1、2023 GLOBAL FOOD POLICY REPORT|RETHINKING FOOD CRISIS RESPONSES IFPRIAbout IFPRIThe International Food Policy Research Institute(IFPRI),a research center of CGIAR,provides research-based policy solutions to sustainably reduce poverty and end hunger and malnutrition in low-and middle-income countries

2、.IFPRI was established in 1975 to identify and analyze alternative national and international strategies and policies for meeting the food needs of the developing world,with particular emphasis on low-income countries and on the poorer groups in those countries.Partnerships,commu-nications,capacity

3、strengthening,and data and knowledge management are essential components for translating IFPRIs research to action and impact.The Institutes regional and country programs play a criti-cal role in responding to demand for food policy research and in delivering holistic support to country-led developm

4、ent.IFPRI collaborates with partners around the world.www.ifpri.orgAbout CGIARCGIAR is a global partnership for a food-secure future dedicated to transforming food,land,and water systems in a climate crisis.CGIAR science is dedicated to reducing poverty,enhancing food and nutri-tion security,and imp

5、roving natural resources and ecosystem services.As the worlds largest agricultural innovation network,its research is carried out by 15 CGIAR Centers working around the world in close collaboration with hundreds of partners,including national and regional research institutes,civil society organizati

6、ons,academia,development organizations,and the private sector.www.cgiar.orgA Peer-Reviewed Publicationgfpr.ifpri.infoCopyright 2023 International Food Policy Research Institute(IFPRI).This publication is licensed for use under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License(CC BY 4.0).Subje

7、ct to attribution,you are free to share,copy,and redistribute the material in any medium or format,and adapt,remix,transform,and build upon the material for any purpose,even commercially.Third-parTy conTenT:The International Food Policy Research Institute does not necessarily own each component of t

8、he content contained within the work.The International Food Policy Research Institute therefore does not warrant that the use of any third-party-owned individual component or part contained in the work will not infringe on the rights of those third parties.The risk of claims resulting from such infr

9、ingement rests solely with you.If you wish to re-use a component of the work,it is your responsibility to determine whether permission is needed for that re-use and to obtain permission from the copyright owner.Examples of components can include,but are not limited to,tables,figures,or images.recomm

10、ended ciTaTion:International Food Policy Research Institute.2023.2023 Global Food PolicyReport:Rethinking Food Crisis Responses.Washington,DC:International Food Policy Research Institute.https:/doi.org/10.2499/9780896294417This is a peer-reviewed publication.Any opinions expressed herein are those o

11、f the authors and are not necessarily representative of or endorsed by the International Food Policy Research Institute(IFPRI).The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IFPRI.International Food Policy Research Institute120

12、1 Eye Street,NWWashington,DC 20005-3915 USAwww.ifpri.orgiSBn:978-0-89629-441-7iSSn:2329-2873doi:https:/doi.org/10.2499/9780896294417Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress.Photo creditscover:Lumiereist/S.chapTer imageS:p.6hikrcn/S;p.20Bumble Dee/S;p.34MartinMecnarows

13、ki/S;p.36Abdul Majeed/European Union;p.44Andre Nery/S;p.52Dominic Chavez/World Bank;p.62Riccardo Mayer/S;p.72ymphotos/S;p.82fivepointsix/S.Book layouT:Jason ChowediTorial manager:Pamela Stedman-Edwardsiv ContentsFOREWORD.3ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.5ChAPTER 1 The Road to Resilience:Rethinking Responses to Food

14、 Crises.6Johan Swinnen and Katrina KosecChAPTER 2 Food Crisis Risk Monitoring:Early Warning for Early Action.20Rob Vos,Arif Husain,Friederike Greb,Peter Lderach,and Brendan RiceChAPTER 3 Crisis Resilience:Humanitarian Response and Anticipatory Action.36Sikandra Kurdi and Sandra RuckstuhlChAPTER 4 Ag

15、rifood Value Chains:Building Resilient Food Systems.44Bart Minten,Ben Belton,and Thomas ReardonChAPTER 5 Social Protection:Adaptive Safety Nets for Crisis Recovery.52Kalle HirvonenChAPTER 6 Gender:Promoting Equality in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings.62Hazel Malapit and Lynn BrownChAPTER 7 Fo

16、rced Migration:Fragility,Resilience,andPolicy Responses.72Manuel A.Hernandez,Olivier Ecker,PeterLderach,and Jean-Franois MaystadtREGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS.82Africa.84Samuel Benin,Wim Marivoet,Harriet Mawia,andJohnUlimwenguMiddle East and North Africa.90Kibrom Abay,Xinshen Diao,David Laborde,and Mariam R

17、aoufCentral Asia.97Kamiljon AkramovSouth Asia.102Anjani Kumar and Shahidur RashidEast and Southeast Asia.108Kevin Chen,Yunyi Zhou,and Rui MaoLatin America and the Caribbean.112Eugenio Daz-Bonilla and Valeria PieiroNOTES.117ForewordThe past decade has been marked by multiple,often overlapping,crises.

18、The COVID-19 pandemic,various natural disasters,and the ongoing war in Ukraine have all threatened the fabric of our global food sys-tems.This string of crises has left an indelible mark.In too many places,progress in reducing poverty and malnutrition has been reversed,with long-term implications fo

19、r peoples health and livelihoods.While in some ways our food systems have also proved surprisingly resilient,as both the private and public sectors have stepped up to meet new needs,the challenges are huge.As climate change worsens and geopoliti-cal strife grows amid the threat of more frequent pand

20、emics,crises may well become more common and more devastating.Now is the time to rethink how we address food crises.Many governments,donors,and international organizations have called for moving beyond humanitarian responses that are implemented only after a cri-sis begins,toward better prediction,p

21、reparation,and resilience building that will make future crises less devastating.While discussions of a humanitarian-development-peace approach have been underway for years,this report aims to provide a solid policy basis for moving forward.The 2023 Global Food Policy Report explores a growing body

22、of evidence on how diverse policy responses can reduce both the immediate and longer-term impacts of food crises,and improve livelihoods,incomes,and food security and nutrition for the future.Drawing on research from IFPRI and other CGIAR centers,it provides evidence-based policy recommendations for

23、 governments,donors,and nongovern-mental organizations.We hope that this years report will help shape a transformation in how we respond to the shocks that threaten our food systems,by contributing evidence and policy options to inform discussions among local,national,and global policymakers.We look

24、 forward to engaging with many partners around the world to expand this research work and support action for better crisis response.JOhAN SWINNENDirector General,IFPRIManaging Director,Systems Transformation,CGIAR 3AcknowledgmentsThe 2023 Global Food Policy Report was prepared under the overall lead

25、ership of Johan Swinnen,KatrinaKosec,and a core team comprising Charlotte Hebebrand,Pamela Stedman-Edwards,Sivan Yosef,Claire Davis,and Jamed Falik.Contributions were made by Kibrom Abay,KamiljonAkramov,Ben Belton,SamuelBenin,LynnBrown,KevinChen,EugenioDaz-Bonilla,Xinshen Diao,Olivier Ecker,Friederi

26、keGreb,Manuel Hernandez,KalleHirvonen,Arif Husain,Anjani Kumar,Sikandra Kurdi,David Laborde,Peter Lderach,JessicaLeight,HazelMalapit,Rui Mao,Wim Marivoet,Harriet Mawia,Jean-Franois Maystadt,Brian McNamara,BartMinten,ValeriaPieiro,MiriamRaouf,Shahidur Rashid,Thomas Reardon,Brendan Rice,Sandra Ruckstu

27、hl,JohnUlimwengu,RobVos,SivanYosef,andYunyiZhou.Production of the report was led by PamelaStedman-Edwards.Jason Chow was responsible for design and layout.Editorial assistance was provided by Claire Davis and Gillian Hollerich.We would like to thank IFPRIs donors,including all those who supported IF

28、PRIs research through their contributions for the CGIAR Fund:https:/cgiar.org/funders/5KEY MESSAGES Calls to rethink responses to food crises have arisen from recent overlap-ping shocks to food systems including the COVID-19 pandemic,increased food prices,conflicts,and natural disasters and from con

29、cerns that crises are becoming more frequent,complex,and protracted.Now is an oppor-tune moment to develop more permanent responses to food crises,guided by strong evidence on the impact of policies,programming,tools,and gov-ernance approaches.Drawing on research from IFPRI and colleagues,this repor

30、t provides a broad set of evidence-based recommendations for better predicting and preparing for crises,addressing crises when they occur,and building equity and the resilience of food systems.Early warning systems can facilitate preemptive,rapid,and context-appropriate responses,provided they are w

31、ell coordinated and based on frequent monitoring of key indicators and understanding of how structural risks can aggravate shocks to food security.Anticipatory action frameworks,which help prepare and organize humanitarian aid before crises strike,show promise both for mitigating crises and supporti

32、ng long-term development efforts.Agrifood value chains can support livelihoods and food security during crises when governments maintain a business environment that fosters flexibility and technical and financial innovation,and provide essential infrastructure and targeted assistance for at-risk val

33、ue chain actors.Social protection systems are essential to reducing the impact of crises;they can build resilience prior to a crisis and facilitate recovery when they are flexible,shock-responsive,and carefully targeted.Integrating social protection with gender and climate goals can further empower

34、women and promote sustainability.Improvements in collecting gender-disaggregated data,particularly amid crises,and tracking progress toward clear gender targets can promote gender equality.Likewise,including womens voices in policy-making and programming decisions can help ensure that crisis respons

35、es improve rather than erode gender equality.Forced migration can create both challenges and opportunities for development.Migrants can provide benefits for both the host and sending communities when policies facilitate their integration into host communities and support those who remain.The resilie

36、nce of food systems depends critically on good governance;gov-ernance determines the ability to implement and sustain effective policies and programming to offset negative shocks,curb incentives for violent con-flict,and support the functioning of markets and private sector investments.Recent events

37、 have highlighted the need for crisis response funding to be expanded and used more efficiently.Repurposing agricultural support funds and better leveraging private sector funds could bolster investment in long-term resilience.CHAPTER 1The Road to ResilienceRethinking Responses to Food CrisesJOHAN S

38、WINNEN AND KATRINA KOSECJohan Swinnen is managing director,Systems Transformation,CGIAR,and director general,International Food Policy Research Institute(IFPRI).Katrina Kosec is a senior research fellow,Development Strategies and Governance Unit,IFPRI.6 Rethinhing RespieRe ep ppod heReIn 2022,the wo

39、rld faced multiple crises.Globally,disruptions to food systems continued amid a protracted pandemic,major natural disasters,civil unrest and political instability,and the grow-ing impacts of climate change,all while the war in Ukraine exacerbated a global food and fer-tilizer crisis.Yet some aspects

40、 of food systems have proved surprisingly resilient in the face of crisis.The International Food Policy Research Institutes(IFPRIs)2021 Global Food Policy Report:Transforming Food Systems after COVID-19 showed,for example,that adopting new business models helped to keep food value chains function-in

41、g during the pandemic,and expanding social protection programs reduced negative impacts on food security.Moving forward,a range of promising approaches have already been identified to pro-mote resilience along with other development goals.For example,IFPRIs 2022 Global Food Policy Report:Climate Cha

42、nge&Food Systems out-lines several policies,such as rural access to clean energy,trade reforms,and landscape governance,that address climate change while also supporting poverty reduction and food security.While these advances hold potential,the global community still needs a better understanding of

43、 how food sys-tems and their various actors respond to crises,and which policy interventions could successfully sup-port households and food value chains in different countries and crisis contexts.Over many years,IFPRI has built a wealth of evidence on policies,programming,tools,and approaches that

44、reduce hunger and poverty and promote sustainable development and wom-ens empowerment,including during crises.With this report,we present some of our most recent research in response to the growing call for a more holistic approach to preparing for,detect-ing,averting,mitigating,and responding to cr

45、ises.Heeding this call will require a shift from simply responding to crises with humanitarian assistance to a concerted approach that strengthens the humanitarian-development-peace nexus,supports and empowers the most vulnerable,and builds more resilient food systems for the future.In this first ch

46、apter,we highlight the vulnerability of food systems to frequent and damaging shocks etR paod ep RehlhRi R 7that are affecting growing numbers of people.The chapter presents key recommendations from the reports thematic chapters,which explore how gov-ernments and other key stakeholders can better pr

47、epare for and respond to shocks and crises.We also consider the cornerstones of a more effective response to crises:effective governance and suf-ficient and flexible funding.The regional section of the report reviews how crises have impacted six major world regions in recent years,and how these deve

48、lopments signal new challenges and opportu-nities.We hope this report helps to advance a new paradigm for crisis mitigation and response,one that facilitates robust recovery and improved stabil-ity for all.VULNERABILITY OF FOOD SYSTEMS AND FOOD SECURITYFood systems were facing threats well before th

49、e COVID-19 pandemic.In the years before the pan-demic,global development progress had started stagnating and even reversing in some places a marked change following several decades of dra-matic declines in hunger and poverty.In 2014,572 million people were undernourished a record low.But by 2019,thi

50、s number had grown to 618 million,largely due to conflict,weather-related disasters,and economic downturns in many coun-tries(Figure 1).1During the past few years,multiple shocks have worsened this reversal in progress.The pandemic triggered a global recession,widespread labor shortages,food losses,

51、and transport bottlenecks,which affected both the quantity and quality of available food.This likely increased the number of undernourished by 196 million people,raising the total to 768 million by 2021.2 In 2020,an astound-ing 3 billion people could not afford a healthy diet.3 This constellation of

52、 factors also set back achieve-ment of gender equality by more than 30 years,as measured by changes in the World Economic Forums Global Gender Gap Index between 2020 and 2022.4As the recovery from COVID-19 began,prices surged for food,fuel,and fertilizer,creating new Figure 1 Prevalence and number o

53、f undernourished worldwide,20002021Source:FAO,IFAD,UNICEF,WFP,and WHO,The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022(Rome:FAO,2022).Note:Values for 2021 are projected;the figure shows the mid-point of the projected ranges.These figures reflect chronic hunger;see Chapter 2 on different me

54、asures of food insecurity.Number of people undernourished Prevalence of undernourishment18%7965727.8%6187689.8%8%13%16%14%12%10%6%8%900800700600500300400PercentMillions2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 20218 Rethinhing RespieRe e

55、p ppod heReBox 1 FOOD AND FERTILIZER CRISIS,20212022In 2021,food prices rose to their highest levels in a decade as a result of weather shocks,strong demand associated with recovery from the COVID-19-induced recession,lingering supply chain disruptions,and record low inventories for wheat,corn,and s

56、oybeans.High natural gas and coal prices also pushed fertilizer prices to record highs.In the aftermath of the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine,food and fertilizer prices spiked even further,causing serious harm not only to wheat-importing countries,many in the Middle East and North Africa,but also

57、 to many other low-and middle-income countries.Even though many international commodity prices began to fall by mid-2022,they still remain above the historical pre-COVID-19 average,and domestic inflation remains rampant in many low-income countries.1The impacts on food and nutrition security and pov

58、erty are likely to be dire.Simulations run by IFPRI researchers show that the global price shocks may have caused national poverty headcount rates to rise by as much as 7.7 percentage points and undernourishment by up to 4.4 percentage points.2 In Egypt,for example,48 percent of households have alre

59、ady reported eating less food to reduce expenses,and 75 percent have reported eating less chicken and eggs,key sources of protein.3The outlook for 2023 remains critical.4 Global stock-to-use ratios for grains remain at or below the lows of recent years.These could reach critical levels if global sta

60、ple food production falls due to greatly reduced harvests in Ukraine,projected drought conditions in the Southern Hemisphere,decreased fertilizer application resulting from relatively high fertilizer prices,new weather shocks,or other shocks caused by the war in Europe or elsewhere(Figure).Moreover,

61、many low-income countries face significant macroeconomic problems,and the share of low-income countries in debt distress has increased by 60 percent since 2015.Efforts to respond to this crisis could be improved with robust early warning systems,donor transparency and coordination,and a shift toward

62、 crisis resilience.Global ending stocks,excluding ChinaSource:Data from US Department of Agriculture,Foreign Agricultural Service,Production,Supply,and Distribution online,accessed January 2023.6040020503010MaizeSoybeansRiceWheatDays of use702020/212021/222022/23etR paod ep RehlhRi R 9problems that

63、were exacerbated when Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.International food prices subsequently rose another 32 percent,5 and fertilizer prices tripled(Box 1).6 Of the countries that were already in a food crisis in 2021,more than half depended on Russia and Ukraine for wheat imports,heightenin

64、g risks for their populations.7 International food and fertilizer prices have since fallen but remain high by historical standards,and many low-and middle-income countries(LMICs)are plagued by ris-ing domestic inflation and depreciating currencies.As a result of these compounding crises,as many as 2

65、05 million people in 45 countries experienced crisis-level acute food insecurity or worse by 2022,a number that has nearly doubled since 2016.8 Most recently,in early 2023,a severe earthquake killed tens of thousands across Syria and Turkey and left many homeless,further intensifying the level of cr

66、isis for these countries.Shocks to food systems can take many different forms and vary dramatically in their impacts.When they lead to severe disruptions that cause a surge in acute food insecurity,these shocks are deemed a food crisis(see Chapter 2 for the technical definition of a food crisis).Whe

67、ther a community,country,or region is resilient to a shock or is at risk of a food crisis depends on many factors.Past experiences show that crises rarely arise from isolated shocks to food systems.They are often compounded,and their negative effects intensified,by long-term sources of fragility,inc

68、luding poverty,climate change,gender and social inequalities,poor gover-nance and lack of trust in public sector institutions,and lack of social cohesion.Threats from climate change loom especially large for many countries,especially those in Africa.Climate change is rapidly intensifying,increasing

69、pressure on food systems,rural livelihoods,and ecosystems more broadly.9 While some places may benefit from a longer growing season amid ris-ing temperatures,changing weather patterns and advancing desertification have reduced the aver-age growth in agricultural productivity by as much as 21 percent

70、 since 1961.This decline in growth,which is expected to worsen,is most harmful to tropical agriculture.10Climate change is also triggering more fre-quent and extreme weather events(Figure 2),with Figure 2 Trends in extreme weather events,droughts,and floods,19002022Source:Data from EM-DAT,accessed J

71、anuary 2023.https:/emdat.be/Note:Extreme weather includes severe storms,tornadoes,sandstorms,and extreme temperatures,among other events.25020000000200020102020DroughtsFloodsExtreme weather eventsNumber of events10 Rethinhing RespieRe ep ppod heRedevastati

72、ng impacts on food systems and human lives,especially in more densely populated and water-scarce regions of LMICs.In 2022,flooding in Pakistan displaced more than 33 million peo-ple,and an ongoing drought in the Horn of Africa killed 7 million livestock.11 Climate change,along with poor agricultural

73、 practices,can increase the risk of plant diseases,pests,and zoonotic diseases.Projections from IFPRIs IMPACT model find that 65 million more people will be undernourished by 2030 and as many as 72 million more by 2050 with climate change,as compared to a scenario without climate change.12Climate ch

74、ange also affects conflict and dis-placement in multiple ways.13 In 2020,about three-quarters of internally displaced people(IDPs)were forced to relocate by disasters mostly weather-related.14 Conflict accounts for the other quarter,including in Somalia and Yemen,where famine warnings have recently

75、been issued.In many places,conflict and climate change both contribute to crisis situations,most notably in Syria,Afghanistan,and South Sudan,where num-bers of IDPs and refugees are high.Countries enduring conflict are particularly vulnerable to climate-induced shocks,15 which can act as a threat mu

76、ltiplier that further increases insecurity,vio-lence,and migration as resources become scarce.Recent events highlight this complex relationship:of the more than 200 million people facing acute food insecurity in 2022,most live in protracted crisis situations that is,situations marked by pro-longed c

77、ivil strife and conflict,repeated weather shocks,and economic decline,or some combina-tion thereof.16UNEQUAL IMPACTSECONOMIC VULNERABILITYRecent crises highlight the vast differences in how food system shocks affect the rich and the poor both countries and their vulnerable populations.In general,LMI

78、Cs have fared worse throughout many recent shocks,due to limited budgets to enact stimulus and social protection measures,reduced remittances from high-income countries,and rapidly rising import bills for food and agri-cultural inputs.Within these countries,vulnerable populations bear the brunt of c

79、rises.These groups which include rural smallholders,the urban poor,the landless,IDPs,and refugees can be made even more vulnerable by other com-pounding factors,such as gender,age,ethnicity,and social class.Food system shocks are felt most severely in fragile and conflict-affected settings,where 1.5

80、 billion people currently live.The 2021 UN Food Systems Summit(UNFSS)underscored this burden,noting,“most hungry people are in fragile and conflict-affected placeswhere it is espe-cially difficult to transform food systems and to meet the needs of the most vulnerable and mar-ginalized people.”On ave

81、rage,30 percent of people in countries facing protracted crisis situa-tions live in extreme poverty a situation that can prevent them from adapting to and recovering from shocks.17Coping strategies can affect food and nutri-tion security,as well as long-term well-being.Shifting to cheaper,less nutri

82、tious staple foods,for example,is a common coping response among the poor,a practice that has increased amid pandemic-related food shortages and ris-ing prices driven by the Russia-Ukraine war.Other damaging strategies include selling off produc-tive assets and reducing spending on education and hea

83、lth particularly for girls.Earlier marriage of girls is another response that leads to last-ing harm.18 Migration,either voluntary or forced,can have negative health implications and create challenges for livelihoods and access to produc-tive resources,for both migrants and their host communities.Ho

84、wever,migration can also help households escape crises,diversify risks,and expand income-generating activities.19Forced migrants including IDPs and refu-gees are among the most vulnerable.By 2022,a projected 103 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide(Figure 3).Of this group,80 percent expe

85、rienced acute food insecurity and high levels of malnutrition.20 Russias invasion of Ukraine has triggered Europes largest refugee cri-sis since World War II,with nearly 8 million people fleeing the war.Despite this,LMICs host 83 percent of the worlds international refugees,many of whom have been di

86、splaced for years and even decades.21 etR paod ep RehlhRi R 11The number of IDPs is almost double that of inter-national refugees,with about half living in Syria,Colombia,the Democratic Republic of the Congo,and Yemen.GENDER AT THE CENTER OF FOOD CRISESWomen are disproportionately harmed by cri-ses,

87、given the structural and normative barriers that limit their resilience and ability to respond effectively.More so than for men,shocks reduce womens access to food and dietary diversity,decision-making power within their households,assets,services like healthcare,and physical safety,and also deepen

88、their time poverty.22 These vul-nerabilities stem from womens already limited access to resources,technologies,and services which is intensified by shocks and crises as well as to channels of power and influence that could help them benefit from crisis response policies and programming.23Rural women

89、 in LMICs face barriers not only to accessing land,water,and other productive resources,24 but,just as importantly,to accessing and benefiting from complementary resources,technologies,and services needed for agricultural production and participation in the food system.25 For example,having less soc

90、ial capital can limit womens access to technology(such as modern agricultural inputs,mechanization,labor-saving technologies,and information and communications technology ICT),agricultural extension and advi-sory services,and financial services(credit,formal savings,and insurance).Crises can intensi

91、fy these gender gaps as resources become increasingly scarce,womens access is likely to decline further.Shocks can also intensify the burden of unpaid care work for women,such as providing food,col-lecting water,and caring for the sick,and increase gender-based violence.Shocks and crises can also di

92、srupt critical social protection structures and support.For exam-ple,extreme weather events or a pandemic like COVID-19 can prevent women from accessing government identification cards needed for relief programs,or make it difficult to collect payments.In times of crises,governance structures may al

93、so prove more dysfunctional or reduce funds for social protection.Figure 3 Forcibly displaced people worldwideSource:UNHCR,Refugee Data Finder,updated October 2022.https:/www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/Note:Includes internally displaced people as of end-2021,refugees as of mid-2022,asylum-seekers

94、as of mid-2022,and other people in need of international protection as of mid-2022.402002200420062008200022Millions12012 Rethinhing RespieRe ep ppod heReMigration further complicates gender issues.Women and girls account for about 50 percent of

95、IDPs and refugees,but in some places they make up a much larger share.In addition,children account for more than 40 percent of all displaced people.26 However,when women remain at origin and men migrate as often occurs with eco-nomic shocks women may shift from contributing as family workers to beco

96、me primary farmers.27 Without access to key resources or greater decision-making power,this increase in responsibil-ities and workload can leave women worse off.28A WAY FORWARD:BUILDING ON WHAT WORKSAlthough the rise in food insecurity and poverty is alarming,food systems showed major strengths duri

97、ng recent crises.Understanding these strengths can help stakeholders rethink the way forward and build on successes as they respond to new crises.In recent decades,a range of transformational developments has increased the resilience of food systems.Trade has helped countries to secure alter-native

98、suppliers during supply shocks,though export restrictions during crises can still pose a threat.29 Urbanization and rising incomes in LMICs have sparked demand for more diverse foods,including animal-source foods and fruits and vegetables.In response,value chains have expanded and diversi-fied,poten

99、tially improving the ability to meet food and nutritional needs in the face of shocks,while creating new livelihood opportunities.Value chains also provide inputs and services to rural producers,which can increase resilience in the agriculture sec-tor.In rural and urban areas,social safety nets have

100、 been more widely adopted,providing food security and better economic opportunities for women and men.In many places,the growing empowerment of women has strengthened their decision-making role in food systems,helping them to derive greater ben-efits from these systems.In addition,efforts have been

101、expanded to pre-dict crises and proactively reduce their impacts through programming and effective gover-nance and institutions.Several new approaches have been tested around the world,including anticipatory action programs,forecast-based financing,and the scaling-up of innovative social safety nets

102、.The upward trend in migration has,when managed well,expanded job opportunities(particularly for youth)and helped households sup-port their livelihoods,make investments,and build resilience.30 Taken together,these developments warrant policies that capitalize on their capacity to support resilience.

103、A NEW,MORE PERMANENT RESPONSEAs the world reflects on lessons learned from recent food system shocks,now is an opportune moment to rethink our approach to food crisis response by building on existing innovations and exploring new solutions.Traditional crisis response has focused on humanitarian and

104、emergency food aid,but a more systematic and sustainable approach is needed to address protracted crises,which are likely rising.31 Research tools are already available to the interna-tional community and national governments to help them not only predict,monitor,and respond to cri-ses,but also to g

105、overn for resilience and equity.Shifting toward longer-term and more permanent“crisis resilience”is critical.The thematic chapters in this report explore some of the promising policies,programming,and tools for developing a strong response to increas-ing and intensifying shocks.These can help us bet

106、ter predict and prepare for crises,address cri-ses when they occur,and build more resilient and equitable food systems.PREPARING FOR CRISESEarly warning systems,especially in combina-tion with anticipatory action efforts,can facilitate both immediate humanitarian responses and the integration of aid

107、 with longer-term development strategies.Existing systems must be improved to better address the growing complexity of crises,including climate-related events and con-flict situations.Early-warning,early-action(EWEA)systems alert policymakers and international humanitar-ian agencies to sudden and si

108、gnificant increases in acute food insecurity,signaling food crises,and provide guidance on where and when to etR paod ep RehlhRi R 13target humanitarian efforts.A timely and effective response depends on accurately identifying and tracking different food crisis situations;understand-ing how they aff

109、ect different populations,sectors,and places;and addressing the pressures exerted on people and food systems.Multiple systems are already monitoring chronic and acute food insecurity as well as trends in agri-food markets,such as sudden changes in the prices of international agricultural commodities

110、 and fer-tilizers.This information is extremely useful,but ideally it should be consolidated and improved to shape responses more precisely.This will require filling gaps in monitoring and analysis,particu-larly to understand and track the drivers of crises in diverse contexts,including compound cri

111、ses.It will also require better integration of existing systems to ensure that policymakers and others receive clear,timely warning signals of potential cri-ses and guidance on priority setting.Finally,new processes are needed that allow for faster classifi-cation and response to crises,especially t

112、o identify famine,where immediate response is most cru-cial.Chapter 2 considers the role of early warning systems in crisis response and suggests ways to assist policymakers with defining and prioritiz-ing responses.The vast majority of humanitarian response is activated after a crisis occurs,delive

113、ring life-saving aid but at relatively high costs.During crises,rapid response is critical to reach households before they deplete savings or engage in dam-aging coping strategies,and before widespread repercussions occur,such as increased fragility.Anticipatory action frameworks help prepare and or

114、ganize humanitarian aid before crises strike by allocating funds,responsibilities,and supplies in advance.These frameworks,along with innovative forms of humanitarian assistance,show promise for mitigating crises at lower costs and supporting longer-term development efforts.Once triggered by an earl

115、y warning system,the anticipatory action plan can be implemented smoothly and without lengthy delays.Anticipatory action requires monitoring data that illuminate risks,exposure,and vulnerability;information services that can reach vulnera-ble people and advise them on how to respond;and a clear deci

116、sion support system,especially in fragile settings where government authority may be weak.Its effective delivery also depends on robust governance arrangements,which can ensure appropriate targeting and deployment.When more broadly conceived,anticipatory action can help shift the focus of crisis res

117、ponse toward longer-term resilience and development by incor-porating nutrition-sensitive programming,making use of local procurement,and supporting local institutions and more permanent safety nets.This approach could play a crucial role in mitigating food system shocks,but currently makes up only

118、a small percentage of humanitarian aid.To increase adoption of these programs,more data and research are needed on the effectiveness of different humanitarian assistance approaches and anticipatory action programs for protecting food and nutrition security particularly in fragile and conflict-affect

119、ed settings.Chapter 3 discusses the potential of anticipatory action and innovative types of humanitarian assistance,how these can align with development strategies,and how further data collection and analysis can support them.CREATING RESILIENT FOOD SYSTEMSSocial protection systems,including safety

120、 net programs that provide food or cash transfers,can both build resilience prior to a crisis and facili-tate crisis recovery.They are most effective when they are flexible,shock-responsive,and well tar-geted.Before a crisis,safety nets help households and communities build assets,increase productiv

121、e investments,and diversify income sources.During crises,social safety nets can prevent negative cop-ing strategies that pose risks to long-term health and livelihoods.Many LMICs have dramatically expanded their social safety nets in recent years,but as the COVID-19 pandemic and recent food price sp

122、ikes showed,coverage is low in the poor-est countries,and many cannot access these safety nets particularly the urban poor.A proactive approach is needed to develop social protection systems that are highly adap-tive,flexible,and inclusive,and can be quickly expanded when crises strike.Support can b

123、e scaled up more quickly and effectively by inte-grating these“shock-responsive”social protection 14 Rethinhing RespieRe ep ppod heResystems with EWEA systems and humanitarian aid,and creating unified and digitized targeting systems.In addition,integrating social protec-tion with gender and climate

124、goals can further empower women and promote environmental sus-tainability.Given the great need to expand safety net programs,new ways to cover costs should be explored,such as integration with green financing schemes,as well as ways to reduce implementa-tion costs,including cash transfers and mobile

125、 payments.Chapter 5 considers the role of social protection in both resilience building and cri-sis response,exploring how these programs have evolved over time and how best to ensure their longevity by examining financial realities,new modalities,and a greater focus on inclusion.The successful func

126、tioning of food systems relies on agrifood value chains,including the pro-duction,processing,transport,and marketing of food.These value chains differ greatly in their struc-ture and local contexts,which in turn affects the impact of shocks and value chain responses.Given these differences,crisis re

127、sponses are likely to be more effective when tailored to the type of shock,the particular context and value chain,and if possi-ble,the size of the affected enterprises.The experience of the COVID-19 pandemic highlights the importance of flexibility for all types of value chains and their actors.Almo

128、st every-where,food-related businesses that were able to digitize and develop new marketing mecha-nisms amid pandemic-related restrictions proved hardier that those that were not.32 Private sector actors can increase their businesses resilience by investing in improved and innovative tools,such as c

129、limate-smart agriculture and new forms of insurance.Governments can provide support by creating a regulatory and business environment that fosters value chain innovations and ensures that women-owned enterprises can take advan-tage of them.Governments can also support an open trade policy to facilit

130、ate the diversifica-tion of value chains.Before and during crises,government monitoring can help to ensure the continuation of private trading and guide it where needed.Chapter 4 explores the strengths and vulner-abilities of value chains,with a close look at the differences in how crises affect var

131、ious actors,including small and large enterprises and those owned by women and men.It shows how the capacity to innovate and policies that allow trade and innovation to continue are critical to both quick recovery and long-term resilience.SUPPORTING AND EMPOWERING THE MOST VULNERABLEBuilding resilie

132、nce among the most vulnera-ble populations,particularly women and forced migrants,can reduce the impact of crises when they occur and speed recovery.Food system resil-ience must therefore include a strong focus on enhancing livelihoods and inclusion.These efforts must prioritize the needs of the mos

133、t vulnerable in the short term,ensuring access to food and vital services,but also build their resilience and capacity for the longer term.Empowering women amid crisis situations is particularly important,given that they shoul-der a disproportionate share of negative impacts and often deplete their

134、assets or compromise their diets as a coping mechanism.A first step to increase equity involves improving the qual-ity of gender-disaggregated data collected before and during crisis situations,including on womens access to programs meant to support them.Innovative methods,such as phone sur-veys,can

135、 facilitate data collection in fragile and conflict-affected settings.When decision-makers have more specific information about the different women who are enduring various negative effects,policies and programming can be tailored to bet-ter support them.Effective policy responses along with legal p

136、rotections will also need to account for the barriers that women face to participat-ing in food systems,their domestic work burdens,and the likelihood of gender-based violence,all of which are likely to increase amid crises.Efforts must also be made to increase womens political participation and amp

137、lify their voice and agency in their communities.In particular,wom-ens voices must be included in peace processes and high-level positions where policymaking and programming decisions are made,so that cri-sis responses improve rather than erode gender equality.Such policy responses can empower etR p

138、aod ep RehlhRi R 15and create opportunities for women while also addressing the adverse impacts of crises.Finally,supporting womens access to resources and tech-nologies,including mobile phones,can help them better weather crises.Being explicit about gender targets and track-ing progress is central

139、to promoting gender equality amid crises.For the long term,effec-tive gender-focused interventions including cash transfers,self-help groups and other civil society organizations,and/or technical and voca-tional training,among others,can help women in diverse settings build resilience to shocks and

140、crises.Chapter 6 explores what we know about the gendered impacts of crises,reviews the most important data gaps,and provides recom-mendations for ensuring that crisis responses address inequities.Conflict and climatic and economic crises often trigger forced migration(Chapter 7),creating chal-lenge

141、s and opportunities for migrants and their sending and host communities.Although people forced to migrate often face high risks and food insecurity,migration can play an important role in improving individual livelihoods and economic development.Forced migrants and refugees have been shown to make p

142、ositive contributions to their host communities economies,and remittances to sending communities can provide substantial benefits as well.33 Thus,all stand to benefit from policies that facilitate economic and social integra-tion,including cash transfers,training programs,and the right to work and c

143、hoose a place of resi-dence.However,forced migration can strain host communities when resources and opportunities are limited,requiring efforts to limit migration from sending communities while strengthening the absorptive capacity of host communities.Governments,NGOs,and development orga-nizations

144、can better address the root causes of forced migration through innovative data collection and research,especially on irregular migration and the needs of women.They can build the capacity of host communities by investing in infrastructure and services and designing policies that expand the benefits

145、of migration and limit harms.Innovative approaches hold great potential to accelerate the transition from humanitarian action to longer-term development,such as by aligning social protection and climate action objectives to mutually sup-port peace,security,and sustainability.Attention must also be p

146、aid to those who remain behind,because they often lack the resources or social net-works needed for migration,and are least capable of recovering from a crisis.Chapter 7 reviews key facts about forced migration and provides rec-ommendations to ensure that policies increase the benefits of migration

147、and reduce detrimental impacts on migrants,host communities,and send-ing communities.FOUNDATIONS FOR BETTER CRISIS RESPONSEImproving international and national responses to food crises cannot be done without accountable governance and effective institutions,policies,and programming,as well as reliab

148、le funding and over-sight to ensure that responses address immediate needs and long-term resilience.GOVERNANCEEffective governance at all levels is critical to advanc-ing early warning,anticipatory action,and policy responses that are sustainable and responsive to the compounding drivers of crisis.I

149、nstitutions and public sector incentives must support government accountability(that is,responsiveness to citizens needs and preferences),as well as the equitable,reliable,and cost-effective provision of infrastruc-ture and services.This requires making the best use of government investments(rather

150、than wasting or squandering them),and ensuring the effec-tive deployment,communication,and continuity of anticipatory action,humanitarian assistance,social protection,and other programs that are criti-cal to averting and addressing shocks and crises.34 Effective governance can also minimize market d

151、is-ruptions and incentivize private sector investments to promote resilience.Finally,it can more broadly contribute to trust and social cohesion to help avoid internal conflicts and future crises.35 The pil-lars of the UNs far-reaching Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction integrate good gove

152、rnance structures,and many measures of crisis prepared-ness include some version of governance,whether 16 Rethinhing RespieRe ep ppod heReviewed as the provision of planning services or effective communication between leaders and their citizens.36 In many instances,good governance mechanisms have be

153、en shown to improve disaster preparedness.37Many promising approaches exist to build effec-tive governance.For example,transparency and the free flow of information,including through ICT that connects government with citizens,can help make governments more accountable.38 Improving the incentive envi

154、ronment for bureaucrats and frontline service providers can ensure that they are hired and promoted for delivering what mat-ters to citizens.Education,training,and transparent policymaking can help guarantee that the voices of women and other vulnerable groups are included in crisis responses to bro

155、adly support gender equality and social inclusion.To hold governments accountable,international and local actors can use research tools to track social,economic,and envi-ronmental risks and to monitor and evaluate policy responses to crises.FINANCING MECHANISMS FOR CRISIS PREVENTION,PREPAREDNESS,AND

156、 RESPONSEThe developments of the past few years have dramatically increased the need for better crisis response funding.In 2023,the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs appealed for US$52 billion in funding for humanitarian assistance and protection,a 461 percent increase since 201

157、2.Funding received in 2022 amounted to$24 billion,or only 47 percent of the need.39 Governments were forced to spend record amounts on social protection in response to compound crises,even as programs faced disruptions due to these very shocks.In 2022,170 economies announced,imple-mented,or enhanced

158、 more than 1,000 social protection and associated programs to mitigate the impacts of inflation,a fourfold increase from April 2022 to December 2022.About$711 billion,equivalent to 0.7 percent of global GDP,was invested in social protection in 2022.40This funding must be increased to meet grow-ing n

159、eeds.Although some crisis funding increased in 2022 such as the International Monetary Funds(IMFs)opening of a temporary food shock window to quickly channel funds to countries impacted by the global food crisis far more is needed,espe-cially for crisis preparedness,resilience building,and support f

160、or humanitarian-development-peace approaches.Smart investments to build resil-ient food systems,while costly,are far more cost-efficient and effective than reacting to crises after they occur.The finance lever of the UNFSS estimates that it would cost between US$300 billion and$400 billion per year

161、through 2030 to transform food systems for sustainability and resilience.41 Some of this investment can be used to expand credit market access to smallholders and small and medium enterprises in LMICs.Credit can pro-vide these businesses with a short-term financial cushion during shocks and an oppor

162、tunity for long-term investment in resilience-enhancing tech-nology and practices.For example,producers can use credit to invest in solar power,cold storage,or drought-resistant crop varieties that will help address climate threats.At the national and inter-national levels,financial flows should be

163、redirected toward more crisis-resilient technology,prac-tices,and infrastructure.Forecast-based finance schemes,currently being implemented by some agencies,could be expanded and deployed in fragile settings for beneficiaries and locations that have been identified ahead of time.A key strategy to re

164、direct these funds involves repurposing the more than$600 billion in global spending that goes for agricultural support.Currently,much of this financing supports activi-ties that are inefficient and unsustainable.Some funds could be reallocated to incentivize the adop-tion of more sustainable practi

165、ces such as no-till farming,and invested in agricultural research and development aimed at traditional targets such as productivity gains,as well as new targets such as improved resilience.42Policymakers can also do more to shift private investment toward crisis prevention and resilience,given that

166、private sector investment in food sys-tems far outweighs that of governments.Both the quantity and quality of private sector funding for resilience can be improved by creating an enabling environment for private sector actors to invest,and incentivizing investments that support liveli-hoods and sust

167、ainability.Business opportunities etR paod ep RehlhRi R 17to implement Sustainable Development Goal actions related to food and agriculture could gar-ner$2.3 trillion annually for the private sector by 2030,while requiring an annual investment of only$320 billion.43 Conversely,enacting rules for pri

168、vate investors,such as requiring publicly traded compa-nies to disclose environmental and climate-related risks,could more closely align financial incentives with the SDGs and the Paris Climate Agreement.44 Development banks could also use their funds to de-risk and crowd-in private investment throu

169、gh blended finance or food systems bonds.For exam-ple,the Bridgetown Agenda,promoted at the recent climate COP27,called for$500 billion in IMF Special Drawing Rights to be used to attract private investment in resilience for low-income countries at the frontlines of the climate crisis.45 Ultimately,

170、all such changes to current financial flows would pre-vent even greater future costs in the form of crisis response,economic disruption,and loss of life.CONCLUSIONThe first years of this decade exposed the many vulnerabilities of our food systems,which employ 2 billion people and sustain and nourish

171、 all of the worlds 8 billion people.46 Food systems are not only susceptible to increasingly complex and compounding shocks,but are also closely inter-twined with other essential systems climate and environmental services,trade and the economy,infrastructure,governance,healthcare,and social protecti

172、on.Failures within these systems can cause crises in our food systems,and in turn,weaknesses in our food systems can drive environmental degra-dation,conflict,economic disruptions,and poverty and inequity.Using food systems to build a more proactive response to disaster one that is anticipatory,flex

173、-ible,and inclusive can produce multiple benefits for food and nutrition security,poverty,liveli-hoods,equality,and political stability.The process of building and improving crisis responses should be rooted in high-quality evidence:robust data,state-of-the-art tools,and policy analyses and sce-nari

174、os developed by research organizations and networks like IFPRI and CGIAR.This evidence can help policymakers,donors,the international development community,and the private sector to move quickly in times of need.Increasing crises in human systems and the natural world will not abate in coming years

175、the time to step up our efforts to develop a more permanent,sustainable response is now.18 Rethinhing RespieRe ep ppod heReNow is an opportune moment to rethink our approach to food crisis responses by building on existing innovations and exploring new solutions.KEY MESSAGES Early-warning,early-acti

176、on systems provide alerts of potential food crises identified as sudden and substantial increases in acute food insecurity as well as guidance to policymakers and international development agencies about needs for humanitarian action.Use of different methodologies and varying coverage of vulnerable

177、populations mean different early warning systems for acute food inse-curity can yield dissimilar estimates of the severity of food crises.Local food security monitoring systems are poorly connected to sys-tems that track global food and agriculture market trends.Monitoring of acute food insecurity a

178、nd chronic food insecurity are poorly inte-grated at the country level.This leads to differing interpretations of the nature and magnitude of food crises.Existing systems pay insufficient attention to structural vulnerabilities that determine how different shocks,including global price shocks,affect

179、 food insecurity in particular contexts and compound other causes of acute food insecurity,such as poverty,conflict,and climate change.Famines are the catastrophic expression of severe food crises.Todays famine-like contexts are mostly driven by conflict.Conflict typically impedes the data collectio

180、n required by existing protocols for declaring famine,which can delay humanitarian action,at the expense of a pre-ventable human toll.To increase the effectiveness of early warning systems,it is important to:Expand the country coverage and frequency of consensus-based acute food insecurity analysis.

181、Revise the protocol for declaration of a famine to ensure it is operational in conflict-affected locations.Better integrate the various types of early warning systems for food crises through much stronger collaborative efforts across responsible international organizations,with support from the rese

182、arch commu-nity and in consultation with policymakers,development agencies,and local actors.Improve monitoring of risk factors and structural causes of crises to sup-port the development of real-time early warning systems that are able to anticipate and potentially help prevent food crises through t

183、imely and well-targeted responses.Strengthen analysis of factors driving crises in particular places including global supply and price shocks,how these are transmitted to local contexts,what structural vulnerabilities increase or mitigate their impact,and how they affect acute and chronic food insec

184、urity to inform long-term responses that build resilience and reduce the risk of food crises.CHAPTER 2Food Crisis Risk MonitoringEarly Warning for Early ActionROB VOS,ARIF HUSAIN,FRIEDERIKE GREB,PETER LDERACH,AND BRENDAN RICERob Vos is director,Markets,Trade,and Institutions Unit,International Food

185、Policy Research Institute(IFPRI).Arif Husain is chief economist and director of Research,Assessment and Monitoring,World Food Programme.Friederike Greb is an economist,Research,Assessment and Monitoring,World Food Programme.Peter Lderach is CGIAR co-lead for climate security,The Alliance of Bioversi

186、ty and CIAT.Brendan Rice is a research analyst,Markets,Trade,and Institutions Unit,IFPRI.20 Early Earnrng fa Early EAcnfrGlobal and national agrifood systems are vul-nerable to a variety of shocks that have caused major disruptions to food production,mar-kets,and livelihoods over the past two decade

187、s,and have set back efforts to reduce poverty,food insecurity,and malnutrition.Currently,the world is contending with the global repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war.In many countries,the impact of the war is compounded by local conflict,weather shocks,lingering effects of COVID-19,macro-economic

188、 instability,and weak coping capacity.These concurrent crises have led to a sharp rise in both acute and chronic food insecurity since 2017,especially in developing countries.According to estimates from the United Nations agencies,chronic food insecurity measured as the number of people with prolong

189、ed insufficient food energy intake rose from around 573 million in 2017 to as many as 828 million in 2021(Figure 1A).Acute food insecu-rity measured as food deficiency affecting lives at any given point in time almost doubled between 2016 and 2022,from 108 million people in 2016 to 205 million in 20

190、22 in 45 food crisis countries(Figure 1B).Estimates of the World Food Programme(WFP),which considers more countries,suggest that as many as 349 million people in 79 countries faced acute food insecurity in 2022.1This rapid rise in food insecurity has placed tremendous pressure on governments and hum

191、an-itarian and development partners to respond,despite limited financial resources.These actors are also hindered by insufficient information needed for prioritizing policies,investments,and other interventions and for balancing responses to immediate impacts with investments in longer-term resilien

192、ce.Governments and international agen-cies increasingly need more effective early warning systems that provide timely and accurate pro-jections to inform policies for immediate and longer-term responses.Multiple early warning systems exist to monitor food crisis risks.Among those that directly monit

193、or acute food insecurity,there is considerable overlap and sometimes seemingly conflicting information because of differences in methods,population coverage,and frequency of data collection.Other warning systems focus on global food and agricul-tural market trends,providing useful information ffd Aa

194、nsns ansk Mfrncfanrng 21Figure 1 Chronic hunger and acute food insecurityA.PEOPLE FACING CHRONIC HUNGER,20002021B.PEOPLE FACING CRISIS-LEVEL OR WORSE ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY,20162022People suffering hunger(millions)90080070060050040030020010002000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20102012

195、2013201514%10%12%8%6%4%2%0%201120142016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021MillionsPrevalence of undernourishment(PoU)(%)2502000022PMillionsSource:For Figure 1A,FAO,IFAD,UNICEF,WFP,and WHO,The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022(Rome:FAO,2022);For Figure 1B,F

196、SIN and GNAFC,2022 Global Report on Food Crises:Joint Analysis for Better Decisions(Rome:2022);and FSIN and GNAFC,2022 Global Report on Food Crises:Mid-Year Update(Rome:2022).Note:In Figure 1A,numbers for 2020 and 2021 indicate the pro-jected range.In Figure 1B,number for 2022 is projected.22 Early

197、Earnrng fa Early EAcnfrabout risks to(global)food availability and afford-ability,but do not directly link to national and localized food security risks.Better integration of these types of early warning systems and expanded capacity for data collection and analysis of complex drivers of food insecu

198、rity are needed to inform pol-icies and rapid action to reduce the impact of,or even prevent,food crises.This chapter provides an overview of the main early-warning,early-action(EWEA)systems now in place for identifying food crisis risks and inform-ing responses.We describe what works,as well as the

199、 shortcomings of present systems.The chapter then discusses how better integration of currently disjointed food crisis monitoring and analysis mech-anisms could create a more effective,real-time monitoring mechanism for identifying and under-standing global and national threats to food security.This

200、 would allow not only swift palliative action but importantly could also inform the design of preventative and preemptive responses that create resilient food systems and livelihoods and reduce food crisis risks.As such,it would overcome the costly drawbacks of traditional approaches that limit earl

201、y action to humanitarian assistance,which saves lives but does not address the structural vulnerabilities that may contribute to the recurrence of food crises and to the protracted nature of many food crisis situations.EARLY WARNING SYSTEMSFood security is a growing global concern demand-ing policy

202、solutions.A“food crisis”is generally identified when rates of acute food insecurity surge at the local,national,or global level(Box 1).2 Of the 45countries and territories covered in the most recent Global Report on Food Crises,10 reported that the number of people facing acute food insecu-rity incr

203、eased by more than 50 percent during 2022,owing to escalating food prices,weather extremes,and conflict or insecurity(Figure 1B).3 For exam-ple,at present,a compound crisis is unfolding in the Horn of Africa,where an unprecedented multisea-son drought that began in late 2020,combined with conflict,d

204、isplacement,and macroeconomic shocks,has put the region on the brink of famine.Increases in global food prices can be an import-ant driver of food insecurity,though the impacts are mediated by local conditions and vulnerabili-ties.Food prices surged in 2021 as markets faced supply bottlenecks during

205、 the COVID-19 recovery and spiked further in the first half of 2022 as a con-sequence of the Russia-Ukraine war.4 Countries already facing protracted food crises before the pandemic and the war have been hardest hit by the recent surge in food prices(see Chapter 1,Box 1).Populations in all 45 crisis

206、 contexts saw the cost of a Box 1 DEFINING FOOD INSECURITYFood insecurity is broadly defined as the lack of secure access to sufficient safe and nutritious food needed for normal human growth and development and for an active and healthy life.1Chronic food insecurity describes a situation where peop

207、le are unable to meet their minimum food requirements(usually defined as minimum intake of calories)over a sustained period of time usually over the course of a year or longer.Chronic food deprivation is most closely associated with“hunger,”that is,the prevalence of undernourishment,as monitored by

208、the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations(FAO)and other international organizations.2Acute food insecurity is defined as any manifestation of food insecurity at a specific point in time of a severity that threatens lives,livelihoods,or both,regardless of the causes,context,or durat

209、ion.3 Acute food insecurity is highly susceptible to change and can manifest in a population within a short amount of time,as a result of sudden changes or shocks that affect determinants of food insecurity and malnutrition.4 Acute food insecurity can be transitory,in the sense that it reflects a sh

210、ort-term or temporary inability to meet food consumption requirements related to sporadic crises,which suggests a capacity to recover.However,situations of severe acute food insecurity often emerge in contexts where widespread chronic food insecurity already exists and where affected people have lit

211、tle to no capacity to recover without assistance.ffd Aansns ansk Mfrncfanrng 23basic food basket increase by at least 10 percent by AprilJune 2022(up from the five-year average),but people in Ethiopia,Haiti,Sierra Leone,South Sudan,Sudan,Syria,Yemen,and Zimbabwe faced annual-ized food cost increases

212、 of more than 75 percent.5 Many are also suffering high general price inflation(driven by the cost of energy and other basic needs),further eroding their purchasing power.Most food crisis countries are highly depen-dent on food imports and have little capacity to insulate their populations from impo

213、rted food infla-tion,given their low foreign currency reserves,high public debt burdens,and/or depreciating national currency.International support to address this con-straint(such as through additional aid,debt relief,or improved access to contingency financing)is often overlooked as a necessary co

214、mpanion to food assis-tance.Even if this support comes,it typically arrives late and is inadequate,as we saw during the 2022 food crisis when the IMF opened its Food Shock Window only after food prices had been falling for more than four months.Consequently,govern-ments of food crisis countries have

215、 little scope to expand social protection or other support to vulner-able populations.Protracted civil strife and weather shocks have compounded economic woes in many of these countries,such that the total number of people facing acute food insecurity at crisis level or worse(Box 2)in 45 food crisis

216、 countries increased from 155 million in 2020 to 205 million by mid-2022.6 In Afghanistan,South Sudan,Somalia,Yemen,and parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo(DRC),more than half of the analyzed populations at risk are considered to face acute food insecurity or worse,and famine warnings have

217、 been issued for Somalia and Yemen(Figure 2).We focus here on two main types of early warn-ing systems:acute food insecurity early warning Figure 2 Share of analyzed populations in crisis-level or worse acute food insecurity in 45countries/territories,2022Source:Reproduced from FSIN and GNAFC,2022 G

218、lobal Report on Food Crises:Mid-Year Update(Rome:2022).5%Percentage of the analyzed populations(ranges)in Crisis or worse(IPC/CH Phase 3 or above)or equivalent1024.99%50%Country not selected for analysis59.99%2549.99%No 2022 dataIndicates migrants/refugee populations(color coding as shown in key)24

219、Early Earnrng fa Early EAcnfrsystems,which directly estimate degrees of food insecurity;and agricultural market information early warning systems,which focus on supply and mar-ket conditions that could endanger food security.In addition,we indicate how these systems relate to the monitoring of chron

220、ic food insecurity.Figure 3(and Table A.1 at the end of the chapter)charts the most important early warning systems by type of information provided(food insecurity or agricul-tural markets)and frequency of monitoring(annual,weekly,or daily).We discuss these below.ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY EARLY WARNING

221、MECHANISMSExisting EWEA systems,developed and run by several international agencies,humanitar-ian organizations,and governments,have been instrumental in monitoring acute food insecu-rity as well as the drivers of food insecurity spikes in local contexts.These systems have been use-ful in identifyin

222、g the need for food assistance and other humanitarian and development aid to stave off the worst consequences of food crises.The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification/Cadre Harmonis(IPC/CH),often referred to as the gold standard for classifying degrees of food insecurity,7 uses a five-phase

223、scale,with Phase 3 considered“crisis level,”where emergency food assistance is needed;Phase 4 is desig-nated“emergency,”with urgent action needed to save lives;and Phase 5 identifies a“catastro-phe,”or famine(Box 2).The USAID-supported Famine Early Warning Systems Network(FEWS NET)incorporates IPC/C

224、H indicators in its forward-looking analyses of populations at risk of acute food insecurity.The warning systems that monitor current food insecurity conditions in countries identified as Figure 3 Agricultural market and food insecurity early warning systems by type and frequency of informationSourc

225、e:Table A.1(end of this chapter)and N.Haan,M.Van Dijk,and W.Rossi Cervi,Food Security and Agriculture Information Systems Landscape Analysis(London:CASA and UK Aid for the Foreign Commonwealth&Development Office,2021).Note:FSP1,FSP2,FSP3,and FSP4 refer to,respectively,IFPRIs Food Security Portals(1)

226、commodity price and volatility monitoring system;(2)trade and fertilizer restrictions trackers;(3)domestic food price tracker,and(4)vulnerability dashboard and food crisis risk monitoring panel.VAM1,VAM2,and VAM3 refer to,respectively,WFPs(1)VAM/HungerMap LIVE and nowcasting tool;(2)CARI;and(3)Marke

227、t Monitor.Frequency of informationReal timeMonthlyInfrequentType of informationFood securityMixtureAgriculturalFSP1FSP2FSP3FASAMISGEOGLAM,CropWatch GIEWSFAOSTATIPC/CHFEWSNETVAM2VAM 3FSP4VAM1Agricultural information systemsMixed information systemsFood security information and early warning systems f

228、fd Aansns ansk Mfrncfanrng 25at-risk including IPC/CH and FEWS NET typ-ically provide only annual or,at best,quarterly assessments,which international aid agencies consider too infrequent to adequately address acute situations.Both mechanisms rely on com-binations of primary and secondary informatio

229、n sources to identify vulnerable populations accord-ing to the IPC/CH classification system.The Food Security Information Network(FSIN)and the Global Network Against Food Crises(GNAFC)are import-ant users of these monitoring mechanisms.FSIN integrates data from IPC/CH,FEWS NET,WFP,and other sources

230、to reach interagency consensus about acute food insecurity situations and reports its assessments in the semi-annual Global Report on Food Crises.The GNAFC,which brings together multiple donors and international and regional organizations,uses the reports findings to priori-tize places for assistanc

231、e.While the various acute food insecurity early warning systems are similar,they take different approaches to generating alerts.IPC/CH looks at the current acute food insecurity situation and then projects improvement or deteriora-tion based on evidence and consensus of expert opinion convened at th

232、e country level(including Box 2 THE INTEGRATED FOOD SECURITY PHASE CLASSIFICATION(IPC):CONSENSUS-BASED IDENTIFICATION OF FOOD CRISESIPC sets a common standard and shared language for classifying the severity of acute food crisis situations using a five-phase scale,and provides information on the num

233、ber of people affected and on the drivers of food insecurity.1 IPC classifications at the country level are based on a convergence of evidence,which works from the premise that various unrelated sources and types of data can“converge”toward strong conclusions.The Cadre Harmonis(CH)is the IPC-compati

234、ble measure applied to food security conditions in West Africa.We refer to IPC/CH as one entity in this chapter.The table describes the five phases of acute food insecurity and the type of priority action expected from governments and the international community for each situation.IPC/CH acute food

235、insecurity phase description and priority response objectivesPhasePhase description and priority response objectivesPhase 1None/MinimalHouseholds are able to meet essential food and nonfood needs without engaging in atyp-ical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.Action required to

236、build resil-ience and for disaster risk reduction.Phase 2StressedHouseholds have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods.Phase

237、 3CrisisHouseholds either have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition,or are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by deplet-ing essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.Urgent action required to protect livelihoods and

238、 reduce food consumption gaps.Phase 4EmergencyHouseholds either have large food consumption gaps that are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality,or are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.Urg

239、ent action required to save lives and livelihoods.Phase 5Catastrophe/FamineHouseholds have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employ-ment of coping strategies.Starvation,death,destitution,and extremely critical acute mal-nutrition levels are evident.(For Famine classifi

240、cation,area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality).Urgent action required to revert/prevent wide-spread death and total collapse of livelihoods.Source:Reproduced from FSIN and GNAFC,2022 Global Report on Food Crises:Joint Analysis for Better Decisions(Rome:2022).2

241、6 Early Earnrng fa Early EAcnfrkey stakeholders from national governments,the United Nations,and nongovernmental agencies).8 FEWS NET projects how risk factors such as rainfall,price changes,conflict,and harvest pros-pects are likely to affect the extent and severity of acute food insecurity in the

242、near term,typically an eight-month period.9 FEWS NETs analysis fur-ther differs from IPCs in that it does not include a consensus-based process.The Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping(VAM)instrument,which includes Food Security Assessments,a Market Monitor,and a Seasonal Explorer,is a central element

243、 of WFPs early warning mechanism.The VAM brings together assessments of household-level food security con-ditions,local and global market trends in food supply and prices,harvest prospects,and food security risks associated with geopolitical and eco-nomic shocks(VAM1 in Figure 3).The system now also

244、 experiments with mobile technology,artificial intelligence,and data analytics to facilitate near real-time food security monitoring across countries,accessible through the HungerMap LIVE.10Like FEWS NET,WFPs monitoring mechanisms combine geospatial,economic,and household data to analyze food securi

245、ty in the organizations 80 countries of operation.For its acute food inse-curity assessments,WFP uses its Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security(CARI,referred to as VAM2 in Figure 3),which combines food consumption scores,economic capacity indicators,and data on livelihood c

246、op-ing strategies to generate snapshots(“nowcasts”)of existing acute food insecurity.11 Nowcasts are used to identify the need for emergency interven-tions,including where and how food assistance is needed.WFPs assessments are used as inputs to the acute food insecurity estimates of all the countrie

247、s covered by IPC/CH,but also cover many more food insecurity contexts.As a result,WFPs global estimate for the number of people facing crisis-level or worse acute food insecurity is much higher,349 million in 79 countries in 2022 com-pared with 205 million in 45 countries identified in the Global Re

248、port.WFPs assessments feed into its internal cor-porate alert system to trigger early responses.At the same time,drawing on information from IPC/CH and VAM1,the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations(FAO)and WFP also issue joint early warnings on acute food inse-curity through quart

249、erly identification of“hunger hotspots,”with country-specific recommendations for anticipatory action and emergency response.12 These early warnings are based on projections of populations at risk,considering the presence of natural hazards,conflict,displacements of peo-ple,and economic shocks that

250、are likely to drive acute food insecurity to crisis levels or worse.In the projections for October 2022 to January 2023(issued in September 2022),FAO and WFP iden-tified 19 hunger hotspots with 195.5 million people projected to be at risk of seriously wors-ening acute food insecurity.Of greatest con

251、cern are Afghanistan,Ethiopia,Nigeria,Somalia,South Sudan,and Yemen,where some vulnerable pop-ulations are already in or projected to suffer famine-like conditions.The hunger hotspot mechanism is a good exam-ple of existing interagency collaboration in early warning systems for acute food insecurity

252、 and could provide a way forward for avoiding over-lap and duplication.Similar collaborative efforts are also needed to better align the monitoring of acute and chronic food insecurity which is import-ant for avoiding confusion about the two concepts and thus about the magnitude of food insecurity p

253、roblems and to support alignment of humani-tarian and development action in the fight against hunger.Currently,mechanisms for monitoring chronic food insecurity are disconnected from the early warning mechanisms for acute food insecu-rity.Standard indicators of chronic food insecurity are the preval

254、ence of undernourishment(PoU)and severe and moderate food insecurity as measured through the Food Insecurity Experience Scale(FIES).13 As indicated in Figure 1,many more people face chronic shortage of adequate food intake than face acute food insecurity.At present,these esti-mates of chronic food i

255、nsecurity are not suitable for early warning purposes as they are available only with a time lag of a year and only include national aggregates and averages(for this reason,they are not included in Figure 3).Moreover,conceptually,the undernourishment and FIES indicators differ starkly from those for

256、 acute food insecurity.These ffd Aansns ansk Mfrncfanrng 27fundamental differences hamper any analysis of the extent to which the risk factors linked with acute food insecurity and those linked with chronic condi-tions coincide,and thus,also hinder the alignment of humanitarian and development effor

257、ts.AGRICULTURAL MARKET EARLY WARNING SYSTEMSAgricultural market early warning systems moni-tor market trends,such as global price and supply shocks,that affect the stability of food availability and affordability.In many countries,the agriculture sector is a key driver of food security,as it is both

258、 the main supplier of food and a critical source of income.Adverse shocks to food supplies caused by weather calamities such as droughts,fluctua-tions in global and local food prices,policies such as export restrictions,or other problems can have significant impacts on food security in vulnerable re

259、gions.Unlike most acute food insecurity early warning systems discussed above,several of these information systems use high-frequency or near real-time data to provide alerts of the risk of supply and price shocks(Figure 3).Several of these mechanisms were developed in the wake of the 2007/08 food p

260、rice crisis.The most notable is the Agricultural Market Information System(AMIS),an interagency platform launched in 2011 by the G20 Ministers of Agriculture.14 AMIS provides monthly assessments of global food sup-plies and identifies needs for coordinated policy action(such as avoiding export bans

261、or manag-ing food reserves)in times of market uncertainty.The GEOGLAM Crop Monitor,a related mecha-nism,is an international effort to provide open and timely remote-sensing information on global crop-growing conditions and agroclimatic factors,both for major food import and export regions and for co

262、untries where food security is at risk.15 Similar global information services are also provided by,for instance,CropWatch of the Chinese Academy of Sciences,which also feeds into GEOGLAMs early warning system.16IFPRIs Food Security Portal is another import-ant platform developed in response to the 2

263、007/08 crisis.The Portal tracks food price volatility in inter-national markets,and its Excessive Food Price Variability Early Warning System(FSP1 in Figure 3)provides alerts of above-normal volatility through a traffic-light system that is updated daily(see page on IFPRI monitoring tools following

264、this chapter).This warning system has provided early signals of market tightness and of the impacts of export restrictions on global market prices(see Chapter 4).Several additional tools and dashboards have recently been added to the Portal,most notably a Food and Fertilizer Export Restrictions Trac

265、ker(FSP2),a Fertilizer Market Dashboard,a Domestic Food Price Monitor(FSP3),and a Vulnerability Analysis tool(FSP4).These were developed in response to the series of recent food system shocks caused by COVID-19,multiple climate-related disasters,and the Russia-Ukraine war.Other agricultural market e

266、arly warning mecha-nisms with long data series include the information on international and national agricultural markets and policies provided by the U.S.Department of Agricultures Foreign Agricultural Service(FAS)and the International Grains Councils monitoring of grains,rice,and oilseeds market c

267、onditions,includ-ing daily publication of its Grains and Oilseeds Index.FAO provides regular updates on market conditions for internationally traded agricultural commodities,including through its monthly Food Price Index,and on domestic food market condi-tions and dependence on food imports through

268、its Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture(GIEWS).The GIEWS con-tinuously monitors food supply,demand,prices,and other key indicators at global and national levels and provides basic information for the pre-identification of(potential)food crisis countries covered by IPC

269、/CH and the Global Report.GAPS AND SHORTCOMINGSWhile both types of warning systems provide vital information,better integration among these exist-ing systems,addressing key data and analytic gaps,and a redefinition of famine criteria would boost their usefulness for humanitarian and develop-ment res

270、ponses.NEED FOR INTEGRATIONInsufficient integration of existing agricultural early warning systems with the acute food insecu-rity warning systems is a critical shortcoming.Joint FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment 28 Early Earnrng fa Early EAcnfrMissions,which analyze countries agricultural p

271、ro-duction alongside household food security,and the link between the FAOs GIEWS and IPC/CH are among the few examples of connection points between these two types of early warning sys-tems.Also,WFPs VAM/Hunger Map LIVE,IPC/CH,and FEWS NET draw on data from the agricultural market warning systems.At

272、 present,however,these links remain weak.AMIS,for instance,only monitors staple food price trends in global mar-kets and does not provide alerts regarding how(potential)shocks may be transmitted to domes-tic food prices at the consumer level(such as those for flour and bread)to signal food security

273、risks.This disconnect may underlie the mistaken tendency to immediately interpret global supply or price shocks as a“food crisis”(Box 3),with-out examining how local contexts may moderate their impacts.GAPS IN DATA AND ANALYSISAt least four critical gaps in the data and anal-ysis used by early warni

274、ng systems need to be addressed.ConfliCt and food inseCurity.Conflict is known to be a primary driver of acute food insecurity(and identified as such in the main EWEAs for acute food insecurity),and growing evidence on the two-way causal relationship between conflict and food inse-curity is becoming

275、 available.17 But major research gaps remain,particularly in fragile contexts and sit-uations of extreme food insecurity(see Chapter 7).Conflict is inherently a complex and politically sen-sitive phenomenon,and studying food security in conflict situations is difficult.Yet,understanding how conflict

276、 and food security interact is vital for analyzing and forecasting future food security sce-narios,as well as for conflict mediation,which is an essential part of comprehensive intervention strat-egies.Lack of clear insight into how climate change heightens the risk of conflict increases this chal-l

277、enge.CGIARs Climate Security Observatory and Climate Security Dialogues dashboard could be instrumental in helping to fill this void and strength-ening the analysis of drivers of acute food insecurity as undertaken,for instance,for FAO and WFPs hunger hotspot assessments.Box 3 GLOBAL FOOD PRICE SPIK

278、ES AND FOOD CRISESThe global food price spike of 2007/08 caught major development donors by surprise.As prices spiraled upward,the uniform response from donors was to provide more food assistance.Donors also recognized that underinvestment in R&D in prior decades had contributed to slow productivity

279、 growth and price spikes,and they committed to increasing funding for agricultural research.Despite this commitment,global food prices spiked again during 2010/11.However,the focus on global price shocks left donors blind to the 2011 famine in Somalia which was driven by conflict and repeated drough

280、t,and cost the lives of a quarter of a million people before adequate emergency aid arrived.The international price surges of 2007/08 and 2010/11 have often been referred to as“global food crises.”This jump to identify a food crisis reflects a common presumption that higher prices in world markets a

281、re directly transmitted to domestic markets,raising domestic prices and eroding food access for vulnerable households.However,such price transmission is mediated by many factors,meaning that a spike in global food prices may not be adequate grounds for identifying a food crisis.Will this time be dif

282、ferent?When the Russia-Ukraine war began,food and fertilizer prices spiked in international markets during FebruaryMay of 2022.Many observers saw this as a“global food crisis,”and most of the response so far has focused on increasing humanitarian assistance.Yet,the impacts of COVID-19 and the war in

283、 Ukraine on global food markets have highlighted the diverse vulnerabilities of food supply chains and other factors contributing to inadequate resilience of vulnerable populations.Better monitoring and understanding of those risks and how they can drive up food insecurity and hunger should be a pri

284、ority for improving early warning systems.ffd Aansns ansk Mfrncfanrng 29livestoCk and fisheries produCtion and mar-kets.Existing early warning systems include almost no indicators to monitor conditions in livestock and fisheries production and markets.These are important to the livelihoods of many p

285、oor and food insecure people,as well as increasingly important components of diets.transmission of global agriCultual market shoCks.Understanding remains limited of how,and to what degree,these shocks are transmitted to domestic food supplies and prices,and how this affects the food security of vuln

286、erable populations(Box 3).The transmission of global shocks var-ies greatly across countries and commodities and,hence,responses cannot be enacted with a broad brush.For example,a recent IFPRI study shows that the supply shock to global wheat markets from the Russia-Ukraine war was only very partial

287、ly and grad-ually reflected in domestic price surges in most countries,though the impact was dramatic in some(see Chapter 1,Box 1).18 Such analyses of shock transmission from the global to the more local con-text should be part of agricultural market early warning systems and should facilitate linka

288、ges with food insecurity warning systems.ConsistenCy in estimates of aCute food inse-Curity.As mentioned,the existence of different estimates of the global number of acutely food insecure people is a source of confusion,reducing the credibility of the numbers and making it harder to communicate the

289、magnitude of the worlds hun-ger problems ultimately slowing responses.Country coverage is the main reason underly-ing the difference between the global estimates for crisis-level acute food insecurity of the Global Report(205 million in 2022)and WFP(349 million).Hence,while costly in terms of inform

290、ation gather-ing,expanding coverage of the consensus-based IPC/CH analyses to all of the nearly 80 commonly recognized food-crisis countries would lead to a convergence in country coverage and consistency in estimates of acute food insecurity.AN ACTIONABLE DEFINITION OF FAMINEA shared understanding

291、of the situation on the ground is essential for an early warning system to trigger early action,most importantly where there is a risk of famine.However,the present proto-col for declaring famine is no longer sufficiently operational in current contexts.The existing IPC protocol is designed to gathe

292、r information in slow-onset emergencies,such as prolonged drought.However,in many of todays food emer-gencies,conflict is the major driver pushing people to the brink of starvation.In these con-flict contexts,information to determine whether there is famine must be collected within just a few hours

293、at most.A revision of famine criteria is needed to allow for a consensus-based judgment call without time-consuming collection of detailed survey data.ACHIEVING REAL-TIME MONITORING OF RISKS AND VULNERABILITIESWhile the current suite of early warning systems provides valuable food insecurity project

294、ions,addressing the shortcomings could improve pre-dictions and make them more useful for early action.How do we get there?First,a stronger,clearer analytical framework for weighing the various risks and assump-tions that go into short-term forecasts of both agricultural market conditions and acute

295、food insecurity would improve the quality of predic-tions.Assumptions about how current conditions may relate to risk of future food crises should be analyzed systematically.By focusing on risk factors,vulnerabilities,and resilience,such a framework would better inform responses that address both im

296、mediate needs(acute food inse-curity)and structural conditions that determine vulnerabilities and coping capacity.Second,for these early warning systems to support early action that builds resilience before a potential crisis occurs or a current food crisis intensifies,future food security outcomes

297、must be estimated many months in advance to give decision-makers time to plan interventions(see Chapter 3).The need for early alerts,along with the complexity of the factors shaping food security out-comes,complicates the work of projecting food crisis risk to inform early action.Most current sys-te

298、ms are not equipped for this,though FEWS NET 30 Early Earnrng fa Early EAcnfrand WFPs VAM have taken important steps toward forward-looking estimation of acute food insecurity based on risk analysis.19Third,models should be developed for more integrated,quantitative EWEA systems.Some efforts in this

299、 direction are already being made.The World Banks Famine Action Mechanism(FAM)was set up in partnership with IPC/CH and FEWS NET,as well as other organizations,to scale up anticipatory(preventative)and early emergency action for emerging food crises.The FAM has explored statistical analysis and mach

300、ine learn-ing to help predict crises and inform responses through a new financing modality(Crisis Response Window Early Response Financing,under IDA 19).20 Although this initiatives approach to predict-ing crises in real time shows promise for the use of forecasting technology,it has not yet produce

301、d results that could credibly underpin early action.Nonetheless,the FAM has used the framework to inform country-level consultations inAfghanistan,Chad,Somalia,South Sudan,andYementhat aimed to identify anticipatory and early action pro-gramming.These consultations led to Somalias shock-responsive s

302、afety net,21 but unfortunately,this response did not prevent a renewedfamine warning from being issued for large parts of the country in 2022.The FAM shares features with risk-contingent credit lines,like the World Banks Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option,22 and“forecast-based finance”(FbF)23 sche

303、mes that are being imple-mented by some disaster relief and humanitarian assistance agencies,including WFP,to anticipate disasters and prepare for action.24 These schemes support EWEA decision-making and trigger access to humanitarian funding for early action based on in-depth forecast information a

304、nd risk analysis.Under an FbF plan,participating agencies agree in advance on the allocation of financial resources for early action,as well on the specific forecast thresh-old that will trigger release of those resources,and roles and responsibilities of everyone involved(see Chapter 3).FbF schemes

305、 are often deployed in well-defined fragile settings,for predefined bene-ficiaries and geographies.WFPs FbF scheme and other early action responses by governments and humanitarian aid agencies are informed by the HungerMap LIVE.Real-time monitoring through daily interviews with local informants cond

306、ucted by call centers is active in 40 countries and comple-mented by predictive modeling that identifies food crisis risks for another 53 countries.The modeling uses acute food insecurity data as well as other rel-evant indicators,such as a rainfallvegetation index,conflict reports,market prices,mac

307、roeconomic sta-bility indicators,and nighttime light intensity(an indicator of economic development).25 The near real-time nowcasts of the HungerMap build on machine-learning algorithms to yield information to monitor key drivers of food security risks and to make short-term forecasts of populations

308、 at risk of acute food insecurity.Compared with traditional information systems,real-time information makes it possible to identify deterioration in food security much more quickly,enhancing the early warning systems needed for anticipatory action and emer-gency response.Various research centers are

309、 engaging in similar efforts,26 but these either focus only on a subset of risk factors or are as yet far from operational for use as part of EWEA systems.Much more work is needed to improve and tailor these efforts to support effective EWEA mechanisms that can inform concerted responses and align a

310、ctions along the humanitarian-development nexus.CONCLUSIONThere is simply not enough funding available to address the increasing number of crises and bene-ficiaries already in need,and the deepening climate crisis will widen this funding gap.If interventions instead remain focused on emergency relie

311、f,the world will have to provide more and more assis-tance with every lean season.Better EWEA systems would allow governments and international agencies to tackle food crises earlier and more effectively,and to reorient interventions toward resilience building.More work is needed to integrate or at

312、least to better explain the different approaches and methodologies currently used by EWEAs to iden-tify acute food insecurity,monitor chronic food insecurity,and incorporate the key information provided by agricultural market warning systems.More intensive cooperation between existing ffd Aansns ans

313、k Mfrncfanrng 31platforms,such as AMIS,on the one hand,and FSIN and GNAFC,on the other,will be needed to move forward.The importance of adequate agri-cultural market information and food security monitoring mechanisms has been repeatedly reit-erated by multiple global platforms and gained prominence

314、 with the 2022 global food crisis,as reflected in the 2022 G20 Leaders Declaration and the initiative of the G7 Development Ministers for a Global Alliance for Food Security.27 This inter-nationally concerted support is essential but will be most effective if it drives the improvement and integratio

315、n of existing mechanisms rather than creating new ones.To effectively and efficiently support responses to food crises,early warning systems must be enhanced to include real-time monitoring of key risk factors and vulnerabilities that affect food access in rapidly changing global and national con-te

316、xts,along with analyses of how those risk factors and vulnerabilities increase the likelihood of food crisis situations.Most importantly,they must inform policy recommendations for buffering the most harmful impacts of those shocks in the short run and for building sustainable resilience for the lon

317、g term.The chapters that follow explore both the types of early action that early warning systems can facilitate and short-and long-term policy responses that can reduce the frequency and impact of food crises.TaBle a1 Description of early warning and other relevant monitoring systems NameOrganizati

318、onDescriptionLinkIPC/CH Integrated Phase Classification/Cadre HarmonisFood and Agricul-ture Organization(FAO),World Food Programme(WFP),and multiple partnersThe IPC provides decision-makers with core estimates of severity and magnitude of acute and chronic food insecurity and malnutrition using evid

319、ence and consensus-based analysis to inform emergency responses as well as medium-and long-term policy and programming.http:/www.ipcinfo.org/FEWS NET Famine Early Warning System NetworkU.S.Agency for International Development(USAID)FEWS NET provides unbiased,evidence-based analysis to governments an

320、d relief agencies that plan for and respond to humanitarian crises.Its analyses also support resilience and development programming.FEWS NET posts monthly reports on several dozen countries,primarily in sub-Saharan Africa.https:/ Vulnerability Analyses and Mapping and Hunger Map LIVEWFPVAM1 provides

321、 vulnerability data for food security analysis and monitoring and real-time“nowcasting”of food security situations in more than 80 countries to inform WFP planning and resourcing.https:/dataviz.vam.wfp.org/https:/hungermap.wfp.org/VAM2/CARI Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Secu

322、rityWFPWFPs CARI provides“snapshots”of acute food insecurity situations based on multiple indicators,including food consumption scores,food energy shortfall,poverty status,food expenditure shares,and livelihood coping strategies.WFP uses this information to identify need for emergency interventions.

323、https:/www.wfp.org/publications/consolidated-approach-reporting-indicators-food-security-cari-guidelinesVAM3 WFP Global Market MonitorWFPWFPs monthlyGlobal Market Monitor provides information onchanges in the cost of basic food baskets,alerts for price spikes in local markets,and domestic inflation

324、and currency movements as well as an overview of global food commodity price developments.Price information is publiclyavailable and covers more than 1,500 markets.https:/www.wfp.org/content/market-monitorGIEWS Global Information and Early Warning SystemFAOGIEWS continuously monitors food supply,dem

325、and,prices,and other key indicators at global and national levels for assessing the overall food security situation in most countries of the world.http:/www.fao.org/giews/en/32 Early Earnrng fa Early EAcnfrNameOrganizationDescriptionLinkFAOSTATFAOFAOSTAT provides free access to food and agriculture

326、data for more than 245 countries and territories and covers all FAO regional groupings,from 1961 onward.It includes annual crop production,agricultural trade,and food balance sheets,among other data.http:/www.fao.org/faostat/en/#homeGEOGLAM Crop Monitor of the Group on Earth Observations Agricultura

327、l MonitoringGEOGLAMGEOGLAM provides open,timely information on crop conditions in support of market transparency for the G20 Agricultural Market Information System(AMIS)as well as an early warning system for countries at risk of food production shortfalls.https:/cropmonitor.org/CropWatchChinese Acad

328、emy of ScienceCropWatch assesses national and global crop production and related information using remote sensing and ground-based indicators.http:/ Agricultural Market Information SystemAMIS(multi-agency,multi-country/G20)AMIS is an interagency platform,composed of G20 members plus Spain and 7 addi

329、tional major exporters and importers of agricultural commodities,to enhance food market transparency and policy responses for food market stability.http:/www.amis-outlook.org/FAS Foreign Agricultural ServiceU.S.Department of Agriculture(USDA)FAS links US agriculture to global agriculture and food su

330、pplies information to enhance export opportunities and provide information about prospects for global food security.https:/www.fas.usda.gov/FSP1 Food Security Portal(FSP)Excessive Food Price Variability IndexIFPRIThe FSP provides a real-time early warning system for price trends and price volatility

331、 in international markets for key agricultural commodities.International prices and the volatility index are updated daily.https:/www.foodsecurityportal.org/tools/excessive-food-price-variability-early-warning-systemFSP2 Food Security Portal(FSP)Food and Fertilizer Trade Restrictions;Fertilizer Mark

332、et;and Production and Stocks TrackersIFPRIThe FSP provides daily updates of food and fertilizer trade restrictions,monthly updates of fertilizer prices and market conditions,and monthly updates of global supply and stocks of key staple foods.https:/www.foodsecurityportal.org/tools/COVID-19-food-trad

333、e-policy-trackerhttps:/www.foodsecurityportal.org/node/1947https:/www.foodsecurityportal.org/node/1734FSP3 Food Security Portal(FSP)Domestic Food Price MonitorIFPRIThe FSP provides a dashboard with trends in domestic food prices(aggregate and by main food items)with most prices updated monthly.It also includes a dashboard to track transmission of international price trends and other determinants o