1、State and Trends ofCarbon Pricing2023WORLDBANK.ORG2 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORG 2023 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development The World Bank1818 H Street NW,Washington,DC 20433Telephone:202-473-1000;Internet:www.worldbank.orgSome rights reserved1 2 3 4 26 25 24

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12、sworldbank.org.ISBN(electronic):978-1-4648-2006-9DOI:10.1596/978-1-4648-2006-9FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES3 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGThe development of this report was led by the World Bank and prepared by experts from the World Bank,adelphi,

13、and Ecologic Institute.Contributions,including data and information on mandatory cap-and-trade systems,were provided by the International Carbon Action Partnership.Additional data and contributions were also provided by Ecosystem Marketplace and CDP.S&P Global Platts and the Institute for Climate Ec

14、onomics also supported development of this report.The World Bank task team responsible for this report was composed of Joseph Pryor,Kathleen Patroni,Jichong Wu,Alejandra Mazariegos,Samuel Okullo,Shreya Rangarajan,Seoyi Kim,Harikumar Gadde,and Sandhya Srinivasan.The consulting team was led by Constan

15、ze Haug(adelphi)and Benjamin Grlach(Ecologic Institute)and included David Hynes,Santiago Ramrez Niembro,Baran Doda,Anastasia Steinlein,Leon Heckmann,and Victor Ortiz Rivera (all adelphi)and Michael Jakob and Jonathan Gardiner(Ecologic Institute).This report benefited greatly from the insights and co

16、ntributions from:Andrs Camilo lvarez-Espinosa;Alexandra Andrea Maite Campmas;Tomotaka Aoki;Veli Auvinen;Christopher Axelson;Pa Biestro;Rachel Boti-Douayoua;Chlo Boutron;Marcelo Caffera;California Air Resources Board;Ana Laura Callejas;Marcos Castro;Juan Martn Chves;Climate Action Secretariat of the

17、Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy (British Columbia);David Coln;Julie Ct;Tanguy De Bienassis;Department of Climate Change,Energy,the Environment and Water(Australia);Department of Finance(Canada);Department of Finance(Northwest Territories);Goran Dominioni;Maosheng Duan;Jane Ellis;

18、Dominik Englert;Sofie Errendal;Simon Fellermeyer;Marion Fetet;Andhyta Firselly Utami;Carolyn Fischer;Nicolas Garceau;Aric Gliesche;Marlen Goerner;Logan Gourmand;Government of Newfoundland and Labrador;Government of Prince Edward Island;Government of Saskatchewan;Mary Grady;Adriana Gutirrez;Stephane

19、Hallegatte;Hawaii State Department of Business,Economic Development,and Tourism;Hawaii State Energy Office;Dirk Heine;Rurik Holmberg;Andrew Howard;Yuji Jigata;Louise Kessler;Hyemee Kim;Jussi Kiviluoto;Camille Leboeuf;Luca Lo Re;Emdio Lopes;Martina Bosi;Satoshi Mikami;Ministry of Environment and Prot

20、ected Areas(Alberta);Ministry of Finance (British Columbia);Ministry of Finance(Luxembourg);Ministry of the Environment,Climate,and Sustainable Development(Luxembourg);Nandita Molloy;Jess Abraham Bartolom Lasa;Mariza Montes de Oca Leon;Marco Murcia;Kuhle Mxakaza;New Brunswick Department of Environme

21、nt and Local Government;Lauren Nichols;Eduardo Piquero;Plan Vivo Foundation Secretariat;Methmali Rajaguru;Gerardo Ramrez;Kim Ricard;Susanne Riedener;Marisol Rivera-Planter;Robin Rix;ngela Rodrguez;Isabelle Rojon;Puttipar Rotkittikhun;Jacqueline Ruesga;Gabriel Saive;Rico Salgmann;Hugh Salway;Marissa

22、Santikarn;Arantzazu Mojarrieta Sanz;Juan Pedro Searle;Secretary of Energy,Ministry of Economy(Argentina);Chris Shipley;William Space;Randall Spalding-Fecher;Vikash Talyan;Jonas Teusch;Gemma Torras Vives;Maiko Uga;Under Secretariat of Public Revenue,Ministry of Economy (Argentina);Andrea Victoria Gar

23、cia Salinas;Isabella Villanueva;Anthony Weatherby;Urko Dez Webster;Klas Wetterberg;Hui-Fen Yeh;Yuan Fang Yeo;Mourad Ziani;Uri Ziskind.Report design was done by H and editing was done by EpsteinWords.This report has been developed as part of the Technical Work Program under the Partnership for Market

24、 Implementation.A F O R E S T T R E N D S I N I T I A T I V EFOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES4 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGFIGURE 1 Price evolution in selected ETSs from 2018 to 2023 16FIGURE 2 Key drivers or recent ETS and Carbon Tax price developm

25、ents 19FIGURE 3 Prices and coverage across ETSs and carbon taxes 21FIGURE 4 Internal carbon pricing distribution of prices across industries 22FIGURE 5 Map of carbon taxes and ETSs 23FIGURE 6 Share of global GHG emissions covered by direct carbon pricing instruments 24FIGURE 7 Evolution of global re

26、venues from carbon taxes and ETSs over time(nominal)26FIGURE 8 Scale and uses of carbon revenue in 2021 28FIGURE 9 Carbon taxes and ETSs by world regions and income levels implemented,scheduled,or under consideration 29FIGURE 10 Mapping prices and coverage of carbon taxes and ETSs 30FIGURE 11 Global

27、 volume of issuances by crediting mechanism type(20182022)35FIGURE 12 Map of national and subnational crediting mechanisms 36FIGURE 13 Percentage of total issuance by project category 37FIGURE 14 Prices of standardized carbon credit contracts 20212023 41FIGURE 15 Article 6.2 bilateral agreements 47B

28、OX 1 Definitions:carbon pricing policies 11BOX 2 ETS and carbon tax prices and inflation 17BOX 3 Tracking broader carbon prices:beyond ETSs and carbon taxes 18BOX 4 Internal carbon prices applied across industries 20 BOX 5 Internal carbon pricing 22BOX 6 Using carbon pricing as a fiscal tool:Mexico

29、subnationals case study 32BOX 7 Definitions:carbon crediting markets and mechanisms 34BOX 8 Carbon credit markets as a vehicle to finance forest preservation 38BOX 9 Raising the integrity of supply and demand in voluntary carbon credit markets 44BOX 10 Transitioning from the clean development mechan

30、ism to Article 6.4 46TABLE C.1 Carbon pricing developments in selected Canadian provinces and territories 60TABLE C.2 Developments in Chinas subnational pilots 61 TABLE C.3 Carbon pricing developments in selected Mexican states 63 TABLE C.4 Carbon pricing developments in selected US states 66List of

31、 FiguresList of BoxesList of TablesFOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES5 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGList of Abbreviations ACCUAustralian Carbon Credit UnitsETSEmissions trading systemNOKNorwegian kroneBCBritish ColumbiaEUEuropean UnionOBPSOutput-based

32、pricing system(Canada)BCABorder carbon adjustmentEUREuroOECDOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentCADCanadian dollarG7Group of SevenOTCOver-the-counterCAD TrustClimate Action Data TrustGDPGross domestic productPATPerform,Achieve,and Trade Scheme(India)CARBCalifornia Air Resources Boa

33、rdGHGGreenhouse gasPMIPartnership for Market ImplementationCBAMCarbon border adjustment mechanismICAOInternational Civil Aviation OrganizationPSSPerformance standards system(Canada)CCDRCountry Change and Development ReportICAPInternational Carbon Action PartnershipPVCPlan Vivo certificate CCMCost co

34、ntainment mechanismICPInternal carbon priceREDD+Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest DegradationCCRCost containment reserveICVCMIntegrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon MarketRGGIRegional Greenhouse Gas InitiativeCCPsCore Carbon PrinciplesIEAInternational Energy AgencySDGSustainable De

35、velopment GoalCDMClean Development MechanismIETAInternational Emissions Trading AssociationSEMARNATMinistry of Environment and Natural Resources(Mexico)CERCertified emission reductionIMFInternational Monetary FundSGDSingapore dollarCHFSwiss francIMOInternational Maritime OrganizationtCO2Metric tons

36、of carbon dioxideCNYChinese yuanIPCCIntergovernmental Panel on Climate ChangetCO2eMetric tons of carbon dioxide equivalentCO2Carbon dioxideITMOInternationally transferred mitigation outcomeTIERTechnology Innovations and Emissions Reduction(Canada)COPConference of the PartiesJCMJoint Crediting Mechan

37、ismUMAUnit of Measurement and Update(Mexico)COP212015 United Nations Climate Change Conference(21st Conference of the Parties)LNGLiquefied natural gasUKUnited KingdomCOP262021 United Nations Climate Change Conference(26th Conference of the Parties)MEMRMinistry of Energy and Mineral Resources(Indones

38、ia)UNUnited NationsCOP272022 United Nations Climate Change Conference(27th Conference of the Parties)MoUMemorandum of understandingUNFCCCUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate ChangeCOP282023 United Nations Climate Change Conference(28th Conference of the Parties)MtCO2Million metric tons of

39、carbon dioxideUSUnited StatesCORSIACarbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation MRVMonitoring,reporting,and verificationUSDUnited States dollarDKKDanish kroneMXNMexican pesoUYUUruguayan pesoEDGAREmissions Database for Global Atmospheric ResearchNDCNationally determined contribut

40、ionVATValue-added taxEEBEcology and Environment Bureau(China)NECRNet Effective Carbon RatesVCMIVoluntary Carbon Markets Integrity InitiativeETFExchange-traded fundNGFSNetwork of Central Banks and Supervisors Greening the Financial SystemVCSVerified Carbon StandardFOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHA

41、PTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES6 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGTableof ContentsFOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXESForeword Executive SummaryChapter 1IntroductionChapter 2Carbon Taxes and Emissions Trading SystemsChapter 3Carbon CreditingMarkets and MechanismsChap

42、ter 4ConclusionAnnex ADefinitionsAnnex BMethodologies and Sources Annex CCarbon Tax andETS UpdateAnnex DCrediting Mechanism UpdatesEndnotes7 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGForewordCarbon markets and mechanisms have steadily evolved since the first State and Trends report was pu

43、blished 10 years ago.The share of global emissions covered by carbon taxes and emissions trading systems(ETSs)has grown from 7%to around 23%.Jurisdictions continue to introduce new carbon pricing instruments,such as Indonesias ETS this year,and cover new emission sources,such as aviation.Government

44、revenues from carbon taxes and ETSs have grown nearly fivefold as policies have evolved and diversified to reflect increased ambition.And voluntary action around carbon markets has proliferated as corporations have become the biggest source of demand for carbon credits.Over the decade,the State and

45、Trends report and the Carbon Pricing Dashboard have provided objective and up-to-date information on direct carbon pricing.They have guided policymakers,supported academic and analytical work,and informed the private sector and nongovernmental organizations alike.This years report shows that governm

46、ents are prioritizing direct carbon pricing policies to reduce emissions,even in difficult economic times.The economic turmoil and geopolitical instability of this past year threatened to divert attention from the pressing need to act on climate.Despite these pressures,ETSs and carbon taxes have pro

47、ven resilient;several jurisdictions either delivered on existing plans for new ETSs or taxes,increased their ambition,or announced further proposals for developing new initiatives in the coming years.Recent developments on Article 6 suggest a pathway for international carbon markets,though more work

48、 is needed to build the administrative capacity for countries to engage further.Governments,the private sector,and others are thinking about carbon markets and pricing in increasingly sophisticated ways.Direct carbon pricing is being viewed through a broader lens,not only as a key mitigation policy

49、but also as a tool to raise revenue,drive innovation,and help deliver on broader sustainability and development goals.The World Banks pioneering new diagnostic,the Country Climate and Development Report(CCDR),has emphasized the potential for direct carbon pricing policies to support countries on the

50、ir development journeys.There is still a long path ahead even as the need for more progress intensifies.Climate-related natural disasters in 2022 cost lives,caused billions of dollars of damage,and displaced millions,particularly in the developing world.The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changes

51、 Sixth Assessment Report laid bare the increasingly dangerous and irreversible risks of failing to act.But the report also offered hope that we can still prevent the worst effects if we act now to transition to a low-carbon future.Introducing a price signal for climate mitigation is critical to driv

52、ing investment and behavior change to lower emissions.Carbon pricing must continue to grow,both in terms of coverage and price,to drive the transformational change needed to meet the Paris temperature goals.However,governments need to consider trade-offs when deciding which carbon pricing approach t

53、o use:ETSs,carbon taxes and carbon crediting,and international carbon markets each have their place.The World Bank is supporting many countries to engage with the full range of carbon pricing policiesincluding through the Partnership for Market Implementation(PMI)program,which provides technical ass

54、istance for domestic carbon pricing and operationalizing Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.State and Trends takes stock of progress and reiterates the World Banks commitment to work with governments and stakeholders to put a price on carbon to accelerate climate action.Jennifer Sara,Climate Change Gl

55、obal Director,World Bank GroupFOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES8 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORG Facing a global energy crisis and high inflation,many countries responded with relief measures:lowering energy prices for businesses and households through

56、changes to energy taxes,fossil fuel subsidies,or price controls,or by making direct payments.These measures saw already high levels of government debt continue to climb.Despite these challenges,there was continued momentum for climate action.Several high-emitting countries strengthened domestic clim

57、ate policies and targets,though global efforts still fall short of what is required.In this context,the political economy of carbon pricing has become even more complex.THE PAST YEAR HAS SEEN GOVERNMENTS FACE CHALLENGES ON SEVERAL FRONTS Prices increased in half of ETSs or carbon taxes,although in r

58、eal terms surging inflation will have offset some of the increase.There were only a few instances where governments wound back ETSs or carbon taxes in response to the energy crisis by delaying the start of a new instrument,postponing a planned expansion or price increase,or in one case repealing a c

59、arbon tax.With several new instruments launched and some scope expansions,the number of implemented instruments increased to 73 with the share of global GHG emissions covered around 23%.ETSs AND CARBON TAXESHAVE WEATHERED THE 2022 GLOBAL ENERGY CRISIS RELATIVELY WELL Governments continue to face tra

60、de-offs between different objectives,such as increasing revenue,promoting community acceptance,and managing international competitiveness.Revenues from ETSs and carbon taxes are often used for specific purposesalmost 40%of the revenue is earmarked for green spending,and 10%is used to compensate hous

61、eholds or businesses.Both are seen as ways to increase support for these policies.The revenue potential of ETSs and carbon taxes has become more relevant in light of increasing pressures on public budgets.RECORD HIGH REVENUESFROM ETSs AND CARBONTAXES APPROACHEDUSD 100 BILLION Executive SummaryFOREWO

62、RDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES9 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORG Most existing instruments are in high-income countries in North America and Europe,at either the national,subnational,or regional level.High-income jurisdictions account for the highest carbon

63、 prices.There is only one instrument in the Middle East and Africa region.However,several African countries are exploring options and taking preparatory steps.Interest from emerging economies is driven by the need for climate change mitigation policy but also managing transition risks,exploring reve

64、nue opportunities,and preparing for European Union accession.UPTAKE OF ETSs AND CARBON TAXES ARE RISING IN EMERGING ECONOMIES;HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES STILL DOMINATE Both issuances and retirements of carbon credits fell slightly compared to 2021,although they remain significantly above levels in preced

65、ing years.Voluntary demand from companies remains the primary driver of market activity,but compliance demand could become more important.Prices and price trends varied:prices for exchange-traded credits declined across all categories,especially those from nature-based projects,while some participan

66、ts have seen prices increase in over-the-counter transactions.Macroeconomic conditions,prominent critiques of carbon credits and offsetting,and bottlenecks in issuance are among the apparent causes of dynamics over the past year.CARBON CREDIT MARKETS EXPERIENCED A SLOWDOWN AFTER YEARS OF RAPID GROWT

67、H New investors,financial products,technological platforms,and service providers are laying the foundations for what some expect will be a decade of significant growth.Different initiatives seek to promote standardization and improve transparency in carbon credit marketsseeking to encourage market g

68、rowth and integrity of corporate action.Implementation of Article 6 is moving forward as more countries sign bilateral cooperation agreements and the first activities to generate authorized emissions reductions are developed.CARBON CREDIT MARKETS CONTINUE TO DIVERSIFY AND BECOME MORE SOPHISTICATEDEx

69、ecutive SummaryFOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXESChapter 1Introduction11 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGBOX 1 DEFINITIONS:CARBON PRICING POLICIESThis report focuses on direct carbon pricing instrumentsthose that provide a clear price signal with the aim

70、of reducing GHG emissions.These include ETSs,carbon taxes,and carbon crediting.An ETS limits emissions from covered entities by issuing tradable emission units that entities can use to meet their compliance obligations.ETSs can be designed in different ways:the most common are cap-and-trade ETSs tha

71、t set an overall limit for emissions from covered entities and rate-based systems where total emissions are not capped but individual entities are allocated a performance benchmark that serves as a limit on their net emissions.A carbon tax imposes a fee on the emissions produced(or the emissions emb

72、odied in an amount of fuel).A carbon crediting mechanism generates tradable certificates representing emission reductions.Indirect carbon pricing refers to other policies that change the price of products associated with GHG emissions in ways that are not directly proportional to the relative emissi

73、ons associated with those products.These instruments(such as fuel excise taxes)provide a carbon price signal,even though they are not usually implemented to achieve climate outcomes.While Box 3 provides some further information on recent trends in indirect carbon pricing,these policies are not inclu

74、ded in the core analysis and text of this report.Further information on definitions can be found in Annex A.Direct carbon pricing policies are touted as an efficient and effective climate mitigation policy,but their uptake and impact depend on many factors(see Box 1 for definitions).A carbon price p

75、rovides an economic signal,allowing markets(instead of governments)to determine where emissions can be reduced for the lowest cost.In considering these policies,governments weigh the political economy implications of the different options,in particular how they will affect consumers(particularly thr

76、ough energy prices),how they will affect government revenue,and the urgency of reducing emissions.i Governments also consider the broader policy landscapehow direct and indirect carbon pricing interactas well as the appetite for alternative climate change mitigation policy approaches.Broader develop

77、ments including economic growth and trends in energy markets,voter preferences,and the state of public finances all shape how and whether direct carbon pricing instruments are considered,adopted,reformed,or perhaps in some cases repealed.Further,for ETSs,where the carbon price emerges as a function

78、of the supply and demand for allowances,these broader factors can directly and indirectly affect prices day by day.Against this backdrop,this report provides a brief overview of the key trends shaping direct carbon pricing policies over the past year,before detailing the observed changes in these po

79、licies over the same period.1The year 2022 was marked by a global energy crisis that contributed to high inflation and a cost-of-living crisis in many parts of the world.The quick economic rebound from the COVID-19 pandemic had already started to drive up energy(i)For further reading on the politica

80、l economy of carbon pricing see,e.g.,G.Dolphin,M.G.Pollitt,and D.M.Newbery,“The Political Economy of Carbon Pricing:A Panel Analysis,”Oxford Economic Papers 72,no.2(April 2020):472500;World Bank Group,“The FASTER Principles for Successful Carbon Pricing:An Approach Based on Initial Experience,”2017;

81、D.Victor,E.Toder,R.Repetto,J.Bordoff,J.Stock,and M.Mildenberger,“The Political Economy of Carbon Pricing:Presentations and Discussion,”presented at Global Harmonized Carbon Pricing:Looking Beyond Paris,Yale Center for the Study of Globalization International Conference,May 2728,2015.The global energ

82、y crisis posed significant challenges for energy markets and the world economy in 2022.Governments have responded with measures to shield consumers from price hikes,adding to fiscal pressures accumulated during the pandemic.In this context,the political economy of implementing direct carbon pricing

83、policies has become more complex.On the one hand,the increasing urgency of addressing the climate crisis,the benefits of diversifying energy supplies,and the need to shore up government revenues have provided an even stronger rationale for introducing new and strengthening existing carbon pricing po

84、licies.On the other hand,pressure on governments to consider any measures to reduce prices in the short term has been working against emissions trading systems(ETSs)and carbon taxes.This report provides an update on developments in existing and planned direct carbon pricing policies(e.g.,ETSs,carbon

85、 taxes,and crediting mechanisms)over the past year,revealing how these contextual factors have affected prices,uptake,reform,and plans for these policies.FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES12 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGdemand and prices in 2021.Russia

86、s invasion of Ukraine greatly amplified this effect,pushing up fossil fuel prices even farther and to unprecedented heights.Combined with supply chain disruptions in the aftermath of the pandemic,the energy crisis drove up global inflation to its highest level in 30 years,triggering tighter monetary

87、 policy in most countries.As a consequence,global economic growth slowed in 2022 and is expected to decline even more sharply by 1.7%to 2.9%in 2023,significantly below the historical average over the past two decades.2 High levels of inflation,caused by higher prices not just for energy but also foo

88、d and housing,have led to a cost-of-living crisis affecting particularly developing countries and those with low incomes.3As countries suffered from record-high fossil fuel prices,governments responded by prioritizing relief measures for households and businesses.The concerns over poverty,especially

89、 energy poverty,were felt worldwide.In the developing world,the energy price spikes threatened to roll back progress on universal access to electricity,and the International Energy Agency(IEA)warned that“almost 100 million people may be pushed back into reliance on firewood for cooking instead of cl

90、eaner,healthier solutions.”4 In response,many countries provided temporary energy price relief for consumers.Most European countries have temporarily lowered value-added tax(VAT)on fuels and other energy taxes,regulated the retail price of fuels,or provided direct assistance to fuel consumers.5 Othe

91、r nations,including Australia,Mexico,and South Africa,temporarily suspended or reduced federal fuel excise taxes or delayed planned increases.6 Some policies were targeted toward those most vulnerable to high prices;the Republic of Korea,for example,provided vouchers for energy expenses to around 1.

92、2 million low-income households.7 The combination of the economic turmoil in 2022 and the pandemic hangover has left many governments facing fiscal pressures.Having spent heavily in response to the COVID-19 pandemic(with amounts exceeding 5%or even 10%of gross domestic product(GDP)in most industrial

93、ized and many emerging economies),relief measures to address the energy crisis have put an additional dent in national budgets over the past year.8 According to the IEA,fossil fuel subsidies hit an all-time high in 2022,rising beyond USD 1 trillion,and doubling compared to their 2021 levels.9 As a r

94、esult,the developing world now faces a record amount of debt,amounting to nearly USD 100 trillion in early 2023.10 At the same time tax revenue is declining in many places due to slow economic growth,and higher interest rates make servicing the debt more difficult.All this significantly constrains g

95、overnments room to maneuver.Meanwhile,the urgency of tackling the climate crisis is as strong as ever.Extreme weather events hit most regions of the world in 2022.Large-scale flooding covered one-third of Pakistans territory;extreme heat and drought affected parts of Europe,China,and India,breaking

96、local temperature records by large margins;and the most severe drought on record hit the horn of Africa,putting 22 million people at risk of starvation.11 In terms of international climate policy,the 27th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(COP27)ma

97、de progress in some areas,but not others.The loss and damage fund,aimed at assisting vulnerable countries in managing the effects of climate disasters,saw advancement.Workstreams to operationalize Article 6 of the Paris Agreement also moved ahead,and delegates at COP28 in the United Arab Emirates wi

98、ll further address this process.The need for transparency and accountability in goal setting and reporting by nonstate actors received significant attention through the report of the High-Level Expert Group on Net Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities.12 However,the summit fell short of e

99、xpectations by failing to commit to the phasing out of fossil fuels and making only limited progress in discussions and pledges made on climate finance.“The developing world now faces a record amount of debt,amounting to nearly USD 100 trillion in early 2023.”FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER

100、 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES13 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORG“The latest UnitedNations Environment Programme emissions gap report makes clear that without imminent large-scale transformation of the global economy,the collective goal of limiting global temperature increase to 1.5C will b

101、e outof reach.”Domestically,many nations forged ahead with climate action in 2022.Responding to the ever-increasing urgency of the climate crisis,but also driven by the rising price of fossil fuels,many countries around the world set new climate targets or progressed concrete policies to reduce emis

102、sions.Australia updating its nationally determined contribution(NDC)target and passing legislation on climate targets,Chile adopting a climate framework law and a net-zero commitment and policies to achieve it,and India updating its NDC target and committing to a net-zero target are just some exampl

103、es.On the whole,89 countries,13 representing 86%of global emissions,had adopted net-zero commitments at the end of 2022,with target dates ranging from 2035 to 2060.14 Many countries also adopted substantial market and regulatory incentives for the accelerated deployment of renewable electricity gene

104、ration capacity;electrification of end uses,for example with heat pumps and electric vehicles;investments in energy efficiency,electricity storage,and grid expansion;and support for the development of advanced low-carbon technologies such as green hydrogen.In many European countries ETSs and carbon

105、tax policies remain central to climate policy,while other countries are focusing on more directly supporting green industries and jobs.For example,the Inflation Reduction Act in the United States constituted a hallmark achievement in 2022,including measures such as the introduction of a methane emis

106、sions charge;subsidies for electric vehicles;and increased tax credits for carbon capture,utilization,and storage.Yet,overall,countries are still not on track to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.Despite encouraging signs,the overall ambition of climate policies still falls severely short of wha

107、t is required.15 The latest United Nations Environment Programme emissions gap report makes clear that without imminent large-scale transformation of the global economy,the collective goal of limiting global temperature increase to 1.5C will be out of reach.16 Countries new and updated NDCs are,if i

108、mplemented,projected to result in global warming of 2.4C2.6C.17,ii To get on track toward 1.5C(without significant overshoot),the world must cut current emissions by 45%until 2030.18 The solutions to achieve the necessary transformation are well known and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Chang

109、es Sixth Assessment Report concludes that there is sufficient finance in the global system to close the respective investment gaps,but more action is needed.19 In this context,the political economy of direct carbon pricing is becoming more complex.The steep rise in consumer prices,and in particular

110、energy bills,turned up the pressure on policymakers to consider all options to reduce cost burdens in the short termincluding in some cases calls for changes to carbon taxes and ETSs.20 At the same time,the International Monetary Fund and others argued that the energy crisis underlined the importanc

111、e of promoting energy independence and achieving energy security and that adequate carbon pricing can support these goals by incentivizing the deployment of domestic renewables and energy-saving measures.21 Targeted revenue recycling and incentives for low-carbon investment have been used to improve

112、 access to low-carbon alternatives,promote development projects,and reduce the cost of living for the poor.Various studies have suggested that direct carbon pricing can support economic development objectives and does not necessarily reduce economic growth or employment.22 The need to develop cost-e

113、fficient strategies for NDC implementation and the demonstrated effectiveness of carbon pricing at reducing emissions increase momentum for direct carbon pricing and make it a central element for many countries plans to deliver on the Paris goals.(ii)The International Energy Agency expects a tempera

114、ture rise of 1.7C by 2100,under the scenario that current climate pledges and additional national and sectoral commitments to climate are achieved in full.For further reading see,International Energy Agency,“World Economic Outlook 2022,”November 2022.FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER

115、 4ANNEXES14 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGState and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2023 provides a comprehensive overview of the developments in direct carbon pricing during 2022 and into 2023.The report covers ETSs,carbon taxes,and carbon crediting mechanisms,each of which provides

116、 a clear monetary incentive directly linked to the associated volume of emissions(see Box 1 for short definitions of these instruments).This annual update is intended to serve as a factual and timely reference for anyone interested in these policies.It provides information on observable metrics,such

117、 as prices,coverage,and revenues,and how these have changed,particularly over the past year.The report is not intended to critically assess particular approaches or design features,but rather to provide insights on the observed changes and their drivers and to summarize how governments and others ha

118、ve responded to the changing political and economic landscapes.While it is not the main focus,the report also recognizes that these policies exist in the context of a broader carbon price signal that includes indirect carbon prices like fuel excise taxes and fossil fuel subsidies(see Box 3).This is

119、particularly relevant in a year where the energy crisis prompted governments to consider all avenues to support consumers.The prevalence and magnitude of indirect carbon pricing policies still dwarf the impact of direct carbon pricing:fossil fuel excise taxes and subsidies are worth over USD 1 trill

120、ion each year.23 Despite the growth in direct carbon pricing over the past years,this is still significantlylarger than ETSs and carbon taxes,which raised almost USD 100 billion in revenues in 2022,and the voluntary carbon market,with a total annual value in the order of USD 2 billion.24 Chapters 2

121、and 3 analyze key trends and developments in carbon markets and pricing globally over the last year,focusing on carbon taxes and ETSs in chapter 2 and carbon crediting mechanisms in chapter 3.Chapter 4 concludes.Annexes AD provide key definitions and further information on the latest developments fo

122、r individual initiatives.For more detailed information on all carbon taxes,ETSs,and carbon crediting mechanisms,please refer to the Carbon Pricing Dashboard(https:/carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/).“The prevalence and magnitude of indirect carbon pricing policies still dwarf the impact of direc

123、t carbon pricing.”FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXESChapter 2Carbon Taxes and Emissions Trading Systems16 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORG2.1 Growth in prices in ETSs and carbon taxes slowed following years of steep growth,but showed resilience in the fac

124、e of challenging circumstancesOverall,ETSs and carbon taxes have weathered the 2022 global energy crisis relatively well.Half of these instruments saw prices increase,while around a third(those with fixed prices)saw prices unchanged.iii Fewer than 15%of instruments saw prices decrease.The biggest in

125、creases were seen in the European Union Emissions Trading System(EU ETS)linked with the Switzerland ETS,with the EU ETS price exceeding EUR 100(USD 109)for the very first time in March 2023(Figure 1).iv Price movements in these markets were more volatile in 2022 compared to previous years.However,ma

126、ny ETSs saw prices dropby as much as 35%in the Republic of Korea.Only a few countries responded to the political pressures from high energy prices by deliberately lowering carbon tax rates or postponing scheduled increases.Citing surging energy prices,Germany postponed by a year the planned increase

127、 of the price in its national ETS,v which Energy prices and the cost-of-living crisis were major factors driving price trends and influencing the design and implementation of carbon taxes and emissions trading systems(ETSs)over 2022.Despite this,these policies appear to be weathering the challenging

128、 political and economic circumstances relatively well.While some countries directly intervened to keep carbon tax or ETS prices low,most prices remained relatively stable,and in some jurisdictions,notably in Europe,they increased.Some ETSs experienced more volatility in 2022 as a result of fluctuati

129、ng energy prices and to a lesser extent government responses to the energy crisis.High-income countries still see the highest direct carbon pricing coverage,prices,and revenues.Yet there is growing interest especially among low-and middle-income countries,especially in light of the potential for car

130、eful design and targeted use of carbon pricing revenue to support development goals.Carbon Price(USD/tCO2e)EU ETSCalifornia C&T/Qubec C&TNew Zealand ETSRGGI020406080100120Figure 01Price Evolution in Select ETSs from 0222023China National ETSRepublic of Korea ETSFIGURE 1 PRI

131、CE EVOLUTION IN SELECTED ETSs FROM 2018 TO 2022(iii)The level of the carbon price represents the strength of the signal to avoid or remove emissions.If prices rise,there is a stronger signal to drive further emission reductions.If prices decrease,there is less incentive to act.See,e.g.,World Bank Gr

132、oup,“FASTER Principles.”(iv)The Austria ETS and Germany ETS are not included here,as the prices in these mechanisms will be set by the respective governments until 2025.Note:Based on data from ICAP Allowance Price Explorer.Prices for the RGGI initiative and for California and Qubec CaT,come from the

133、 primary market,whereas for the other systems the prices reflect the secondary marketFOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES17 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGBOX 2 ETS AND CARBON TAX PRICES AND INFLATIONGlobally,inflation reached close to 8.8%in 2022.29 While

134、 such inflation levels are not unusual in many developing countries and emerging economies,most advanced economies had not experienced them for decades.In this context,there are larger than usual differences between the nominal changes in prices expressed in local currency and the real changes in pr

135、ices.Inflation affects carbon tax and ETS prices in different ways,depending on how prices are set.Prices in most ETSs are influenced by inflation;these prices are determined based on developments in other markets(including energy commodities,electricity,etc.),so price developments in these markets

136、would affect the ETS price.In the EU ETS and the linked Switzerland ETS,a large increase in nominal prices is more modest in real termsthe EU ETS price increased by 3.9%in real terms.On the other hand,real declines in other markets are larger than nominal changes:the 35%nominal decrease in the Korea

137、n ETS is even larger in real terms at around 40%.Several carbon taxes,such as those in Colombia and Poland,are inflation adjusted,as are the auction floor prices in the California and Qubec ETSs,which increase annually by 5%plus the rate of inflation.There is usually some delay in applying the infla

138、tion adjustment,so these instruments might still see decreasing real prices this year but real increases next year.By contrast,the price in the German national ETS and carbon taxes in the Canadian provinces,Chile,Singapore,and some European countries were fixed in nominal terms.In these cases,inflat

139、ion erodes the carbon price signal.Where prices are scheduled to increase by a predefined value,real increases are smaller than the defined nominal increase.was due to move from EUR 30 to EUR 35(from USD 33 to USD 38)at the start of 2023,also delaying by a year subsequent scheduled increases in 2024

140、 and 2025.25 South Africa extended an existing arrangement in its national carbon tax,under which companies are allocated a tax-free emissions allowance,similar in effect to a free allocation in an ETS,though this did not affect the headline price.26 Sweden has also postponed planned price increases

141、.By contrast,most jurisdictions did not tone down the ambition of their carbon taxes or ETSs.Scheduled price increases or other tightening measures were implemented for a number of fixed-price instruments.In many instances,this happened automatically since the tax rate is indexed to inflation(see Bo

142、x 2).In some other jurisdictions,prices increased far more than inflation:national carbon taxes in Ireland,Luxemburg,the Netherlands,and Norway,as well as the Canadian federal carbon tax,all increased by 20%or more,well above the respective inflation rates.New Zealand continued phasing down free all

143、ocations in its ETS,further tightened the eligibility and accounting rules for free allocation,and tightened the cap to align with the countrys national emissions budgets.The EU ETS cap continued its planned downward trajectory,with 2.2%,or 43 million allowances,cut in 2022,and free allocations were

144、 also reduced.In Switzerlands ETS,surplus allowances in circulation triggered the new market stability mechanism,which cut auction volumes by 50%.However,although momentum behind carbon taxes and ETSs remained resilient,other interventions in many of these jurisdictions to lower energy prices have i

145、mpacted overall carbon price policy signals(see Box 3).What is more,several jurisdictions made decisions to further strengthen existing carbon taxes or ETSs in the coming years.In November 2022,Singapore amended its carbon pricing bill to lock in price increases announced in 2021.This will increase

146、the countrys carbon tax from its current rate of SGD 5 to SGD 45(USD 434)starting in 2026,reaching as high as SGD 50 to SGD 80(USD 3860)by 2030.Canada is also proceeding with its approach to increase the stringency of its federal benchmark,vi with prices set to exceed CAD 170(USD 127)by 2030.Based o

147、n this approach,the updated 2023 Federal Fuel Charge starts at CAD 65(USD 48).South Africa has proposed a rising trajectory for its national carbon tax,set to reach at least USD 30 in 2030,despite resistance from business stakeholders.27 The EU agreed to a further tightening of the EU ETS cap as par

148、t of its “Fit for 55”package,with the rate of decline doubling to 4.4%annually beginning in 2028.Finally,in the US state of California,the Air Resources Board published its 2022 Scoping Plan for Achieving Climate Neutrality by 2045.28 While the plan still needs to be translated into concrete regulat

149、ory changes for the Californian cap-and-trade system,the document sets out a sectoral roadmap for the transition away from fossil fuels.(v)The price in Germanys national ETS will be set by the government until 2025,with the price planned to rise each year.The updated trajectory will see allowances s

150、old at EUR 30(USD 33)in 2023,EUR 35(USD 38)in 2024,and EUR 45(USD 49)in 2025(see Annex A for more details).Prices for the RGGI initiative and for California and Qubec CaT,come from the primary market,whereas for the other systems the prices reflect the secondary market(vi)The Canadian federal govern

151、ment sets minimum national stringency standards(the federal“benchmark”)that all subnational systems must meet to avoid the federal system applying.FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES18 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGBOX 3 TRACKING BROADER CARBON PRICES:BE

152、YOND ETSs AND CARBON TAXESWhile this report focuses on direct carbon pricing policiesETSs,carbon taxes,and carbon creditingindirect carbon pricing policies such as fuel excise taxes,fossil fuel subsidies,and differentiated VAT rates can also provide a strong price signal that changes the economics o

153、f high-emissions fuels or products(Annex A includes more detailed definitions of these concepts).Looking at both direct and indirect policies in combination gives a more complete picture of the overall carbon price incentives.Analysis combining direct and indirect carbon pricing policies gives a bet

154、ter sense of which emissions are covered by a carbon price signal,the strength of the signal,and how this landscape evolves over time.This can show,for example,where a positive carbon price is canceled out by negative carbon pricing(i.e.,fossil fuel subsidies)or when indirect carbon prices are conve

155、rted to(or renamed as)direct policies without materially changing the strength of the overall incentive.Recognizing the importance of this broader view of carbon pricing,several organizations have been working on analyses that quantify the combined impact of direct and indirect carbon pricing.In 202

156、2,the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)published Net Effective Carbon Rates(NECR)for 71 countries(predominantly in the OECD and Group of 20).The NECR is an indicator that includes direct carbon pricing in the form of carbon taxes and ETSs,plus indirect carbon pricing throu

157、gh fossil fuel taxes and fossil fuel subsidies.vii This builds on the OECDs previous work on Effective Carbon Rates,but importantly includes the impact of fossil fuel subsidies for the first time.In a similar vein,the World Bank is developing a Total Carbon Price metric that covers a broader range o

158、f countries.30 Indirect carbon prices are much more widespread than carbon taxes or ETSs,but carbon taxes and ETSs are growing more quickly,albeit from a smaller base.In 2021,out of the 71 countries the OECD assessed,67 had positive indirect carbon prices in the form of fuel taxes while only 39 had

159、carbon taxes or ETSs.This shows not only that most energy emissions are priced in some way,but also that most countries have experience in implementing policies that provide a carbon price signal.However,the change between 2018 and 2021 shows direct carbon prices are expanding at a faster rate.While

160、 the share of emissions covered by an ETS or carbon tax increased by more than 50%,the share of emissions covered by other fuel taxes barely changed.This contrast is particularly noticeable in developing countries,due primarily to substantially increased emissions coverage as a result of the launch

161、of Chinas national ETS.Indirect carbon prices set by fuel taxes are generally much higher than direct ones set by carbon taxes or ETSs:the weighted average fossil fuel tax in 2021 was three times the level of the average carbon price as a result of carbon taxes and ETSs.31 This gap,however,is narrow

162、ing,with prices in most ETSs and carbon taxes in the NECR dataset increasing by over 50%between 2018 and 2021.32 Fossil fuel subsidies are still widespread and erode the incentive provided by positive carbon prices.Effectively,these constitute a negative indirect carbon price,which counteracts the p

163、ositive price signal from direct and indirect carbon pricing instruments.Fossil fuel subsidies are still common:nearly all the countries in the OECDs analysis employed them.Their impact is significant:on average across the sample,fossil fuel subsidies reduced the NECR by around USD 0.90 in 2021,offs

164、etting around a fifth of the direct carbon price(the average price provided by ETSs and carbon taxes in 2021 in select countries was USD 4.50).While many governments made changes to energy policies in 2022,with the aim of supporting vulnerable consumers and safeguarding their economies,some of these

165、 measures have also reduced policy signals to reduce emissions.Whether countries stepped back on ETSs or carbon taxes,reduced or paused fossil fuel taxes,or increased energy subsidies,these measures had a dampening effect on the overall carbon price incentive in many countries.While only a few count

166、ries changed ETSs or carbon taxes in response to the crisis,many reduced or paused fossil fuel taxes or increased energy subsidies.33 This vastly expanded public expenditure in support of fossil fuel use:the International Energy Agency estimates that,globally,public spending to lower energy bills ad

167、ded up to USD 500 billion in 2022,of which Europe accounted for 70%.34 Despite lower policy signals,final energy prices have still gone up.Government interventions have not fully offset the increase in fossil fuel costshouseholds in many countries still face much higher energy bills than they did in

168、 the past.This overall increase in energy prices,and especially fossil fuels,means the economic imperative for energy efficiency,energy conservation,and carbon-free electricity generation has likely become stronger over the year.However,these price increases do not provide the same investment signal

169、s as direct carbon prices because they may be short-lived and,like indirect carbon prices,do not reflect the relative carbon content of different fuels.As with direct carbon prices,overall carbon price incentives are insufficient to deliver the transformational change needed to deliver on the Paris

170、goals.Only about 19%of emissions in the countries included in the NECR dataset are priced at a level needed by 2030 to be consistent with net-zero emissions targets.viii The International Monetary Fund,OECD,and others continue to highlight that fossil fuel prices generally fail to appropriately pric

171、e environmental impacts.(vii)The OECD categorizes policies as“explicit”and“implicit,”which are similar,respectively,to the“direct”and“indirect”terms used in this report.(viii)EUR 60 per metric ton of CO2 is used as a midpoint estimate for carbon costs in 2020 and a low-end estimate for 2030;OECD,“Pr

172、icing Greenhouse Gas Emissions:Turning Climate Targets into Climate Action,”2022.FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES19 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGFIGURE 2 KEY DRIVERS OR RECENT ETS AND CARBON TAX PRICE DEVELOPMENTSUpward pressure onETSs and carbon tax

173、 pricesLONG TERMStarting 5 years agoDownward pressure onETSs and carbon tax pricesStructural reforms,price stabilization measures and alignment of caps with long-term mitigation pathways have added to scarcity of allowances in some ETSs.Economic growth increases demand for ETS allowances.Other clima

174、te policies and technology developments reduce emissions(e.g.through energy efficiency,renewable deployment),reducing demand for allowances.Reduced economic activity during COVID lowered demand for ETS allowances,some of which can be carried forward.In a few instances govern-ments postponed planned

175、ETS or carbon tax price rises to counter the effects of rising energy prices.Lower energy demand and increased focus on energy efficiency due to high energy prices.Sustained high energy and fossil fuel prices could reduce energy use,encour-age greater uptake of renewables,reducing demand for allowan

176、cesSupply chain disruptions and availability of critical inputs slowed roll-out of renewable energies and other low-carbon technologies.Some governments adopted increasingly ambitious price trajectories for carbon taxes.MIDIUM TERMPast 2-5 yearsSHORT TERMPast yearLOOKING AHEADHigh gas prices and oth

177、er energy supply disruptions saw some countries temporarily use more coal,pushing up demand for carbon allowances.High inflation increased prices for several carbon taxes that are annually adjusted.Increased energy subsidies and lower fossil fuel taxes,implemented to support con-sumers,supports ener

178、gy use and demand for ETS allowanc-es.Continued increase in ambi-tion to meet net zero could drive higher pricesExpansion of carbon taxes or ETSs to sectors with higher abatement costs could see higher prices needed to deliver change.Beyond policy changes,energy markets were the biggest of several f

179、actors influencing prices in most ETSs(Figure 2).Limited gas supply and extremely high gas prices made coal relatively more competitive.Compounding the issue was drought in Europe,China,and the United States in 2022,causing temporary shortfalls in hydropower output and creating problems for some the

180、rmal power plantson top of existing technical and heat-related issues among,in particular,French nuclear power plants.In many European countries,the combined effect was sufficient to temporarily pause the multiyear trend of decreasing coal usage,and resulting higher power sector emissions drove up E

181、U ETS prices.35 Other economies and their ETSs were more shielded from energy price effects by their long-term liquefied natural gas(LNG)supply contracts.However,if high energy prices are sustained,they will eventually affect all markets.Projections of global energy consumption growth have been revi

182、sed down considerably in light of higher fossil fuel price projections.Lower energy use would reduce demand for ETS allowances and have a dampening effect on prices where prices are determined by allowance supply and demand.Overall,carbon prices would need to rise in the longer term to drive investm

183、ents into climate neutrality at the scale and pace required.The High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices concluded in 2017 that carbon prices needed to be at the level of USD 40/metric tons of carbon dioxide(tCO2)to USD 80/tCO2 in 2020 and reach USD 50/tCO2 to 100/tCO2 by 2030 to be on track to keep t

184、emperatures below 2oCthe upper end of the limit agreed upon in the Paris Agreement(2017 USD)(see Box 4).ix Adjusting for inflation allows a more direct comparison with current carbon pricesprices would need to reach USD 61 to USD 122 by 2030 in 2023 USD.36 As of April 1,2023,less than 5%of global gr

185、eenhouse gas(GHG)emissions are covered by a direct carbon price at(ix)Low and high shadow prices of carbon values are suggested to account for the uncertainty associated with the estimates.FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES20 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.

186、ORGIn 2017,Joseph Stiglitz and Nicholas Stern led a report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices.This report recommended that direct carbon price levels must reach at least USD 40 to USD 80/metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent(tCO2e)in 2020 and USD 50 to USD 100/tCO2e in real terms(in 201

187、7 USD)by 2030(or USD 61122 by 2030 in 2023 terms)to limit global warming to below 2C,provided a supportive policy environment is in place.More recent assessments align with the recommendations from the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices.For example,the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changes(

188、IPCC)Working Group III contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report indicates that with a mitigation pathway limiting warming to 2C the marginal abatement costs of carbon are around USD 90/tCO2 by 2030 in 2015 terms or USD 115 in 2023 terms.37 More recently,the Network of Central Banks and Supervisor

189、s for Greening the Financial System (NGFS)released its updated scenarios for central banks and supervisors in September 2022.NGFSs modeling suggests that carbon prices need to be around USD 50 by 2030 in 2010 terms(or USD 69 in 2023 terms)and subsequently around USD 200 (or USD 276 in 2023 terms)by

190、2050 to achieve a below-2C outcome.38 IPCC modeling(which includes models used by NGFS)concludes that significantly higher carbon prices would be needed for meeting the 1.5C-equivalent scenarios.or above the range recommended by 2030(in 2023 USD),with most of these high-price instruments located in

191、Europe(Figure 3).Policy features such as free allocations or rebates can also limit the extent to which a carbon price can drive the necessary volume of emission reductions,depending on their design.Furthermore,in many jurisdictions,the growth in(nominal)carbon prices failed to match inflation,meani

192、ng that carbon prices actually declined in real terms(see Box 2).Another important consideration is the share of emissions within a jurisdiction that face a carbon price incentive,which varies widely across countries(see Section 2.2).Figure 3 indicatively illustrates thisthe shading indicates the pr

193、oportion of the jurisdictions emissions covered by each carbon tax or ETS.Some jurisdictions have more than one of these policies(such as Poland,which has a carbon tax and participates in the EU ETS);in these cases(indicated with asterisks)the total share of the jurisdictions emissions that are cove

194、red is higher than the coverage of an individual policy.Further,the overall strength of the price signal includes policies beyond direct carbon prices(see Box 3)and can also be reflected through internal carbon pricing(see Box 5).2.2 Uptake of ETSs and carbon taxes grew slightly,mostly in countries

195、that are already pricing carbon As of April 2023,there are 73 carbon taxes or ETSs in operation(Figure 5).Since April 2022 new ETSs commenced in Austria and the state of Washington in the United States,and Indonesia announced the launch of a mandatory national ETS.At the subnational level,three new

196、carbon taxes were implemented in states within MexicoQuertaro,the State of Mexico,and Yucatnwhile a fourth carbon tax in Gua-najuato will enter into force in June 2023.With the exception of Indonesia,all of these new instruments are in countries where carbon taxes or ETSs had already been in place b

197、ut cover new sectors or strengthen existing price signals.In addition to these new instruments,Germanys national ETS expanded in January 2023 to cover coal-de-rived fuels used in facilities currently outside of the EU ETS.The Netherlands introduced carbon price floors for electricity and industry,wh

198、ich ensure a minimum carbon price for emissions covered by the EU ETS and form part of the countrys carbon tax.“As of April 1,2023,less than 5%of of global greenhouse gas emissions are covered by a direct carbon price at or above the range recommended by 2030”BOX 4 THE LEVEL OF DIRECT CARBON PRICING

199、 NEEDED TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PARIS TEMPERATURE TARGETFOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES21 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGFIGURE 3 PRICES AND COVERAGE ACROSS ETSs AND CARBON TAXESNote:Nominal prices on April 1,2023,or most recent exchange-traded or a

200、uction prices before April 1,2023,are shown for illustrative purposes only.Only the main rate is shown for each instrument.Some instruments are not shown in this graph as current price information is not available.Prices are not necessarily comparable between instruments because of(for example)diffe

201、rences in the sectors covered and allocation methods applied,specific exemptions,and compensation methods.The 2030 carbon price corridor is based on the recommendations in the report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices adjusted for inflation.Several jurisdictions apply different carbon tax

202、 rates to different sectors or fuels.In these cases,the included price reflects the highest general tax rate or primary fuel covered by the carbon tax.The instruments included on the x-axis reflect prices provided by each instrument.Instruments indicated with*are in jurisdictions with multiple instr

203、uments,so coverage of those jurisdictions total emissions may be higher than indicated by an individual instrument.The EU ETS includes 27 EU member states plus Norway,Iceland,and Liechtenstein.Several federal and subnational policies in Canada are priced at the same rate,reflecting the Pan-Canadian

204、Approach that requires all Canadian provinces and territories to have a carbon pricing system in place that aligns with the minimum national stringency federal standards.These are presented in two instruments(a carbon tax and an ETS):the carbon tax entry(Canada provinces and federal)includes the fed

205、eral fuel charge,British Columbia carbon tax,and Newfoundland and Labrador carbon tax,while Canada federal and provinces(ETS entry)includes the federal Output-Based Pricing System(OBPS),Alberta Technology Innovation Emissions Reduction regulation,New Brunswick ETS,Newfoundland and Labrador Performan

206、ce Standard Systems,and Saskatchewan OBPS.The coverage under Canada reflects the combined coverage of Canadas total emissions by the included policies.Coverage estimates for subnational Mexico carbon taxes were not available-approximate estimates are included based on the fuels covered by each instr

207、ument.02040608002030 Carbon Price Corridor2023 USD 61122 per t/CO2eUruguay CTLiechtenstein*CTSwitzerland*CTSweden*CTEU ETS*Switzerland*ETSNorway*CTUnited Kingdom*ETSFinland*CTNetherlands*CTIreland*CTFrance*CTLuxembourg*ETSCanada(Provinces and Federal)CTCanada(Provinces and Federal)ETSIcel

208、and*CTPrince Edward Island ETSAustria*ETSNew Zealand ETSGermany ETS*Quertaro*CTCalifornia CaTQubec ETSDenmark CTPortugal CTUnited Kingdom*CTNova Scotia ETSBritish Columbia*ETSLatvia*CTSpain*CTYucatan*ETSRGGI ETSZacatecas*CTBeijing ETSGuangdong ETSMassachusetts*ETSKorea ETSDurango*CTSouth Africa CTSh

209、enzhen ETSShanghai ETSChina ETSHubei ETSColombia CTChile CTChongqing ETSFujian ETSTianjin ETSMexico CTTokyo CTSingapore CTSaitama ETSArgentina CTState of Mexico*CTEstonia*CTJapan CTKazakhstan ETSUkraine CTPoland*CTCarbonTax60%coverage of jurisdictions emissions40%60%coverage of jurisdictions emissio

210、ns20%40%coverage of jurisdictions emissions60%coverage of jurisdictions emissions40%60%coverage of jurisdictions emissions20%40%coverage of jurisdictions emissions130Number of OrganizationsInternal Carbon Pricing Range(USD/tCO2e)ServicesManufacturingMaterialsOthersIndustryFOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHA

211、PTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES23 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGETS and Carbon TaxImplemented or ScheduledETS Implemented orScheduled for ImplementationETS or Carbon TaxUnder ConsiderationCarbon Tax Implemented orScheduled for ImplementationIndonesiaSingaporeBruneiDarussalamNe

212、w ZealandKazakhstanPakistanThailandTrkiyeChinaColombiaChileIsraelArgentinaUruguayCalifornia OregonWashingtonPennsylvaniaNorth CarolinaMassachusetts ManitobaSaskatchewanQubecOntarioAlbertaPrince Edward IslandNorthwestTerritoriesNewfoundlandand LabradorNew BrunswickBritish ColumbiaRGGINew YorkBrazilHa

213、waiiAustraliaNunavut NorwayUKSwedenSpainPortugalPolandNetherlands(Kingdom of the)LithuaniaLatviaItalyIrelandGreeceGermanyFranceFinlandEstoniaDenmarkBelgiumLuxembourgLiechtensteinCataloniaSloveniaAustriaSwitzerlandHungaryMontenegroAlbaniaTaiwan,China*TokyoTianjinShenzhenShanghaiSaitamaHubeiGuangdong(

214、except Shenzhen)FujianChongqingBeijingJapanRepublic of KoreaSakhalinTokyoSaitamaCzech RepublicRomaniaUkraineBulgariaCroatiaSlovak Rep.MoldovaBosnia&HerzegovinaSerbiaNorthMacedoniaGeorgiaVietnamMalaysiaSouth AfricaBotswanaSenegalCte dIvoireMoroccoIcelandGabonNigeriaMexicoJaliscoZacatecasState of Mexi

215、coYucatnGuanajuatoDurangoQuertaroNova ScotiaFIGURE 5 MAP OF CARBON TAXES AND ETSsxiii(xiii)Instruments are considered“scheduled for implementation”once they have been formally adopted through legislation and have an official,planned start date.Instruments are considered“under consideration”if the go

216、vernment has announced its intention to work toward the implementation of a carbon pricing initiative and this has been formally confirmed by official government sources.Some countries that have mechanisms implemented also have additional instruments under consideration.For subnational jurisdictions

217、 only the subnational instrument is reflected.FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES24 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGThere were also delays and repeals,largely driven by the energy crisis.Slovenia repealed its carbon tax,which had been in place since 1996,c

218、iting energy prices.Indonesia delayed the introduction of its planned carbon tax,which was due to start in 2022,referencing global risks stemming from Russias invasion of Ukraine,although it has since launched its ETS.41 Austria delayed its national ETS by three months,but it commenced in October 20

219、22.Germany pushed back the planned expansion of its national ETS to cover waste incineration until 2024.While the US state of Pennsylvania passed legislation to join the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative(RGGI),its implementation is on hold due to a court challenge.The net result of developments ove

220、r the past year is a minor increase in the share of global GHG emissions that are covered by carbon taxes or ETSs.ETSs and carbon taxes in operation cover around 23%of global GHG emissions(Figure 6),an increase of less than 1%compared with 12 months ago.xiv This figure accounts for overlap between i

221、nstruments and the fact that coverage differs substantially from country to country for example Uruguay,with a carbon tax that only covers gasoline,compared with more comprehensive approaches,such as Singapore with a carbon tax applied to around 80%of national GHG emissions.The relatively small incr

222、ease in global coveragedespite the expanding scope of some policies and new instruments being implemented is also a result of the fact that GHG emissions are decreasing in most jurisdictions that have implemented a carbon tax or ETS.Newly implemented instruments share design elements from existing s

223、ystems.Similar to Chinas national ETS,Indonesias ETS will function like a tradable performance standard for around 100 grid-connected,coal-fired power stations,with emissions intensity baselines based on the category of power plant,the average emissions intensity,and the average GHG emissions of the

224、 power station.Like the national ETS in neighboring Germany,the Austrian national ETS covers fuel combustion in road transport,buildings,and agriculture(i.e.,emission sources not covered by the EU ETS)and has started with a price that will be set by the government each year until 2025.(xiv)Changes t

225、o the proportion of global GHG emissions covered since last years report reflect factors beyond increased coverage of direct carbon pricing instruments.This includes changes as a result of applying updated GHG emission estimates.The current report uses updated GHG estimates taken from version 7.0 of

226、 the Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research(EDGAR)(https:/edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/),which were released at the end of 2022.EDGAR 7.0 includes a range of updates and provides GHG emission values up to 2021(previous versions only included up to 2018).“ETSs and carbon taxes in operation cove

227、r around 23%of global GHG emissions”FIGURE 6 SHARE OF GLOBAL GHG EMISSIONS COVERED BY ETSS AND CARBON TAXES ETS CoverageOverlap between ETS and CTCarbon Tax Coverage0.4%18%5.5%0%5%10%15%20%25%2000200042005200620072008200920000022Share of Golbal

228、Emissions202373Mechanisms implementedsince April 2022(State and Trends Report 2022)Austria ETSDurango CT(Mex)Indonesia ETSMontenegro ETSQuertaro CT(Mex)State of Mexico(Mex)Washington CCAYucatn CT(Mex)Number of carbon taxes or ETSsin operation April 1,2023FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHA

229、PTER 4ANNEXES25 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORG“New Zealand is set to become the first country in the world to price agricultural emissions from 2025”In the United States,Washington State launched its“cap-and-invest”system in January 2023,modeled after the cap-and-trade systems

230、 already in operation in California and Qubec.Several jurisdictions announced plans to expand the coverage of existing instruments or to adopt new ones.The Mexican ETS completed its pilot phase in 2022 and is intending to enter its operational phase in 2023;the Mexican Ministry of Environment and Na

231、tural Resources(SEMARNAT)is preparing to publish the final rules for the operational phase.xv Australias parliament has passed legislation to introduce crediting into its existing safeguard mechanism starting from July 1,2023,effectively transitioning into a rate-based ETS.The reform would also tigh

232、ten baselines,to align with Australias 2030 targets.The EU agreed to establish a new,separate ETS by 2027 to cover emissions from buildings and road transport,as well as small energy and industry installations outside the scope of the existing EU ETS.The changes would also expand the existing EU ETS

233、 to include maritime shipping from 2024.Shipping companies will gradually face surrender obligations under the EU ETS,starting from 40%of verified emissions in 2024 and increasing to 70%in 2025 and 100%in 2026.At that point the plan will cover 100%of emissions for voyages between member state ports

234、and 50%for those between EU ports and third-country ports.The EU also reached agreement on the details of its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism(CBAM).It will apply to emissions embedded in iron and steel,cement,aluminum,electricity,fertilizers,and hydrogen imported into the EU.The mechanism will fu

235、nction as a carbon price levied on imports to the EU that have embodied emissions priced below the EU carbon price,with obligations for importers to submit“CBAM certificates”priced in line with EU ETS allowances from 2026.Further details on carbon tax and ETS updates are outlined in Annex C.New Zeal

236、and is set to become the first country in the world to price agricultural emissions from 2025,which would extend carbon pricing beyond traditionally covered sectors.42 Until now,carbon taxes and ETSs have largely focused on energy and industrial emissions:most carbon taxes apply to specific fossil f

237、uels used for energy in different sectors,while ETSs mostly focus on stationary energy and large industrial facilities (see Annex C).The New Zealand government announced in December 2022 that the carbon price,a separate mechanism from the New Zealand ETS,will be charged at the farm level.The design

238、of the mechanism underwent a final round of consultations in late 2022,with a government decision expected in the first half of 2023.A similar approach has also been floated in Denmark,where the Danish Climate Council recommended introducing a tax on farming emissions to help meet the countrys emiss

239、ions targets.43 Expanding carbon pricing to agricultural emissions comes with its own set of challenges,with stakeholders raising concerns about impacts on food security,limited opportunities to reduce emissions from agricultural activities(and associated risks of carbon leakage),interactions with p

240、reexisting market distortions,and difficulties ensuring robust monitoring,reporting,and verification.44 Others argue customers are seeking more sustainable alternatives,new approaches to reducing agricultural emissions are emerging,and carbon pricing could ensure greater investment in further develo

241、ping new ways to reduce agricultural emissions.45 If the New Zealand approach is successful,it will provide a useful example of an approach to apply carbon taxes or ETSs to agricultural emissions and potentially to other sectors less commonly covered by these policies.Beyond those countries implemen

242、ting and refining carbon taxes and ETSs,several jurisdictions continue to take preparatory steps for implementing these policies.In East Asia and the Pacific,several countries continue to(xv)The“pilot phase”ran from January 1,2020,to December 31,2021.The pilot phase was designed to have no economic

243、effects,meaning that there were no monetary penalties and allowances were allocated for free,in a proportion equivalent to the reported emissions of covered entities.During the“transition phase,”which began in 2022,the rules for the pilot phase remain applicable until SEMARNAT publishes the rules fo

244、r the“operational phase,”which is expected later in 2023.FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES26 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGexplore carbon pricing policies.Malaysia,Vietnam,and Thailand,for instance,are all considering options for future ETSs.Japans Min

245、istry of Economy,Trade and Industry presented plans that could see a national ETS starting in 2026.46 In August 2022,Chile announced its intention to develop a pilot ETS for the energy sector as part of its 20222026 Energy Agenda.In Trkiye,the Medium Term Programme(20232025)mentions the conversion o

246、f energy taxes to a carbon tax and the introduction of a national ETS.In January 2023,Taiwan,China,passed a law to introduce a carbon tax on large emitters,as well as a CBAM for carbon-intensive imports.The designs of both systems have yet to be determined.2.3 Government revenues from ETSs and carbo

247、n taxes continue to grow and reached a new record high in 2022Continuing with previous trends,revenuesxvi from carbon taxes and ETSs grew by over 10%in 2022,reaching almost USD 95 billion globally.Carbon revenues are a function of the carbon price,the emissions covered,and other design features such

248、 as the method of allowance allocation or the availability of rebates.Compared to the previous year,global revenue from carbon taxes and ETSs increased by around USD 10 billion.In absolute terms,the EU ETS generated the most revenue in 2022,namely USD 42 billion,and the increase in revenues of about

249、 USD 7.8 billion was responsible for more than 76%of the total increase in global carbon pricing revenues.On a per capita basis,Swedens carbon tax for road transport was the instrument that delivered the highest revenues,amounting to slightly more than USD 200 per citizen.In 2022,ETSs accounted for

250、69%of global government revenues from direct carbon pricing,with the remaining 31%from carbon taxes(Figure 7).There are trade-offs made between different objectives,with the amount of revenue raised dependent on design features.There are many different design decisions that impact the amount of reve

251、nue raised by a carbon tax or ETS,including which emissions sources are covered and how the price is set,as well as the level of baselines or free allocations,the use of auctions,the use of rebate schemes,and the use of offsets.Most of the policies that delivered the highest government revenues were

252、 ETSs,but this largely reflected higher prices and the size of the economies they covered.(xvi)Includes revenues from carbon taxes and ETSs(e.g.,from auctioning)collected by governments.It does not account for foregone revenue,for example from freely allocated units or tax exemptions.“Revenues from

253、carbon taxes and ETSs grew by over 10%in 2022,reaching almost USD95 billion globally”FIGURE 7 EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL REVENUES FROM CARBON TAXES AND ETSs OVER TIME(NOMINAL)Billion USDETSCarbon Tax0708090200820092000002231%69%USD 95FOREWOR

254、DSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES27 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORG“Revenue in the EU ETS has increased sevenfold since 2017.This is due partly to higher prices,but also to the gradual shift from free allocation toward auctioning.”The dominance of the EU ETS i

255、n terms of revenues collected reflects in part its size and price,but also its evolving approach to allowance allocation.Revenue in the EU ETS has increased sevenfold since 2017.This is due partly to higher prices,but also to the gradual shift from free allocation toward auctioning.Still,around 35%o

256、f EU ETS allowances are allocated for free.47 This constitutes a sizable opportunity costauctioning these allowances could yield revenues in the order of an additional USD 20 billion per year.xvii Chinas national ETS covers more than double the emissions of the EU ETS,but in effect it adopts 100%fre

257、e allocation through technology-specific,emissions-intensity baselines.This approach means low direct costs for most covered entities,but also that the policy has not raised any revenue.Comparing ETSs with carbon taxes,which often have fewer exemptions or free allocations,gives a different perspecti

258、ve.For example,the Republic of Koreas ETS covers more emissions than Mexicos carbon tax and at a higher price,but free allocations and the availability of offsets in the Korean ETS means government revenue was similar for both mechanisms at around USD 240 million.Collected revenue from carbon taxes

259、and ETSs is frequently used for specific predetermined purposes,helping to ease political resistance.Based on data collected by the Institute for Climate Economics,40%of revenues from carbon taxes and ETSs were earmarkedxviii for dedicated purposes,in particular green spending,and a further 10%for d

260、irect transfers to vulnerable households and firms.The remainder was used for the general budget(20%),tax cuts(9%),and other purposes(6%)(Figure 8).This is an increase in the proportion of carbon revenue being used for specific purposes compared to previous years.This increase was driven by the incr

261、ease in revenue collected under the EU ETS,where the majority of auction revenue allocated to Member States is used for climate-and energy-related purposes(and is well above the 50%required by EU legislation).48 By contrast,the majority of revenues from indirect carbon prices(such as fuel excise tax

262、es)are not earmarked for specific purposes.49 New research from the OECD indicates there is greater public support for climate policy,including ETSs and carbon taxes,if revenues are used to fund green infrastructure and low-carbon technologies or redistributed to low-income households or those most

263、affected by the policy.50,xix Earmarking revenues has been used to support the long-term transformation of energy-intensive industries.For instance,in British Columbia(BC)carbon tax revenues are used to manage impacts on households,maintain industry competitiveness,and encourage new green investment

264、s.The“Clean BC Program”directs an amount equal to the incremental carbon tax paid by industry above CAD 30/tCO2e(USD 22)into incentives for cleaner operations and emission reduction projects.The EU will use close to EUR 40 billion(USD 43 billion)from ETS revenues for the Innovation Fund to finance t

265、he development of new technologies and big flagship projects.Alberta uses most of the revenues from its ETS to help support regulated firms transition away from fossil fuels.From the first installment of CAD 750 million(USD 558 million),CAD 131 million(USD 97 million)was used to fund seven projects

266、under the Industrial Energy Efficiency and Carbon Capture Utilization and Storage Grant Program.51 In some jurisdictions,though,earmarking of public revenues is not allowed,reflecting concerns that earmarking reduces policymakers flexibility and might create a lock-in of economically inefficient spe

267、nding.52 Recycling revenues through direct transfers have been implemented through lump-sum payments and targeted vulnerable households or those most impacted.Policymakers are often concerned that carbon pricing adds to financial pressure on low-income households.53 Although carbon pricing can have

268、a progressive effect on income distribution,54 higher energy costs are an additional burden for low-income households.55 Returning carbon pric-ing revenue to affected households can reduce or eliminate this pressure.The(xvii)This figure represents an indicative value of revenue based on the proporti

269、on of allowances allocated for free in 2022 and the price in 2022.It does not account for broader market impacts that would result from increasing the proportion of allowances auctioned.(xviii)Note,earmarking includes where requirements are set out in legal text or where there is clear documentation

270、 explaining how revenue has been allocated.(xix)For more information on how revenue use can affect political acceptability,see D.Klenert,L.Mattauch,E.Combet,O.Edenhofer,C.Hepburn,R.Rafaty,and N.Stern,“Making Carbon Pricing Work for Citizens,”Nature Climate Change 8(2018):669677,https:/doi.org/10.103

271、8/s41558-018-0201-2.FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES28 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGFIGURE 8 SCALE AND USES OF CARBON REVENUE IN 2021SHARE OF REVENUEBY COUNTRYSHARE OF REVENUEBY TYPE OF MECHANISMSHARE OF REVENUE ALLOCATEDTO DIFFERENT USESETS:70%46%:E

272、armarking29%:General BudgetCarbon Tax:30%6%:Other9%:Tax Cuts10%:Direct TransfersEU ETS:43.4%United Kingdom:9.5%Germany:8.7%France:9.3%United States:5.5%Canada:8.5%Sweden:2.6%Japan:2.4%New Zealand:1.4%Norway:1.8%Other:6.9%Source:Based on 2021 data from Institute for Climate Economics.Note:All auction

273、 revenue allocated to EU Member States is reflected under the EU ETS revenue(not individual member states).Revenues collected under separate instruments(e.g.,France Carbon Tax or Germany ETS)are displayed separately.Share of revenue allocated to different uses in 2021,meaning that revenue use displa

274、yed could include revenue collected prior to 2021.Canadian federal pollution pricing system addresses this by return-ing revenue to citizens through“Climate Action Incentive payments”aimed at primarily benefiting low-and middle-income households and families.The EUs Fit for 55 climate policy package

275、 includes a“Social Climate Fund”that will return EUR 65 billion(USD 71 billion)generated from carbon pricing revenue to vulnerable households,micro enterpris-es,and transport users,specifically through temporary direct income support as well as supporting investments in energy efficiency of building

276、s,decarbonization of heating and cooling of buildings,and im-proving access to low-carbon mobility.56 The largest share of the CO2 levy is recycled back in the form of lump-sum equal per capita trans-fers to households by means of reducing mandatory health insurance contributions.Austria has set up

277、a rebate system for its national ETS:the so-called“climate bonus”that recycles carbon pricing revenue to households.The first payments were made in August 2022 in combi-nation with financial support to address higher costs of living.In total,every adult received EUR 500(USD 544)and every child EUR 2

278、50(USD 272).57 For the next payments in October 2023,the bonus will be between EUR 100 and EUR 200(USD 109217),depending on the place of residence,with higher payments for people living in areas with lower access to public transportation.2.4 High-income nations have higher uptake,prices,and revenues

279、,but other countries are increasingly showing interestThe vast majority of carbon taxes and ETSs are located in high-income countries in Europe and North America.Every country in the European Economic Areaxx and North America has at least some of its emissions covered by one of these mechanisms(noti

280、ng that in the United States these policies are implemented almost entirely at the subnational level).Chinas national ETS accounts for almost all of the emissions covered in East Asia and the Pacific.While some countries FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES29 STATE AND TRENDS O

281、F CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGin Latin America and the Caribbean and South Asia have carbon taxes,Mexico is the only one to have implemented an ETS.In Africa and the Middle East,there are hardly any examples of either instrument.ETSs or carbon taxes are mostly limited to middle-income and high-

282、income countries(Figure 9).Carbon tax rates and ETS prices in high-income countries tend to be higher than those in middle-income countries(Figure 10).Most instruments in high-income countries have prices above USD 50,and nearly all above USD 15.In middle-income countries most instruments have price

283、s below USD 10.There are,though,several examples of instruments in middle-income countries with prices above USD 10,such as in the Beijing and Guangdong ETS Pilots(in China),the carbon tax of Latvia,and the subnational carbon taxes in Mexico(Quertaro,Yucatn,and Zacatecas).High-income countries are r

284、esponsible for collecting almost all of the revenues from carbon taxes and ETSs,reflecting higher prices,higher jurisdictional emissions,and greater uptake but also different designs.Of the 16 national policies that delivered less than USD 30 million in 2022,only a few were in high-income countriesa

285、nd these were carbon taxes that supplement an ETS.There are eight rate-based ETSs in middle-income countries that delivered little or no revenue.These designs are not unique to middle-income countries;Canadas Output-Based Pricing System,along with several subnational Canadian systems,and Australias

286、scheduled ETS operate on a similar basis.Cap-and-trade ETSs are much more likely to be in high-income countries and deliver higher revenues,but this depends on the level of free allocation and eligibility of offsets(as noted in Section 2.3).The only cap-and trade ETS not in a high-income country are

287、 the Kazakhstan and Mexican ETSs,which have not auctioned allowances to date.Middle-income countries were more likely to generate revenues through carbon taxes;for example,Argentinas carbon tax brought in USD 167 million in 2022 and Colombias USD 92 million.The impact of exemptions,differential rate

288、s,and FIGURE 9 COUNTRIES WITH CARBON TAXES AND ETSs BY WORLD REGIONS AND INCOME LEVELS IMPLEMENTED,SCHEDULED,OR UNDER CONSIDERATIONCountry with a Carbon Tax andan ETS implemented or scheduledCountry with a Carbon Taximplemented or scheduledCountry without acarbon tax or an ETSCountry with an ETSimpl

289、emented or scheduledCountry with a Carbon tax or ETSunder considerationNORTHAMERICALATIN AMERICA&CARIBBEANSUB-SAHARANAFRICAMIDDLE EAST&NORTH AFRICASOUTH ASIA,EAST ASIA&THE PACIFICEUROPE&CENTRAL ASIAHigh-incomeCountriesUpper-Middle-IncomeCountriesLower-Middle-IncomeCountries(xx)The European Economic

290、Area includes Austria,Belgium,Bulgaria,Croatia,Republic of Cyprus,Czech Republic,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Iceland,Ireland,Italy,Latvia,Liechtenstein,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Malta,Netherlands,Norway,Poland,Portugal,Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia,Spain,and Sweden.FOREWORDSUMMARYCH

291、APTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES30 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGFIGURE 10 MAP OF CARBON PRICE LEVELS AND COVERAGE OF IMPLEMENTED CARBON TAXES AND ETSs USD 100USD 0.5Indicative price levelby countryEmission coverage inworld regionsSize represents totalemissions in reg

292、ion(s)Pie charts representthe share of covered emissionsin world regionsEast Asia&Pacific33%Europe&Central Asia24%South Asia0%Middle East&North Africa,Sub-saharan Africa7%Latin America&The Caribbean2%North America15%The size of each regional chart represents the total emissions in the corresponding

293、region,whereas the colored section is the share of emissions in the region covered by ETSs and carbon taxes.The price for each country reflects the main rate that applies to the greatest portion of GHG emissions.FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES31 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON

294、PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGrebates within carbon taxes on revenue levels is also evident,though.South Africas carbon tax covers nearly 10 times more emissions than Colombias at a higher rate but delivered a similar volume of revenues.These trends reflect the early stage of climate policy in many deve

295、lop-ing countries,but also their need to focus on other development goals and barriers to implementation.Several instruments in developing countries have remained“under consideration”for some time.For jurisdictions without binding emissions targets before the Paris Agreement(including non-Annex I co

296、untriesxxi),there has historically been less of an imperative to implement policies to reduce GHG emissions.Further,developing countries face partic-ular social,economic,legal,and political barriers to implementing carbon taxes or ETS.58 In particular,many countries are focused on increasing energy

297、access and keeping energy costs low.xxii Some countries are seeking to design and implement multiple direct carbon pricing policies simultaneously,which may help to accommodate specific sectoral circumstances and political or regulatory constraints but makes design and implementation more complex.Fo

298、r example,Indonesia,Malaysia,Mexico,and Vietnam,among others,are all considering or progressing multiple instrumentsapplying them either at the same time but in different sectors,at different levels of governance,or even in combination to cover the same emissions.Despite these barriers,there is incr

299、easing interest in carbon taxes and ETSs in regions with low coverage,such as Africa.There are low-and middle-income countries considering carbon taxes or ETSs in almost every world region(Figure 9).South Africas carbon tax is so far the only one of these policies implemented in Africa,but Botswana,

300、59 Cte dIvoire,60 Gabon,Morocco,61 Nigeria,and Senegal62 have all made indications that there is appetite to adopt either a carbon tax or an ETS.Cte dIvoire and Senegal have undertaken feasibility and impact assessment studies with international donor support,and Botswana continues to explore the fe

301、asibility of implementing a carbon tax.Both Gabon and Nigeria have published legal frameworks for establishing their respective domestic ETSs.Gabons decree sets up a framework for both an ETS and a carbon offsetting system,63 while Nigerias Climate Act creates a council vested with powers to establi

302、sh an ETS.64 Should these carbon pricing efforts progress,the global map of uptake could start to look very different.Drivers of this growing interest among a broader set of countries include fiscal pragmatism,border carbon adjustments,EU accession,and new policy designs,in addition to climate actio

303、n.Governments are increasingly recognizing the opportunity for carbon taxes or ETSs to support fiscal reform by raising revenue through a mechanism that provides positive incentives for change.This is especially relevant now,as many countries face high levels of sovereign debt65 and for countries wh

304、ere a high level of informality can make other types of revenue-raising(like VAT or income tax)less effective.66 The examples in Mexico described in Box 6 provide an apt illustration,and revenue from carbon taxes and ETSs is discussed further in Section 2.3.The EUs planned CBAM includes provisions f

305、or imports to the EU to be granted reduced charges if the embedded emissions have already been subject to a direct carbon price in their country of origin.For countries that export to the EU,this changes the politics of carbon pricing:it is now a question of whether carbon price revenues go to the E

306、U or to the countrys own government.This argument is stronger for countries that have close trade ties with Europe.For instance,Trkiyes Medium Term Programme(20232025)explicitly connects its plans for introducing a national ETS in Trkiye to the EU CBAM.The goal of EU accession provides an incentive

307、for countries in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe to prepare for emissions trading.To be able to join the EU,they must put in place much of the infrastructure for the EU ETS(e.g.,monitoring,reporting,and verification and compliance systems).Finally,many countries have cited the need to deliver

308、 on Paris targets and net-zero commitments as a driver for pursuing these policies.67“There are low-and middle-income countries considering carbon taxes or ETSs in almost every world region.”(xxi)Non-Annex I Parties under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change are mostly developin

309、g countries.(xxii)For further discussion on barriers and case studies see A.Burns,C.Jooste,and G.Schwerhoff,“Climate Modeling for Macroeconomic Policy:A Case Study for Pakistan,”World Bank Group,Policy Research Working Paper 9780,September 2021;United Nations Environment Programme,“The Closing Windo

310、w:Climate Crisis Calls for Rapid Transformation of Societies,The Emissions Gap Report 2022”(Nairobi:United Nations Environment Programme,2022);and B.Doda,M.Hall,C.Haug,E.Kuneman,and T.Laroche-Theune,“Carbon Pricing Potential in East and South Asia:Synthesis and Case Studies for Indonesia,Vietnam,and

311、 Pakistan”(Dessau-Rolau:German Environment Agency,2023).FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXES32 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORG2.5 Progress on international cooperation to impose a cost on emissions has been limited While discussions have continued in inter

312、national organizations around minimum carbon prices or aligning policies,there were no concrete steps forward.The International Monetary Fund and others have continued long-running calls for greater cooperation on carbon pricing.72 In December 2022,the Group of Seven(G7)formally launched its“Climate

313、 Club”as one flagship of the German G7 presidency.73 A key question for many of these initiatives,especially regarding minimum carbon prices,is agreeing on definitions.For example,some initiatives focus on indirect carbon pricing(e.g.,eliminating fossil fuel subsidies),while others are focused only

314、on direct carbon pricing(see Box 1,Box 3,and Annex A for definitions used in this report).International Maritime Organization(IMO)member states have agreed in principle to price carbon dioxide emissions from global shipping,but details are yet to be settled.The IMO adopted its initial strategy to re

315、duce GHG emissions from international shipping in 2018.This includes a target to at least halve the sectors GHG emissions by 2050 relative to 2008.Over the past year,IMO negotiations have focused on revising the initial strategywith many IMO member states calling for full decarbonization by 2050whic

316、h will need to be agreed on in July 2023.To achieve these goals,the IMO is developing a basket of climate policy measures that are likely to include a mechanism to price GHG emissions from international shipping.In recent meetings,many governments and industry representatives voiced support for impl

317、ementing a market-based measure to price GHG emissions from international shipping as part of a basket of measures alongside technical standards.Such market-based measures could include carbon levies and feebate systems.xxiii,74 The International Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO)agreed on the main p

318、arameters for its Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for In-ternational Aviation.At its 41st Assembly meet-ing in October 2022,the ICAO Assembly agreed to set the baseline for offsetting requirements at 85%of 2019 emissions for both the volun-tary(20242026)and mandatory(20272035)phases.Airlines

319、must offset any emissions above this baseline.The original plans had foreseen that the baseline should be based on the aver-age emissions of 2019 and 2020.Owing to the strong decline of passenger numbers in 2020 due to the pandemic,this would have entailed a much stricter baseline.At the same meetin

320、g,ICAO also adopted its long-term aspirational goal,a non-binding target to reach net-zero carbon emis-sions by 2050.BOX 6 USING CARBON PRICING AS A FISCAL TOOL:MEXICO SUBNATIONALS CASE STUDYMexico is the first country in Latin America and the Caribbean with operational subnational carbon taxeseight

321、 states have introduced a green fiscal reform with carbon pricing elements.Zacatecas led the way in 2017,followed by Baja California(which has since been suspended)and Tamaulipas(repealed in 2022),and subsequently the State of Mexico,Quertaro,and Yucatn in 2022.Durango and Guanajuato are the most re

322、cent states to enact carbon taxes.Durangos carbon tax entered into force in January 2023 and Guanajuatos is scheduled for June 2023.More could be implemented in the following years,with a carbon tax under consideration in the state of Jalisco.68 Measures adopted include new taxes that provide incent

323、ives to invest in green,low-carbon technologies and infrastructure,as well as to finance government-sponsored climate change adaptation measures,while reducing inefficient subsidies and distortionary taxation.In Yucatan and Guanajuato,taxes on activities that contribute to ground,underground,and wat

324、er pollution accompanied carbon taxes.Zacatecas,Baja California,Tamaulipas,and the state of Mexico all introduced carbon taxes as a part of a broader reform package with significant environmental protection elements.69 In Zacatecas and Quertaro packages included taxes on minerals extraction and wast

325、e.70 The carbon tax rates are equivalent to or higher than those in several high-income countries.The five states that apply a carbon tax as of April 2023Durango,Quertaro,State of Mexico,Yucatn and Zacatecashave placed an average carbon price of around MXN 266.6(USD 14.78)/tCO2e.The highest rate amo

326、ng the Mexican states,Quertaros,is above USD 30/tCO2e,a significant rate for a developing economy.Legislators rationales may provide useful examples and lessons for other jurisdictions.For example,a desire to enhance fiscal space at the subnational level due to spending pressures from the COVID-19 p

327、andemic drove the adoption of the tax in Tamaulipas(which has since been repealed).In the state of Mexico,reform was aimed at increasing local tax revenues and an increased emphasis on the need for greater efficiency in tax collection.However,the constitutional challenge to Baja Californias effort t

328、o institute a tax on emissions,and the ensuing Supreme Court ruling in favor of the plaintiffs,presents a cautionary tale regarding the complexitiesof subnational green fiscal reform efforts.The Mexican federal government and a group of regulated entities successfully argued that,according to the Me

329、xican Constitution,only the federal government can implement a tax on fuels(the tax applied to emissions generated by the consumption of gasoline and diesel).This ruling could in the future limit the power of local legislators to establish taxeson the carbon content of gasoline and other oil product

330、s.71(xxiii)Central aspects of IMO negotiations relate to addressing potential disproportionately negative impacts on states from any climate change mitigation policies(including carbon pricing),fairness and equity considerations,and the future availability of zero-carbon bunker fuels.In this context

331、,there is strong interest in the use of the potential revenues from such an instrument to address these issues.Revenues generated by the instrument could be significanton the order of USD 40 to USD 60 billion annually until 2050 and could therefore play a key role in ensuring an effective and equita

332、ble energy transition in the sector.FOREWORDSUMMARYCHAPTER 1CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 4ANNEXESChapter 3Carbon Crediting Markets and Mechanisms34 STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023 WORLDBANK.ORGCarbon credit markets trade“carbon credits,”which are units that are generated through voluntarily imp

333、lemented emission reduction activities.Carbon credits can represent emission reductions achieved through either avoidance,for instance by capturing methane from landfills,or removal from the atmosphere,such as sequestering carbon through afforestation or directly capturing carbon from the air and storing it.Each carbon credit represents 1 metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent(tCO2e)reduced or re