上海品茶

您的当前位置:上海品茶 > 报告分类 > PDF报告下载

麦肯锡(McKinsey):2022年全球资产负债表研究报告-进入波动期(英文版)(38页).pdf

编号:110162 PDF 38页 4.36MB 下载积分:VIP专享
下载报告请您先登录!

麦肯锡(McKinsey):2022年全球资产负债表研究报告-进入波动期(英文版)(38页).pdf

1、November 2022Discussion paperGlobal balance sheet 2022:Enter volatilityAuthorsJan Mischke,ZurichEckart Windhagen,FrankfurtOlivia White,San FranciscoJonathan Woetzel,Los Angeles and ShanghaiSven Smit,AmsterdamMichael Birshan,LondonSzabolcs Kemeny,BudapestJorge Sanchez Cumming,LondonEditorJanet Bush,L

2、ondon December 2022McKinsey Global InstituteThe McKinsey Global Institute was established in 1990.Our mission is to provide a fact base to aid decision making on the economic and business issues most critical to the worlds companies and policy leaders.We benefit from the full range of McKinseys regi

3、onal,sectoral,and functional knowledge,skills,and expertise,but editorial direction and decisions are solely the responsibility of MGI directors and partners.Our research is currently grouped into five major themes:Productivity and prosperitycreating and harnessing the worlds assets productively Res

4、ources of the worldbuilding,powering,and feeding the world Human potentialachieving the potential of human talent Global connectionsshaping of economies by flows of trade,people,capital,and ideas Technologies and markets of the futurethe next big arenas of value and competitionWe aim for independent

5、 and fact-based research and analysis.None of our work is commissioned or funded by any business,government,or other institution;we share our results publicly free of charge;and we are entirely funded by the partners of McKinsey.While we engage multiple distinguished external advisers to contribute

6、to our work,the analyses presented in our publications are MGIs alone,and any errors are our own.You can find out more about MGI and our research at Directors MGI PartnersSven Smit(chair)Michael ChuiChris Bradley Mekala KrishmanKweilin Ellingrud Anu MadgavkarMarco Piccitto Jan MischkeOlivia White Je

7、ongmin SeongJonathan Woetzel Tilman TackeIn brief ivThe global balance sheet expanded inexorably in the Era of Markets 1Growth in the global balance sheet accelerated during the pandemic 15Is 2022 a pause or an inflection point in the rise of the global balance sheet?20What is next for economic heal

8、th and wealth?25Acknowledgments 28ContentsiMcKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility After growing net worth and pandemic acceleration,now what?The global balance sheet showed signs of volatility in 2022Assets and net worth rose 170 percentage points relative to GDP from p

9、re-2000 averages,fueled by asset price infationEvolution of global net worth,$trillionEvolution of the global balance sheet,CAGR,%Net worth/GDP,19702021,%Components of net worth growth,200021,%Balance sheet expansion by sector,consolidated data,change in$trillion,201921During the pandemic,$100 trill

10、ion was added to global wealth on paperLiabilitiesFinancial corporationsLiabilitiesHouseholds,government,nonfnancial corporationsNet worth200020605005805908500600800900400300JapanAverageGermanyChinaUS householdsPre-2000 averageacross sampleUnited States170

11、 pp2329502Net investmentAsset price increase above infationGeneral infationNet fnancial assets 550122201921DebtEquityCurrency and depositsOtherReal estateSectorChange in assetsChange in liabilitiesHouseholdsGovernmentsNonfnancial corporationsFinancial corporationsTotal247101918

12、366In briefGlobal balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility The global balance sheet takes stock of the wealth and health of the global economy,looking at the assets and liabilities of households,corporations,governments,and financial institutions.For nearly three decades,the global balance sheet continuo

13、usly grew faster than GDP,as described in MGIs 2021 report The rise and rise of the global balance sheet.This growth then accelerated sharply in the intense first two years of the COVID-19 pandemic.However,in 2022,early signs of a possible inflection point appeared,with greater volatility in the com

14、ponents of the global balance sheet and the first overall shrinkage in decades(Exhibit1).The global balance sheet expanded inexorably from 2000 to the end of 2021.Real assets and net worth;financial assets and liabilities held by households,governments,and nonfinancial corporations;and financial ass

15、ets and liabilities held by financial corporations each grew from about four to more than five times GDP.Global net worth was$610 trillion at the end of 2021.Only about one-fifth of wealth growth came from savers channeling money into new investment,with asset price inflation on the back of low inte

16、rest rates contributing close to 80 percent.Correspondingly,liabilities and debt in China,Europe,Japan,and the United States were higher relative to GDP at the end of 2021 than at the time of the 2008 global financial crisis.For every dollar of net investment,$1.90 of additional debt was created out

17、side the financial sector.In this period,across countries,real estate,debt,and US equities drove most of the growth.While there were large differences among the 30 countries covered in the magnitude,timing,and composition of growth in assets and liabilities,the direction of travel,the rapid expansio

18、n relative to GDP,and the strong role of real estate were near universal.Households particularly in Canada,Denmark,the Netherlands,Sweden,and the United States also experienced rapidly rising equity and pension wealth.Growth in debt relative to GDP was fastest in China,France,and Greece;relative to

19、net investment,it was highest in Portugal,Italy,Greece,and the United Kingdom at factors of 4.1,3.9,3.8,and 3.8,respectively.Growth in the global balance sheet accelerated during the pandemic.In 2020 and 2021,the intense first two years of the pandemic when governments launched large-scale support f

20、or economic activity,households globally added$100 trillion to global wealth“on paper”as asset prices soared and$39 trillion in new currency and deposits were minted.As a result,global wealth relative to GDP grew faster than in any other two-year period in the past nine decades.Debt and equity liabi

21、lities increased by about$50 trillion and$75 trillion,respectively,as governments and central banks stimulated economies.The creation of new debt accelerated to$3.40 for each$1.00 in net investment.Is 2022 a pause or an inflection point in the rise of the global balance sheet?In the face of geopolit

22、ical and economic turbulence,by the third quarter of 2022,all three interlocking balance sheets shrank relative to GDP for the first time in decades.As inflation and interest rates rose,global equity and bond prices declined by about 30 and 20 percent in real terms,respectively.Real estate values gr

23、ew more slowly than inflation and fell in nominal terms in several markets.Despite higher inflation,debt continued to grow slightly faster than GDP at par values(but declined in market values).What is next for the health and wealth of economies?Public-and private-sector leaders and financial authori

24、ties should consider closely monitoring and managing the balance sheet to achieve positive economic outcomes.The forces of secular stagnation could mean that after a brief intermezzo in 2022 and part of 2023,the balance sheet will resume its rise,adding to wealth but also to concerns about balance s

25、heet health.Alternatively,the world could step up efforts to boost productivity growth and reallocate capital to productive capital formation in order to grow out of a supersize balance sheet.If the world does not go down either of these two routes,an unwinding of the balance sheet via inflationas i

26、n the 1970sor via more sustained asset price corrections,deleveraging,and debt write-offs,as happened during the global financial crisis,may result.ivMcKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Exhibit 10.70.70.70.70.71.11.31.11.11.72.01.91.21.21.21.24.9(490)4.7(420)3.7(120)

27、5.2(500)2.12.52.82.71.21.92.31.90.50.43.8(130)5.4(520)5.0(500)0.40.44.9(430)201920006.2(630)20214.8(160)20225.8(510)6.3(610)Evolution of the global balance sheet,consolidated data,1GDP multiples($trillion)After two decades of growth and rapid acceleration through the pandemic,the global balance shee

28、t showed signs of volatility in 2022.LiabilitiesFinancial corporations1Moved from unconsolidated financial data in 2020 report to consolidated,which reduced financial assets and liabilities by about$100 trillion each.2Shares in publicly and privately held corporations.3Includes monetary gold and spe

29、cial drawing rights(SDRs),derivatives and options,and pensions.Source:OECD;Federal Reserve Board;CEIC;national statistics offices;World Bank;McKinsey Global Institute analysisLiabilitiesHouseholds,government,nonfinancial corporationsNet worthEquity2Debt and loansOther financial liabilities3Currency

30、and deposits(3.3x)(1.2x)(1.0 x)(3.4x)(1.2x)(1.0 x)(3.1x)(1.2x)(1.0 x)(Absolute change in GDP)McKinsey&CompanyChange vs GDP multiplesvMcKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility The global balance sheet expanded inexorably in the Era of Markets In 2021,the McKinsey Global Ins

31、titute employed a core tool used by companiesthe balance sheetas a way to gauge the underlying prosperity,health,and resilience of the global economy.We built a global balance sheet that complements GDP and other economic flows as a way of measuring the worlds wealth.This paper presents an update to

32、 the balance sheet through the pandemic(2020 and 2021)and the impact of war in Ukraine,inflation,and the interest rate shock in 2022.The balance sheet adds an important lens for assessing economic wealth and health(see Box1,“The global balance sheet:Taking stock of economic health and wealth”).Jorg

33、Greuel/Getty Images1McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Box11 Countries included in the global balance sheet are Australia,Austria,Belgium,Canada,Central and Eastern Europe(including Czech Republic,Estonia,Hungary,Latvia,Lithuania,Slovakia,and Slovenia),China,Denmark

34、,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Ireland,Italy,Japan,Mexico,Netherlands,New Zealand,Norway,Portugal,South Korea,Spain,Sweden,United Kingdom,and United States.The global average is an extrapolation derived from a weighted average of 30 countries(based on GDP)that account for 77 percent of global GDP.2

35、As per the guidelines stipulated in Valuation of debt securities at both market and nominal value,IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics,October 2020.Market values and par values have historically approximated each other and diverged in episodes of quick changes in interest rates over the p

36、ast 20 years;see the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas analysis“Market value of U.S.government debt.”The global balance sheet:Taking stock of economic health and wealth A large balance sheet can be a sign of strength and wealth when it is underpinned by productive capital stock,but it can also expose f

37、ragilities when signs of asset price inflation and growing leverage are present(Exhibit2).Notably,on the asset side,the balance sheet is a way to gauge overall wealth at the country and household levels,but also capital allocation and misallocation,and sources of wealth growth and whether they are s

38、ustainable or merely reflect asset price inflation.On the liability side,it provides a full account of debt and other financial liabilities at the economic sector level and supports analysis of stock and growth of liabilities in comparison with income growth,new capital formation,or asset price grow

39、th.To construct a global balance sheet,MGI added up all real assets in the economy as well as all financial assets and liabilities,analogous to the way a corporation builds its balance sheet.1 Included are all sectorsnamely households,government,nonfinancial corporations(which include state-owned en

40、terprises),and financial corporations(which include central banks).All assets and liabilities are valued at market prices.2 Human and environmental capital,and contingent liabilities,such as pay-as-you-go pension schemes,are excluded.At a functional level,the global balance sheet has three component

41、s that interlock:(1)the real economy balance sheet:real assets and net worth;(2)the financial balance sheet:financial assets and liabilities held by households,governments,and nonfinancial corporations;and(3)the financial-sector balance sheet:financial assets and liabilities held by financial corpor

42、ations.The real economy balance sheet has$620 trillion of real assets.About two-thirds of these are real estate(land and buildings),and one-third includes assets like machinery and equipment,infrastructure,natural resources,and intellectual property(IP).These are mirrored on the liability side as na

43、tional or global net worth.Note that while for households,net worth includes both real assets such as property and financial assets like stocks and bonds,at the global or closed economy level,all financial assets are matched by corresponding liabilities so that net worth equates to the value of real

44、 assets(with a small deviation in MGIs analysis due to the position of the rest of the world).The financial balance sheet of households,nonfinancial corporations,and governments has$520 trillion in financial assets,such as stocks,bonds,pension funds,and cash and deposits that facilitate ownership an

45、d risk transfer of real assets as well as time shifting of savings and consumption.These financial assets balance against corresponding liabilities since they represent eventual claims that owners,namely those holding the asset,have on them.Finally,financial institutions create and intermediate thos

46、e financial assets and liabilitieswith transformation of risks,maturity,and sizeand hold$490 trillion in financial assets and corresponding liabilities.On the asset side,the largest contributor to the balance sheet of financial institutions is debt,followed by equity,currency and deposits(at other f

47、inancial institutions or at central banks),and other financial assets such as derivatives and financial reserves.Among liabilities for financial institutions are currency and deposits,equity,and pensions.2McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Exhibit 2The global balanc

48、e sheet consists of three interlocking balance sheets ofcoincidentally$500 trillion to$600 trillion each.AssetsLiabilities and net worthThe financial sectorCreates and intermediates assets in the financial system;measures the use of intermediaries in the financial system Financial assets held by fin

49、ancial corporationsLiabilities held by financial corporationsThe financial systemAllows the separation of wealth from investment in and ownership of real assets;measures the value of future obligations to each otherFinancial assets held by households,governments,and nonfinancial corporationsLiabilit

50、ies held by households,governments,and nonfinancial corporationsThe real economyDrives growth and wealth;measures the value to a marginal ownerNonfinancial assetsNet worthSize of balance sheet,consolidated data,1$trillion in 2021,%1Moved from unconsolidated financial data in 2020 report to consolida

51、ted,which reduced financial assets and liabilities by about$100 trillion each.Note:The global average is an extrapolation derived from a weighted average of 30 countries based on GDP comprising 77%of global GDP.Figures may not sum up due to rounding.Source:OECD;Federal Reserve Board;CEIC;national st

52、atistics offices;World Bank;McKinsey Global Institute analysis9%4 49 90 09%58%24%69%31%Other nonfinancial assetsReal estate6 62 20 06 61 10 0Debt and loansOther financial assetsEquityCurrency and deposits38%24%25%5 50 00 014%24%27%43%6%5 52 20 042%0%51%7%5 52 20 0McKinsey&Company3McKinsey Global Ins

53、titute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Over the past couple of decadesa period that the McKinsey Global Institute(MGI)has dubbed the Era of Marketsthe global balance sheet has risen inexorably.3 Between 2000 and 2021,the market value of the three parts of the global balance sheet quadrupl

54、ed,far outstripping growth in GDP.4 Historically,net worth(real and financial assets minus liabilities)accounted for four times GDP,but it reached more than six times GDP at the end of this period.Real assets and net worth rose to their highest levels relative to GDP since the two world wars,while l

55、iabilities and debt are now above the peaks reached around the global financial crisis.For every dollar of net investment,the financial system created$1.90 in additional debt.Net worth expanded by 170 percentage points relative to GDP from pre-2000 averages,fueled by asset price inflation In recent

56、decades,the world has experienced a sustained period of rising asset prices.Globally,net worth is now 170 percentage points higher relative to GDP than the pre-2000 average,and by 2021 it had reached the highest level relative to GDP since before WorldWarII(Exhibit3).Only 23 percent of growth in the

57、 value of assets and net worth reflected savings channeled into net new investment that added to the productive or real capital stock of the economy.What really drove net worth growth was inflation in asset prices that far exceeded growth in consumer prices.Declining interest rates were a core drive

58、r.Particularly in real estate,lower financing costs meant that buyers were willing to pay higher property prices relative to prevailing rents.3 On the cusp of a new era?McKinsey Global Institute,October 2022.4 The rise and rise of the global balance sheet:How productively are we using our wealth?McK

59、insey Global Institute,November 2021.Real assets and net worth rose to their highest levels relative to GDP since the two world wars,while liabilities and debt are now above the peaks reached around the global financial crisis.4McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Exh

60、ibit 3Country1net worth at market prices relative to nominal GDP,19702021Assets and net worth rose 170 percentage points relative to GDP from pre-2000 averages,fueled by asset price inflation.1Countries are Australia,Austria,Belgium,Canada,Central and Eastern Europe(incl Czech Republic,Estonia,Hunga

61、ry,Latvia,Lithuania,Slovakia,and Slovenia)China,Denmark,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Ireland,Italy,Japan,Mexico,Netherlands,New Zealand,Norway,Portugal,South Korea,Spain,Sweden,United Kingdom,and United States;the global average is an extrapolation derived from a weighted average of 30 countries ba

62、sed on GDP comprising 77%of global GDP.2For the United States,household net worth and country net worth differ markedly due to high values of corporate equity relative to assets.Source:OECD;Federal Reserve Board;CEIC;national statistics offices;World Bank;World Inequality Database;McKinsey Global In

63、stitute analysisNet worth/GDP,%1,00080520000530080007009001,1001,200AverageUS households2GermanyJapanUnited StatesChina170 pp-2232950General inflationAsset price increase above inflationNet investmentComponents of net worth growth,200021,%Pre-2000 average across samp

64、le countriesMcKinsey&CompanyNet financial assets5McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Net worth is now at levels relative to GDP last seen before the world wars in several economies The high ratio of wealth to GDP witnessed todayup to eight times in some countrieswas

65、also observed prior to World War I.For 50 years before the start of that war,the average wealth-to-income ratio of some of the worlds leading economies was relatively constant at levels comparable with,or higher than,today(Exhibit4).5 During the turbulent first half of the 20th century,two world war

66、s and the Spanish flu pandemic severely disrupted global economies,reducing wealth to 30 percent of its average value relative to GDP from what it had been just a couple of decades earlier in countries such as France and Germany.Physical capital was destroyed.In Germany,hyperinflation also devalued

67、financial assets and liabilities.Rapid industrialization changed the social fabric and engines of growth,and agricultural land lost its place as the primary store of value.After 1950,however,wealth-to-GDP ratios started growing again not only as the capital stock was built after the war but also as

68、long-run asset prices recovered.More structurally,continued urban agglomeration,including the development of suburbs,as well as a shift to services contributed to real estate becoming a growingand indeed primarystore of value.6 The global trajectory accelerated in many economies in the late 1990s an

69、d around the turn of the millennium on the back of the“great moderation”characterized by declining interest rates and rising asset prices.Rapid income growth in superstar cities,whose supply of real estate is inelastic but which experience insatiable increases in demand,has added to real estate pric

70、e pressures.5 In the preWorld War I period,we use income instead of GDP.6 Thomas Piketty,Capital in the 21st century,Belknap Press,2014;and Daniel Waldenstrm,Wealth and history:An update,Centre for Economic Policy Research discussion paper DP16631,November 2021.Continued urban agglomeration,includin

71、g the development of suburbs,as well as a shift to services contributed to real estate becoming a growingand indeed primarystore of value.6McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Exhibit 4Net worth at market prices relative to net national income,18552020Net worth is now

72、 at levels relative to GDP not seen since before the two world warsin several economies.1 The global average is an extrapolation derived from a weighted average of 30 countries based on GDP comprising 77%of global GDP.Source:OECD;Federal Reserve Board;CEIC;national statistics offices;World Bank;Worl

73、d Inequality Database;McKinsey Global Institute analysisMcKinsey&CompanyBody of exhibit is in AIAcross countries,real estate and US equities drove asset growthWhile the magnitude,exact timing,and composition of asset growth relative to GDP differed among countries,the direction of change and its und

74、erlying factors have been remarkably consistent across the globe in recent decades.The vast majority of countries have experienced rapidly growing net worth on the back of rising real estate values.These show up,in particular,on household balance sheets,benefiting homeowners but hurting those who se

75、ek property.South Korea,France,and New Zealand top the list of total and real estate net worth growth(Exhibit5).Resource exporters including Australia,Canada,and Norway are also near the top of the list.These economies have benefited from rising resource wealth and have witnessed those funds pouring

76、 into real estate markets,boosting valuations(see Box2,“Australia leads in household net worth relative to GDP due to high land prices”).0810ChinaHighlighted countryUS householdsOther countriesAverage0810Spain0810France0810Sweden0810Germany01855

77、2020246810United Kingdom0810Italy0810United States7McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Exhibit 5CountryAssetsLiabilitiesNet worth2Real estate grew relative to GDP almost universally,and so did debt and equity.Country net worth growth,200021,GDP

78、multiple Canada1.9South Korea3.1PortugalNorwayFranceNew Zealand0.23.3Sweden1.1AustraliaItalyNetherlands3.74.35.0China2.1SpainFinland5.4Mexico2.3Austria2.2GermanyUnited KingdomCentral and Eastern EuropeDenmarkBelgium5.2United StatesJapanGreeceIreland1.83.44.65.02.95.5Total32.43.00.81.63.22.91Includes

79、 other real and financial assets;other real assets include machinery and equipment,IP products,inventories and valuables,cultivated biological resources,mineral and energy reserves,other natural resources,and other intangibles;other financial assets include monetary gold and SDRs,insurance pensions,

80、derivatives and options,other accounts receivable,and investment fund shares.2Net worth equals real assets plus financial assets minus liabilities.3Weighted average(relative to GDP)of countries in the sample.Note:For the following economies,balance sheet data were not sufficiently available for the

81、200021 period:South Korea financial balance sheet 200821;New Zealand financial balance sheet 200720;Mexico 200321;Ireland 200121.All financial figures are consolidated,except where noted.Consolidated figures are shown for Canada,New Zealand,and the United States after partial consolidation adjustmen

82、ts were applied.Figures for China,Japan,Mexico,and South Korea are not consolidated.Source:OECD;Federal Reserve Board;CEIC;national statistics offices;World Bank;McKinsey Global Institute analysisReal estateEquitiesOther assets12.31.41.40.21.70.51.71.51.92.12.72.31.60.21.31.10.20.92.31.22.31.31.40.6

83、4.2DebtOther liabilities3.93.63.43.33.33.02.92.72.22.12.01.91.91.71.31.31.20.90.40.30.60.80.92.31.5McKinsey&Company8McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility China has recorded some of the most rapid increases in real estate prices alongside its property boom.The country h

84、as experienced very significant GDP growth and a sizable expansion in other real assets,largely reflecting infrastructure,but also inventories of unfinished or unsold property.Japan experienced its peak before the collapse of its famous bubble in 1991 and has not fully recovered since.Many European

85、economies have also experienced a rapid rise.In the United States,national net worth declined materially relative to GDP in the 1980s during a rapid monetary tightening cycle and the savings and loan crisis before rapidly rising again in the run-up to the global financial crisis.US household wealth

86、rose much faster than national net worth and kept rising,also after the global financial crisis.The reason is that,in contrast to national wealth,household wealth includes equity assets,which rose rapidly in price,but excludes rising public and foreign debt.Only a limited number of countries experie

87、nced a contraction in net worth relative to GDP over the past two decades.Greece,Ireland,and Portugal all matched the global rise until the global financial crisis and subsequent eurozone crisis,which hit them hard.These crises turned previous real estate price increases into sharp declines,and larg

88、e increases in public and foreign debt were needed to stabilize these economies.While Italy and Spain also experienced crises at this time,over the course of two decades their net worth still expanded relative to GDP.In addition to property price growth,several economies,including Denmark,Finland,th

89、e Netherlands,and Norway,also experienced rapid expansion in their net international investment position.For Norway,this reflected its sovereign wealth fund.For Denmark and the Netherlands,it reflected their large pension systems,which each grew about 150 percentage points faster than GDP.In Finland

90、,the government and households increased their ownership of foreign mutual funds and equities.Looking at different sectors of the economy,countries including Japan,Mexico,the Netherlands,Spain,the United Kingdom,and the United States transferred large amounts of public wealth to households as they a

91、dded public debt or privatized public assets.Box27 New Zealand excluded;data for financial assets available only until 2020.Australia leads in household net worth relative to GDP due to high land prices.In household wealth,Australia topped the list in our sample at the end of 2021 at 7.1 times GDPmo

92、re than double the ratio in Finland,Norway,or Irelandor about$396,000(Exhibit6).Note that these are average levels,and there is large inequality among households.The value of land is the largest factor,ranging from well below one times GDP in countries like Finland and Mexico to almost four times GD

93、P in Australia,Spain,and New Zealand.Canada,China,Denmark,Sweden,and the United States stand out for the largest value of household equity assets relative to GDP(where this includes nonlisted and owner-operator firms).7 Pension assets are particularly large in Australia,Denmark,the Netherlands,the U

94、nited Kingdom,and the United States,countries where pension funds have been established as attractive(or mandatory)savings vehicles.In Japan,which has had decades of monetary stimulus and near-zero interest rates,households stand out for their large holdings of currency and deposits.9McKinsey Global

95、 Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Exhibit 6CountryReal assetsFinancial assetsLiabilities3967.12716.62966.53216.24256.12786.11166.03036.03465.93655.72645.62335.43445.32585.21865.23015.12895.02634.51394.5753.82363.01643.01132.82552.411775.81.11.11.30.70.50.90.61.00.71.10.80.61.01.1

96、0.61.10.80.50.60.21.10.40.80.30.8Australia leads the world in household net worth relative to GDP due to high land prices.1Includes machinery and equipment,IP products,inventories,cultivated biological resources,mineral and energy reserves,other natural resources,and other intangibles.2Includes othe

97、r financial assets including monetary gold and SDRs,insurance pensions,derivatives and options,other accounts receivable,and investment fund shares.3Same as other financial assets.4Net worth equals real assets plus financial assets minus liabilities.5Denmark land was adjusted based on OECD home pric

98、e index,given land stock valuation reported in Denmarks national accounts undershoots home price growth in Denmark.6Weighted average(relative to GDP)of countries in the sample.7Based on total world GDP,including countries inside and outside our sample.Source:OECD;Federal Reserve Board;CEIC;national

99、statistics offices;World Bank;McKinsey Global Institute analysisHousehold sector balance sheets across countries,consolidated data,GDP multiple,2021 snapshot2.62.83.32.24.62.53.83.33.83.01.73.62.41.24.33.32.23.92.02.21.61.31.51.33.5NorwayAustraliaSpainNew Zealand2.7NetherlandsItalyCanadaSouth KoreaU

100、nited StatesChinaBelgiumJapanDenmark5United KingdomPortugal3.4SwedenAustria3.1GermanyGreeceMexicoFinlandCentral and Eastern Europe3.5Ireland1.8Total62.95.25.05.14.13.72.23.4France3.84.32.32.12.83.22.13.43.42.11.52.5LandOther real assets1Dwellings and buildingsEquity assetsCurrency and depositsInsura

101、nce pensionsOther financial assets2DebtOther financial liabilities3Household net worth per capita,PPP,$thousandMcKinsey&CompanyNet worth410McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Debt and equity liabilities have expanded relative to GDP since 2000 and are now higher than

102、 before the global financial crisis From 2000 to 2021,global corporate equity liabilitiesincluding those of privately held firmsrose by 101 percentage points relative to GDP to more than two times GDP.US equities were a primary driver.Notably,China has an even larger ratio of equity liabilities to G

103、DP.Debt levels are also high by historical standards,exposing economies to the risks of higher debt service costs,deleveraging,and financial fragilities as interest rates rise.Since 2000,debt has grown by about$200 trillion globally,or by 74 percentage points relative to GDP(Exhibit7).8In the United

104、 States,debt relative to GDP has risen by about 95 percentage points since 2000approximately$45 trillion of additional debtand is now higher than at its peak before the global financial crisis.Government debt grew by about 0.7 times GDP during this period,particularly in response to the financial cr

105、isis and the pandemic.Household debt has fallen from its peak relative to GDP,but it is still higher than in the early 2000s before the run-up to the global financial crisis began.The same is true for financial corporations.In Europe(our sample includes 16 member states of the European Union plus th

106、e United Kingdom),the trajectory and level of total debt have been broadly similar to those of the United States.However,at the sector level,nonfinancial corporations have amassed a higher level of debt than in the United States,while households have been less leveraged relative to GDP(Exhibit8).In

107、China,debt growth took off after the global financial crisis.Nonfinancial corporations,which include state-owned enterprises(outside the financial sector),led the charge,but households also took on debt during a long-running property boom.In Japan,following the 1989 crisis,private-sector debt declin

108、ed relative to GDP while public debt increased rapidly in repeated attempts to stabilize and stimulate the economy.While the direction of travel was universal,the amount of debt and broader financial liability growth relative to GDP varied widely(Exhibit9).Growth in liabilities exceeded two times GD

109、P in Canada,China,Denmark,Ireland,Japan,Sweden,and the United States.Looking only at debt outside the financial sector relative to GDP,growth was fastest in Greece,China,and France at 1.6,1.5,and 1.3 times GDP,respectively.The ratio of net new debt for each dollar of net new investment exceeded a fa

110、ctor of three in Greece,Italy,Portugal,and the United Kingdom.8 A notable spike in 2020 partly reflected denominator effects as GDP contracted during the pandemic.These numbers exclude the debt liabilities of financial institutionsthat is,the bonds they raise from other sectorsbut not the debt secur

111、ities they hold as assets;financial-sector debt is about 20 percent of total global debt at market value.Debt levels are also high by historical standards,exposing economies to the risks of higher debt service costs,deleveraging,and financial fragilities as interest rates rise.11McKinsey Global Inst

112、itute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Exhibit 71990950.51.02.001.52020152.5103.05.0053.54.04.520000.51990020202.0151.01.5102.55.00520003.54.0954.53.0In 2021,liabilities and debt were higher relative to GDP than they were beforethe global financial crisis.Nominal(par)values of debt liabili

113、ties relative to nominal GDP,199020211Debt liabilities;excludes financial corporations.Note:The global average is an extrapolation derived from a weighted average of 30 countries based on GDP comprising 77%of global GDP.Source:OECD;Federal Reserve Board;CEIC;national statistics offices;World Bank;Wo

114、rld Inequality Database;McKinsey Global Institute analysisTotal debt liabilities by country;sector breakdown follows1+97Japan+160China+70Europe(incl.United Kingdom)+95United States+74Average2000 vs 2021Percentage pointsEquity liabilities by country1Nonfinancial corporations,including unlisted firms+

115、109Japan+75China+34Europe(incl.United Kingdom)+128United States+101AverageMcKinsey&Company12McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Exhibit 8Debt grew from 2000 to 2021 across sectors in China,Europe,Japan,and the United States.Nominal(par)values of debt liabilities rela

116、tive to nominal GDP,198020211Includes United Kingdom.Source:OECD;Federal Reserve Board;CEIC;national statistics offices;World Bank;World Inequality Database;McKinsey Global Institute analysis20009019801.510202000.51.02.02.53.03.5200019803.50901020200.51.01.52.02.53.00202000.51.01.52.02.53

117、.03.5102.0.5202001.03.51.52.53.0GovernmentsHouseholdsNonfinancial corporationsDebt liabilities by sector,relative to GDPFinancial corporationsChinaEurope1USJapanMcKinsey&Company13McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Exhibit 9CountryLiabilitiesRatio of new d

118、ebt to new investmentGrowth in liabilities relative to GDP and net investment varies significantlyamong countries.Change in multiples,200021(total economy excluding financial sector)Note:The following countries had limited data availability in 2000 and therefore had shorter timelines:Mexico 200321,I

119、reland 200121;South Korea 200821,New Zealand 200720.Source:OECD;Federal Reserve Board;CEIC;national statistics offices;World Bank;McKinsey Global Institute analysis1.71.52.81.32.42.22.53.82.41.51.54.11.21.10.72.63.91.33.80.32.51.12.21.91.9Net new debtEquity liabilities growthOther new liabilitiesAus

120、traliaGreeceJapanUnited StatesIrelandAustriaSwedenChina1.3DenmarkCanadaFrance1.9Spain0.5PortugalUnited KingdomSouth KoreaNorwayMexicoBelgium2.3Italy1.70.2FinlandCentral and Eastern EuropeNew ZealandNetherlandsGermany2.1Global4.22.72.32.31.22.31.71.61.51.41.41.41.31.10.90.20.60.2McKinsey&Company14McK

121、insey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Growth in the global balance sheet accelerated during the pandemicGrowth in wealth and liabilities accelerated sharply in the intense first two years of the pandemicbetween the end of 2019 and the end of 2021as governments took large-

122、scale action to support economic activity.Looking at real assets and net worth,the global economy added$100 trillion to global wealth“on paper”as asset prices soared(Exhibit10).As a result,global wealth relative to GDP grew faster than in any other two-year period in the past 88 years.Meanwhile,debt

123、 and equity liabilities increased by about$50 trillion and$75 trillion,respectively,as governments and central banks stimulated economies.New debt creation accelerated to$3.40 per dollar in net investment,and$39 trillion in new currency and deposits were created.Jorg Greuel/Getty Images Avalon_Studi

124、o/Getty Images15McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Asset price growth added$100trillion to global wealth on paper During the first two years of the pandemic,in 2020 and 2021,the global balance sheet grew at 10 percent annually,compared with about 6 percent per year

125、in the previous two decades.Household net worth grew by about$110 trillion,despite the humanitarian catastrophe and widespread economic hardship caused by the pandemic.While this could be regarded as a positive,the distribution is highly unequal,and the sustainability of this expansion has already b

126、een put to the test in 2022.9 Unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus contributed to accelerating growth in home prices,an equity market boom,and rising currency and deposit holdingsthe mirror image of growing public debt and financial and central bank balance sheets.Household cash holdings grew

127、by$19 trillion.House price indexes in major markets increased steadily during the first two years of the pandemic as mortgage rates reached new lows.The S&P 500 index rose by 16 percent in 2020 and 28 percent in 2021,amid rapid growth in valuations of digital economy firms as lockdowns shifted activ

128、ities online.Across the other sectors of the economy,governments increased debt by$19 trillion at market values in an attempt to stabilize household and corporate income and balance sheets with instruments such as furlough programs,cash transfers,lost revenue compensation,and loan guarantees.Prices

129、of mineral reserves also increased.9 The rise and rise of the global balance sheet:How productively are we using our wealth?McKinsey Global Institute,November 2021.Exhibit 10SectorChange in assetsChange in liabilitiesHouseholdsGovernmentsNonfinancial corporationsFinancial corporationsTotalDuring the

130、 pandemic,net worth growth accelerated,adding$100 trillionto global wealth on paper.Balance sheet expansion by sector,consolidated data,change in$trillion,2042488Real estateCurrency and depositsDebtEquityOther real assetsOther financial assetsOther liabilitiesMcKinsey&CompanyNo

131、te:Total change in sector net worth is calculated as sector change in assets minus sector change in liabilities;growth in financial corporations cash assets is primarily due to deposit assets at central banks,which System of National Accounts standards do not consolidate against central banks deposi

132、t liabilities.Source:OECD;Federal Reserve Board;CEIC;national statistics offices;World Bank;McKinsey Global Institute analysis16McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Nonfinancial corporations raised$15 trillion in new debt to weather the pandemic amid favorable financi

133、ng conditions.Equity valuations,which for corporations sit on the liability side of the balance sheet,rose rapidly.On the asset side,while some commercial property like office and retail suffered at the beginning of the pandemic,net asset value bounced back in some markets by the end of 2020 and con

134、tinued increasing toward the end of 2021.10 The value of inventory expanded by a total of$6.6 trillion.Companies invested in stockpiling as supply chains became less reliable$4 trillion of this came from inventory growth among Chinese firms that included unfinished and unsold buildings.Financial cor

135、porations added$40 trillion in currency and deposits during the two pandemic years alone.Central banks rapidly expanded their balance sheets,injecting money into economies as part of stabilization programs during the crisis.Commercial banks added to money creation by providing more loans and by cred

136、iting the recipients of those loans with newly created cash deposits in return for the new loan obligations.Outside the financial sector,more than$3 of new debt was created for every$1 of net new investment in 2020 and 2021 The world has experienced increased financial deepening.From 2000 to 2021,ne

137、t new debt grew at 1.9 times the rate of net investment,and total financial liabilities,including equity,at 3.8 times that rateeven before including the financial sector.In the first two years of the pandemic,for every dollar of net investment,liabilities grew by a staggering 7.3 times net new inves

138、tment,of which$3.40 was net new debt outside the financial sector(Exhibit11).Finance was seemingly used more for asset transactions at rising valuations than to fund new investment,although the exact links are difficult to parse.10 Analysis of US equity real-estate investment trusts;data from S&P NA

139、V Monitor.Real estate accelerated its rise relative to GDP,most notably in Australia,Austria,Canada,France,NewZealand,and Portugal.17McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Balance sheet growth accelerated across countriesThe broad pattern of accelerated balance sheet gr

140、owth held true across countries(Exhibit12).Real estate accelerated its rise relative to GDP,most notably in Australia,Austria,Canada,France,New Zealand,and Portugal.Equity assets(and corresponding liabilities)grew more than real estate in Denmark,Finland,Sweden,and the United States.Debt grew most r

141、apidly in Canada,France,Greece,Japan,South Korea,Spain,and the United States.Exhibit 11In 2020 and 2021the first two years of the pandemicmore than$3 of new debt was created for every$1 of net investment.Source:OECD;Federal Reserve Board;CEIC;national statistics offices;World Bank;McKinsey Global In

142、stitute analysisTwo-decade overview,200021Focus on the pandemic,201921104 197 350 176 24 454Growth of liabilities outside the financial sectorGrowth of real assets39613 44 92 50 2 10596Growth of real assetsGrowth of liabilities outside the financial sectorGlobal growth and stocks of liabilities and

143、real assets,excluding financial sector,consolidated,$trillionDebtRevaluationEquityOther liabilitiesNet investment1.9xNew debt vs net new investmentMcKinsey&Company3.8xNew liabilities vs net new investment3.4xNew debt vs net new investment7.3xNew liabilities vs net new investment18McKinsey Global Ins

144、titute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Exhibit 12CountryChange in assetsChange in liabilitiesAustraliaCanadaChinaCentral and Eastern EuropeDenmarkFranceGermanyItalyJapanMexicoNetherlandsSouth KoreaSwedenUnited KingdomUnited StatesFinlandGreecePortugalSpainNew ZealandNorwayBelgiumAustriaIr

145、elandTotal1.40.31.70.70.61.90.91.02.00.31.01.01.61.41.21.41.11.71.30.20.70.21.5-0.21.10.31.00.30.50.80.30.20.60.20.40.70.10.30.71.10.50.30.40.30.20.5-0.10.60-0.5Balance sheet growth accelerated across countries.Source:OECD;Federal Reserve Board;CEIC;national statistics offices;World Bank;McKinsey Gl

146、obal Institute analysisBalance sheet expansion by asset type and country,consolidated data,change in net worth/GDP;201921;excludes financial assets and liabilitiesCurrency and depositsDebtReal estateOther financial assetsEquityOther real assetsMcKinsey&CompanyOther liabilities19McKinsey Global Insti

147、tute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Is 2022 a pause or an inflection point in the rise of the global balance sheet?Rising rates and inflation in the first three quarters of 2022 led to volatility and a pause in the multidecade rise of the global balance sheet.In the face of geopolitical

148、and economic turbulence,notably rising inflation and interest rates and declining asset prices,over those quarters,all three interlocking global balance sheets shrank relative to GDP for the first time since the global financial crisis.sommart/Getty Images20McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance s

149、heet 2022:Enter volatility Several factors that drove sustained balance sheet expansion have turned(for now)Significant changes in key macroeconomic indicators occurred in the first three quarters of 2022(Exhibit13).In the third quarter of 2022,global interest rates increased by three percentage poi

150、nts,which is the highest year-on-year increase in more than 40 years.Inflation also reached heights last seen in 1982,with an annual increase of 7 percent.Equities and debt also decreased sharply,as leading equity market indexes fell 30 percent in real terms,the second-greatest decrease since 1980,b

151、ehind only the global financial crisis in 2008.Major bond indexes dropped 19 percent and ended the third quarter of 2022 notably lower than at any other point in the past two decades.Housing prices turned sharply,declining for the first time in ten years by one percentage point after an 8 percent in

152、crease in the previous year.In the first three quarters of 2022,the global balance sheet declined for the first time since the global financial crisisAs the inflation and interest rate shock unfolded,investors became more wary of debt,real estate prices leveled off,and the valuation of equity and de

153、bt securities declined.By the third quarter of 2022,the global balance sheet had registered a decline of about$20 trillion in financial assets and liabilities outside the financial sector(Exhibit14).Note that while the market value of(mostly government and corporate)debt declined by 8 percent(exclud

154、ing financial corporations)as interest rates rose,at par values,debt on the global balance sheet kept expanding by 0.2 times GDP.The balance sheet declined relative to GDP,due to decreases in equities,debt securities,and real estate(in some countries),versus a nominal growth in GDP driven by high in

155、flation rates during 2022.The financial system and financial-sector balance sheets contracted by about 40 and 30 percentage points of GDP,respectively,during the first three quarters of 2022.Net worth fell by 10 percentage points of GDP.As the inflation and interest rate shock unfolded,investors bec

156、ame more wary of debt,real estate prices leveled off,and the valuation of equity and debt securities declined.21McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Exhibit 0203020214Inflection points were evident in 2022 on a range of key macroeconomic indicato

157、rs.1S&P 500 used for equity prices.2Vanguard Total Bond Market Index(consisting of investment-grade US bonds)used for bond prices.Source:OECD;Federal Reserve Board;CEIC;national statistics offices;World Bank;Oxford Economics(OE)database;McKinsey Global Institute analysisChange in core macroeconomic

158、indicators,1980Q3 2022Global inflation,%,averageEquity,1YoY growth,1%(adjusted for inflation)Bond prices,2YoY growth,%,average(adjusted for inflation)Global nominal interest rates,%averageGlobal real estate prices,YoY growth,%,average(adjusted by inflation)Oil prices,YoY growth,%,average(adjusted by

159、 inflation)203000400203040302090520002002020305598020009020303006090120-118-19McKinsey&CompanyValue at Q3 2022XChange in 2022 relative to 202122McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter vola

160、tility Exhibit 14In the first three quarters of 2022,the global balance sheet declined for the first time since the global financial crisis.1Real estate was assumed to grow in line with Oxford Economics(OE)house prices index,plus net investments.2Change in equities linearly estimated based on the 20

161、22E/2021 change in the OE share market prices index.3Change in investment fund shares is estimated similarly to equities,but with an assumption of volume growth in line with 2022E/2021 OE GDP growth estimate.Insurance pensions are estimated similarly to investment fund shares,but with an additional

162、assumption of a 0.503 beta to equities based on global benchmarks.4Debt securities were assumed to grow in line with Q4 2021 to Q2 2022 trend vs GDP;for countries with missing 2022 debt securities data,average of decline trend in other countries vis-vis average GDP growth was applied as a proxy,exce

163、pt for the United States,where market value of federal debt to Q3 2022 was used for government;Vanguard Total Bond Market Index was used for US financial corporations.For China,bond securities were assumed to grow in line with China SP bond index.Source:Oxford Economics(OE)database;MGI Global Balanc

164、e Sheet database;McKinsey Global Banking Pools;Federal Reserve;McKinsey Global Institute analysisMcKinsey&Company5.4x GDP5.0 x GDPHouseholds4.9x GDP2021 balance sheet sizeGovernmentNonfinancial corporationsFinancial corporations2022 balance sheet size5.2x GDP+0.1Equity liabilities of non-financial c

165、orporations declined by 0.4 times GDP at market values.Government debt declined by 0.1 times GDP at market but grew by 0.1 times GDP at par values.Change in global balance sheet in the first three quarters of 2022,multiples of GDPLiabilities(financial sector)Liabilities(households,government,and non

166、financial corporations)Net worth and the real economyNet worthFinancial net worthBalance sheet sizeEquity liabilitiesReal assetsDebt at market pricesOther financial liabilities6.3x GDP6.2x GDPDebt securities growth at par value0.10.20.3The value of equity and debt liabilities that financial institut

167、ions issue to finance themselves has declined at market value(while debt grew by 0.1 times GDP at par values)+0.10.10.40.10.40.30.10.00.30.30.3Declining equity prices meant households lost wealth,while,as a mirror image,corporate equity liabilities declined.23McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance

168、 sheet 2022:Enter volatility The balance sheet contracted in most countries;real assets and net worth in Australia and Sweden felt the most impactWhile broad patterns in the global balance sheet were consistent in 2022,the magnitude of change differed across countries(Exhibit15).Australia,Canada,and

169、 Sweden,where real estate markets had long been considered to be“overheated,”experienced the largest declines in real estate worth relative to nominal GDP.By contrast,rising mineral prices contributed to positive change in net worth in Australia(alongside infrastructure and machinery)and Canada.Exhi

170、bit 15Change in net worthChange in liabilitiesJapanUnited StatesFranceMexicoUnited KingdomAustraliaGermanyChinaCanadaSwedenTotalThe financial balance sheet contracted relative to GDP in most of thecountries in our sample.Source:OECD;Federal Reserve Board;CEIC;national statistics offices;World Bank;M

171、cKinsey Global Institute analysisBalance sheet expansion excluding financial sector,consolidated data,change in GDP multiple,202122E0.30.30.200.10.20.10.10.30.50.1Real estateOther real assetsNet financial worth0.20.50.50.30.10.10.60.30.61.00.4Other financial liabilitiesDebtEquitiesMcKinsey&Company24

172、McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility What is next for economic health and wealth?Scenarios,which will be fleshed out and fully analyzed in a new paper in 2023,suggest four different directions for the relation of the balance sheet to GDP and thus economic health and w

173、ealth in the period to 2030(Exhibit16).Os car Wong/Getty Images25McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Exhibit 16Will the balance sheet resume its rise relative to GDP or start to unwind?Source:McKinsey Global Institute analysisTrendsScenarioReal GDP growthInterest rat

174、esInflation What you need to believeImpact on the balance sheetHistorical precedentThe rise resumesSecular stagnation continues due to aging and inequality with low inflation and negative real ratesResumption in debt and asset pricesand the global balance sheetrising faster than GDPAdvanced economie

175、s 201220Productivity accelerationTechnology and investment accelerate productivity growth and entail positive real interest ratesDebt and asset prices growas does the global balance sheetbut slower than accelerating GDPUS and Europe in the late 1990s and early 2000sInflationary way outPersistent inf

176、lationary pressure from reconfiguration of energy systems,global supply chains,household balance sheets,and company pricing power while macro risks and political pressure limit central bank interventionDebt and asset prices and the global balance sheet grow,but slower than inflationAdvanced economie

177、s in the 1970sAsset price correction and delever-agingPersistent inflationary pressure leads to strong monetary and fiscal tightening and long-run positive real interest ratesAsset prices correct further;deleveraging and debt write-offs are features along with risks to macroeconomic stabilityJapan d

178、uring the 1990s,advanced economies in 200914,Greece in the 2010sBelow last 20 years averageAboveMcKinsey&CompanyIn line26McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility The following pathways are possible with potential for different economies to take differing paths:1.The rise

179、resumes.In this scenario,inflation proves to be transitory and global saving and aging effects return real interest rates,inflation,and real GDP growth to very low levels;secular stagnation continues.In this scenario,a savings glut is stymied by a lack of attractive investment opportunities and is t

180、herefore channeled into existing assets,boosting the values of equity and real estate.Low interest rates encourage further growth in debt.Wealth keeps growing“on paper,”and so do leverage and balance sheet risk,as we have experienced in recent decades.2.Productivity acceleration.In this scenario,the

181、 world economy experiences a persistent acceleration in productivity growth and a reallocation of funds to productive investment.In this scenario,the benefits of rapid digitization and technological advances would,at last,show in GDP growth;energy system reconfiguration would not only lead to greene

182、r and more secure but also,eventually,cheaper energy;and policy changes would help unleash investment in areas like future mobility and affordable housing.Macro-prudential policy helps contain further debt and asset price growth,and global GDP growth outpaces balance sheet growth.Such productivity a

183、cceleration was visible in the United States in the late 1990s,although the balance sheet was much smaller then.3.Inflationary way out.In this scenario,inflationary pressures become entrenched,as high energy prices continue to cascade through the economy;labor market shortages persist,not least due

184、to demographic shifts;expectations become unanchored;and the velocity of money grows.Wages grow faster than productivity,and corporate pricing power allows companies to pass cost increases on to consumers.Central banks would intervene with higher rates,but not enough to get inflation back below 2 pe

185、rcent,as they face financial stability risks,distributional issues,and weak growth.This leads to a decline in the ratio of the global balance sheet to GDP as high inflation leads to fast nominal GDP growth while monetary tightening limits asset price growth and debt formation.This scenario would hav

186、e some parallels with the 1970s stagflation era.4.Asset price correction and deleveraging.In this scenario,central banks battle high inflation with sharply higher interest rates.Highly leveraged sectorsstarting with the public sectortighten belts and attempt to reduce debt burdens,muting growth.Asse

187、t prices contract given high interest rates,rising risk premiums and a dampened growth outlook.Where debt service costs become too large and assets are underwater(that is,their value is lower than the debt held against them),defaults and write-offs or even a financial crisis potentially unfold.This

188、scenario could unfold somewhat in combination with the inflationary way out.It would be somewhat similar to what happened during the tightening cycle in the United States in the 1980s(although the balance sheet was much smaller then)or after the global financial crisis of 2008.Significant variation

189、in scenarios and pathways should be expected for different economic regions that have dissimilar starting points,trajectories,and macroeconomic parameters.For instance,the United States has particularly large balance sheet positions in equity and public debt,and a macroeconomic environment of high i

190、nflation and rapid central bank tightening.The eurozone has relatively high public debt and real estate values,coupled with high inflation and,so far,less central bank tightening than in the United States.China has a large balance sheet in real estate and property debt.The different scenarios that m

191、ay unfold over the next ten years will have different implications for households,governments,and corporations.Will net worth continue to grow faster than GDP,continuing the expansion in the balance sheet observed over the past 20 years,or will productivity catch-up bridge the gap and power growth i

192、n the real economy?Many questions remain to be resolved.27McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility This project was led by Jan Mischke,an MGI partner in Zurich;Sven Smit,Olivia White,and Jonathan Woetzel,McKinsey senior partners and directors of MGI in Amsterdam,San Franc

193、isco,and Los Angeles/Shanghai,respectively;and Eckart Windhagen and MichaelBirshan,McKinsey senior partners in Frankfurt and London,respectively.The project team was led by McKinsey consultant Jorge Sanchez Cumming and included MohammedAboTaleb,RebeccaJ.Anderson,OniBhaumick,AlexanderGreen,SzabolcsKe

194、meny,MaraJessRamirez,and MarioRojas.Arvind Govindarajan provided helpful inspiration.We thank Janet Bush,MGI executive editor,who helped write and edit the paper.We are grateful to our colleague MGI partner Anu Madgavkar for her vital guidance on this topic.We thank Hans-Helmut Kotz,a visiting profe

195、ssor of economics at Harvard University,co-chair of the European Economic Policy Forum at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies,a senior fellow of the Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE,and an MGI adviser.Finally,we want to thank Vasudha Gupta,MGIs manager of editorial operati

196、ons;MarisaCarder and Patrick White,senior graphic designers for MGI;and MGI specialist Tim Beacom.Sven SmitDirector and Chair,McKinsey Global Institute Senior Partner,McKinsey&Company AmsterdamMarco PiccittoDirector,McKinsey Global Institute Senior Partner,McKinsey&Company MilanChris BradleyDirector

197、,McKinsey Global Institute Senior Partner,McKinsey&Company SydneyOlivia WhiteDirector,McKinsey Global Institute Senior Partner,McKinsey&Company San FranciscoKweilin EllingrudDirector,McKinsey Global Institute Senior Partner,McKinsey&Company MinneapolisJonathan WoetzelDirector,McKinsey Global Institu

198、te Senior Partner,McKinsey&Company Los Angeles and ShanghaiDecember 2022Acknowledgments 28McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility Related MGI and McKinsey researchPixels of Progress:A granular look at human development around the world(December 2022)Our world is big and

199、complex,but human progress is still about life on the ground,up close and in detail.This report shares findings from a new dataset that breaks the world down into more than 40,000microregions.Global flows:The ties that bind in an interconnected world(November 2022)Economic and political turbulence h

200、as prompted speculation that the world is already deglobalizing.But the evidence suggests that global integration is here to stay,albeit with nuance.On the cusp of a new era?(October 2022)Current economic and political turbulence could presage the start of a new era that is structurally very differe

201、nt,with a new narrative of progress.The net-zero transition:What it would cost,what it could bring(January 2022)Governments and companies worldwide are pledging to achieve net-zero emissions of greenhouse gases.The report looks at the economic transformation that the transition would entail,estimati

202、ng the changes in demand,capital spending,costs,and jobs for sectors that produce about 85 percent of overall emissions and assessing economic shifts for 69 countries.The rise and rise of the global balance sheet:How productively are we using our wealth?(November2021)The research examines corporate,

203、government,and household balance sheets across economies and reveals a paradox:bricks and mortar make up most of net worth,even as economies turn digital and intangible.Getting tangible about intangibles:The future of growth and productivity?(June 2021)Could investment in intangible assets breathe n

204、ew life into productivity growth and unlock new growth potential?This research explores the correlation between intangibles investment and the performance of sectors,economies,and firms,and examines ways intangible assets can be deployed effectively to drive growth.PLACEHOLDER ONLY!Use Secondary ima

205、ge with Color adjustment treatment,following guidelines.Pixels of Progress:a granular look at human development around the world December 2022November 2022Discussion paperGlobal flows:The ties that bind in an interconnected worldAuthorsJeongmin Seong,ShanghaiOlivia White,San FranciscoJonathan Woetze

206、l,Los Angeles and ShanghaiSven Smit,AmsterdamTiago Devesa,SydneyMichael Birshan,LondonHamid Samandari,New YorkEditorJanet Bush,London October 2022Discussion paperOn the cusp of a new era?AuthorsChris Bradley,SydneyJeongmin Seong,ShanghaiSven Smit,AmsterdamJonathan Woetzel,ShanghaiEditorJanet Bush,Lo

207、ndon January 2022ReportThe net-zero transitionWhat it would cost,what it could bring McKinsey Global Institute in collaboration with McKinsey Sustainability and McKinseys Global Energy&Materials and Advanced Industries PracticesNovember 2021The rise and rise of the global balance sheetHow productive

208、ly are we using our wealth?Getting tangible about intangiblesThe future of growth and productivity?Discussion paperJune 2021AuthorsEric Hazan,Paris Sven Smit,Amsterdam Jonathan Woetzel,Los Angeles and Shanghai Biljana Cvetanovski,London Mekala Krishnan,Boston Brian Gregg,San Francisco Jesko Perrey,D

209、sseldorf Klemens Hjartar,Copenhagen29McKinsey Global Institute|Global balance sheet 2022:Enter volatility McKinsey Global Institute December 2022 Copyright McKinsey&Company Designed by the McKinsey Global I McKinsey_MGI McKinseyGlobalInstitute McKinseyGlobalInstituteSubscribe to MGIs podcast,Forward Thinking:mck.co/forwardthinkingCover image Hajohoos/Getty Images

友情提示

1、下载报告失败解决办法
2、PDF文件下载后,可能会被浏览器默认打开,此种情况可以点击浏览器菜单,保存网页到桌面,就可以正常下载了。
3、本站不支持迅雷下载,请使用电脑自带的IE浏览器,或者360浏览器、谷歌浏览器下载即可。
4、本站报告下载后的文档和图纸-无水印,预览文档经过压缩,下载后原文更清晰。

本文(麦肯锡(McKinsey):2022年全球资产负债表研究报告-进入波动期(英文版)(38页).pdf)为本站 (Kelly Street) 主动上传,三个皮匠报告文库仅提供信息存储空间,仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理,对上载内容本身不做任何修改或编辑。 若此文所含内容侵犯了您的版权或隐私,请立即通知三个皮匠报告文库(点击联系客服),我们立即给予删除!

温馨提示:如果因为网速或其他原因下载失败请重新下载,重复下载不扣分。
会员购买
客服

专属顾问

商务合作

机构入驻、侵权投诉、商务合作

服务号

三个皮匠报告官方公众号

回到顶部