies would be a serious setback for many countries,in particular the worlds poorest,and would significantly damage the global econo

53、my.Third,fostering employment is essential to boost potential growth and achieve a stronger and more inclusive recovery.For example,governments should work to decrease the gaps in employment rates between men and women in countries where these gaps remain high.Investing in skills is also essential,t

54、o counteract the human capital losses that occurred during the pandemic,especially for the most vulnerable,and address the persistent and emerging skill shortages that many countries are facing.11 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Summing up We are currently fac

55、ing a very difficult economic outlook.Our central scenario is not a global recession,but a significant growth slowdown for the world economy in 2023,as well as still high,albeit declining,inflation in many countries.Risks remain significant.In these difficult and uncertain times,policy has once agai

56、n a crucial role to play:further tightening of monetary policy is essential to fight inflation,and fiscal policy support should become more targeted and temporary.Accelerating investment in the adoption and development of clean energy sources and technologies will be crucial to diversifying energy s

57、upplies and ensuring energy security.A renewed focus on structural policies will allow policymakers to foster employment and productivity,as well as to make growth work for all.In other words,it is in our hands to overcome this crisis.And if we choose to undertake the right set of policies,we will c

58、ertainly increase our chances of success.22 November 2022 lvaro Santos Pereira OECD Chief Economist ad interim 13 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Introduction The global economy is facing mounting challenges.Growth has lost momentum,high inflation is proving p

59、ersistent,confidence has weakened,and uncertainty is high.Russias war of aggression against Ukraine has pushed up prices substantially,especially for energy,adding to inflationary pressures at a time when the cost of living was already rising rapidly around the world.Global financial conditions have

60、 tightened significantly,amidst the unusually vigorous and widespread steps to raise policy interest rates by central banks in recent months,weighing on interest-sensitive spending and adding to the pressures faced by many emerging-market economies.Labour market conditions generally remain tight,but

61、 wage increases have not kept up with price inflation,weakening real incomes despite the actions taken by governments to cushion the impact of higher food and energy prices on households and businesses.Global GDP growth is projected to be 3.1%in 2022,around half the pace seen in 2021 during the rebo

62、und from the pandemic,and to slow further to 2.2%in 2023,well below the rate foreseen prior to the war.In 2024,global growth is projected to be 2.7%,helped by initial steps to ease policy interest rates in several countries.Global prospects are also becoming increasingly imbalanced,with the major As

63、ian emerging-market economies accounting for close to three-quarters of global GDP growth in 2023,reflecting their projected steady expansion and sharp slowdowns in the United States and Europe.Headline consumer price inflation in the major advanced economies is projected to moderate from 6.3%this y

64、ear to around 4 per cent in 2023 and 2 per cent in 2024 as tighter monetary policy takes effect,demand pressures wane,and transport costs and delivery times normalise,although the pace of decline will vary across countries.The uncertainty about the outlook is high,and the risks have become more skew

65、ed to the downside and more acute.The projections reflect the toll taken by high energy prices over the next two years,but outcomes could be weaker still if there are energy supply shortages in global markets that raise prices further,or if enforced rationing is required to lower gas and electricity

66、 demand sufficiently during the next two European winters.Higher policy interest rates could also slow growth by more than projected,with policy decisions difficult to calibrate given high debt levels and strong cross-border trade and investment links that raise the spillovers from weaker demand in

67、other countries.Widespread and rapid monetary tightening also heightens financial vulnerabilities.Financial strategies put in place during the long period of hyper-low interest rates may be exposed by rapidly rising rates and exert stress in unexpected ways.Many emerging-market economies could also

68、face significant difficulties,particularly commodity-importing economies.Higher interest rates,the appreciation of the US dollar and a deterioration in the terms of trade increase the challenges of servicing elevated external debt and deficits,particularly if growth slows sharply and global financia

69、l conditions tighten further.Significant risks also remain about the projected steady expansion in China,with the continued weakness in property markets,rising non-performing loans and the disruptions from the continued zero-COVID-19 policy potentially weighing heavily on domestic demand 1 General a

70、ssessment of the macroeconomic situation 14 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 and global growth.On the upside,reduced uncertainty,easier financial market conditions or lower commodity prices would moderate the slowdown in growth.Elevated uncertainty,slowing grow

71、th,strong inflationary pressure and the ongoing impact of the war in Ukraine on energy markets leave policymakers with difficult choices in order to maintain macroeconomic stability and improve the prospects for sustainable and inclusive growth over the medium term.Continued monetary policy tighteni

72、ng is needed in most major advanced economies to anchor inflation expectations and lower inflation durably.Domestic policy measures will need to be carefully calibrated and responsive to new data given uncertainty about the growth outlook,the speed at which higher interest rates take effect and the

73、potential spillovers from restrictive policy in other countries.Tighter global financial conditions and persistent inflation pressures are also likely to prompt further monetary policy tightening in many emerging-market economies,and limit the scope for any easing in countries where growth is slowin

74、g and interest rates have already been raised substantially.Fiscal support is being provided to help cushion the impact of high energy costs on households and companies.In the absence of such support there would almost certainly be sizeable output declines in many countries,with all of the attendant

75、 potential costs these could entail.However,better design is often needed to ensure support is only temporary and concentrated on the most vulnerable households and companies,preserves incentives to reduce energy consumption and can be withdrawn as energy price pressures wane.Short-term fiscal actio

76、ns to cushion living standards should also take account of the need to avoid a further persistent stimulus to demand at a time of high inflation,thereby ensuring consistency with monetary policy and avoiding adverse effects on fiscal sustainability.Credible fiscal frameworks would help to provide cl

77、ear guidance about the medium-term trajectory of the public finances and mitigate concerns about debt sustainability at a time of rising spending pressures and higher future payments on public debt.The war and the pandemic add to the longstanding challenges for growth,resilience and well-being from

78、the acceleration of digitalisation,population ageing and the need to lower carbon emissions.Effective and well-targeted reform efforts are required to enhance productivity and skills,reduce inequality and improve gender balance,strengthen resilience and boost living standards.Well-chosen policies,su

79、ch as increased support for childcare and reduced tax wedges for lower paid workers,could help to address the current pressures faced by lower-income households and also offer medium-term benefits for employment and inclusion.Keeping international borders open to trade,removing obstacles to stronger

80、 cross-border economic migration,and ensuring faster integration of migrants into the labour market would also help to alleviate near-term supply-side pressures on inflation.Governments also need to ensure that the goals of energy security and climate change mitigation are aligned.Efforts to safegua

81、rd near-term energy security and affordability through fiscal support,supply diversification and lower energy consumption should be accompanied by stronger policy measures to enhance investment in clean technologies and energy efficiency.The fallout from the war remains a threat to global food secur

82、ity,particularly if combined with further extreme weather events resulting from climate change.Better international cooperation is needed to keep agricultural markets open,address emergency food needs and strengthen domestic supply.Stronger international co-operation on debt relief,including through

83、 the G20,is also necessary to minimise the potential adverse economic and social consequences of default,with a rising number of lower-income developing countries already experiencing debt distress and having fragile banking sectors.15 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OE

84、CD 2022 Table 1.1 Global growth is projected to slow further StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/uexsym Growth is slowing and financial conditions have tightened Global growth has lost momentum amidst high inflation The war in Ukraine is having a persisting adverse effect on economic conditions.Global GDP s

85、tagnated in the second quarter of 2022,with sharp falls in output in both Ukraine and Russia,and a contraction of output in both China(reflecting lockdowns due to the zero COVID-19 policy)and the United States.Global growth picked up in the third quarter,helped by a rebound in China and the United S

86、tates,but remained moderate,with weak real income growth holding back consumers expenditure and higher energy prices resulting in a sharp slowdown in many economies,particularly in Europe.Average 2022202320 2022 2023 2024 Q4Q4Q4Real GDP growth World3.4 5.9 3.1 2.2 2.7 2.0 2.3 3.0 G203

87、.5 6.2 3.0 2.2 2.7 2.0 2.2 3.0 OECD2.2 5.6 2.8 0.8 1.4 1.2 0.9 1.8 United States2.4 5.9 1.8 0.5 1.0 0.2 0.3 1.6 Euro area1.9 5.3 3.3 0.5 1.4 1.4 0.7 1.7 Japan0.8 1.6 1.6 1.8 0.9 2.0 1.2 0.7 Non-OECD4.4 6.2 3.4 3.3 3.8 2.7 3.6 4.0 China6.8 8.1 3.3 4.6 4.1 4.4 4.5 4.0 India36.8 8.7 6.6 5.7 6.9 Brazil-

88、0.4 4.9 2.8 1.2 1.4 OECD unemployment rate6.5 6.2 5.0 5.3 5.5 5.0 5.5 5.5 Inflation G20,3.0 3.9 8.1 6.0 5.4 8.0 5.5 5.5 OECD,1.6 3.8 9.4 6.5 5.1 9.6 5.5 5.1 United States1.4 4.0 6.2 3.5 2.6 5.5 3.1 2.3 Euro area0.9 2.6 8.3 6.8 3.4 9.6 4.9 2.9 Japan0.9 -0.2 2.3 2.0 1.7 3.2 1.4 1.9 OECD fiscal balance

89、-3.2 -7.3 -3.7 -3.6 -3.1 World real trade growth3.4 10.0 5.4 2.9 3.8 2.4 3.2 4.0 1.Per cent;last three columns show the change over a year earlier.2.Moving nominal GDP weights,using purchasing power parities.3.Fiscal year.4.Per cent of labour force.5.Headline inflation.6.Personal consumption expendi

90、tures deflator.7.Moving nominal private consumption weights,using purchasing power parities.8.Harmonised consumer price index.9.National consumer price index.10.Per cent of GDP.Source:OECD Economic Outlook 112 database.Per cent16 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 202

91、2 In the past few months some indicators of global economic activity,such as retail sales,industrial production and international trade,have stabilised after a particularly weak second quarter(Figure 1.1,Panel A).This has been helped by fewer restrictive anti-COVID-19 measures in China and a consequ

92、ent rebound in activity,including car sales(Figure 1.1,Panel B).However,survey indicators point to a loss of momentum in many countries,especially in Europe(Figure 1.1,Panels C and D).In the corporate sector,the global all-industry new orders PMI declined steadily for several months through to Octob

93、er,with a broad-based softening across industries.Consumer confidence is notably weak as well,reflecting in part a decline in real household incomes in most OECD economies,with higher inflation not being matched by faster growth in nominal incomes.Low-income households and rural households have been

94、 particularly hit,reflecting the large share of food and energy in their expenditures.Figure 1.1.A variety of high-frequency indicators point to a slowdown Note:Data in Panel A are PPP-weighted aggregates.The retail sales measure uses monthly household consumption for the United States and the month

95、ly synthetic consumption indicator for Japan.Source:OECD Main Economic Indicators database;CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis;S&P Global;Refinitiv;and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/bl8kx7 17 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Infl

96、ationary pressures have intensified.In the median advanced and emerging-market economy,headline consumer price inflation reached 9.6%and 10.8%respectively in the third quarter of 2022.The unexpected persistence of inflationary pressures this year owes much to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine,which

97、 resulted in an immediate spike in a number of key commodity prices for oil,gas and coal,a range of metals,wheat and corn and some edible oils,as well as fertilisers.While that spike has subsequently been unwound for most commodities,in part due to weak demand from China,the prices of internationall

98、y traded gas and coal remain elevated(Figure 1.2).With spot electricity prices generally being linked to the price of gas,the marginal source of electricity generation,record high gas prices have meant similarly extreme wholesale electricity prices in Europe.Only part of that wholesale price surge h

99、as so far been reflected in retail electricity prices(Figure 1.3),with many European governments stepping in to shield consumers from the full impact of the increase in the price of imported gas,adding to the usual factors that limit complete pass-through(Kuik et al.,2022),including the delays in ad

100、justing household and corporate supply contracts.However,some large rises have already occurred,and unless wholesale electricity prices continue to decline(as they have in recent weeks),further retail price rises are likely.If these do not occur,there are risks that distribution companies could beco

101、me insolvent,and that governments implementing price caps could face costly and potentially long-lasting subsidies.Even prior to the war in Ukraine,inflation pressures had begun to rise,with both demand-and supply-side factors contributing to price increases in the OECD economies(Box 1.1).Some of th

102、ese factors have subsided or begun to reverse over the past year.Goods price inflation has eased,with the shift in the composition of demand from services to goods(and in particular durable goods)now being reversed(Figure 1.5,Panel A).The normalisation of demand patterns has begun to be reflected in

103、 rising inflation rates for services in most countries and,in some,declining inflation rates for goods.1 Figure 1.2.Commodity prices have diverged recently Note:Gas TTF corresponds to the Dutch Transfer Title Facility and coal to the HWWI coal price.November figures are based on the average availabl

104、e data up to November 16.Source:Refinitiv;and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/4o2i85 1 The United States and Canada are two countries where services price inflation is rising and goods price inflation is moderating.For example,in the United States goods price inflation(based on the PCE

105、 price index)peaked at 10.6%in March,but has declined to 8.1%in the latest month(September),while services inflation has increased steadily since early 2021,picking up from 2.7%in March 2021 to 5.3%in September 2022.18 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Figure 1.

106、3.Retail energy prices have increased much less than wholesale prices,especially in Europe Note:Data for both retail and wholesale prices refer to September 2022.Retail price changes based on the personal consumption expenditures deflator in the United States,harmonised consumer prices in Germany,Fr

107、ance and the United Kingdom,and national consumer prices in Japan.Natural gas wholesale prices are proxied by the Henry Hub Natural Gas spot price for the United States,the Liquified Natural Gas price in Asia for Japan and the Dutch Title Transfer Utility(TTF)for Germany,France and the United Kingdo

108、m.Wholesale electricity price data come from each domestic electricity market.Source:Refinitiv;U.S.Bureau of Economic Analysis;Statistics Japan;Eurostat;U.S.Energy Information Administration;Japanese Power;and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/ck8o2s Another factor that was pushing up in

109、flation until early 2022 but has been ebbing markedly over the past few months is shipping costs.With goods demand in advanced economies easing,and with supply chains being largely restored since the first phase of the pandemic,freight costs have declined sharply of late(Figure 1.5,Panel B).For the

110、G20 countries as a whole,the impact of shipping costs on inflation is estimated to have peaked in the third quarter of 2021,and declined to just 0.18 percentage points by the third quarter of 2022,and zero as of mid-November 2022.2 However,inflationary pressures have become more broad-based(Figure 1

111、.6),with higher costs increasingly being passed through into the prices of goods and services,and profit margins rising in some sectors(Brainard,2022).With many economic agents tending to form their expectations at least partly based on recent experience,it is not surprising in this context that nea

112、r-term household survey measures of inflation expectations have risen(Figure 1.7),even though market-based indicators of longer-term inflation expectations generally remain well-anchored near central bank objectives.2 Based on the framework set out in Guilloux-Nefussi and Rusticelli(2021).19 OECD EC

113、ONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Box 1.1.Supply-and demand-driven inflation in OECD economies The increase in inflation rates over the past two years in economies around the world has created major challenges for policymakers.One key uncertainty has been whether the s

114、urge in inflation has primarily reflected demand factors or negative supply shocks.That question cannot be answered precisely or with certainty,but it is possible to distinguish between demand and supply factors in an approximate way.One such approach is that of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Franc

115、isco,which uses US monthly price and volume personal consumption expenditures(PCE)data to distinguish between items where price and volume shocks move in the same direction and those where they go in opposite directions(Shapiro,2022a and 2022b).Shocks to prices and volumes in a given month are ident

116、ified by running vector autoregressions(VARs)for the 10-year period ending in that month for prices and volumes of each item and inspecting the residuals of the respective regressions.1 The presumption is that price and volume residuals with the same sign reflect demand greater demand pushes up both

117、 prices and volumes and vice versa for lower demand while residuals with opposite signs correspond to supply shocks lower supply means a reduction in volume but an increase in price.In addition to items where price changes are identified as clearly demand-driven or supply-driven,an intermediate rang

118、e,labelled“ambiguous”,where price and/or volume residuals are too small to be considered significant,is also identified a threshold is set that results in approximately 20%of movements on average being classified as ambiguous.The contributions of the three groups sum to total headline PCE inflation,

119、and show the relative importance of supply and demand factors.Other OECD countries do not have matching disaggregated monthly price and volume data for personal consumption,but quarterly national accounts data for household consumption expenditure by consumption purpose(COICOP)can be used to conduct

120、 a similar exercise.2 Figure 1.4 shows the results of this exercise for eight OECD economies,including the United States.The degree of expenditure disaggregation is generally a good deal lower than in the US case,where the PCE data has 136 categories:the number of categories available in the quarter

121、ly national accounts data varies from 11 for Denmark to 110 for the United Kingdom.In all countries,the exercise suggests that both supply and demand factors have pushed inflation up since mid-2020.The proportion of inflation accounted for by demand-driven items in the second quarter of 2022 ranges

122、from less than one-quarter in Korea to around half in the United Kingdom and Canada.Supply-driven inflation is estimated to account for roughly half of total inflation on average in the eight countries shown,but well over half in Denmark,Korea and Sweden.The“ambiguous”share is relatively small in al

123、l countries in the year to the second quarter of 2022,with the exception of the United States,where it accounts for about one-quarter of total inflation.In general,both supply-and demand-driven contributions have increased in recent quarters,with Korea being an exception:there the demand-driven comp

124、onent peaked in the second quarter of 2021 and has subsequently declined.The United States,for which data are now available through the third quarter of 2022,has had a broadly stable demand-driven contribution for several quarters.Compared to the immediate pre-pandemic period,when headline inflation

125、 was close to,though somewhat below,central bank objectives in all these economies,the estimated contribution of both supply-driven and demand-driven inflation has generally increased.The increase in the contribution of supply-driven inflation has been relatively small in Canada and the United Kingd

126、om.For demand-driven inflation,the increase in the contribution relative to 2019 was largest in the United Kingdom(around 4 percentage points),and also relatively large in Canada and France.The share of inflation classified as ambiguous rose somewhat in Australia,Canada,the United Kingdom and the Un

127、ited States,but not in other countries.There are several caveats to bear in mind when considering the results of this exercise.First,the method used identifies the price change for each item in a given period as being primarily demand-or supply-driven,but in most cases a mix of supply and demand fac

128、tors will be operating,even when the exercise allocates the item to the demand-driven or supply-driven category.Also,the pandemic period is clearly atypical,with special factors at play which may make the results less reliable.Finally,the difference in the degree of disaggregation in the available d

129、ata may limit the extent to which valid conclusions can be drawn from cross-country differences.20 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Figure 1.4.Contributions of supply-and demand-driven inflation to headline inflation in selected OECD economies Decomposition of

130、contributions to year-on-year headline inflation Source:U.S.Bureau of Economic Analysis;Statistics Canada;UK Office of National Statistics;INSEE;Australian Bureau of Statistics;Bank of Korea;Statistics Denmark;Statistics Sweden;and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/kwcjv7 _ 1.A two-equat

131、ion VAR of prices and quantities:pi,t=Zi,t1+i,tp and qi,t=Zi,t1+i,tq was estimated where pi,t and qi,t are the logs of the price and quantity indices respectively of category i in quarter t,Zi,t1 is a vector of 4 lags of the log price and quantity indices of category i in quarter t and i,tpand i,tq

132、are the price and quantity residuals for category i in quarter t.The equations were estimated over a 10-year rolling window for the period 2005Q4-2022Q2 or 2022Q3.The supply-driven,demand-driven and ambiguous contributions to year-on-year inflation are computed as a weighted sum of the latest four q

133、uarterly contributions.2.In its latest Economic Bulletin(ECB,2022a),the European Central Bank has replicated the Shapiro exercise using monthly core CPI(excluding energy and food)data and turnover data for services and retail trade from Eurostats short-term business statistics.The categories are not

134、 quite matched,and the turnover data have to be deflated to get volume estimates,but in other respects the exercise follows the US model closely.The ECB finds that the initial surge in core inflation in the euro area was initially mainly supply-driven but that supply and demand factors have played b

135、roadly similar roles in recent months.21 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Figure 1.5.Some factors pushing up inflation prior to the war are now subsiding Note:In Panel A,the dashed lines correspond to a continuation of the pre-pandemic trend(2010-19).The OECD i

136、ndex is based on a weighted sum of individual country growth rates using GDP weights in PPP terms.Consumption of durable goods,non-durable goods,and services is available for 35,27 and 27 OECD countries,respectively,except for 2022Q3,where estimates are based on the subset of countries with availabl

137、e data.Source:OECD Economic Outlook 112 database;Bureau of Economic Analysis;OECD,Quarterly National Accounts;Refinitiv;and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/a8skq5 Figure 1.6.Inflation has become increasingly broad-based Percentage share of products in the inflation basket that have a y

138、ear-on-year inflation rate above 6%Note:Inflation based on the personal consumption expenditures deflator in the United States,harmonised consumer prices in the euro area,its member countries and the United Kingdom,and national consumer prices elsewhere.The computation uses about 40 sub-indices for

139、Indonesia,70 for Japan,150 for Canada,France,Germany,Greece,Italy and Spain,and more than 200 for the remaining countries.Source:Bureau of Economic Analysis;Eurostat;Statistics Japan;Office for National Statistics;Statistics Indonesia;and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/pkl923 22 OECD

140、ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Figure 1.7.Short-term inflation expectations have risen in many economies Median household inflation expectations Source:Federal Reserve Bank of New York;European Central Bank;Bank of England;Bank of Canada;and OECD calculations.Stat

141、Link 2 https:/stat.link/rahx8s Another key measure of the extent to which above-target inflation is becoming entrenched is the pace of unit labour cost growth.Year-on-year unit labour cost growth is estimated to have been around 4%in the median advanced economy and the aggregate euro area in the thi

142、rd quarter of 2022,over 6%in the United States,and above 10%in some Central and Eastern European economies.In contrast,annual unit labour cost growth remained below 1%in Japan,Spain,and several smaller European economies.Nonetheless,labour cost growth is now rising in most economies,reflecting stron

143、ger nominal wage increases and weaker labour productivity growth,with firms retaining workers as output growth slows.Output per employee is estimated to have stagnated in the OECD economies over the year to the third quarter of 2022,and declined in some countries,including the United States.In those

144、 countries,unit labour costs have risen more quickly over the past year than wages,putting upward pressure on prices and/or squeezing firms profit margins.Labour markets generally remain tight.In many OECD economies,unemployment rates are at their lowest levels in the past two decades and vacancy ra

145、tes are unusually high(Figure 1.8).The pace of employment growth has,however,slowed recently in some countries,with vacancy rates beginning to ease,and unemployment rates edging up.Nominal wage growth(compensation per employee)has picked up in most economies,but has not kept pace with inflation,resu

146、lting in a sharp erosion of wages in real terms in many OECD economies(Figure 1.9).With inflation expected to remain well above target over at least the next year,it is probable that many wage demands in 2023-24 will be considerably higher than previously anticipated.23 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME

147、2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 There are some important differences in labour force developments across OECD member countries since the onset of the pandemic.In most countries,participation rates have continued to rise,with inactivity rates substantially below pre-pandemic levels.Excepti

148、ons include the United States,the United Kingdom as well as Colombia,Chile and Latvia,with labour force participation remaining below its pre-pandemic level(Figure 1.10).This may help to explain why some measures of labour market tightness,such as vacancies(Figure 1.8)are more acute in countries suc

149、h as the United States and the United Kingdom than in countries where inactivity declined substantially relative to the pre-pandemic period,such as Greece and Poland.The reasons for such differences in the evolution of labour force participation are complex,but probably include differential impacts

150、of the pandemic on the health of the working-age population.Countries with high rates of COVID-19 illness and mortality in 2020 and 2021 generally have had less of an increase,or some decline,in labour force participation rates relative to the immediate pre-pandemic level.3 In addition,the labour ma

151、rket recovery in some emerging-market economies has largely been driven by higher numbers of informal jobs,which will not be reflected in the labour force statistics.Labour market tightness in some OECD economies has also been accentuated by the relatively low levels of immigration during 2020-21.Af

152、ter a slump during the first year of the pandemic,migration to OECD economies recovered quite strongly in 2021:permanent-type migration into a selection of 24 OECD member countries increased by 25%to 4.2 million(OECD,2022a).Even so,such migration remained lower than pre-pandemic levels in almost all

153、 countries(Canada and Spain being exceptions).4 Figure 1.8.Labour markets are tight Source:OECD Economic Outlook 112 database;Eurostat;OECD,Labour Force Statistics;France Labour Ministry(DARES);and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/etnkgr 3 It is less clear whether countries that have ex

154、perienced a fall in labour force participation for reasons linked to the pandemic have an untapped reserve of workers that could be easily brought into the workforce,or whether these workers attachment to the labour market has been durably weakened.4 Over the two-year period 2020-21,permanent-type i

155、mmigration to the United States,the largest receiving country,was lower than the pre-pandemic average by nearly 1 million people.The US labour force shrank by 2.3 million in this period,suggesting that the lower level of immigration is likely to have contributed to the tightening of labour market co

156、nditions and the emergence of labour shortages in some sectors.24 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Figure 1.9.Real wages are declining in most economies Real compensation per employee,total economy,2022Q3 Note:Compensation per employee deflated using the person

157、al consumption expenditures deflator.Source:OECD Economic Outlook 112 database;and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/7z8l9r Figure 1.10.Unemployment and inactivity rates have fallen in most OECD economies Difference between 2022Q2 and 2019Q4 Source:OECD Labour Force Statistics;and OECD c

158、alculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/dg6txq 25 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Trade growth held up in the first half of 2022,but recent indicators have weakened Global trade continued to recover in the first half of 2022,helped by strong demand and some ea

159、sing in supply chain bottlenecks and port congestion(Figure 1.11,Panel B),alongside the lifting of most COVID-19 restrictions in many countries.This helped to offset a sharp contraction in Chinas imports in the first half of 2022 as its zero-COVID-19 policy remained in place.Manufacturing surveys su

160、ggest backlogs of work have almost normalised and supplier delivery times have improved.The ongoing recovery in cross-border tourism also boosted services exports in most regions in the first half of the year.By the third quarter of 2022,the volume of global trade in goods and services 2022 was over

161、 7%higher than in the fourth quarter of 2019,despite the incomplete recovery in services trade.The war in Ukraine has disrupted the usual pattern of bilateral trade flows,with sharp declines in trade between the advanced economies and Russia,and rising trade between Russia and some Asian economies.T

162、he Black Sea grain initiative allowed the resumption of grains trade from the port of Odessa,which has led to 10 million approved tonnes leaving since the first shipment on 1 August 2022.Recent trade indicators have been mixed,but there are signals that trade growth is set to slow.Survey measures of

163、 new export orders in manufacturing have fallen sharply,particularly in Europe(Figure 1.11,Panel A).Container port traffic volumes continued to rise through to September,but early estimates from the Kiel Trade Indicator suggest that global merchandise trade may have contracted in October.Changes in

164、the terms of trade and net income transfers from the rest of the world impact countries disposable income and consumption possibilities in addition to the changes in production activity measured by GDP growth.Sizeable swings in the terms of trade have occurred for many countries in 2022,due to chang

165、es in exchange rates and commodity prices.As a result,the growth of real gross national disposable incomes(RGNDI)is projected to be very different to real GDP growth in many countries.The growth of gross disposable national income for Norway and Saudi Arabia in 2022 is projected to be over 14 percen

166、tage points higher than GDP growth(Figure 1.12),reflecting high oil and gas export prices.In contrast,the trading gain(changes in the terms of trade)is projected to be negative in most other European economies in 2022,with the increase in RGNDI in the median EU economy projected to be over 1 percent

167、age point lower than GDP growth in 2022,and with income declines in some countries,including Germany.Figure 1.11.Global supply chain pressures have eased but new export orders are declining Source:S&P Global;CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis;and Federal Reserve Bank of New York.Sta

168、tLink 2 https:/stat.link/nxagqz 26 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Figure 1.12.Terms-of-trade losses have hit incomes in energy importing economies,especially in Europe Contribution to real gross national disposable income growth in 2022 Source:OECD calculatio

169、ns.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/mxk18s Financial market conditions have tightened significantly The accelerated pace of monetary policy tightening in major economies and rising risk aversion have led to a further tightening of global financial conditions.Volatility has surged,particularly in governme

170、nt bond markets,surpassing the peak observed at the height of the pandemic(Figure 1.13,Panel A).Larger increases in market interest rates in the United States relative to many other economies have pushed the US dollar to its highest level in the last two decades,contributing to greater volatility in

171、 the currency markets of advanced and emerging-market economies(Figure 1.13,Panel B).A sharp deterioration of liquidity conditions in sovereign and corporate bond markets has also exacerbated abrupt price developments(OECD,2022b;IMF,2022a).5 Real long-term interest rates have risen in the United Sta

172、tes,the United Kingdom and the euro area,reflecting a fast pass-through from surging policy interest rates to the long end of the yield curve,though they remain lower than typically observed prior to the global financial crisis(Figure 1.14).Slowing growth and rising interest rates have weighed on eq

173、uity markets in most advanced economies(Figure 1.15,Panel A).Price declines have been relatively large in many Central and Eastern European countries,reflecting weakening growth prospects.Recurring waves of COVID-19 outbreaks in China and moderating growth in Korea have led to capital outflows and a

174、lso hit equity markets.In contrast,equity prices have risen in a few commodity exporters,as well as in India,where new free trade agreements have attracted foreign capital,and Trkiye,reflecting strong domestic investor demand to hedge against high inflation risk.Government bond yields have increased

175、 in almost all countries since May(Figure 1.15,Panel B).In the euro area,government bond yields have increased broadly in line with those in the United States,despite the earlier start to US monetary policy tightening.The announcement of the Transmission Protection Instrument by the ECB in July and

176、a significant use of flexibility across countries in bond reinvestments have limited the increase in sovereign spreads within the area.Yields have increased significantly less in emerging-market economies and have remained stable in Japan,reflecting the yield curve control policy.5 In the United Kin

177、gdom,the announcement in September of debt-financed expansionary fiscal plans contributed to an unanticipated surge in long-term gilt yields.Efforts by leveraged UK-based institutional investors,primarily pension funds,to boost liquidity through asset sales then contributed to further rises in bond

178、yields,creating an adverse feedback loop(Breeden,2022).Intervention by the Bank of England,with a time-limited long-term bond purchase programme in the first half of October,and subsequent changes in fiscal plans,reversed the initial rise in yields by mid-November.27 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 202

179、2 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Figure 1.13.Financial market volatility has increased Note:Implied volatility as measured by the VIX index can be interpreted as the market expectation of risk(future volatility).The MOVE index is a yield curve weighted index of the normalised implied volatili

180、ty on 1-month Treasury options which are weighted on the 2,5,10 and 30 year contracts.Source:Refinitiv;and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/c35o4n Figure 1.14.Real long-term interest rates have risen sharply in many countries Source:Refinitiv;and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat

181、.link/wcuibq The US dollar has appreciated further against most advanced economy currencies since May(Figure 1.15,Panel C),reflecting a faster pace of monetary policy normalisation in the United States,particularly vis-vis Japan,and sharply deteriorating growth prospects in the euro area and the Uni

182、ted Kingdom.With the exception of a few commodity exporters,almost all emerging-market economy currencies have depreciated against the US dollar.28 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Figure 1.15.Financial market conditions have tightened significantly Note:Latest

183、 refers to the change between the average of May 2022 and the latest available data up to November 16.Maximum and Minimum refer to the largest increases or falls relative to the average of May 2022.Based on a 10-day average of daily observations.Source:Refinitiv;and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 http

184、s:/stat.link/nfokld Financing conditions have continued to tighten for firms and households.In the euro area,interest rates on new lending to businesses in September were 120 basis points higher than their 2021 low,and corporate bond yields have also increased.In the United States and the euro area,

185、yields on high-yield bonds and leveraged loans have reached levels close to or above those at the height of the pandemic(Figure 1.16)and recent issuance of high-yield bonds has slowed to its lowest level since the global financial crisis.Corporate bond and credit default spreads have also widened,pa

186、rticularly in Europe in the face of rising concerns about energy shortages and the sustainability of leveraged firms(OECD 2022b).Current and expected increases in policy rates have also passed through swiftly to new fixed-rate mortgage lending rates in many countries,and are also affecting countries

187、 with a relatively high share of adjustable-rate mortgages,adding to potential vulnerabilities(see below).29 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Figure 1.16.Corporate bond yields have risen sharply Note:IG and HY refer to Investment Grade and High Yield bonds,resp

188、ectively.The 2020 peak for the United States corresponds to March 2020 and for the euro area to April 2020.Source:ICE BofA Indices database;and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/t94kgv Global growth is projected to weaken further with inflation slowing gradually The global economy is fac

189、ing a period of weak growth and persistent inflation,with elevated downside risks.Tighter monetary policy and higher real interest rates,elevated energy prices,weak household income growth and declining confidence are all expected to take a toll on growth,especially in 2023.Fiscal support to cushion

190、 the impact of high food and energy costs will help to limit the slowdown,although mild consolidation is still projected in most economies.Job losses may also be more limited than would be expected on the basis of past downturns if firms wish to retain workers that have been hard to recruit after th

191、e pandemic.Savings accumulated during the pandemic also provide some buffer for the household and corporate sectors,although these are not evenly distributed.High uncertainty could limit the extent to which savings are drawn down and deter firms from making longer-term investments.The projected slow

192、down in global GDP growth in 2023(Table 1.1;Figure 1.17,Panel A)is cushioned to some extent by an expected further fall in household saving rates in several major advanced economies,though not in the United States,where the saving rate has already dropped below pre-pandemic levels.A mild recovery is

193、 projected to get underway in most countries in 2024,with real income growth recovering and fading inflation pressures providing space for initial steps to ease monetary policy in North America,Central and Eastern Europe and many emerging-market economies.Prospects in the Asia/Pacific region,where m

194、any countries have relatively low inflation and policy support is projected to help growth recover in China,appear stronger than in the Americas or Europe.Near-term output declines are projected in many European countries,including Germany,Italy,the United Kingdom and the overall euro area.This resu

195、lts in an unusually imbalanced projection,with outcomes heavily reliant on the absence of any significant downside shocks in the major Asian emerging-market economies,which collectively account for close to three-quarters of global growth in 2023 and around three-fifths in 2024(Figure 1.17,Panel B).

196、Europe is being affected particularly heavily by the impact of the war in Ukraine and high energy prices,which are expected to persist throughout the projection period.30 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Figure 1.17.Global growth is projected to slow and be inc

197、reasingly imbalanced across regions Note:In Panel B,Emerging Asia comprises China,India,Indonesia and the Dynamic Asian Economies.Latin America comprises Argentina,Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Costa Rica,Mexico and Peru.Contributions calculated moving PPP shares of global GDP.Source:OECD Economic Outlook 1

198、12 database;OECD Economic Outlook 110 database;and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/9tim1h The prospects for individual major economies over the next two years differ widely.High inflation and rising interest rates are restraining growth in North America.In the United States,real wages

199、have fallen,and the tightening of monetary policy has pushed up interest rates at all maturities,weakening investment,especially in the housing market.Higher interest rates have also resulted in a strengthening of the dollar,exerting a headwind on export activity.GDP growth is projected to slow from

200、 1.8%in 2022 to 0.5%in 2023,before picking up to 1.0%in 2024.Slower growth will lessen the tightness of labour markets,with a rise of about 1 percentage point in the unemployment rate over the projection period.Together with weaker demand pressures and easing of supply chain bottlenecks,this is proj

201、ected to allow inflationary pressures to gradually recede.Core inflation is expected to get back close to the Federal Reserves 2%target towards the end of 2024,permitting some easing of monetary policy.Canadas economy is subject to many of the same forces and expected to have a similar profile of gr

202、owth and inflation through 2023-24,with both headline and core inflation converging towards the 2%target by the end of 2024,permitting some easing of monetary policy in the second half of that year.The major advanced economies in Asia are projected to experience less of a slowdown than other regions

203、.Growth in Japan is projected to remain above potential,but moderate gradually.Higher energy prices have hindered real household income growth and dented confidence and business investment,and a loss of economic momentum in key trading partners is checking export growth.Fiscal policy is projected to

204、 be more supportive in 2023,but then tighten in 2024.GDP growth is expected to be 1.8%in 2023 and 0.9%in 2024,after 1.6%in 2022.The unemployment rate is projected to continue to edge down in 2023-24,reaching 2.4%,and the further tightening of labour markets is reflected in a projected increase in co

205、re inflation from 0.3%in 2022 to 1.6%in 2023 and 1.7%in 2024.Weak external demand is also a factor in the projected slowdown in Korea,along with modest disposable income growth and a soft housing market.GDP growth is expected to slip from 2.7%in 2022 to a little under 2%in 2023 and 2024.Inflation wi

206、ll remain high for some time in 2023 due to service and utility price pressures,but will gradually moderate to under 2%by the end of 2024.31 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Growth in Europe is slowing sharply in late 2022 as a result of the war in Ukraine and

207、weak external demand,with output projected to decline in several countries over the winter.Held back by high energy and food prices,weak confidence,continuing supply bottlenecks and the initial impact of tighter monetary policy,annual growth in the euro area in 2023 is projected to be 0.5%,after 3.3

208、%in 2022,before picking up to 1.4%in 2024 as spending starts to recover.The implementation of Next Generation EU plans should underpin investment.Subdued demand growth will help to moderate inflation,but tight labour markets,and the prospect that high wholesale energy prices will continue to feed in

209、to retail prices in 2023 and 2024,means that inflation will subside only gradually,remaining above target in 2024.Higher interest rates,elevated energy and food prices and weak confidence are affecting the United Kingdom,where output is projected to contract by 0.4%in 2023 and rise by only 0.2%in 20

210、24,with tighter fiscal policy restraining the rebound.As in the euro area,weaker demand is projected to help bring inflation down steadily,to 6.8%in 2023 and 3.4%in 2024.In China,recurring waves of lockdowns have disrupted economic activity in 2022.With weaker housing investment also remaining a sig

211、nificant headwind,growth in 2023 and 2024 will be sustained by infrastructure investment and other measures to moderate the correction in the real estate sector.After 3.3%in 2022,GDP growth is projected to pick up to 4.6%in 2023 before easing to 4.1%in 2024.Consumer price inflation is expected to re

212、main benign,helped by the current policies to manage energy and food prices.The other major Asian emerging-market economies are also projected to be relatively resistant to global headwinds next year,and to have only a modest and short-lived overshooting of inflation objectives.In India,growth is pr

213、ojected to dip from 6.6%in the current(2022-23)fiscal year to 5.7%in FY2023-24,before rebounding to 6.9%in FY2024-25,broadly in line with the pre-pandemic trend.Higher food and energy prices have dented households purchasing power,and the expected weakness of external demand over the coming year wil

214、l also moderate activity,despite a strong pick up in contact-intensive service sectors,including international tourism.Consumer price inflation will remain above 6%(the upper limit of the central banks target range)until early 2023 before gradually receding as higher interest rates take effect.Growt

215、h in Indonesia is projected to remain buoyant owing to strong demand for Indonesias main export commodities,as well as pent-up consumption from the pandemic period.GDP growth will remain close to 5%in 2023 and 2024,while inflation should fall back under the 4%ceiling of the central banks target band

216、 by the end of 2023 as the effects of monetary tightening are felt.The major Latin American economies have performed better than expected in 2022,especially food and energy exporters which benefitted from improved terms of trade.This rebound is expected to lose steam during 2023 and 2024,amid tighte

217、r global and domestic financial conditions,a withdrawal of most remaining fiscal support and less buoyant commodity prices.Inflation in the major Latin American economies is likely to be close to its peak currently,but will recede only gradually,despite early rate increases by many Latin American ce

218、ntral banks that have delivered firmly positive real interest rates.In Brazil,slowing export momentum,tight credit conditions and a less expansionary fiscal policy are projected to curb growth in 2023,with only a modest improvement in 2024.Annual GDP growth is projected to be 2.8%in 2022,1.2%in 2023

219、 and 1.4%in 2024.As supply bottlenecks fade and the effects of higher policy rates continue to materialise,inflation is projected to decline to between 4-4 per cent in 2023 and 2024.Against the backdrop of slowing global trade and tighter monetary conditions,annual GDP growth is expected to weaken i

220、n 2023 in most other advanced and emerging-market economies,before recovering somewhat in 2024.Output is projected to contract in a number of economies in 2023,including Chile,the Czech Republic,Latvia and Sweden.Central and Eastern Europe,the region most directly affected by the war in Ukraine,gene

221、rally has both markedly weak growth and relatively high inflation through 2023,while countries in the Asia/Pacific region typically suffer less of a growth 32 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 slowdown next year and have lower peak inflation rates than elsewhere

222、.In almost all the smaller economies,as in the larger ones,inflation is projected to decline in both 2023 and 2024,but often to remain above central bank targets even at the end of that period.The slowdown in output growth in 2023 is not generally expected to be reflected in large rises in unemploym

223、ent.The OECD-wide unemployment rate is projected to increase to around 5.5%,some 0.5 percentage points above the low point in mid-2022,with many firms holding on to workers that have been hard to recruit since the pandemic,amidst softer labour force growth and only small increases in participation r

224、ates in most OECD economies over the next two years.Job growth is also projected to slow sharply,from around 3%this year in the OECD economies to 0.5%per annum on average in 2023-24,with declines in employment in 2023 in several Central and Eastern European economies,Denmark,Finland,Italy and Sweden

225、.Such labour market outcomes would nonetheless be mild by the standards of past slowdowns,and a risk is that this could prolong elevated cost pressures for longer than expected.Consumer price inflation in many economies is projected to stay higher for longer than previously foreseen,despite a larger

226、 and more rapid tightening of monetary policy in much of the world and the gradual easing of some supply bottlenecks in goods markets.This reflects in part the war in Ukraine,especially in Europe,where the implications of the sharp rise in the price of imported natural gas in 2022 will continue to b

227、e felt in 2023 and 2024 as delayed retail price increases for electricity and gas come through and existing price caps become less generous.Nonetheless,with policy interest rates generally rising into 2023 and then being maintained at high levels throughout the projection period,resource pressures d

228、iminishing and energy price inflation slowing,inflation is projected to fall and approach central bank objectives in many economies in 2024.Annual inflation in the OECD economies is projected to decline,from 9.4%in 2022 to 6.5%in 2023 and 5.1%in 2024.Inflationary pressures are projected to ease in a

229、ll countries,but this is likely to take some time in those with very tight labour markets and broad-based inflation pressures at present.In 2023,headline inflation is projected to be over 10%for a second successive year in Hungary,Poland,the Slovak Republic and the Baltic States,and be 8%in Germany

230、and over 6 per cent in the euro area as a whole.In contrast,price pressures are expected to ease considerably in 2023 and 2024 in the United States,Canada,Australia and Korea,and remain mild in Japan.Inflation is projected to continue to diverge in the emerging-market economies,with continued low in

231、flation in China,very high inflation in Argentina and Trkiye,and inflationary pressures generally receding in other countries as tighter monetary policy takes effect.Global trade volume growth is projected to slow to 2.9%in 2023 as demand softens and price pressures mount,with the slowdown particula

232、rly noticeable in Europe and the United States.The resumption of growth in China will help to offset some of the softness in OECD activity,but import demand is also expected to be subdued in many commodity-importing countries.A mild upswing is projected in 2024,with global trade growth picking up to

233、 3 per cent.Global current account imbalances are expected to remain higher than prior to the pandemic(Figure 1.18).Chinas trade surplus will remain elevated as exports grow robustly and international tourism imports remain well below pre-crisis levels over the projection period.This increase is off

234、set by a lower surplus in Japan and in Europe,in part due to the adverse terms of trade shock from higher imported energy prices.The US current account deficit will only decline marginally over the projection period.As commodity prices are assumed to remain unchanged at high levels in the projection

235、s,many oil-exporting economies are expected to have persistent and sizeable current account surpluses.33 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Figure 1.18.Current account imbalances are higher than immediately prior to the pandemic Note:The Dynamic Asian Economies a

236、ggregate includes Hong Kong(China),Malaysia,Chinese Taipei,the Philippines,Singapore,Thailand and Vietnam.The oil producers aggregate includes Algeria,Angola,Azerbaijan,Bahrain,Brunei,Chad,the Republic of Congo,Ecuador,Equatorial Guinea,Gabon,Iran,Iraq,Kazakhstan,Kuwait,Libya,Nigeria,Oman,Qatar,Saud

237、i Arabia,Sudan,Timor-Leste,Trinidad and Tobago,Turkmenistan,United Arab Emirates,Venezuela and Yemen.The rest of the world aggregate includes all other non-OECD countries which are not listed.Source:OECD Economic Outlook 112 database;and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/awyt56 Key risks

238、 and vulnerabilities The impact of lower energy imports to Europe from Russia could prove more severe than expected European economies continue to face significant challenges from the current and planned embargos on Russian coal and seaborne oil imports,and from the dwindling supply of gas from Russ

239、ia into the European market.A key risk around the projections is that the associated increase in energy prices proves much more disruptive and persistent than assumed in the baseline.Past experience suggests that sizeable increases in energy expenditures in OECD economies are often associated with r

240、ecessions(Box 1.2).The search for alternative sources of supply has been an important factor pushing up energy costs this year,with European countries bidding to attract supply from other markets amidst tight global supply conditions.There are sizeable differences across European countries and indus

241、tries in the energy mix and the reliance on different types of energy inputs.The ongoing shift away from Russian imports is thus affecting sectors in different ways according to their initial dependency on energy imports from Russia,the scope to obtain alternative energy supplies,and the extent to w

242、hich they are impacted by cutbacks elsewhere in their supply chains.Such challenges are particularly acute in Germany,as well as in many Central and Eastern European economies,and in energy-producing sectors,transport(where specialised refined fuels from Russia can be hard to replace),minerals and m

243、etals manufacturing and the chemicals industry.For OECD Europe as a whole,estimates derived by combining input-output and sectoral energy use data suggest that output in manufacturing and market service sectors could decline by between 2-3 per cent,if energy inputs from Russia were not offset by dra

244、wing down stocks or by substituting other energy inputs(OECD,2022c).Such estimates are very uncertain,as energy supply disruptions to key production processes,or shortages of fuels for transportation could force companies to shut down production 34 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINA

245、RY VERSION OECD 2022 completely rather than reduce it proportionally.The near-term impact of a simultaneous sharp contraction in production across many sectors and countries is also likely to be larger than if only one country is affected.Gas supplies are a particular concern in Europe over the next

246、 two winters.Gas and electricity prices are already elevated and could jump further in the event of shortages emerging in Europe.Such shortages could occur if non-Russian gas supplies from outside the EU fail to materialise to the extent expected,or if the demand for gas is exceptionally high due to

247、 a cold winter(Haas et al.,2022;IEA,2022a).EU gas storage levels have been raised considerably through 2022,and in October were over 92%on average in EU member states and full in many.Even at this level,there is still some uncertainty about whether demand in a typical winter can be met without stora

248、ge levels in the European gas market being pushed below effective operational levels unless the reductions in energy consumption in the last few months are maintained.In this respect,it is important that fiscal measures to support households and companies continue to allow price signals to operate t

249、o help to bring about the necessary adjustment of consumption.A prolonged cold winter would be more likely to result in shortfalls unless additional gas supplies could be obtained in the near term,which would inevitably require substantially higher prices,or demand is reduced strongly.Even if suppli

250、es prove adequate for the forthcoming winter,significant challenges are likely to persist through 2023 and keep gas prices elevated,with European economies continuing to face substantial difficulties in securing sufficient supplies to rebuild storage capacity ahead of the 2023-24 winter(Fulwood,2022

251、;IEA,2022b).In turn,such efforts will push up gas prices and reduce the quantities of LNG available outside Europe,especially in Asia,with detrimental effects on some developing economies.Box 1.2.Energy expenditures since the 1970s Fluctuations in the share of energy expenditures in total spending a

252、re closely associated with cyclical changes in economic activity.With energy an important input for firms,a rise in energy prices typically shifts the aggregate supply curve of the economy upwards,all else equal,lowering output and raising the price level.Higher energy prices also erode the purchasi

253、ng power of households:when energy prices surge,energy expenditures tend to increase,crowding out other spending.The negative effect on aggregate demand amplifies the effect of the supply shock on output while somewhat offsetting the impact on overall consumer prices.The negative demand effect could

254、 be mitigated to the extent that domestic energy producers spend their windfall profits,or distribute the extra income to households who spend it,but most OECD countries are importers of fossil fuels,and recipients of energy price windfalls generally tend to spend their extra income slowly(Cookson e

255、t al.,2022).Estimated expenditures on energy oil,natural gas,coal and electricity have risen sharply this year in OECD economies(Figure 1.19),with relatively similar fluctuations over time across most OECD countries.The estimates use consumption volumes and end-use prices which include taxes from th

256、e International Energy Agency.For 2022,the volumes consumed are assumed to be equal to the average of those in 2019 and 2021,with price levels estimated using the average of observed 2022 data compared to 2021 for reference prices for each category(in local currency terms):Brent for oil products,ICE

257、 Newcastle futures for coal,and national wholesale prices for electricity and natural gas.The expected relationship between energy expenditure shares and economic cycles in the OECD region is clearly visible.During the past five decades,OECD-wide recessions have with the exception of the COVID-19 re

258、cession in 2020 only occurred when the ratio of energy expenditures to GDP has been at a high level(always at least 13%)and rising.These findings are consistent with the results of studies of even longer periods(Fizaine and Court,2016)and studies of the link between oil price increases and US recess

259、ions(Kilian and Vigfusson,2017).The rapid rise in estimated OECD-wide energy expenditures this year,to around 17%of GDP,is a warning signal about the near-term risk of widespread recessions among OECD economies.35 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Figure 1.19.Pe

260、riods of high energy expenditures are often associated with a recession Estimated energy end-use expenditures for the OECD economies Note:Recessions(shaded areas)correspond to years in which there were at least two negative quarterly GDP growth rates for the OECD aggregate.Estimates of the level of

261、energy expenditure,computed as end-use prices in local currency multiplied by volumes consumed,are produced at the country level for 29 OECD countries.GDP shares are then aggregated using moving GDP weights in PPP terms.End-use prices(defined as the average unit price effectively paid by industrial

262、and household consumers as well as for electricity generation)include taxes.Prices start in 1978 in the IEA database;they were backcast to 1971 using the Brent price for oil,and prices for coal products and natural gas,and the rate of increase of the electricity price in the US CPI for electricity.P

263、rices are extended to 2022 using the growth rate of reference prices converted in local currency(average of observed 2022 data compared to 2021):Brent for oil,ICE Newcastle futures for coal,and wholesale prices for electricity and natural gas(available for 25 and 27 OECD countries,respectively).For

264、2022,the volumes consumed correspond to the average of 2019 and 2021.Source:International Energy Agency;OECD Economic Outlook 112 database;Refinitiv;US Energy Information Administration;Japanese Power;German Federal Network Agency(SMARD);Korea Electric Power Statistics Information System;Canada Inde

265、pendent Electricity System Operator;and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/3iejks At the same time,the composition of the current surge in energy expenditure is different to that seen in earlier episodes.Past swings in expenditures on energy have been mostly driven by spending for oil pro

266、ducts,whereas the upswing in 2022 is more broad-based,with large contributions from gas and electricity.It is possible that this difference is relevant for the relationship between overall energy expenditure and OECD-wide downturns.For one thing,the most extreme increases in the prices of gas and el

267、ectricity have taken place in Europe:it is likely that the consequences for output will likewise be skewed.Indeed,the United States and a number of other OECD countries are net exporters of gas(and oil)and thus benefit from terms of trade improvements resulting from the surge in energy prices.The fi

268、rst large increase in OECD-wide end-use expenditures happened in 1974 with the ratio of energy spending to GDP rising by nearly 8 percentage points in one year,of which over 6 percentage points came from oil products.This was due to the first oil crisis,following the announcement by Arab members of

269、OPEC of an oil embargo in October 1973,which pushed the oil price sharply higher:the average price in 1974 tripled relative to 1973.In subsequent decades,spending on oil products has been a key driver of the evolution of energy expenditures,reflecting oils large share in consumption volumes and its

270、relatively high degree of price volatility.The second oil crisis,in 1979,resulted in an increase in energy expenditure of 3 percentage points of GDP over two years,while the mid-1980s oil glut caused spending to decline by around 36 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD

271、2022 8 percentage points,after which it stabilised at around 10%of GDP.It was only in the second half of the 2000s that energy expenditures started to increase again,peaking in 2008 at around 13%of GDP,with two-thirds of the increase being explained by spending on oil products.The relative stability

272、 of energy expenditures from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s hid a decline in energy intensity(energy consumed per unit of real GDP)of about 15%which was offset by a similar increase in the relative(weighted)price of energy.Indeed,energy intensity in OECD economies has declined steadily since the f

273、irst oil crisis,falling by more than 50%over the period 1971-2021.This was driven by falls in the GDP intensity of oil and coal,with intensity remaining relatively stable for electricity and increasing for gas.For 2022,the estimated increase of 7 percentage points is similar to that observed in 1974

274、,and takes the ratio of energy spending to GDP back to the levels seen from the mid-1970s through to the mid-1980s.Expenditures related to all energy products are increasing significantly,with spending on electricity,oil products,natural gas and coal products increasing by 2,2,2 and 1 percentage poi

275、nts,respectively.One of the key unknowns about the current episode is the speed and extent of the pass-through from global or wholesale prices to end users(Figure 1.3).The increase in global and wholesale prices that has already occurred could be spread into 2023 or beyond,or may never even reach en

276、d users,depending on public policies and the future evolution of prices.To the extent that end users are not exposed to the full price impact,the implications for aggregate demand may be more muted than suggested by the underlying swing in energy costs.EU member countries have already agreed on effo

277、rts to lower energy consumption in the near term,and higher prices have also begun to slow demand to some extent.Nonetheless,risks of enforced reductions in usage remain,implying potentially sizeable declines in energy consumption in some countries and industries where there is either a relatively h

278、igh direct use of gas or a high indirect use via electricity production(Figure 1.20).Some industries that use gas intensively,such as metals manufacturing and chemicals,could see declines of between 4-6%in the median EU economy in the event of a 10%decline in gas usage and a 10%reduction in the use

279、of gas for electricity(OECD,2022d).Figure 1.20.Gas is an important energy source for electricity generation in many European countries Electricity production by energy source in 2020 Source:Eurostat.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/08swf6 37 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION O

280、ECD 2022 Illustrative simulations,using the NiGEM global macroeconomic model,highlight the potential hit to growth and additional inflation in 2023 and 2024 that could arise from gas shortages in Europe and the associated uncertainty that might arise.Shortages are assumed to push up global gas,ferti

281、liser and oil prices(as European countries bid for additional gas supply in world markets),hit confidence and financial conditions and require a temporary period of enforced reductions in gas use by businesses in early 2023 and again in early 2024(OECD,2022d).Taken together,the shocks could reduce g

282、rowth in the European economies by close to 1 percentage points in 2023,relative to baseline,and raise inflation by over 1 percentage points(Figure 1.21).This would push many countries into a full-year recession in 2023.Growth would also be weakened in 2024 by around percentage point in Europe,and i

283、nflation raised by 0.9 percentage points.Higher prices and reduced working hours would hit real incomes,with household spending falling by around 2%in the European economies,and private sector investment would be hit by the higher user cost and weak demand,declining by close to 10%by 2024.Within the

284、 European Union,the countries in Central and Eastern Europe would collectively be hit harder than others,with output lowered by around 1.6%in 2023,compared to a decline of 1.3%in the rest of the European Union.Outside Europe,the impact of the shocks would be smaller,but there would still be adverse

285、impacts from higher inflation on real incomes(except in gas-producing economies)and weaker demand from Europe.For the world as a whole inflation would be pushed up by 0.6 percentage points in 2023 and 0.4 percentage points in 2024,with growth reduced by percentage point and percentage point respecti

286、vely.6 Figure 1.21.Prolonged gas shortages and greater uncertainty would hit growth and raise inflation in 2023 and 2024 Note:Illustrative scenario of the impact of gas shortages in Europe.The scenario assumes that global gas,oil and fertiliser prices rise by 50%,10%and 25%respectively in 2023 and 2

287、024.Greater uncertainty is modelled as an ex-ante increase of 1 percentage point increase in the household saving rate and a 1 percentage point rise in the user cost of capital and investment risk premia in all EU economies and the United Kingdom in 2023 and 2024.A temporary period of enforced ratio

288、ning in industry use is modelled by a 3%reduction in potential output in all EU economies and the United Kingdom in the first quarter of 2023 and 2024 via a combination of reduced technical efficiency and a fall in average hours worked.Source:OECD calculations using the NiGEM macroeconomic model.Sta

289、tLink 2 https:/stat.link/0o2xy4 6 A related supply risk is that the impact of EU sanctions against Russian oil exports,which is incorporated in the baseline projections,could also prove more disruptive than anticipated,affecting global supply and pushing up oil prices further.This would add to globa

290、l inflationary pressures in 2023.Particular uncertainty remains about the extent and price at which Europe will be able to obtain alternative supplies of some refined oil products currently imported from Russia,particularly diesel.38 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD

291、 2022 Monetary policy tightening highlights pre-existing financial vulnerabilities There are increasing risks that fast-rising interest rates,tighter global financial conditions and significant asset repricing could expose longstanding financial vulnerabilities in advanced and emerging-market econom

292、ies.Rising private sector debt-service burdens and lower bond market liquidity are keys risks in the advanced economies For households and companies,faster-than-expected rises in interest rates increase debt payments and make rollovers more difficult.A sharp increase in interest rates may jeopardise

293、 the ability of households and corporates to service their debts,potentially leading to defaults and bankruptcies,and to corrections in house prices.Prices have already started to decline in some OECD countries,albeit from very high levels,with house price-to-income ratios at record highs across mos

294、t OECD countries in the second quarter of 2022.Population growth and rising disposable income are more important long-term drivers of house prices than real interest rates(Cournde et al.2020),though the impact of the changes in the latter could be non-linear,with a larger response of house prices to

295、 a given increase in rates when these are at a low level(Nocera and Roma,2017).As interest rates continue to rise,households financial positions can fall under stress given elevated debt levels.Even prior to the large increase in interest rates this year,household debt service ratios in the first qu

296、arter of 2022 were already often above those in the early 2000s,when interest rates were significantly higher(Figure 1.22,Panel A),reflecting higher debt levels.At the same time,declines in the share of variable-rate mortgages in some countries over the past two decades should cushion the impact of

297、rising interest rates in the short run,although the share remains high in several countries(Figure 1.23).Moreover,even mortgages classified as fixed-rate are subject to rate renegotiation from time to time in many countries.Nonetheless,many households could still face a significant rise in their deb

298、t servicing costs.In many advanced economies,rising policy rates have already been passed through into mortgage rates and bank lending standards have also tightened(European Central Bank 2022b;Bank of England 2022a).Low-income families in countries where households are highly indebted and variable-r

299、ate mortgages are widely used,such as some Nordic countries,could be particularly vulnerable(OECD 2022c;Norges Bank 2021).Analysis by the Bank of International Settlements indicates that an increase in interest rates of 425 basis points(akin to the increase in the federal funds rate over the 2004-20

300、06 period)could lead to an increase in debt servicing costs of more than 2 percentage points on average across advanced economies(BIS,2022).Rising policy rates can also expose financial vulnerabilities in the corporate sector.In the median OECD economy,the debt of non-financial firms reached 141%of

301、GDP in 2021,29 percentage points higher than in 2000,and debt-service ratios are already close to those prevailing at that time(Figure 1.22,Panel B).Although debt maturities have lengthened during the pandemic,the share of firms unable to service debt payments could increase sharply in the event of

302、additional tightening by central banks.Default volumes on leveraged loans and high-yield bonds in the United States in June 2022 were already three times higher than in mid-2021(Fitch Ratings,2022)and downgrades of speculative-rated corporate bonds have outnumbered upgrades since November 2021(OECD,

303、2022b).Increased stress on households and companies,and the possibility of loan defaults,also raises risks of large potential losses at bank and non-bank financial institutions.This could amplify the impact of a shock to higher borrowing costs if it resulted in further significant tightening of fina

304、ncial conditions and lending standards and additional pressures on debt servicing capacity.Stress tests generally suggest that the tighter regulatory measures put in place since the global financial crisis have helped to improve the resilience of the banking sector to shocks(Ding et al.,2022).Noneth

305、eless,many banks could still face substantial losses if a larger-than-expected downturn occurred,especially in emerging-market economies where banks are particularly sensitive to shocks and typically have lower capital ratios than in advanced economies.39 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PR

306、ELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Figure 1.22.Debt service obligations could surge Debt service ratios Note:Debt comprises loans and debt securities.Source:Bank for International Settlements;and OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/1vfay2 Figure 1.23.Variable-rate mortgages can exacerbate financi

307、al risks Share of adjustable-rate mortgages in new mortgage issuance Note:Adjustable-rate mortgage loans are new loans issued at variable rate or with an initial rate fixed for a period of up to 1 year.Due to limited data availability,the green bars for Norway and Sweden refer to 2006.For the United

308、 Kingdom,Canada and Australia the green bars respectively refer to 2008,2013 and 2019.Orange bars refer to 2022 or to the latest available data.Source:ECB;Financial Conduct Authority;Japan Ministry of Land,Infrastructure,Transport and Tourism;Norges Bank;Federal Housing Finance Agency;Bank of Canada

309、;and Australian Bureau of Statistics.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/cp47zn 40 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Rising interest rates can help some non-bank financial institutions,such as pension funds and life insurers,by reducing the net present value of their lo

310、ng-term nominal liabilities.At the same time,rapid increases in interest rates could also expose vulnerabilities in some of these institutions.Repricing of stretched asset valuations could lead to disorderly market corrections and investor outflows.Non-bank financial institutions could also suffer l

311、iquidity strains and mark-to-market losses on their assets,including on their portfolios of sovereign bonds,and be confronted with large redemption calls.For institutions that are highly leveraged,or which are subject to severe liquidity mismatches,such as open-ended funds,the impact could be partic

312、ularly large.Energy utilities could also come under stress,as rising energy prices and high volatility lead to large margin calls on their derivatives positions.Concerns over the liquidity of energy utilities have already prompted several European governments to implement emergency support schemes i

313、n the form of short-term liquidity lines and loan guarantees.If defaults of some non-bank financial institutions and utility companies could not be prevented,they could reverberate across the rest of the financial system,leading to a sharp further tightening of financing conditions for households an

314、d corporates.Financial vulnerabilities in emerging-market economies are exacerbated by external spillovers Tighter financing conditions,increased debt,the strong appreciation of the US dollar and the slowdown of export market growth exacerbate vulnerabilities in emerging-market economies.Risk premia

315、 have increased,capital outflows have accelerated,and international reserves have declined in many countries.In China,the resurgence of COVID-19 outbreaks or the contagion of financial fragilities in the highly indebted property sector to the rest of the economy could result in a sharper-than-expect

316、ed slowdown in growth.Several emerging-market and developing economies also face food security risks from high food,energy and fertiliser prices,and supply shortages.Adverse global economic conditions and elevated uncertainty continue to hamper investor confidence and heighten financial market volat

317、ility.Foreign-currency sovereign bond spreads have risen this year,especially in Eastern Europe and Latin America(Figure 1.24,Panel A),and capital outflows have intensified until recently(Figure 1.24,Panel B).Local-currency government bond and equity prices have also declined in Eastern European cou

318、ntries,reflecting geopolitical concerns.Cumulative portfolio outflows since February have been large in China,reflecting large debt outflows and price falls in equity markets.Portfolio outflows have also been sizeable in India,Indonesia and Trkiye,leading to a decline in international reserves in th

319、ese countries.OECD estimates suggest that a 100 basis points rise in emerging-market economy investment risk premia could reduce output in these economies by around 0.5%in the following year(OECD,2018).Total indebtedness has remained higher than its pre-pandemic level in many emerging-market economi

320、es(Figure 1.25).Large currency depreciations against the US dollar in commodity-importing countries can add to the increases in debt-servicing burdens from higher global interest rates,especially where there are mismatches between the currency composition of liabilities and external revenues.Currenc

321、y depreciations are also often associated with rises in foreign-and local-currency government bond spreads,especially in episodes of stress.In addition,depreciations can weigh on domestic demand if they prompt higher domestic interest rates or generate adverse balance sheet effects for foreign curre

322、ncy borrowers.This would offset the benefits of a lower effective exchange rate for trade,and might result in greater stress on the balance sheets of banks.7 7 Recent IMF stress tests suggest that 29%of emerging-market economy banks could see significant capital shortfalls in the event of a severe d

323、ownturn and a disorderly tightening of global financial conditions(IMF,2022a).41 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 Figure 1.24.Amidst high and volatile sovereign credit risk,capital outflows from emerging-market economies have risen Note:Panel A shows the JP Mor

324、gan EMBI global bond spread,a measure of the sovereign risk spread of USD-denominated emerging-market economy government bonds over US government bonds.EME Europe covers Bulgaria,Romania and Trkiye.EME Asia covers China,Indonesia,India,Malaysia,the Philippines,Thailand and Vietnam.EME-Latin America

325、covers Brazil,Chile,Colombia and Mexico.The EME aggregate covers all mentioned countries plus South Africa and Ukraine.Panel B shows a daily composite index reflecting the performance of commodity,equity,foreign-currency-denominated government bond and currency asset classes.Increasing values of the

326、 index indicate capital flows into emerging-market economies,whilst decreasing values indicate capital outflows.At its source,the construction of the index sets the weight of the commodity asset class to 10%and those of the remaining asset classes to 30%each.Source:Factset;Bloomberg;and OECD calcula

327、tions.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/y0nble Figure 1.25.Indebtedness is high in many emerging-market economies Note:Total debt refers to the sum of private non-financial sector debt(based on market values)and general government debt(based on nominal values).Source:Bank for International Settlements;and

328、 OECD calculations.StatLink 2 https:/stat.link/flxajq 42 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK,VOLUME 2022 ISSUE 2:PRELIMINARY VERSION OECD 2022 The recent appreciation of the US dollar has contributed to downgrades in the sovereign debt ratings of many emerging-market economies.Further dollar strength could add to

329、 financial vulnerabilities in these countries.8 In Chile,Mexico and Trkiye,US dollar-denominated credit extended to non-bank borrowers is relatively high,potentially making domestic demand more vulnerable to currency depreciation(Figure 1.26,Panel A).9 The import coverage of foreign currency reserve

330、s has also declined in many emerging-market economies,potentially reducing the resilience to external shocks(Figure 1.26,Panel B).There are also risks that larger external deficits and lower international reserves could pose challenges to macroeconomic and financial stability in countries like Chile

331、,Colombia and Trkiye(Figure 1.26,Panel C).In contrast,current account balances have improved further or moved from deficit to surplus in some energy-exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia and Indonesia,which continue to benefit from a positive terms of trade shock.Low-income developing countries a

332、lso face rising food security and financial risks.High food and fertiliser prices and shortfalls in the supply of cereals from Russia and Ukraine significantly increase risks of hunger in many developing countries.The transmission of these shocks depends on the penetration of food imports in local s

333、upply chains,the pattern of fertiliser use in domestic agricultural production and the extent to which alternative food supplies are available(IFPRI,2022).For instance,Russia and Ukraine account for about three-quarters of total wheat and wheat flour imports of many countries in the Middle East and North Africa(see Box 1.1 in OECD,2022a;Rauschendorfer and Krivonos,2022).Illustrative simulations in