1、2023 Trade Policy Agenda A N D 2022 Annual Reportof the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements ProgramUnited States Trade RepresentativeHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH FOREWORD The 2023 Trade Policy Agenda and 2022 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreement

2、s Program are submitted to the Congress pursuant to Section 163 of the Trade Act of 1974,as amended(19 U.S.C.2213).Chapter IV and Annex III of this document meet the requirements of Sections 122 and 124 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act with respect to the World Trade Organization.This report incl

3、udes an annex listing trade agreements entered into by the United States since 1984.This report also includes an annex on U.S.trade in 2022,for which goods trade data by country are for full year 2022 and full-year services data by country are for 2021(latest data available).The Office of the United

4、 States Trade Representative(USTR)is responsible for the preparation of this document and gratefully acknowledges the contributions of all USTR staff to its writing and production.We note,in particular,the contributions of Laura Buffo,Teresa Howes,Daniel Leibowitz,Amy Morris,and Andrew ONeil.Appreci

5、ation is extended to partner Trade Policy Staff Committee agencies.March 2023 LIST OF FREQUENTLY USED ACRONYMS AD.Antidumping AfCFTA.African Continental Free Trade Area AGOA.African Growth and Opportunity Act APEC.Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation APEP.American Partnership for Economic Prosperity AS

6、EAN.Association of Southeast Asian Nations CAFTA-DR.Dominican RepublicCentral AmericaUnited States Free Trade Agreement CBERA.Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act CBI.Caribbean Basin Initiative CBP.U.S.Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection CVD.Countervailing Duty DOL.U.S.Dep

7、artment of Labor DSB.WTO Dispute Settlement Body DSU.WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding DST.Digital Services Tax EU.European Union FOIA.Freedom of Information Act GATT.General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GATS.General Agreement on Trade in Services GDP.Gross Domestic Product GI.Geographical Indi

8、cation GPA.WTO Agreement on Government Procurement GSP.Generalized System of Preferences ICTIME.Interagency Center on Trade Implementation,Monitoring,and Enforcement ILO.International Labor Organization IP.Intellectual Property IPEF.Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity ITA.WTO Information

9、Technology Agreement KORUS.United StatesKorea Free Trade Agreement MENA.Middle East and North Africa MFN.Most-Favored-Nation MOU.Memorandum of Understanding NAFTA.North American Free Trade Agreement OECD.Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development SBA.U.S.Small Business Administration SCM.

10、WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures SME.Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise SPS.Sanitary and Phytosanitary TAA.Trade Adjustment Assistance TBT.Technical Barriers to Trade TFA.WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement TIFA.Trade and Investment Framework Agreement TPRG.Trade Policy Review Grou

11、p TPSC.Trade Policy Staff Committee TRIMS.Trade-Related Investment Measures TRIPS.Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights TRQ.Tariff-Rate Quota USAID.U.S.Agency for International Development USITC.U.S.International Trade Commission USMCA.United StatesMexicoCanada Agreement USTR.United

12、States Trade Representative WTO.World Trade Organization TABLE OF CONTENTS THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA.1 I.INTRODUCTION.1 II.ADVANCING A WORKER-CENTERED TRADE POLICY.2 A.Standing up for Workers Rights.2 B.Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustainable Environmental Practices.5 C.

13、Supporting U.S.Agriculture.8 D.Bolstering Supply Chain Resilience.9 III.RE-ALIGNING THE U.S.-CHINA TRADE RELATIONSHIP.10 IV.ENGAGING WITH KEY TRADING PARTNERS AND MULTILATERIAL INSTITUTIONS.11 A.Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity.12 B.Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity.13 C.Wor

14、ld Trade Organization.13 D.Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.14 E.Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.15 F.Bilateral Initiatives.15 1.European Union.15 2.Taiwan.16 3.Kenya.16 4.India.17 5.Japan.17 6.Korea.17 7.Singapore.18 8.United Kingdom.18 9.African Continental Free Trade Area.

15、18 V.PROMOTING CONFIDENCE IN TRADE POLICY THROUGH ENFORCEMENT.19 VI.PROMOTING EQUITABLE,INCLUSIVE,AND DURABLE TRADE POLICY AND EXPANDING STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT.20 A.Promoting Equitable,Inclusive,and Durable Trade Policy.20 B.Engagement and Consultation with Partners and Stakeholders.21 THE 2022 ANNU

16、AL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM.1 I.AGREEMENTS,NEGOTIATIONS,AND OTHER INITIATIVES.1 A.New Trade Initiatives.1 1.Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(Pillar I:Trade).1 2.United StatesTaiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade.1 3.United StatesKenya Strategic Trade an

17、d Investment Partnership.2 4.United StatesEuropean Union Trade and Technology Council.2 5.Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity.3 6.African Continental Free Trade Area Memorandum of Understanding.4 B.Free Trade Agreements in Force.4 1.Australia.4 2.Bahrain.4 3.Central America and the Dominica

18、n Republic.5 4.Chile.11 5.Colombia.11 6.Israel.13 7.Jordan.13 8.Korea.15 9.Mexico and Canada.15 10.Morocco.18 11.Oman.19 12.Panama.19 13.Peru.20 14.Singapore.22 C.Other Agreements and Trade-Related Initiatives.22 1.The Americas.22 2.Europe and the Middle East.24 3.Japan,Republic of Korea,and the Asi

19、a-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum.27 4.China,Hong Kong,Taiwan,and Mongolia.29 5.Southeast Asia and the Pacific.30 6.Sub-Saharan Africa.32 7.South and Central Asia.34 D.Preference Programs.35 1.Generalized System of Preferences.35 2.African Growth and Opportunity Act.36 3.Haitian Hemispheric Oppor

20、tunity Through Partnership Encouragement Act.38 4.Nepal Trade Preference Program.38 5.Caribbean Basin Initiative.38 II.TRADE ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.41 A.Overview.41 B.Section 301.43 1.Chinas Acts,Policies,and Practices Related to Technology Transfer,Intellectual Property,and Innovation.44 i.United S

21、tatesChina Economic and Trade Agreement.46 ii.Product Exclusions.46 2.European Union Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products(Hormones).47 3.Digital Services Taxes.49 i.France Digital Services Taxes.49 ii.Other Digital Services Taxes.49 4.Enforcement of U.S.WTO Rights in European Union Large Civil

22、 Aircraft Dispute.54 5.Vietnams Acts,Policies,and Practices Related to the Import and Use of Illegal Timber.56 6.Vietnams Acts,Policies,and Practices Related to Currency Valuation.57 C.Section 201.58 D.WTO and FTA Enforcement.59 E.Other Monitoring and Enforcement Activities.112 1.Preference Programs

23、 Monitoring and Enforcement.112 2.Special 301.115 3.Section 1377 Review of Telecommunications Agreements.117 4.Section 337.117 5.Antidumping Actions.119 6.Countervailing Duty Actions.120 7.Subsidies Monitoring and Other Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Enforcement.121 III.OTHER TRADE ACTIVITIES.1

24、23 A.Promoting Equitable,Inclusive and Durable Trade Policy and Expanding Stakeholder Engagement.123 1.Overview of Intersectional and Interconnected Strategies and Actions.123 2.Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities.124 3.Advancing Gender Equity and Equality and Womens Econ

25、omic Empowerment in Trade Policy.127 4.Strengthening Data to Consider and Improve the Distributional Effects of Trade.131 5.Expanded and Consistent Inclusive Engagement.132 B.Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Initiative.133 C.Agriculture and Trade.137 1.Opening Export Markets for American Agricultur

26、e.137 2.Bilateral and Regional Activities.141 3.Agriculture in the World Trade Organization.145 4.Enforcing Trade Agreements for American Agriculture.146 D.Digital Trade and Services.146 E.Intellectual Property.147 F.Manufacturing and Trade.149 G.Trade and the Environment.151 1.Free Trade Agreements

27、 and Bilateral Activities.152 2.Regional,Multilateral,and International Organization Engagement.158 H.Trade and Labor.159 1.Free Trade Agreements and Bilateral Activities.160 2.Preference Programs.165 3.Regional,Multilateral,and International Organization Engagement.166 4.Combating Forced Labor in G

28、lobal Supply Chains.168 5.Trade Adjustment Assistance.170 I.Trade Capacity Building.172 1.The Enhanced Integrated Framework.172 2.U.S.Trade-Related Assistance under the World Trade Organization Framework.172 3.Trade Capacity Building Initiatives for Africa.174 4.Free Trade Agreements.175 5.Standards

29、 Alliance.175 J.Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.176 1.Trade Committee Work Program.176 2.Trade Committee Dialogue with Non-OECD Members.177 3.Other OECD Work Related to Trade.178 IV.THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION.179 A.Introduction.179 B.WTO Negotiations and Dialogues.180 1.Joint

30、 Statement Initiatives.180 2.Other Negotiations.182 C.General Council Activities.183 D.Council for Trade in Goods.184 1.Committee on Agriculture.184 2.Committee on Antidumping Practices.185 3.Committee on Customs Valuation.185 4.Committee on Import Licensing.185 5.Committee on Market Access.186 6.Co

31、mmittee on Rules of Origin.186 7.Committee on Safeguards.186 8.Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.187 9.Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.187 10.Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade.188 11.Committee on Trade Facilitation.188 12.Committee on Trade-Related Investment

32、 Measures.189 13.Committee on Participants on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products.189 14.Working Party on State Trading Enterprises.189 E.Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.190 F.Council for Trade in Services.190 1.Committee on Trade in Financial

33、Services.191 2.Working Party on Domestic Regulation,and Joint Statement Initiative on Services Domestic Regulation.191 3.Working Party on General Agreement on Trade in Services Rules.191 4.Committee on Specific Commitments.191 G.Other General Council Bodies and Activities.191 1.Committee on Trade an

34、d Environment.191 2.Committee on Trade and Development.192 3.Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions.193 4.Committee on Budget,Finance and Administration.193 5.Committee on Regional Trade Agreements.193 6.Accessions to the World Trade Organization.194 7.Working Group on Trade,Debt and Finance.

35、195 8.Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology.195 9.Work Program on Electronic Commerce.196 H.Dispute Settlement Understanding.196 I.Trade Policy Review Body.198 J.Plurilateral Agreements.200 1.Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft.200 2.Committee on Government Procurement.200 3.Information

36、 Technology Agreement Committee.201 V.TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENT.203 A.Policy Coordination.203 B.Transparency and Public Input.204 1.Transparency.204 2.Public Outreach.205 3.The Trade Advisory Committee System.206 4.Tribal,State and Local Government Relations.209 5.Freedom of Information Act.210 C.Con

37、gressional Consultations.210 ANNEX I:U.S.TRADE IN 2022.213 I.2022 Overview.215 II.Exports.217 A.U.S.Goods Exports.218 B.U.S.Services Exports.219 III.Imports.219 A.U.S.Goods Imports.219 B.U.S.Services Imports.221 IV.The U.S.Trade Balance.222 ANNEX II:U.S.TRADE-RELATED AGREEMENTS AND DECLARATIONS.223

38、I.Agreements That Have Entered Into Force.225 II.Agreements That Have Been Negotiated,But Have Not Yet Entered Into Force.253 III.Other Trade-Related Agreements,Understandings and Declarations.255 ANNEX III:BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE WTO.269 THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA THE PRESIDENTS

39、2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA|1 THE PRESIDENTS TRADE POLICY AGENDA I.INTRODUCTION The Biden Administration promised to build the economy from the bottom up and the middle out,and we are doing just that.Unemployment is at its lowest rate in over 50 years.This Administration has seen more jobs created in t

40、wo years than any other Administration has seen in four.Manufacturing is rebounding faster than it has in almost 40 years,while wages are rising,and rising even faster for lower-and middle-income workers.The American Rescue Plan,the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law,the CHIPS and Science Act,and the Inf

41、lation Reduction Act were historic investments in America,and they are working.The Biden Administration continues to believe that trade canand shouldbe a force for good.Done right,and in coordination with other policy disciplines,it can grow the middle class,address inequality,tackle the climate cri

42、sis,and level the playing field by promoting fair competition.We remain committed to upholding a fair and open global trading systemone that puts working families first,raises living standards,ensures full employment,and promotes sustainable development.We are continuing to rewrite the story on trad

43、e by bringing more people into the process and developing policies and initiatives that are resilient and sustainable and create broad-based growth.In 2023,our trade agenda will continue to focus on unlocking new opportunities for American workers and familieswhile also supporting and strengthening

44、the middle class,driving decarbonization,and creating good-paying jobs across the American economy.In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russias brutal,illegal attack on Ukraine,it also means fortifying relationships with our partners and allies and strengthening critical supply chains to wi

45、thstand shocks and disruptions to the system and to defend democratic values.To realize this vision,we are continuing to forge the partnerships necessary to update and enforce the rules governing the global economy and trade.In the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere,the United States is leading

46、 with a positive economic vision through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity.With the European Union,we continue to deepen our relationship and intensify cooperation on pressing challenges,such as the Peoples Republic of Chinas(PRC)

47、non-market policies and practices.Further,we are intensifying negotiations on a first-of-its-kind trade arrangement to address non-market excess capacity and the greenhouse gas emissions of imported steel and aluminum.We are also continuing to build out the Trade and Technology Council,and the Trade

48、 and Labor Dialogue under its umbrella,to pursue shared priorities,including supply chain resilience,challenges posed by non-market economies,inclusive digital trade,and the elimination of forced labor.Additionally,in 2022,we kicked off ambitious initiatives with Taiwan and Kenya to deepen our trade

49、 and economic relationships with both partners,and we aim to make rapid progress on both initiatives in 2023.At the World Trade Organization(WTO),after working with WTO Members to deliver key outcomes during the Twelfth Ministerial Conference,the United States is driving the conversation on transfor

50、ming the institution to be more responsive to the rapidly changing global economic environment and to the needs of everyday people.Moreover,following the successful U.S.Africa Leaders Summit last year,the Administration will continue to strengthen our partnerships with the African continent and to s

51、upport regional and continental integration efforts,with the well-being of workers,women,and youth to inform our work.2|THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA Our Administration is also fully committed to continued enforcement of our existing trade agreements to hold our trading partners accountabl

52、e.This includes utilizing the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreements Rapid Response Mechanism to raise labor standards across North America and drive a race to the top.We are also using other mechanisms to open,maintain,and enhance access to markets and address unfair trade practices that harm our w

53、orkers and businesses and ensure that they enjoy the benefits that they were promised.Finally,a vital element of our effort to build an inclusive trade policy agenda is understanding the effects of our policies on underrepresented and underserved workers and communities,and ensuring that they have a

54、 say in how our policies are designed and implemented going forward.We know that an important part of making trade work for all Americans is having a better understanding of the effects of past trade policies.At the Administrations request,the United States International Trade Commission(USITC)condu

55、cted a first-of-its-kind study of the distributional effects of goods and services trade and trade policy on U.S.workers.Through an extensive information gathering process,the investigation brought to light what many already knew:while trade has benefited many,devastating effects have been concentra

56、ted in certain communities.The report also illustrated the gaps around data,and particularly disaggregated data,that can further inform a more equitable trade policy.USTR will continue working with the USITC and other partners to design trade policy that addresses inequality and supports the goals a

57、nd aspirations of all Americans.USTR will also continue to implement its Equity Action Plan to ensure that racial and gender equity is embedded in its ecosystem.By placing workers and everyday people at the center of our trade policy,the Biden Administration will continue to use trade as a force for

58、 good,to build a durable and fair tomorrow by pursuing resilience,sustainability,and inclusive prosperity.II.ADVANCING A WORKER-CENTERED TRADE POLICY A.Standing up for Workers Rights Trading partners should compete on the merits,not on the basis of exploitation.Through the Biden Administrations effo

59、rts to promote fair competition,we will continue to level the playing field for American workers.One of the Administrations top priorities is effective enforcement of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement(USMCA).The USMCA includes the strongest labor provisions in any trade agreement ever,as wel

60、l as a ground-breaking enforcement tool,the rapid response mechanism(RRM).The RRM allows the United States to quickly take action and target specific facilities in Mexico where workers are being denied their rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining.From March 2022 through February

61、2023,the United States successfully used the mechanism to secure concrete wins for workers at four different facilities.In April 2022,Mexican labor union Sindicato Nacional Independiente de Trabajadores de Industrias y de Servicios Movimiento 20/32(SNITIS)and a U.S.-based policy organization filed a

62、n RRM petition concerning Panasonic Automotive Systems,an automotive parts producer in Reynosa,Mexico.The petition alleged that workers at the Reynosa facility were being denied the right of free association and collective bargaining.At the United States request,the facility took several actions,inc

63、luding renouncing a collective bargaining agreement it had signed with a union that lacked lawful bargaining authority;reimbursing workers for dues the company had deducted from workers paychecks on that unions behalf;offering reinstatement and backpay to twenty-six workers who were allegedly termin

64、ated for participating in union activity;and reimbursing workers for wages unpaid as a result of a work stoppage at the facility.THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA|3 SNITIS has since won a representation election at the facility and negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that includes a s

65、ubstantial wage increase.In May 2022,the United Automobile,Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America(UAW),the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations(AFL-CIO),and Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros,Metalrgicos,Sidergicos y Similares de la Repblica

66、Mexicana(SNTMMSSRM)filed an RRM petition concerning Teksid Hierro,an automotive parts producer in Frontera,Mexico.The petition alleged that workers at the Teksid Hierro automotive parts facility were being denied the right of free association and collective bargaining.The facility took several actio

67、ns,including providing access to the facility for the purpose of carrying out worker representation,paying union dues withheld from workers and owed to the independent union,and reinstating and offering back pay to thirty-six workers.SNTMMSSRM has since prevailed in a union representational challeng

68、e and continues to represent workers at the facility for purposes of bargaining.In June 2022,La Liga Sindical Obrera Mexicana(LSOM),an independent Mexican union,and Comit Fronterizo de Obreras,a labor organization,filed an RRM petition alleging that workers at the VU automotive components facility i

69、n Piedras Negras were being denied the right of free association and collective bargaining.As a result of the review,the Government of Mexico and the company took several actions that remediated identified issues,including educating workers on their rights,providing training to company personnel,fac

70、ilitating a written commitment from the employer to remain neutral in a future union representation election,and holding a supervised union representation election on August 31,2022,in which VU workers voted in favor of LSOM.Despite this facility taking positive actions in 2022,there appears to be b

71、acksliding and new denials of rights at the facility.Therefore,on January 30,2023,the United States asked Mexico to conduct a second review.In September 2022,the AFL-CIO,United Steelworkers,and Sindicato Independiente de las y los Trabajadores Libres y Democrticos de Saint Gobain Mxico,a Mexican uni

72、on,filed an RRM petition regarding the Saint Gobain Mxico,S.A.de C.V.Nicolas Bravo 8,a facility in Cuautla,Mexico that exports automotive glass.The petition contained allegations regarding denials of workers rights of free association and collective bargaining pertaining to a collective bargaining a

73、greement approval vote in July 2022 and an upcoming vote to determine which union would represent the workers in collective bargaining agreement negotiations.Workers at the facility elected a new,independent union to represent them in collective bargaining agreement negotiations,which contributed to

74、 the resolution of the concerns in the petition and resulted in another historic win for workers.These five actions show that we can work with trading partners to promote workers rights and workplace democracy and form a strong foundation for our ongoing work to advance labor rights in 2023.USTR,wor

75、king with the U.S.Department of Labor and other agencies that make up the USMCA Interagency Labor Committee for Monitoring and Enforcement,will continue to support workers and work with the Government of Mexico to closely monitor situations that may involve violations of workers rights.In addition t

76、o our work under the USMCA,the Administration undertook several efforts that will provide the foundation for further action in 2023 to advance workers rights and raise labor standards to create sustainable growth,including on addressing forced labor.On January 25,2022,USTR announced that it will dev

77、elop its first-ever focused trade strategy to combat forced labor.Following that announcement,on July 6,2022,USTR published a Federal Register notice seeking public comments on the strategy.USTR is conducting a thorough interagency review of USTRs existing trade policies and tools to combat forced l

78、abor,to determine areas that may need strengthening,and to identify gaps that need to be filled.USTR will use this analysis to establish objectives,priorities,new tools,and key action items to advance development 4|THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA of the strategy.The strategy will bring atten

79、tion to the U.S.Government toolkit to combat forced labor,which has been cultivated over the last twenty-five years to prevent this harmful practice,as well as to protect and provide appropriate remedies for those affected by forced labor,through trade policy and engagement.As part of the Administra

80、tions commitment to inclusive trade policy development,USTR has sought to maximize input from stakeholders,including labor organizations,civil society,survivors of forced labor and human trafficking,and the private sector.In September 2022,the G7 Trade Ministers reiterated their joint commitment to

81、use trade policy to combat forced labor and build upon the 2021 G7 Trade Ministers Statement on Forced Labor expressing their shared interest in tackling forced labor and child labor in global supply chains.The United States will continue to work with our trading partners through multilateral fora t

82、o highlight,and spur progress on,the scourge of forced labor.In addition to our work in the G7,the Administration is working bilaterally with trading partners to address forced labor in supply chains.In September 2022,we launched the Trade and Labor Dialogue with the European Union.Through this new

83、mechanism,we are convening labor,business,and government representatives from both sides of the Atlantic to focus on eliminating forced labor in global supply chains and understanding the impacts of digital trade on workers.In January 2023,the United States also signed a Memorandum of Cooperation wi

84、th Japan to launch a Task Force on the Promotion of Human Rights and International Labor Standards in Supply Chains under the U.S.-Japan Partnership on Trade.Since the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act was enacted on December 23,2022,as a member of the U.S.Department of Homeland Security-led(DHS)Fo

85、rced Labor Enforcement Task Force(FLETF),USTR continues to work with DHS to monitor and block the importation of goods made in whole,or in part,with forced labor.As a result,on June 17,2022,the FLETF published the Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined,Produced,or Manufactured with Force

86、d Labor in the Peoples Republic of China,which demonstrates our Administrations commitment to fully enforce our laws prohibiting the import of goods made by forced labor.It also highlights our resolve to fight against the economic exploitation and human rights abuses committed against Uyghurs and ot

87、her ethnic and religious minorities in the Peoples Republic of China(PRC).Eliminating forced labor will also require cooperation and leadership from the private sector.In July 2021,the United States issued an updated advisory for U.S.businesses whose supply chains run through the Xinjiang Uyghur Aut

88、onomous Region,China,where the PRC and associated enterprises continue to subject Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities to forced labor.Signatory agencies of the advisory regularly engage with the private sector on this guidance.The United States will continue to work with industry to ri

89、d supply chains of forced labor and hold bad actors accountable.The Biden Administration is also bringing its worker-centered trade policy and commitment to fair competition to other multilateral fora and to bilateral discussions.During 2022,the United States continued to support including labor iss

90、ues in the next generation of trade agreements by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC)economies.To further this goal,USTR established an APEC work program in the Committee on Trade and Investment examining the importance of multi-stakeholder engagement in trade policy and proposed a project o

91、n labor-related technical assistance and capacity building provisions in regional trade arrangements and free trade agreements.In addition,the United States supported efforts to promote the importance of multi-stakeholder engagement and hosted an APEC Economic Committee Panel on Tripartism based on

92、an APEC policy report on the Future of Work.THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA|5 As the host of the APEC this year,the United States will build on this progress and work with other APEC economies to drive the conversation on making trade work for workers,consumers,and businesses throughout our

93、region.In March 2022,USTR and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)organized the second United StatesASEAN Trade and Labor Dialogue.The dialogue focused on inclusive approaches to trade and economic recovery,improving working conditions and business competitiveness,and workforce developm

94、ent and labor protections in a digital era.Further,USTR continued to support U.S.Government efforts to address forced labor associated with fishing,including in the context of work with ASEAN governments,industry,and other stakeholders.The United States continues to call upon other regional and mult

95、ilateral organizations to consider how they can more effectively hear from workers and be relevant in addressing the needs of regular people.In 2023 and beyond,the United States will continue advocating for workers rights on the world stage and collaborating with our partners and allies to improve o

96、utcomes for workers across the globe.B.Accelerating Decarbonization and Promoting Sustainable Environmental Practices Combating the climate crisis and promoting environmentally sustainable practices continue to be top priorities for the Biden Administration.Trade is an indispensable tool to achieve

97、these goals.In 2023,the United States will continue to use a range of available tools,including new and existing trade initiatives,to seek higher levels of environmental protection from our trading partners and promote decarbonization efforts necessary to limit global temperature increase to 1.5 deg

98、rees Celsius.New Agreements and Approaches to Advance Our Climate Goals and Protect the Environment Collaborating with key trading partners to forge new partnerships and create new approaches is critical to promote a sustainable trade agenda.In October 2021,the United States and the EU launched nego

99、tiations on the worlds first emissions-based sectoral arrangement on steel and aluminum trade,known as the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum(Global Arrangement).This will be a paradigm-shifting model that drives decarbonization while limiting anti-competitive and non-market practi

100、ces that contribute to worldwide excess capacity.It will drive investment in green steel and aluminum production in the United States,Europe,and around the world,reducing emissions in two of the most carbon-intensive industrial sectors and ensuring a competitive U.S.steel and aluminum industry for d

101、ecades to come.In 2023,we will intensify our work to conclude negotiations of the Global Arrangement.This arrangement will be proof that trade policy is an important part of our climate agenda,and that effective climate action canand mustsupport good-paying,quality jobs.Another example is our work w

102、ith Canada on solar panels.In July 2022,the United States and Canada signed a memorandum of understanding to settle a dispute on trade in solar products under the USMCA.The MOU also contains a mechanism to ensure that solar product imports from Canada do not undermine the effectiveness of the existi

103、ng U.S.safeguard measure on imports of solar products.In 2023,we will use this MOU to promote greater deployment of solar energy in the United States using products from one of our closest allies,and foster a more resilient North American supply chain for clean energy products made without forced la

104、bor.6|THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA Through regional engagements,such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF)and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity(Americas Partnership),and our bilateral negotiations with Kenya and Taiwan,we will pursue opportunities to m

105、aintain and improve levels of environmental protection of our trading partners and increase climate ambition,including to decarbonize our respective economies.We will seek commitments by our trading partners that will enable and mobilize the technologies,public and private investment,and technical r

106、esources needed to scale up clean energy infrastructure and facilitate trade in climate-friendly goods,services,and technologies,while generating high-quality jobs that power economic growth and advance progress toward the goals of the Paris Agreement commitments.Additionally,in 2023,the United Stat

107、es will continue to advance our priorities on trade and environment under the U.S.-EU TTC.This will include continuing work to scope the recently-launched Transatlantic Initiative on Sustainable Trade,in particular to advance our respective priorities to address the climate crisis and create a resil

108、ient,sustainable,and inclusive trade agenda.The United States will also continue working to address unsustainable and illegal,unreported,and unregulated(IUU)fishing practices that are destroying the marine ecosystem.For decades,IUU fishing has been a global problem affecting ocean ecosystems,threate

109、ning economic and food security,and putting law-abiding fishermen and seafood producers at a disadvantage.The United States has been a leader in combating IUU fishing and,through implementation of our National Strategy for Combating Illegal,Unreported,and Unregulated Fishing,we will continue to work

110、 to curtail the global trade in seafood and seafood products derived from IUU fishing and promote global maritime security.We will also enhance existing activities with new initiatives to form a comprehensive set of actions to address IUU fishing and associated forced labor,including working to prev

111、ent importation of IUU fish and fish products or those associated with forced labor.Additionally,in June 2022,we worked with other WTO Members to conclude the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies,the first ever multilateral trade agreement with the environment at its core.The Agreement prohibits subsidi

112、es to vessels or operators engaged in IUU fishing,for fishing overfished stocks,and for fishing on the unregulated high seas.Further,the Agreement contains strong transparency provisions that will add significant understanding of the universe of fish subsidies.The Biden Administration will work with

113、 other Members to both bring this new Agreement into force and to continue negotiations to build on this Agreement with additional disciplines on subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity and to enhance transparency related to forced labor on fishing vessels.The United States also se

114、eks to continue to protect our shared environment,including oceans and marine resources,and those whose livelihoods depend on them,from the harm caused by plastic pollution.In 2022,the United States supported the launch of multilateral negotiations for an international agreement on ocean plastic pol

115、lution.In 2023,we will continue this effort,recognizing the role that trade plays as both a contributor to the problem of plastic pollution,and its potential to serve as an important part of the solution.Further,the United States will continue to support and promote more resource-efficient and circu

116、lar economy approaches in other international fora,including the WTOs Committee on Trade and Environment and the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions,and at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD).The environment will also be a priority during our AP

117、EC host year this year,under the theme of“Creating a Resilient and Sustainable Future for All.”APEC 2023 provides the United States a unique opportunity THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA|7 to promote efforts that advance APEC economies contributions to addressing environmental and climate chal

118、lenges.For example,we are leading a Recyclable Materials Policy Program(RMPP)under the Committee on Trade and Investment.Under this program,the United States will host a workshop on compostable bioplastics and will continue to support and expand the work of the RMPP to help develop the capacity of A

119、PEC economies to identify and frame domestic policies that promote solid waste management and recycling infrastructure.In 2023,we will also further APEC work in areas such as remanufactured goods;verifying the environmental contributions of certain goods,services,and technologies;and enabling the de

120、velopment,deployment,and uptake of relevant new technologies,such as zero-emission and autonomous vehicles.Enforcing Environmental Provisions Through Existing Agreements and Tools We will also continue to take innovative approaches through our existing agreements and tools to advance our climate and

121、 environmental goals.The USMCA provides another important example of how trade policy,when done right,is a powerful tool to advance responsible climate action.The Agreement includes the most comprehensive environmental commitments of any U.S.trade agreement,including provisions to address wildlife t

122、rafficking,illegal logging and IUU fishing,fisheries subsidies,marine litter,and air and water pollution.The Biden Administration is using the full range of tools at its disposal to confront these issues.On February 10,2022,USTR requested consultations with Mexico under the environment chapter of th

123、e USMCA,concerning the effectiveness of Mexicos enforcement of its environmental laws and compliance with its USMCA environment commitments relating to the protection of the vaquita,the prevention of illegal fishing,and trafficking of totoaba fish.Since that time,USTR has led a number of technical-l

124、evel consultations,working through an extensive list of questions regarding Mexicos efforts and capacity to enforce its laws and regulate fishing activities in the Upper Gulf of California.As a result,USTR developed and submitted a draft plan of action to Mexico in August 2022,to which we received a

125、 counterproposal in January 2023.USTR will continue to work closely with Mexico on the development,implementation,and monitoring of this plan of action.Another example is our work on illegally-harvested timber,which harms the environment,depletes natural resources,and disadvantages U.S.workers and b

126、usinesses who use lawful and sustainable means to make their goods.In October 2021,the United States announced an agreement with Vietnam that addresses U.S.concerns in the Vietnam Timber Section 301 investigation.This was the first Section 301 investigation to address an environmental concern,and th

127、e agreement secures commitments that will help keep illegally harvested or traded timber out of the supply chain and protect the environment and natural resources.In April 2022,the United States and Vietnam convened the first meeting of the Timber Working Group(TWG)under that agreement,which was est

128、ablished to facilitate coordination between the parties and oversee the implementation of the Timber Agreement.The second meeting of the TWG was convened in November 2022.These meetings established a strong basis for further collaboration on implementation of the Timber Agreement.In 2023,the Biden A

129、dministration will continue to closely monitor Vietnams implementation of this agreement.Further,we will also work to identify other trading partners that engage in practices related to the import and use of illegal timber,and we are prepared to take action to address this serious environmental conc

130、ern,as needed.8|THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA Moreover,the United States will continue to monitor implementation of environmental provisions of all our trade agreements,including the United States Chile Free Trade Agreement,the United States Peru Trade Promotion Agreement,and the United St

131、ates Panama Trade Promotion Agreement.The Biden Administration will continue to use all available toolsand create new ones as neededto use trade policy to tackle the climate crisis and to protect the environment.C.Supporting U.S.Agriculture The Biden Administration also recognizes that farmers,ranch

132、ers,fishers,and food manufacturers are key to our worker-centered trade policy,and we are fighting to achieve quick,economically meaningful wins for them.From 2000 to 2022,annual U.S.agricultural exports grew from$58 billion to a record$202 billion.In 2023,our Administration will continue to improve

133、 economic opportunities for U.S.farmers,ranchers,and food manufacturers by expanding market access opportunities in foreign markets through the negotiation of agreements that include provisions intended to eliminate or reduce nontariff barriers that can hamper market access for U.S.agricultural prod

134、ucts.The Administration will seek to include in these agreements enforceable provisions that build on WTO obligations,including provisions to ensure that sanitary and phytosanitary(SPS)measures are science-based,developed through transparent,predictable processes,and implemented in a nondiscriminato

135、ry manner.U.S.farmers are integral to the Biden Administrations worker-centered trade policy,and they will see more open trade in 2023 as a result of our ongoing efforts.In January 2023,we brought into force an amendment to Japans beef safeguard mechanism under the U.S.Japan Trade agreement.The upda

136、ted agreement will allow U.S.beef exporters to more reliably meet Japans growing demand for high-quality beef,providing more predictability and reducing the probability that safeguard duties will be imposed on exports of U.S.beef in the future.In January 2023,the United States and the EU signed the

137、U.S.EU Tariff Rate Quota Agreement that provides certainty to U.S.exporters regarding access to the EU market following the UKs exit from the EU,and secures favorable market access outcomes for U.S.agricultural products such as rice,wheat,and corn.In February 2023,India announced a 70%cut to tariffs

138、 on U.S.pecan exports,removing a longstanding barrier to U.S.agricultural trade.This was a big win for farmers and was a result of the successfully revitalized United States India Trade Policy Forum.In 2023,USTR will continue to work with India to open market access for U.S.agricultural goods in Ind

139、ia.These outcomes demonstrate the Biden Administrations continued commitment to work constructively with our trading partners to provide greater economic opportunity for U.S.producers.Enforcement also plays a critical role in promoting predictability and leveling the playing field in agricultural tr

140、ade.The Biden Administration will continue enforcing our existing agreements so U.S.producers can compete on a level playing field in global markets.For example,the United States is holding Canada to its commitments through enforcement action under the USMCA.The United States has raised concerns und

141、er the USMCA previously about Canadas dairy tariff rate quota(TRQ)allocation measures.In December 2021,a USMCA dispute settlement panel found THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA|9 Canadas dairy TRQ allocation measures to be inconsistent with Canadas USMCA obligations.In response to the adverse f

142、indings of the panel,Canada introduced changes to its TRQ allocation measures,but these new policies are still inconsistent with Canadas obligations under the USMCA.In May 2022,the United States requested,for the second time,dispute settlement consultations under the USMCA to address dairy restricti

143、ons by Canada that are contrary to its USMCA commitments.Specifically,we challenged Canadas dairy TRQ allocation measures that deny allocation access to eligible applicants,including retailers,food service operators,and other types of importers,and impose new conditions on the allocation and use of

144、the TRQs.In January 2023,the United States announced the establishment of a panel to review Canadas measures,and the panel is expected to issue a report later this year.These actions demonstrate the Biden Administrations commitment to ensuring that U.S.dairy producers receive the full benefits of th

145、e USMCA to market and sell U.S.products to Canadian consumers.Additionally,the United States continues to engage with Mexico to address concerns with Mexicos policies regarding agricultural biotechnology,which threaten to cause serious economic harm to U.S.farmers and Mexican livestock producers,and

146、 stifle important innovations needed to help producers respond to pressing climate and food security challenges.If our concerns are not resolved,the United States will consider all options to fix this problem,including by taking formal steps under the USMCA.In 2023,the Biden Administration will cont

147、inue to ensure that our trade agreements benefit American workers,including farmers,and will use our enforcement tools as necessary to ensure that our trading partners deliver on their commitments and that U.S.agricultural producers receive the benefits negotiated in existing FTAs.This includes leve

148、ling the playing field for U.S.farmers by monitoring the treatment of products of agricultural biotechnology and advocating for non-discriminatory,science-based treatment of U.S.agricultural products by our trading partners.We will also monitor the practices of other trading partners to ensure that

149、U.S.agricultural products are not subject to unfair,unjustified,or discriminatory restrictions.D.Bolstering Supply Chain Resilience The pandemic,followed by Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine,illustrated the dangers of concentrated supply chains and inadequate consideration of geopolitical risk

150、in making sourcing decisions.Further,the concentration of our supply chains in China contributes to our vulnerability,especially for critical technologies.That is why strengthening our supply chains is a critical component of the Biden Administrations efforts to advance our worker-centered trade pol

151、icy,create sustainable economic growth,and ensure that the system is more resilient in the face of supply shocks.To begin addressing these challenges,President Biden signed Executive Order 14017(Americas Supply Chains)in 2021,directing a whole-of-government approach to assess vulnerabilities in,and

152、strengthen the resilience of,critical U.S.supply chains.Pursuant to the Executive Order,the Biden Administration conducted a 100-day review for four priority product areas:semiconductors,large capacity batteries,critical minerals and materials,and pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredient

153、s.USTR is actively engaged and coordinated with like-minded trade partners to develop durable solutions that advance supply chain resilience in these critical areas.And the Task Force has already started to deliver results,including:(1)addressing food insecurity in the wake of Russias further invasi

154、on of Ukraine;(2)tackling forced labor in global supply chains;(3)continued collaboration with partners on developing solutions to tackle supply chain issues;(4)facilitating trade in safe and effective medicines and minimizing drug shortages;(5)securing smoother and more efficient movement of essent

155、ial goods during a pandemic;and(6)protecting the uninterrupted flow of trade in North America during an emergency.10|THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA Supply chain resilience is also at the heart of all our trade initiatives,including the IPEF which has a pillar dedicated to this issue and the

156、 Americas Partnership.The Administration is also highlighting this issue bilaterally,including with partners like the European Union and Kenya,and in multilateral fora like the G7,G20,and APEC.Over the next year,the Biden Administration will continue its work to strengthen supply chains to promote e

157、conomic security,national security,good-paying jobs and worker protections,and the health of small-and medium-sized businesses,with strong standards for environmental sustainability and community engagement.Further,steps to address identified supply chain vulnerabilities and develop the foundation f

158、or increased resilience will be an important component of the United States ongoing engagement with its trade partners.III.RE-ALIGNING THE U.S.-CHINA TRADE RELATIONSHIP The U.S.-China economic and trade relationship is one of profound consequence.As the two largest economies in the world,the bilater

159、al relationship affects not just the two participants,but the entire globe.The Biden Administration acknowledges that this relationship is complex and competitive.With respect to trade,competition must be fair.Chinas approach to trade drives frictions in many of Chinas relationshipsnot just ours.Chi

160、na,as a large,non-market economy,is uniquely able to distort the marketplace through unfair,anticompetitive practices,which harm workers and businesses in the United States and in other countries,including some of our closest allies and partners.By unduly concentrating production of certain goods in

161、 China,these non-market policies and practices also undermine supply chain resilience and harm consumers that,in the long run,are deprived of the innovation and choice that fair competition would produce.To successfully counter the range of threats posed by China,we must be frank about the challenge

162、s we face.China employs a wide array of unfair,distortive measures that provide substantial support to Chinese industries across the economy,often in pursuit of specific aims in terms of production,capabilities,and market share.China has also limited market access for imported goods and services and

163、 restricted the ability of foreign manufacturers and services suppliers to do business in China.Further,it has used various,often illicit,means to secure foreign intellectual property and technology to pursue its industrial policy objectives.China fails to provide its people with the most basic of l

164、abor rights,including the right to organize and bargain collectively.Low operating costs resulting from artificially low wages and poor worker protections remain some of the key reasons why companies have chosen to offshore production there.Moreover,the use of state-sponsored forced labor,including

165、in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,is an affront to human dignity and a further example of Chinas unfair economic practices.Similarly,Chinas environmental policies make it a manufacturing destination of choice for production processes that would be barred in other countries.Chinas unfair,non-m

166、arket practices are also reflected in its approach to the environment,including:its weak environmental regulation and enforcement;subsidies that contribute to overfishing;illegal fishing practices;decimation of the infrastructure for recyclable commodities through a vast web of import bans;and overp

167、roduction of industrial goods.Chinas policies are also harmful to the environment,including its tolerance of imports of illegally harvested wildlife products,which enables a major source of demand.THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA|11 The Biden Administration is taking a holistic and pragmatic

168、approach to our relationship grounded in the principles of our worker-centered trade policy.It starts with the groundbreaking domestic investments enacted through the Presidents leadership,which allow the United States to engage and compete with China from a position of strength.This includes,for ex

169、ample,repairing our roads and bridges through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law,bolstering our capacity for critical technologies through the CHIPS and Science Act,and manufacturing clean energy technology here at home and in that of free trade partners through the Inflation Reduction Act.In additio

170、n,we are taking steps to build supply chain resilience that will defend American workers and consumers from the harms wrought by Chinas trade and economic abuses.We are also considering all existing toolsand will potentially seek new ones as neededto combat the harms of Chinas state-led,non-market p

171、ractices.Critically,we are bringing renewed focus to engagement with our partners and allies,who also suffer harm from Chinas unfair trade and economic practices.We share values and an essential interest in fair,market-based competition.The ability to defend against unfair Chinese practices requires

172、 that market economies act in concert to confront policies and practices that are fundamentally at odds with a global trading system based on market competition.A key initiative is the U.S.-EU Cooperate Framework for Large Civil Aircraft.In 2021,we reached agreement to set aside longstanding aircraf

173、t disputes and suspend tariffs for five years,in order to strengthen our cooperative and strategic relationship.The United States and the EU are working to deepen their shared understanding of Chinas state-directed industrial targeting goals to more effectively defend our market-oriented aerospace w

174、orkers,companies,and sector from the PRCs non-market economic policies and practices.In particular,as noted above,the Biden Administration will continue holding China accountable for its use of state-sponsored forced labor,which is not just an extreme form of unfair competition but a moral stain.Con

175、sistent with the statutory ban on the importation of goods made in whole or in part with forced labor,the Administration issued an updated Xinjiang Supply Chain business advisory in 2021.Going forward,the Biden Administration will continue holding China accountable for its use of state-sponsored for

176、ced labor and working with our trading partners to eradicate the use of forced labor throughout global supply chains.The United States will continue implementation and enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.We are also mindful of the effects that trade actions can have on American bus

177、inesses,especially small businesses,and workers.In May 2022,USTR commenced the statutory four-year review process by notifying representatives of domestic industries that benefit from the Section 301 tariffs on imports from the PRC of the possible termination of those actions and of the opportunity

178、for the representatives to request continuation.In September 2022,USTR announced that because requests for continuation were received,the tariff actions had not terminated and USTR would conduct a review of the tariff actions.USTR will continue a targeted tariff exclusions process to ensure that our

179、 economic interests are being served,and we will keep open the option of further tariff exclusions processes as warranted.IV.ENGAGING WITH KEY TRADING PARTNERS AND MULTILATERIAL INSTITUTIONS Growing the middle class,opening new markets,addressing inequality,and incentivizing climate and environmenta

180、l action are goals we share with many of our trading partners.Working with others to craft 12|THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA trade policies that promote these goals reflects the American leadership that many of our trading partners are seeking,and the Biden Administration continues to meet

181、the challenge.Using trade policy as a tool to achieve these shared goals,USTR continues to step up its engagement with partners,allies,multilateral institutions and international organizations.These actors and institutions play a pivotal role in cultivating meaningful outcomes to address shared conc

182、erns.The Biden Administration has repaired previously strained relationships with partners and allies and recommitted the United States to the worlds international institutions.We are applying the principles of our worker-centered trade policy to resolve long-standing disputes,and to create new part

183、nerships and frameworks fit for jointly tackling our greatest shared challenges.We are also leading the effort to revitalize our international institutions to ensure that they effectively address the needs of everyday people.President Bidens strategy has already borne fruit,leading to mutually benef

184、icial outcomes that advance the goals of shared prosperity and open the door to still greater cooperation.A.Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity The Biden Administration is committed to engaging economically with partners in the Indo-Pacific region.In the coming decades,we believe that com

185、petitiveness will largely be defined by how well countries are able to harness technology and digital sectors of our economies and the coming energy and climate transition to promote inclusive growthand working with our partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific will be critical to achieving these goal

186、s.The Indo-Pacific is one of the most dynamic regions in the world,and it is one of strategic importance to the United States.Additionally,the region is home to some of our closest allies and trading partners,including some with which we have longstanding trade agreements.By working closely with all

187、ies and partners to bolster our economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific,we can establish a new path forward that supports the global competitiveness of American workers and businesses and furthers the shared interests of our allies in the years to come.That is why we launched the IPEF in May 2022.Th

188、is framework will promote inclusive growth for workers and businesses,advance strong labor standards,and tackle climate change.The framework is also central to the Biden Administrations economic strategy in the Indo-Pacific and complements our national security goals in the region.The IPEF will be a

189、 model for the rest of the world that unlocks enormous economic value.It is a 21st century framework designed to tackle 21st century challenges and opportunities,including:fair and resilient trade(including labor,digital and other elements);supply chain resilience;infrastructure,decarbonization,and

190、clean energy;and tax and anti-corruption.USTR is leading efforts to craft a trade agreement with partners that includes high-standard provisions in a range of areas,including labor;environment;digital trade;agriculture;transparency and good regulatory practices;services domestic regulation;competiti

191、on policy;trade facilitation;inclusivity;and technical assistance and economic cooperation.In September 2022,trade ministers met in Los Angeles,California,to announce a statement outlining the details of our plans for further work in those areas.And in December 2022,we held the first in-person negot

192、iating round in Brisbane,Australia,where we started text-based negotiations on the following topics:trade facilitation,agriculture,services domestic regulation,and transparency and good regulatory practices.In addition to text-based discussions,USTR officials held detailed conceptual discussions for

193、 the following topics under Pillar I:environment,labor,digital economy,competition policy,and inclusivity.In 2023,THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA|13 the United States will continue intensive negotiations with our IPEF partners to deliver a high-standard agreement with cutting-edge trade rule

194、s.B.Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity In our own hemisphere,we are pursuing the Americas Partnership to enhance our strong regional bonds in line with a shared vision for inclusive,people-centered economic growth.The Americas Partnership will foster regional competitiveness,resilience,sha

195、red prosperity,and inclusive and sustainable investment,while tackling the climate crisis,by seeking high-standard agreements in these critical areas.In January 2023,the United States hosted a virtual ministerial meeting to move this initiative forward,with representatives from the initial Western H

196、emisphere countries who endorsed the principles and high-level goals of the initiative.Those countries are Barbados,Canada,Chile,Colombia,Costa Rica,the Dominican Republic,Ecuador,Mexico,Panama,Peru,and Uruguay.This significant group represents roughly 90 percent of the Western Hemispheres GDP and n

197、early two thirds of its people.The United States has deep economic ties in the region,including free trade agreements with nine of our initial partners.The Americas Partnership will strengthen and expand our efforts to drive regional economic growth by focusing on the drivers of bottom-up and middle

198、-out economic growth,good-quality jobs,and our competitiveness.Our workers,our companies,and our people benefit from our close economic ties and deep partnership with our closest neighbors.Through the Americas Partnership,we will ensure that our hemisphere remains among the most dynamic economic reg

199、ions in the world.The Americas Partnership is a flexible framework that will be open to all countries that share our values and vision for a prosperous hemisphere.We will move quickly toward execution of the Americas Partnership,starting with preparations for future negotiations on commitments and o

200、ther areas of cooperation.Our Administration will continue to consult closely with labor,environmental groups,civil society,industry and businesses,and Congress as we make progress on this important initiative.C.World Trade Organization The Biden Administration is committed to the World Trade Organi

201、zation(WTO).Consistent with our approach to trade policy more broadly,our Administration believes the WTO should be a force for good that supports a race to the top and addresses global challenges as they arise.The WTO was founded on shared values of fair,market-oriented competition,transparency and

202、 the rule of law,raising living standards and ensuring full employment,sustainable development,and respect for governments responsibility to promote our citizens welfare and security.The United States still believes these fundamental values support peace,prosperity,and economic security.The WTO,howe

203、ver,has not kept pace with the rapidly changing global economy,and the inability of current rules to effectively constrain unfair trade and economic practices have only become clearer.Most recently,WTO dispute settlement panels have strayed from the WTOs founding principles by casting judgment on th

204、e national security decisions of its Members.The WTO must improve its capacity to respond to the needs of everyday people,and urgent reform is critical to support the needs of our society,including on workers rights,supply chain fragility,and the climate.That is why the Biden Administration is leadi

205、ng and partnering on a WTO reform agenda that reflects the priorities of our worker-centered approachone that protects our planet;improves labor standards;advances gender equity,equality,and empowerment;facilitates an inclusive digital economy;and 14|THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA contribut

206、es to shared prosperity.We aim to restore efficacy to the negotiating arm and promote genuine transparency;improve the understanding of and respect for Members WTO commitments;and equip the organization to effectively account for the unfair,non-market policies and practices that are at odds with the

207、 fundamental premise of market-based competition and that create and perpetuate significant global market distortions.The Biden Administration understands that change will take time,and we are simultaneously working to deliver results on achievable outcomes through the WTOs existing structure.Despit

208、e skepticism,the United States worked with WTO Members to deliver concrete outcomes during the Twelfth Ministerial Conference in June 2022.These outcomes touched on important issues that directly affect working people everywhere,including a modification of intellectual property protections for COVID

209、 vaccines;an extension of the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions;a multilateral agreement on fisheries subsidies disciplines;and a Ministerial Declaration on food insecurity,and a work program to respond to modern sanitary and phytosanitary(SPS)challenges to feed a growing glob

210、al population.Additionally,to better inform our discussions with WTO Members following the outcome on COVID-19 vaccines,USTR has requested that the United States International Trade Commission(USITC)provide a public report on available data and information regarding access to COVID-19 diagnostics an

211、d therapeutics.As a part of its investigation,the USITC will solicit comments from the public and hold a public hearing.The United States will continue engaging with WTO Members in 2023 to make progress on these and other issues and to transform the organization to address the challenges of our time

212、.D.Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation As part of our enduring commitment to the region and broad-based economic growth,the United States is excited to serve as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC)host in 2023,with the theme of“Creating a Resilient and Sustainable Future for All.”The United Sta

213、tes is taking full advantage of our host year to collaborate with like-minded partners to showcase the importance of engagement with the APEC region for American prosperity.As an incubator of ideas and a catalyst for collaboration,APEC is uniquely positioned to explore how the United States and our

214、partners in the region can work together to build a more durable and resilient global economy.The United States is fully committed to working with APEC economies to make resiliency,sustainability,and inclusivity core values in trade policy and to advance the needs of workers,consumers,and businesses

215、 throughout the region.Throughout this year,we are energizing existing avenues of work in APEC,and we are also developing new efforts,in order to more meaningfully mainstream APECs prioritization of sustainability and inclusion into its ongoing work on trade and investment.That includes lifting up w

216、orkers and women entrepreneurs,empowering small businesses to enter the market,grow,and compete,and using trade to pursue decarbonization and protect our planet.These topics are more important than ever as we continue to face a world full of challenges and uncertaintythe economic fallout from COVID-

217、19,Russias continued aggression in Ukraine,fragile supply chains,growing inequality,and a worsening climate crisis.Throughout our host year and beyond,the United States will continue to work with other APEC economies to promote sustainable,inclusive,and resilient growth throughout our region and to

218、unlock economic opportunities for those who have been underserved,marginalized,and underrepresented in all of our populations.THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA|15 E.Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD)has also re

219、cognized that trade must work for all,and it is another venue that provides the Administration with an opportunity to advance our worker-centered trade agenda.An ongoing priority for the Biden Administration is the resolution of long-standing U.S.concerns about discriminatory digital services taxes(

220、DSTs).As part of the historic 2021 OECD/G20 Inclusive Frameworks Two-Pillar Solution on global taxation,U.S.trading partners around the globe made a political agreement to withdraw existing DSTs and other similar measures as the global tax reform is implemented,and not to adopt any such new measures

221、 that target and discriminate against American companies and their workers.USTR continues to monitor the imposition of DSTs by our trading partners and will evaluate all of its available options,including under our trade agreements and domestic statutes,if other countries move forward with new measu

222、res or fail to withdraw existing measures.Our engagement in the OECD is also serving to deepen a shared understanding of how China subsidizes key industries and the important role played by Chinese state-owned enterprises as both the recipients and providers of industrial subsidies.Through innovativ

223、e analytical tools,the OECD is producing findings that will enable the United States to advance discussions on these critical issues together with likeminded partners.USTR will also continue to pursue a mutually supportive trade and environment agenda at the OECD,and through its co-lead role to the

224、meetings of the Joint Working Party on Trade and Environment,will advance work on trade and environmental services,circular economy and trade,and enabling reverse supply chains.F.Bilateral Initiatives President Biden has used trade policy as a tool to rebuild relationships with partners to advance a

225、 worker-centered trade policy.Some of these engagements were held under the auspices of existing trade agreements,including free trade agreements and trade and investment framework agreements(TIFAs),while others led to the formation of new partnerships.1.European Union The United States and the Euro

226、pean Union(EU)share an economic relationship of critical importance,as well as the goals of growing the middle class,addressing inequality,and incentivizing responsible environmental stewardship.Geostrategic challenges,including Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine and increased assertiveness of a

227、utocratic regimes,have reinforced the importance of our shared democratic values,commitment to universal human rights,and leadership role in upholding liberal rules-based order.The Biden Administration believes that a strong U.S.-EU partnership is key to realizing this vision.2022 cemented our progr

228、ess in cooperating to promote shared goals and manage challenges and irritants.Since Russias invasion of Ukraine,the Administration has worked closely with the EU to hold Russia accountableincluding through close coordination on aggressive sanctions.We will also continue to partner with the EU to ma

229、rshal significant levels of security assistance,humanitarian aid,and direct economic support for Ukraine.Additionally,through negotiations on the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum,we are demonstrating that trading partners can come together and align on common objectives and use t

230、rade tools 16|THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA to decarbonize our economies and drive cleaner trade.In 2023,we will work to conclude negotiations of the Global Arrangement.In December 2022,the United States and the EU held the first Ministerial Meeting of the Working Group on large civil airc

231、raft to review progress and deepen efforts to defend the interests of our aerospace workers and companies from the PRCs non-market economic policies.Since holding the inaugural ministerial meeting of the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council(TTC)in September 2021,our governments have met regularly to

232、 collaborate on a number of concrete areas,such as challenges posed by non-market policies and practices and economic coercion;avoiding unnecessary barriers to trade in emerging technology products and services;promoting and protecting labor rights and decent work;combatting child and forced labor;e

233、xpanding resilient and sustainable global supply chains;and trade and environment.Specifically,on labor,we kicked off the Trade and Labor Dialogue to bring together labor,business,and government representatives from both sides of the Atlantic to focus on eliminating forced labor in global supply cha

234、ins and better incorporating key stakeholder insights into our work.Going forward,the Biden Administration will also seek to use the TTC to cooperate on the development and deployment of new technologies that are based on our shared democratic values,including respect for human rights,and that encou

235、rage compatible standards and regulations as appropriate,while respecting the sovereign right to regulate.Additionally,in 2023,we will continue to host the U.S.EU Small-and Medium-Sized(SME)Workshop to identify ways to expand bilateral trade and investment and to enhance broad and inclusive SME part

236、icipation in that trade and investment.2.Taiwan The United States has a long-standing and dynamic trade relationship with Taiwan,a vibrant democracy and important trading partner in the region.Building on this history,in June 2022,the United States and Taiwan launched the United States Taiwan Initia

237、tive on 21st Century Trade under the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States.In August 2022,the two sides announced the negotiating mandate for this initiative,which calls for reaching agreement on high-standard com

238、mitments and economically meaningful outcomes in a number of trade areas,including trade facilitation,regulatory practices,agriculture,anticorruption,small-and medium-sized enterprises,digital trade,labor,environment,standards,state-owned enterprises,and non-market policies and practices.Since then,

239、the two sides have pursued an ambitious schedule of meetingsincluding most recently in January 2023in an effort to make progress as quickly as possible.The United States places a high priority on partnering with Taiwan to further deepen and strengthen our trade and investment relationship.3.Kenya Th

240、e United States will continue working with Kenya to deepen our trade and investment relationship,including by advancing worker-centered trade policies and promoting regional and continental economic integration in Africa.On July 14,2022,the United States and Kenya launched the United States Kenya St

241、rategic Trade and Investment Partnership(STIP).The STIP builds on our cooperation to date and will pursue enhanced engagement leading to high standard commitments in a wide range of areas with a view to increasing investment;promoting sustainable and inclusive economic growth;benefiting workers,cons

242、umers,and businesses(including micro-,small-,and medium-sized enterprises(MSMEs);and THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA|17 supporting African regional economic integration.The first round of conceptual discussions was held in February 2023.In the coming months,the Biden Administration will hold

243、 further conversations with the Kenyan government on important issues,including:agriculture;anti-corruption;digital trade;environment and climate change action;good regulatory practices;MSMEs;workers rights;supporting participation of women,youth,and others in trade;standards collaboration;and trade

244、 facilitation and customs procedures.The Biden Administration also views this approach as one to be built upon to include other areas of mutual interest and to serve as a model for engagement with other willing countries on the African continent.4.India The United States and India share a dynamic an

245、d important trade and investment relationship.In 2021,the United States and India relaunched the United States India Trade Policy Forum(TPF),which had not met since 2017.In January 2023,the United States and India convened the 13th meeting of the TPF in Washington.Our governments discussed the treme

246、ndous potential for growth between our economies and how we can work together to bring a positive impact to working people in both countries.Additionally,the new TPF Working Group on Resilient Trade will provide a structured framework for discussions of issues of mutual interest,including trade faci

247、litation,labor,environment,and good regulatory practices,all with a view towards building a more resilient future for our economies.The United States will continue to partner with India to tackle shared challenges,build resilient supply chains,and promote a transparent,rules-based trading system for

248、 market economies and democracies.5.Japan Japan has long been a valued trading partner of the United States,as well as a close ally.Following the Section 232 tariff agreement to allow historically-based sustainable volumes of Japanese steel products to enter the U.S.market without the application of

249、 Section 232 tariffs,the United States and Japan held several meetings of the United States Japan Partnership on Trade.This initiative reaffirms the shared commitment to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance through regular engagement to advance an agenda of cooperation as well as to address bilateral

250、trade issues of concern to either side.Through our meetings,we discussed specific initiatives and efforts in a range of areas,including labor and environment-related priorities,a supportive digital ecosystem for all,third country concerns,trade facilitation,and multilateral cooperation.Our governmen

251、ts are also resolving concerns and pursuing common goals through the Partnership,including a Memorandum of Cooperation to launch a Task Force on the Promotion of Human Rights and International Labor Standards in Supply Chains.The United States will use this Partnership to deepen our cooperation and

252、advance sustainable,resilient,inclusive,and competitive trade policies that lift up our people and economies.6.Korea Korea is a valued trading partner and a close ally.The United States Korea Free Trade Agreement(KORUS)continues to be both a reflection of that close relationship and the foundation u

253、pon which we can build to make it even more cooperative.Following our convening of the KORUS Joint Committee in 2021,the United States and Korea held a meeting of the Labor Affairs Council in April 2022.The council discussed steps to strengthen workers rights and respect for freedom of association,e

254、xplore a trilateral cooperation project with the International Labor Organization,eliminate forced labor from shared supply chains,and consider areas of future 18|THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA cooperation and technical capacity building.During the public portion of the meeting,workers,empl

255、oyers,civil society organizations and other attendees discussed issues related to the KORUS Labor Chapters implementation,particularly related to freedom of association and trade union rights.Going forward,we are committed to working with Korea to address our shared concerns,such as supply chain cha

256、llenges,sustainable trade,emerging technologies,the digital economy,and trade facilitation.7.Singapore Singapore has long been a critical partner and was the first the first Asian economy to sign a free trade agreement with the United States.Since convening a United States Singapore Free Trade Agree

257、ment Joint Committee Meeting in October 2021,our governments have been meeting regularly to press forward with work on the environment,labor,digital trade,supply chains,and intellectual property,among other issues.The United States will continue working closely with Singapore on these and other matt

258、ers in 2023.8.United Kingdom In 2023,the United States and the United Kingdom(UK)will continue to deepen our trade relationship and work to promote trade based on fair competition,address forced labor in supply chains,and address the challenges posed by distortive policies of non-market economies.We

259、 will continue efforts in the large civil aircraft Working Group to explore concrete ways to more effectively address the challenge posed by the PRCs non-market policies and practices.We will also continue to work together on reforming and strengthening the WTO so it better serves the lives and live

260、lihood of all people,and also explore ways to boost investment in clean energy technology.Additionally,we will continue to host the U.S.UK Small-and Medium-Sized(SME)Dialogue to identify ways to expand bilateral trade and investment and to enhance broad and inclusive SME participation in that trade

261、and investment.USTR will also hold events in the United States and the United Kingdom to hear directly from our respective stakeholders on the way forward for U.S.-UK trade ties.We will engage in robust discussions and outline considerations for advancing our trading relationship to support our work

262、er-centered trade policy.9.African Continental Free Trade Area The United States will continue to engage with the African Continental Free Trade Area(AfCFTA)Secretariat to support regional and continental economic integration,attract investment in supply chains within the continent,and improve the l

263、ivelihoods of African workers,including and especially women and youth under the AfCFTA.To further this goal,in December 2022,the United States and the AfCFTA Secretariat signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation for Trade and Investment between the United States and the African Continenta

264、l Free Trade Area,during the United States Africa Business Forum.The MOU sets up an annual high-level engagement between the United States and the AfCFTA Secretariat,as well as quarterly meetings of technical working groups,to discuss issues to be identified by the participants.The working groups wi

265、ll bring together representatives from the AfCFTA Secretariat,USTR,the interagency,and other stakeholders to exchange information on best practices and facilitate an open dialogue to enhance the relationship between the United States and the AfCFTA Secretariat,the AfCFTA State Parties,and related st

266、akeholders.The Biden Administration recognizes that it is impossible to meet todays defining challenges on trade without African contributions and leadership.The United States is committed to working with the African THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA|19 Union,including the African Union Commis

267、sion and the AfCFTA in 2023 and beyond to develop a lasting partnership with the continent.We will build upon the progress made during the African Growth and Opportunity Act(AGOA)ministerial meeting in December 2022 and look forward to a constructive AGOA forum this year to further improve AGOAinclu

268、ding how we can increase the utilization rates,particularly among smaller and less-developed countries,as well as ensure that the programs benefits fully reach all segments of society.V.PROMOTING CONFIDENCE IN TRADE POLICY THROUGH ENFORCEMENT The Biden Administration is committed to vigorously enfor

269、cing our trade agreements as a critical element of pushing a global race to the top.Enforcement is a key component of our worker-centered trade policy agenda.We are using all of the tools at our disposal to combat unfair,non-market practices,defend American jobs,and create broad-based economic prosp

270、erity.American workers and businesses can compete with anyone when the playing field is level and competition is fair,and trade policy is an indispensable tool in achieving those goals.We are shaping a global trading system that enforces labor and environmental standards,protects intellectual proper

271、ty,and ensures that regulations are science-based and predictable.As discussed above,the Biden Administration has already taken unprecedented action to utilize trade policy as a tool to defend U.S.economic interests.Under the United States Mexico Canada Agreement(USMCA),we have used the rapid respon

272、se mechanism(RRM)to secure significant outcomes for workers on seven occasions.We also establishedand ultimately prevailed inthe first dispute settlement panel proceeding under the USMCA on Canadas dairy tariff-rate quota administration.The United States has also repeatedly engaged with Canada and M

273、exico on a number of issues,including to ensure that U.S.agricultural products receive fair treatment,that the regulatory environment is fair and transparent,and that all U.S.goods receive fair treatment.Continuing to vigorously enforce the USMCAs standards will continue to be a top priority for the

274、 Biden Administration in 2023.We have established a dispute settlement panel to address our concerns with Canadas revised dairy restrictions that are contrary to its USMCA commitments.We are currently consulting with Mexico to address our concerns with Mexicos measures that undermine American compan

275、ies and U.S.-produced energy in favor of Mexicos state-owned electrical utility and state-owned oil and gas company,Petrleos Mexicanos(PEMEX).We are also engaged in environmental consultations with Mexico under the USMCAs Environment Chapter relating to the protection of the critically endangered va

276、quita porpoise,the prevention of illegal fishing,and trafficking of totoaba fish.We will continue to use all available enforcement mechanisms to robustly uphold the USMCAs groundbreaking standards.We are also thoroughly deploying domestic enforcement tools to protect our economic interests.USTRs Spe

277、cial 301 Report highlights the adequacy and effectiveness of U.S.trading partners protection and enforcement of intellectual property(IP)rights.IP-intensive industries support more than 60 million U.S.jobsfrom the independent inventor just starting out to the documentary filmmaker studying critical

278、social issues.Robust protection and enforcement in foreign countries help protect these jobs and ensure that Americans can fairly compete in global marketplaces.Similarly,the 2022 Notorious Markets List,released on January 31,is worker-centered in its focus.It identifies examples of online and physi

279、cal markets that reportedly engage in or facilitate substantial copyright piracy or trademark counterfeiting.Consistent with the Administrations worker-centered trade 20|THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA policy,this years publication highlights the impact of online piracy on U.S.workers and ex

280、amines how online piracy can impact the wages,residuals,pensions,and health care benefits that workers in the creative industries depend on.In addition,the Administration will continue to administer its preference programs in line with our worker-centered agenda and in accordance to the statutory el

281、igibility criteria.After using all diplomatic means available to induce the governments to remediate the issues,President Biden announced in November 2022 the termination of Burkina Fasos eligibility for the African Growth and Opportunity Act(AGOA)trade preference program.Our Administration is deepl

282、y concerned by the unconstitutional changes in government in Burkina Faso and urges the country to take necessary actions to return to elective democracy.The United States remains committed to and continues to work with Burkina Faso to meet the clear statutory benchmarks toward reinstatement in the

283、AGOA program.The United States also opposes acts,policies and practices by foreign countries that are intended to undervalue their currencies in order to gain an unfair competitive advantage over American businesses and workers.Under the Biden Administration,the U.S.government has deployed the full

284、range of available tools to put effective pressure on countries that have been judged to intervene excessively in the foreign exchange market.The Biden Administration is committed to examining the currency practices of all major U.S.trading partners and holding them to account as necessary.The Biden

285、 Administration will continue to monitor the practices of our trading partners and hold them accountable for meeting the standards established under our trade agreements.Further,we will also continue to review our existing trade tools,identify ways to strengthen them,and create new tools as necessar

286、y to achieve meaningful results that level the playing field for U.S.workers and businesses.In 2023,we will continue to work with Congress to fully evaluate the efficacy of our current trade tools and identify areas where new tools may be needed.VI.PROMOTING EQUITABLE,INCLUSIVE,AND DURABLE TRADE POL

287、ICY AND EXPANDING STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT Trade policy,when done correctly,can play a critical role in advancing equitable and resilient economic growth for underserved and marginalized communities,here in the United States and with trading partners who share concerns about rising inequality.The Bide

288、n Administration is committed to thorough and thoughtful engagement as we develop and implement the Presidents trade policy agenda.Inclusive engagement is a key component to ensuring that our resulting trade policies are durable and equitable,and to building trusted,sustained lines of communication

289、with those communities that will be affected by those decisions.As such,the Biden Administration will continue to expand the tables we set and meet with communities across the countryincluding Tribal nations,Indigenous communities,and African and Asian American and Native Hawaiian and Pacific Island

290、er communitiesto ensure that the voices of all stakeholders are heard and respected as we evaluate and make these decisions.A.Promoting Equitable,Inclusive,and Durable Trade Policy In strengthening the nations competitiveness and expanding the benefits of trade,racial and gender equity are core elem

291、ents of U.S.trade and investment policy.An intersectional,interconnected framework is particularly important in emerging sectors where the United States has the potential to be competitive and THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA|21 create well-paying U.S.-based jobs through trade.For these reaso

292、ns,many of President Bidens first actions directed the whole of government to embed equity in their policy goals,objectives,and outcomes.As a result,the 2022 Annual Trade Report includes updates on USTR initiatives to advance racial and gender equity in U.S.trade policy.In addition,all U.S.trade pol

293、icy tools,engagements,and new trade initiatives incorporate and reflect the core principles outlined in the Executive Orders on Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government and Worker Organizing and Empowerment,the United States historic,first Nation

294、al Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality,and the Presidential Memoranda on Tribal Consultation and Strengthening the Nation-to-Nation Relationship and on Advancing the Human Rights of LGBTQI+Persons around the World.In particular,in April 2022,USTR released its Equity Action Plan,developed in accor

295、dance with President Bidens Executive Order on Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government.Through an intersectional,interconnected,whole-of-agency approach,the Plan includes incorporating racial and gender equity into the following trade and invest

296、ment-related policy actions:(1)annual public updates on strategies and activities;(2)strengthening data to consider and improve the distributional effects of trade;(3)advisory committee administration,including questions posed to cleared advisors,training,and guidance;and(4)expanded and consistent U

297、STR engagement with underserved and marginalized communities.Additionally,the U.S.Trade Representative continues to play a constructive,active role as the co-chair of the White House Initiative and Presidents Advisory Commission on Asian American Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islanders,and as a member

298、 of the Gender Policy Council and White House Council on Native American Affairs(WHCNAA).On January 17,2023,the White House convened federal government officials and community leaders to release the Biden Administrations first-ever National Strategy to Advance Equity,Justice,and Opportunity for Asia

299、n American,Native Hawaiian,and Pacific Islander(AA and NHPI)Communities.The National Strategy includes detailed plans from thirty-two federal agencies,including USTR,which build on the Administrations previous actions to promote safety and equity for AA and NHPI communities.Further,data continues to

300、 be critical to informing our work with like-minded partners to advance inclusive growth and trade policy.In October 2021,USTR requested that the U.S.International Trade Commission(USITC)conduct an independent,two-part investigation of the distributional effects of goods and services trade and trade

301、 policy on U.S.workers by skill,wage and salary level,gender,race/ethnicity,age,and income level,especially as they affect underrepresented and underserved communities.On November 14,2022,the USITC released its report cataloging information on the distributional effects of trade and trade policy on

302、underrepresented and underserved communities.USTR will use the results of the USITCs investigation to advance inclusive growth,economic resilience and competitiveness,and data needs in U.S.trade policy,including supporting efforts to close data gaps and improving data accessibility,granularity,and s

303、cope.USTR will continue to work with the USITC as it strengthens its capacity to analyze the distributional effects of trade actions on U.S.workers.B.Engagement and Consultation with Partners and Stakeholders The Biden Administration recognizes Congress important role in crafting U.S.trade and inves

304、tment policy.We welcome and seek guidance and feedback from Members of Congress to share their views and constituents priorities regarding trade policy.USTR consults with Congressional committees and the leadership of both parties in the U.S.Senate and U.S.House of Representatives,holds meetings and

305、 calls with Members and their staff,participates in Congressional hearings and leads congressional delegations 22|THE PRESIDENTS 2023 TRADE POLICY AGENDA overseas to meet with trading partners and multilateral organizations.USTR also engages Members of Congress in their districts and states meeting

306、with constituents,including workers,farmers,businesses,and community-based stakeholders.In addition,we share negotiating text with Members of Congress and appropriately cleared staff prior to sharing it with stakeholders outside of the federal government or with foreign countries.In 2023,the Biden A

307、dministration will continue to actively engage with Congress and work with Members to ensure their feedback informs trade policy.Additionally,the Biden Administration is committed to engaging with a wide range of diverse stakeholders,including historically marginalized and underserved communities,as

308、 we develop and implement our trade policy agenda.USTR will continue connecting with stakeholders with diverse perspectives and experiences throughout the country to listen,learn,and build trusted relationships and lines of communication to develop inclusive policy that delivers equitable results.Ou

309、r Administration has also regularly consulted and briefed the 28 advisory committees that USTR manages and co-leads as we seek to hear input from labor unions,environmental groups,consumer groups,nongovernmental organizations,state and local governments,industry,and academia.In addition to seeking c

310、leared advisor feedback on how to improve the administration of advisory committees,USTR will continue to invite and challenge cleared advisors to consider and advise on advancing innovative,equitable trade and investment policy,and encourage diverse and inclusive perspectives to apply to serve on t

311、rade advisory committees.THE 2022 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM I.AGREEMENTS,NEGOTIATIONS,AND OTHER INITIATIVES|1 I.AGREEMENTS,NEGOTIATIONS,AND OTHER INITIATIVES A.New Trade Initiatives 1.Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(Pillar I:Trade)In May 2022,the U

312、nited States launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF)with Australia,Brunei Darussalam,Fiji,India,Indonesia,Japan,the Republic of Korea,Malaysia,New Zealand,Philippines,Singapore,Thailand,and Vietnam.IPEF will advance resilience,sustainability,inclusiveness,economic growth,fa

313、irness,and competitiveness for participating economies.Through this initiative,the IPEF partners aim to contribute to cooperation,stability,prosperity,development,and peace within the region.This framework will offer tangible benefits that fuel economic activity and investment,promote sustainable an

314、d inclusive economic growth,and benefit workers,consumers,and businesses(including micro,small,and medium-sized enterprises),across the region.The 14 IPEF partners represent 40 percent of global GDP and 28 percent of global goods and services trade.The launch began discussions of future negotiations

315、 on the following pillars:(I)Trade;(II)Supply Chains;(III)Clean Economy;and,(IV)Fair Economy.The IPEF is designed to be flexible,and IPEF partners are not required to join all four pillars.The Office of the U.S.Trade Representative(USTR)is leading for the United States on the Trade Pillar,the Depart

316、ment of Commerce is leading on Pillars II and III;and the two agencies are co-leading on Pillar IV.On September 9,2022,USTR and IPEF partners issued a ministerial statement outlining the scope of negotiations for the Trade Pillar.Current Trade Pillar partners are:Australia,Brunei Darussalam,Fiji,Ind

317、onesia,Japan,the Republic of Korea,Malaysia,New Zealand,Philippines,Singapore,Thailand,and Vietnam.In December 2022,IPEF partners met in Australia for the first round of negotiations.Through the IPEF Trade Pillar negotiations,the United States seeks to build high-standard,inclusive,free-and fair-tra

318、de commitments and to develop new,creative,and economically-meaningful approaches to trade policy in the Indo-Pacific region.USTR endeavors to advance U.S.trade policy goals of resilience,sustainability,and inclusivity by negotiating commitments in the following areas:labor,environment,digital econo

319、my,agriculture,transparency and good regulatory practices,competition policy,trade facilitation,inclusivity,and technical and economic cooperation.2.United StatesTaiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade On June 1,2022,the United States announced the launch of the U.S.Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century

320、 Trade under the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan(AIT)and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States(TECRO).After a public comment period and public hearing with stakeholders,the two sides announced the official negotiating mandate on August 17,2022,and t

321、hen commenced formal negotiations.2|I.AGREEMENTS,NEGOTIATIONS,AND OTHER INITIATIVES The U.S.Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade is intended to develop concrete ways to deepen the economic and trade relationship between the two economies,advance mutual trade priorities based on shared values,and

322、promote innovation and inclusive economic growth for workers and businesses.The two sides have developed an ambitious roadmap for reaching agreements with high-standard commitments and economically meaningful outcomes in the following trade areas:(1)agriculture;(2)anticorruption;(3)digital trade;(4)

323、environment;(5)good regulatory practices;(6)labor;(7)non-market policies and practices;(8)small and medium-sized enterprises;(9)standards;(10)state-owned enterprises;and,(11)trade facilitation.On November 8 and November 9,2022,the United States and Taiwan,under the auspices of AIT and TECRO,held two

324、 days of productive conceptual discussions on the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade.During the meetings,the two sides exchanged views on the key concepts to be addressed in several of the trade areas set out in the negotiating mandate for the initiative.The United States and Taiwan intend

325、 to use the U.S.Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade and their ongoing engagement with stakeholders to advance and deepen the important U.S.Taiwan economic and trade relationship,to promote shared values,and to address shared challenges and opportunities.3.United StatesKenya Strategic Trade and I

326、nvestment Partnership U.S.officials met with Kenyan Government officials in Nairobi from May 3 to May 6,2022 to discuss a wide range of topics and help identify key areas of convergence that deepened mutual understanding between both countries.On July 14,2022,the U.S.Trade Representative and the Cab

327、inet Secretary for Kenyas Ministry of Industrialization,Trade and Enterprise Development,issued a joint statement launching the United StatesKenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership(STIP).They decided that the United States and Kenya would pursue enhanced engagement leading to high standard

328、commitments in a wide range of areas with a view to increasing investment;promoting sustainable and inclusive economic growth;benefiting workers,consumers,and businesses(including micro,small,and medium-sized enterprises);and,supporting African regional economic integration.They identified an initia

329、l set of issues where the United States and Kenya intend to develop an ambitious roadmap for enhanced cooperation with the goal of negotiating high-standard commitments in order to achieve economically meaningful outcomes.On November 3,2022,the U.S.Trade Representative met virtually with the Cabinet

330、 Secretary for Kenyas Ministry of Investments,Trade,and Industry,and on December 12,2022,the two met in person in Washington DC.During both meetings,the two noted the shared objectives of their governments as reflected in the July 14,2022 joint statement launching the United StatesKenya STIP.They hi

331、ghlighted how the initiative aligns with the Government of Kenyas domestic objective of greater economic inclusiveness as well as its objective of advancing African regional economic integration,and discussed plans to begin expert engagement in early 2023 on the issues identified in the joint statem

332、ent.4.United StatesEuropean Union Trade and Technology Council The United StatesEuropean Union Trade and Technology Council(TTC)was the principal coordination mechanism through which the United States engaged the EU on trade policy during 2022.Across ten TTC working groups,the United States and the

333、EU are pursuing policy outcomes on trade and technology that align with shared values and promote a rules-based economic system.I.AGREEMENTS,NEGOTIATIONS,AND OTHER INITIATIVES|3 The TTC held its second ministerial meeting in Paris,France on May 16,2022 and its third ministerial on December 5,2022 in College Park,Maryland.The U.S.Trade Representative co-chaired the two ministerial meetings along wi