1、In collaboration with: WEMOWEMO World Energy Markets Observatory 2A Strategic Overview of the Global Energy Markets2A Strategic Overview of the Global Energy Markets 2018 Capgemini. Reproduction in part or in whole is strictly prohibited. Contents WEMO 2018 Global Editorial 6 North America 19 WEMO 2

2、018 North America Editorial 20 1-Climate Challenges however, its full potential is hindered by lack of clarity around regulations and business models .104 Topic Box 3.1: Capacity mechanisms .115 Topic Box 4.1: Beyond energy retail prices .130 Topic Box 4.2: Will regulated energy tariffs disappear? .

3、133 Topic Box 6.1: In a more challenging environment, Utilities are implementing new investment strategies towards services and low carbon energy .151 Southeast Asia Topic Box 1.1: Government and private sector initiatives to reduce emissions challenges .165 Topic Box 3.1: Singapore is being develop

4、ed as a gas hub .179 Topic Box 3.2: Issues and Challenges for Regional Power Cooperation .180 Topic Box 4.1: Case studies Singapore, Philippines this represents an increase of nearly 100% since January 2016. Four factors in particular came into play: Supply and demand: the booming world economy has

5、led to a demand increase of more than 5Mb/d1 since 2015 with global oil consumption expected to top 100Mb/d by the end of 2018. World oil demand rose by 1.6% (or 1.5 Mb/d) in 2017, a rate that was higher than the annual average of 1% seen over the last decade. Inventories of crude that had built up

6、during the 2014-2016 glut have decreased because of this strong demand and the supply cuts by OPEC/Russia. OPEC and Russia: in late 2016 an agreement was reached to limit their supplies in order to push up the oil price. This deal has removed at least 1.8 Mb/d since the start of 2017. Despite Americ

7、an pressure to enhance production in order to lower prices, OPEC and Russia agreed in June 2018 to increase production slightly less ? output. In practice the increase will be less (around 700,000 b/d) because many OPEC members arent in a position to raise their output. The oil price increased moder

8、ately after these decisions were announced. Geopolitical risks: when supplies are tight, as presently, these risks ? The U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal announced in May 2018 and the probable sanctions on Irans oil exports are the most tangible risk. Iran is the third largest worldwide oi

9、l producer and since the nuclear deal was struck and the oil-related sanctions lifted, Irans exports had increased. Venezuelas oil output has fallen by at least 500,000 b/d because of the economic and political crisis in the country and there is little sign that the state oil company PDVSA will be a

10、ble to reverse the trend. ? Arabia and Houthi rebels in Yemen: the Houthis, who have Irans support, have stepped up their attacks on Saudi Arabias oil infrastructure and even Riyadh. There is a chance either of supply ? between Saudi and Iran. Finally, Libya, where oil output has recovered to 1Mb/d,

11、 remains highly unstable even seven years after the civil war started. In conclusion the risk of a supply ? Swelling supplies from the US: ? ? but shale oil has faced pipeline constraints and infrastructure bottlenecks limiting how quickly production can reach the market. For the future, many observ

12、ers forecast robust oil prices although they dont see a return to pre- downturn levels. In 2008, the oil barrel price peak at US$150 coincided with the beginning of the economic recession. What was the chicken and what was the egg? Could todays price level trigger a new recession? 1 Mb/d: million ba

13、rrels per day 7 ? been under construction along the Gulf of Mexico. The earliest Cheniere Energys Sabine Pass in Louisiana started exports in February ? ? in March 2018. There has been no approval for new U.S. LNG plants since 2015 because of expectations of excess supply. These expectations have di

14、minished because of soaring LNG demand. In May 2018, Cheniere announced it was expanding its Corpus Christi plant in Texas. Other U.S. projects are making good progress, signaling a second wave of investment in U.S. LNG plant export capacity. The biggest threat to these plans is the trade dispute be

15、tween the U.S. and China. Even if LNG was excluded from Chinas list of U.S. exports ? (almost all U.S. fossil fuels are on this list including oil and coal) the prospect of being shut out of the worlds biggest growth market will hang over Final Investment Decisions until hostilities are brought to a

16、n end. C oal demand and prices are up Despite being the major commodity least loved by analysts, global coal demand rose about 1% in 2017, reversing the trend seen over the last two years. This growth was mainly due to demand in Asia, almost entirely driven by an increase in coal- ? ? June 2018 the

17、price of thermal coal (burnt in power plants to produce electricity) rose to US$112 a ton, G as is still a regional commodity Global natural gas demand grew by 3%, thanks in large part to abundant and relatively low-cost supplies. China alone accounted for almost 30% of growth globally. Gas prices r

18、ose in Europe, Asia and North America in 2017, but remained below the 10-year average. Over the past year, European and Asian prices have been supported by increasing oil, coal and carbon prices.2 ? Gas (LNG), natural gas markets ? discrepancies in spot prices between ? At the end of 2017, when the

19、U.S. Henry Hub spot price was around US$3/MBTU3, the UK NBP price reached US$6/MBTU and the Japan price was nearly triple that at US$7-8/MBTU. The LNG global market represents 10% of gas supplies worldwide. It has ? in 2017 it reached 294 Mtpa4 and in 2020 it is likely to represent 360 Mtpa or 150%

20、of its 2015 capacity. Following its “blue sky policy” to curb Green House Gases (GHG) emissions and limit coal usage, China increased imports by 46% in 2017 overtaking South Korea to become the worlds second largest LNG buyer after Japan. It was the third largest destination for U.S. LNG exports aft

21、er Mexico and South Korea5. Thanks to the abundance of low cost gas unlocked by the shale revolution, the U.S. is a competitive supplier compared in particular to Russia, Qatar and Australia. 130% higher than its 2016 low because of strong Asian demand. Although thermal coal is being phased out of m

22、any European countries (except Germany and Poland) it accounts for 40% of energy consumption in emerging markets, especially Asia. Demand from India, Japan and South Korea was robust in H1 2018 while an early summer heatwave boosted imports to China despite the Beijing ?6. E conomic growth is increa

23、sing the threat of climate change Economic growth is triggering growth in global energy demand, which increased by 2.1% in 2017, (compared with 0.9% the previous year7): 72% of the rise was met by fossil fuels, a quarter by renewables, and the remainder by nuclear. Global energy-related CO2 emission

24、s grew by 1.4% in 2017, reaching a historic high of 32.5 gigatonnes (Gt), a resumption of growth after three years of global emissions remaining unchanged. The increase in CO2 emissions, however, was not universal. While most major economies saw a rise, some others experienced declines, including th

25、e United States, the United Kingdom, Mexico and Japan. The Paris 2015 Climate Accord objective to keep the global temperature rise below 2 degrees in 2050 is becoming even more ? Already the 2015 countries pledges projections led to warming of ? catastrophic consequences for life 2 3 MBTU: Million B

26、ritish Thermal Unit 4 Mtpa: Million tons per annum 5 Ed Crooks, “US trade spat threatens new wave of LNG plants”, Financial Times, June 27, 2018 6 7 IEA global Energy hydropower (dams), biomass and, to a certain extent, concentrated solar have storage. They dont have the same generation output chara

27、cteristics or the same grid impact. The intermittent renewables capacity factor8 varies according to location and, notably, wind and solar intensity. In the U.S., on average, the 2017 wind capacity factor was 37% and the PV9 solar 27% while the nuclear plant capacity factor was 92%10. ? into account

28、 when comparing installed capacity of intermittent renewables with schedulable ? plants). In contrast to previous years, 2017 investment in electric renewables generation decreased by 7%11? while investment in the oil and gas value chain increased. Solar and ? while onshore wind and hydropower inves

29、tment decreased; probably because of the lack of suitable sites on Earth, and the 2017 results were not in the right direction. It is now unclear how governments will be able to announce increased ambitions in line with the goal of holding global warming at 1.5 degrees in 2050. Following his elector

30、al campaign commitment, President Trump announced in June 2017 that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Accord. Even if other countries dont follow the U.S. ? to combat global warming, since ? in 2019. Domestically, the U.S. administration has cancelled the Clean Power Act (which was nev

31、er actually implemented) and there has been a relaxation of car consumption constraints. Also, the Environment Protection Agency (EPA) budget was ? However, ignoring President Trumps proposed cuts to renewable energy and early-stage energy programs, Congress decided to increase energy- related R how

32、ever, they ? Solid state batteries that are ? much higher energy density26 than lithium-ion batteries, have emerged as potential game changers for future battery chemistries. Leading car manufacturers are already adopting them for some of their models. Other new technologies such as Zn-Air, metal-Ai

33、r, sodium-ion, new Red-ox systems, and nano- ? industrial development stages. Battery costs have decreased quickly with an acceleration since 2016. These costs were divided by 5 in 10 years, decreasing nearly as quickly as PV cells. They should continue to decrease from around US$200/kWh in 2017 to

34、below US$100/kWh in 2025-2035. Future battery challenges are related to recycling, safety (even in extreme conditions), energy density increase and weight decrease (for mobility), increased number of possible cycles, quick charging (especially for e-vehicles), low CO2 emissions during battery manufa

35、cturing, and further cost decreases (to US$80/kWh). Batteries end of life: three areas are being investigated: repurposing used electric vehicle batteries in grid-scale storage applications; remanufacturing individual modules or packs for reuse in new vehicles; and recycling materials in used cells

36、and packs into new battery grade materials 27. Hydrogen produced by electrolysis is a mobility and storage long-term ? Hydrogen-fueled vehicles represent high investment but while the cost of fuel is higher than for Electric Vehicles (EVs) it is comparable to gas-fueled cars. Currently, power-to-gas

37、28 is not competitive as it produces gas at a cost of 50-100/MBTU, much higher than natural gas market prices (6/MBTU in Europe and much less in the U.S.) and even higher than subsidized biogas (30/MBTU in France). 24 As a consequence of the increased renewables share on the grids, the difference be

38、tween peak and off-peak electricity prices has decreased 25 By mid 2018, Pacific Gas and in June 2018, BP announced the acquisition of Chargemaster, the UKs largest network of charging stations (6,500). Interaction between EVs and electricity operators is a major issue. On the one hand, their develo

39、pment will push electricity consumption up which is good news for Utilities, and idle EV batteries could improve electricity grid stability especially when the share of intermittent renewables is increasing. On the other hand, if EV charging is not mastered, ? charging at certain times of day, their

40、 development would pose a big challenge for the DSOs37, ? reinforce their grid for peak hours consumption38 which is very costly. N uclear is a carbon- free schedulable generation technology ? ? and 1,600 MW are the present ? ? French-designed EPR39 became operational in China in 2018; a very import

41、ant milestone for this new third generation reactor. Years later than scheduled and with huge budget overruns, the Finnish EPR at Olkiluoto and the French one at Flamanville are due to come in service in 2019-2020. A further project involving two EPRs at Hinkley Point C (South-West England) is due f

42、or completion at the end of 2025. The Taishan reactor coming online answers many technical concerns, notably regarding safety. These technical assessments should be reinforced after the completion of Flamanville and Olkiluoto. ? a turning point for the French nuclear industry, which streamlined its

43、organization at the end of 2017 following EDFs acquisition of Framatome (ex Areva NP), making EDF the clear leader in Frances nuclear industry. The commissioning of Taishan is reassuring for the Hinkley Point C decision and could push India to ? for the Jaitapur site40. However, the commercial battl

44、e for French technology is not won. Several years later than planned and with a large cost overrun, ? Sanmen plant, developed by Westinghouse, also began loading fuel during spring 2018. However, Westinghouse has been in chapter 11 bankruptcy protection since 2017 and plunged its owner ? Westinghouse is in the process ? Canadian asset manager, after a ? in January 2018. China is chasing an aggressive target to increase its nuclear capacity to 58 GW by 2020 from 35.8 GW at the end of 2017 or 4% of this big nations power generation. China has become ? design an