1、Special Report Shaping a Multiconceptual World 2020 2Shaping a Multiconceptual World World Economic Forum 91-93 route de la Capite CH-1223 Cologny/Geneva Switzerland Tel.: +41 (0)22 869 1212 Fax: +41 (0)22 786 2744 E-mail: contactweforum.org www.weforum.org Copyright 2020 by the World Economic Forum

2、 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, or otherwise without the prior permission of the World Economic Forum. ISBN-13: 978-2-940631-02-5 The Report is availa

3、ble at www.weforum.org. 3Shaping a Multiconceptual World Brge Brende World Economic Forum John R. Allen Brookings Institution Yoichi Funabashi Asia Pacific Initiative L. Enrique Garca R. Council on Foreign Relations of Latin America and the Caribbean (RIAL) Jane Harman Woodrow Wilson International C

4、enter for Scholars Fyodor Lukyanov Council on Foreign and Defense Policy Robin Niblett Chatham House Samir Saran Observer Research Foundation Amos Yadlin Institute for National Security Studies Qi Zhenhong China Institute of International Studies Shaping a Multiconceptual World 2020 4Shaping a Multi

5、conceptual World The 50th anniversary of the World Economic Forum coincides with a period of profound global change. These events prompted the Forum to draw on its network of diverse experts heads of leading global think tanks and research institutions and present 10 chapters that explore the emergi

6、ng shape of geopolitics in the new era. 5Shaping a Multiconceptual World Contents 06 The Expansion of Geopolitics 12 Disrupting the International Order 32 Culture, Identity and the Evolution of Geopolitics 44 The Upcoming Technological Revolution on the Battlefield? Not So Fast Brge Brende John R. A

7、llen 20 Multilateralism in an Ungoverned World 26 Managing the Rising Influence of Nationalism Fyodor Lukyanov Robin Niblett 66 74 78 Economic and Trade Challenges for a World in Transition About the Authors Acknowledgements 60 The Future Balance: The Geopolitical Impacts of GDP, Population and Clim

8、ate Change Yoichi Funabashi Qi Zhenhong Amos Yadlin 38 Navigating the Digitization of Geopolitics Samir Saran L. Enrique Garca R. Chapter One Chapter Two Chapter Three Chapter Four Chapter Five Chapter Six Chapter Seven Chapter Nine 52 Building Climate Intelligence Jane Harman Chapter Eight Chapter

9、Ten 6Shaping a Multiconceptual World The Expansion of Geopolitics The expansion of geopolitics can be seen across a number of areas economic, environmental, technological where it is an open question whether powers will Brge Brende, President, World Economic Forum The world appears to be on the brin

10、k of a new era not since the end of the Cold War three decades ago has the global landscape been primed to be redrawn in such a significant way. New centres of power, new alliances and new rivalries are emerging, putting pressure on institutions governing global trade and security. As power is shift

11、ing and dispersing, domains for geopolitical competition or cooperation are also expanding. 7Shaping a Multiconceptual World collaborate to address fast-approaching challenges, adopt a posture of rivalry in a bid to gain advantage or take an approach that is some combination of the two. Understandin

12、g the trajectory of geopolitics is a prerequisite for navigating the new global environment. That is why the World Economic Forum asked heads of think tanks from around the world to explore the direction of global relations, focusing on how geopolitics today is expanding to include new actors as wel

13、l as new domains across which power dynamics are operating. The interdisciplinary and multiconceptual nature of this analysis is fit for purpose only by exploring the full dimension of global relations through a diversity of perspectives can we hope to gain practical insight into the geopolitics of

14、our new era. Domains for competition or cooperation That the world is in a period of significant transition is apparent. In approximately a decade, seven of the worlds 10 largest economies are expected to be from current emerging markets.1 Alongside the rise of new economic powers, increased militar

15、y spending by several of these countries is creating new regional and global dynamics.2 The shifting distribution of global power, according to John R. Allen, President of the Brookings Institution, is “creating a moment of genuine danger in international affairs” one that calls for a reassertion of

16、 Western-led multilateralism. But Fyodor Lukyanov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, feels the sun has set on the age of a stable post-Cold War order. Instead, he argues, there are likely to be more “ad hoc coalitions of countries” as the “efficiency” of 20th-ce

17、ntury global institutions declines. Indeed, the identity of the global community and the very idea of a community itself is being contested. Robin Niblett, Director of Chatham House, examines the rise of nationalism around the world, arguing that the trend stems from ingrained, even primal, tendenci

18、es among states to support national mythologies. Paradoxically, the only way to achieve a cooperative geopolitical framework, Niblett argues, is through governing structures at the state and local levels that accommodate strong national identities. Qi Zhenhong, President of the China Institute of In

19、ternational Studies, makes the case that global frictions particularly those between the West and non-West are largely the result of values-based alliances that have served to exaggerate differences between cultures. The path towards stronger multilateral cooperation, for Qi, is through respect for

20、diverse cultures, as well as through a collective global identity. When it comes to technology, digitalization across industries and societies is becoming a matter of course what has come to be known as the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Breakthroughs in technology are offering powers opportunities t

21、o coordinate in unlocking new possibilities, but these same The expansion of geopolitics can be seen across a number of areas economic, environmental, technological 8Shaping a Multiconceptual World advances can tempt powers to seek strategic advantage.3 Samir Saran, President of the Observer Researc

22、h Foundation, argues that because digital technology will be a frontline of geopolitical competition, the formation of a “D20” group, comprised of the leading technology companies and global powers, is necessary to mitigate conflict. But Amos Yadlin, Executive Director of the Institute for National

23、Security Studies, offers a dose of scepticism about the power of digital technologies to upend the balance of military power. In arguing that the strategic advantages of artificial intelligence in a military context may be short-lived, Yadlin counsels stakeholders not to place excessive faith in a s

24、ingle defense system, even if it appears promising. On the environment, the window for stemming the effects of climate change is closing and the world is entering a stage in which the repercussions of our actions or inactions is becoming apparent. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the most pronounc

25、ed effects of global warming the melting of ice caps in the Arctic, for instance will serve as a wake-up call for ambitious multilateral action or as an opportunity to exploit new resources for strategic advantage. Indeed, Jane Harman, Director, President and CEO of the Wilson Center, sees a climate

26、-changing world as one that offers areas for both geopolitical cooperation as well as competition. Focusing on reducing global emissions is vital, she states, but so too is viewing the effects of a changing climate through a prism of national security. “The winner of the green technology race will f

27、ind tremendous economic and geopolitical rewards at the finish line,” Harman says. Yoichi Funabashi, Chairman of the Asia Pacific Initiative, sees the effects of rising temperatures as a geopolitical X-factor of sorts. Because states will capture advantages that come with new shipping routes in the

28、Arctic or new market opportunities for sustainable infrastructures but will also face dangers from rising seas and stronger storms, Funabashi argues it is difficult to identify which states will be most impacted by climate change and in which way. The economic landscape is the area in which the road

29、 ahead, in terms of geopolitical rivalry or cooperation, is perhaps the most uncertain. Global growth in the near term is expected to soften and the International Monetary Fund has called for “synchronized policy action” to stem a slowdown.4 But some powers have used the tools of an integrated globa

30、l economy trade, foreign direct investment, protocols around cross-border data flows to coerce global rivals rather than advance shared prosperity. Within this context, L. Enrique Garca R., President of the Council on Foreign Relations of Latin America and the Caribbean, makes the case for developin

31、g economies, such as those in Latin America, to resist taking sides and instead to play the long game by focusing on the fundamentals of building stronger intra-regional ties and producing more globally competitive products. One only needs to look to the recent past to see the value of a cooperative

32、 geopolitical framework 9Shaping a Multiconceptual World Shaping the future As domains for global cooperation or rivalry expand, shaping the direction of geopolitics becomes ever more complicated. To be sure, stakeholders can cooperate across individual domains while competing across others. But ove

33、r time, cooperation will likely beget cooperation and rivalry will likely beget rivalry. The more powers compete and pursue strategic advantage at the expense of addressing shared technological, environmental and economic challenges, the more likely it will be that a broader sense of friction will d

34、evelop across the global system. A rivalrous global system will in turn make it more unlikely that shared priorities are fulfilled. One only needs to look to the recent past to see the value of a cooperative geopolitical framework. Whether it was strengthening security protocols in the aftermath of

35、the 11 September terrorist attacks or preventing a global depression in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, multilateral efforts were key to advancing safety and prosperity. As the world becomes even more interconnected in terms of flows of information, capital and people, states will be mor

36、e reliant on one another to realize positive outcomes for themselves and the global community. At a time when power dynamics are in flux, there is an opportunity for stakeholders to make the decision to shape geopolitics in a cooperative, rather than competitive, manner. 10Shaping a Multiconceptual

37、World References 1 Yen Nee Lee, “Here Are 4 Charts that Show Chinas Rise as a Global Economic Superpower”, CNBC, 23 September 2019, accessed 31 October 2019; Enda Curran, “These Could Be the Worlds Biggest Economies by 2030”, Bloomberg, 8 January 2019, https:/www. accessed 31 October 2019. 2 Kemal D

38、ervi, “Global Power is Shifting. Is it the End of Multilateralism?”, World Economic Forum, 24 July 2018, https:/www. weforum.org/agenda/2018/07/is-this-the-end-of-multilateralism/, accessed 31 October 2019. 3 Eric Rosenbach and Katherine Mansted, “The Geopolitics of Information”, Belfer Center for S

39、cience and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 28 May 2019, https:/www.belfercenter.org/publication/geopolitics-information, accessed 31 October 2019. 4 Kristalina Georgieva, “Decelerating Growth Calls for Accelerating Action”, International Monetary Fund Annual Meetings 2019 “Curtain Rai

40、ser” Speech, 8 October 2019, https:/www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/10/03/sp100819-AMs2019-Curtain- Raiser, accessed 31 October 2019. 11Shaping a Multiconceptual World 12Shaping a Multiconceptual World Disrupting the International Order Throughout modern history, established regional or internatio

41、nal orders have been overturned when a shift in technology has enabled or amplified a change in the balance of military or economic power. That was true when new technologies and techniques of sail vaulted Portugal past the larger European powers to become the first Western nation to establish a maj

42、or presence in the Indian Ocean; when steam and the invention of the loom and new financial techniques powered the English industrial revolution; and when new approaches to mass production catapulted the United States to the top of the world economy and then to the forefront of the defence of the fr

43、ee world in World War II and during the Cold War. 13Shaping a Multiconceptual World John R. Allen President, Brookings Institution, USA Unsplash/Michael Afonso 14Shaping a Multiconceptual World The American-led arrangements that emerged have been the backbone of international order ever since, and t

44、he systems of alliances and multilateral institutions that have supported this order have been the bulwark of international stability. But as we near the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II and mark the 30th anniversary of the end of the Cold War, a combination of economic and technological

45、shifts is once again driving geopolitical change. Some of these changes arise from hugely positive developments: integrating into the global economy and undergirded by liberal institutions like the World Trade Organization, emerging markets have pulled more than a billion people out of poverty and f

46、orged a global middle class. During the same period, institutions like the United Nations, driven by the West but encompassing genuinely global collaboration, made sustained progress on reducing the ills of civil war, infectious disease and humanitarian crises. But for all the positives, there is no

47、 escaping the reality that the cumulative effect of changes fuelled by economic and technological developments over the past three decades are creating a moment of genuine danger in international affairs. Technological change and the rebalancing of power The technological advances and an economic re

48、balancing under way are causing the world to enter a new phase one where the non-Western powers, as well as some non-state actors, see low-cost and relatively low-risk opportunities to weaken the United States and the Western alliance. One area where this danger is pronounced is in East Asia. As Chi

49、nas growth has vaulted it into the top ranks of global economic power, it has progressively shed its strategy of “hide and bide” and begun to exert itself in political and strategic affairs, in its region and beyond. The economic and export prowess of China is intrinsically challenging the dominance of the Western model in international affairs. Again, some of this is productive: Chinas surge into Africa in the