1、PATHWAY TO NET-ZERO EMISSIONSEnergy Transition Outlook 20232DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYRemi EriksenGroup President and CEO DNVFOREWORDThis Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions(PNZ)is effectively a blue-print for how that target can still be

2、 hit within the bounds of technical and political feasibility,and within the context of mainstream economic growth forecasts.However,our PNZ is also a blueprint for how to progress towards the target even though we may not quite reach it.Every tenth of a degree of warming counts,as the IPCC has outl

3、ined dramatically.I use the word blueprint advisedly.Our PNZ details how energy technologies work together in a pathway to net-zero emissions by mid-century.A blueprint is typically the starting point for project scheduling and also contains the details for requesting permits.We address those two is

4、sues in this report.Firstly,on scheduling,we show how time is of the essence immediate,pragmatic action is required.Moreover,we find that almost all official net-zero ambitions that have been legislated,proclaimed,or included in policy documents need to be delivered roughly 10 years ahead of stated

5、dates.Secondly,in our discussion of enabling policy,we show how tough choices,including bans and mandates,are unavoidable.We single out permitting of new infrastructure,including renewable sites and transmission and distribution grids,as the key bottleneck.Our PNZ is not a burn now,pay later scenari

6、o.The heavy lifting is done by accelerating the build-out of renewable sources and simultaneously cutting fossil sources.The numbers shown alongside this page bear this out.Most notable is the tripling of electricity production by 2050,with 21 times more electricity from solar PV and 15 times more f

7、rom wind relative to todays levels.Coal exits the power system altogether,while oil and gas declines by some two thirds.There is considerably more carbon capture and removal but those technologies mainly deal with residual emissions from sectors and regions where decarbonization is exceptionally cha

8、llenging.Net-zero scenarios are often airily dismissed as unaffordable.Our results show the opposite.While our PNZ entails a 5%uplift in energy expenditure relative to our most likely energy future,we find that this still represents a smaller percentage of global GDP in 2050 than energy expenditure

9、does today.That insight should stiffen the resolve of high-income regions to invest in a faster transition in low-income regions.And,for all decision makers,it throws into sharp relief the difference between a cleaner,more-efficient energy system and a world of mounting climate damage for generation

10、s to come.Science tells us that we must achieve a net-zero energy system by 2050 to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees.With emissions at record levels and set to climb higher before peaking next year,the chances of hitting that target are now,admittedly,remote but not impossible.Comparing net zero

11、with our present energy systemUNIT2022PNZ in 2033Solar capacity(incl.off-grid)GW1 2009 1008 times more solar installedWind capacity(incl.off-grid)GW9504 9005 times more wind installedHydrogen(incl.derivatives)Mt/yr973203 times more hydrogenShare of EVs in passenger fleet%1.2%26%One fifth of the glob

12、al vehicle fleet is EVCO2 captured through CCSMtCO2/yr281 600Capture capacity reaches 1.6 GtCO2UNIT2022PNZ in 2050 Oil demandEJ/yr17659Oil falls by two-thirdsGas demandEJ/yr15456Gas falls almost as far as oilCoal demandEJ/yr1591690%less coalGrid-connected electricityPWh/yr2980Near-tripling of electr

13、icity productionSolar capacity(incl.off-grid)GW1 20033 00028 times more solar installedSolar grid generationPWh/yr1.43021 times more electricity from solarWind capacity(incl.off-grid)GW95014 20015 times more wind installedWind grid generationPWh/yr23015 times more electricity from windNuclear capaci

14、tyGW3901 100Near-tripling of nuclear capacityHydrogen(incl.derivatives)Mt/yr97760Almost 8 times more hydrogenHydrogen share in final energy%0.01%12%Transformation from current negligible levelsShare of EVs in passenger fleet%1.2%83%CO2 captured through CCSMtCO2/yr286 400CO2 captured through DACMtCO2

15、/yr0.011 600 Fossil fuels Electricity Fast growers HIGHLIGHTS1.5C is less likely than ever,staying as far below 2C as possible is critical A net-zero energy system by 2050 that secures a 1.5C warming future remains a possibility,but its achievement is highly improbable CO2 emissions are expected to

16、reach record levels in 2023,but must decline by 19%already by 2030 Given the present increase in emissions,all plausible net-zero pathways now factor in an overshoot of emissions beyond 2050 that need to be tackled by net negative emissions technology.(DNVs pathway has an overshoot of 310 GtCO2)Some

17、 technologies are powering ahead,others must scale dramatically Solar PV and electric vehicles are scaling well,setting a pace close to a 1.5C trajectory Most other technologies,including hydrogen production and carbon removal,are lagging behind the necessary scaling In the next decade,solar and win

18、d capacity must together increase 5-fold,while storage capacity must grow 4-fold Net-negative emissions at 6 Gt/yr between 2050 and 2100 to achieve 1.5C poses a significant risk and depends on scaling of nascent technologies like direct air capture(DAC)and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage(B

19、ECCS)Immediate,permanent cuts in fossil fuel use are necessary to keep the hope of reaching 1.5C alive.Delayed action adds to the risk Every action to reduce emissions and accelerate transition is important,as it is crucial to stay as far below 2C as possible Energy efficiency improvements need to b

20、e double current levels Electricity must reach 47%of the energy mix in 2050,but that is dependent on rapid grid extensions which are already subject to critical permitting and supply chain bottlenecks Combustion of fossil fuels must fall by 78%to 2050,enabled by efficiency and fast replacement of oi

21、l,gas,and coal by renewable electricity,hydrogen,and biofuels.A massive carbon capture and removal effort,reaching 8 Gt in 2050,is essential to compensate for the remaining CO2 emissions from fossil fuels3DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYA

22、ll regions must decarbonize beyond present ambitions,but at different speeds To reach global net zero in 2050,high-income regions and leading demand sectors must move further and faster Acceleration must happen in a context where very few countries are on track to achieve even their present emission

23、 targets For global net zero in 2050,all regions must achieve their net-zero targets earlier than stated ambitions:OECD countries in the early/mid 2040s,China before 2050,and rest of the world before 2060 Our PNZ is predicated on the UNFCCCs principle of common but differentiated responsibilities fo

24、r net-zero.Regions decarbonize according to their capabilities,while balancing other SDG priorities.GDP per capita is a good proxy for the required pace of transition Sectors and industries will also decarbonize along differing timelines,with the power sector being a first mover reaching net zero in

25、 2043Policies must force deep decarbonization in all sectors Policy is the main lever for a faster transition,and all regions and sectors must accelerate There is an urgent need to rethink and establish new policies,with international cooperation ensuring ownership of actions across all countries Hi

26、gh-income countries must finance infrastructure and decarbonization projects in low-income coun-tries and de-risk investments Mandates and bans are unavoidable,especially for a drastic cut in fossil fuel consumption.No new coal,oil,or gas is needed;what exists in current fields is sufficient Behavio

27、ural shifts are needed for net zero,and some shifts must be mandated A sufficiently high cost on carbon is a necessity to discourage unabated fossil fuelsCOP 28 is taking place in the context of global discord and in a year that will set both new emissions and temperature records.Consensus may be di

28、fficult,but solutions for faster action are needed.HIGHLIGHTS4DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICY5DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023 Foreword 2 Highlights 3 1 Introduction 6 1.1 Is Net Zero realistic?7 1.2 Where is the action for Net Zer

29、o?8 2 A net-zero policy 93 The Pathway 11 3.1 The transformation of the energy system 12 3.2 Fossil fuels 14 3.3 Solar 16 3.4 Wind 17 3.5 Other non-fossil energy sources 18 3.6 Hydrogen+19 3.7 Technology challengers 20 3.8 Electricity 21 3.9 Emissions 23 3.10 Expenditures 25 4 Sectoral roadmaps 27 4

30、.1 Road 28 4.2 Aviation 29 4.3 Maritime 30 4.4 Buildings heating 31 4.5 Iron and steel 32 4.6 Cement 33 4.7 Petrochemicals 34 4.8 Power 35 4.9 Hydrogen 36 4.10 CCS and DAC 37 5 Regional roadmaps 38 5.1 North America 40 5.2 Latin America 41 5.3 Europe 42 5.4 Sub-Saharan Africa 43 5.5 Middle East and

31、North Africa 44 5.6 North East Eurasia 45 5.7 Greater China 46 5.8 Indian Subcontinent 47 5.9 South East Asia 48 5.10 OECD Pacific 49 References 50 The project team 51 CONTENTS!Click on the section you want to exploreThis pathway differs markedly from DNVs best estimate forecast of the most likely e

32、nergy future described in the 2023 edition of our ETO.Readers should note that in the report we use the term ETO forecast to refer to the most likely future,in contrast to a PNZ future.Comparing our forecast with a pathway to net zero allows us to place a dimension on the scale of the change needed

33、to achieve an energy transition that delivers a 1.5C future.We have set out to define,model,and describe a pathway that is technically and politically feasible,although we caution that our pathway tests the outer limits of political feasibility.Our PNZ relies on existing technologies and their scale

34、-up,and not on uncertain scientific and technological break-throughs.It is politically feasible in that it relies on a proven toolbox of policy measures and allows for low-income regions to implement the necessary measures later than their high-income counterparts.All sectors will also not decarboni

35、ze at the same pace and with the same tools.To describe this tailored transition,our report comprises several roadmaps for sectors and regions,detailing how each would contribute in our PNZ.The ETO emissions forecast predicts 23 GtCO2 of annual emission in 2050,showing there is a big gap to be close

36、d to reach net-zero emissions by then.So,how to close that gap?Most of the CO2 emissions can be avoided through implementing low-emission technologies in the energy system.There are technical solutions that need massive deployment and scale-up,such as renewable energy,storage,grids,hydrogen,and carb

37、on capture.Other technologies must be scaled down,such as coal,oil,gas,and combustion engines.These actions alone will be insufficient,and there will also be a need to deploy significant amounts of carbon removal technologies.These could be nature-based solutions such as reducing deforestation and i

38、ncreasing sequestration in biomass.They could also be technical deployments like direct air capture.Although we are confident that we have struck a realistic balance between viable technology and policy,the pathway we define is still an extremely challenging one,and there are undoubtedly alter-nativ

39、e routes to achieving a 1.5C future.In its contribution to the IPCCs Sixth Assessment Report(AR6)on climate change(IPCC,2022),Working Group III describes no less than 230 pathways that align with a 1.5C future.Many other energy forecasters also regularly outline their vision of a net-zero pathway.Fe

40、w,if any,model and describe a pathway to net zero as the sum of differentiated regional and sectoral transitions,as we do in this report.There might be some diverging views on assump-tions,technology choices,and adequate policies,but our PNZ and all these pathways point to the urgency and the scale

41、of the action that are needed to curb the emissions at the necessary pace.Strong decisions must be taken now if we are to reach this target,and every delay makes the task more challenging.1 INTRODUCTION Despite the rapidly unfolding energy transition currently underway,DNVs Energy Transition Outlook

42、(ETO)2023 finds that the world is most likely headed towards 2.2C global warming by 2100 relative to pre-industrial levels.Is it possible,then,to accelerate the pace of the transition to secure a warming future in line with the Paris Agreement?This report describes what DNV believes to be a plausibl

43、e but very challenging pathway to achieve net-zero emissions(PNZ)by 2050 and a future where the global average temperature increase is limited to 1.5C by the end of the century.ETO 2023Our most likely energy transition forecast indicating warming of 2.2CPNZ 2023A back-cast on how to close the gap to

44、 1.5C ETO and PNZ forecast vs back-castThe focus of the ETO and the Pathway to Net Zero reportsUnits:Change in average temperature with respect to pre-industrial levels(C)CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICY6DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023A most likely future does not rule

45、 out other possible futures.In our view,net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050 is still possible to achieve,but only barely.It will require urgent acceleration of targeted policies and simultaneous efforts from all regions and sectors.Considering that scale of effort,and record emissions at present,we cauti

46、on that achieving net zero is less likely than ever.Nevertheless,this report outlines what we believe to be a possible,albeit very narrow,pathway to net-zero emissions.It includes detailed net-zero roadmaps for each major demand sector and each of the ten world regions covered in our analysis.Achiev

47、ing net zero by 2050 is realistic for some sectors,some regions,and certain countries;but that will not be sufficient to achieve global net zero.As some sectors and regions will not achieve net zero by 2050,others will have to go further and faster by strengthening their ambitions and achieving net

48、zero before 2050 and net-negative emissions by 2050.Nations and sectors that conceivably can move faster will have to do so.Individually and collectively,the sectoral roadmaps described in this report are all possible,but very tough.Nothing of this scale has ever been attempted.Their successful impl

49、ementation will require not only strong contributions from technology and finance,but an extraordinary step-up in energy,climate,industrial,and economic policies along with behavioural changes.Moreover,these changes and emission reductions must happen simultaneously.Alternatively,if some sectors or

50、regions underperform in relation to the decarbonization roadmaps,other sectors or regions will have to frontload their transformations to over-deliver on already-challenging roadmaps.Each of the roadmaps we set out here is challenging;the probability of all being realized is low.If by realistic we m

51、ean a clear or better-than-even chance of achieving something,then we would need to concede that net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050 is unrealistic.However,it is possible and,given what is at stake,it is imperative we do our utmost to achieve it.Ultimately,at some point in the future,humanity is likely t

52、o hit net-zero emissions because the alternative is untenable i.e.average global temperatures will simply keep rising.The question therefore is not if net zero,but when?From where we are now,where CO2 emissions have not yet peaked,that when seems very unlikely to be 2050.However,every tenth of a deg

53、ree of global warming matters disproportionately.Climate change is here already,driven by cumulative emissions that have already forced a temperature increase just beyond 1C above pre-industrial levels.The impact is visible to all,with devastating societal implications and rising economic losses fel

54、t world-wide.From this point on,even relatively small additional increases in temperature give additional long-term consequences and risk triggering plan-etary tipping points.Because risks and impacts pile up extraordinarily for warming above 1.5C,the rational response is surely to expend extraordin

55、ary effort now and in the coming years to prevent a very dangerous future.DNVs contribution lies precisely in not painting a rose-tinted view that net-zero emissions is easy to achieve.Instead,we provide a reality check on how difficult the goal really is.Is net zero probable?No.Is it irresponsible

56、therefore to still talk about it?Absolutely not.Science has dictated a target and the rational response is to try to come as close to it as possible.1.1 IS NET ZERO REALISTIC?Our annual ETO forecast(now in its 7th edition)describes the energy future that DNV considers most-likely given expected econ

57、omic,technology and policy developments.This is not a future in which energy-and process-related CO2 emissions reach net zero in 2050 far from it.It is logical to question,therefore,whether achieving a net-zero future by 2050 is at all realistic.CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLI

58、CY7DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023Judging from the ambitions announced by politicians and the deep concerns voiced by the general public,the warnings seem to be heard.But those ambitions are not translating into programmatic action for net zero,with very few exceptions.At a time when the IPCC

59、 is calling for at least a sixfold increase in finance provided to emissions reductions projects by 2030,the Climate Tracker world map(https:/climateac-tiontracker.org/)is still devoid of the colour green denoting a country that is 1.5C Paris compatible.What explains the lack of progress?There are o

60、pposing forces and many barriers to the energy transition,as we have discussed in our ETO publications(DNV,2022;DNV,2023).These include,in no particular order,fossil-fuel subsidies,resistance from vested interests,corruption,short-term priorities,unfit regulatory frameworks,lack of global cooperatio

61、n,energy system inertia,corporate greenwashing,policy reversals,and so on.While these barriers collectively are not sufficient to prevent an energy transition from happening,they are certainly hindering a fast transition.Some of these barriers are unnecessary and should be removed;other barriers are

62、 more systemically difficult to address.Emissions reduction is one of many priorities that nations face.The 17 Sustainable Development Goals,with climate action as the 13th goal,clearly pinpoint multiple,urgent global priorities.Yet,research e.g.DNVs Future of Spaceship Earth report(DNV,2016)finds t

63、hat climate action is a prerequisite for meeting many,if not all,of the other SDGs.Recently,a UN status report emphasized that climate-related disasters are in fact already hindering progress towards the SDGs(UNECOSOC,2023).There are obvious synergies between priorities such as climate action(SDG 13

64、),affordable and clean energy(SDG 7),and ensuring good health and well-being(SDG 3),for example reduced air pollution in cities that favour clean electricity over coal.Other goals are in conflict with climate action,e.g.replacing traditional biomass used for cooking with natural gas to avoid indoor

65、air pollution,or protecting nature(SDG 14 and SDG 15)by not allowing acreage for new renewable energy build-out.While climate action should always be top of mind,it should not always have priority;holistic planning and policymaking is needed to carefully manage dilemmas.Yet further complicating poli

66、cymaking are the twin tragedies.The first of these is the tragedy of the commons,where the common restraint on emis-sions required to protect the physics of our common atmosphere is undermined by countries and other actors seeking to maximize short-term gains through emissions-intensive activities.T

67、hat is related to the tragedy of horizons,a term coined by Mark Carney,former governor of the Bank of England,to describe the catastrophic impact that climate change will have on future generations while noting that the current generation has little incentive to fix it(Carney,2015).We should add tha

68、t there is also a tragic lack of comprehension among the many who dismiss a net-zero energy system as impossibly disruptive and expensive.We show in this report that net zero is not only achievable with the technology that exists today,but it delivers,in short order,an efficient and clean energy sys

69、tem that would see the world spending considerably less on energy as a proportion of GDP than it does today.We acknowledge that our pathway to net zero does not solve all related challenges,including the biodiversity crisis and the challenges associated with non-energy-related SDGs,including a just

70、transition.But our pathway will,at the very least,reduce the risks of climate change that threaten to derail all other goals.1.2 WHERE IS THE ACTION FOR NET ZERO?For many decades,scientists have warned about the risk of climate change and pointed out the necessary measures to prevent its escalation.

71、Near consensus among scientists,as summarized in IPCCs Assessment reports and the annual COP meetings,is raising an increasingly bigger red flag.United Nations Secretary-General Antnio Guterres warning of“Code Red for humanity”leaves no doubt as to where we are headed.The Climate Change 2023:Synthes

72、is Report(IPCC,2023)has never been clearer in its language and message:“Climate change is a threat to human well-being and planetary health(very high confidence).There is a rapidly closing window of opportunity to secure a liveable and sustainable future for all(very high confidence)”.Net zero is a

73、race to a cleaner,more efficient energy system that costs less as a percentage of GDPCONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICY8DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023Current 2030 climate targets are not met in our ETO forecast of the most-likely energy future,let alone sufficient for a

74、 net-zero pathway.Recalibrating policy for net zero requires strong political will,international collaboration,and public engagement to maintain public support.Research has shown that this is best achieved through mission-oriented innovation approaches to better co-ordinate policy areas and administ

75、rative silos(Larrue,2022).There is a risk,however,that the mission itself can over-emphasize science,technology,and innovation(STI)at the expense of broader social gains.Creating a shared,public sense of mission is best achieved by building consensus around the positive aspects of climate action the

76、 health benefits of clean air,the pres-ervation of forests and mangroves as natural flood defenses,the productivity-boosting benefits of clean electricity,and money saving end-use equipment like heat pumps(Hallegate,2022).Bending the emissions curve requires credibility in terms of commitments and d

77、elivery plans.The cost of capital is driven by risk perception.When long-term Government spending and finance must be net-zero alignedA redirection of public investment towards infra-structure and clean energy projects must be matched by streamlining and fast-tracking permitting regulations.In addit

78、ion,administrative procedures to access government support need simplification.Supply-side and demand-side support are needed to advance technological change at scale and stimulate markets for net-zero aligned products and behaviour.For a speedier transition in middle-and low-income regions,there is

79、 a need for collaboration and concessional(below market rate)finance and grants that de-risk investments in capital intensive renew-ables.Funding needs to flow as outlined by the Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance(Songwe et al.,2022)at the request of the Egyptian and UK Presidenc

80、ies of COP 27 and COP 26,which concluded that USD 1trn/year,beyond the earlier promised USD 100bn/year,is the external finance needed in developing countries(other than China)by 2030 to deliver the Paris Agreement.Examples of existing decarbonization investment include the Just Energy Transition Par

81、tnerships,the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment(PGII),and the greening of Chinas Belt and Road Initiative.Financing at this level needs to be accompanied by multilateral consensus-building around risk and opportunity:that for low-income countries risk does not lie in being deni

82、ed access to polluting technologies but rather in not being able to access more efficient cleantech that unlocks produc-tivity and draws those countries into low-carbon value chains as valued trading partners(Hallegate,2022).Fossil-fuel subsidies,reported by the International Monetary Fund(Black et.

83、al,2023)at a record level of USD 7trn in 2022,need to be scaled back.stringent policy paths are priced into the financial markets,this will lead to higher cost of capital for carbon-intensive investments.Time is of the essence in the transformation of econ-omies and the sectors within them,and only

84、through a combination of mandates,requirements,incentives,disincentives such as carbon pricing,and continued R&D,can decarbonization solutions be developed and deployed at scale and speed across sectors and regions.DNVs PNZ activates the entire policy toolbox and intensifies policy factors to shift

85、the supply mix and deploy decarbonization options amongst end-use sectors(Figure 2.1).Our pathway relies on a mix of policy instruments,combining direct regulation with requirements and limits on pollution(i.e.emissions),phase-in and phase-out policies,technology-specific support,and economic instru

86、ments sticks and carrots to bring emissions as close as possible to zero.Our pathway then relies on carbon removal technologies both for any remaining emissions and to compensate for carbon budget overshoot emissions.2 A NET-ZERO POLICYReaching the 1.5C goal is first and foremost a political decisio

87、n.The scale of change needed requires action across many policy areas and co-ordination across many systems,as outlined in this report.This can appear daunting,but there is growing evidence that climate action need not come at the expense of development and poverty reduction especially where the foc

88、us is on inclusive development to reduce peoples vulnerability to climate change.FIGURE 2.1Policy factors triggering the pathway1.Renewable power support7.Bans,phase-out plans,mandates2.Energy storage support8.Carbon pricing schemes3.Zero-emission vehicle support9.Fuel,energy,and carbon taxation4.Hy

89、drogen support10.Air pollution intervention11.Plastic pollution intervention12.Methane intervention5.CCS,DAC support6.Energy-efficiency standards 9DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYStudies show that people are willing to contribute to a net

90、-zero transition(Whitmarsh et al.,2023),especially when the effectiveness and upside of climate policies are emphasized.Convenience and affordability are key issues influencing behavioural change and require both regulation and incentives.Win-win measures,such as home insulation,that cuts both energ

91、y bills and emissions,stand a better chance.Research has shown that by shielding manufacturing facilities from the effects of fuel-price hikes,fossil-fuel subsidies have the perverse effect of disincentivizing investment in much more efficient electrification(Cali et al.,2022);the implied opportunit

92、y cost should be demonstrated and widely communicated.Socio-economic effects on workers and entire communities need to be managed through domestic and regional measures(e.g.the EUs Just Transition Mechanism)and interna-tional collaboration.Sectors and regions to move at different speeds At the level

93、 of sectors or supply chains comprising several decarbonization solutions,a blend of policy measures must be implemented.Sectoral policies forging the PNZ are presented in Chapter 4.Net-zero policy levers in the ten global regions are detailed in Chapter 5 and these recognize that regions have varyi

94、ng levels of responsibility and capabilities.DNVs PNZ imposes a greater burden on the regions that are better placed economically and with competence for immediate clean technology deployment,and to progress the technical readiness in key abatement technologies that need to be validated at commercia

95、l scale to enable net zero.Financial regulation needs to unlock net-zero investment practices by ensuring transparent disclosure of climate-related risks such as the US Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC)s Climate Disclosure Rule(proposal)and EUs Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation.Green t

96、axonomies prompt private financial institutions capital alloc-ations aligned with net zero,such as in the EU and ASEAN s Taxonomies and the Peoples Bank of Chinas Green Bond Endorsed Project Catalogue.Stringent net-zero policy must address public acceptability When designing climate policy intervent

97、ions,politicians need to read the public and their economic circumstances with empathy(Marshall,2023).Public engagement,a society-wide dialogue and sense of collective effort are essential for policy success.Interventions that hit peoples pockets,such as fossil-fuel taxation and subsidy reforms,risk

98、 public backlash in high-income and low-income regions alike.Examples are plentiful:the yellow vests protests in France against fuel-tax increases,protests in Kazakhstan against lifting price caps(Horowitz,2022),riots in Nigeria over attempts to abolish fuel subsidies(Layade-Kowo,2023),and in Kenya

99、where a fuel subsidy was reinstated to stabilize retail fuel prices in response to public anger over higher cost of living(Reuters,2023).Where trust in government is already low,subsidy removal without providing incentives and clearly publicizing the benefits of moving to cleaner technology is a spa

100、rk for conflict.Carbon pricing is essential to disincentivize emis-sions and divert direct spending and investment out of emission-intensive alternatives.It is also a central instrument to fund net-zero spending.Political trust in how fees will be used influences support for CO2 and environmental ta

101、xes.Acceptability can also be enhanced through care-fully designed recycling mechanisms to handle distributional fairness and household impacts(Kleinert et al.,2018;Fairbrother et al.,2023).The flagship report from the High-Level Commission on carbon prices specified that “prices would need to be in

102、 the USD 50 to USD 100/tCO2-e range by 2030,provided a supportive policy environment is in place”(CPLC,2017).The International Monetary Fund proposed interna-tional carbon price floors to reinforce the Paris Agreement but with consideration for economic development(Parry et al.,2021;Chateau et al.,2

103、022).Differentiated price levels for high-,middle-,and low-income countries,respectively were suggested with resultant burden-sharing shifting economic cost of mitigation to high-income regions.To achieve DNVs pathway,carbon pricing is not the only policy measure but forms part of supportive policy

104、packages.Prices are cognizant of regions economic circumstances.Our differentiated carbon price levels in high-,middle-and low-income regions are shown in Figure 2.2.Europe,North America,OECD Pacific,slightly above Greater China,reach carbon price levels of USD 100150/tCO2 in 2030 and USD 150-250/tC

105、O2 in 2040.By 2050,regional trajec-tories range from USD 50 to 250/tCO2.Carbon pricing must disincentivize emissions10DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYThe pathway we describe,and the forceful actions it requires,leads into uncharted territ

106、ory on a global scale,and its low likelihood means we must define the key assumptions in our model.The key constraint is time.While our pathway is one of many,the world must not wait for consensus on a plan.There is,however,clear consensus on the urgency of the action needed to stay below 1.5C,and g

107、eneral understanding of the overarching require-ments.CO2 emissions will mostly be cut by implementing low-emission technologies in the energy system.Massive deployment and scale-up is needed in renewable energy,storage,grids,hydrogen,and carbon capture and storage(CCS),among others.There must be bi

108、g cuts in the use of coal,oil,gas,and combustion engines.Behavioural change(e.g.reducing air travel)is also essential to rapidly curb emissions.3 THE PATHWAY We designed our pathway to net-zero emissions(PNZ)so that global CO2 emissions in 2050 hit net zero.The present annual(2022)emissions are 41 G

109、tCO2 and our ETO forecasts 2050 emissions of 23 GtCO2.If we are to close this gap and limit the global average temperature increase to 1.5C,it will be through very tightened energy,industrial,and climate policies in all regions and sectors,and by applying the entire policy toolbox.Gross zero and net

110、 zeroWhile net-zero emissions is a logical goal on a global scale,it should be applied with care at regional and sectoral scales.There is a big difference between net zero and gross zero,and a global net-zero future does not mean all sectors and regions will meet the zero-emission target by 2050.It

111、is both implausible and unjust to expect a gross-zero result in which all sectors,regions,and countries achieve this challenging goal simultaneously.Each region differs in its emissions status and ability to reduce emissions.Similarly,the readily available abatement options vary considerably between

112、 demand sectors.Accordingly,our pathway applies the net-zero approach on only a global scale,while allowing for a large differentiation on a regional scale.Similarly,we apply the net-zero approach to the entirety of energy demand rather than individual demand sectors,which decarbonize at different r

113、ates.A fair transitionWhile the concept of a just transition is compelling,we have not attempted to model a dramatic transfer of wealth across world regions over the next 30 years.This choice is partly because energy provision and consumption is a relatively small component of total economic activit

114、y,and because such wealth transfer is not very likely to happen anytime soon.Therefore,in our PNZ we have applied the same popu-lation and GDP growth assumptions and consequently the same GDP per capita in 2050 as we use in our ETO forecast of the most likely energy future.While this is inconsistent

115、 with the notion of a just transition,a greater injustice would arise from the expectation that all regions should move at the same decarbonization pace regardless of their different starting positions.We have therefore scaled the implementation of mitigation measures to achieve net zero relative to

116、 the GDP per capita of the region.Arguably,our approach thus balances the fair and the plausible.Need for carbon removalIn our PNZ,the carbon budget for staying below 1.5C is exhausted by 2030,and there is a need to deploy significant amounts of carbon-removal technologies.These could be nature-base

117、d solutions such as reducing deforestation and increasing carbon sequestration in biomass.They could also be technical deployments like direct air capture(DAC).Cumulative removal of CO2 must reach almost 7 GtCO2 per year by the end of the century to remove the overshoot accumulated by 2050,and compe

118、nsate residual fossil-fuel emissions.The key constraint is time:the world must not wait for consensus on a plan.11DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYThe decoupling of economic activity and energy use must intensify under the PNZ.A massive ra

119、mping up of variable renewable energy sources(VRES),accompanied by a drastic near phase-out of coal and strong decline in using the other fossil fuels,is equally fundamental to achieving our PNZ.Final energy demand in the PNZ is 398 EJ in 2050,10%less than in 2022.The declining energy use does not m

120、ean we would have fewer energy services.On the contrary,the PNZ effectively leverages the benefits of energy efficiency and electrification.The primary energy supply mix in 2050 in the PNZ is very different from today,with fossil fuels retaining only a 20%share versus 80%now.This contrasts with our

121、ETO estimate of an almost equal share of fossil and non-fossil energy sources by mid-century.Additionally,our assumptions regarding population and GDP are identical in both cases,clearly indi-cating that the PNZ is an energy-efficient pathway with a higher share of more efficient renewable energy he

122、lping to deliver the required level of decarbonization together with carbon capture and removal.3.1 THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ENERGY SYSTEM Low-carbon technologies Solar and wind together provide more than half of primary energy supply in our PNZ.With continued high learning rates,there is positive

123、reinforcement at work in installing more and more solar and wind,which continues to bring down the levelized costs of these energy sources.The share of solar and wind in 2050 is almost double that of their share in our ETO.Bioenergy increases its share and role in our PNZ,growing from 10%today to 15

124、%in 2050.This is due to multiple factors:heat-only plants having to use bioenergy;greater bioenergy use in manufacturing;and bioenergy use for producing biofuels,especially for aviation and maritime sectors.Regulations and mandates aim to replace natural gas with emission-friendly biomethane where p

125、ossible and available.Because of its stable and dispatchable elec-tricity and its long lifetime,hydropower still plays a role in the net-zero energy mix.Its share increases slightly from 3%today to 4%by 2050.Spurred by energy security concerns,the share of nuclear power more than doubles from 4%in 2

126、022 to 10%in 2050 despite the fierce competition of solar and wind power.Fossil fuels Coal is nearly phased out in our PNZ but is still used mainly for manufacturing in regions such as Greater China and the Indian Subcontinent,whose transitions lag the developed regions,with a later phase-out of coa

127、l.Despite the push to eliminate unabated fossil fuels completely,oil still persists in the energy system in 2050.This is due to its prevalence in hard-to-abate sectors such as aviation and continued but limited oil use in the road sector in developing countries where charging infrastructure is not f

128、ully built out by 2050.The PNZ also has natural gas in the mix in 2050,but most of its use is coupled with CCS or similar abatement technologies.Both oil and gas also retain a fair amount of residual use in the non-energy sector,for example as feedstock for plastics,but this fossil-fuel use is not c

129、ausing any direct emissions.CCS is essential to abate the remaining emis-sions where possible.About 2.1 GtCO2 from fossil fuels are captured by 2050,covering a third of the fossil-fuel emissions.12DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYA CLEAR P

130、ATHWAY FOR THE NEXT DECADE The massive transformation in the energy system in our PNZ starts strongly in the coming decade,building the foundation for the rest of the transition Massive electrification effort in final energy demandIncreased and greener electricity generationThe rise of carbon captur

131、e and removal+7,200 GWSolar and windcapacity-19%Fossil fuels+42%Electricity50%Reduction of coal-fired generationAverage wind capacity additionAverage solar capacity additionOil production Grid and renewables expendituresBattery capacity The last decade(2013-2023)+37%p.a.+43%p.a.+1%p.a.+3%p.a.+61%p.a

132、.The next decade(2023-2033)+16%p.a.+16%p.a.-2%p.a.(No new oil)+8%p.a.+47%p.a.20232033CCS on fossil fuels and industrial processesBECCSDAC30 MtCO2/yr1600 MtCO2/yr13DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICY3.2 FOSSIL FUELS The unavoidable decline an

133、d voyage into the unknownFossil fuels have dominated the energy system for more than a century.They are the main source of anthropogenic CO2 emissions and their phase-out is unavoidable to reach a decarbonized energy system.The system has a lot of inertia,but fossil fuels,which account for around 80

134、%of primary energy supply today,will see their share decline to 20%in less than 30 years in our PNZ.This fast decrease would have consequences that are hard to foresee.Oil and gas production has steadily increased in the past decades,and a declining demand is uncharted territory.It should be emphasi

135、zed that the regional spread of production is uncertain.This is because supply-side policies to control production in an oversupplied,shrinking market have yet to be agreed upon by hydrocarbon producing countries;this is unknown and unfamiliar territory for the oil and gas industry.The consequences

136、for production quotas and market prices are therefore highly speculative.For oil and gas,our assumption is that regions with lower production costs and less stringent climate policies(i.e.Middle East and North Africa and North East Eurasia)would gain increasing shares in production.For coal,producti

137、on would still mostly meet domestic demand,with Greater China and the Indian Subcontinent accounting for about two-thirds of the remaining global production.Carbon capture is essential to abate remaining fossil emissionsWithout CCS,reaching net zero will be virtually impossible.It is a convenient so

138、lution to abate fossil-fuel emissions in existing installa-tions(in power production or in manufacturing)that cannot realistically be replaced by low or zero-carbon alternatives on a short timescale.CCS-based solutions can also be more competitive,especially in the short term.CCS facilities have ope

139、rated for several decades in areas such as enhanced oil recovery or fertilizer production where the CO2 can be captured at a relatively low cost.However,for as long as there are fossil fuels in the energy mix and emissions from production processes,CCS will be sorely needed.Energy use from coal and

140、oil falls rapidly in our PNZ,while gas shows a more moderate decline.Additionally,capture rates are higher for coal and gas,where much of the CO2 is emitted at large point-sources,compared with oil which typically has many small point-sources.That is why most of the captured emissions are from natur

141、al gas and coal.As a result,our PNZ sees coal emissions reducing by 97%,gas emis-sions by 85%,and oil emissions by 76%to mid-century,despite continued use.61%in 20228%in 2050Share in electricity production80%in 202220%in 2050Share in primary energyPNZPNZ14DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTEN

142、TSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYCoalDue to its high emission intensity,coal is the first target of decarboni-zation policies.The power sector sees a complete global phase-out of coal in electricity production by 2050.While coal use in power gener-ation has alternatives that are com

143、petitive today and will increasingly be so in the future,there are other sectors that are costly to abate.For high-heat processes,coals phase-out will therefore be slow.In the PNZ,800 million tonnes of coal would still have to be extracted in 2050,exclusively as hard coal used almost solely in indus

144、try.OilAfter the 2021-2022 rebound from the COVID-19 pandemic,global oil demand in the PNZ rapidly declines by two thirds to 59 EJ per year in 2050.The lions share of this remaining demand is split between the non-energy sector(34%),where oil would continue to be used as a feedstock for producing pe

145、trochemicals and plastics with no major asso-ciated emissions,and in the transport sector(49%).Within transport,the remaining demand is concentrated in the road sector in lower-income regions(81%of total)and in the hard-to-electrify aviation sector(18%of total).Nevertheless,overall transport demand

146、for oil will fall 74%by 2050.Non-energy demand declines only slightly,as oil is nearly impossible to replace in the sector.A small share of oil demand by 2050 is in manufac-turing,within subsectors such as construction,mining,and cement.The two regions with the highest oil demand shares in 2050 will

147、 be the Middle East and North Africa(19%)and Greater China(14%).The Middle East and North Africa is the largest oil-producing region today,with a 37%share of total production.This share rises dramatically over the next three decades as other major oil-producing regions see their production rapidly d

148、eclining.By 2050,The Middle East and North Africa,where extraction and production costs are lowest,is expected to dominate oil production with a 70%share.Natural gasThe power sector would remain the primary consumer of gas,but power generation would represent a declining share in the demand from 35%

149、today to 27%by 2050.Increasing electrification of residential and commercial heating and cooking sees will see the buildings sectors share of gas demand decline as well.As is the case with oil,non-energy use of gas as a feedstock climbs to 14%in 2050 since feedstock use is a lesser source of emissio

150、ns and hydrocarbons are virtually irreplaceable in the petrochemical industry.North America is currently the worlds leading producer of natural gas,accounting for more than a quarter of global production.It would concede this position to the Middle East and North Africa,due to the latter regions les

151、s-stringent climate ambitions and lower extraction costs.15DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICY3.3 SOLARDirect and indirect electrification is a key feature of our pathway,and there is probably no other renewable technology that can match the

152、 potential of solar PV.Together with wind,solar PV is already the cheapest generator of new electricity in most places in the world,and costs continue to fall rapidly as manufacturing capacity ramps up.As a result,solar PV overtakes oil in our PNZ as the main primary energy supply source by 2040 and

153、 represents a bigger share than all fossil fuels combined by 2050.About a third of the installed capacity is dedicated to off-grid hydrogen production and the rest is grid-connected.In 2032,solar PV overtakes gas-fired electricity to become the largest source of electricity globally,before being ove

154、rtaken by wind in 2037.The intermittency challenge of solar would be partially solved by comprehensive installations combining solar PV with storage to access higher capture prices when supply is lower,such as at night.40%of grid connected solar PV installations are co-located with storage by 2050.A

155、 tripling of annual capacity addition by 2030Though impressive,this growth rate seems achievable.In 2011,capacity additions were only at 30 GW/yr,about one ninth of 2022 levels,and there is already today significant production overcapacity in China that could be mobilized in the short term(IEA,2023)

156、.This is why the 2030 capacity addition target is only 40%higher than in our ETO forecast.There should however be an intensive scale-up along the entire supply chain,especially in regions wanting locally-sourced solar panels.However,even if adequate manufacturing capacity is built,significant challe

157、nges will arise for permitting and grid-connection at the pace required in our PNZ.In that regard,solar PV plants with their high modularity and flexibility show clear advantages over wind and other renewable solutions.Besides utility-scale installations,solar PV systems can also be installed on roo

158、ftops,optimizing land use.50%of capacity to be installed in China and Indian Subcontinent by 2050Today,Greater China has the largest share(35%)of solar PV capacity among our regions.In our PNZ,Greater China dominates capacity addi-tions in the years up to 2030,following which the Indian Subcontinent

159、 progressively overtakes it for grid-connected electricity generation.Two regions,South East Asia and the Middle East and North Africa,also see substantial growth from the late 2030s.Nevertheless,Greater China would have the largest grid-connected capacity in the world by 2050.It also shows by far t

160、he highest off-grid capacity for hydrogen production with a huge ramp-up in the 2030s.The current industrial base in the region supports this global dominance and preference for solar PV.There is a small amount(0.5 PWh per year)of off-grid production by 2050,mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Indi

161、an Subcontinent,supplying electricity to rural districts for lighting,mobile charging,and other smaller end uses.Such off-grid installations,though marginal in energy terms,are extremely valuable from a sustainable development perspective.5%in 202237%in 2050Share in electricity production1%in 202228

162、%in 2050Share in primary energyPNZPNZ16DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICY3.4 WINDBy mid-century,wind is the second largest provider of primary energy in our pathway,with a higher supply than all fossil fuels combined,and is the largest grid

163、-connected electricity source.This is a big step up from our ETO forecast,in which primary energy supply from wind is about half this in 2050.We consider three categories of wind power plants:onshore wind,fixed offshore wind,and floating offshore wind.Of these,onshore wind power grows 37-fold betwee

164、n 2022 and 2050.Fixed offshore,which starts from a much lower base,increases its share in the electricity generation mix from 0.6%in 2022 to 8%by 2050.Of the three,floating offshore wind is the least mature and has 2.5%share in electricity generation in mid-century.Globally by 2050,the combined on-g

165、rid and off-grid power system capacity in our pathway consists of 11.1 TW of onshore wind,2.4 TW of fixed offshore wind,and 0.6 TW of floating offshore wind.A quadrupling of capacity addition by 2030A considerable amount of new wind power capacity needs to be installed every year from now on to gene

166、rate the levels of power needed in our PNZ.This would need considerable effort to improve permitting and grid-connection processes.From 2023 to 2030,for every GW of offshore wind power,5 GW of onshore wind power plants are built on average.However,competition for suitable land would increasingly imp

167、act onshore wind costs,while offshore wind costs would decline rapidly.Thus,regions such as North America and Greater China progressively start investing more in offshore wind power plants.From 2035 onwards,for every GW of offshore wind power plant,only 3 GW of onshore wind power plants are built wo

168、rldwide.Such a massive development in fixed offshore wind translates to higher investment in new electricity-grid lines,especially in undersea cables.The short-term headwinds in the wind industry would also need to be resolved very quickly.In addition to the grid-connected wind capacity described ab

169、ove,about 3.6 TW of wind capacity is built for dedicated hydrogen production as off-grid capacity between now and 2050.China dominates grid-connected capacity,Europe off-gridGreater China is the worlds biggest generator of wind power today and remains so in our PNZ through to 2050 when its share of

170、installed grid-connected wind power generating capacity is 36%.North America and Europe are second and third in 2050,respectively.Capacity addi-tions in these three leading regions trigger steeper cost reductions for wind power,which also drives significant wind generation development in other regio

171、ns including some not yet invested in wind power.These other regions include South East Asia and OECD Pacific.North East Eurasia would be an outlier,adding very little wind-powered electricity generation.In our PNZ,most of the off-grid capacity for hydrogen production is in Europe,followed by North

172、America and Greater China.1%in 20227%in 202223%in 205036%in 2050Share in primary energyShare in electricity productionPNZPNZ17DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICY3.5 OTHER NON-FOSSIL ENERGY SOURCES BioenergyIn the PNZ,bioenergy has to assume

173、increasingly greater importance because there are no easy alternatives to thermal power plants,which are crucial for regions such as North East Eurasia and,in the medium term,in the transport sector.Bioenergy in annual primary energy supply increases from 59 EJ in 2022 to 97 EJ by 2050.Bioenergy und

174、ergoes a sectoral shift to 2050.In 2022,buildings was the largest demand sector for bioenergy(46%).Due to electrification and hydrogen use in buildings,this share drops to 26%by 2050.In contrast,the PNZ has heat-only power plants and manufacturing increase their bioenergy use.In North America,for ex

175、ample,36%of bioenergy demand in 2050 is in the manu-facturing sector,at which time 79%of such demand in North East Eurasia is from power plants.The absolute demand for bioenergy in the transport sector grows from 5 EJ in 2022 to 6 EJ in 2050.This is in stark contrast to our ETO forecast where the de

176、mand doubles to 11 EJ by 2050:to achieve net zero,more bioenergy needs to be used in hard-to-abate sectors like aviation,manufacturing,and heat-only plants.Such use in point-emission installations also makes bioenergy with carbon capture and storage(BECCS)possible,enabling net-negative sites.Bioener

177、gy is less important in decarbonizing transport,where electrification is a better solution to achieve net zero in road transport,and for making ammonia and e-fuels for maritime transport.NuclearPresently there is dramatic nuclear power cost increases in construction,build-out,planning,and waste disp

178、osal in Europe,North America,and OECD Pacific.At the same time,nuclear power plants are far from as reliable an energy source as is often claimed,with utilization rates lower than 50%in summer 2022 in several jurisdictions.Maintenance issues,climate-induced lack of cooling water,and supply-chain dis

179、rup-tions are just some examples impacting this development.However,nuclear power is a low-carbon technology with many advantages in a PNZ.It has limited land use,increases supply-chain resilience by requiring different raw materials than renewables,and is often associated with greater energy securi

180、ty.Yet,the required technological know-how and the uncertain future of small modular reactors(SMRs)limits the number of countries where massive development can occur.As a result,although it cannot directly compete against the large cost decrease and fast development of solar PV or wind,nuclear power

181、 generation doubles between now and 2050 in in our PNZ reaching 5900 TWh/yr.HydropowerHydropower has historically been the largest renewable electricity source,a role it retains today.Hydropower provides many services to a power system:it is usually a source of cheap and flexible electricity,and pum

182、ped hydro currently represents more than 98%of the global electrici-ty-storage capacity.However,the potential for new hydropower development is limited by natural constraints,and generation increases by 70%between now and 2050,reaching almost 7 PWh in mid-century,driven by significant growth in Grea

183、ter China,the Indian Subcon-tinent,and Sub-Saharan Africa.This is just 10%above our ETOs most likely forecast,underlining the limited additional impact of hydropower in our pathway.Interestingly,hydropower is highly sensitive to climate change,as extreme weather events(droughts and heavy rains),glac

184、ier melting,and decreased snowfalls all have a negative influence on the production output.As time goes by,we can expect that hydropower will perform better in our pathway than in a world above 1.5C.27%in 202219%in 2050Share in electricity production17%in 202229%in 2050Share in primary energyPNZPNZ1

185、8DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICY3.6 HYDROGEN+Essential for decarbonizing hard-to-electrify sectorsLow-carbon hydrogen is an integral part of net-zero strategies being developed by many countries and is urgently needed for the decarboniza

186、tion of hard-to-abate sectors.Accordingly,hydrogen and derivatives have a far higher share of final energy demand in our PNZ(15%)than in our ETO forecast(5%)by 2050.More than a fourth of global hydrogen and synthetic fuel demand by 2050 is used for industrial heating.By 2050,28 EJ/yr of energy deman

187、d in manufac-turing is supplied by hydrogen,a 22%share among energy carriers used in manufacturing.By 2050,pure hydrogen accounts for 7%of road transport energy demand,despite significant subsidies assumed in our PNZ.This relatively small share is the result of the competitiveness of battery-electri

188、c propulsion in all segments of road transport.The story is different in maritime transport.The absence of a significant battery-electric option for most parts of maritime transport leaves synthetic low-and zero-carbon fuels as viable options for decarbonization,leading to hydrogen derivatives suppl

189、ying 72%of the maritime fuel mix by 2050 in our PNZ.Global aviation also sees a significant share(40%)of pure hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives in its fuel mix.The development of electrolysisThe share of fossil-based hydrogen declines from almost 100%to about 15%by 2050,and no unabated installation

190、remains.By mid-century,the highest share of hydrogen production comes from dedicated off-grid capacities(74%),led by dedicated solar PV.Global hydrogen production needs to scale signif-icantly.Electrolysis capacity for dedicated off-grid hydrogen production needs to be 0.4 TW in 2030,1.9 TW in 2040,

191、and 3.8 TW by 2050,led by Greater China and Europe.Grid-based electrolysis needs to follow this capacity ramp-up with capacity at almost 2 TW by 2050.Here,the development is led by North America and Europe.Total hydrogen production(including feedstock)in 2050 at 820 Mt/yr under our PNZ compares with

192、 350 Mt/yr forecast by our ETO for the same year.By 2050,around 15%of hydrogen production goes to hydrogen derivatives as fuel.Interestingly,natural gas with CCS is the preferred route for ammonia production,as the current production process is well-suited for efficient carbon capture.19DNV Pathway

193、to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICY3.7 TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGERS Even in our pathway to net zero,other renewable energy sources are likely to remain marginal on a global scale between now and 2050.We do not model concentrated solar power(CSP);in our pathwa

194、y,geothermal and solar thermal combined provides less than 2%of world primary energy by mid-century geothermal power at 9,000 PJ/yr and solar thermal at 250 PJ/yr.This is around the same amount of solar PV that we see in world primary energy today,but our net-zero scenario expects this energy carrie

195、r to grow to 28%(186,000 PJ/yr)by 2050.Solar thermal use in energy demand actually decreases throughout our pathway period,as it is mainly used in buildings in China for water heating,which electricity will take over.Other potential future energy sources consist of tech-nologies which are not yet pr

196、oven and marginal tech-nologies that are not expected to scale by 2050.Ocean energy is one of these marginal technologies.Among several types of ocean energy technology,the most highly developed today have a combined capacity of about 536 MW.The LCOEs and investment costs of these technologies are d

197、eclining but remain higher than for other forms of renewable energy,and there are other barriers to ocean energys widescale adoption.Another energy source we do not see emerging is nuclear fusion.Several promising research projects focusing on smaller fusion systems are currently being piloted and a

198、 nuclear fusion reaction produced more energy than it took to drive the reaction for the first time in December 2022.Even with this breakthrough,there will still be a significant delay before energy on a scale comparable with other power sources will be provided.Therefore we confine our pathway to t

199、radi-tional fission technologies.During the period covered by this pathway,one or more of the emerging energy technologies may achieve a breakthrough such that they become cost competitive.However,to have a significant impact on the energy system,they would need to grow much faster than incumbent re

200、newable technologies.We do not see this happening at scale and have therefore excluded emerging technologies from the pathway.That is not to suggest that R&D effort on these tech-nologies should be abandoned;to the contrary,prom-ising technologies such as SMRs or wave-powered offshore desalination c

201、ould make a considerable contribution to post-2050 non-fossil energy.AI developments have received a lot of attention lately and show considerable potential to improve energy production and use,provided safety concerns are addressed(Bengio et al.,2023),but we have not quantified this effect in our P

202、NZ.20DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYMassive direct and indirect electrification is a key pillar for reaching net zeroThe electrification of the energy system is essential for unlocking higher energy efficiencies.Combined with the fast de

203、carbonization of the power mix,electrification is the prime factor driving down emissions in our pathway.As a result,global electricity demand,including electricity demand for grid-connected H2 electrolysis,is 84 PWh per year in 2050,almost three times what it was in 2022.Moreover,the PNZ electricit

204、y demand is 31%higher than the projected(most likely)forecast.The largest increase is in demand for power for electrolysis of hydrogen.From very low levels today,electrolysis demand for power supplied through the grid or from dedicated off-grid renewables is 11%(25 PWh/yr)of total demand in 2050.The

205、 transport sector sees the next highest growth in demand(21-fold)for electricity,where electrification of vehicles is an important lever,especially in road transport.Transports share in electricity demand grows from 1%in 2022 to 25%by 2050.Wind and solar with the lions share,and no more unabated fos

206、sil-fired plantsTo meet the demand,grid-connected electricity supply grows to 80 PWh/yr in 2050.This is a 26%higher value than in our ETO forecast.Phase-out of coal starts in some jurisdictions before 2030,with increased demand provided chiefly by solar and wind.Solar electricity sees a 27-fold incr

207、ease between 2022 and 2050,while wind electricity rises 15-fold over the same period.Solar and wind account for 73%of electricity by 2050,6%higher than in our ETO forecast.In total,non-fossil sources(renewables and nuclear)account for 92%of electricity generation mid-century,with the rest coming fro

208、m gas-fired power plants.Natural gas does not completely disappear from power generation.However by then,about a half of gas-fired power plants run instead on hydrogen,with a maximum volumetric blending ratio of 80%hydrogen.The off-grid rural solar capacity in the world is 236 GW in 2050,chiefly ins

209、talled in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian Subcontinent.Off-grid dedicated renewable capacity for electrolysis grows from very small levels in 2020 to 15 TW by 2050.Of this dedicated renewable capacity,one fourth will be offshore and onshore wind and three-fourths will be solar-based electrolysis.D

210、evelopment of grids and storage solutions must follow the paceThere is a recurring concern that power systems highly reliant on VRES are not resilient enough.There is indeed a need for new balancing mechanisms and technologies,but this is not necessarily where the major challenges will lie for the g

211、rids(see next page).Already today,a large number of renewable developments are slowed down if not cancelled due to gridlocks(DNV,2023).The doubling of grid capacity addition requires significant streamlining and acceleration of permitting and grid-connection processes.Scaling up supply-chains for gr

212、ids build-out and utility-scale storage is also where challenges are expected.From a few dozen GWh today,battery storage would need to scale up rapidly to meet the necessary demand in our pathway,with a 200-fold increase to 3,400 GWh of grid-connected capacity(including battery from road vehicles)al

213、ready by 2030.3.8 ELECTRICITY8 TWh 20302 times higher80 TWh in 2050Yearly grid capacity addition in the next decade compared to the last decadeGlobal utility-scale storage capacity21DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYTHE CHALLENGES OF NET-ZE

214、RO POWER GRIDSIn our PNZ,the 2050 power grid faces numerous challenges:Adequacy:Ensuring there is always enough energy to satisfy demand.This is particularly evident when comparing demand peaks to dips in renewable generation,such as during cloudy days with scarce solar or calm days with minimal win

215、d.Flexibility:The grid needs to swiftly adjust to varying supply,especially from inconsistent renewable sources like solar and wind.Reliability concerns with variable renewables:Solar and wind,essential for a green transition,raise reliability issues.When these sources cannot meet demand due to inad

216、equate sunlight or wind,backup systems(e.g.,storage or conven-tional plants like gas or nuclear)must fill the gap.Conversely,when there is an abundance of renewable energy,mechanisms are needed to store or redirect the excess.Solutions include battery storage,pumped hydro,hydrogen production,and dem

217、and response methods such as strategic EV charging and energy trading.Even with high renewable incorporation,there may be occasions when solar and wind are curtailed because it is not cost-effective to utilize the excessive output for only short periods annually.The charts depict the weekly how the

218、electricity demand and supply would behave for North America during a winter and a summer week in 2050.A daily demand pattern is evident in both weeks,with demand peaks occurring during the day.While the manufacturing sectors load remains fairly consistent between seasons,the buildings sector shifts

219、 from winter space heating to summer cooling demands.Solar PV consistently supplies power during daylight hours in both weeks,but wind supply varies without a clear daily pattern.Notably,solar energy has a greater impact in the summer,whereas wind energy is more abundant in the winter.During times w

220、hen both solar and wind outputs are low,storage solutions and other flexible power sources compensate for the shortfall.In the summer week,there is a noticeable fluctuation in output from traditional power sources,highlighting the need for increased flexibility.WinterDemand by segment(GWh/hour)Suppl

221、y by source(GWh/hour)SummerLegend Storage charging Hydrogen production EV charging Rail,aviation,shipping Resid.appl.and lighting Comm.appl.and lighting Space cooling Heating and cooking Manufacturing Energy sector own use OtherT&D losses allocated to demand Storage discharge Vehicle-to-grid Offshor

222、e wind Onshore wind Solar PV Solar+storage Oil-fired Gas-fired Coal-fired Bioenergy Hydropower Nuclear22DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICY3.9 EMISSIONS Net-zero emissions,carbon budgets,and the 1.5C targetThe pathway to net-zero emissions i

223、s produced as a back-cast in which net-zero global CO2 emission is achieved in 2050 from a starting point of 41 GtCO2 in 2022.This number includes emissions from the energy system and process-related emissions such as emitted during cement production as well as from land-use changes.The net-zero goa

224、l is often associated with limiting average global temperature increase to 1.5C.But as crucial is the pace at which we reach net-zero emissions.This can be estimated through the carbon budget,i.e.the cumulative amount we can emit to stay below 1.5C.In our PNZ,the current carbon budget of 280 GtCO2 w

225、ould be exhausted by 2030.That means that to return to a 1.5C trajectory by 2100,the cumulative emissions between 2030 and 2050 an overshoot of some 307 GtCO2 need to be removed in the second half of this century.In that sense,our PNZ is not the most aggressive net-zero scenario,as it already acknow

226、ledges that because of the inertia of the energy system,achieving a 1.5C future without temporarily higher average warming is out of reach.It also implies that a continuous effort will be needed until the end of the century to achieve this target.This involves a massive carbon capture and sequestrat

227、ion effort.This is none-theless an enormous task and a huge gap compared with the emission levels we forecast in the ETO.Closing the gapThe ETO emissions forecast predicts 23 GtCO2 of annual emission in 2050,showing there is a big gap to be closed to reach net-zero emissions by then.The development

228、of CO2 emissions is well correlated with future energy use from fossil-fuel carriers.Reducing combustion by replacing fossil fuels with electricity from nuclear and renewables can,along with improved efficiency,cumulatively cut about 235 GtCO2 emissions between 2023 and 2050.Furthermore,CCS plays a

229、decisive role in the PNZ,especially in power and manufacturing,contributing to a reduction of more than 89 Gt of emissions over that period.Current source of anthropogenic greenhouse gases(GHG)10%15%75%Waste and industrial processes Agriculture,forestry and other land useEnergy system23DNV Pathway t

230、o Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYCarbon-removal solutions are essential for reaching net zero and limiting a large overshoot of the carbon budget Assuming a continued scaling up of DAC,as well as further improvements in land use after 2050,total negati

231、ve emissions must reach-6 GtCO2/yr in 2060 and continue the trend to-7.1 to 2100.Cumulatively from 2050,this amounts to-310 GtCO2,which would eliminate the 1.5C carbon overshoot by 2100.Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage 2.3 GtCO2 in 2050Capturing and storing the CO2 from biomass combustion i

232、n power,district heating,waste inciner-ation,or industrial plants will be a preferred solution,as its moderate cost will rapidly be competitive against fast rising carbon prices.As a result,captured emissions rapidly grow,reaching a plateau in the late 2030s,corresponding to the maximum amount of CO

233、2 that can practically be captured in large emission points.Direct air capture 1.6 GtCO2 in 2050Removing CO2 from the atmosphere is an energy-intensive and costly process,at least with current industrial-scale technologies.However,the modularity and the limited physical footprint of DAC plants have

234、a clear advantage.They provide attractive offsets for the hardest-to-abate sectors,and allow high-income regions to reach net-negative emissions.It should be noted that technology development is still in its infancy,and it is possible that costs may sink dramatically.More economical alternatives to

235、DAC could also be developed before mid-century,especially if massive investments are poured in carbon removal technologies.Agriculture,forestry and other land use 1.2 GtCO2 in 2050In addition to energy-and process-related emissions,there are significant CO2 emissions from agriculture,forestry,and ot

236、her land use(AFOLU).The historical levels of these emissions are currently estimated(Global Carbon Project,2022)to 4 GtCO2/yr today.We need a reversal of todays land use;deforestation must be halted and significant effort put into resto-ration,reforestation,and biomass regrowth.Instead of the net em

237、issions that we have today,this enables us to reach the annual removal of 1.2 GtCO2/yr by 2050,growing post-2050 to remove up to 2 Gt/yr by 2100.Non-CO2 GHG emissions While CO2 represents about two-thirds of GHG emissions,what happens to other highly potent GHGs,such as methane(CH4),is important and

238、 is considered in the IPCC carbon budgets and net-zero considerations.For instance,methane(CH4)emissions from fossil fuels or changes in agricultural practices,including fertilizer use or aerosol emissions,have considerable influence on what net-zero CO2 will mean in practice.We use the IPCC scenari

239、os in line with very low and low non-CO2 GHG emissions estimates,which correspond well with the very low CO2 emissions in our PNZ.Therefore,the approach is consistent.The abatement in CH4 emissions in our PNZ is the result of carbon prices,reduced activity levels(production of fossil fuels),and the

240、interaction between these factors.The carbon price of CH4 is calculated as a unit of CH4 converted to its CO2 equivalent(CO2-e)using a 100-year Global Warming Potential(GWP)time horizon.Thus,calculated CO2-e carbon prices for CH4 are compared against the marginal cost of CH4 abatement.In the PNZ,CH4

241、 emissions from coal,oil,and natural gas reduce to 22 Mt/yr by 2050,82%less than the 2022 level,and more than 50%less than in the most likely future that our ETO forecasts.Note that the total sum of GHGs ultimately determines the global average temperature increase,and thus leads to some logical imp

242、lications:A more aggressive reduction of GHGs in other sectors provides slightly more leeway in the energy sector and still enables a 1.5C future.With less action on reducing emissions in the other sectors,achieving 1.5C would require cutting emissions even faster and more severely in the energy sec

243、tor.However,it is beyond the scope of this report to describe how CH4 and N2O agricultural emissions or emissions from waste and landfills should be reduced(e.g.through a shift in dietary choices).Nevertheless,we assume a reduction in these non-CO2 emissions in line with IPCC representative pathways

244、 for 1.5C.However,it is clear that achieving 1.5C is extremely difficult,and that to do so in all sectors within and outside the energy system requires everyone to act together and urgently.24DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICY3.10 EXPENDITU

245、RES Our pathway is affordable in the sense that it has lower costs than the present energy system.While global GDP more than doubles by 2050,global energy expenditures do not grow as fast.This disconnect is due to increasing electrification and improvements in energy efficiency,which in turn cause f

246、inal energy demand to fall.The challenge,however,is that overall costs for our PNZ are higher than those associated with the most likely future we forecast in our ETO.The main obstacle does not come from energy expenditures per se,which are cumulatively only 5%higher over the 2023 to 2050 period in

247、our PNZ.Most of the additional expenditures occur before 2040,which implies front-loading of costs which does impose a challenge,but one that is manageable.This is especially the case because from the mid-2040s expenditures are actually lower in the PNZ.This is results from two opposing factors:by 2

248、050,unit cost of final energy increases by 18%compared to our ETO,while at the same time energy demand is 19%lower.On a per capita basis,the variations are small compared to the growth of GDP over the same time period,as shown in Figure 3.19.The main financial obstacle to the PNZ,therefore,does not

249、relate to additional direct expenditure on energy production and transport/transmission.Instead,the challenge is associated with all the addi-tional costs our pathway does not assess related to improving energy efficiency(e.g.home insulation)or low-carbon alternatives,or indeed costs asso-ciated wit

250、h a just transition,including support for workers affected by the rapid displacement of fossil fuel sources.Those higher costs may be used as an excuse for inaction but are in our view far from insur-mountable.USD 75trn investments for decarbonized energyThe breakdown of energy expenditures shown in

251、 Figure 3.20 shows that fossil expenditures drop,driven by an almost 80%decline for upstream oil and gas through to 2050.The progressive global ban on new oil and gas exploration and development means that by 2050,expenditures only relate to operating remaining production fields.The overall picture

252、for power generation,which drives non-fossil expenditures,is that costs shift from operating expenses dominated by the cost of fossil fuels to capital expenditures in renewable power and related installations.Indeed,almost no fossil fuel-fired power investment is made from 2030,and the remaining cos

253、ts are for operating and maintaining those that are still running until their phase-out in the 2040s.The decline in fossil fuel-related investment contrasts with higher expenditures in low-carbon power generation.The increase in electricity demand drives non-fossil investments,which amount to some U

254、SD 53trn over the next 30 years as shown in Figure 3.21.The doubling of electricity production and decen-tralization of power generation,coupled with a large amount of new VRES capacity,necessarily leads to strong investment in grids,totalling some USD 22trn over the next 30 years.Grid expenditures

255、more than double between 2022 and 2050 in our PNZ.From the mid-2040s,expenditures are actually lower in the PNZ.25DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYThe additional costs of our pathwayOur PNZ also implies massive and immediate invest-ments i

256、nside and outside of the energy system.Although these investments might be profitable over the long term,upfront costs and lack of visibility on the future regulations and economic situation currently favour the status quo.Cost of capital is one of the key cost drivers for capital-intensive purposes

257、,and a common objective such as the one needed in our pathway will de-risk low-carbon technology investments.Therefore,we expect similar but stronger trends than in our ETO,with lower cost of capital for low-carbon projects,while the planned phase-out of fossil fuels increases cost of capital for fo

258、ssil-based projects.This is decisive for capital-intensive carbon capture and removal projects,which are a key feature of our pathway.As shown in Figure 3.22,carbon capture and storage(CCS)requires early investments of more than USD 100bn by 2030.The uptake of the less efficient and more costly dire

259、ct air capture(DAC)takes off later.The removal of CO2 via DAC will represent a significant expenditure of USD 450bn per year by 2050.Impact on householdsThe acceptability of the transition lies in its afforda-bility for the population.Especially in the current inflationary period,every increase in t

260、he energy bills paid by household creates extra tension in societies,as shown in recent events in Nigeria or Kenya.Figure 3.23 shows trends in household energy expenditures in the regions in our pathway.These household energy expenditures include CAPEX for residential space heating and cooling(such

261、as cost of air conditioners),water heating(such as cost of heat pumps),and cooking(such as cost of electric stoves)and OPEX,which is the energy costs and energy taxes of running all the household equipment,and passenger vehicles.The impact on household energy bills varies by region.High-income regio

262、ns are front-runner regions in the energy transition,and actually see a decrease in such bills compared with our most likely future from the mid-2030s.This is because they are already seeing and would increasingly benefit from the global acceleration in cost-learning curves for low-and zero-carbon t

263、echnologies.Strong energy-efficiency(EVs,home insulation)measures also mean lower energy needs and thus lower energy bills.Middle-income regions see higher expenditures during the modelled period,although the spread is important.Fossil-fuel producing regions like Middle East and North Africa often h

264、eavily support fossil fuels through gasoline subsidies for example,and the tran-sition to electricity would increase the costs.Even if the difference between the two futures declines with time,the transition period would be sensitive,highlighting that de-risked financing from high-income regions is

265、an integral part of the presented pathway to net zero.Low-income regions see a similar trend to that described in our most-likely future.This is explained by the low household energy consumption in these regions,with limited access to personal cars and water and space heating already relying primari

266、ly on bioenergy and electricity in our most-likely future.Importantly,the growth of GDP per capita would outpace any increase in household expenditures across all of the world regions we model,clearly showing the capacity for societies to accommodate higher expenditures,through subsidies for the low

267、er-income households for instance.26DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYIn this chapter,we detail the pathways to net zero for these nine chosen sectors on both the demand and supply sides,covering technologies and policies.Some of the sector

268、s which contribute smaller shares to global CO2 emissions,and which do not form part of our focus in this chapter,include manufactured goods,construction and mining,rail,energy sector own use,and agriculture.In terms of sectoral contributions,road transport is currently by far the largest emitter am

269、ong the seven demand-side sectors in focus,with a 40%share of the total.Under the PNZ,the road transport sector,with difficult conditions for CCS,still dominates the remaining emissions,contributing half of the total,with iron and steel in second place.In the PNZ,the easier-to-abate power sector see

270、s a much more rapid transition towards renewable electricity and a much higher prevalence of CCS in the worlds fossil-fuelled plants,as elaborated in the power section,resulting in power reaching net-zero emissions in the early 2040s.CCS and carbon removal technologies such as DAC are essential to r

271、each net-zero and are described in the dedicated roadmap.For CCS,there is a stark contrast between stationary,large point sources(such as manufacturing and power)where CO2 emissions at high concentrations can be captured relatively cost-effectively,versus mobile,dispersed sources(such as transport a

272、nd buildings)where CCS technology cannot be applied due to the low density of emissions.CSS in these latter sources therefore remains near zero within our 2050 timeframe.4 SECTORAL ROADMAPSWe focus our pathway to net zero(PNZ)on developments within the most energy-intensive industries and the demand

273、 and supply sectors responsible for the lions share of emissions.We have selected nine sectors that together currently contribute more than 29 Gt to global CO2 emissions,which is over 80%of current global energy-related and industrial process emissions.Decarbonization is essential in eight sectorsEn

274、ergy-related and process emissions20222050Carbon capture and storageTotal:37 GtCO2Total:2.7 GtCO2(-1.2 GtCO2)Total:0.03 GtCO2Total:6.4 GtCO2PowerPowerPowerRoadRoadMaritimeMaritimeAviationOther sectorsIron and SteelCementIron and SteelAviationCementBuilding heatingPetrochemicalsPetrochemicalsOther se

275、ctorsBuilding heating27DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYPNZRoad transport,among the largest GHG emitters today is also difficult to fully abate,with about 2 GtCO2 emis-sions remaining by 2050.The basic technologies used to achieve the path

276、way already exist,with the principle means of reducing emissions being electrification,and the replacement of fossil-fuelled ICEs.However,some fossil-fuelled road transport,mostly trucks,will persist,explaining residual oil demand and emissions.SECTORAL PATHWAYPOLICY LEVERSGovernment support to EV p

277、urchasers and manufacturers with direct and indirect purchase-price reductions in the next few years,supported by quotas for EV shares in manufacturers fleets.Fuel-cell electric vehicle(FCEV)technology will only prevail in small shares of long-haul trucking and public transport,whereas the advantage

278、s of electric propulsion will edge out both fossil fuel and hydrogen in all seg-ments of road transport.Subsidized EV purchase Reduced toll roads and parking fees to incentivize EV uptake,in addition to other financial and user incentives Regionally differentiated ICE bansSome fossil fuel-propelled

279、road transport will remain.New sales of ICE vehicles will eventually be banned in all regions except Sub-Saharan Africa.OECD regions and Greater China have a phased ban on fossil-fuelled passenger vehicles from 2030 onwards,with other regions following.The sales prohibition is extended to commercial

280、 vehicles just a few years after passenger ICE vehicle sales are stopped.The PNZ does not rely on a cash-for-clunkers(early retirement)programme.Stricter fuel economy standards and emission limits for ICEs Additional taxes on gasoline and diesel Fossil-fuel subsidy removal EV uptake is already subsi

281、dized in many regions.A decline in fossil-fuel subsidies frees up government budgets for investments in e.g.EV technology and improvement of battery charging speed,followed by improvements in availability and average charging speed of charging stations,and manufacturing capacity and transitioning co

282、nventional car manufacturers.Public infrastructure investments R&D battery chemistries Investment support in manufacturing capacity/conversion4.1 ROAD91%85%67%40%Share of oil in energy demand32%of global vehicle fleet are EVs69%of global vehicle fleet are EVs87%of global vehicle fleet are EVsBan on

283、ICE passenger vehicles in OECD regions and Greater China62 million passenger BEV soldNo more ICE passenger sales in the Indian Subcontinent Average commercial BEV range 700 kmNo more ICE vehicle sales globally15 million FCEV commercial vehicles on the road42%Decline in energy demand by 205074%Declin

284、e in oil demand by 2050REDUCED FOSSIL FUEL USEACCELERATED EV UPTAKEINFRA-STRUCTURE AND ECOSYSTEM INVESTMENTS$28DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYPNZAlthough 25%below our ETO forecast,our PNZ assumes a solid growth in global passenger flight

285、s from 3.3 billion in 2022 to 7.8 billion in 2050.Due to the introduction of decarbonized fuels,emissions from aviation decline 60%to 330 MtCO2 per year between 2022 and 2050.Electrification is limited to short-haul flights,with biofuel and hydrogen applicable to medium and long-haul flights.SECTORA

286、L PATHWAYPOLICY LEVERSEfficiency will continue to improve due to better engine technology,improved aircraft design,larger planes,and better flightpath logistics.Technical requirements on fuel economy and emissionsFuel blending mandates will be the main policy tool for enforcing uptake of low-carbon

287、fuels in a PNZ future.SAF can replace the existing kerosene with relatively little adjustment of fuel tanks and engines(depending on the blending ratio).SAF is likely to consist mainly of biofuels,particularly hydroprocessed esters and fatty acids synthetic paraffinic kerosene(HEFA-SPK).Extensive re

288、search into hydrogen has indicated its potential for use in medium-haul aircraft.This is likely to represent more than half of SAF in high-income regions from around 2040.Fuel targets and blending mandates Technology mandates for electric short-haul flightsReducing demand for flying and limiting gro

289、wth in the number of flights via increased cost.Flying should be perceived as a luxury,and restricting the number of flights per person is a possible auxiliary policy.Increasing fees and taxes,and more costly fuels4.2 AVIATION60%Decline in emissions from 2022 to 205027%Share of oil in 2050SUSTAINABL

290、E AVIATION FUEL(SAF)INCREASED EFFICIENCYREDUCED DEMAND2751679642Average emission per passenger trip(kgCO2)9%biofuelsPeak emission in 202522%e-fuels30%biofuelsDeployment of short-haul electric planesDeployment of hydrogen planesEmissions at 40%of present day levelsPassenger demand 15%lower than in ET

291、O34%e-fuels 29DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYPNZDecarbonizing shipping by 2050 requires higher energy efficiency and improved logistics.It will also need a very different fuel mix to todays predom-inance of marine fuel oils.This includes

292、 new fuels derived from low-carbon sources,irrespective of energy-efficiency gains.Our PNZ has a diverse future energy mix comprising both fossil and low-carbon fuels,with fossil fuels gradually phased out.SECTORAL PATHWAYPOLICY LEVERSA clear,long-term,and predictable regulatory framework for emissi

293、on reductions will be the key driver for technology development and investing in deploying carbon-neutral fuels and solutions.Initial policies need to focus on lowering critical barriers such as the cost differential between new and conventional fuels.Technical or operational requirements on GHG emi

294、ssions Carbon pricing that ensures a level playing field for ships that run on more expensive carbon-neutral fuels Mandated uptake of low-carbon fuelsThe energy transition in shipping will require major investment in infrastructure and production capacity for supply of carbon-neutral fuels.The onsho

295、re investment costs and the higher cost of producing zero-carbon or carbon-neutral fuels will lead to significantly higher fuel costs for ships.Investment support to infrastructure related to production,distribution and refuelling of carbon-neutral fuelsIn light of fuel-switching ambitions,it is vit

296、al to ensure that demand for low-and zero-carbon fuels can be met.This is also partially influenced by governmental strategies and policies.Reduce obstacles to implementation of carbon-neutral fuels,such as technical and organizational barriers4.3 MARITIME92%Decline in emissions from 2022 to 20501%S

297、hare of oil in 2050REGULATIONS AND POLICYCARGO OWNER AND CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS131280.9Average emission intensity(kgCO2/tonne-mile)5%low-carbon fuels in fuel mix28%low-carbon fuels in fuel mix87%low-carbon fuels in fuel mixACCESS TO INVESTORS AND CAPITAL$0.04 Mt/yr ammonia 40 Mt/yr ammonia170 Mt/yr e

298、-fuels360 Mt/yr e-fuels37 Mt/yr e-fuels 300 Mt/yr ammonia30DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYPNZA drastic reduction in total CO2 emissions in our pathway is primarily achieved through electrification and energy efficiency.The technology for

299、 net-zero emissions from heating buildings already exists;the challenge lies in the speed and efficiency of its imple-mentation.By 2050,electricity(40%),driven by heat pump uptake,and hydrogen(23%),used in gas or dedi-cated boilers,dominate buildings heating demand.SECTORAL PATHWAYPOLICY LEVERSParti

300、al ban on fossil-based heating equipment,and mandated electricity-ready new buildings,translating to a limited and regionally differentiated percentage of new buildings allowed to use fossil fuels.This leads to a faster phase-out of fossil-fuel equipment and quicker electrification.New fossil-based

301、equipment also has limited lifetime,thus leading to faster replacement with electricity or hydrogen-based heating.Regulations and partial bans limiting equipment choices for fossil-fuel based heatingThe stranded risk of fossil-fuel infrastructure in buildings significantly reduces the attractiveness

302、 of fossil-fuel heating equipment,and curtails the ability to garner debt or capital equity to install them in new commercial buildings.Today,oil and natural gas boilers have a cost of capital of 17%,which increases to 20%in 2050,compared to the 7%cost of capital of electrical equipment in 2022.High

303、er cost of capital on fossil-fuel boilers in commercial buildings Support for technological leapfrogging in selected regions Consumer-side fossil-fuel subsidy removal Higher energy-efficiency standards for existing and new builds leading to lower specific heating demand per floor area unit.Energy ef

304、ficiency can also be achieved by using innovative building materials.Efficiency standards and regulations on building envelope thermal characteristics4.4 BUILDINGS HEATING84%Decline in emissions from 2022 to 205014941Average emission intensity(gCO2/m2/yr)1.3 GtCO2Gap with ETO forecast in 20504%hydro

305、gen in fuel mixElectricity has the largest share in the fuel mix10%hydrogen in fuel mixDoubling of heat pumps installedFossil-boilers halve compared to 2023 62%electricity in the fuel mixPHASE-OUT FOSSIL-FUEL EQUIPMENTACCELERATE ELECTRI-FICATIONHIGHER COST OF CAPITAL FOR FOSSIL-FUEL EQUIPMENTINCREAS

306、E ENERGY EFFICIENCY OF BUILDINGS31DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYPNZMany technologies for our PNZ e.g.grids,wind turbines,and CCS equipment need large amounts of steel,but steel production is currently emission-intensive due to heavy coa

307、l use.In our PNZ,material efficiency and recycling measures sees a steady reduction in steel use.By 2050,most steel will come from scrap or direct reduced iron(DRI)in electric arc furnaces(EAF),driving emissions down by 94%.SECTORAL PATHWAYPOLICY LEVERSAround 40%of energy demand in iron and steelmak

308、ing comes from the reduction of iron ore,a process that currently relies predominantly on coal used in blast furnaces.Major barriers to lowering emissions include:the high share of coal in the sectors energy inputs;the long lifetime of incumbent assets;and the typically low margins in a mature,compe

309、titive,and commoditized market.Carbon price is the most important policy for the commercialization and scaling up of low-carbon iron and steel production.Low-carbon steel technologies include the already widely used scrap-based EAF for steel production and the prom-ising direct reduction method.The

310、latter involves the solid-state reduction of iron oxide into iron,where pre-heated iron ore is converted into DRI with hydrogen acting as the reducing agent and energy source.The DRI can then be fed directly into an EAF to produce steel.Low-carbon direct reduction can be either hydrogen-based or nat

311、ural gas-based with CCS.These two similar technologies are currently either not economically viable due to the high costs and/or low availability of feedstock(e.g.in the case of green hydrogen-based DRI).The direct reduction can also be designed to operate with methane,hydrogen,or a mixture of these

312、 gases as the reducing agents.Therefore,blending hydrogen into natural gas is seen as a transition strategy before there is technological readiness for pure hydrogen use.Favourable energy taxation for hydrogen production Support for new DRI-EAF plants Support for scaling up CCS technologies for natu

313、ral gas-based DRI.Steel is virtually 100%recyclable,and improving the collection and recycling of scrap steel in EAF is essential.In our PNZ,by 2050,all steel production in the OECD and 90%of production in other regions is assumed to be via EAF,with a global steel recycling rate of 95%.There is also

314、 a decrease in the steel intensity of new buildings(20%lower by 2050)and a faster improvement(1.2%per year compared with 1%per year in the ETO forecast)of energy intensity in steel production itself.Recycling policy enables a faster transition to steel production via EAF.Mandates in construction sta

315、ndards4.5 IRON AND STEEL10%Current share of global emissionsLOW-CARBON DRI-EAFDECARBONIZE BLAST FURNACESIMPROVE MATERIAL EFFICIENCY AND RECYCLING1 6901 46030090Average emission intensity(kgCO2/t steel)1.9 GtCO2Gap with most-likely future 20 MtCO2/yr captured4%hydrogen in the fuel mix31%hydrogen in t

316、he fuel mix48%hydrogen in the fuel mix-10%energy demand per ton of steel-21%energy demand per ton of steel-25%energy demand per ton of steel860 MtCO2/yr captured400 MtCO2/yr captured32DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYPNZAlthough controvers

317、ial and energy-intensive,cements unique properties make it unlikely to be replaced in the coming decades,even in our pathway to net zero.Massive deployment of CCS and changes to cement formulations will be required in a PNZ future to decrease the annual CO2 emissions from 2.4 Gt today to 0.5 Gt in 2

318、050.SECTORAL PATHWAYPOLICY LEVERSReduced demand via the combined effect of policies and decarbonization costs that are passed on to the consumers and make cement less competitive.Enforcement of public procurement for low-carbon cement is also important.Regulation and government promotion support to

319、new or alternative materialsReducing the clinker to cement ratio is achieved by using clinker substitutes and enhancing the strength of the clinker by using additives,alternative binders,etc.Low-carbon cement procurement Easing regulation on cement compositionCarbon Capture,Utilization,and Storage(C

320、CUS)is the main and most effective abatement solution because of unavoidable process emissions,and will capture 76%of direct emissions by 2050.The technology remains in an early phase of deployment,however,with only a handful of projects being announced so far.Carbon price and investment support Imp

321、rovements in energy efficiency of clinker production lead to reductions in both direct and indirect CO2 emissions.Using alternatives to fossil fuels is challenging given compatibility limitations.Coal remains the main heat source for clinker production,though hydrogen has an important role.Waste co-

322、processing(plastics,tyres,etc.)also represents a significant share,as it diverts waste from landfills or incineration,and is a source of income for the industry.Efficiency standards Increased taxation on fossil fuels triggers fuel switching,and boosts use of alternative fuels.ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND F

323、UEL MIXCARBON CAPTURELOWERINGCLINKER-TO-CEMENTRATIOREDUCED DEMAND4.6 CEMENT500540400150Average emission intensity(kgCO2/t cement)7%Current share of global emissions1.8 GtCO2Gap with most-likely futureAverage clinker-to-cement ratio 0.66Average clinker-to-cement ratio 0.62Average clinker-to-cement ra

324、tio 0.599 MtCO2/yr captured230 MtCO2/yr captured990 MtCO2/yr captured-11%coal demand compared to 2022-14%energy per ton of cement 18%hydrogen in the fuel mix33DNV Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions 2023CONTENTSREGIONAL ROADMAPSPATHWAYSECTORAL ROADMAPS POLICYPNZThe chemicals and petrochemicals industry ma

325、kes many of the chemical building blocks for products widely used in our everyday lives:plastic packaging,fertilizers,pharmaceuticals,tyres,and so on.Manufacturing these products,which also rely on fossil fuels as feedstock,will remain a key driver of oil and gas demand.The diversity of processes im

326、plies that a broad range of solutions are needed.SECTORAL PATHWAYPOLICY LEVERSPlastics production represents a third of the sectors energy demand,and increased recycling rates will help lower the energy demand.Eco-design of consumer products,with an increased focus on product recyclability,will have

327、 to follow.This also includes a decrease in plastic waste in the manufacturing process.Mechanical recycling has limitations,and most improvements for non-recyclable polymers can be achieved through waste-to-energy(including co-processing)and waste-to-fuel technologies for better use of the embedded

328、energy.Indeed,for plastics,around half the carbon is embedded into the material itself and is not accounted for in the direct emissions of the sector.Therefore,the disposal phase has a strong impact on the final carbon footprint.Landfill bans for plastics,avoiding long-term GHG emissions,and promoti

329、ng use of non-recyclable plastics as a source for alternative fuels.Mandated recycling,with a generalization of extended producer responsibility regulations on product design for higher recyclability Taxes on unrecycled plastics Reduction and substi-tution of the demand via measures like banning sub

330、stitutable single-use plastics will also impact global emissions.Although ammonia production is decarbonized,final use of its derivatives,and their subsequent decomposition in soil,are sources of CO2 and nitrous oxide emissions.Emissions from producing this key building block of nitrogen fertilizers

331、 are currently around 500 MtCO2 per year and must be addressed while also ensuring the security of the food supply.This will thus remain one of the main concerns for governments.Support to low-carbon hydrogen,an essential chemical for making ammonia.Stringent regulation of local nitrate pollution,an

332、d interventions on food waste,reduce ammonia derivatives demand.For some processes,such as ammonia production from natural gas,carbon capture has a clear benefit because of the further need for CO2,often in the same plant.Carbon capture is also cost-effective in that case because of the pure CO2 out

333、put,and several industrial plants already have the technology in place,explaining the rapid future ramp-up Carbon price and investment support4.7 PETROCHEMICALS9%Current share of global emissionsLOW-CARBON AMMONIA9%11%13%19%Petrochemical feedstock share in global oil and gas demand2.1 EJ of waste-derived oil (4%of global oil demand)Recycled plastics cover 28%of plastics demand1400 MtCO2/yr capture