1、1 Insight Report In partnership with Marsh in advanced economies alone, it is expected to increase from 105% of GDP in 2019 to 122% in 2020.5 Most governments are likely to face increasingly burdened budgets for many years, others may face a structural weakening of their fiscal positions, and some c

2、ould become at risk of defaulting. How governments will seek to recuperate public finances, whether they will need to and who will absorb the impact of fiscal imbalances are largely uncertain. Higher taxes in the future may present one option. However, since shutdowns have affected most sectors, hig

3、her levies are likely to be borne by the few sectors that have fared well multiple groceries, pharmaceuticals and software companies have already announced large-scale hiring plans6 which would risk countering their capacity to support the recovery. Reallocating or reducing public budgets may be ano

4、ther option. Through the pandemic, public expenditure has been critical to guarantee pay for furloughed workers, procure critical goods and strengthen health systems. Exit strategies will also depend on large public spending, as governments will need to secure tests, therapeutic drugs, vaccinations

5、or a combination of the above. Any austerity measures and reallocation may therefore affect other critical areas, including infrastructures, non-health scientific research and development, and climate action (see Chapter 2) all of which have critical long-term benefits for the global economy, enviro

6、nment and society at large as well as potentially shifting financial costs to future generations. Global economic relations can trade and FDI recover? Before the crisis, the global economy was already under strain from trade tensions, low investment, weak confidence and high debt. Nonetheless, a sud

7、den and deep contraction of the global economy was not on the horizon. Now, the International Monetary Fund anticipates world output to drop by 3% in 20207 much worse than during the 2008/2009 financial crisis global trade is predicted to collapse between 13% and 32%8 and foreign direct investment (

8、FDI) inflows are estimated to fall between 30% and 40%.9 Weaker global economic relations are expected in a recession, but this crisis is different. In a worldwide lockdown with a halt on non-essential activities and cross-border movements, typical strategies to revive trade and FDI may not be adequ

9、ate. Lowering tariffs to stimulate affected sectors is contingent on the normalization of trade, and incentives for FDI may only have a partial effect, as investors face uncertainty on when, which or even how 122% of GDP: public debt in advanced economies for 2020 long markets will reopen. There may

10、 also be tighter FDI restrictions, as some economies seek to prevent aggressive takeover deals.10 As an economically exogenous shock, COVID-19 could also accelerate the reshuffling of geo-economic influence since impact and recovery will differ substantially between economies. The euro area is antic

11、ipated to be the hardest hit, with China, India and Indonesia the only G20 countries expected to grow in 2020.11 Through April, China, Germany and Japan had begun returning to normal well before other countries reached peak infections (Figure 1.1). Such shifts may redistribute global influence and e

12、nhance greater regionalization. Geopolitical rent-seeking, attempts to concentrate trade and FDI, deteriorating trust and geo-economic rivalries may not only worsen the impact of the crisis and complicate global recovery; they could also exacerbate its already dire humanitarian consequences. For exa

13、mple, the pandemic has put an additional 130 million people at risk of starvation for a FIGURE 1.1 Timeline of peak confirmed daily cases of SARS-CoV-2 China 13 Feb Germany 27 Mar United Kingdom 10 Apr France 12 Apr Japan 17 Apr India 16 May United States 24 Apr 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 (thousands, as

14、 of 17 May 2020) FI GU R E 1 . 1 Timeline of peak confirmed daily cases of SARS-CoV-2 Source: Johns Hopkins University (JHU), “COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE)”, USA 17COVID-19 Risks Outlook: A Preliminary Mapping and its Implications total of 265 million y

15、et multiple countries have banned the export of key foods.12 Emerging economies in danger of submerging into a deeper crisis? COVID-19 has unfolded in a staggered manner around the world, as has the response from governments, leading to a dissimilar magnitude of economic fallout across each country.

16、 So far, emerging economies are expected to contract by 1.0%, as opposed to 6.1% for advanced economies, which were already at risk of stagnant growth. Although emerging economies had exhibited higher growth before the crisis, many were affected later than economies in the developed world, and the i

17、mpact could be amplified by vulnerabilities in welfare systems. Most emerging markets face a twin battle of weaker health systems and lower capacity to shore up their economies. At the time of writing, initial responses had remained below 4% of 18COVID-19 Risks Outlook: A Preliminary Mapping and Its

18、 Implications GDP in many emerging markets, compared to between 14% and 28% in advanced economies (Figure 1.2).13 COVID-19 thus risks creating second-order effects in emerging economies that could significantly worsen the fallout of the ongoing crisis for example, mass youth unemployment leading to

19、social unrest, or the inability to tend to vulnerable groups such that public health is weakened further. With peak infections yet to come in many countries and larger fiscal responses likely to be needed, currency and commodity price shocks are already pressuring limited fiscal capacities in develo

20、ping economies by reducing revenues and raising the cost of debt. At the time of writing, the WTI crude oil price had fallen by more than 60%,15 while the Brazilian real, Mexican peso, Russian rouble, South African rand and Turkish lira had on average depreciated over 28%.16 Depreciations, the depen

21、dency on imported goods and the scarcity of key products could also plunge emerging economies into an inflationary spiral, which would primarily affect vulnerable groups already struck by unemployment and the lack of social safety nets. Business environment an end to the mass global consumption and

22、production economic model? Business confidence is at its lowest since the financial crisis,17 as businesses consider the long-term impact of the current lockdown on consumption and production patterns. Global supply chains are currently critical to rapidly producing and distributing essential goods

23、worldwide, including personal protection 2.4% per year: consumption growth during the Great Recession equipment and a possible vaccine against COVID-19, and deeply tied to restoring consumption, production and employment as countries come out of lockdowns. As businesses look to overcome severe disru

24、ption from COVID-19 lockdowns through reshoring and establishing new parallel supply chains, these adjustments could solidify into longer-term standard arrangements. Some of this may enhance resilience and create new local opportunities. But it may also restrict vital cooperation and economic flows,

25、 particularly when nationalistic tendencies have intensified as countries look to safeguard their citizens and economies. For example, many countries have restricted exports of food and medical supplies during 2020.18 In the long term, governments fearing another outbreak and supply shortages could

26、seek to minimize reliance on imports through hard barriers to trade. Many countries are also seeing a strong push for limiting foreign participation in their economies,19 and a mass onshoring of companies20 or whole industries.21 Global markets are thus at risk of drastically shrinking, which could

27、put companies of all sizes out of business. Even in markets where access is not obstructed after shutdowns are lifted, businesses might face more adverse domestic environments than before the pandemic. Widespread bankruptcies and industry consolidation the second most worrisome risk for companies in

28、 the survey may introduce new systemic risks, endanger peoples livelihoods, batter small and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs) and disempower consumers. Prior to the current crisis, debt accumulation was also burdening the private sector. In 2019, corporate debt reached record levels in China and the

29、 United States and was listed by the IMF as a key vulnerability 19COVID-19 Risks Outlook: A Preliminary Mapping and Its Implications in the global financial system.22 Private debt is likely to increase significantly in the current context, adding to the risk of bankruptcies and unemployment. The cor

30、onavirus pandemic could also trigger permanent changes in consumer behaviour, which would pose new challenges to businesses. The current collapse in demand for oil is one example, but data from countries that have lifted lockdowns also indicates more widespread changes as consumers reassess their ch

31、oices: spending less, reducing social interaction and limiting the use of certain goods and services. Following the financial crisis, global consumption grew at the slowest pace for any 10-year period on record (Figure 1.3),23 a downward trend that is likely to continue now. Businesses may also face

32、 reputational costs and pushback from consumers depending on their behaviours in the current crisis, especially in relation to employment. Public sector from bigger government to bolder government? The current crisis has vastly expanded the role of government in attempting to ensure economic hiberna

33、tion while health systems battle the pandemic and in managing the societal fallout of the crisis. It has also become clear that governments that had previously invested in healthcare, digital infrastructure, safety nets and active labour market policies have fared better than those that did not have

34、 such systems in place. As they became lenders, insurers and payers of last resort, governments not only have a chance to work towards a more robust national resilience framework, but to leverage this moment to place incentives for more sustainable development together with their support.24 Source:

35、The World Bank, World Bank Open Data F IGURE 1. 3 Final consumption expenditure (annual % growth) 1971-19784.00 1979-19882.89 1989-19982.60 1999-20083.16 2009-2018 2.35 0.5%1.01.52.02.53.03.54.0 FIG U RE 1.3 Final global consumption expenditure (10-year average percent growth), 1971-2018 F IGURE 1.2

36、 Fiscal response in selected G20 economies (% of GDP) Germany Japan France USA Australia Thailand Brazil Indonesia Russia Malaysia Turkey India Mexico 5%1015202530 Source: IMF, “Policy Responses to COVID-19”, 17 May 2020 FIG U RE 1.2 Fiscal response in selected G20 economies (% of GDP)14 20COVID-19

37、Risks Outlook: A Preliminary Mapping and Its Implications On the one hand, it is possible for stimulus packages, public work projects, financial reforms and new regulations to seek to embed more inclusive and sustainable approaches across economies. This would enhance and accelerate the trend toward

38、s a “stakeholder capitalism” that builds into the economic recovery ways to address critical challenges such as climate change, societal cohesion, technology regulation and healthcare provision. On the other hand, it is possible that the present moment vastly expands the size and power of government

39、 without introducing positive directionality or by exacerbating inequalities and reducing economic dynamism. 21COVID-19 Risks Outlook: A Preliminary Mapping and Its Implications 22COVID-19 Risks Outlook: A Preliminary Mapping and Its Implications Sustainability setbacks Emerging risks from stalling

40、progress CHAPTER 2 As countries start to emerge from the immediate health crisis and work on rebooting their economies, potential divergent trends on the role of sustainability in those efforts create emerging risks of a slowing or multi-speed transition of economies and industries. On the one hand,

41、 calls for a green recovery by a range of leaders, sustainability-focused stimulus packages by large economies, and potential changes in production models and consumer behaviours may support the sustainability agenda. On the other hand, brown stimulus measures, cuts in sustainability investment, wea

42、ker commitments to climate and nature action, and COVID-19 Risks Outlook: A Preliminary Mapping and its Implications23 REUTERS/MICHAEL CARONNA 24COVID-19 Risks Outlook: A Preliminary Mapping and Its Implications the impact of low oil prices create new risks of stalling progress. This might tip the w

43、orld towards a vicious cycle of climate degradation, biodiversity loss and future infectious disease outbreaks possibly with severe effects on the broader 2030 sustainable development agenda. Public salience one priority among many? Governments, businesses and society have become increasingly aware

44、of the risks to the long-term well-being of the planet. This was indicated by the 2019 Global Risks Perception Survey, in which a multistakeholder community rated environmental risks as the top five global risks for the next decade. In the COVID-19 Risks Perception Survey, conducted in April and con

45、sidering an 18-month period, risk professionals appeared to be primarily concerned with the state of the economy a “sharp erosion of global decarbonization efforts” does not appear in the top fallout from the current crisis. In a positive interpretation, these results could indicate confidence that

46、governments and businesses will uphold commitments to reduce emissions. But the risk remains that countries might reduce support for the renewable energy sector, or not include Paris Agreement requirements in their recovery programmes to ease economic activity, protect strategic industries and jobs.

47、25 Another interpretation of those results is that decarbonization and related aspects such as climate change adaptation and resilience have become lower priority in the face of the immediate health and economic crises, despite the clear lessons to be learned from the pandemic on the importance of r

48、esilience planning. If the issue loses salience in the public agenda, some leaders could see an opportunity to refrain from making what might be unpopular decisions. Almost one of every five respondents to the survey points to “anger with political elites and distrust of government” as a likely outcome of the pandemic fallout, underlining that governments need to read public opinion carefully as they develop response strategies. However, a recent Ipsos MORI survey in 29 countries, including all G20 economies, shows that public support for prioritizing climate change and environ