1、Covid-19 and Europe-China Relations A country-level analysis European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC) Special Report - 29 April 2020 29 April 2020 All rights reserved French Institute of International Relations (Ifri) ISBN: 979-10-373-0164-2 Cover: Designed by Ftima Rubio Disclaimer: The views an

2、d analyses presented herein are those of the signed authors and do not repre- sent the views of all members of ETNC, its participating institutions, nor the institutions with which the ? for any errors or omissions, nor any liability for damages resulting from the use of or reliance on infor- ? Covi

3、d-19 and Europe-China Relations A country-level analysis Edited by John Seaman with analysis and peer reviews by Ugo Armanini, Angelos Bentis, ?-? Ties Dams, Lucas Erlbacher, Mario Esteban, Rudolf Frst, Hans Jrgen Gsemyr, Francesca Ghiretti, Markus Herrmann, Bjrn Jerdn, Yang Jiang, Marc Julienne, Lo

4、renzo Mariani, Tamas Matura, Iulia Monica Oehler-? Lucrezia Poggetti, Barbara Pongratz, Patrick Renz, Carlos Rodrigues, Tim Rhlig, Michael Settelen, Monika Sie Dhian Ho, ?, Tim Summers, Justyna Szczudlik, Velina Tchakarova, Plamen Tonchev, Richard Q. Turcsnyi, and Frans-Paul van der Putten European

5、Think-tank Network on China (ETNC) Special Report 29 April 2020 Contents INTRODUCTION CHINA AS PARTNER, COMPETITOR AND RIVAL AMID COVID-19 _ 5 AUSTRIA A NON-CONFRONTATIONAL ROAD TO EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY? _ 11 BULGARIA LIMITED DEPENDENCE ON MEDICAL SUPPLIES FROM CHINA, BUT PROACTIVE CHINESE P

6、UBLIC DIPLOMACY _ 14 CZECHIA COVID-19 PUTS CHINA AT CENTRE OF INCREASINGLY DIVISIVE NATIONAL DEBATE _ 17 FRANCE BETWEEN HEALTHCARE COOPERATION AND POLITICAL TENSIONS WITH CHINA AMID COVID-19 _ 21 GERMANY COVID-19 A CATALYST FOR CURRENT TRENDS IN RELATIONS WITH CHINA _ 25 GREECE CLOSE ? AND PRIMARILY

7、 COMMERCIAL ? COOPERATION BETWEEN GREECE AND CHINA _ 29 HUNGARY BUSINESS AS USUAL WITH CHINA AMID COVID-19 _ 32 ITALY COOPERATION, COMPETITION AND LOCAL POLITICS AMID COVID-19 _ 35 LATVIA MASK DIPLOMACY IN MINOR KEY _ 40 NETHERLANDS TOUGH QUESTIONS, STRONGER ANSWERS IN THE FACE OF COVID-19 AND A MOR

8、E AUDACIOUS CHINA _ 43 NORWAY CRISIS HIGHLIGHTS NORMALITY IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA _ 47 ? Contents 4 POLAND ? COVID-19 _ 50 PORTUGAL ?WHILE, IF THE SOUL I? RELATIONS WITH CHINA AMID COVID-19 _ 54 ROMANIA ?D COVID-19 GENERATE CONTRADICTORY OPINIONS _ 57 SLOVAKIA CHANGING VIEWS OF CHINA DURIN

9、G THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC _ 60 SPAIN A NECESSARY PARTNERSHIP WITH CHINA IN BATTLING COVID-19 _ 63 SWEDEN NOT QUITE FRIENDS IN NEED WITH CHINA AMID THE COVID-19 CRISIS _ 68 SWITZERLAND COVID-19 HAS NOT ALTERED LIMITED CHINA POLICY DEBATE _ 71 UNITED KINGDOM SHARPENING THE CHINA DEBATE AMID COVID-19 _ 7

10、4 LIST OF AUTHORS _ 77 ABOUT THE EUROPEAN THINK-TANK NETWORK ON CHINA (ETNC) _ 79 LIST OF INSTITUTIONS CONTRIBUTING TO ETNC_ 80 Introduction: China as partner, competitor and rival amid Covid-19 JOHN SEAMAN FRENCH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IFRI) As Europe struggles with an existential cr

11、isis brought on by Covid-19, the complexities of its relations with China are on full display. While the crisis itself is unprecedented in many ways, it is also the first time that China has figured so prominently on an issue of such immediately critical importance to European citizens, governments,

12、 and the European project more broadly. As such, China has become a conspicuous part of public and policy debates around Covid-19 across much of the continent. The way that relations with China evolve over the course of the current crisis, and the debate around these relations, will more than likely

13、 have a lasting effect on the Europe-China relationship, long after the crisis has subsided. To begin to understand the dynamics at play, the chapters in this report provide country-specific analysis on these shifting relations within the context of Covid-19. They also seek to provide some indicatio

14、n of the broader impact on bilateral relations and their trajectories. Before the crisis hit, relations with China had already grown more complex. What were largely commercially-driven relations a decade ago have now become more diverse, more (geo)p? Europe have grown considerably and China itself h

15、as become more competitive and more globally ambitious.1 Just over one year ago, in March 2019, the European Commission and the External Action Service characterized China as a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival. The chapters that follow attest to the veracity of this multi-fa? _ 1. Over the

16、 last five years, the European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC), which has put together the current report, has been analysing these changes through country-specific lenses in its annual reports ? mapping Europe-China relations (2?Belt and Road?Chinese investment (2017), political values (2018), a

17、nd the US-China rivalry (2019 ? published in January 2020) and their broader implications for Europe and its relations with China. ? Introduction 6 China on and around Covid-19. This was already supposed to be a defining year for Europe-China relations. Critical decisions are slated to be made on qu

18、estions such as 5G licensing rules in Europe and a bilateral investment agreement between China and the EU, while in September 27 European heads of state and government are meant to sit down, for the first time collectively, with their Chinese counterpart in Leipzig, Germany. Now, 2020 is shaping up

19、 to be decisive on an even broader range of issues. ? This report seeks to identify and underline key developments in bilateral relations between China and a wide range of European countries, and to highlight debates that these relations inspire across Europe within the context of the evolving healt

20、h crisis. It is a collection of independent analyses from 19 countries meant to compare notes on country-level experiences and build on the annual reports of the European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC). The goal here is not to be exhaustive or definitive ? indeed, the crisis is still unfolding a

21、cross much of Europe and the globe, and the potential for change is still great. Rather, this report offers a marker in time and a window into some of the issues that will become increasingly important in Europe-China relationships in light of Covid-19. Moreover, views from certain key partners in E

22、urope are notably missing (including, for instance, Ireland, Croatia, or even non-EU member states in the Balkans). In particular, this report could be supplemented by an all-important analysis of interactions between European Union institutions and China on Covid- 19. This would be particularly sig

23、nificant given the debate around European unity and the visibility of European officials such as the Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, and the high representative, Josep Borrell, on China-related issues during the crisis. Recent media reports2 have moreover revealed the pressures that Chin

24、a has placed on EU officials during the crisis, which also serve to highlight frictions within the EU over how to approach China. Furthermore, while it strives for objectivity, the report also takes a decidedly European point of view. Comparing the analyses below with similar analyses from a Chinese

25、 perspective on Europe-China relations would also be instructive. _ 2. See for instance reports in the New York Times, Politico and the Financial Times on 24 and 25 April. ? Introduction 7 Key observations, and questions to explore further The Covid-19 crisis has hit at a time when debates over the

26、need to adopt more coherent strategies towards China have been emerging across Europe. In many ways, the current crisis has become a catalyst for a number of trends that have been shaping Europe-China relations in recent years, while in other ways it has turned the tables. It has simultaneously brou

27、ght Europe and China into closer cooperation, pushed them further apart, and seemingly underlined the fractures that exist within Europe on how to approach an increasingly influential China. ? Covid-19 crisis assistance has been mutual, and commercial exchanges in medical supplies from China to Euro

28、pe have far exceeded aid volumes. Many European countries were quick to organize support for China as the coronavirus emerged in Wuhan, with EU officials noting aid deliveries of over 50 tonnes of medical supplies in January?as largely muted, according to reports, out of respect for Chinese requests

29、 to maintain a low profile. In turn, Chinese assistance has arrived from multiple sources, including various levels of the Chinese government, state-owned enterprises, private companies, foundations, as well as connections resulting from local Chinese communities in Europe. Sister-city arrangements

30、and the various local government connections made as a result of decentralized diplomacy are another feature noted in a number of chapters below. In many instances, there is also a correlation between Chinese companies with commercial interests in the country and donations from these companies, as n

31、oted in the cases of Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal and Spain, for instance. There are also notable similarities across a number of countries, where aid provided from China has been accompanied by messages tailored to local audiences ? be they celebrated Portuguese poets or the ancient Greek philo

32、sopher Aristotle. China has organized a number of video conferences with governments and health experts across Europe to share information about its experiences in fighting Covid-19, particularly related to medical and scientific aspects of combating the virus. It is worth noting that the first vide

33、o conference was set up with Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries ? including non-EU member states ? that make up the so-? on 13 March. The conference preceded those with other European counterparts by one week. One hypothesis behind this scheduling (see the chapter on Latvia) is that Beijin

34、g sought to provide CEE countries with a tangible deliverable of the 17+1 format that, for many participating governments, is losing its appeal. ? Introduction 8 ? is important to note that commercial deliveries of medical supplies from China have far exceeded aid volumes. While instances of defecti

35、ve supplies from China have also entered the discussion, this does not seem to have fundamentally altered the debate (see for example the case of Spain). Privileged access to Chinese suppliers as a result of high-? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? governments, from Germany to Poland to the Czech Republ

36、ic. ? ?ic diplomacy has gone into overdrive. It appears well coordinated, with varying degrees of dogmatism, divisiveness and moderation. Chinese embassies and ambassadors across Europe have become highly visible, both on social media and in traditional media, as the Covid-19 crisis has expanded acr

37、oss the continent. Some Chinese official social media accounts were only created in the last year and have become active during the current crisis. Drawing from the chapters below, key messages tend to fall into four categories: 1) highlighting solidarity and aid; 2) calling for international unity;

38、 3) ?-19 as a success story, and in some cases (for instance in France) blaming Western democracies for their poor management or even responsibility in the spread of the pandemic; 4) countering narratives critical of China, including through sowing doubt about the origins of Covid-19. ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

39、? ? there appears to be a relative degree of consistency in messaging, there is a diversity in method that ranges from low key (see Latvia or Romania) to charm offensive (see Poland, Portugal, Italy or Spain) to provocative or aggressive (see Sweden, Germany or France). The degree of variation is wo

40、rth considering further. Could this be due, for instance, to different styles or ways of thinking within the Chinese foreign ministry or Party-state apparatus more broadly, or does it reflect a consciously constructed approach formulated on a reading of target audiences and the state of bilateral re

41、lations with each country? Some countries (for example France and Germany) have pushed back on the ? ? ambassador and/or making public statements that serve to challenge the Chinese narrative. ? Introduction 9 ? Relations with China amid Covid-19 have fuelled internal political discord in some count

42、ries, while also highlighting divisions within Europe. The cases of Italy and the Czech Republic are illustrative of how, in some countries in Europe, relations with China have become an important, even divisive topic of political debate. Still, these cases do not appear to be the rule across Europe

43、, or at least not yet. The political ramifications of the crisis brought on by Covid-19 are far from clear, but the populist politics that have swept Europe in recent years is not likely to disappear, and may rather be strengthened, particularly if the severe economic crisis proves protracted. ?-19,

44、 particularly in early to mid- March, as the virus was breaking out on the continent, was seen by some to provide a stark contrast to the inaction and lack of unity within Europe at the time. It is not the first time that China has been used as a domestic political lever against the European project and it is likely that it will not be the last. As noted in the chapter on Portugal, for instance, Covid-?