1、The Future of the Digital Order Jeff Cirillo, Lisa Curtis, Joshua Fitt, Kara Frederick, Coby Goldberg, Ilan Goldenberg, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Megan Lamberth, Martijn Rasser, and Dania Torres NOVEMBER 2021About the AuthorsJeff Cirillo | Former Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Intern in the Transatlantic Security

2、Program.Lisa Curtis | Senior Fellow and Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program.Joshua Fitt | Associate Fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Program.Kara Frederick | Research Fellow in the Center for Technology Policy at the Heritage Foundation. Former Fellow in the Technology and National Secu

3、rity Program at CNAS.Coby Goldberg | Former Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Intern in the Indo-Pacific Security Program.Ilan Goldenberg | Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Security Program.Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor | Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program.Megan Lamberth | As

4、sociate Fellow in the Technology and National Security Program.Martijn Rasser | Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program.Dania Torres | Former Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Intern in the Middle East Security Program and Communications Consulatant. AcknowledgmentsWe want to tha

5、nk members of CNAS Digital Freedom Forum, including Alexandra Givens, Aynne Kokas, Alina Polyakova, and Kori Schake, whose insights helped shape the scope and analysis of this report. The Digital Freedom Forum is a bipartisan effort that brings together a diverse set of stakeholders to determine how

6、 the United States should respond to the illiberal use of technology abroad, while advancing the values of freedom and openness in the digital domain. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone and do not represent those of the forum or its members. The authors also thank CNAS

7、 Adjunct Senior Fellows Margarita Konaev and Samuel Bendett for their valuable input and feedback on parts of the report draft. We thank our CNAS colleagues Maura McCarthy, Paul Scharre, Melody Cook, Rin Rothback, Emma Swislow, and Anna Pederson for their roles in the review, production, and design

8、of this report. We also wish to acknowledge and thank Kristine Lee for her invaluable contributions to the report. Finally, we are grateful to Xiaojing (JJ) Zeng and Henry Wu for their valuable research support and assistance in reviewing and finalizing this work. Any errors that remain are the resp

9、onsibility of the authors alone. This report was made possible with the generous support of the Quadrivium Foundation and general support to CNAS.As a research and policy institution committed to the highest standards of organizational, intellectual, and personal integrity, CNAS maintains strict int

10、ellectual independence and sole editorial direction and control over its ideas, projects, publications, events, and other research activities. CNAS does not take institutional positions on policy issues and the content of CNAS publications reflects the views of their authors alone. In keeping with i

11、ts mission and values, CNAS does not engage in lobbying activity and complies fully with all applicable federal, state, and local laws. CNAS will not engage in any representational activities or advocacy on behalf of any entities or interests and, to the extent that the Center accepts funding from n

12、on-U.S. sources, its activities will be limited to bona fide scholastic, academic, and research-related activities, consistent with applicable federal law. The Center publicly acknowledges on its website annually all donors who contribute.Cover Art: Melody Cook/CNASCNASDC1About the CNAS Countering H

13、igh-Tech Illiberalism Project Democracies and open societies are under assault by a new breed of high-tech illiberalism. The same digital technologies that connect people and enable a free exchange of ideas are being used to polarize and pervert the politics of democratic societies. As a result, dig

14、ital technologies once touted as a democratic panacea are being subverted by authoritarians to deepen their grip internally, undermine basic human rights, spread illiberal practices beyond their borders, and erode public trust in open societies. In some instances, authoritarian regimes may even be a

15、ble to harness advanced technologies to outperform democracies in certain key areas, weakening the case for political freedom in the emergent ideological competition of the 21st century.This project, supported by a grant from the Quadrivium Foundation, aims to build a broad coalition of stakeholders

16、 in the United States and in allied and partner nationsincluding engineers, academics, technologists, current and former policymakers, and practitionersto develop the policy and technology innovations necessary to secure a freer and more open future.TABLE OF CONTENTS01 Executive Summary02 Summary of

17、 Recommendations04 Introduction: Pillars of the Digital Order05 China11 Russia19 The Middle East24 Implications of Regional Trends for the Digital Order28 Recommendations32 Conclusion33 Appendix: Countering High-Tech Illiberalism: Events, Products, and Media EngagementCNASDC1NExecutive Summary ation

18、s that successfully harness the vast economic, political, and societal power of emerging information and communications tech-nologies will shape the future of the global digital order. This future is not set in stone. A digital order defined by liberal democratic values requires U.S. leadership and

19、the cooperation of trusted like-minded partners. In the absence of democratic leadership, autocratic rivals of the United States can fill that voidexploiting the control of information, surveillance technologies, and standards for technology governance to promote a digital eco-system that entrenches

20、 and expands their authoritarian practices. In exploring how a closed, illiberal order is taking root in strategic regions around the world, this report offers recommendations for how to craft, promote, and preserve a more open and democratic alternative. An assessment of crosscutting trends between

21、 China, Russia, and the Middle East across three pillarsinformation control, surveillance, and technology governanceleads us to the following conclusions: China is the prime mover in shaping the evolving digital order in its favor. Beijings use of technologies such as facial recognition software and

22、 telecommuni-cations networks allows the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to expand control over its citizens. The CCPs ability to promote and export this model of digital repression, in turn, gives like-minded, nondemocratic governments a roadmap for how to deploy digital tech-nologies for control and

23、 abuse in their own countries. Russias model of digital authoritarianism, while technologically less sophisticated than Chinas, could prove to be more readily adaptable and enduring for current and aspiring autocrats. Regional powers such as Belarus, Azerbaijan, and some Central Asian states have al

24、ready incorporated elements of this model. In the Middle East, authoritarian leaders use digital tools to control internal populations by sabotaging and spying on citizens, and this contributes to the con-struction of an illiberal digital order that is beneficial to Americas peer competitorsChina an

25、d Russia.These conclusions reveal four key trends with implications for the future of the digital order: Growing China-Russia alignment will generate dangerous digital synergies, such as (1) making digital autocracy accessible for a broader swath of states; (2) accelerating Chinas and Russias digita

26、l innovation; (3) eroding liberal norms in interna-tional institutions; and (4) raising the prospects of a “splinternet,” a fragmenting of the internet along nationalistic, political, technological, religious, or ethnic lines. Countries around the world, particularly autocratic regimes and those fli

27、rting with illiberalism, will seek to regulate online communications platforms through (1) social media; (2) data localization laws; and (3) instigating company self-censorship, which restricts free speech and increases online control. Illiberal regimes will seek out Chinese technology to help them

28、control social movements and civil protests. U.S. nondemocratic partners, adversaries, and even some democratic partners justify their pursuit of Chinese technology by underscoring ways the adopted technologies will contribute to economic growth, social stability, and efforts to fight crime and terr

29、orism. The practices of illiberal regimes will reduce the efficacy of U.S. mitigation practices. Russia and Chinas efforts to promote an illiberal digital order complement one another and could accelerate inno-vation between the two nations. The United States must craft a policy response that consid

30、ers these emerging patterns and incorporates more than its usual partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Shoring up the existing coalition of democratic actors to counter these illiberal trends will likely not be sufficient. This report offers recommendations that the United States can implement on

31、 three fronts: at home, while engaging with traditional U.S. democratic as well as nondemocratic partners, and when coun-tering U.S. adversaries such as China, Russia, and Iran. The United States must take a leadership role, recog-nizing that the future digital order is at stake. CENTER FOR A NEW AM

32、ERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 2ESummary of Recommendationsffective policy responses must engage a range of actors to address intersecting regional trends and the implications of authoritarian attempts to reshape the digital order. This report offers rec-ommendations

33、to guide U.S. efforts to advance a more liberal democratic order by addressing data protection and data privacy at home, by working with the governments of other countriesboth democratic and nondemocratic partnersand by challenging competitors. To implement these recom-mendations, coordination betwe

34、en legislative bodies, federal agencies, and White House officials will be instrumental.At HomeThe United States needs to put its own digital house in order to effectively shape and promote a liberal digital order around the world. A shortfall in regulatory over-sight and a lack of national policies

35、 on digital matters is inhibiting Americas ability to lead. The United States should enact a national data pro-tection and privacy law. Congress should: Establish a data protection framework that clearly articulates the U.S. approach to data privacy at home. Relevant U.S. government entities should

36、hold regular formal consultations with U.S. tech compa-nies on the risks of doing business in countries with nondemocratic governments. The National Security Council, in conjunction with the Departments of State and Commerce, should: Initiate an ongoing dialogue between government officials and tech

37、 company executives on matters of digital freedom.The U.S. government needs to prioritize research and development of privacy-preserving technology solutions. To this end, Congress and the White House would be well served to: Create incentives for novel research in technologies that preserve privacy

38、 of data, while also maintaining the use of techniques to extract value from datasets.With Democratic PartnersThe United States must work with like-minded demo-cratic partners to ensure a digital order that preserves and promotes open societies, and to combat the illib-eral use of emerging digital t

39、echnologies. The U.S. government needs to recruit and convene democratic alliesboth bilaterally and multi-laterallyto craft and execute a comprehensive framework to shape the future digital order. The White House should: Formalize the tech alliance concept of a global gov-erning body of techno-democ

40、racies to coordinate policy with a broader pool of allies. Pursue bilateral and minilateral working groups with techno-democracies to coordinate policies and strate-gies pertaining to technology. Expand cooperation on digital initiatives in the Indo-Pacific with like-minded democratic partners, star

41、ting with the Quad countries. Work through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council to develop a shared vision and approach to managing the human rights implications of technology. The U.S. government must work in tandem with industry leadership in international standard-set-ting bodies to promote b

42、etter alignment and coordination with like-minded countries within these bodies. To effect this, the White House and Congress ought to: Engage key partners to counter Chinas influence within international bodies that set standards for fun-damental technologies. Provide financial support or incentive

43、s for U.S. firms to increase their representation on international bodies that depend on industry stakeholders.The U.S. government should counsel key partners on best practices for investment screening and export controls. The White House and the Departments of State, Commerce, and Treasury should:

44、Design and strengthen systems for screening technolo-gies that are susceptible to abuse by authoritarians. Establish interagency processes to coordinate tech-nology policy partnerships. Use the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council to share insights on specific companies and cases that need to be pro

45、tected.The United States should work with its democratic partners to incentivize and encourage middle income and developing countries to invest in trusted and secure technologies and technology infrastruc-ture. To this end, we recommend that Congress and the White House:CNASDC3 Provide financial sup

46、port or incentives so that demo-cratically aligned digital firms from allied and partner countries will provide trusted alternatives to Chinese digital investments. Establish a Digital Development Fund through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to collaborate with the Int

47、ernational Development Finance Corporation (DFC). Develop assessment frameworks and standards to vet digital development projects with the State Department, USAID, and the DFC. Support democratic innovation bases that give incen-tives to diverse vendors and focus on developing secure and modular alt

48、ernatives to Chinas Safe City and sur-veillance technology solutions. The United States needs to boost multilateral engagement on governance and technical norms and standards as they pertain to emerging digital ecosys-tems. To effect this, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy is a

49、dvised to: Launch initiatives with allies in the Indo-Pacific to build out a shared set of norms on safe practices for the use of cutting-edge technologies, which can then undergird future proposals at international standards bodies.U.S. government agencies should build local resilience among civil

50、society and watchdog groups to combat foreign influence operations or other forms of illiberal technology use. The State Department should: Establish a standalone Digital Rights Fund to support civil society groups playing a watchdog role. Provide best-practices training to local media in coun-tries

51、 such as Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia on how to counter Chinese and other disinformation campaigns, and empower civil society organizations in countries that are particularly vulnerable to digital influence operations. Develop an expanded Fulbright Scholars program for journalists from countries

52、on the front line of Chinese influence campaigns.With Nondemocratic Partners The United States does not have the luxury of working only with like-minded, democratic allies. To provide a formidable counterweight to such antidemocratic com-petitors as China, Russia, and Iran, it must emphasize digital

53、 freedom concerns in bilateral relations with other nondemocratic partners. U.S. agencies should regulate U.S. entities or persons participation in and support of the illib-eral use of technology in overseas markets. The Commerce and State Departments must: Provide explicit guidance to U.S. companie

54、s operating in the markets of nondemocratic partners, and take measures to prohibit U.S. companies from entering joint ventures with Chinese companies in areas that could have negative implications for digital freedom, such as smart cities. Take measures to establish a noncompete regulation to preve

55、nt former cybersecurity experts and officials trained or previously employed by the U.S. govern-ment from working for foreign governments. Countering U.S. CompetitorsThe United States must leverage its powerful economic tools to counter competitors illiberal technology use. Together with its allies

56、and partners, the United States should work to effectively combat tech-enabled human rights abuses and other repressive policies. The United States is advised to harness sanctions, advisories, and export control measures to impose costs on the repressive practices of illiberal govern-ments. The Whit

57、e House should: Consider additional Magnitsky Act sanctions and Leahy law restrictionsin concert with the Commerce Departments Entity Listif companies are found to be complicit in tech-enabled human rights abuses. Coordinate with the Commerce and Treasury Departments to sanction illiberal government

58、s digital economies, including cybersecurity firms, in cases of their use of technology for repressive or disruptive purposes. This will signal that regimes must be responsible actors to participate in the global ecosystem.Relevant U.S. agencies must focus on protecting areas of comparative strength

59、 vis-vis nation-state adversaries. To this end, the U.S. Commerce Department is advised to: Assess relative costs and benefits of export controls on artificial intelligence (AI) chips, which can encourage import substitution, versus targeted end-use/end-user controls on chips and on the semiconducto

60、r manufac-turing equipment that is used to make the chips.1CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 4CIntroduction: Pillars of the Digital Orderhallengers to liberal democracy seek to shape the digital order in ways that conform with their objectives and inte

61、rests. This represents a direct challenge to the values, ideals, and priorities of the United States and its democratic allies. Autocratic regimes have exploited the digital environment to foster internal control and expand their external influenceboth of which are integral to maintaining their hold

62、 on power. Illiberal actors use tactics in three pillars to shape the digital order in their favor: information control, surveillance, and technology governance. In practice, a governments weaponization of the digital order includes manipulating the availability and messaging of informa-tion; digita

63、l monitoring; and setting and exporting rules, norms, and policies that advance closed systems. The intent behind this weaponization is to enhance internal stability by muffling resistance, disrupting opponents, and advancing national interests globally. The case for an open digital order rests on t

64、he fun-damental principles of free societiescommitments to liberal democratic values, the rule of law, and respect for and promotion of human rights. An open digital order is the only way to ensure the trust and integrity of technological ecosystems, inclusive growth and shared prosperity, and innov

65、ation imbued with universal rights. Authoritarian uses of technology threaten the strength and resilience of democratic values and institutions. Information Control The shaping, storing, manipulation, and distribution of digital information is a foundational application of power in modern society. R

66、epressive regimes exploit that power with tactics such as state-linked influence operations that disseminate targeted content; national, centralized data-bases; and internet and data sovereignty. States including China, Russia, and Iran, as well as several U.S. partners such as Saudi Arabia and the

67、United Arab Emirates, conduct censorship on media platforms to restrict access to information that potentially is unfavorable to them. The creation of official, national data architectures and centralized databases is another method to entrench gov-ernment control over and access to personal data. T

68、he push for internet and data sovereignty in Russia, China, and Iran in particular offers examples of how user data, access, and information can be controlled with bifurcated internet initiatives and intermittent internet shutdowns that are designed to restrict information access at polit-ical infle

69、ction points such as elections and protests.Repressive governments can employ these tactics in combination with behavior-shaping technologies that embed less visible methods of control, including algorithms that dispense favorable information about the regime, while filtering out derogatory commenta

70、ry. Access to information is much less restricted in dem-ocratic nations, but governments still seek to control their information environments, albeit to a lesser extent than in autocracies.2 Information control in democratic contexts can be seen in “content moderation” strate-giessocial media compa

71、nies policies toward regulating speech on their platforms, for examplewhich elicit a range of support and criticism from policymakers and the public. Information control can also be exhibited in government-held databases owned by large federal agencies, with varying degrees of interoperability betwe

72、en systems.SurveillanceDemocracies and repressive regimes alike use surveil-lance technologies to counter crime, monitor crowds, and streamline traffic. Illiberal regimes often go further, employing their surveillance nets to monitor and control entire populations and to collect data on citizens and

73、 visitors alike. Such surveillance is possible with wide-spread deployments of cameras and video systems. China leads the world in the number of surveillance cameras in use, followed closely by the United States, India, and Brazil.3 Building on basic surveillance techniques, new technologies such as

74、 facial recognition systems and biometric data collection platforms (e.g., voice or gait recognition technology) enable authorities to keep track of citizens and to collect, organize, and analyze informa-tion on their life patterns. New processing capabilities to parse the data and generate assessme

75、nts enable predic-tive analytics that can be used to preemptively detain people. Smart city initiatives may eventually combine all these developments into regional panopticons that monitor citizens at scale.Technology Governance Authoritarian regimes wield governance as a weapon in their fight to ex

76、ert influence over the digital order. Norms, values, and principles are critical to preserving the democratic use of technology. However, several authoritarian governments are pushing technology standardswhich influence the way technology is used across the globethat are infused with values that rej

77、ect democratic imperatives of openness and transparency. Closed societies are increasingly implementing practices that favor their material and ideological interests in these CNASDC5Cinteractions. Furthermore, the collection, storage, and sharing of data, concerns over data privacy and illicit trans

78、fer (e.g., forced data transfer between private companies), and new modes of data exploitation will influence the digital order in fundamental ways. Data vulnerabilities stand to determine winners and losers in armed conflict, the integrity of intelligence tradecraft, the efficacy of military and in

79、telligence operations, and other national security imperatives. Finally, export controls can also affect the transmission of technologies between states by slowing or pre-venting the adoption of specific tools. This report examines these pillars and trends in three regions relevant to U.S. national

80、security inter-ests: China, Russia, and the Middle East. It then provides recommendations for how the U.S. gov-ernment should address the challenges that digital authoritarianism poses across the world.Chinahina is a prime mover in exploiting the evolving digital order. Using key digital technologie

81、s, Beijing has made repression and social control mechanisms more scalable and effective. Pervasive online censorship, ubiquitous cameras coupled with facial recognition software, and social credit systems designed to shape citizens behavior have enhanced the Chinese Communist Partys (CCP) ability t

82、o control information and conduct surveillance of the population.As Beijing enhances its capacity for surveillance at home, it is also marketing digital technologies abroad. Digital infrastructure projects, under the guise of Chinas Digital Silk Road, offer relatively low-cost alternatives to splash

83、y and expensive physical infra-structure development.4 In Pakistan, for example, where traditional infrastructure projects have experienced massive delays, Huawei built an 820-kilo-meter fiber-optic cable over two years for only $44 millionas much as it would cost to build four kilo-meters of railwa

84、y.5 Chinese technology companies, meanwhile, see massive profit opportunities in foreign markets, in addition to sources of more diverse data pools that can enable them to further improve their technological offerings.Chinas export of digital infrastructure is integral to the expansion of the CCPs i

85、nfluence over norms, gov-ernance, and public security models globally as it seeks to make the world safe for autocracy.6 The Chinese government has helped train police departments in dozens of countries on how to harness Chinese tech-nologies toward illiberal ends, and it has provided foreign govern

86、ments across the Indo-Pacific region the tools to codify illiberal digital norms in domestic law.7 China is also exporting the notion that an open internet is not a prerequisite for accruing the economic benefits of connectivity, and indeed could even serve as a hindrance to growth.Pushing these ill

87、iberal norms abroad bolsters Beijings efforts to subvert international stan-dard-setting bodies. These bodies, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), exist to promote standards that protect freedom of com-munication and access to information, in addition to other democratic norms a

88、round the use of tech-nology. China has been leading a campaign within multilateral fora to block resolutions that do not align with Beijings vision of technology as a tool to expand authoritarian control.Beijing is not exporting these technologies and associated norms into a vacuum. As autocratic g

89、ov-ernments and leaders in fragile democracies look to exert greater control over their populations and pursue inexpensive pathways toward digital devel-opment, they find Beijings high-tech illiberalism an attractive model. They thus deliberately seek Chinas technology, funding, and know-how. Consid

90、ering these trends, the Indo-Pacific has registered a democratic decline during the past decade, as some governments have moved toward a more statist vision of the internet predicated on government censorship and content curation.8Although Beijings activities are only one factor contributing to this

91、 outcome, China is well posi-tioned to set a large portion of the region on a less free and open trajectory. The following sections examine three primary vectors by which Beijing seeks to bend the region toward a more illiberal digital future: information control, surveillance, and technology govern

92、ance and standards.Chinas export of digital infrastructure is integral to the expansion of the CCPs influence over norms, governance, and public security models globally as it seeks to make the world safe for autocracy.CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order

93、 6Information ControlOver the past two decades, the CCP has not only sought to preclude the use of technology as a conduit of freedom and open information, but has gained an unprecedented ability to apply cutting-edge technologies toward illiberal ends. These capabilities first manifested in the CCP

94、s control of the web, but its levers have grown far more sophisticated and far-reaching.With the introduction of the Great Firewall in the early 2000s, China asserted sovereign control over cyberspace, a domain previously assumed to be beyond the grasp of 20th-century authoritarian governance.9 Chin

95、ese internet users could no longer access many parts of cyberspace that were open to the rest of the world, and companies refusing to comply with Chinese content restrictions were penalized. In its early days, the Great Firewall enabled censors to take down only a few blatantly anti-CCP websites and

96、 posts, and internet users circumvented tightening control with clever homonyms and coded language. Gradually, however, sanitized yet attractive alternatives to foreign websites proliferatedto the point where many internet users stopped trying to “jump the Great Firewall,” even as censors grew more

97、sophisticated in using emerging artificial intelligence (AI) tools to scrub websites clean of any offending posts.10 For those who continued to post content deemed prob-lematic, the CCP in 2015 created an internet police force with the power to question and arrest people for online speech violations

98、. Some provinces aim to establish one internet police officer for every 10,000 citizens.11The CCPs content controls have also migrated to communications conducted over popular social media platforms and applications.12 During the protracted 2019 democracy struggle in Hong Kong, the CCPs censorship m

99、achinery operated at full throttle as TencentWeChats parent companysuspended the accounts of users who criticized Beijing, including those located in the United States.13 There are similar censorship concerns regarding TikTok, which has gained broad reach in the United States.14 As Chinese platforms

100、 proliferate beyond the nations borders, the CCP is positioned to quietly export its model of censorship and content suppression across the region.Beijing leverages access to Chinas lucrative domestic market to influence the actions of Western technology companies in order to shape the global online

101、 infor-mation environment. China has also used the threat of blacklisting to make U.S. companies complicit in censorship. In June 2020, for example, the American video conferencing platform Zoom admitted that, at the request of the Chinese government, it had taken down user accounts based outside of

102、 China that had engaged in planning for June 4 Tiananmen Square massacre com-memorations.15 In 2019, Apple Inc. also buckled under pressure from the Chinese government. After a Chinese state-owned newspaper criticized the U.S. technology giant for allowing HKmap.live on its platformwhich helped Hong

103、 Kong protesters track police movementsApple removed the app from its online store.16 During the same period, it also removed the Taiwanese flag emoji from iPhones in Hong Kong and Macau.17Beijing has long viewed control over ideas as a core tenet of Chinas national power. While keeping a tight lid

104、on its domestic cyberspace, Beijings concerted effort to expand state media capacity, increase the market share of Chinese social media platforms, and cultivate opaque partnerships with local media companies has enabled the CCP to amplify state propaganda beyond its borders.18Dating back to the late

105、 2000s under Hu Jintao, the CCPs Central Propaganda Department sharpened its focus on the global “competition for news and public opinion” and “the contest over discourse power” through the “innovation of news propaganda.”19 Shortly after becoming the General Secretary of the CCP, Xi Jinping reitera

106、ted at the August 2013 National Meeting on Propaganda and Ideology that China needed to “strengthen media coverage . . . use innovative outreach methods . . . tell a good Chinese story, and promote Chinas views internationally.”20 A 2013 meeting of the Central Propaganda Department reiterated that s

107、haping online public opinion was an area of “highest priority” for the party.21Beijing has harnessed its global technology internet companies, including Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, and Huawei, to mold public opinion and peddle its desired narratives.22 Those at Chinas periphery have absorbed the brunt

108、of the CCPs tech-enabled propaganda. For example, its “50-cent army” of government-paid com-mentators and bots flooded Taiwans social media sphere in the lead-up to its 2018 local election, and operated at full throttle during the 2019 pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong to advance narratives that f

109、avored China and undermine the credibility of dissidents.23In addition to eliminating dissident voices and pro-moting nationalistic content on domestic social media platforms such as WeChat and Douyin, Beijing has also strong-armed overseas diaspora news outlets. If these small ventures report on st

110、ories that run counter to the CCPs narrative, it has threatened to cut off ad revenue.24 Through this tactic, Beijing can still exert control over non-state media in countries that enjoy freedom of the press.25CNASDC7SurveillanceThe CCPs techno-authoritarian controls not only govern Chinas internet

111、but have taken hold in the offline world. China has a vast system of an estimated 415 million surveillance cameras across its provinces.26 Of the 20 cities in the world with the highest ratio of surveillance cameras to people, 18 are in China.27 The proliferation of surveillance cameras has yielded

112、vast quantities of information about citizens lives offlinewhere they go, what they say, and whom they seethat previously stood beyond the reach of authoritarian control.New advances in AI-enabled facial recognition, voice recognition, and predictive policing technologies are necessary to turn into

113、an effective means of control the massive amount of information produced by Chinas vast surveillance web. This is precisely the aim of Chinas new smart city technologies.Chinas smart city systems and AI development are not merely tools of surveillance. They often bring material gains to governments,

114、 companies, and people. Notably, the Chinese company with the most AI-based patents is a state-owned electric utility monopoly, the State Grid Corporation of China, which uses AI to optimize grid management.28 Chinas New Generation AI Development Plan, the central government policy that aims to ensu

115、re China becomes the global leader in AI research by 2030, encourages local governments to use smart city technologies for solving a range of problemsfrom bureaucratic accountability to transportation efficiencyand to support local companies that make use of AI in new technologies.29A plurality of C

116、hinas top 100 AI firms specialize in security. These companies harness technology to make repression and social control mechanisms more scalable and effective.30 Since 2005, the Ministry of Public Security has rolled out two massive surveillance projects across the country: Skynet and Sharp Eyes. (S

117、kynet, which references a Chinese idiom about the Net of Heaven that catches all wrongdoing, is not to be confused with the dystopian artificial intelligence from the movie The Terminator.)31 Xinjiang has emerged as a testbed for Chinese companies latest surveillance technology. In essence, Beijing

118、has coupled 21st-century innovation with 20th centurystyle mass detention camps to repress the regions Uyghur population.32As private companies have sprouted up to meet wide-spread government demand for surveillance systems, they have used the profits from their contracts and the SenseTime, the worl

119、ds highest-valued artificial intelligence company, is working closely with the Chinese government to build AI technologies that support Chinas facial recognition ambitions. Here, SenseTime executive Leo Gang Liu (left) speaks at the CNBC East Tech West conference in 2018. (Dave Zhong/Getty Images fo

120、r CNBC International)CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 8data collected through these systems to further hone their technologies. Two surveillance camera makers, Hikvision and Dahua, control more than 50 percent of the Chinese market for surveillance ha

121、rdware.33 Four unicorn startups, known as the AI four little dragons, specialize in facial recognition technology: SenseTime (or Shangtang, with a valuation of $12 billion in 2021, the worlds most valuable AI startup), Megvii, Cloudwalk (or Yuncong), and Yitu.34 Chinas most successful provider of vo

122、ice recognition technology, iFLYTEK, makes 60 percent of its profits from government contracts.35 Ultimately, China hopes to develop AI-driven predic-tive policing to the point where criminal patterns can be detected before crimes are committed, a lofty ambition dubbed by German scholar Sebastian He

123、ilmann as “digital Leninism.”36Technology GovernanceChina is exporting its digital norms and practices to governments that seek to suppress social movements and civil protest. The CCPs goal is to make the world safer for authoritarianism and create information environments that facilitate the market

124、 penetration of its technology companies. It is also increasingly using international bodies to legitimize these digital norms and standards.China trains officials from countries around the world in methods of illiberal digital governance. In 2018, the Chinese government organized training sessions

125、with representatives from more than 30 coun-tries on media and information management.37 Private companies help, too. Meiya Pico, the digital forensics company that was named in a data privacy scandal by the former Trump administration, has provided training courses for police forces across 30 count

126、ries.38The Chinese government has sought to build new regulatory systems in its own image in countries that have deep economic interdependencies with China, particularly in Southeast Asia. The China Academy for Information and Communications Technology (CAICT), a state-sponsored think tank, argued i

127、n a 2019 report on cybersecurity policy in Southeast Asia that “China should leverage its influence in Association of Southeast Asian Nations member states to integrate ASEANs cybersecurity action plans with its own development strategy.”39 Chinese companies have also, in some cases, helped govern-m

128、ents write laws and development plans that directly benefit the companies. For example, Huawei drafted the Lao National ICT (information and communications technologies) Development Plan white paper for that countrys Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.40 Elsewhere, China has provided a model fo

129、r illiberal digital governance without directly writing the rules. Vietnam introduced Chinese-style data localization rules in 2018; Cambodia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have all implemented laws that bring a heavy hand to regulating online speech.41China has endeavored to strategicall

130、y take control of standard-setting bodies. In the Chinese governments first-ever white paper on international cyberspace cooperation, jointly published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Public Security in March 2017, the CCP committed to leading the “institutional reform of the

131、U.N. Internet Governance Forum” by positioning China to play a larger role in shaping the global future of internet governance.42 China is mobilizing illiberal actors in multilateral forums to control, modify, and dilute resolutions coming out of international organiza-tions and standard-setting bod

132、ies, which are supposed to be protecting freedom of expression and other liberal democratic norms around the use of technology.As China introduces smart city technology to countries around the world, it has proposed health technology to scan body temperature. Following the outbreak of COVID-19, Chin

133、a implemented health technology, as shown in this photo, to scan body temperatures to identify possible COVID-19 cases. (Getty Images)CNASDC9This has played out most notably in the ITU, the United Nations ICT standard-setting body, led by former Chinese Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications offic

134、ial Zhao Houlin.43 Since Zhaos ascension as secretary-general in 2014, the ITU has increasingly cooperated with and promoted the Chinese companies and technical standards that undergird Beijings oppressive surveillance state. Notably, the ITU has spoken positively about Chinas attempts to monopolize

135、 future communications infrastruc-ture in countries under the umbrella of the Digital Silk Road, which could threaten the freedom and openness of the internet. More recently, Huawei has tried to advance its new internet protocol initiative at the ITU, a framework that would give governments an easy

136、means of shutting down websites.44 To control the standard-setting process more effectively in international bodies, including the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), which is responsible for setting global mobile data standards, China pressures its companies to vote in unison. In 2018, the c

137、hairman of Lenovo was forced to offer a public apology for being “unpatriotic” after it was discovered his company had backed a technologically superior American 3GPP proposal over one made by Huawei in 2016.45Chinas politicization of the standard-setting process is most dangerous when it comes to s

138、urveillance technolo-gies. At the ITU, companies such as ZTE and Dahua submit standards modeled on their own in-house technologies for facial recognition and urban video monitoring devices, cementing commercial advantages for models that lack privacy protections. These standards are often directly a

139、dopted as domestic law by countries that do not have the capacity to develop regulations independently of inter-national bodies.46 In the field of AI, China has seized the advantage; for example, in Subcommittee 42, the body of the International Organization for Standardization and the International

140、 Electrotechnical Commission that is tasked with drafting AI standards, China succeeded in electing Huawei employee Wael Diab as chairman. The committee held its inaugural meeting in Beijing in 2018.47Finally, China has directed its coalition-building efforts beyond the confines of long-established

141、international standards bodies and sought to construct alternative institutions. Leveraging support and assuming legiti-macy from other illiberal regimes that share its policy preferences, Beijing has strategically positioned itself as a champion of developing states and geared its actions toward re

142、ctifying the imbalances of Western-dominated international bodies.48 In particular, Beijing has sought to enhance standards cooperation and digital integration with members of its signature Belt and Road Initiative.In 2019, the Standardization Administration of China (SAC) created a “national standa

143、rds infor-mation platform” among the Belt and Road partner countries “to strengthen the exchange and sharing of standards information.”49 In 2020, the SAC announced 85 standardization agreements with 49 countries and regions.50 As China increasingly pursues standard-set-ting work outside of the Unit

144、ed Nations, the SAC has officially dropped its former stated goal of integrating technology standards with the European Union and United States.51 The annual World Internet Conference (WIC) in Zhejiang, which excludes the United States and Europe, has emerged as a platform for furthering this agenda

145、. At the WIC, China brings together repre-sentatives from a range of Belt and Road countries to discuss cyber sovereignty and the dominance of large U.S. tech platforms.52Beijing is poised to advance its vast surveillance apparatus abroad under the guise of its Digital Silk Road, leveraging the poli

146、tical and economic inroads it has made through its Belt and Road Initiative to build China-centric coalitions through its digital infrastruc-ture. An authoritative party journal article in 2017 discussed the centrality of the “global influence of internet companies” to Chinas strategy for emerging a

147、s a “cyber superpower.”53 As Chinese technology companies are encouraged to chuhai (take to the sea) and penetrate foreign markets, they have emerged as major players across the Indo-Pacific region in fields including telecommunications equipment, data centers, and urban public security networks.Chi

148、nese companies have also, in some cases, helped governments write laws and development plans that directly benefit the companies.Beijing is not exporting these technologies into a vacuum. Autocratic governments and leaders in fragile democracies seek to emulate Chinas high-tech illiberalism as they

149、exert greater control over their populations and pursue inexpensive pathways toward digital development. For example, during Xi Jinpings state visit to the Philippines in November 2018, President Rodrigo Duterte signed 29 agree-ments, including a Safe Philippines Project that contracted with Huawei

150、and the China International Telecommunication and Construction Corporation CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 10TECHNOLOGIES UNDER THE DIGITAL SILK ROAD UMBRELLA54Safe Cities. One of Chinas most successful exporters of surveillance infrastructure has be

151、en Huawei, the telecommunications giant with ties to the Chinese government. Huawei is partnering with local authorities on what it has branded as Safe Citiesa platform of comprehensive urban management and surveillance.55 In some Chinese cities, the platform has become fully integrated with local p

152、olice databases that enable authorities to track residents travel and social patterns, using information gathered by the technology to identify whether individuals are predisposed to commit crimes.56As of 2018, 230 cities across 90 countries had contracted with Huawei for Safe City projects.57 The E

153、xport-Import Bank of China subsidizes these projects, making them cost-efficient for third-party governments.58 “Joint construction of smart cities is a good opportunity for expanding international markets and promoting the importance of the cybersecurity industry,” CAICT argued in a 2019 report.59

154、Achieving the vision for smart cities is a work in progress. As one Thai technology expert said, “The idea of a smart city is a joke. A smart city in Phuket turns out to be providing free Wi-Fi and internet to tourists!”60 But even if the exported version of this technology does not immediately reac

155、h the level of sophistication and effectiveness found in planning documents, privacy and freedom will pay a toll along the “New Digital Silk Road.” Facial recognition software. At least three of Chinas AI four little dragons are helping foreign governments adopt facial recognition technology. As the

156、se companies go abroad, they send valuable data back to China to hone their algorithms, while helping foreign autocrats build out their surveillance infrastructure. Cloudwalk signed a deal with Zimbabwes government to provide facial recognition technology.61 Yitu provides the technology for cameras

157、used by the Malaysian police, and it bid for a project to embed facial recognition technology in all of Singapores lampposts.62 Megvii has supplied upward of 500 such systems across at least 11 countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Yitu, Megvii, and the fourth AI dragon, Sens

158、eTime, were added to the U.S. Department of Commerces Entity List in 2019 for their role in enabling Beijings repression of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.63 Cloudwalk was subsequently added in 2020.64Networks and 5G infrastructure. China seeks to dominate the Indo-Pacifics 5G infrastructure. It is a

159、lso making an aggressive push to gain greater control of global data flows through the construction of terrestrial and undersea fiber-optic cables that will undergird future 5G networks.65 Undersea cables across the world carry 99 percent of global data flows.66 Huawei Marine Systems alone has worke

160、d on nearly 100 such projects.67 If Huawei, or another Chinese company, builds an undersea cable, it can easily build back doors through which to monitor data flows through the cable.68 Health care technology. Chinese companies are racing to meet pandemic-specific health care needs that cast China i

161、n the savior role. Five Chinese companiesHikvision, Dahua, Sunell, TVT, and YCXhave emerged alongside one U.S. competitorTeledyne FLIRas the largest suppliers of the global market for thermal imaging, which is used for monitoring human temperatures at a distance.69 Alibaba is trying to market its cl

162、oud services for pandemic modeling and telehealth systems.70 Not only does the export of health-care technology provide Chinese companies access to large pools of foreign data, it also can serve as a surveillance Trojan horse for China. Hikvision and Dahua, for example, have secured contracts for th

163、eir thermal vision cameras, thermal detectionenabled metal detectors, and even thermal-screening mobile apps, including in U.S. states and cities, despite the fact that these companies are on U.S. federal sanctions lists because of their roles in Xinjiang. Turning the crisis into an opportunity, the

164、 CCP seeks to further embed its companies in markets that, in less panicked times, might forgo relying on sanctioned companies. to construct a 12,000-camera surveillance system across metropolitan Manila and other cities.71 In 2017, Malaysia partnered with Alibaba to launch a Digital Free Trade Zone

165、, despite concerns that the Belt and Roadsponsored project would allow Chinese companies to monopolize the Malaysian markets.72 Two years later and under new political leadership, Malaysia deepened the digital relationship, signing five memorandums of under-standing on technology cooperation.73As Ch

166、inas national technology champions go abroad to construct the Digital Silk Road, Beijings bid to set international technology standards and establish new platforms for online connec-tivity has gained momentum far beyond the Indo-Pacific region. Perhaps nowhere has it been more successful than in Afr

167、ica. Chinas digital gover-nance work in Africa began in Tanzania, where, in 2015, Beijing was selected to pilot a China-Africa capac-ity-building program.74 With technical assistance from the Chinese govern-ment, Tanzania enacted a cyber-crime law and a content creationlicensing system forcing blogg

168、ers and Facebook users to pay $900 for a three-year license.75 Uganda and Zambia mimicked Tanzanias tax on online content creators and users of such platforms as WhatsApp, Skype, and Viber.76 “Our Chinese friends have managed to block such media in their country and replaced them with their homegrow

169、n sites that are safe, constructive, and popular,” Tanzanias deputy minister for transport and communications admir-ingly told counterparts at a Chinese-organized round-table in Dar es Salaam.77Without direct guidance from such capacity-building programs and roundtables, countries that lack the dome

170、stic capacity to build regulatory frameworks often adopt as domestic law the international standards set by Chinese companies at U.N. bodies such as the ITU. “African states tend to go along with what is being put forward by China and the ITU as they dont have the resources to develop standards them

171、selves,” observed legal department head Richard Wingfield of Global Partners Digital in an interview with The Financial Times.78This amounts to a broad shift in emerging markets, making the internet in those places more closely resemble CNASDC11AVladimir Putin famously stated, “Artificial intelligen

172、ce is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind. . . . Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.”83 In recent years, the Kremlin has launched a growing number of government-sponsored projects intended to facilitate technological innova-tion and the de

173、velopment of Russias digital economy. Putin likely views such efforts as critical for generating investment, economic growth, and global prestige in a rapidly digitalizing world. While there are constraints on Russias ability to fulfill its technological ambi-tionsbrain drain and a business environm

174、ent that still struggles to attract and develop private investment in the technology sector, for examplethe Kremlin will remain a relevant actor with the potential to influence the trajec-tory of the future digital order. As the Kremlin pursues its technological development, it is also aware of the

175、risks that digital technologies pose to regime stability and is taking steps to mitigate those risks. As Putin noted in the same 2017 speech, “AI comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict.”84 Putins statement and broader actions suggest that he sees emerging t

176、echnologies as posing at least three key challenges to Russian sover-eignty and the regimes hold on power. First, one of the Kremlins biggest concerns is that Russias current dependence on Western ICT creates a vulnerability that NATO and the United States in particular could exploit in a time of co

177、nflict.85 Moscow has explained its moves to create a sovereign Russian internet, for example, as a defensive action allowing for the uninterrupted func-tioning of the internet in Russia in the event of a major foreign policy crisis (typically defined as a U.S. effort to disconnect Russia from the gl

178、obal internet).86 Indeed, Russian military doctrine identifies information as playing an increasingly central role in modern conflicta vector that outside actors could use to threaten Russian sovereignty and national interests.Second, Moscow sees ICT as a conduit for external enemies to spread “alie

179、n” values inside Russia to destabi-lize the country. Putin has gone to considerable lengths to establish a narrative of Russia as a “separate civiliza-tion.”87 These efforts stem from Russian discontent over U.S. efforts to promote the universality of its values in the aftermath of the Cold War. Ins

180、tead, Putin and those around him have sought to establish a culturally distinct system of Russian values defined by “an authentic concept of spiritual freedom inspired by Eastern Christianity and the idea of a strong, socially protective state capable of defending its own subjects from abuses at hom

181、e and threats from abroad.”88 Putin has called the Chinas. As one African politician told researchers from the University of Witwatersrand in South Africa, “If China could become a world power without a free internet, why do African countries need a free internet?”79 A 2019 report by the Collaborati

182、on on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa warns: The autocratic Chinese model appears to be gaining acceptance in the continent. It comprises widespread and sophisticated automated sur-veillance, online content manipulation, arrests of critics, content removal, data collection, rep

183、ressive laws to censor online media, violence against digital activists, technical attacks against dissidents, the great firewall blocking foreign social media, websites and messaging apps, revo-cation of mobile and internet connectivity.80 Given the Chinese regimes focus on security and sta-bility,

184、 the CCP is likely to continue evolving its model of digital repressionexploiting and harnessing the power of digital technologies to further its control over the pop-ulation. The governments use of surveillance tools and information control mechanisms serves as an illustrative example to other like

185、-minded, aspiring digital authori-tarians, charting the course for how to exploit and abuse these technologies for power and repression. Russialthough China is leading the charge, it is not the only country offering a vision and endorsement of digital autocracy. Whereas Beijings pervasive system of

186、surveillance integrates vast amounts of data to aid in citizen control, Russias model of digital author-itarianism, albeit less technologically sophisticated, could prove to be more readily adaptable and enduring.81 Many autocracies more closely resemble Russia than China in that they did not build

187、censorship into their systems from the start and lack the resources and, often, the capacity to filter data and block content, as does Beijing. Likewise, many regimes prefer to uphold at least a veneer of democracy and prefer less overtly repressive approaches to digital control, potentially increas

188、ing the appeal of the Kremlins model. Although much attention has been devoted to Russias use of disinformation, there is less understanding of the actions Moscow is taking to support digital authoritarianism more broadly. Moscow is focused on establishing Russia as a leader in technology and the di

189、gital economy.82 In 2017, President CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 1212internet a “CIA project,”89 and his brand of digital autoc-racy is in part designed to protect, from external threats, his notion of Russia as a separate civilizationincluding th

190、e influence of what the Kremlin portrays as the “deca-dence” of Western values. Finally, the Kremlin is acutely aware of the way that citizens across the globe have used digital technologies to aid their efforts to challenge and in some cases over-throw governments. Kremlin fears of technology-fuele

191、d revolutions, combined with mounting domestic chal-lenges, have led the government to increase repression. The trend toward greater reliance on control began after Putin returned to the presidency in 2012, and it has accelerated in recent years with a rash of new oppressive legislation that the reg

192、ime weaponizes to silence regime critics and weaken civil society. Many of the longtime drivers of Putins supporteconomic growth, patronage, and more recently public support for returning Russia to the global stagehave run their course. The Russian economy has slowed, COVID-19 remains a challenge, c

193、orruption is prevalent, and public euphoria over the annexation of Crimea in 2014 has long faded. The protests that accompanied Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalnys arrest in January 2021protests the Kremlin saw as being fueled by TikTok and Twittersolidified views of social media as a threat.

194、The Kremlins domestic challenges, which will likely persist in the aftermath of COVID-19, will accelerate its efforts to restrict the internet and social media and weaponize digital technologies to upgrade and enhance control tactics and better ensure the survivability of the regime. Moreover, the K

195、remlin is no longer content to simply counter perceived threats within Russias borders. Instead, Moscow views the information environment as a critical battlespace in its competition with the West. Since 2014 Moscow has gone on the offensive, taking the fight to liberal democracies, especially the U

196、nited States and Europe. The Kremlin uses digital tools to undermine liberal democratic institutions and weaken the cohesion among liberal Western democraciescohesion that it recognizes as increasing the challenge to his regime. To this end, the Kremlin has deployed paid human trolls, AI-powered soc

197、ial media bots, and networks of indi-viduals to interfere in public discussions at scale. The Kremlins goal is to sow discord and uncertainty, divert critical discourse, erode trust in democratic societies, and undermine confidence in democratic institutions.90 While the effect of these efforts is d

198、ifficult to measure, they are designed to amplify differences in societies to further divide targeted populations and distract from anti-Kremlin narratives. The Kremlins brand of digital autocracy, in other words, is not only about controlling citizens within Russia. It is also intended to make the

199、world safer for Putins regime.Moving forward, the Kremlin will likely seek to balance Russias digital development with increasing government oversight, both legal and digital. As Russias model develops, the Kremlin will likely hold some sway over the trajectory of the future digital order, in large

200、part by creating a model that autocratscurrent and aspiringcan adopt or emulate. The countries closest to Russia, including Belarus, Azerbaijan, and some Central Asian states, have already adopted parts of the Russian model. The spread of parts of Russias brand of digital dictatorship will create he

201、adwinds against U.S. efforts to maintain a free and open internet and ensure the demo-cratic use of digital technology. Russias model of digital control differs considerably from that of China. Although Moscow is likely to borrow from Beijings toolkit and the two countries will continue to share bes

202、t practices, Russias model will remain distinct. Russias brand of digital autocracy combines legal and technological measures to control citizens After the detention of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, people gathered in January 2021 in Pushkin in Moscow, to protest against Vladimir Putins

203、government. After images and posts in support of Navalny were shared on social media, the Russian government attempted to throttle access to Twitter. (Getty Images)CNASDC13access to information from the internet, suppress domestic opposition, and undermine democratic insti-tutions around the world t

204、o ensure the regimes survival and advance Russias foreign policy goals. The fol-lowing sections examine the three pillars of the digital orderinformation control, surveillance, and technology governancein the Russian context.Information ControlRussian leaders have long viewed the media as instru-men

205、ts of political propaganda, and information as a commodity that needs to be controlled. For Putin, the first Chechen war and especially Russias invasion of Georgia in 2008 underscored the importance of con-trolling information and the impact that public opinion could have on the regimes ability to a

206、dvance its objec-tives. The Arab Spring and Russias own large-scale protests in 2011 and 2012 further crystallized Russian leaders belief that an uncontrolled internet threatens state stability. As the Kremlin has grown increasingly attuned to the challenges that digital technologies pose to authori

207、tarian regimes, the Putin government has taken steps to increase control of the information environment. But rather than resorting to overt forms of censorship, the Kremlin has developed a system of legal mechanisms, discrete online surveillance, and growing internet sover-eignty, while manipulating

208、 online discourse at home and abroad. This approach has enabled the Russian govern-ment to build a brand of digital authoritarianism that is distinct from Chinas model. Legal framework. Russias model of digital control is in part defined by a robust but often vague set of laws that allow for the blo

209、cking of a wide variety of content and systematic collection of user data. Russias legal framework places a heavy burden of liability on content intermediaries, creating strong incentives for self-cen-sorshipa key pillar supporting the stability of the Putin regime.91 All Russian media, including th

210、e internet, are regulated by Roskomnadzor, or the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media. Roskomnadzor and several other government agencies are charged with moni-toring and blocking websites and social media posts that include “offending content,”

211、including calls for mass protest, crime, or extremist activity.92 While the authority to censor rests with the state, the responsibility to implement censorship falls on the internet service providers (ISPs), which are held legally responsible for forbidden content that is acces-sible to their users

212、. Amid the January 2021 protests in support of Navalny, for example, Roskomnadzor quickly moved to pressure social media platforms including TikTok, YouTube, and Instagram to remove videos that it said called for minors to participate in protests.93 Roskomnadzor also maintains a list of banned websi

213、tes that ISPs must broadly interpret to avoid liability for under-censoring, which can result in heavy fines and even the loss of their state licenses. Since 2012, the number of laws underpinning Russias digital control has grown. Russian authorities apply these laws indiscriminately, creating a chi

214、lling effect on the countrys media environment. For example, the 2014 Bloggers Law requires all online outlets (including blogs and personal pages within social networking sites) with more than 3,000 daily page views to register with the government and be held legally liable for any content on their

215、 website that authorities deem inaccu-rate.94 Likewise, the Law Against Retweets punishes with up to five years in prison the dissemination or re-dis-semination of “extremist content”which is defined vaguely so that it can be interpreted to include a broad swath of content. For example, Russian auth

216、orities have repeatedly brought charges against Crimean Tatars for online posts criticizing the invasion of Ukraine. Russian courts have also convicted at least six people of sharing pro-LGBT information over a four-year period under a 2013 anti-LGBT “propaganda” law.95 In effect, this complex legal

217、 system empowers the government to surveil internet communications with few limitations, censor objectionable content, intimidate civil society Protesters hold flags and banners aloft as they march in Bolotnaya Square on December 10, 2011, in Moscow. Protests took place in Moscow and St. Petersburg

218、amid allegations from both domestic critics and international observers that the recent Duma elections had been rigged. Russias ruling party, United Russia, lost its parliamentary majority but still won close to 49.5 percent of the vote. (Harry Engels/Getty Images)CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

219、| NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 14groups and media, and prosecute individual Russians for expressing dissenting political views.96 Online media outlets and social media platforms also face the threat of potential financial takeovers and pressures to change editors, CEOs, or other key

220、personnel if they fail to uphold content restrictions. Internet surveillance. In addition to the legal framework, intimidation, and social norms around self-censorship, Russias brand of digital control is based on a robust system of technical surveillance of internet traffic. The Kremlin has long us

221、ed its System of Operative Search Measures (SORM) to monitor and filter content on the internet. SORM is a nationwide system of automated and remote legal interception adapted from the Soviet period. It covers all Russian telecommunications, including phone calls, email traffic, and internet browsin

222、g activ-ity.97 ISPs and telecom providers are required by law to install SORM equipment. Telecommunications inter-cepted by SORM equipment are stored in a national database for access by the Federal Security Service (FSB), which can monitor the data with little oversight and few constraints. Russian

223、 laws that effectively criminalize criticism of the government further empower the FSB to censor internet communications.98 These capabilities allow the government to enforce its complex web of laws that effectively ban different forms of dissent. Civil society groups and media organizations are fre

224、quently targeted for surveillance.99 Between April 2019 and June 2020, authorities brought 200 criminal prosecutions against Russians who disseminated information online that contradicted official statementsincluding against journalists, politicians, and activists.100 Technological developments, inc

225、luding in data analytics, will enable the Kremlin to become more effective with its online surveillance. AI technologies, for example, will eventually enable the regime to sift through a greater volume of images and text, more effectively filtering and blocking online content that is unfavorable to

226、the government. Much of Russias recent publicly available AI research is focused on technologies with surveillance applications, including linguistics and natural-language processing for internet content mon-itoring, as well as computer vision, pattern recognition, and machine learning for facial re

227、cognition.101 And even if censorship fails and dissent escalates, the Kremlin has an added line of defense: the government can block citizens access to the internet (or large parts of it) to prevent members of the opposition from communi-cating, organizing, or broadcasting their messages. The Russia

228、n government reportedly used targeted mobile internet shutdowns during anti-government protests related to local elections in Moscow in August 2019, and there were some reports of disruption to mobile phone and internet coverage during the pro-Navalny protests in January 2021.102 Internet sovereignt

229、y and data localization. Beyond surveillance, the government has taken several further steps to increase control over the internet, despite the potential for backlash from a public grown accustomed to a relatively free and open internet. Since 2014, the Russian state has moved to establish a “sovere

230、ign internet” more like the Chinese model, which can potentially be severed from the global internet, allowing the government to control cross-border data flows.103 Internet sovereignty laws allow for compulsory installation of state-controlled technical equipment and central-ized control of cross-b

231、order connection lines, as well as the development of a Russian national domain name system. These sovereign internet measures will poten-tially allow the government to censor content more easily, stop the flow of internet traffic across Russian borders, determine the flow of information within them

232、, and expand surveillance.104The Russian governments efforts to assert control over the internet have also included a push for data localization through laws requiring all personal data on Russian persons to be stored domestically. As of July 1, 2018, anti-terror legislation, known as Yarovoyas Law,

233、 has required ISPs, cell phone operators, search engines, and other web services to store all Russian traffic, including private chat rooms, emails, and social network posts, for as long as six months at their own expense.105 Metadata are to be stored for three years. Russia blocked access to Linked

234、In in 2016 and has fined other large companies for failing to store all data on Russian territory.106 In July 2021, Putin signed into law In effect, this complex legal system empowers the government to surveil internet communications with few limitations, censor objectionable content, intimidate civ

235、il society groups and media, and prosecute individual Russians for expressing dissenting political views.CNASDC15legislation requiring foreign social media companies to open offices in Russia.107 Such legislation represents yet another effort by the Kremlin to exert greater control over Big Tech. Mo

236、scow has also stepped up efforts to fine firms such as Google for failing to delete content it defines as being illegal.108Government regulators block virtual private networks (VPNs)a common means for bypassing internet controlsthat allow access to content that the govern-ment has blocked.109 Encryp

237、tion has also increasingly become a target of internet regulation. In October 2020, the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media published a draft law that will ban websites from using common internet encryption pro-tocols that protect user privacy, potentially eliminating a b

238、arrier that currently makes it harder for the govern-ment to block banned content and track the websites that users visit.110 Propaganda and misinformation. Propaganda and misinformation operations are a defining feature of Russias brand of digital control. The Kremlin seeks to manipulate the inform

239、ation environment at home and beyond Russias borders to increase regime security and advance its own objectives. In both arenas, the govern-ments tactics are designed not to limit the supply of information, but rather to flood the environment with pro-government information and misinformation; defle

240、ct and drown out negative press; distract, obfuscate, and confuse; and persuade through pro-Kremlin narratives.111 Automated accounts (or bots) on social media amplify useful narratives inside Russia and in other countries and produce a flurry of distracting or misleading posts that crowd out oppone

241、nts messaging. The Kremlin floods the internet with pro-regime stories, distracting online users from negative news and creating confu-sion and uncertainty through the spread of alternative narratives.112 Russias misinformation and disinformation efforts abroad have been extensively covered, and the

242、 Kremlin uses many of the same tactics domestically as it does beyond its borders.113 In both cases, the Russian government manipulates information with the goal of enhancing regime security.Looking forward, maturing technologies such as microtargeting and deepfakesrealistic digital forgeries of aud

243、io, video, or imagesare likely to further boost the capacity of the Kremlin to manipulate perceptions of its citizens and foreign targets. Microtargeting will eventu-ally allow the government to tailor content for specific individuals or segments of society, just as the commercial world uses demogra

244、phic and behavioral characteristics to customize advertisements. AI-powered algorithms, for example, will allow the government to microtarget individuals with information that either reinforces their support for the regime or seeks to counteract specific sources of discontent. Likewise, the producti

245、on of deep-fakes will make it easier to spread false information even more convincingly, potentially making it more difficult for individuals to know what is real and enhancing the Kremlins ability to sow doubt, confusion, and apathy.114SurveillanceBecause the Russian state is the dominant funder of

246、 high-tech research in the nation, AI development there is likely to focus on applications of interest to govern-ment: surveillance and domestic security.115 The Kremlin uses AI technologies to expand its physical surveillance of citizens, although its capabilities remain more limited than Chinas. R

247、ussian authorities have not published data on the number of cameras in cities, but reports suggest that in 2019, there were 193,000 in Moscow and 55,000 in St. Petersburg.116 One Russian survey estimates there are more than 13 million video cameras across public places in all of Russia. This figure

248、is far fewer than the 200 million in China and 50 million in the United States; but in per capita terms, Russia ranks third in the world behind these two countries.117 Facial recog-nition cameras are also planned for Russias schools. By June 2020, the surveillance systems had report-edly been delive

249、red to 1,608 schools, and authorities plan to surveil the countrys more than 43,000 schools in coming years.118 Russian authorities have used AI-powered facial recognition cameras to scan crowds for criminal suspects and monitor civic activity such as protests.119 For example, Russian sources report

250、 that officials used the growing network of video cameras in public places and improvements in facial recognition technology to identify participants in the Navalny protests of January 2021 so that they could arrest them.120 Doing so allows the regime to avoid high-profile arrests being captured on

251、the streets by social media users, thereby reducing the risk of public backlash during vulnerable periods for the regime. Russian officials also posit that aug-mented-reality glasses will soon allow police to identify and track suspects in real time, although there are reasons to be skeptical of suc

252、h claims, especially given the regimes interest in inflating public perceptions of its capabilities.121The COVID-19 pandemic has raised questions about the strength of Russias surveillance capabilities. The nations network is likely less sophisticated than CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMB

253、ER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 16Chinas and thus less able to effectively enforce public health rules. Nonetheless, the pandemic has allowed the Russian government to expand surveillance and exper-iment with new tools with its facial recognition camera network and surveillance of mobile devi

254、ces.122 In Moscow, authorities have enforced quarantines and punished alleged violators with the help of a network of facial recognition cameras, and the public has been required to download a mobile app that tracks residents move-ments.123 However, it remains unclear how effective these systems are

255、, and researchers have expressed skepticism that the technology is as accurate as Russian authorities and manufacturers claim.124Russian surveillance has taken other forms, including extended employee monitoring. Since October 2020, employees of Moscow companies that switch to remote work must provi

256、de employers with their personal data, including phone numbers, travel documents, and vehicle registration numbers.125 Failure to comply with this requirement could cost employers a fine of up to 300,000 rubles (almost $4,000).126 Local and regional governments, under a mandate from the Kremlin that

257、 took effect in December 2020, now operate “regional management centers” for data that combine citizens personal information with other data such as traffic patterns, economic indicators, and shopping trends. The ostensible purpose of these data centers is to improve local and regional government fu

258、nctions. In effect, however, they act as management centers not for local governing but to tie Russians personal data into central government oversight.Though the Russian tech sector lags behind those of the United States and China, the Russian state has accelerated efforts to boost research and dev

259、elopment of AI technol-ogies. In October 2019, Putin approved a national strategy for AI. Its goals are primarily economic, including accel-erating research and development of AI technologies and assuring national “self-sufficiency” in AI, including the “predominant use” of domestic technologies.127

260、 Several Russian companies have achieved market success in AI technologies, including facial recognition tech producer NtechLab.128 Putin in 2019 promised to dramatically increase funding for the national AI effort, to $6.1 billion over six years, and called for additional legal changes that would b

261、e friendlier to high-tech research and experimen-tation.129 In 2018, Russia announced a new company that seeks to exploit military developments in AI for civilian use, aiming to accelerate domestic applications for AI and reduce dependence on foreign suppliers.130 Russias focus on AI, even if it has

262、 not kept up with the United States and China, will increase its capacity to field digital tools. Technology GovernanceRussia promotes elements of its model of digital authori-tarianism through diplomacy, particularly working with China in multilateral organizations to advance norms that legitimize

263、state control of information under the pretense of cybersecurity.131 In the West, cybersecurity is narrowly understood to protect data and internet infrastructure from damage or theft. U.S. officials have long argued that the open internet serves U.S. political, economic, and dip-lomatic interests.

264、The internet freedom agenda advocated by the United States during the administrations of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama comprised ideas that would allow for the free flow of information on the internet in the interest of personal freedoms, economic growth, and innovation.132 However,

265、 Russia and China are advancing notions of cybersecurity, or, in their terms, “information security,” that emphasize control over content and communica-tions methods to eliminate threats to regime legitimacy and social stability.133 The Russian government views the internet and the global media envi

266、ronment more broadly as working to advance U.S. and liberal democratic influence and values that threaten the Putin regimes hold on power. Putin has likened the American notion of internet freedom to “internet imperialism,” an arm of Western influence within Russias borders and a threat to domestic

267、stability.134 This perception underpins Russias efforts in international arenas to legitimize its pursuit of surveillance and censorship capabilities and to encourage other countries to follow its lead. It is therefore a primary objective of the Russian state to not only assert sover-eignty over the

268、 network within its borders, but also “make other countries, especially the United States, accept” this right.135 Moreover, the Russian military considers itself the target of persistent U.S. cyber activity, using this stated belief to justify what it describes as “defensive” information and cyber a

269、ctions inside Russia. Russia sees international organizations as forums where it can reshape norms and advance new ones around cyber and internet sovereignty to create condi-tions more conducive to its vision of digital control and sovereignty. It frequently does so in tandem with China and other pa

270、rtner countries in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and especially in U.N. bodies. These forums tend to favor the interests of governments, many of which want greater internet control than do the civil society groups and tech companies that advocate for a free, open, and secure internet.136 In

271、 2011 and 2015, Russia proposed an International Code of Conduct for Information Securitypresented at the U.N. alongside representatives of China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistanwhich calls on CNASDC17states to crack down on “dissemination of information” that “undermines other countries political, econo

272、mic or social stability,” as well as information that incites ter-rorism or extremism.137 Largely rhetorical, the proposal illustrated these nations approach to cybersecurity and seemed aimed at persuading developing countries of its merit.138 In 2012, Russia introduced a proposal at the ITU that wo

273、uld allow national governments to usurp control of internet regulation functions currently managed by the U.S. nonprofit Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).The U.N. has been a critical venue for Russian efforts to reshape global governance. Much of this work, which is done i

274、n lockstep with China, has taken place within the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (now known as the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace in t

275、he Context of International Security, or more commonly just GGE). In 2013, Moscow worked with Beijing in the GGE to include language in the groups consensus report that “state sovereignty” and the international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty apply to state conduct in cyberspace. The

276、y expanded this norm in the 2015 report, which stated that sovereignty applies to states “ICT-related activities and to their jurisdiction over ICT-related infrastructure within their territory.”139 After failing to reach a consensus with the United States in the GGE in 2017, Russia and China have s

277、ought to build on their past progress with an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) open to all U.N. member states. Though the large and open-ended nature of this group naturally makes it slower to reach any meaningful con-sensus, it has served as another platform for Russian and Chinese representatives t

278、o promote norms of sover-eignty in cyberspace over norms of internet openness and freedom.140 In December 2019, Russia backed a res-olution to establish a committee to consider a new U.N. cybercrime treaty. Several large democracies, including Nigeria and India, were persuaded by Russian arguments t

279、hat a new treaty was needed to fight cybercrime and ter-rorism, even as the United States warned that the treaty could be a veiled effort to legitimize internet surveil-lance and crackdowns on online dissent.141 In October, the United States and Russia agreed to seek a common set of “rules of the ro

280、ad” to prevent malicious cyberat-tacks. The U.N. joint resolution embraces Washingtons favored Group of Governmental Experts report and Russian-backed recommendations from the Open-ended Working Group. The joint resolution underscores the two countries commitment to and focus on cybersecu-rity and g

281、rowing risks emanating from this domain. Russia has also focused on building support for internet sovereignty. It hopes to create a precedent with its own effort to create sovereignty over the internet and monitor communications, and to persuade other countries to accept this sovereignty and adopt a

282、 similar model.142 Moscow also sought international partnerships to develop technological alternatives to the current unrestricted global internet. Russia has pushed for undersea cable projects that would allow BRICS countriesBrazil Russia, India, China, and South Africato link their networks withou

283、t routing traffic through the United States.143 Additionally, Russia is pursuing greater ICT activity with other BRICS member states.144 Putin has also worked bilaterally with Xi Jinping, signing a 2015 agreement on cybersecurity that further articulated and affirmed cyber sovereignty norms. The two

284、 countries continue to work in the framework of that agreement, primarily by jointly devel-oping technology and processes for internet control.145 The Exportability of the Russian Model of Digital ControlThe CCP will retain far more influence over the tra-jectory of the future digital order than the

285、 Kremlin. Nonetheless, Russias experimental approach to infor-mation manipulation and controlone that combines legal and technological measures to limit citizens access to information over the internet, suppress Russian President Vladimir Putin addresses the United Nations General Assembly in 2015.

286、Since then, Russia has attempted to shape global norms and standards on digital governance, promoting a model that gives sovereign states greater ability to regulate, censor, and undermine access to information. (John Moore/Getty Images)CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of

287、 the Digital Order 18domestic opposition, and undermine democratic insti-tutions around the worldwill continue to play a role in shaping future trends. Moreover, the Kremlin is likely to be forward leaning, taking on risk in its development and application of new digital technologies, which in turn

288、will influence the future digital order. The Putin regime is likely to accept more risk in this domain because the Russian president is acutely aware that his country lags behind the United States and China in AI development. In particular, he seeks to avoid losing another key con-tested space to th

289、e United States. For the time being, Russias brand of digital authori-tarianism will have the most influence in the countries along its periphery. Belarus, Ukraine, and several Central Asian countries have adopted SORM-like systems, making them natural customers for Russian-sourced surveillance tech

290、nology. Moreover, many of these former Soviet nations have adopted parts of Russias legal framework, which they similarly use to stifle the infor-mation environment.146 Farther afield, Russian influence will likely be more limited, in part because the country is unlikely to compete with China as a p

291、rimary exporter of digital control through its sales of surveillance tech-nology, software, and applications. Nonetheless, the Kremlin will wield some influence in less direct ways, including diplomacy and norm-setting. Going forward, Russias influence over the future digital order will likely depen

292、d on the ease of emulating the Russian digital control model, the efficacy and scope of digital authori-tarianism inside Russia, the response of the international community, and Russias ability to overcome barriers to technological innovation. The ease of emulating the Russian model. Many countries

293、lack the capacity to emulate Chinas comprehensive model of censorship and social control. This requires a large state apparatus, expensive and advanced tech-nology, and a domestic internet built for censorship from the get-go. In addition, Chinas model is more overtly repressive and therefore a risk

294、y choice for governments that still claim legitimacy by upholding the trappings of democracy. Russias model, in other words, may be more appealing to a broader swath of countries. Russias laws and other nontechnical forms of digital control do not necessi-tate significant resources or know-how, and

295、the less overtly repressive approach may be more palatable than Beijings model for countries that sit closer to the democracy end of the political spectrum. Russias primary edge on China in the surveillance technology market in some countries is that its solutions are, for now, cheaper and easier to

296、 install. But they may not remain that way for long. As more countries adopt other Chinese digital technologies, such as 5G equipment from Huawei, Chinese surveillance technology will become less expensive and easier to integrate, leaving less oppor-tunity for Russia to grow its share of the surveil

297、lance technology market.147 The efficacy and scope of digital authoritarianism inside Russia. The Kremlin likely views digital tools as an oppor-tunity to upgrade and enhance its repressive tactics. Putin appears intent on more effectively harnessing technology to solve Russias domestic challenges,

298、including the increasing public discontent with his regime. The appoint-ment of Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, for example, likely reflects this focus. Mishustin had success as chief of the Russian Federal Taxation Service by using technolog-ical solutions to cut tax fraud and evasion while boost

299、ing government receipts. His success in those areas probably influenced the Kremlins decision to appoint him prime minister. If the Kremlin can harness digital technologies to strengthen control over an increasingly restive population, other autocrats may take note and seek to emulate those tactics.

300、 Likewise, if Russia can prove a concept for national-izing the internet, other leaders may follow suit. The Kremlins drive for greater control over the digital space, however, risks domestic backlash that could limit the scope of its control. Unlike China, Moscow did not build a controlled internet

301、 from the ground up, and the Russian internet has long been relatively free and open.148 The government appears attuned to the risk of backlash and is taking incremental actions that over time could effectively limit the digital sphere without triggering a strong public reaction. However, Russians h

302、ave grown accustomed to their relative freedoms online and could mount resistance to Kremlin efforts to restrict the space. Russian citizens protested against the internet sovereignty law, for example, and could continue to push back against future efforts, especially if they appear brazen.149 Such

303、domestic opposi-tion could constrain the scope of what the Kremlin is able to do, limiting the comprehensiveness of the digital model that other leaders look to emulate. Likewise, wide-scale The Putin regime is likely to accept more risk in this domain because the Russian president is acutely aware

304、that his country lags behind the United States and China in AI development.CNASDC19Tprotests and/or other forms of instability in Russia would also make the Kremlins model less attractive for leaders watching from other countries. The international response. Russias influence operations have destabi

305、lized politics around the world, particularly in the United States and Europe. Intentionally or not, the Kremlins aggressive posture has demonstrated the vul-nerability of open societies to Russian tactics. Moreover, Russia has faced few consequences for its interference in the United States and in

306、European democracies, signaling to other countries the limited costs associated with these efforts. U.S. adversaries such as China and Iran have followed Russias lead and increased their initiatives to interfere in the U.S. domestic political system.150 The ability of liberal democracies to mount a

307、strong and cohesive response to Russias tacticsby both raising the costs and increasing resiliencewill signifi-cantly shape the extent to which other countries seek to adopt or emulate elements of the Russian model. Limits on Russian technological competitiveness and innovation. Ultimately, Russian

308、influence on the future digital order will be contingent on Moscows ability to compete in this domain. There are, however, real con-straints on the Kremlins ability to meet its technological ambitions, and this will limit its future influence, at least on a global stage. First, implementation of som

309、e Russian initiatives has been plagued by delays. The Russian sovereign internet, for example, currently exists only on paper. Federal law now includes the frameworks for a centrally controlled internet, but implementing it has been challenging. A key test of the underlying technology was delayed in

310、 late 2020, and other tests had already been delayed because of the COVID-19 pandemic.151 The pandemic has also thrown a wrench in data localization plans: Russian ICT providers are struggling to comply with new data storage requirements while also handling a huge surge in traffic caused by pandemic

311、-induced restrictions.152 Likewise, Russia may be delayed in the develop-ment and therefore the export of its digital surveillance technology while it waits for its own domestic solutions. The country is determined to use primarily domestic technology for AI development, but still cannot produce key

312、 digital products with the same quality and efficiency as can China and the United States.153 Brain drain and the lack of an innovative start-up culture have affected Russias drive for domestic high-tech developments. Much of the country also lacks the infrastructure to support this high-tech develo

313、pment, although govern-ment programs are now trying to reverse the trend.154 New government investment has helped address some of these flaws, but centralized funding also creates opportunities for bureaucratic waste and graft that could constrain advancement.155 Moreover, because Russias research a

314、nd development is so heavily state funded, it is also overwhelmingly defense- and security-focused. Meanwhile, the pandemic has forced the national gov-ernment to plan to scale back its financial support for civilian AI development.156 The Middle Easthe Middle East region presents a different type o

315、f challenge for the United States than either China or Russia in the context of the global digital order. With the exception of Iran and Syria, the states in this region that use technology to strengthen authoritarian governance are U.S. partners. Egypts government regu-larly uses information contro

316、l and censorship online to stifle political discourse. The United Arab Emirates has one of the most pervasive surveillance systems in the world. Saudi Arabia used digital surveillance to track the movements of the dissident Jamal Khashoggi, who was ultimately murdered by operatives reporting to Saud

317、i Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. Even Israelone of the few democracies in the Middle Easthas been associated with problematic behavior, with Israeli firms selling cutting-edge surveillance applications to repres-sive governments that have used the technology to spy on journalists and opponents. T

318、his situation is not surprising given the broader context in the region and the history of U.S. policy. The Middle East is the least free region in the world, with 83 percent of the population living under repressive governmentsregimes that Freedom House classifies as “not free.”157 Moreover, the Un

319、ited States has a long track record of maintaining good relations with these authoritarian states, because of evolving motivations that have ranged from countering the Soviet Union during the Cold War to relying on Middle Eastern oil to partnering with these states on counterterrorism after 9/11. Ho

320、wever, an increasingly authoritarian digital order in the Middle East works against U.S. interests in several ways. First, the low levels of freedom and opportunity for the regions populations, particularly young adults, have been major factors in instability and conflict during the past 20 years. T

321、his atmosphere has resulted in widespread repercussions, such as the development of terrorist safe havens and mass migration movements, which harm U.S. interests and destabilize allied and partner nations not only in the Middle East but also in CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The F

322、uture of the Digital Order 20Europe. These problems will persist into the future if regional governments use technology to repress their populations more effectively.Moreover, the pattern of using technology for illib-eral aims contributes to growing levels of influence for Americas peer competitors

323、. China in particular can benefit from Middle Eastern states demand for these types of technological tools, by exporting them and thus further strengthening Chinese influence. Middle Eastern states, however, are less inter-ested than Russia or China in exporting governance structures that support an

324、 authoritarian digital order. While Chinese and Russian efforts are at least partially inspired by their desire to bend international norms to their interests and thus counter the United States, Middle Eastern states have no such motivation. As U.S. partners, they are content to support the current

325、international order provided that their violations of democratic norms are overlooked. As a whole, this situation leads to tough questions for U.S. policymakers as they try to maintain good relations with many of the states in the region, while also convincing them to take steps to maintain a freer

326、digital environment. The following sections again examine the three pillars of the digital order: informa-tion control, surveillance, and technology governance. Following this analysis, the paper then makes recom-mendations for how to address the policy challenges posed by nondemocratic partners in

327、the context of the evolving global digital order.Information ControlAcross the Middle East, information control online has taken two central forms. The first is censorship, which is used as a tool by governments to suppress challenges to their authority. The second is the use of disinforma-tion as a

328、 method of suppression and targeting other states. These developments are not new, but their speed and wide reach have intensified. Censorship. Governments in the region actively curtail freedom of expression through institutionalized mass blocking, targeted attacks, and blanket bans on websites and

329、 online platforms. Egypts growing digital authoritarianism serves as a dark example.158 Over the past few years, Egypts High Council for Cybersecurity has taken steps to block internet activity by acquiring high-tech equipment from Western countries, including the United States and Germany.159 Egypt

330、ian courts have increased their crackdown on social media, jailing female TikTok influencers on charges of indecency and violating public morals.160 In 2018, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi ratified the Anti-Cyber and Information Technology Crimes Lawostensibly a counterterrorism measure all

331、owing authorities to block websites considered “a threat to national security” or to the “national economy.”161 The Egyptian government also instituted a law that considers social media accounts with more than 5,000 followers to be publishing outlets, and therefore liable to more stringent restricti

332、ons and accusations of spreading fake news.162 In June 2020, Egypts Supreme Council for Media Regulation went a step further, announcing a ban on media covering “sensitive issues,” which include the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the coronavirus, and conflicts in Libya and the Sinai Peninsula.163H

333、owever, Egypt is far from the only example of a U.S. partner in the Middle East that uses online censorship to control political discourse. Before Bahrains 2018 elections, the Ministry of the Interior announced plans to crack down on activists who criticized the government online; many have since be

334、en imprisoned and tortured.164 In the case of Saudi Arabia, there was a significant increase in the number of censored websites after the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.165In February 2011, thousands of people protesting former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak used social media platforms, including Faceb

335、ook, to amplify their message and organize protests in Tahrir Square in Cairo. Since then, Egyptian authorities have blocked internet activity by banning websites and online platforms, and have even jailed citizens for social media activity. (Chris Hondros/Getty Images)CNASDC21Government censorship

336、exists even when countries take positive steps toward peace and security in the region. For example, in the aftermath of the United Arab EmiratesIsrael normalization agreement announced in August 2020, Twitter accounts linked to the Emirati gov-ernment ordered security forces to monitor the tweets o

337、f residents opposing the deal; one account urged agencies to “expel them from this country because they will be a threat to the security of our nation.”166 In Egypt, the government warned its countrys media outlets against publishing news and statements that criticized the Emirati-Israeli normalizat

338、ion agreement.167Many regional governments also rely on blanket internet shutdowns to control the spread of information. For example, in response to anti-government protests in 2019, Iraqa U.S. partner whose population has greater freedoms compared to those in many other countries in the regiondelib

339、erately interrupted internet connec-tivity for 263 hours, affecting 19 million users and costing the country an estimated $2.3 billion in lost economic activity.168 In a more extreme case, the Iranian govern-ment imposed days-long internet blackouts in November and December 2019, as it pursued a blo

340、ody crackdown on protestors.169 Indeed, Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps works in concert with the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting to develop cyber battalions that prioritize information control and content production to achieve their national security aims.170 In some cases, restricted

341、 internet access is also moti-vated by economic interests rather than information control. Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have long blocked free internet calling apps, including WhatsApp, Skype, and FaceTime, to protect the commer-cial interests of their state-owned telecommunications com

342、panies.171 During the COVID-19 pandemic, human rights activists have urged governments to lift restric-tions on such applications, on which millions of low-paid migrant workers rely to communicate with their families at home.172 Disinformation. In addition to censorship, Middle Eastern governments o

343、ften engage in disinformation campaigns, sometimes to downplay domestic chal-lenges but more often as a foreign policy tool. These campaigns are occasionally the product of intense state-on-state competition, as was evident during the recent blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirate

344、s, Egypt, and Bahrain. In cases involving American adversariesmost notably Iranthis disinfor-mation is targeted at trying to counter U.S. priorities in the Middle East. At the start of the blockade against Qatar in 2017, there were reports of the United Arab Emirates hacking Qatari state websites an

345、d posting comments that were falsely attributed to the Qatari emir.173 Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates deployed hundreds of thousands of bots to launch attacks on Qatar, criticizing the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatars hosting of the 2022 World Cup.174 In 2019, Twitter took down 4,525 account

346、s linked to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates for spreading propaganda that voiced support for the war in Yemen and opposed the Houthis, Qatar, and Iran.175 The conflict in Libya, in which a number of regional actors have been engaged, has also become a ripe battleground for cyberwar

347、fare, with Saudi, Emirati, Egyptian, Qatari, and Turkish accounts each elevating their own proxies. Last year, Facebook removed multiple pages, groups, and accounts for “coordinated inauthentic behavior” against Libya.176 Meanwhile in Iraq, Iranian-backed Hezbollah have reportedly been training “ele

348、ctronic armies” to spread false information and incite violence against political opponents.177Iran also conducts these types of political warfare operations against the United States. Between April 2018 and March 2019, threat intelligence analysts traced a number of social media accounts to an Iran

349、ian influ-ence operation.178 These accounts, many on Twitter, appropriated existing profile pictures, including those of U.S. political candidates, to create fake accounts and then spread doctored audio and video interviews, along with false American political commentary voicing anti-Saudi, anti-Isr

350、aeli, and pro-Palestinian sentiment.179 This material penetrated legitimate print and online media outlets in the United States and Israel via the publica-tion of letters, guest columns, and blog posts.180 Perhaps most worrisome, the U.S. intelligence community has concluded that in the run-up to th

351、e 2020 U.S. presiden-tial election, Iran used a multipronged covert and overt influence campaign based on online tools to harm Donald Trumps prospects for reelection and undermine confi-dence in U.S. institutions.181Surveillance Across the Middle East, states deploy surveillance technology, mainly i

352、mported from such countries as China, Israel, Russia, and the United States, in the name of national security. States have long used digital infra-structure, such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras and license plate detection, to surveil their populations, but have progressively enhanced th

353、eir systems by adopting the latest AI and machine learning tools, such as biometrics solutions and spyware.182 These CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 22advances have allowed autocrats in the Middle East to monitor more people, collect more data, and u

354、se the information toward illiberal ends. Advanced technologies are weaponized to target political dissidents, journalists, and activists deemed threats to their regimes, spurring a chain of human rights abuses. The remainder of this section first describes how Middle Eastern governments use surveil

355、lance technologies. It then discusses the problems associ-ated with exports of these types of technologies to the Middle East from democratic states such as the United States and Israel. Finally, it examines how the smart city model that the Chinese are exporting to the region has contributed to a m

356、ore authoritarian digital order. Use of surveillance technology. Governments throughout the Middle East use spyware to gain access to private data, primarily on cellphones. Through measures such as hacking, regimes are able to intimidate dissidents at home and conduct espio-nage operations outside t

357、heir borders. U.S. partners such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have spent millions of dollars reinforcing their coercive ecosystems of “preventative surveillance.”183 The most famous example is Saudi Arabias use of electronic surveillance tools to track Khashoggi to the Saudi Consulat

358、e in Istanbul, where he was murdered.184 Saudi Arabia even went so far as to allegedly hire two Twitter employees to spy on users and hack dissidents accounts.185 In another example, the United Arab Emirates for years targeted Ahmed Mansoor, a prominent human rights activist, with spyware on his dev

359、ices. In 2017, he was fined and jailed for his posts on Facebook and Twitter that allegedly “published false information, rumors and lies about the U.A.E.,” which “would damage the U.A.E.s social harmony and unity.”186Surveillance technology is being used not only in the Gulf but also the Levant. Th

360、e Egyptian govern-ment has supported sophisticated methods to target and track its own citizens. In one operation, software installed on the phones of Egyptian journalists, academics, activists, and opposition politicians allowed Egypts General Intelligence Service to read victims files and emails,

361、track their locations, and identify whom they contacted and when.187 In 2019, during a worsening economic and political crisis, Lebanese government agents infiltrated WhatsApp chat groups to track down anti-government protest leaders. American and Israeli sales of surveillance technology. American c

362、ompanies and individuals have also been complicit in surveillance operations across the Middle East. Spyware equipment used in the region was traced to IBM and Google, though public criticisms and domestic regulatory constraints have caused some companies to distance themselves from projects of conc

363、ern.188 In an operation known as Project Raven, the United Arab Emirates hired U.S. contractors and former National Security Agency officials to help Emirati intelli-gence hack into the phones and computers of suspected terrorists, political rivals, dissidents, and activists using a sophisticated ha

364、cking tool called Karma. These opera-tives helped the United Arab Emirates collect evidence against Mansoor and his wife, including emails in which he discussed an upcoming demonstration in front of the Emirati Federal Supreme Court with family members of imprisoned dissidents. Ultimately, some Amer

365、ican cyber professionals withdrew from the project and disclosed their concerns to the FBI.189 This incident, however, points to the need for greater regulation to prevent former U.S. government officials who have these types of expertise from providing their services to nondemocratic statesincludin

366、g those aligned with the United States. Israel, a key U.S. partner, has come under fire for exporting spyware to authoritarian states in the region and across the globe. In 2019, WhatsApp alleged that the Israeli surveillance company NSO Group had assisted governments with hacking into the mobile de

367、vices of dozens of people around the world, including journalists and human rights activists.190 Further details emerged in 2021, including the release of a list of 50,000 phone numbers allegedly targeted by clients of NSO that counted opposition politicians and heads of state.191 By delivering mali

368、cious software through seemingly innoc-uous WhatsApp video calls, the malware initiated various forms of spying, such as intercepting communications, stealing photos and other forms of data, activating microphones and cameras, and tracking the locations of targets.192 Furthermore, Pegasus, a “lawful

369、 intercept” surveillance tool developed by NSO Group, was used to spy on Mansoor and Khashoggi.193 NSO Group exec-utives argue that they ultimately cannot control how their product is used, and that its primary purpose is as a counterterrorism tool. Importantly, in November 2021 the U.S. Commerce De

370、partment placed NSO Group on a blacklist stating that its behavior was “contrary to the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States,” and sending a powerful signal that even companies associated with close U.S. allies will suffer consequences for this type of behavior.CNASDC2

371、3To divert the illiberal trajectory of these high-tech applications, private companies must be held to higher standards. David Kaye, a former U.N. special rapporteur on freedom of expression, advocated for increased stan-dards in the surveillance industry, highlighting the need for closer scrutiny o

372、f companies client bases, as well as potential safeguards to prevent abuse.194 Smart cities and Chinese sales of surveillance tech-nology. Gulf States have also looked to establish smart cities, which integrate a variety of surveillance efforts, including the use of sensors and cameras to gather inf

373、ormation in real time. This information can be used for all kinds of purposesostensibly to consolidate the management of cities and raise productivity, but also to surveil and track dissidents. China has become an important investor in this arena, helping to establish smart cities in Iraq and Saudi

374、Arabia.In 2019, following the liberation of areas previously under ISIS occupation, Huawei launched the first phase of the Iraq Safe City Solution project, which aims to improve security measures. The initiatives objective is to reduce existing security checkpoints by incorporating smart surveillanc

375、e cameras that track individuals more efficiently.195 Since 2014, Huawei has also collaborated with authorities in Yanbu, a major Red Sea port city in western Saudi Arabia, to construct a connected city. The project involves installing broadband and cloud-com-puting infrastructure to build a sensor-

376、enabled city, including security and public services. Huawei provided a comprehensive portfolio of network and information technology solutions, as well as devices such as sur-veillance cameras; the eSight + Network Management System platform, which uniformly manages net-work-wide devices; and softw

377、are produced by Huawei partners.196 The resulting operations collect a range of data on residents, including electricity consumption, vehicle parking, and crowd density, for simultaneous management and analysis.In 2019, Yanbu installed an “e-police” system, which comprises 256 high-definition camera

378、s at 16 major intersections, providing high-quality images and videos that allow authorities to trace vehicles or impose dif-ferent controlling measures by automatically identifying traffic violations. Since its introduction, this system has reduced monthly violations from 5,000 to 2,000.197 Similar

379、ly, police in Dubai have launched a system called Oyoon“eyes” in Arabicintended to reduce crime and traffic accidents by using AI to analyze images and behaviors that point to crime, with little regulatory oversight.198China has been a significant player on this front in the Middle East. Multiple co

380、untries have signed memoran-dums of understanding with Chinese companies, and regional telecom groups have partnered with Huawei and ZTE to foster cooperation on 5G telecommunica-tions.199 While these advanced technologies can improve a countrys safety, they can also facilitate nefarious aims if lef

381、t unchecked. U.S. policymakers are rightly alarmed that companies such as Huawei, which has faced tighter restrictions from the United States, and Hikvision, the surveillance company whose equipment has been used to monitor Uyghurs in Xinjiang, have developed closer economic and technological ties w

382、ith Middle East coun-tries with a history of suppression.200 Additionally, these developments provide the Chinese regime access to and control over critical infrastructure in the region. The expansion of Chinas Digital Silk Road threatens the civil liberties of people in these countries, exacerbates

383、 U.S. concerns regarding stability and the use of these tech-nologies, and is a component of the strategic competition between the United States and China.Technology GovernanceInvestment in emerging technologies carries the promise of a digital transformation for the Middle Easta path to economic gr

384、owth and decreased dependence on oil. Indeed, many states in the region are keen to embrace this opportunity. The reality is, however, that given the highly repressive nature of these states, they are also content to use the technology for illiberal ends and are certainly not keen to establish the t

385、ype of norms that can protect the rights of their populations. The result is that technology standards and regulations in the Middle East are moving more slowly than adoption and aspirational visions. Adoption of AI serves as an emblematic case. According to a 2020 survey, 82 percent of large compan

386、ies across the Middle East and North Africa had launched AI programs by the end of 2019, though the speed of adoption has trailed behind other parts of the world.201 When it comes to regulatory frameworks, however, the region is charac-terized by a general lack of AI regulation, standards, and ethic

387、s.202 Regulations on management, transfer, storage, sharing, and use of data are also deficientdespite the central role such protocols would play in any potential digital trans-formation. Even among Middle Eastbased companies that adopt AI, executives identify additional regulatory clarity and agree

388、d-upon industry standards as prerequi-sites for willingly engaging in the data sharing that would bring benefits such as faster supply chains and more inno-vative product development.203CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 24EBeyond business-to-business d

389、ata sharing, there are also no regulations or clear guidelines for cross-border data flows. No Middle Eastern countries currently participate in plurilateral or bilateral agreements, either binding or non-binding, that would provide a framework for data transfer across borders.204 Data protection la

390、ws are on the books in the free zones of Abu Dhabi Global Markets and the Dubai International Financial Centre, but not the United Arab Emirates comprehensively. In Dubai, the laws cover the regulation of data collection, transfer, and sharing.205 Egypts data protection law went into effect in Octob

391、er 2020 but will likely not be enforced until 2022.206 Since 2018, Bahrain, Qatar, and Turkey have all made efforts to pass legislation that addresses certain aspects of data privacy. Given that most legislation in the region is nascent, the effectiveness of the laws as well as enforce-ment preceden

392、ts and patterns have yet to be evaluated. Regulations are still to come in Saudi Arabia.207 Given the authoritarian nature of most of the gov-ernments in the region, they are unlikely to develop effective technology governance because such standards are ultimately not in their interest. Instead, the

393、 models supported by China, which entail economic growth combined with using technology as a mechanism to rein-force an autocratic system, are far more appealing.The only good news is that most of these countries do align themselves with the United States and, unlike China or Russia, have little int

394、erest in fundamentally reshaping the international order. Thus, while they may be receptive to Chinas version of the future digital order, they will not go out of their way to promote it. Indeed, there may be opportunities for the United States to move these states in a more positive direction over

395、time. Implications of Regional Trends for the Digital Orderfforts by authoritarians to shape the digital order have implications that must be addressed by initiatives to safeguard liberal democratic norms and values. This section outlines four dynamics that are especially concerning. First, the incr

396、easingly close alignment between China and Russia will generate dangerous digital synergies. Second, authoritarian regimes will inevitably seek to expand censorship of free information exchange and political speech. Third, illiberal governments throughout Asia, the Middle East, and parts of Eurasia

397、will continue to seek technology, funding, and technical expertise from China to control social movements and civil society protests. Together these trends will impair U.S. efforts to mitigate risk to the global digital order. The emerging patterns stem from the interplay between different actors ac

398、ross multiple regions. To ensure a more liberal digital order, it is necessary to understand how attempts to expand digital authoritarianism could mutually reinforce and accelerate illiberal behavior.Growing China-Russia alignment will generate dangerous digital synergies.Russian and Chinese views o

399、n emerging technologies and digital control are increasingly aligned. Both gov-ernments view a free and open internet and the spread of social media and other digital tools as threats to their national sovereignty and their hold on power. These governments view the internet and digital technologies

400、as conduits for the United States to destabilize their regimes and as tools for citizens to overthrow oppressive and unresponsive administrations. They are therefore taking steps and aligning efforts in the digital realm to solidify control over their populations internally. While China will retain

401、a leading role in the digital domain, the countries alignment and increasing coordina-tion are likely to amplify the effects of their individual actions in several ways: Making digital autocracy accessible for a broader swath of states. Chinese and Russian leaders have concluded that digital tools,

402、if properly managed, can be lever-aged to increase their control over their citizens. But the two countries have approached digital authoritar-ianism differently, in large part because they started from different places domestically. China built repres-sion and control into its model from the start,

403、 whereas Russia is now working to roll back a previously open space. Nonetheless, the two countries will continue to share best practices as they refine their approaches to digital dictatorship. Just as important, the differences in the Chinese and Russian toolkits offer aspiring auto-crats a grab b

404、ag of options for tailoring approaches to digital control that are best suited to their own domestic contexts. In some casesmost likely in full autocraciesChinas model will dominate. In hybrid regimes where leaders want to maintain the veneer of democracy or cannot get away with such blatant repress

405、ion, leaders will likely mix and match elements of the Russian and Chinese models. In this way, the alignment of the two countries objectiveseven when they pursue them dif-ferentlyis likely to amplify the effect of their individual actions by making digital authoritarianism accessible for more state

406、s.CNASDC25Accelerating their digital innovation. Russia and China view the technology domain as a critical battle space in their competition with the United States, and in some instances view collaboration in the digital sphere as offering the potential for accelerated innovation. Their technology-f

407、ocused dialogues and exchanges indicate that collaboration in areas such as AI is a priority that should be expected to expand. In some cases, their collaboration will have the potential to accelerate the development of illiberal technologies. For example, Russias NtechLab (one of the countrys leadi

408、ng developers in AI and facial recognition) and Chinas Dahua Technology (a manufac-turer of video surveillance solutions) jointly produced a wearable camera with a face recognition function. Complementarity between the two nations in AI devel-opment may allow them both to more quickly develop survei

409、llance and predictive policing models that other governments will follow. Eroding liberal norms in international institutions. China and Russia view the structure of governance of the internet as a source of U.S. power and influence. They therefore seek to undermine this system and shape norms aroun

410、d the internet and emerging technologies such as AI in ways that advance their own illiberal interests. They have made progress on this front and are likely to continue to push a large cadre of states to back their visions for internet sovereignty and domestic surveillance. China, for example, has j

411、oined with Russia and a coalition of other countries to build support at the United Nations for their concepts of digital sovereignty. This coalition is composed entirely of nations ranked by the Freedom Houses “Freedom in the World” index as not free. Its strength was clear in December 2019, when t

412、he U.N. adopted a cybercrime resolution titled “Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal Purposes” that was jointly backed by China, Russia, and a consortium of illiberal actors including North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela.208 The resolu-tion stands in star

413、k contrast to the norms that the United States and its allies have championed, including maximal access to the global internet, and instead seeks to equip authoritarian governments with broad-based means to punish, repress, and censor dissidents online.209 While the Sino-Russian view on internet gov

414、ernance does not currently enjoy majority support in most international institutions, it is plausible that a plurality of states could join the cause in the future. They are also likely to amplify one anothers efforts to create alternative cyber, AI, and digital economy domains that will not be cons

415、trained by democratic norms, civil liberties, and privacy standards.Raising the prospects of “splinternet.” Russia and China are pursuing independent root server systems, pushing hosts to remove root servers from the United States to limit Americas ability to cut off internet access.210 As noted, Ru

416、ssia is following Chinas lead in its effort to create a sovereign internet, RuNetan initiative that analysts have compared with Chinas Great Firewall.211 Although Russias capacity to implement the law is untested, RuNets existence underscores the way Russia and China are sharing best practices and l

417、egit-imizing each others actions. Working together, these two nations pose a more potent force advancing a trend toward fragmentation. If other countries follow suit, the splintering of the internet will create high barriers for global trade, cause U.S. tech companies to lose access to global market

418、s, limit citizens access to free and open information, and empower authoritarians around the world to tighten control over their countriespoten-tially resulting in fewer countries aligned with U.S. values and interests. It is inevitable that countries around the world will seek to regulate online co

419、mmunications platforms. Online communications platforms have reshaped the global political information landscape. For years, the spread of U.S. platforms across Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East was viewed as a vector of free speech and political liberties. The Arab Spring was launched

420、 on Facebook in 2011; WhatsApp helped topple 50 years of one-party rule in Malaysia in 2018; and even Tinder, the dating app, played a vital role in the 2020 Thai protest movement.212 But these unregu-lated information ecosystems have become pathways for legitimate and spurious news alike. They have

421、 imperiled elections in Indonesia and the Philippines, and they have been abused to stoke ethnic and religious violence in India and Myanmar.213 Social media. Governments across the world have exploited the issue of fake news and disinformation on unregulated platforms to assert heavy-handed censors

422、hip over online information spaces. From Egypt to Singapore, regimes have used concerns about false news to crack down on activists and opposition parties.214 Even Indiathe worlds largest democracyhas started to institute regulations on social media. In February 2021, India announced the Information

423、 Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules. The new regulations require Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to appoint India-based compliance officers, who will CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 26provide a report every month

424、that details complaints received and what actions the companies have taken to address them. The companies will be required to remove content within 36 hours of receiving a legal order from Indian authorities, and to reveal the origi-nators of such content. Although these new regulations may have mer

425、it, the hurried way they were announced, with little warning to the affected companies, raises questions. Many observers view the rushed new orders as a response to a recent dispute between the Indian government and Twitter regarding hashtags tied to farmer protests that rocked the government in lat

426、e 2020.Data localization laws. Data localization laws pio-neered in China and Russia have been adopted by India, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, and Vietnam, where governments share a desire to enjoy the economic benefits of digitization within the safety of highly controlled online spaces.215 More rec

427、ently, however, governments in India, Indonesia, and Vietnam have relaxed data localization policies, following heavy lobbying by U.S. industry.216 Company self-censorship. Technology companiesincluding U.S. oneshave compounded the issue of states exerting greater control over online platforms. Chin

428、ese apps such as the video-sharing platforms TikTok and Kuaishou have gained significant ground on American competitors in fast-growing online markets including Brazil and Southeast Asia.217 The Chinese companies have admitted to self-censoring content about such subjects as repression in Xinjiang a

429、nd protests in Hong Kong.218 Non-Chinese compa-nies also are turning to self-censorship as a means of ensuring they retain a foothold in markets governed by authoritarian governments. U.S. companies including Disney, Yahoo, and Zoom have attempted to toe the CCP line on sensitive issues to avoid los

430、ing market access.219 Illiberal regimes will seek out Chinese technology to help them control social movements and civil protests.As autocratic governments and leaders in fragile democracies look to exert greater control over their populations and pursue cheap pathways toward digital development, th

431、ey find Beijings high-tech illiber-alism an attractive model. They actively seek Chinas technology, funding, and know-how. These countries justify their pursuit of Chinese technology by under-scoring ways it will contribute to economic growth, social stability, and efforts to fight crime and terrori

432、sm. Across the Middle East and Indo-Pacific, countries such as the Philippines, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Iran have readily welcomed the adoption of technol-ogies that can be employed for illiberal ends. Chinese technologies and associated norms offer these countries appealing tools for p

433、ursuing their interestspopulation control, state-on-state competition, shifts in regional alignment, and market incentives.220 However, the autocratic leaders true aims are to keep a lid on criticism of the government, and to easily identify and punish individuals who dissent from their policies or

434、inspire others to do so. The demand for Chinese technology. Beijing has exported surveillance technology worldwide, often to coun-tries that seek more effective and cost-efficient ways of repressing opposition. For example, in the United Arab Emirates, Huawei, which has close linkages to the Chinese

435、 government, is partnering with local authorities on Safe Cities platforms that provide com-prehensive surveillance.221 And in 2012, ZTE, one of Chinas largest telecommunications companies, sold surveillance systems to the Telecommunication Corporation of Iran, a state-owned company.222 In 2018, the

436、 Filipino government contracted with Huawei and the China International Telecommunication and Construction Corporation to construct a 12,000-camera surveillance system across metropolitan Manila and other cities. These systems allow the government to monitor landlines and all communications across p

437、hones and the internet, mimicking Chinas own use of authoritarian controls. Copying Chinese regulations and standards. Not only have these countries imported Chinese technologies, they have also looked to Beijing as a model for designing a regulatory environment that benefits government interests. C

438、hinese companies have helped produce other countries government plans, as was the case with Huawei and the “Lao National ICT Development Plan 20162020 White Paper.”223 In the Middle East, Huawei partnered with the U.S. firm Deloitte to develop its own vision of “Government 4.0” in the region, applyi

439、ng the latest technologies to modernize the delivery of govern-ment services.224 China has hosted numerous sessions on censorship in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.225 Egypts latest moves in broad-ening its censorship efforts unequivocally mirror Chinas internet governance

440、 strategy.226 Similarly, in the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, firms including CNASDC27Huawei and ZTE are partnering with local authorities on Safe Cities platforms to provide comprehensive city surveillance.227 The dilemma for the United States. U.S. partner interest in using technol

441、ogy for illiberal purposes poses a dilemma for the United States, which must decide if it will push back on the contentious behaviors and transactions of its allies around the world. If it chooses to do so, it must decide how, to what extent, and potentially at what cost. The dynamics in the Middle

442、East underscore the challenges facing U.S. policymakers. The notion that the United States can export its own high-tech equipment to displace Chinese investment may be valid with a democratic partner such as Israel, but not with a non-democratic partner such as Saudi Arabia, which will deploy these

443、technologies, regardless of their origin, toward the same authoritarian ends as does China. High-tech illiberalism in part is a function of where the technology is employed, and not necessarily its country of origin, whether that is the United States or China. Yet in some cases, the United States sh

444、ould be prepared to amplify democratic values and principles as a means of providing an alternative to China, and as the basis for future economic cooperation with these coun-tries. Furthermore, the United States can facilitate and encourage investment and cooperation between its like-minded allies

445、and countries susceptible to the Chinese model, especially in projects where the United States itself cannot directly assist.The practices of illiberal regimes will reduce the efficacy of U.S. mitigation efforts.Current U.S. efforts to mitigate digital authoritarianism are insufficient. The United S

446、tates uses sanctions, export controls, cost imposition measures, and censure through international institutions to counter the multipronged efforts of its adversaries in the digital space. However, this playbook will prove outdated in the new digital order. This expanding, permissive environment has

447、 allowed bad actors to pull from a grab bag of digital tools to exert control. Russias and Chinas complementary efforts to accelerate illiberal innovation will diminish the efficacy of U.S. mitigation practices. This factor, coupled with the creation of technical redundancies and coalition-building

448、moves to counteract U.S. pressure, necessitates an agile, comprehensive policy response from the United States.Authoritarian governments can embolden other states and lower the barrier to entry for other bad actors to propagate high-tech illiberalism. For instance, Russian forays into U.S. election

449、interference in 2016 broke open the path for China to try its own, distinct tactics in the digital sphere during the 2020 U.S. presidential race.228 Iran, long practiced at hard cybersecurity operations, crafted similar attempts to take aim at Americans trust in their electoral system in the run-up

450、to the 2020 U.S. presidential election.229 In addition, the newly permissive environment expanded the playing field to non-state actors and chaos agents leveraged by adversary govern-ments. Russian use of fringe media outlets and Chinas co-opting of “patriotic netizens” to harass Democratic Progress

451、ive Party supporters in Taiwan provided operational experience for these new players while obfuscating links to the governments that sponsored them.230 A growing number of bad actors who work in a complementary fashion accelerate and broaden the chal-lenges, making mitigation more difficult.The marr

452、iage of convenience between authoritarian governments can also counter U.S. pressure through coalition building. Countries can cultivate ad hoc alliances that both legitimize them to outside states and offer an attractive, alternative bloc characterized by subsidized technology and quick tech rollou

453、ts. In this way, Russia confers legitimacy on China, and vice versa, when attempting to appeal to nation-states on the fence about adopting Western technologies. This veneer of legitimacy, coupled with material consid-erations, can be compelling to national leaders with autocratic sympathies. On the

454、 U.S. side, this factor makes it more difficult to encourage such leaders to pursue democratic digital behavior.CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 28Recommendationshe United States and its allies and partners are engaged in a contest over the future dig

455、ital order. To effectively shape this order and ensure that democratic rules and norms in the digital domain prevail, the United States must pursue a multipronged approach, tailoring its engagement to different actors and contexts. U.S. efforts to advance a more liberal digital order must include ac

456、tions that are custom-ized according to whether they are applied at home or for democratic partners, nondemocratic partners, or competitors.At HomeThe United States needs to put its own digital house in order to effectively shape and promote a liberal digital order around the world. A shortfall in r

457、egulatory over-sight and a lack of national policies on digital matters is inhibiting Americas ability to lead. The United States should enact a national data protection and privacy law. Congress should: Establish a data protection framework that clearly artic-ulates the U.S. approach to data privac

458、y at home.231 Such measures are necessary to address national security risks, streamline regulations, mitigate barriers to innovation, and create a better environment for global influence on data protection and privacy issues.232Relevant U.S. government entities should hold regular formal consultati

459、ons with U.S. tech compa-nies on the risks of doing business in countries with nondemocratic governments. The National Security Council, in conjunction with the Departments of State and Commerce, should: Initiate an ongoing dialogue between government officials and tech company executives on matters

460、 of digital freedom. These should be two-way exchanges, with government officials and industry representatives sharing ideas on best practices, creating informa-tion-sharing mechanisms, identifying risk indicators, and anticipating challenges.233The U.S. government needs to prioritize research and d

461、evelopment of privacy-preserving technology solutions. To this end, Congress and the White House would be well served to: Create incentives for novel research in technologies that preserve privacy of data, while also maintaining the use of techniques to extract value from datasets. These technologie

462、s include homomorphic encryption, secure multiparty computation, differential privacy, and dis-tributed learning.234With Democratic PartnersThe United States must work with like-minded demo-cratic partners to ensure a digital order that preserves and promotes open societies, and to combat the illibe

463、ral use of emerging digital technologies. The U.S. government needs to recruit and convene democratic alliesboth bilaterally and multi-laterallyto craft and execute a comprehensive framework to shape the future digital order. The White House should: Formalize the tech alliance concept of a global go

464、verning body of techno-democracies to coordinate policy with a broader pool of allies. The United States should push for the creation of a multilateral forum comprising the worlds leading techno-democracies to serve as the mechanism by which members reach a coordi-nated approach. Such an organizatio

465、n will be valuable at the very least for the purposes of better informa-tion sharing, and for addressing the priority agenda items mentioned previously. Members, in addition to the United States, should include Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, So

466、uth Korea, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Pursue bilateral and minilateral working groups with techno-democracies to coordinate policies and strate-gies pertaining to technology. The United States should also introduce bilateral working groups with key partners, or in some cases small subgroups of

467、partners (e.g., several key European states together), to address this issue. The working groups should involve sub-groups to discuss: (1) reconciling U.S. and partnership strategic perspectives on China, led by the U.S. State Department; (2) developing and sharing best prac-tices in investment scre

468、ening and export controls, led by the U.S. Treasury Department; and (3) deepening economic and technology cooperation to enhance the United States and its partners technological edge, led by the U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy. Expand cooperation on digital initiatives in the Indo-Pacif

469、ic with like-minded democratic partners, starting with the Quad countries. The National Security Council should continue to guide U.S. interagency efforts to operationalize the Quad working group on emerging and critical technologies. The working group should TCNASDC29identify which areas of technol

470、ogical development are most central to maintaining a free and open political order, and then develop a common understanding of the challenge. The four countries should decide on a coordinated policy approach, and then consider how to expand multilateral action within a wider group of democratic nati

471、ons.235 Work through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council to develop a shared vision and approach to managing the human rights implications of technology.236 The transat-lantic partners need to outline a shared understanding of how to ensure human rights protections in the application and develo

472、pment of technologies, as well as how to effectively compete with Chinas technology offerings in developing countries. Such a shared under-standing will provide a strong foundation to take into discussions with a broader set of democratic nations, including the Quad countries as described above. The

473、 U.S. government must work in tandem with industry leadership in international standard-setting bodies to promote better alignment and coordination with like-minded countries within these bodies. To effect this, the White House and Congress ought to: Engage key partners to counter Chinas influence w

474、ithin international bodies that set standards for fundamental technologies. On critical technologies such as 5G, the United States should work with the European Union, Japan, India, and South Korea to increase trans-parency and representation at the ITU and 3GPP.237 Collaboration with existing agenc

475、ies, including the National Institute of Standards and Technology, will allow the United States to develop and promote tech-nical standards that are in line with U.S. interests.238 Provide financial support or incentives for U.S. firms to increase their representation on international bodies that de

476、pend on industry stakeholders. Some international forums, including the International Organization for Standardization, are heavily depen-dent on industry stakeholders. However, smaller firms often cannot afford to work on proposals for stan-dards.239 Targeted grants will allow smaller U.S.-based ve

477、ndors to participate in standard-setting bodies.240The U.S. government should counsel key partners on best practices for investment screening and export controls. The White House and the Departments of State, Commerce, and Treasury should: Design and strengthen systems for screening technol-ogies th

478、at are susceptible to abuse by authoritarians. Washington should help partner governments on the front lines of digital illiberalism to design and strengthen their screening systems. These include Indias addition of a government-approval requirement for investments from its bordering countries,241 t

479、he European Unions Investment Screening Regulation,242 and Israels advisory committee on foreign investment in October 2019. Establish interagency processes to coordinate tech-nology policy partnerships. The Departments of State, Commerce, and the Treasury should coordinate export controls, technolo

480、gy controls and standards, and acqui-sition efforts.243 Use the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council to share insights on specific companies and cases that need to be protected. Investment screening will be a central theme for the Trade and Technology Council, featured in one of the efforts ten work

481、ing groups. Policymakers should ensure that they move past political statements about working together to align investment screening and start sharing insights on specific cases.The United States should work with its dem-ocratic partners to incentivize and encourage middle income and developing coun

482、tries to invest in trusted and secure technologies and technology infrastructure. To this end, we recommend Congress and the White House: Provide financial support or incentives so that demo-cratically aligned digital firms from allied and partner countries will provide trusted alternatives to Chine

483、se digital investments. Washington should leverage the expanded authorities granted by Congress to the DFC to selectively back ally and partner firms that are well positioned to offer alternatives to Chinas digital infrastructure. The United States should also facilitate the growth of sustainable st

484、art-up ecosystems abroad, through publicly funded incubators and government support for private American incubators abroad. Establish a Digital Development Fund through USAID to collaborate with the DFC.244 USAID and the DFC should collaborate to set up a Digital Development Fund to support informat

485、ion connectivity projects in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. With Beijing offering financial and political support to its national tech-nology champions, companies from the United States compete at a disadvantage in third markets. A new U.S. Digital Development Fund will help to rectify this imbalance

486、by providing lines of credit and concessional grant capital to U.S. companies building information CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 30connectivity projects overseas, including those in the Indo-Pacific. One digital infrastructure devel-opment effort t

487、hat the DFC could seek to replicate is its successful support for an undersea fiber-optic cable connecting the United States, Singapore, and Indonesia.245 Develop assessment frameworks and standards to vet digital development projects with the State Department, USAID, and the DFC. The Blue Dot Netwo

488、rk, a concept developed by the Trump admin-istration, certifies transparent, sustainable, and inclusive infrastructure projects. Along these lines, the State Department, USAID, and the DFC should collaborate to develop standards specific to digital infrastructure projects that can be coordinated wit

489、h allies and partners. After the standards are developed, the State Department should spearhead an effort to encourage fragile democracies to sign on to the framework. This can be accomplished by emphasizing the benefits of cultivating open digital ecosystems for economic growth, job creation, inno-

490、vation, and capacity building. Support democratic innovation bases that give incen-tives to diverse vendors and focus on developing secure and modular alternatives to Chinas Safe City and sur-veillance technology solutions. The U.S. government should fund the development of privacy-protecting altern

491、atives to Chinese surveillance technology. For instance, by funding research into technological solu-tions to combating online disinformation, the United States will encourage industry to develop tools that avoid intrusive solutions such as those employed by the Chinese. The United States needs to b

492、oost multilateral engagement on governance and technical norms and standards as they pertain to emerging digital ecosystems. To effect this, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy is advised to: Launch initiatives with allies in the Indo-Pacific to build a shared set of norms on saf

493、e practices for the use of cutting-edge technologies, which can then undergird future proposals at international standards bodies. The United States should start these discussions with Japan, and then bring in other like-minded democratic partners from Asia and Europe. The goal should be to develop

494、consistent standards and guidelines that protect individual privacy, promote government transparency, and allow for broad and inclusive access to technologies. U.S. government agencies should build local resilience among civil society and watchdog groups to combat foreign influence operations or oth

495、er forms of illiberal technology use. The State Department should: Establish a standalone Digital Rights Fund to support civil society groups playing a watchdog role. A Digital Rights Fund will provide project accountability whenever the U.S. government helps partner nations with weak governing inst

496、itutions develop their digital ecosystems. The United States could also invest in initiatives modeled on the Open Technology Fund to shape the digital development trajectories of nations with illiberal digital regula-tory systems. Provide best-practices training to local media in countries such as T

497、hailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia on how to counter Chinese and other disinformation campaigns, and empower civil society organizations in countries that are particularly vulnerable to digital influence operations. Several parts of the U.S. State Department are well positioned to support such initiativ

498、es. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor should expand funding for technologiessuch as VPNsto empower activists and journalists living under oppressive regimes. The Bureau of International Information Programs should support exchanges about digital norms between governments and civil soc

499、iety groups. The Global Engagement Center is also advised to form strategic partnerships with local media. Develop an expanded Fulbright Scholars program for journalists from countries on the front line of Chinese influence campaigns. In this initiative, scholars would be awarded sponsorship funds t

500、o receive media training at U.S. universities. Additionally, the program could sponsor American journalists doing stints in these countries, thereby supporting local media in their efforts to cover the rise of high-tech illiberalism.246With Nondemocratic Partners The United States does not have the

501、luxury of working only with like-minded, democratic allies. To provide a formidable counterweight to such anti-democratic competitors as China, Russia, and Iran, it must emphasize digital freedom concerns in bilateral relations with other nondemocratic partners. CNASDC31U.S. agencies should regulate

502、 U.S. entities or persons participation in and support of the illiberal use of technology in overseas markets. The Commerce and State Departments must: Provide explicit guidance to U.S. companies operating in the markets of nondemocratic partners, and take measures to prohibit U.S. companies from en

503、tering joint ventures with Chinese companies in areas that could have negative implications for digital freedom, such as smart cities. The U.S. government should support continued economic engagement with nondemocratic partnersbut establish clear redlines around areas where U.S. and democratically a

504、llied companies may not invest or enter. This process should include restrictions on U.S. com-panies sharing, for example through joint ventures, of certain types of technology that can be used for surveil-lance and censorship. Take measures to establish a noncompete regulation to prevent former cyb

505、ersecurity experts and officials trained or previously employed by the U.S. government from working for foreign governments. The United States should put restrictions on former U.S. government officials, especially in the intelligence and technology sectors, working for nondemocratic allies. It is n

506、ot uncommon for former analysts in the intelligence community to leave government and use their cyberse-curity skills in the private sector or abroad. Currently there are few, if any, restrictions preventing government employees from later leveraging their extensive cyber experience in opportunities

507、 with foreign governments. The United States must instead rely on the goodwill or conscience of former employees to recognize the serious national security dangers associated with working with foreign, nondemocratic partners in partic-ular. Washington should codify provisions that prevent these gove

508、rnment-trained cybersecurity experts from potentially exploiting U.S. systems through employment by foreign governments. In addition, the intelligence community must find ways to lower attrition rates and increase the number and range of competitive opportu-nities for employment within the U.S. gove

509、rnment that are available to these cyber experts.Countering U.S. Competitors The United States must leverage its powerful economic tools to counter competitors illiberal technology use. Together with its allies and partners, the United States should work to effectively combat tech-enabled human righ

510、ts abuses and other repressive policies. The United States is advised to harness sanctions, advisories, and export control measures to impose costs on the repressive practices of illiberal govern-ments. The White House should: Consider additional Magnitsky Act sanctions and Leahy law restrictionsin

511、concert with the Commerce Departments Entity Listif companies are found to be complicit in tech-enabled human rights abuses. Measures to be deployed in such cases should include International Emergency Economic Powers Act suspensions (for example, importation or distribution of Chinese-controlled so

512、cial media services and apps should be banned) and divestment via the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. Pursuant to the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, the U.S. president and the FBI should bring closer scrutiny to technology companies involved in repres-sion in Xinjiang,

513、 and work with Customs and Border Protection to block the import of associated goods.247 The executive branch and relevant government agencies could also explore the creation of a sanctions list for any company that provides technologies for mass surveillance systems without accompanying safeguards.

514、248 Coordinate with the Commerce and Treasury Departments to sanction illiberal governments digital economies, including cybersecurity firms, in cases of their use of technology for repressive or disruptive purposes. This will signal that regimes must be respon-sible actors to participate in the glo

515、bal ecosystem. Such actions will likely attract the attention of illiberal governments, given that many of these regimes have prioritized the development of their digital economies.Relevant U.S. agencies must focus on protecting areas of comparative strength vis-vis nation-state adver-saries. To thi

516、s end, the U.S. Commerce Department is advised to: Assess relative costs and benefits of export controls on AI chips, which can encourage import substitution, versus targeted end-use/end-user controls on chips and on the semiconductor manufacturing equipment that is used to make the chips.249 Just a

517、s the United States has moved aggressively to choke Huaweis supply of semicon-ductor chips, it should seek to cut off Chinas means of stealing the intellectual property for and importing supplies of the chips upon which AI companies rely. Graphics processing units (GPUs) are a particular supply chai

518、n vulnerability for Chinas AI firms. GPUs are a central component of AI training, and the global CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 32Cmarket share is split between three U.S. companies: NVIDIA, AMD, and Intel.250 None of Chinas 10 leading chip makers s

519、pecialize in making GPUs, and though some Chinese startups have declared their intention to enter the field, they are currently unable to compete on any significant level.251 Chinese chip makers are also entirely dependent on foreign sources for semi-conductor manufacturing equipment, making these d

520、evices a key chokepoint.Conclusionritical trends around information control, surveil-lance, and technology governance are shaping the use of technology across the globe. An effective policy response to authoritarian attempts to reshape the digital order will necessitate dealing with a diverse set of

521、 actors, including key democratic partners, nondem-ocratic actors, and competitors. Policy solutions must account for emerging digital synergies between China and Russia. Dangerous digital synergies between China and Russia will make digital autocracy accessible for a broader swath of states, while

522、accelerating their digital innovation, eroding liberal norms, and bringing the “splinternet” closer to a reality. Authoritarian regimes will continue to rigorously assert their norms, espe-cially self-censorship, in opposition to free information ecosystems. This will result in more stringent regula

523、tion of online communications platforms. Illiberal countries will continue to respond to the demand signal from U.S. nondemocratic partners, adversaries, and even some democratic allies for inexpensive and cutting-edge technology. U.S. mitigation practices suffer diminished efficacy due to bad actor

524、s use of a grab bag of digital tools, along with Russia and Chinas complementary efforts to accelerate innovation in those two nations. The United States must synthesize a policy response that addresses these emerging and troubling patterns.At a minimum, the United States must work with like-minded

525、democratic partners to ensure a digital order that preserves and promotes open societies. To do so, the White House should recruit and convene dem-ocratic alliesboth bilaterally and multilaterallyto build a comprehensive framework that can shape the future digital order. Whether or not autocrats dig

526、ital models prevail on the world stage will be determined in the next decade, and democracies must take an active role now in shaping that result. Reclaiming the digital order for democracy will require a synthesized, dynamic policy response. The United States and its partners should direct their re

527、sources and influence toward countries on the brink of imitating the CCPs totalitarian vision, and toward nondemocratic partners tempted by this repressive vision. To counter an ascendent China and its allies of convenience, as well as temper the permissive digital environment for these authoritaria

528、ns, the United States must invest in unconventional coalitions. There are many potential spoilers in the global contest for digital freedom in the form of undecided nation-states. The courses they chart will determine whether the digital future bends toward a closed world or an open one. CNASDC33APP

529、ENDIX Countering High-Tech Illiberalism: Events, Products, and Media EngagementThe CNAS Countering High-Tech Illiberalism project is composed of several lines of effort, including Digital Dictators, Digital Freedom Initiative, and Blunting Chinas Authoritarian Toolkit. Select publications, media fea

530、tures, and public events from these lines of effort are listed here. Digital DictatorsThis initiative aims at understanding the ways autoc-racies are leveraging technology to their advantage and developing the strategies to respond. PUBLICATIONS “China and Russias Dangerous Convergence,” Andrea Kend

531、all-Taylor and David Shullman, Foreign Affairs, May 3, 2021. “The Digital Dictators: How Technology Strengthens Autocracy,” Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020. “Digital Repression in Autocracies,” Erica Frantz, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Joseph

532、Wright, The Varieties of Democracy Institute Working Papers, March 1, 2020. “Digital Authoritarianism: Finding Our Way Out of the Darkness,” Naazneen Barma, Brent Durbin, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, War on the Rocks, February 10, 2020. MEDIA FEATURES “Digital Dictators,” Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Center

533、 for a New American Security, August 26, 2020. “The Rise of Digital Dictators, with Andrea Kendall-Taylor,” Andrea Kendall-Taylor on The Presidents Inbox, a podcast from the Council on Foreign Relations, March 6, 2020.Digital Freedom InitiativeThis effort is dedicated to identifying solutions to pro

534、tect digital democracy in the United States and abroad by preserving the integrity and value of technol-ogies for free citizens and helping defeat their abuse by malign actors.PUBLICATIONS “Cuba Needs a Free Internet,” Richard Fontaine and Kara Frederick, Foreign Policy, July 29, 2021. “Democracys D

535、igital Defenses,” Richard Fontaine and Kara Frederick, Wall Street Journal, May 7, 2021. “Democracy by Design: An Affirmative Response to the Illiberal Use of Technology for 2021,” Kara Frederick, Center for a New American Security, December 15, 2020. “If You Play Videogames, China May Be Spying on

536、You,” Dave Aitel and Jordan Schneider, The Wall Street Journal, October 28, 2020. “The Razors Edge: Liberalizing the Digital Surveillance Ecosystem,” Kara Frederick, Center for a New American Security, September 3, 2020. “Beyond TikTok: Preparing for Future Digital Threats,” Chris Estep, Kara Freder

537、ick and Megan Lamberth, War on the Rocks, August 20, 2020. “The Resilience of Sino-Russian High-Tech Cooperation,” Samuel Bendett and Elsa B. Kania, War on the Rocks, August 12, 2020. “How to Stop China from Imposing Its Values,” Anthony Vinci, The Atlantic, August 2, 2020. “Countering Chinas Techno

538、nationalism,” Martijn Rasser, The Diplomat, April 24, 2020. “The Dangers of Manipulated Media in the Midst of a Crisis,” Megan Lamberth, Council on Foreign Relations Net Politics blog, February 12, 2020. “The China Challenge Strategies for Recalibrating the U.S.-China Tech Relationship,” Martijn Ras

539、ser, Elizabeth Rosenberg, and Paul Scharre, Center for a New American Security, December 12, 2019. “Decide, Disrupt, Destroy: Information Systems in Great Power Competition with China,” Ainikki Riikonen, Strategic Studies Quarterly, November 21, 2019. “The Rise of Municipal Ransomware,” Kara Frederi

540、ck, City Journal, September 3, 2019.CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 34 “The New War of Ideas: Counterterrorism Lessons for the Digital Disinformation Fight,” Kara Frederick, Center for a New American Security, June 3, 2019. “The Autocrats New Tool Ki

541、t,” Richard Fontaine and Kara Frederick, The Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2019.MEDIA FEATURES “Is TikTok a Harmless App or a Threat to U.S. Security?” Kara Frederick, 60 Minutes, November 15, 2020. “How TikTok Could Be Used for Disinformation and Espionage,” Kara Frederick, 60 Minutes, November 15

542、, 2020. “How Corporations and Big Tech Leave Our Data Exposed to Criminals, China, and Other Bad Actors,” Kara Frederick, prepared testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committees Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, United States Senate, November 5, 2019. “The Low Road: Charting Chinas Digital Expa

543、nsion,” Kara Frederick, Dan Kliman, and Ely Ratner, Center for a New American Security, September 4, 2019. “Counterterrorism Lessons for the Digital Disinformation Fight,” Kara Frederick, Government Matters, August 19, 2019. “Podcast: The Autocrats New Tool Kit,” Richard Fontaine, Kara Frederick, an

544、d Paul Scharre, Center for a New American Security, March 15, 2019.Blunting Chinas Authoritarian ToolkitThis project focuses on developing a U.S. and allied strategy that will curb Chinas ability to use digital infrastructure to contravene international standards of freedom and transparency. In so d

545、oing, it also seeks to educate democratic stakeholders on the risks that an unchecked China poses.PUBLICATIONS “Advancing a Liberal Digital Order in the Indo-Pacific,” Lisa Curtis, Joshua Fitt, and Jake Stokes, Center for a New American Security, September 15, 2020. “Designing a U.S. Digital Develop

546、ment Strategy,” Siddharth Mohandas, Kristine Lee, Joshua Fitt, and Coby Goldberg, Center for a New American Security, September 10, 2020. “To Counter China Online, Regulate Big Tech,” Coby Goldberg, World Politics Review, August 26, 2020. “Collective Resilience Is the Way to Address China Challenge,

547、” Eric Sayers and Brad Glosserman, The Japan Times, August 14, 2020. “The U.S.-China Confrontation Is Not another Cold War. Its Something New.” Richard Fontaine and Ely Ratner, The Washington Post, July 2, 2020. “Dangerous Synergies: Countering Chinese and Russian Digital Influence Operations,” Dani

548、el Kliman, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Kristine Lee, Joshua Fitt, and Carisa Nietsche, Center for a New American Security, May 7, 2020. “Forging an Alliance Innovation Base,” Daniel Kliman, Ben FitzGerald, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt, Center for a New American Security, March 29, 2020. “Rising to the C

549、hina Challenge: Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific,” Ely Ratner, Daniel Kliman, Susanna V. Blume, Rush Doshi, Chris Dougherty, Richard Fontaine, Peter Harrell, Martijn Rasser, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Eric Sayers, Daleep Singh, Paul Scharre, Loren DeJonge Schulman, Neil Bhatiya, Ashle

550、y Feng, Joshua Fitt, Megan Lamberth, Kristine Lee, and Ainikki Riikonen, Center for a New American Security, January 28, 2020. “Challenging Chinas Bid for App Dominance,” Kristine Lee and Karina Barbesino, Center for a New American Security, January 22, 2020.MEDIA FEATURES “The Low Road: Charting Ch

551、inas Digital Expansion,” Kara Frederick, Daniel Kliman, and Ely Ratner, Center for a New American Security, September 4, 2019. “Chinas Power Play: The Role of Congress in Addressing the Belt and Road,” Daniel Kliman, prepared testimony before the United States Senate Finance Committees Subcommittee

552、on International Trade, Customs, and Global Competitiveness, June 12, 2019.CNASDC351. Andrew Imbrie, discussion with co-author, August 3, 2020; Saif Khan and Alexander Mann, “AI Chips: What They Are and Why They Matter” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, April 2020), https:/cset.georgetow

553、n.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-An-AI-Chips-Primer-What-They-Are-and-Why-They-Matter.pdf. 2. Steven Feldstein, The Rise of Digital Repression: How Tech-nology Is Reshaping Power, Politics, and Resistance, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).3. Liza Lin and Newley Purnell, “A World With a Billion

554、 Cam-eras Watching You Is Just Around the Corner,” The Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2019, https:/ Oliver Philippou, “Video Surveillance Installed Base Report2019” (Omdia, December 5, 2019), https:/technol- 4. Paul Triolo and Robert Greene, “Will China Control the Global Internet via its Digital

555、Silk Road?” SupChina, May 8, 2020, https:/ Jude Blanchette and Jonathan E. Hillman, “Chinas Digital Silk Road after the Coronavirus” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 13, 2020), https:/www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-digital-silk-road-after-coronavirus.6. Nadge Rolland, “Chinas Vis

556、ion for a New World Or-der,” NBR Special Report No. 23 (National Bureau of Asian Research, January 27, 2020), https:/www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr83_chinasvision_jan2020.pdf.7. Chris Erasmus, “Chinese Experts Train Crime-Hardened Police of South Africas Biggest City,” South Chi

557、na Morning Post, September 3, 2019, https:/ Deng Xiaoci and Zhang Dan, “Beijing Police Working with Foreign Counterparts and Interpol to Hunt Down Fugitives,” Global Times, April 28, 2019, http:/ and Danielle Cave, Fergus Ryan, and Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, “Mapping More of Chinas Tech giants: AI and Surve

558、illance” (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 28, 2019), https:/www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-more-chinas-tech-giants.8. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2019: Democracy in Retreat” (Freedom House, 2019), https:/freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWeb

559、-compressed.pdf.9. “Remarks by the President in Address on China and the National Interest,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary, press release, October 24, 1997, https:/clinton-whitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/html/19971024-3863.html.10. Yaqiu Wang, “In China, the Great Firewall Is Changin

560、g a Generation,” Politico, September 1, 2020, https:/ Paul Mozur, “Coronavirus Outrage Spurs Chinas Internet Police to Action,” The New York Times, March 16, 2020, https:/ Tamara Khandaker, “The WeChat factor,” Vice, February 1, 2019, https:/ Isobel Asher Hamilton, “WeChat Users in the U.S. Say the

561、App Is Censoring Their Messages about Hong Kong,” Busi-ness Insider, November 26, 2019, https:/www.businessin- Abby Ohlheiser, “Welcome to TikToks Endless Cy-cle of Censorship and Mistakes,” MIT Technology Re-view, July 13, 2021, https:/ 15. Jason Slotkin, “Zoom Acknowledges It Suspended Activists A

562、ccounts at Chinas Request,” NPR, June 12, 2020, https:/www.npr.org/2020/06/12/876351501/zoom-acknowledg-es-it-suspended-activists-accounts-at-china-s-request.16. Jack Nicas, “Apple Removes App That Helps Hong Kong Protesters Track the Police,” The New York Times, October 9, 2019, https:/ Mark Gurman

563、, “Apple Pulls Taiwanese Flag Emoji From iPhones in Hong Kong,” Bloomberg, October 8, 2019, https:/ Sarah Cook, “Beijings Global Megaphone: The Expansion of Chines Communist Party Media Influence Since 2017” (Freedom House, 2020), https:/freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/beijings-global-me

564、gaphone. 19. Liu Yunshan, “Huigu Yu Zhanwang” Seeking truth: re-view and outlook, QSTheory, June 22, 2009, https:/web.archive.org/web/208/http:/ 20. Anne-Marie Brady, “Authoritarianism Goes Global (II): Chi-nas Foreign Propaganda Machine,” Journal of Democracy, 26 no. 4 (October 2015), 51

565、59.21. “Ba Wangshang Yulun Gongzuo Zuowei Xuanchuan Sixiang Gongzuo De Zhongzhongzhizhong” Make online public opinion work the top priority of propaganda and ideological work, CPCNews, October 31, 2013, http:/ FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 3632. Charles R

566、ollet, “In Chinas Far West, Companies Cash in on Surveillance Program That Targets Muslims,” Foreign Policy, June 13, 2018, https:/ “IDC Releases China Video Surveillance Equipment Tracker Report: AI & 5G Bring Video Surveillance to a New Era,” EMSNow, September 23, 2019, https:/ 34. Bernard Marr, “

567、Meet the Worlds Most Valuable AI Startup: Chinas SenseTime,” Forbes, June 17, 2019, https:/ Narayanan Somasundaram, “Chinese AI Startup SenseTime Resumes Push for $2bn Hong Kong IPO,” Nikkei Asia, June 18, 2021, https:/ and Parmy Olson, “SoftBank Backs Facial-Recognition Startup Despite Privacy Conc

568、erns,” The Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2021, https:/ Mara Hvistendahl, “How a Chinese AI Giant Made Chattingand SurveillanceEasy,” Wired, May 18, 2020, https:/ Jeffrey Ding, “Deciphering Chinas AI Dream” (Univer-sity of Oxford, March 2018), https:/www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Deciphering_Chi

569、nas_AI-Dream.pdf; Andrew Browne, “China Uses Digital Leninism to Manage Economy and Monitor Citizens,” The Wall Street Journal, October 17, 2017, https:/ 37. Adrian Shahbaz, “The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism: Freedom on the Net 2018” (Freedom House, October 31, 2018), https:/freedomhouse.org/rep

570、ort/free-dom-net/2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism; Daniel Kliman, Rush Doshi, Kristine Lee, and Zach Cooper, “Grading Chinas Belt and Road” (Center for a New American Security, April 8, 2019), https:/as.org/publications/reports/beltandroad.38. Cave, Ryan, and Xu, “Mapping More of Chinas Tech Giant

571、s.”39. “Zhongguo-Dongmeng Wangluo Anquan Chanye Fazhan Xianzhuang Yanjiu Baogao,” research report on current developments of China-ASEAN cybersecurity industry (China Academy for Information and Com-munications, December 2019), http:/ Elsa Kania, Samm Sacks, Paul Triolo, and Graham Webster, “Chinas

572、Strategic Thinking on Building Power in Cyber-space,” New America, September 25, 2017, https:/www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/blog/chinas-stra-tegic-thinking-building-power-cyberspace/.23. I-fan Lin, “Made-in-China Fake News Overwhelms Tai-wan,” Global Voices Advox, November 30, 2018, ht

573、tps:/advox.globalvoices.org/2018/11/30/made-in-china-fake-news-overwhelms-taiwan/; Freedom House, “China Attempts to Influence Taiwan Elections through Social Me-dia,” China Media Bulletin No. 135, April 24, 2019, https:/freedomhouse.org/report/china-media-bulletin/china-me-dia-bulletin-student-indo

574、ctrination-surveillance-innova-tion.24. For more on the topic of digital influence operations and how the tactics of Beijing and Moscow are converging, see Daniel Kliman, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Kristine Lee et al., “Dangerous Synergies: Countering Chinese and Russian Digital Influence Operations

575、” (Center for a New American Security, May 7, 2020), https:/as.org/publications/reports/dangerous-synergies.25. Dan Levin, “Chinese-Canadians Fear Chinas Rising Clout Is Muzzling Them,” The New York Times, August 27, 2016, https:/ Paul Bischoff, “Surveillance Camera Statistics: Which Cities Have the

576、 Most CCTV Cameras?” Comparitech, July 22, 2020, https:/ 27. Holly Chik, “China Is Home to 18 of the 20 Most Surveilled Cities in the World,” Inkstone, July 27, 2020, https:/ Bischoff, “Surveillance Camera Statistics: Which Cities Have the Most CCTV Cameras?” 28. Jeffrey Ding, “ChinAI #82: State Gri

577、dA Hidden Giant in AI?” ChinAI Newsletter, February 9, 2020, https:/ Matt Sheehan, “How Chinas Massive AI Plan Actually Works,” MacroPolo, February 12, 2018, https:/macropolo.org/analysis/how-chinas-massive-ai-plan-actually-works/; Graham Webster, Rogier Creemers, Paul Triolo, and Elsa Kania, “China

578、s Plan to Lead in AI: Purpose, Prospects, and Problems,” New America, August 1, 2017, https:/www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/blog/chinas-plan-lead-ai-purpose-prospects-and-problems/.30. Jeffrey Ding, “ChinAI #48: Year 1 of Chinai,” ChinAI News-letter, April 1, 2019, https:/ Cave, Ryan, a

579、nd Xu, “Mapping More of Chinas Tech Gi-ants.”CNASDC3740. “Broadband Forum to Develop ICT in Laos,” The Nation Thailand, December 1, 2016, https:/ Allie Funk, “Internet Freedom in Asia Hits Unprecedent-ed Low” (Freedom House, December 2, 2019), https:/freedomhouse.org/article/internet-freedom-asia-hi

580、ts-un-precedented-low.42. International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyber-space, Chapter III: “Strategic Goals,” Xinhua, March 1, 2017, http:/ Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development, Mr. Houlin Zhao, Secretary-General, ITU, Co-Vice Chair of Commission (bio), https:/www.broadbandcommission.o

581、rg/commissioners/Pages/zhao.aspx.44. Madhumita Murgia and Anna Gross, “Inside Chinas Controversial Mission to Reinvent the Internet,”Finan-cial Times, March 27, 2020, https:/ James Andrew Louis, “Can Telephones Race? 5G and the Evolution of Telecom” (Center for Strategic and Inter-national Studies,

582、June 15, 2020), https:/www.csis.org/analysis/can-telephones-race-5g-and-evolution-telecom; Frank Hersey, “Lenovo Founder in Public Backlash for Unpatriotic 5G Standards Vote,”Technode, May 16, 2018, https:/ Anna Gross, Madhumita Murgia, and Yuan Yang, “Chinese Tech Groups Shaping UN Facial Recogniti

583、on Standards,” Financial Times, December 1, 2019, https:/ Jeffrey Ding, Paul Triolo, and Samm Sacks, “Chinese In-terests Take a Big Seat at the AI Governance Table,” New America, June 20, 2018, https:/www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/chinese-interests-take-big-seat-ai-gover

584、nance-table/.48. John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, “Exam-ining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective,” CGD Policy Paper No. 121 (Center for Global Development, March 2018), https:/www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-impli-cations

585、-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf; Jonathan E. Hillman, “Corruption Flows Along Chinas Belt and Road” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 18, 2019), https:/www.csis.org/analysis/corruption-flows-along-chinas-belt-and-road.49. “Belt and Road Cooperation: Shaping a

586、Brighter Shared Future,” China Daily, April 28, 2019, http:/124.127.52.76/a/201904/28/WS5cc4fa20a3104842260b8cf7_5.html.50. “The Belt and Road Initiative: Progress, Contributions and Prospects,” Permanent Mission of the Peoples Repub-lic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and other Inte

587、rnational Organizations in Switzerland, http:/www.china-un.ch/eng/zywjyjh/t1675564.htm.51. Paul Triolo, Kevin Allison, and Clarise Brown, “The Digi-tal Silk Road: Expanding Chinas Digital Footprint” (Eur-asia Group, April 29, 2020), https:/ 52. Paul Triolo and Robert Greene, “Will China Control the

588、Global Internet via its Digital Silk Road?” SupChina, May 8, 2020, https:/ 53. Kania, Sacks, Triolo, and Webster, “Chinas Strategic Thinking on Building Power in Cyberspace.”54. This framing section includes analysis and language that originated in Daniel Kliman, thenSenior Fellow and Director, Asia

589、-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security, “Chinas Power Play: The Role of Congress in Addressing the Belt and Road,” Statement to the Subcommittee on International Trade, Customs, and Global Competitiveness, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, June 12, 2019, https:/www.finance.se

590、nate.gov/download/06122018-kliman-testi-mony&download=1; Daniel Kliman, Senior Fellow and Director, Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security, “Addressing Chinas Influence in Southeast Asia: Americas Approach and the Role of Congress,” Statement to the Subcommittee on Asia, t

591、he Pacific, and Nonproliferation, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, May 8, 2019, https:/ “Safe cities” is sometimes translated as “smart cities,” depending on the specific name of the initiative. This report remains faithful to the direct translation of each individual pro

592、ject. Bob Koigi, “Huawei Launches Safe City Project to Tackle Africa Customers Security Needs,” Africa Business Communities, October 19, 2016, https:/ “Huawei Holds Safe City Africa Summit in Case Town,” Huawei News, April 29, 2015, https:/ Juan Pedro Toms, “Huawei, Dubai Police to Develop Safe City

593、 Innovation Center,” Enterprise IoT Insights, October 21, 2016, https:/ and “Inside Huaweis Bandung Safe City Project with Telkom Indonesia,” Telecom Asia, April 15, 2016, https:/ FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 3856. Diana Adams, “Real Life Huawei Collabor

594、ative Smart City and Safe City Solution in Action,” Medium, November 15, 2017, https:/ Cave, Ryan, and Xu, “Mapping More of Chinas Tech Gi-ants.”58. Steven Feldstein, “The Global Expansion of AI Sur-veillance” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 17, 2019), https:/carnegieendow-men

595、t.org/2019/09/17/global-expansion-of-ai-surveil-lance-pub-79847. 59. “Zhongguo-Dongmeng Wangluo Anquan Chanye Fazhan Xianzhuang Yanjiu Baogao,” research report. 60. Feldstein, “The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance,” 15. 61. Lynsey Chutel, “China Is Exporting Facial Recognition Software to Africa,

596、 Expanding Its Vast Database,” Quartz, May 25, 2018, https:/ Li Tao, “Malaysian Police Wear Chinese Start-Ups AI Camera to Identify Suspected Criminals,” South China Morning Post, April 20, 2018, https:/ Cave, Ryan, and Xu, “Mapping More of Chinas Tech Gi-ants. “Addition of Certain Entities to the E

597、ntity List,” Fed-eral Register, October 9, 2019,https:/www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/10/09/2019-22210/addition-of-cer-tain-entities-to-the-entity-list.64. “Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List; Revision of Existing Entries on the Entity List,” Federal Register, June 5, 2020, http

598、s:/www.federalregister.gov/docu-ments/2020/06/05/2020-10868/addition-of-certain-enti-ties-to-the-entity-list-revision-of-existing-entries-on-the-entity-list. 65. Andrew Kitson and Kenny Liew, “China Doubles Down on Its Digital Silk Road” (Center for Strategic and Interna-tional Studies, November 14,

599、 2019) https:/reconnectin-gasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/china-doubles-down-its-digital-silk-road/.66. Douglas Main, “Undersea Cables Transport 99 Percent of International Data,” Newsweek, April 2, 2015, https:/ 67. Jonathan Hillman, “War and PEACE on Chinas Digital Silk Road” (Center for Strategic

600、 and International Studies, May 16, 2019), https:/www.csis.org/analysis/war-and-peace-chinas-digital-silk-road.68. James Stavridis, “Chinas Next Naval Target Is the Internets Underwater Cables,”Bloomberg, April 8, 2019, https:/ Dave Gershgorn, “In Just 6 Months, Fever Cameras Have Become a Full-Fled

601、ged Industry,” Medium, July 20, 2020, https:/ Blanchette and Hillman, “Chinas Digital Silk Road after the Coronavirus.”71. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Dealing with Demand for Chinas Global Surveillance Exports” (Brookings Institu-tion, April 2020), https:/www.brookings.edu/research/dealing-with-deman

602、d-for-chinas-global-surveillance-ex-ports/. 72. Nyshka Chandran, “Alibabas Digital Free Trade Zone Has Some Worried about China Links to Ma-laysia,” CNBC, February 12, 2018, https:/ Jenne Lajiun, “Five MoUs Signed during Malaysia-China Meeting,” The Borneo Post, June 15, 2019, https:/ Samm Sacks, “B

603、eijing Wants to Rewrite the Rules of the Internet,” The Atlantic, June 18, 2018, https:/www.theat- George Ogola, “The Threats to Media Freedom Are Getting More Sophisticated in Africas Digital Age,” Quartz, October 4, 2018, https:/ Ogola, “The Threats to Media Freedom Are Getting More Sophisticated

604、in Africas Digital Age.”77. Sacks, “Beijing Wants to Rewrite the Rules of the Inter-net.”78. Gross, Murgia, and Yang, “Chinese Tech Groups Shaping UN Facial Recognition Standards.”79. Emeka Umejei, “The Imitation Game: Will Chinas Invest-ments Reshape Africas Internet?” Power 3.0, December 6, 2018,

605、https:/www.power3point0.org/2018/12/06/the-im-itation-game-will-chinas-investments-reshape-africas-in-ternet/. 80. “Mapping Trends in Government Internet Controls, 19992019” (Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa, September 2019), https:/cipe-sa.org/?wpfb_dl=307.CNAS

606、DC3981. Jaclyn Kerr, “The Russian Model of Digital Control and Its Significance,” in Artificial Intelligence, China, Russia, and the Global Order, ed. Nicholas D. Wright (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2019), 70, https:/www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0161_WRIGHT_ARTIFICI

607、AL_INTELLIGENCE_CHI-NA_RUSSIA_AND_THE_GLOBAL_ORDER.PDF; Alina Polyakova, “Russia Is Teaching the World to Spy,” The New York Times, December 5, 2019, https:/ Keith Dear, “Will Russia Rule the World Through AI?” The RUSI Journal, 164 no. 56 (November 2019), 3660.83. Radina Gigova, Who Vladimir Putin

608、Thinks Will Rule the World,” CNN, 2 September 2017, https:/ Gigova, Who Vladimir Putin Thinks Will Rule the World.”85. Larry Lewis, “Russian Kryptonite to Western Hi-Tech Dominance,” Center for Autonomy and AI blog (CNA), July 18, 2018, https:/caai.blog/2018/07/18/russian-kryp-tonite-to-western-hi-t

609、ech-dominance/.86. “Russia Is Ready to Disconnect from Global Internet, Medvedev Says,” The Moscow Times, February 1, 2021, https:/ “Russia Is a Distinct Civilization, Putin Says,” The Mos-cow Times, May 18, 2020, https:/ Andrei Tsygankov, “Crafting the State-Civilization Vladimir Putins Turn to Dis

610、tinct Values,” Problems of Post-Communism, 63 no. 3 (April 2016), 14658, https:/ Ewen MacAskill, “Putin Calls Internet a CIA Project Renewing Fears of Web Breakup,” The Guardian, April 24, 2014, https:/ Denis Stukal, Sergey Sanovich, Richard Bonneau, and Joshua A. Tucker, “Bots for Autocrats: How Pr

611、o-Gov-ernment Bots Fight Opposition in Russia,” http:/ Robert Morgus, “The Spread of Russias Digital Authori-tarianism,” in Artificial Intelligence, China, Russia, and the Global Order, ed. Nicholas D. Wright, 8997, Air University Press, https:/www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AU-Press/Books/B_01

612、61_WRIGHT_ARTIFICIAL_INTELLI-GENCE_CHINA_RUSSIA_AND_THE_GLOBAL_ORDER.PDF. 92. “Russia: Growing Internet Isolation, Control, Censorship,” Human Rights Watch, June 18, 2020, https:/www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/18/russia-growing-internet-isola-tion-control-censorship#.93. Kat Lonsdorf, “Social Media Fueled

613、 Russian Protests despite Government Attempts to Censor,” NPR, January 24, 2021, https:/www.npr.org/2021/01/24/960113653/social-media-fueled-russian-protests-despite-govern-ment-attempts-to-censor.94. Michael Birnbaum, “Russian Blogger Law Puts New Restrictions on Internet Freedoms,” The Washington

614、Post, July 31, 2014, https:/ Neil MacFarquhar, “Russia Quietly Tightens Reins on Web with Bloggers Law,” The New York Times, May 6, 2014, https:/ 95. “Online and on All Fronts: Russias Assault on Freedom of Expression,” Human Rights Watch, July 18, 2017, https:/www.hrw.org/report/2017/07/18/online-a

615、nd-all-fronts/russias-assault-freedom-expression#.96. Alina Polyakova and Chris Meserole, “Exporting Digital Authoritarianism: The Russian and Chinese Models” (Brookings Institution, August 2019), 6, https:/www.brookings.edu/research/exporting-digital-authoritarian-ism/. 97. Polyakova and Meserole,

616、“Exporting Digital Authoritari-anism: The Russian and Chinese Models,” 8.98. Shannon von Sant, “Russia Criminalizes the Spread of Online News Which Disrespects the Govern-ment,” NPR.org, March 18, 2019, https:/www.npr.org/2019/03/18/704600310/russia-criminaliz-es-the-spread-of-online-news-which-disr

617、espec-ts-the-government.99. Polyakova and Meserole, “Exporting Digital Authoritari-anism: The Russian and Chinese Models,” 9.100. “The Fake News Infodemic: The Fight against Corona-virus As a Threat to Freedom of Speech,” Agora Interna-tional Human Rights Group, https:/agora.legal/fs/a_de-lo2doc/196

618、_file_ENG_final.pdf.101. Margarita Konaev and James Dunham, “Russian AI Research 20102018” (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, October 2020), 13, https:/cset.georgetown.edu/publication/russian-ai-research-2010-2018/. 102. Elizaveta Focht, “Internet during Rallies in Moscow Could Be Jammed

619、at the Request of Security Officials” in Russian,BBC, August 6, 2019, https:/ Zak Doffman, “Russian Au-thorities Secretly Shut Down Moscows Mobile Internet: CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 40Report,” Forbes, August 8, 2019, https:/ “Authorities Jamme

620、d Moscows Mobile Internet during Opposition Protests,” The Moscow Times, August 7, 2019, https:/ and “Alexei Navalny: More than 3,000 Detained in Protests across Russia,” BBC News, January 23, 2021, https:/ Polyakova and Meserole, “Exporting Digital Authori-tarianism: The Russian and Chinese Models,

621、” 7; Alena Epifanova, “Deciphering Russias Sovereign Internet Law,” DGAP Analysis No. 2 (German Council on Foreign Relations, January 2020), https:/dgap.org/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/dgap-analyse_2-2020_epifanova_0.pdf. 104. “Russia: Growing Internet Isolation, Control, Censorship.” 105 “Russ

622、ias Big Brother Law Enters into Force,” The Mos.cow Times, July 1, 2018, https:/ Shaun Walker, “Russia Blocks Access to LinkedIn over Foreign-Held Data,” The Guardian, November 17, 2016, https:/ “Putin Signs Law Forcing Foreign Social Media Giants to Open Russian Offices,” Reuters, July 1, 2001, htt

623、ps:/ “Russia Fines Google Again for Failing to Remove Banned Content,” Reuters, August 19, 2021, https:/ 109. Polyakova and Meserole, “Exporting Digital Authoritari-anism: The Russian and Chinese Models,” 910.110. “Russias Digital Development Ministry Wants to Ban the Latest Encryption Technology fr

624、om the RuNet,” Meduza, September 21, 2020, https:/meduza.io/en/feature/2020/09/22/russia-s-digital-development-min-istry-wants-to-ban-the-latest-encryption-technolo-gies-from-the-runet.111. Adrian Chen, “The Agency,” The New York Times, June 2, 2015, https:/ Morgus, “The Spread of Russias Digital Au

625、thoritarianism,” 85.112. Kerr, “The Russian Model of Digital Control and Its Sig-nificance,” 55.113. See, for example, the extensive work conducted by the German Marshall Funds Alliance for Securing Democracy and the Atlantic Councils Digital Forensic Research Lab. See also CNASs report “Dangerous S

626、ynergies: Counter-ing Chinese and Russian Digital Influence Operations,” for more on the convergence of Russian and Chinese information operations; Daniel Kliman et al., “Dangerous Synergies: Countering Chinese and Russian Digital Influ-ence Operations,” (CNAS, May 2020), https:/as.org/publications/

627、reports/dangerous-synergies.114. “Its Getting Harder to Spot a Deep Fake Video,” Bloomberg QuickTake, September 27, 2018, YouTube vid-eo, https:/ 115. Vladimir Gelman, “Brave Digital World: Alternatives for Russia,” The Moscow Times, May 1, 2019, https:/www.the- Paul Goble, “Video Facial Recognition

628、 Technology Used to Make Arrests after January 23 Navalny Protest,” Window on Eurasia, January 31, 2021, https:/ Goble, “Video Facial Recognition Technology Used to Make Arrests after January 23 Navalny Protest.”118. Matthew Luxmoore, “Yes, Big Brother IS Watching: Russian Schools Getting Surveillan

629、ce Systems Called Orwell,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 17, 2020, https:/www.rferl.org/a/russian-schools-getting-surveil-lance-systems-called-orwell-/30676184.html; “Russia to Install Orwell Facial Recognition Tech in Every SchoolVedomosti,” The Moscow Times, June 16, 2020, https:/ Felix Li

630、ght, “Russia Is Building One of the Worlds Larg-est Facial Recognition Networks,” The Moscow Times, November 12, 2019, https:/ Felix Light, “Coronavirus Outbreak Is Major Test for Russias Facial Recognition Network,” The Moscow Times, March 25, 2020, https:/ Goble, “Video Facial Recognition Technolo

631、gy Used to Make Arrests after January 23 Navalny Protest.” Kristina Foltynova, “We See You! How Russia Is Developing a Vid-eo Surveillance System” in Russian, Idel Reality, https:/www.idelreal.org/a/31076237.html.121. Light, “Russia Is Building One of the Worlds Largest Facial Recognition Networks.”

632、122. Peter Podkopaev, “On Social Control, the Kremlins Reach May Exceed Its Grasp” (Freedom House, July 8, 2020), https:/freedomhouse.org/article/social-control-krem-CNASDC41lins-reach-may-exceed-its-grasp.123. Light, “Russia Is Building One of the Worlds Largest Facial Recognition Networks.”124. Pa

633、trick Reevell, “How Russia Is Using Facial Recogni-tion to Police Its Coronavirus Lockdown,” ABC News, April 30, 2020, https:/ “Moscow Authorities Intend to Collect Personal Data of Employees of Moscow Companies through Employers” in Russian, D-Russia, August 10, 2020, https:/d-russia.ru/vlasti-mosk

634、vy-namereny-cherez-rabotodatelej-sobi-rat-personalnye-dannye-sotrudnikov-moskovskih-kom-panij.html.126. Anastasiia Zlobina, “Moscow Government Collects Em-ployees Data without Consent,” Human Rights Watch, Oc-tober 13, 2020, https:/www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/13/moscow-government-collects-employees-dat

635、a-with-out-consent.127. Office of the President of the Russian Federation, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Develop-ment of Artificial Intelligence in the Russian Federation, October 10, 2019, https:/cset.georgetown.edu/wp-con-tent/uploads/Decree-of-the-President-of-the-Rus-s

636、ian-Federation-on-the-Development-of-Artificial-Intelli-gence-in-the-Russian-Federation-.pdf.128. Samuel Bendett, “Russias AI Quest Is State-DrivenEven More Than Chinas. Can It Work?” Defense One, Novem-ber 25, 2019, https:/ Bendett, “Russias AI Quest Is State-DrivenEven More Than Chinas. Can It Wor

637、k?”; Samuel Bendett, “Putin Seeks to Plug Gaps in Russias State-Driven Tech Efforts,” Defense One, January 18, 2020, https:/ 130. Lewis, “Russian Kryptonite to Western Hi-Tech Domi-nance.”131. Morgus, “The Spread of Russias Digital Authoritarian-ism,” 88.132. MacAskill, “Putin Calls Internet a CIA P

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639、ry 2015, from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakh-stan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, A/69/723 (July 22, 2015), https:/digi-tallibrary.un.org/record/786846/files/A_69_723-EN.pdf.134. MacAskill, “Pu

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642、Updated Code of Conduct Get More Traction in a Post-Snowden Era?” (Council on Foreign Relations, January 28, 2015), https:/www.cfr.org/blog/will-china-and-russias-updated-code-conduct-get-more-traction-post-snowden-era.139. U.N. General Assembly, Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the

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646、rics-russia2020.ru/news/20200928/654551/BRICS-Civil-Forum-2020-Mikhail-Petrosyan-BRICS-CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 42countries-show-high-digital-ambitions.html; and “BRICS Ministers of Communication Discuss Digital Economy Development and Prospec

647、ts for BRICS Cooperation in ICTs,” BRICS Russia, September 18, 2020 (BRICS Sum-mit, 17 November 2020), https:/eng.brics-russia2020.ru/news/20200918/582139/BRICS-Ministers-of-Communi-cation-discuss-digital-economy-development-and-pros-pects-for-BRICS.html. 145. Andrew Roth, “Russia and China Sign Coo

648、peration Pacts,” The New York Times, May 8, 2015, https:/ Sean Lyngaas, “Debating the Sino-Russian Cyber Pact,” Federal Computer Week, May 12, 2015, https:/ Polyakova, “Russia Is Teaching the World to Spy.” Light, “Coronavirus Outbreak Is Major Test for Russias Facial Recognition Network.” 147. Poly

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650、e American Public,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, press release, August 7, 2020, https:/www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2139-statement-by-ncsc-director-wil-liam-evanina-election-threat-update-for-the-american-public. 151. “The Ministry of Telecom and Mass Commun

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652、her Law Enters Into Force.” 153. Light, “Coronavirus Outbreak Is Major Test for Russias Facial Recognition Network.” 154. Dear, “Will Russia Rule the World Through AI?”155. Bendett, “Russias AI Quest is State-DrivenEven More than Chinas. Can It Work?”156. “Artificial Intelligence in Russia,” Occasio

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654、EPORT_BOOKLET_Final.pdf. 158. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2020: A Leader-less Struggle for Democracy.” 159. Samuel Woodhams, “Egypts Arrested Digital Spac-es,” Middle East Report Online (Middle East Research and Information Project, July 22, 2019), https:/merip.org/2019/07/egypts-arrested-d

655、igital-spaces/; Sam Kim-ball, “After Arab Spring, Surveillance in Egypt Intensi-fies,” The Intercept, March 9, 2015, https:/ “Egypt Jails Female TikTok Influencers for Two Years over Indecent Videos,” Middle East Eye, July 27, 2020, https:/ “Egypt Jails Female TikTok Influencers for Two Years over I

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658、019.166. “U.A.E.-Linked Twitter Accounts Urge Crackdown on Israel Peace Deal Critics,” The New Arab, August 16, 2020, https:/english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/8/16/uae-linked-accounts-urge-crackdown-on-israel-peace-deal-critics.167. “Egyptian News Media Warned Not to Criticize U.A.E.-Is-rael D

659、eal,” Al-Monitor, August 27, 2020, https:/www.al- Chloe Taylor, “Government-Led Internet Shutdowns Cost the Global Economy $8 Billion in 2019, Research Says,” CNBC, January 8, 2020, https:/bc.CNASDC43com/2020/01/08/government-led-internet-shutdowns-cost-8-billion-in-2019-study-says.html.169. Farnaz

660、Fassihi, “Iran Blocks Nearly All Internet Access,” The New York Times, November 17, 2019 (updated Decem-ber 5, 2019), https:/ 170. Wil Crisp and Suadad al-Salhy, “Inside Hizbollahs Fake News Training Camps Sowing Instability Across the Middle East,” The Telegraph, August 2, 2020, https:/www.telegrap

661、h.co.uk/news/2020/08/02/exclusive-inside-hez-bollahs-fake-news-training-camps-sowing/; Emerson T. Brooking and Suzanne Kianpour, “Iranian Digital Influ-ence Efforts: Guerrilla Broadcasting for the Twenty-first Century” (The Atlantic Council, 2020), https:/www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-re

662、ports/report/iranian-digital-influence-efforts-guerrilla-broadcast-ing-for-the-twenty-first-century/.171. “Gulf States Urged to Unblock Internet Calls amid Coro-navirus Pandemic,” The New Arab, April 8, 2020, https:/english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/4/8/gulf-states-urged-to-unblock-internet-ca

663、lls-amid-coronavirus.172. “Gulf States Urged to Unblock Internet Calls amid Coro-navirus Pandemic.”173. Karen Young and Ellen Nakashima, “U.A.E. Orchestrated Hacking of Qatari Government Sites, Sparking Regional Upheaval, According to U.S. Intelligence Officials,” The Washington Post, July 16, 2017,

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665、 Coordinated Inauthen-tic Behavior in U.A.E., Egypt and Saudi Arabia,” Face-book Newsroom, August 1, 2019, https:/ Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollahs Regional Activities in Sup-port of Irans Proxy Networks” (The Middle East Insti-tute, July 2021), https:/www.mei.edu/publications/hez-bollahs-regional-activi

666、ties-support-irans-proxy-networks. 178. Alice Revelli and Lee Foster, “Network of Social Media Accounts Impersonates U.S. Political Candidates, Lever-ages U.S. and Israeli Media in Support of Iranian Inter-ests,” FireEye, May 28, 2019, https:/ Revelli and Foster, “Network of Social Media Accounts Im

667、personates U.S. Political Candidates, Leverages U.S. and Israeli Media in Support of Iranian Interests.”180. Revelli and Foster, “Network of Social Media Accounts Impersonates U.S. Political Candidates, Leverages U.S. and Israeli Media in Support of Iranian Interests.”181. National Intelligence Coun

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669、logy/privacy/surveil-lance-gulf-states/.183. Megha Rajagopalan, “Facial Recognition Technology Is Facing a Huge Backlash in the U.S., but Some of the Worlds Biggest Tech Companies Are Trying to Sell It in the Gulf,” Buzzfeed News, May 19, 2019, https:/ Deborah Amos, “Lebanons Government Is Accused o

670、f Swarming WhatsApp to Catch Protesters,” NPR, March 9, 2020, https:/www.npr.org/2020/03/09/809684634/lebanons-government-is-accused-of-swarm-ing-whatsapp-to-catch-protesters.185. Aaron Holmes, “Saudi Arabia Allegedly Recruited Twitter Employees to Spy on Users. Thats Just One of Many Ways Saudi Age

671、nts Use Tech Tools to Spy on Critics,” Business Insider, November 7, 2019, https:/ “U.A.E.: Prominent Activist Jailed for Ten Years for Social Media Posts,” Amnesty International UK, May 31, 2018, https:/www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/uae-promi-nent-activist-jailed-ten-years-social-media-posts. 1

672、87. Ronen Bergman and Declan Walsh, “Egypt Is Using Apps to Track and Target Its Citizens, Report Says,” The New York Times, October 3, 2019, https:/ Ryan Gallagher, “Middle East Dictators Buy Spy Tech from Company Linked to IBM and Google,” The Inter-cept, July 12, 2019, https:/ FOR A NEW AMERICAN

673、SECURITY | NOVEMBER 2021The Future of the Digital Order 44semptian-surveillance-mena-openpower/; Thomas Brewster, “Microsoft Slammed for Investment in Israe-li Facial Recognition Spying on Palestinians,” Forbes, August 1, 2019, https:/ Christopher Bing and Joel Schectman, “Inside the U.A.E.s Secret

674、Hacking Team of American Mercenaries,” Reuters, January 30, 2019, https:/ Craig Timberg and Jay Greene, “WhatsApp Accuses Israeli Firm of Helping Governments Hack Phones of Journalists, Human Rights Workers,” The Washington Post, October 29, 2019, https:/ Daniel Estrin, “What to Know about the Spyin

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679、ernments Keep Watch on Us.” 199. Alexander Cornwell, “Bahrain to Use Huawei in 5G Rollout despite U.S. Warnings,” Reuters, March 26, 2019, https:/ “Huawei Signs 5 MoUs with Saudi Ministries to Develop ICT Infrastructure,” Telecom Review, March 20, 2019, https:/www.telecom- and Juan Pedro Toms, “ZTE

680、Signs Deal with Ooredoo to Pave the Way for 5G in the Middle East,” RCR Wireless News, March 2, 2018, https:/ Alexander Cornwell, “Bahrain to Use Huawei in 5G Roll-out despite U.S. Warnings.” “Huawei Signs 5 MoUs with Saudi Ministries to Develop ICT Infrastructure”; Juan Pedro Toms, “ZTE Signs Deal

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