1、TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, SUPPLY CHAIN TRADE, AND WORKERS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2019 2019 World Trade Organization World Trade Organization Centre William Rappard Rue de Lausanne 154 1211 Geneva 2 Switzerland Telephone: +41 (0)22 739 51 11 Internet: www.wto.org

2、This work is a product of the World Trade Organization, the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Research Center of Global Value Chains headquartered at the University of International Business and Economics (RCGVC-UIBE), the

3、World Bank Group, and the China Development Research Foundation. It is based on joint research efforts to better understand the ongoing development and evolution of global value chains and their implications for economic development. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this w

4、ork are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the co-publishing partners, their Boards of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The co-publishing partners do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominatio

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6、use the co-publishing partners encourage dissemination of their knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for non-commercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Ba

7、nk Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 2025222625; e-mail: pubrightsworldbank.org. WTO print ISBN 978-92-870-4967-4 WTO web ISBN 978-92-870-4968-1 This publication uses US spelling. All mentions of dollars refer to US dollars, unless otherwise indica

8、ted. The term “billion” refers to a thou- sand million. The Research Center of Global Value Chains acknowledges the financial support from the Bill Research Faculty and Senior Policy Fellow, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University Other contributors Nadim Ahmad Head of Trade a

9、nd Competitiveness Statistics Division, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Marc Bacchetta Counsellor, World Trade Organization Michael J Ferrantino Lead Economist for Trade Policy, World Bank Group Claire H Hollweg Senior Economist, World Bank Group Satoshi Inomata Chief Senior R

10、esearcher, Institute of Developing Economies Japan External Trade Organization Bilal M Khan Assistant Professor, Research Center for Global Value Chains, University of International Business and Economics Emine Elcin Koten Consultant, World Bank Group Xin Li Professor, School of Statistics, Beijing

11、Normal University Kathryn Lundquist Statistician, World Trade Organization Bo Meng Senior Overseas Research Fellow (New York), Institute of Developing Economies - Japan External Trade Organization Jiansuo Pei Associate Professor, School of International Trade and Economics, University of Internation

12、al Business and Economics Daria Taglioni Senior Economist, World Bank Group viii Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and workers in a globalized world Acknowledgments T he Global Value Chains Development Report is a joint publication of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Institute of

13、Developing Economies (IDEJETRO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Research Center of Global Value Chains (RCGVC-UIBE), the World Bank Group, and the China Development Research Foundation, based on joint research efforts to better understand the ongoing developme

14、nt and evo- lution of global value chains and their implications for economic development. This second report draws contributions from 23 background papers; 16 of them were presented and discussed at the confer- ence “Technological Innovation, Supply Chain Trade, and Work- ers in a Globalized World”

15、 in Beijing during March 2223, 2018, organized by the RCGVC and the China Development Research Foundation. Drafts of the eight chapters of the report were pre- sented and discussed at the second Authors Conference in Geneva on October 8, 2018, organized by the WTO. The editors thank the authors of b

16、ackground papers and individual chap- ters and the discussants and participants in the two conferences for insightful comments and suggestions that helped draft and improve the chapters (see appendices 1 and 2 for the programs). Special thanks go to our external reviewers: Jonathan Eaton (Penn State

17、 University), Gary Hufbauer (Peterson Institute for International Economics), Alonso de Gortari (Princeton and Dart- mouth), Kalina Manova (University College London), Maurice D Kugler (George Mason University), Marcel Timmer (the University of Groningen), and Felix Tintelnot (University of Chicago)

18、. The editors are grateful to Michael Spence for his keynote speech at the background paper conference in Beijing and his invalu- able expertise and advice on the overall narrative of the report. The editors also thank Robert Koopman, chief economist of the World Trade Organization and Caroline Freu

19、nd, director of the World Bank Groups Trade, Regional Integration and Investment Climate, for their guidance and support during the joint research process as well as research and data contributions from the Asian Development Bank. The editors are grateful to William Shaw, who copy-edited the report,

20、 and to Anthony Martin, Head of WTO Publications, and Helen Swain, WTO Publications Editor, who were responsible for the production of the report. The RCGVC would like to acknowledge the financial support from the Bill and, net imports are no longer a proper measure of the impact of an international

21、 trade shock on the domestic economy in the age of GVCs, compared to the time when final goods trade dominated. China happens to be at the end of many Asian value chains, taking sophisticated components from Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Chinese Taipei and assembling these into final products. T

22、wo-thirds of all intermediate imports of information and communication technology (ICT) products, coming from other countries in Factory Asia, but also with signif- icant contributions from Europe and North America, are used as inputs into Chinese exports. Indeed, the Chinese domestic value content

23、of their exports of ICT products accounts for only around half of the total export value. As such, trade balances look very different in value-added terms. For example, the U.S. trade defi- cit in ICT products with China is roughly cut in half if the calcula- tion is made in value added terms. Labor

24、 market effects of GVCs in developed countries One of the main controversies of globalization is its effect on labor markets in both developed and developing economies. Across advanced economies, the real median wage has grown slowly over the past two decades and manufacturing employ- ment has been

25、on the decline, while incomes of highly skilled workers and owners of capital have soared. There are of course many factors at work here, and not all are related to globaliza- tion, especially countries own domestic tax and transfer policies, but one additional factor has been big developing countri

26、es, especially China and Eastern European economies, opening up and joining the global economy. A number of studies have concluded that, in particular, the impact of Chinese import competition on the U.S. labor market, especially after China joined the WTO, was a significant factor behind U.S. manuf

27、acturing employment dropping sharply after 2000. But these analyses have typically only provided a partial view of the overall impact on employment, by and large ignoring the reality of value chains. A full view requires that we account for the fact that the development of value chains results in ch

28、urning across economies, as firms and countries specialize and create certain types of jobs while eliminating others. General equilib- rium analyses of the so-called “China shock” that take account of GVCs find that, for the U.S., trade was not a main contribu- tor to the loss of manufacturing jobs

29、and has only minor aggre- gate employment effects. One important reason for this more nuanced effect is that while some industries contracted because of increased competition, others expanded thanks to the cost savings that GVC linkages provided, counterbalancing jobs lost in contracting industries.

30、 This is consistent with economic theory, which suggests that trade should not have a large net effect on employment. That being said, the effects vary considerably across regions and individuals with different skill levels. Moving from the nationwide and sectoral level to regional and individual ou

31、tcomes reveals substantial heterogeneity in how aggregate effects map out. For instance, when local labor markets within countries are not sufficiently diversified, trade can widen regional disparities. Regions specialized in import-competing and upstream industries can fall behind, while areas with

32、 industries that export or benefit from cost savings due to cheaper imported inputs pull away. Similarly, trade may work in the same direction as other drivers in contributing to labor market polarization. In particular, automa- tion has impacted jobs in the middle of the skills distribution, with r

33、emaining jobs concentrated at the high and low ends. Between 1999 and 2007, the years when China was reducing barriers and entering the WTO, nearly all advanced economies had increases in employment shares for high- and low-skilled jobs, and declines for middle-skill work (see Figure 1). While trade

34、 and automation are making a country as a whole richer, there is a need for adjustment policies to ensure a more even distribution of these gains. This is especially the case as value chains magnify trade-induced changes in skill requirements and thereby raise the demand for worker flexibility and t

35、he need for training support. With regard to the optimal design of such policies, value chains make targeted or specific labor market interventions increasingly difficult. As input-output linkages cause trade shocks to spread more widely within economies, import competition is less and less limited

36、in terms of industries, regions, or skill levels. As a result, it can become more difficult to identify the exact reason for individual displacement. Therefore, adjustment policies should not differentiate between the various reasons for worker displacement, such as automation or trade, and be less

37、dependent on affected workers fulfilling certain FIGURE 1 Percentage point changes in employment shares by skill level between 1995-2015 Percent High skillMiddle skillLow skill -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 Southern Europe Northern Europe Western Europe TotalNorth America JapanCentral Europe Source: OECD (2017)

38、. See chapter 2 for details. Executive summary 3 conditions. In addition, mobility and place-based policies could usefully complement general labor market policies to address regional divergence. Labor market effects of GVCs in developing countries The emergence of global value chains has offered de

39、veloping countries new opportunities to integrate into the global econ- omy. This has fundamental impacts on where jobs go, who gets them, and what type of jobs they are. Significant parts of the developing world are deeply involved in GVCs. Their input has been initially concentrated in labor-inten

40、sive activities, which may have had important impacts on poverty in developing countries. For example, the boom in exports to the United States following the USVietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement of 2001 was partic- ularly beneficial to wages of unskilled workers, reduced the skill premium, and was a

41、key driver of poverty reduction in Viet Nam because it was concentrated in unskilled, labor-intensive GVC sectors, most notably textiles. There is a positive association between output growth and employment growth within GVC sectors, which increased over- all welfare as workers moved out of agricult

42、ure or the informal sector toward better paying, higher value-added jobs. Women who previously had difficulty accessing this type of wage work have filled many of these jobs. Employment and wage impacts can happen both directly within exporting firms as well as indi- rectly through these firms deman

43、d for goods and services from the domestic economy. The extent to which GVCs interact with domestic labor thus depends on the linkages of exporting firms to domestic, input-supplying firms. The firms that export directly account for only a small part of GVC jobs. In Viet Nam, most of the job creatio

44、n results from backward linkages that is, in indirect exporting firms that supply inputs to the direct exporters (see Figure 2). The relationship between GVC integration and level of employment though is not necessarily positive in all contexts. Imports of goods and services (backward GVC participat

45、ion) matter as much as exports of intermediates (forward GVC partici- pation) to be successful in GVCs, where opening up to imports is often a pre-condition to successfully export. However, there may be import-competing effects in labor markets. Evidence as well as intuition suggests that GVC partic

46、ipation will have other distributional implications. Greater participation of developing countries in global trade is expected to integrate not only markets for products, services, finance and technology, but also, directly and indirectly, markets for labor. The hallmark of globalization is big deve

47、loping countries opening up and join- ing global trade. In general, such economies are abundant in unskilled labor and scarce in skilled labor and capital relative to global averages. The factor-endowment theory of trade predicts that trade will reduce returns to unskilled labor in advanced econ- om

48、ies while raising returns to capital and skilled labor. This trend has generally been observed. But the opposite trend should occur in developing countries that open up: wages of unskilled workers, clearly the most abundant factor in many developing countries, should rise faster than other factor re

49、wards. This has not happened in most developing countries; rather, employment creation and wage gains have been biased towards more skilled workers. GVC expansion in developing countries is associated with higher relative demand for skilled workers. Characteristics of GVCs themselves, by supporting more complex industrial organization, as well as services inputs that are complementary to value chains, can be skill-biased. Automation may be threatening GVC jobs in developing countries in the long term, where the routine tasks more suscep- tible to automation are increasingly perfo