1、GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017 MEASURING AND ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF GVCs ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Public Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure AuthorizedPublic Disclosure Authorized 2017 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 181

2、8 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 2024731000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the World Bank Group, the Institute of Developing Economies, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Research Center of Global Value Chains within the University of I

3、nternational Business and Economics, and the World Trade Organization and is based on joint research efforts to better understand the ongoing development and evolution of global value chains and their implications for economic development. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in

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7、ld Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 2025222625; e-mail: pubrightsworldbank.org. ISBN 978-92-870-4125-8 This publication uses U.S. spelling. All mentions of dollars refer to U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated. The term “billion” refers t

8、o a thou- sand million. The Research Center of Global Value Chains acknowledges the financial support from the Bill compensation was flat for low-skilled workers and increased only slightly for medium-skilled workers. These shifts are consistent with the overall transformation of the information and

9、 communication technology industry in the United States over the period, which went from producing goods to primarily designing and providing support services. Now consider the analogous analysis for Chinas information and communication technology industry (see figure 5). The first thing to notice i

10、s that labor productivity growth was phenomenal, increasing some six times over 15 years (right scale, left panel). During the period, labors share dropped from more than 40% to about 30%, while capitals share rose from less than 60% to nearly FIGURE 3 The estimated smile curve for Chinas exports of

11、 electrical and optical equipment deepened between 1995 and 2009 Compensation per hour ($) Source: Meng, Ye, and Wei 2017. Note: See annex 2.2 in chapter 2 for a key to country abbreviations and sector codes. Executive summary 5 70% (left scale). Clearly, capital was able to reap much of the ben- ef

12、it of the productivity gain. It should be emphasized that the gain accrued to the capital deployed in China, and that included multinational corporations engaged in GVCs. Other research has shown that most of the value added in Chinas exports has come from the domestic private sector, and multinatio

13、nal corporations produce a substantial amount as well. Thus, much of the benefit from the expansion of Chinese GVCs has gone to private owners of capital. But there have also been significant wage increases for all workers albeit starting from a very low base (right panel). The big proportional gain

14、 went to skilled labor, whose compensation nearly doubled (right panel). Compensation for medium-skilled workers (with high school degrees) went up about 80%. Even low- skilled workers saw their pay rise more than 50%. The distribu- tion of hours worked by different skill classes in China is basical

15、ly a mirror image of that for the United States. The overwhelming share of labor input in Chinas information and communication technology industry over the period was low- and medium- skilled, though their shares did decline somewhat, from more than 95% of hours to 90% (middle panel of figure 5). Hi

16、gh-skilled input was very small, about 5% of hours by the end of the period. These distributional findings shed some light on the grow- ing protectionist sentiment in some advanced economies and on the fact that globalization remains popular in developing FIGURE 4 Efficiency and factor income distri

17、bution in the information and communication industry in the United States, 19952009 0 20 40 60 80 2009200520001995 Medium-skilled labor High-skilled labor Low-skilled labor 0 25 50 75 100 2009200520001995 0 25 50 75 100 2009200520001995 Medium-skilled labor Low-skilled labor High-skilled labor Capit

18、al compensation Labor compensation Labor productivity 100 150 200 250 300 Percent of GDPPercent of total hours workedCompensation ($ per hour) 2009 $ (thousands) Source: Meng, Ye, and Wei 2017. FIGURE 5 Efficiency and factor income distribution in the information and communication industry in China,

19、 19952009 0 25 50 75 100 2009200520001995 0 25 50 75 100 2009200520001995 0 5 10 15 20 2009200520001995 Medium-skilled labor High-skilled labor Low-skilled labor High-skilled labor Low-skilled labor Capital compensation Labor compensation Labor productivity 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 Medium-skill

20、ed labor Percent of GDPPercent of total hours workedCompensation (renminbi per hour) 2009 renminbi (thousands) Source: Meng, Ye, and Wei 2017. 6 Measuring and Analyzing the Impact of GVCs on Economic Development countries that are deeply involved in GVCs, such as China, Mexico, and Viet Nam. These f

21、indings do not permit drawing strong causal conclusions, but the analysis is consistent with a story in which the benefits from GVC-related trade have been distributed highly unevenly. For the United States the big win- ners appear to be high-skilled workers and multinational cor- porations. GVCs ha

22、ve enabled them to benefit from enormous productivity gains in developing countries such as China. Ordi- nary workers in the United States have not seen much (if any) benefit. In China ordinary workers have benefited. Even at the beginning of the period factory wages in China were far ahead of rural

23、 incomes. And those wages doubled over 15 years. The wage gains are a driving factor behind the impressive decline of absolute poverty in China. Relatively speaking, however, the big benefits in China accrued to the small number of high-skilled workers and to the owners of capital, including foreign

24、 investors. Developing country participation in global value chains Witnessing this rise of GVCs, stakeholders in developing coun- tries typically want to see their country more involved in value chains and moving to higher value-added activities within the chains over time. GVC research can help id

25、entify factors asso- ciated with integration into GVCs, such as the related issues of developing country involvement in GVCs, trade costs, and the middle-income trap (chapters 3, 4, and 5). For the involvement of developing countries in GVCs, geog- raphy clearly matters. The world seems to have thre

26、e intercon- nected production hubs for the extensive trade in parts and components (figure 6): one centered on the United States, one on Asia (China, Japan, Republic of Korea), and one on Europe (especially Germany). Figure 6 shows the important bilateral flows of parts and components, with the coun

27、tries that are most deeply involved highlighted in red. China aside, developing countries are generally on the periphery and tend to trade with the hub that is geographically closest. Many developing regions are barely involved at all. Most African countries are far from existing hubs. And within de

28、veloping countries, it is large firms that tend to be involved in global production networks. In Latin America, for instance, small firms rarely trade outside the region. Unit labor costs and trade costs How to explain the differential participation of developing coun- tries in GVCs? Low wages are o

29、ften thought to be an important factor. But low wages exist across developing countries, yet only a few locations are involved in GVCs. Low unit labor costs (the ratio of average wages to per capita GDP) turn out to be much more important than low wages. Figure 7, which plots unit labor costs agains

30、t wages in 2000 and 2010 for a large number of developing countries, show no positive relationship between them because labor productivity varies so much across countries. Countries with high labor productivity will have higher wages and still be low-cost producers. The countries more deeply involve

31、d in GVCs (identified in orange in figure 7) all stand out as having low unit labor costs, but not necessarily low wages. In contrast, in each time period there is a circle of countries that have very low wages but high unit labor costs. These are mostly African econo- mies. Other costs in the produ

32、ction process offset any potential advantage from low wages. One of the most important impediments for developing countries is trade costs, examined in chapter 4. Today, nontariff trade costs (freight, insurance, and other cross-border-related fees) tend to be much larger than any remaining import t

33、ariffs as products travel through production stages. Those trade costs, which vary by country and sector, have a monetary dimension (for example, transportation, insurance, and other fees) but also a more intangible dimension that encompasses information costs, nonmonetary barriers (regulation, lice

34、nsing, and so on), insecure contracts, and weak trade governance leading to uncertainty. These impediments to trade can be expressed as ad valorem tariff equivalents and are generally much higher than tariffs. In sectors with complex value chains, such as motor vehicles, com- puters, and machinery,

35、trade costs are more than four times higher than tariffs. In traditional traded goods, such as agricul- tural products, minerals, and wood, these trade costs tend to be less of an impediment. So while weak transportation links, inefficient customs clear- ance, bureaucracy, and red tape all tend to i

36、mpede trade, their effects are most pernicious in sectors requiring that parts move back and forth across borders. The costs of impediments cas- cade. Countries with very high trade costs will not be able to participate in GVCs, and any exports are likely to be traditional goods, often primary produ

37、cts. Developing countries try to address this problem by establishing special export process- ing zones, which have superior logistics and expedited customs clearance (as well as through duty drawbacks on any remaining import tariffs). The problem with this second-best approach is that it limits par

38、ticipation in GVCs to the small number of firms in the export processing zones, while other domestic firms, espe- cially small ones that might become parts suppliers, are left to stumble in a world with high transaction costs. A better approach is to improve trade facilitation for all firms in the e

39、conomy. China provides some interesting lessons. China is known for having started its economic reform with four special economic zones that fit the model of export processing zones, with favored infrastructure and customs clearance. What is less known is that within a short time China had expanded

40、these benefits to more than 30 cities nationwide. Competition among the cities has enabled quite a few of them to emerge as locations with low trade costs and deep participation in GVCs. Research into the value added of trade has shown that the majority of the domes- tic value added in Chinas export

41、s comes from private domes- tic firms. Foreign firms are often the processing exporters from China, but the successful expansion of value chains to domes- tic firms within China has resulted in most of the value added coming from the domestic private sector. Executive summary 7 Further evidence on t

42、he importance of reducing transactions costs comes from the World Banks Logistics Performance Index, which captures how well infrastructure and bureaucracy work together to move goods through the production process and on to consumers. A clear relationship emerges between better logistics performanc

43、e and deeper involvement in GVCs when the Logistics Performance Index is plotted against a centrality indicator of each countrys role in GVCs (an indicator that ranks FIGURE 6 Trade in components shows three interrelated production hubs Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Canada Switzerland C

44、hile China Czech Republic Germany Spain France United Kingdom Hong Kong, China Hungary Indonesia India Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea, Rep. Mexico Malaysia Netherlands Poland Portugal Russian Federation Singapore Sweden Thailand Turkey Chinese Taipei United States Viet Nam South Africa Source: Dia

45、kantoni and others 2017, based on the UN Comtrade database (https:/comtrade.un.org). Note: Includes the 61 economies in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentWorld Trade Organization Trade in Value-Added database and their most important bilateral gross trade flows. 8 Measuring a

46、nd Analyzing the Impact of GVCs on Economic Development a country or industrys centrality to GVCs taking into account direct and indirect trade flows to and from trading partners in the global production network; figure 8). The link is not that tight (R2 = 0.29), however, indicating that other facto

47、rs are at work as well. But it is interesting that there are no countries in the lower- right quadrant: no countries with poor logistics performance are central to GVCs. For countries that want to get more involved in GVCs, trade facilitation and infrastructure are obvious places to start. Global va

48、lue chains and the middle-income trap One of the most hotly debated issues in development is the “middle-income trap” (chapter 5). This is the idea that it is rel- atively easy to grow from low income to middle income, by imi- tating successful countries and expanding factors of production (labor fo

49、rce growth and investment). But it is harder to move from middle income to high income, which in general is based more on innovation and creativity than on extensive growth. FIGURE 7 Developing countries deeply involved in global value chains have low unit labor costs but not low wages, 2000 and 2010 Unit labor costs (ratio of average wages to GDP per capita) Average wages ($) 02,0004,0006,0008,00010,00012,00014,000 0 2 4 6 8 02,0004,0006,0008,00010,00012,00014,000 0 2 4 6 8 2000 2010 Morocco China Egypt Czech Republic Poland Mexico South Africa Brazil Tunisia Colombia Latv