1、REPORTGerman Council on Foreign RelationsThe Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to ActNo. 27November 2021Tyson BarkerHead of the Technology & Global Affairs ProgramTHIS VOLUME IS THE THIRD OF FOUR MONITORING STUDIES2No. 27 | November 2021REPORTThe Digital Technology Environment and

2、Europes Capacity to ActIDEENWERKSTATT DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIKThis monitoring study was written within the framework of the project “Ideenwerkstatt Deutsche Auenpolitik,” a pro-cess of reflection on the capacity to act in German and Eu-ropean foreign policy, the underlying conditions for which are und

3、ergoing a fundamental transformation. In addition to the much-discussed changes to the international system and increasing great-power competition between the United States and China, technological developments, new securi-ty threats, the consequences of climate change, and socio-economic upheaval a

4、re just some of the developments that will determine the future tasks and international impact of German foreign policy. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandem-ic poses numerous political, economic, and societal risks; it accelerates many existing trends in the multilateral system with immediate consequen

5、ces for Germany and the EU. In light of these challenges, the project “Ideenwerkstatt Deut-sche Auenpolitik” aims to put German foreign policy to the test through evidence-based analyses and interdisciplinary strategy discussions and contribute to strengthening Ger-manys and the EUs capacity to act

6、in foreign policy.The project focuses on four thematic areas that are high-ly relevant for the future ability to act of German and Eu-ropean foreign policy: geo-economics, migration, security and defense, and technology. As part of the projects over-all strategic and analytical effort, DGAP produce

7、a moni-toring study on each of these areas four in total, including this one. All four studies analyze Europes capacity to act and provide recommendations for EU and German policymak-ers on how to strengthen this capacity. In order to provide a nuanced yet comprehensive picture, they take into accou

8、nt the different stages of the policy cycle: (1) problem definition, (2) agenda-setting, (3) policy formulation, (4) implementa-tion, and (5) impact assessment. In gauging Europes capacity to act, the studies refer to a series of scenario workshops on the four thematic areas, held in late 2020, in w

9、hich DGAP and external experts created status-quo, best-case, and worst-case scenarios for how the future might look in 2030. Tak-ing these respective scenarios into account, the monitoring studies analyze to what extent the EU and Germany are pre-pared for the worst case, are aware of the implicati

10、ons of the status quo, and are moving toward achieving the best case. The report that distills the results of the scenario workshops and all four monitoring studies can be found here: https:/ /dgap.org/en/ideenwerkstatt-aussenpolitikThis study on capacity to act in digital technology owes an immense

11、 debt of gratitude to a number of individuals with-out whom it would not have been possible. Thanks to Lucas Wollny, Martin Kmmel, Marlon Ebert, Richard Griee, David Hageblling, Jonas Winkel, Diego von Lieres and Becca Hun-ziker for their research, editing, advice and assistance with graphics. Also,

12、 to the team that lead this project: Roderick Parkes, Anna-Lena Kirch, and Serafine Dinkel for their co-ordination, persistence, and imagination, as well as John-Jo-seph Wilkins, Austin Davis Wiebke Ewering, Carl-Friedrich Richter and Helga Beck for editing and layout. Great appre-ciation also goes

13、to Johannes Gabriel for his organization of the scenario workshop, and to the participants who gave up three days over Zoom to provide the raw material for the foresight analysis. Thanks also to Thorsten Klassen, Steffen Zorn, and Alicia von Vo for their efforts to make this project possible, as wel

14、l as Daniela Schwarzer, Cathryn Clver-Ash-brook, and Christian Mlling for their leadership. This project is funded by3No. 27 | November 2021REPORTThe Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to ActTable of ContentsExecutive Summary 4The Digital Environment and Europes Capacity to Act 7Thr

15、ee Scenarios for the Digital Environment in 2030 7Measuring the EUs Capacity to Act Across Five Benchmarks 9Problem Definition 9Agenda-Setting 12Policy Formulation 14Policy Implementation 16Impact Capacity 21Germanys Role with Regard to the EUs Capacity to Act 23Stocktaking: Assessment of Capacity t

16、o Act as a Whole 24Implications and Recommen dations Derived from the Monitoring Exercise 26No. 27 | November 2021REPORTExecutive Summary4Digital technology has become a key dimension of geopolitical, economic, and normative power with states like China and the United States racing to claim the mant

17、le of technological leadership. Oth-ers like Canada, Israel, Japan, and the UK are follow-ing. The EU has recognized that the instruments at its disposal are increasingly limited to its regulatory power, leveraging the desire of technology actors to access the vast European market. But relative mar-

18、ket-size decline and steady erosion of innovation vis-vis peer competitors even on Europes own competitive turf (automobiles, appliances, and in-dustrial Internet of Things (IIoT) are beginning to take a heavier toll on Europes strategic outlook to-ward 2030. This has significant and often still un-

19、derappreciated geopolitical implications for Eu-ropes future. As the EU has moved from a narrative around the Dig-ital Single Market (DSM) to one around digital sover-eignty, leaders have seen a growth in defensive ac-tion aimed at managing digital spaces particularly in information and communicatio

20、n technology ser-vices (ICT) and a new jolt of tech-industrial policy activity, most recently seen in the pandemic-inspired Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF). The Europe-an Union has begun to coalesce around the notion of “digital sovereignty” as the leitmotif of its efforts, but has yet to tac

21、kle shades of difference between key players. The quest for digital sovereignty, which com-bines narrative power with rhetorical ambiguity, can at times paper over hard choices about strategic pol-icy objectives, particularly between France and Ger-many, for the sake of consensus building.Six realit

22、ies frame the EUs approach as it tries to forge unity for a more forceful, geopolitically-mind-ed digital tech policy. First, Europes digital market remains fragmented. Second, technology itself has taken on a more general-purpose nature, with appli-cations across sectors. Third, the geopolitical en

23、viron-ment particularly US-China tech competition has raised the potential for the development of separate technology stacks. Fourth, the coronavirus pandem-ic has fueled the acceleration of Europes digital de-pendences on external actors and consolidated the dominance of Big Tech. Fifth, there has

24、been a glob-al renaissance in tech industrial policy. And finally, da-ta governance is an increasingly contested space with the specter of digital localization looming large. Overall, the 2030 baseline scenario points to a stag-nant, negatively inflected trajectory for Europe if the EU continues to

25、rest on its standing as a regulato-ry power. For the EU to redirect this trajectory to the best-case-scenario, ten policy objectives are central: complete the DSM; guarantee supply-chain access and resilience at all layers of the technology stack; es-tablish leadership and control of critical and em

26、erg-ing technology areas; develop deep, interoperable, easily accessible data pools; unlock state, institution-al, and venture capital (VC) investment; attract glob-al ICT talent; conduct and commercialize emerging technology research and development (R&D); broad-en global regulatory and standard-se

27、tting leadership beyond personal data and competition; strength-en cybersecurity; and advance reliable tech alliances with like-minded states.The geopolitical environment whether collabora-tive, hostile, or hybrid is seen as an equally relevant factor in the EUs ability to develop technological ca-p

28、acity. A benign geopolitical environment with con-sensus-driven, interoperable, and universally accept-ed tech standards, and governance would be most advantageous. Absent that, collaborative efforts with the United States, for instance in the Trade and Tech-nology Council, could bolster Europes dig

29、ital tech outlook. For Germany, this means addressing the willingness to approach tech industrial policy with meaning-ful investments in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, semiconductors, and elsewhere as truly European, rather than German projects. Germany will still shape European an

30、d global digital regulation by anticipating the EUs tech regulatory agenda and establishing national laws, regulation, and standards that can then be elevated to the EU level. It has al-ready done so in in content moderation, digital com-petition, cybersecurity, and elsewhere. Ultimately, the EUs po

31、licy success will be determined by its ability to shore up areas where it is weakest namely, improving policy formulation, implementa-tion, and impact at home; and establishing constant and interactive benchmarking, honest performance assessments particularly of failures and confron-tations with tra

32、deoffs, particularly around regulation in areas like data governance, platform regulation, and AI. The EU must set out clearly defined objectives that confront the tough questions of “what is essen-tial” and “what is nice to have.”EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capac

33、ity to Act5No. 27 | November 2021REPORTThe Digital Environment and Europes Capacity to ActIn her 2020 State of the European Union address, Europe-an Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called the path to 2030 Europes “digital decade.” The EU introduced major new ideas on competition instrument

34、s, cloud com-puting, 5/6G, online media pluralism, election systems integrity, disinformation, platform regulation, and cyberse-curity in 2020 with other major proposals on industrial da-ta and AI planned for 2021. At the same time, the COVID-19 crisis has led states to look at major investments in

35、emerging tech as part of national stimulus packages, and von der Ley-en pledged that 20 percent of the EUs 750-billion recovery plan, NextGenerationEU, would go to making the continent ready for the deep digital age. Taken together, the EU and its member states are under-going a massive rethink on t

36、echnologys impact on their economy, security, and democracy. As technological com-petitiveness moves from precision-centric engineering, as in the automotive sector, to data-centric analytics and us-er interfaces, there is a perception that the EU is falling be-hind. And von der Leyens quest to tran

37、sform the European Commission into a geopolitical body recognizes that a com-prehensive approach to digital technology will be one of if not the most important determinants of Europes ability to project power and global influence in the world of 2030. But the way the EU uses the term “technology” in

38、 fact en-compasses many very different policy areas. Even narrowly defined, technology includes areas as varied as semiconduc-tor manufacturing, digital infrastructure, platform gover-nance, e-commerce, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, quantum computing, the IoT, cybersecurity, and both per

39、-sonal and non-personal data. In recent European debates, it has even been broadened to include e-health, the future of work, smart cities, automated manufacturing, fintech, logis-tics, and, increasingly, the application of strategic technolo-gy in military contexts, just to name a few.This high deg

40、ree of complexity makes streamlined thinking about the efficacy of European tech policy immensely dif-ficult and one of the primary reasons that a series of suc-cessfully implemented policies does not always result in the ultimate outcomes the EU desires. The EU has had some success in exercising it

41、s capacity to act by setting glob-al standards in privacy, competition, telecommunications, and internet protocols. Its gaming, IoT, and industrial inter-net sectors continue to stand among global tech leaders. All contribute to the EUs role as an exporter of both values and innovation. At the same

42、time, the EU has also had significant disap-pointments. Once dominant in the cellular handset mar-ket, European leadership in this area collapsed following the post-2007 smartphone boom. Earlier efforts to develop an indigenous PC industry and internet search have been un-successful. Europe is falli

43、ng behind in AI adoption. The cloud market is being ceded to external actors. And Europe is in-creasingly dependent on external actors for the fabrication of chips a key component for European manufacturing of cars, heavy machinery, and appliances. The Commission, member states, and industry are in

44、the midst of demarcat-ing sectors where leadership by other states is hard to con-test and likely less central for future European technological power (PCs, social media platforms) from other areas where European tech industrial capacity will be determinant in the EUs future ability to secure its te

45、ch industrial base (in cloud computing and industrial data, for instance).In some ways, Europes efforts to coordinate digital tech policy are akin to conducting a symphony orchestra. The actors and mechanisms regulatory, industrial, and market access-based similar to instrumental sections, vary grea

46、t-ly in size, scope, and ability. Europes policy-makers, indus-try, and users the composers draw on their knowledge of the strengths of various instruments to write a cohesive plan that elevates the product of the whole. The European Commission and individual member states act as the con-ductor, att

47、empting to guide what could otherwise be a ca-cophonous rabble into a coordinated, mutually reinforcing harmony. Except, in the swiftly moving reality of tech poli-cy, Europe is essentially attempting to write the music, con-struct the instruments, train the conductor and players, and perform the sy

48、mphony simultaneously. The outcome does not yet resemble a stirring performance of Beethovens Ode to Joy.As a large, open economy, the EU remains highly reli-ant on outside actors principally, the United States and East Asia for its digital technology. On its current trajec-tory, the EU will remain

49、a global tech player in the coming The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act6No. 27 | November 2021REPORTdecade, but will have less room for maneuver as it confronts a tougher, more competitive global tech landscape than has previously existed. As the battle for digital competit

50、iveness heats up, the EUs success in advancing its capacity to act will be determined along the following dimensions which in-teract and inform each other: First, its regulatory power the EUs ability to establish rules governing the development and use of technology at home and to effectively shape

51、global tech governance in a way that advances Europes objectives. Second, its innovation power Europes ability to both develop and, perhaps more importantly, commercially adopt new technologies to enhance Europes global industrial competitiveness. Third, in many ways the linchpin for the first two,

52、the EUs market power the means by which the EU is able to instrumentalize access to its market and deepen unfettered activity within its market as a means of incen-tivizing conformity of non-European tech players with European rules. Harnessing European market power relies on a policy mix that combi

53、nes both the EUs regu-latory and industrial instruments.Taken together, these dimensions form the basis with which the EU will shape its digital technology landscape as it heads toward 2030. This monitoring exercise examines past in-struments and current ambitions. The Digital Technology Environment

54、 and Europes Capacity to Act7No. 27 | November 2021REPORTThree Scenarios for the Digital Environment in 2030In the technology scenario workshop that was conducted in November 2020, participants examined key drivers af-fecting Europes ICT landscape as it attempts to develop as a global tech leader. T

55、he workshop identified three possible scenarios for Europes digital outlook in 2030. Of the three, the baseline scenario is the most likely outcome both the best- and the worst-case scenarios are possible, but not necessarily probable. Ultimately, despite commonalities be-tween the baseline and best

56、-case scenarios, the baseline is surprisingly equidistant from the scenarios on either ex-treme. Each scenario is outlined below: The baseline scenario:“Coding 2020 into 2030”The worst-case scenario:“Made in China 2030”The best-case scenario: “A Strong Europe in a Stable World”In the baseline scenar

57、io “Coding 2020 into 2030” con-tinued US political oscillation between populism and liberal internationalism forces the EU to pursue “contingent uni-lateralism.” The scope and level of adoption continues to grant the EU an ability to set global technology standards. The EU provides new rules on AI,

58、cloud computing, indus-trial data, platforms, and competition that lay the ground rules for both Europe and non-EU third countries. As it does so, however, Europe suffers from innovation stag-nation due to an increasingly securitized and fragmented strategic technology landscape in areas like data f

59、lows, ICT infrastructure, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and tech investment. The fusion of engineering-driven manufactur-ing and user-driven smart devices puts Europes home-turf prowess in automobiles, heavy machinery, and appliances in direct competition with a phalanx of dynamic upstarts from Ch

60、ina and the United States (e.g., Tesla, Xiaomi, and Haier). Attempts to provide state aid to startups and inno-vative divisions of legacy companies largely flounder under the weight of cumbersome bureaucracy and the risk-averse strategies of public authorities responsible for managing public investm

61、ent. Unable to compete on quality and user experience with new US and Chinese players, but still main-taining a large market with access predicated on playing by EU rules, Europe consolidates its role as rule maker and tech taker. The EU clings to its role as the tech referee, set-ting regulations o

62、n data and competition globally perhaps adding new regulatory areas like AI and cloud even as it continues to lose ground in innovation.BOX 1 BASIC DEFINITION OF THE TECH STACK: There are four general layers in the “tech stack,” or the parts of the digital ecosystem. Broadly defined, they are: The p

63、hysical layer (e.g., cables, telecommu-nications infrastructure like 5G equipment, and physical computational infrastructure like semiconductors and IoT); The logical layer (e.g., internet Protocols, authen-tication, and packets and data); The platform layer (e.g., cloud and edge services, applicati

64、on programming interfaces (APIs), and other cross-cutting, platform-based offerings); and The application layer (e.g., discreet applications such as over-the-top (OTT) services like social media, streaming, instant messaging, and audio communication services). No layer is clearly defined each inform

65、s and permeates the others. Software and AI bind the layers together. Data flows through all layers. The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act8No. 27 | November 2021REPORTIn the worst-case scenario “Made in China 2030” the EU gradually becomes dependent on the Chinese technol-og

66、y stack (BOX 1). Chinas technological leadership slowly increases as Europes predominant reliance on US tech grad-ually gives way to a reliance on China, starting with hardware, smartphones, and apps. This trend is reinforced by increas-ing European accommodation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI

67、), which places China at the center of standard-setting efforts on issues of state-centric tech governance, cyberse-curity, and technical standards. The gradual march toward dependency on Chinese technology is solidified with condi-tions buried in terms of service that lock in Chinese control over t

68、echnological infrastructure associated with digital ser-vices. Access and control to this ICT infrastructure becomes privileged. Chinas preponderant control of technologi-cal services in Europe allows China to wield it as a political weapon. The EU loses its capacity to act as it must acquiesce to C

69、hina. In the best-case scenario “A Strong Europe in A Stable World” the EU becomes a full-fledged technological peer with the United States and China with equivalent essential patents, unicorns, venture capital, and IT talent. The three powers cooperate, sharing the benefits of emerging tech-nologie

70、s. Intra-EU digital inequality between countries as well as in the urban-rural divide virtually disappears as access to 5G and online infrastructure is available to all, en-abling strong EU sectors (e.g., IoT, robotics, health, mobility, and gaming) to thrive. The EU repeats the General Data Pro-tec

71、tion Regulations (GDPR) success with Gaia-X, creating a federated cloud system based on European values that be-comes a global gold standard. This allows for global industrial and sectoral data pools. The pace of innovation in quantum, encryption, and AI is matched by robust, trustworthy reg-ulation

72、 and education that shapes a competitive workforce, ensures carbon neutrality, and fosters citizen trust in new technologies. Based on the best-case scenario, there are ten conditions that Europe would have to meet in order to optimize its tech-nological capacity to act in technology i.e., position

73、Europe as a global tech leader (BOX 2).The workshop demonstrated that concerns about techno-logical dependency and the geopolitical implications of the tech race are of great concern. Simply put, in the context of the emerging US-China tech race, Europes incumbent regulatory strength will likely be

74、insufficient to achieve its desired role as a technological actor on par with the Unit-ed States and China. Europe must couple its role as a reg-ulator with new efforts to create an environment in which indigenous innovation can flourish. Both the baseline and worst-case scenario reflected a loss of

75、 agency for Europe. Is-sues of significant political concern such as technologys role in carbon emission mitigation, the advancement of a human-centric values system, and the promotion of digital equity in the Global South became secondary in those sce-narios as others placed more emphasis on contro

76、l of tech-nology itself. BOX 2 CONDITIONS FOR EUROPES EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE GLOBAL TECH LEADER STATUS Complete the Digital Single Market with seamless digital services and regulations across the 27 member states; Guarantee supply-chain access and resilience at all layers of the technology stack; Establ

77、ish leadership and control of critical and emerging technology areas; Develop deep, interoperable, easily accessible data pools; Unlock state, institutional, and venture capital (VC) investment; Attract global ICT talent; Conduct and commercialize emerging technology R&D; Broaden global regulatory a

78、nd standard-set-ting leadership beyond personal data and competition; Strengthen cybersecurity in critical infrastructure and along all lines of digital operations; and Advance reliable tech alliances with like-minded states. The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act9No. 27 | No

79、vember 2021REPORTMeasuring the EUs Capacity to Act Across Five Benchmarks This study explores the EUs capacity to act in digital tech-nology across five categories: 1) how the EU defines the problem it is attempting to address; 2) how the EU sets an agenda; 3) how the EU formulates policy; 4) how th

80、e EU im-plements policy; and 5) to what degree European policy has an impact at home and globally. In each of these, it draws on the interactions, mutual reinforcements, and, at times, ten-sions between European power as a digital regulator, and its aspirations as a tech industrial leader at each st

81、age of the policymaking process. Because digital tech policy is ex-tremely heterodox, it is difficult to fit the policy making pro-cess neatly into these five broadly defined categories. This, in and of itself, is a limitation that the EU must confront and one that is explored in detail as part of t

82、his analysis. That said, this study works within the limitations of these cate-gories and draws out some findings that could better posi-tion the EU to adapt to accelerating developments in digital technology in a geopolitical context. PROBLEM DEFINITIONLike other areas assessed in this exercise, th

83、e European Commission along with key member states is, on its face, skillful in its ability to define the problems it faces in digi-tal technology. It is able to identify deficiencies and frame them. Commission President von der Leyen has made dig-ital leadership one of the two main priorities, alon

84、g with a green transition, of her strategy at the Commission. She has stated her belief that “Europe must have the capability to make its own choices, based on its own values, respecting its own rules,” 1 while also correctly lamenting that, in reality, “Europe is still punching well below its weigh

85、t.” 2 1 Ursula von der Leyen, “Shaping Europes digital future,” European Commission, February 19, 2020: (accessed March 11, 2021).2 Ursula von der Leyen, “Keynote speech by President von der Leyen at the Masters of Digital 2021 event,” European Commission, February 4, 2021: (accessed March 11, 2021)

86、.3 Bundesministerium fr Wirtschaft und Energie and Le ministre de lconomie, des Finances, “A Franco-German Manifesto for a European industrial policy fit for the 21st Century,” February 19, 2019: (accessed March 11, 2021).The sense of existential foreboding in the race for techno-logical leadership

87、is also underscored by member states, particularly the larger ones. France and Germany recent-ly laid out Europes 2030 ICT outlook in even starker terms, saying “the choice is simple when it comes to industrial poli-cy: unite our forces or allow our industrial base and capacity to gradually disappea

88、r.” 3In examining the landscape, six key drivers emerge at the outset of Europes “digital decade.” Each has been identi-fied repeatedly by the European Commission. The following pulls together the most-identified themes, such as: Europes fragmented Digital Market: Europe lacks the large, unified dig

89、ital market operating with one lan-guage, legal culture, and capital market that makes the United States and China attractive for digital innova-tion. Europes digital services market remains frag-mented, lacking natural advantages in areas like cohesive language, culture, online behavior, and invest

90、-ment preferences. The changing nature of technological development itself: Access and control over platforms, cloud, inter-net infrastructure, advanced algorithms like AI, quan-tum technology, and advanced microprocessing are becoming central to economic, strategic, and demo-cratic power and vulner

91、ability. The level of adoption and sophistication of general-purpose technologies increa- singly “provides the key value addition to” classical products and services. Legacy sectors like automotives, appliances, machinery, the industrial fabrication of chemicals, and pharmaceuticals the heart of Eur

92、o-pean industry are increasingly based on software and data-processing. As such, Europes legacy companies face fierce competition with US and Chinese tech com-petitors. The play for technological leadership is increasingly made on industrial turf, which Europe had long dominated. The prospect of tec

93、hnological decoupling: Chinas techno-authoritarian rise has bumped up against a United States increasingly willing to leverage global dependence on US tech for geopolitical aims. The resulting demand to pick a side, be it on semiconductor usage, data localization and access requirements, or even the

94、 protocols governing the future internet, is The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act10No. 27 | November 2021REPORTforcing Europe to quickly choose whether it will accept dual systems of ICT architecture, attempt to carve out an interoperable position that preserves access to b

95、oth, or develop a third alternative. A complete split in two would encompass all aspects of the technological stack: the physical, protocol, platform, and application layers of the digital economy, as well as the algorithms and data they run on. The COVID-19-fuelled acceleration of Europes digi-tal

96、dependences on external actors and consolidated Big Tech dominance: Even before the COVID-19 crisis, the European Commission had defined its interest in revisiting its dependence on the United States and China. But the pivot to digital adoption fueled by the COVID-19 pandemics economic and technolog

97、ical shocks drew Europes existing technological depen-dency into high relief. Reliance on US platform ser-vices, from video conferencing to streaming services, combined with greater awareness of supply chain vul-nerabilities in areas like semiconductors, created new urgency for Europes pursuit of in

98、digenous technolog-ical capabilities. Moreover, the dominance of Big Tech platforms has increased their ability to gatekeep everything from APIs used in contract-tracing apps to e-commerce, adtech, and cloud. The Commissions 2019 EU-China Strategy which identified China as a “negotiating partner, ec

99、onomic competitor and sys-temic rival” specifically emphasized achieving a “more balanced and reciprocal economic relationship.” 4 However, Chinas six-percent GDP growth in Q4 2020 amid pandemic conditions has accelerated the EUs market dependency on the Middle Kingdom, causing new reliance on Chine

100、se IT as a condition for access to the Chinese market for European IoT applications like connected cars. The rise of state-backed industrial policy: Chinas relative success in moving up the technological value chain in the last ten years has been a disruptive force in the global technology ecosystem

101、. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has worked to fuse state and enterprise together. This unified structure can take different forms, from fully state-owned enterprises to theoretically independent enterprises like Chinese Big Tech with party-heavy management boards. This sort of vertical system in

102、corporates massive state-run national and local investment and procurement struc-tures that give preference to state-favored companies, 4 European Commission, “EU-China A strategic outlook,” March 12, 2019, p. 6: (accessed March 11, 2021).5 “New Rules For Online News And Social Media: 10-Point Guide

103、,” NDTV, February 25, 2021: (accessed March 11, 2021).forced joint ventures, and shared technology intellec-tual property (IP) gathered through state-backed industrial espionage with copy-cat companies at home. The codependence with the state, with the CCP as the undisputed senior partner, is a hall

104、mark of Chinas domestic technology sector, and its presence has become a benchmark of its expansion in areas like telecommunications hardware, handsets, fintech, e-commerce, social media, and IoT. The fusion has driven other large powers, notably the United States, but also the UK, Canada, Japan, So

105、uth Korea, and the EU, to revisit how they support access to and control key technologies. Weakening models for digital governance: The desire to create parallel governance structures, contested global standards, and attempts to claw back control from international, multistakeholder governance bod-i

106、es are affecting the global nature of the internet itself. Overall, repeated, disparate attempts to repatriate digital governance by countries like China and Russia are threatening a balkanization of the digital space. In China, these include the Huawei-led effort to establish a next-generation netw

107、ork and protocol system known as “New IP”; sweeping data localization requirements written into the 2017 Internet Security Law that man-date “important data” be stored in-country, which could impact European access to industrial data; and increasing use of antitrust law to rein in control of pri-vat

108、e Chinese Big Tech actors like Alibaba. In India, 2021 revisions to the national law governing intermediaries require new content moderation and grievance redress infrastructure based in-country, adding to existing and increasingly stringent data and supply chain localization requirements.5Each of t

109、hese six trends reflected in the baseline scenario and taken to their extremes in the worst-case scenario are clear and present in the minds of Brussels most senior pol-icy makers. As a strategic matter, the Commission has long identified digital market fragmentation as a source of both economic and

110、 geostrategic weakness of Europe. However, the key external drivers above have caused Europe to re-assess beyond strictly market terms. The European Union and its member states have identified broad outcomes nec-essary to address these policy challenges. Generally, the EU has attempted to shape a di

111、gital technology environment in which: The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act11No. 27 | November 2021REPORT1. High quality, safe connectivity is accessible to all EU citizens; 2. ICT processes particularly the processing, transfer, and storage of data is accessible through da

112、ta spaces and consistent with Europeans fundamental rights;3. Rules governing digital services and data usage are uniformly enforced;4. The Digital Single Market across Europe is pursued;5. European actors are increasingly competitive;6. Europe has control over key technologies and access to secure,

113、 resilient supply chains; 7. Europe has indigenous, reliable digital infrastructure; and 8. Sustainability and the green transition are linked to digitalization goals. The European Commission and leading member states are capable of accurately contextualizing and diagnosing Eu-ropes deficiencies in

114、a global context. There is no compla-cency trap when Brussels compares Europes innovation industrial base with peer competitors. The European Union has worked to create instruments to strengthen control of strategic technology development and tech transfer. New instruments have been specifically dev

115、eloped with technol-ogy projects that draw on EU R&D funding (e.g., Horizon Eu-rope) or strategic technology (e.g., suppliers to the Galileo satellite network). The goal behind these instruments is to broaden the EUs tech industrial base. Sovereignty in tech-nological matters can only be ensured if

116、the EU itself is ca-pable of developing and producing relevant technology, an area in which it has fallen far behind the United States and is losing ground to China. The EU and its member states have identified this problem and are focusing on key aspects, most importantly bolstering its capabilitie

117、s in semiconduc-tors 6 and quantum computers, 7 as well as focusing attention on internet infrastructure.8However, the EU has difficulty defining the problem and setting up a framework in three interrelated areas. First, given the scope of the defined challenges, Europe at times finds itself unable

118、or unwilling to prioritize often con-flicting objectives. This is not new. Even in its landmark pol-icy achievement, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), assessments of the EUs policy approach are not 6 European Commission, “Member States join forces for a European initiative on processors

119、 and semiconductor technologies,” December 7, 2020: (accessed March 11, 2021).7 Deutsche Bundesregierung, “Bund frdert Quantentechnologien” The federal government promotes quantum technology, January 15, 2021: (accessed March 11, 2021).8 Laurens Cerulus, “Lisbon eyes undersea cable investment to bol

120、ster EU tech infrastructure,” Politico, December 10, 2020: (accessed March 11, 2021).9 Ursula von der Leyen, “Open letter from the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, to Mathias Dpfner, CEO of Axel Springer SE,” European Commission (January 29, 2021): (accessed March 11, 2021

121、).10 Hannah Balfour, “Could GDPR be impeding the global COVID-19 pandemic response?,” European Pharmaceutical Review (October 2, 2020): (accessed March 11, 2021).unanimous. On the one hand, the EU is proud of its creation of the global standard for personal data. On the other hand, the EU sees where

122、 it might have been a victim of its own success creating a standard that ties its hands when faced with competitors in the US and Asia able to use personal data more freely. Europes conflicting objectives have also spilled over into the way the bloc views data storage infra-structure location, and o

123、wnership. Europes European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), Frances Commission natio-nale de linformatique (CNIL), and Germanys Federal Data Protection Act (DPA) have all expressed reservations about both data transfer to the United States and the use of US cloud service providers based in Europe.

124、 They base their reservations on legal access requirements for law enforce-ment and intelligence services. Second, the EU still has significant blind spots in providing frank, clear-eyed assessments of the real trade-offs of its digital policies. For instance, first-mover regulations con-tributed to

125、 the blocs paucity of data and, as a result of this and other factors (e.g., fragmented markets, risk culture, capital access, research commercialization), Europe missed out on the first wave of internet innovation. As a result, the EU was less able to compete with the United States and Chi-na as a

126、globally competitive social media and e-commerce actor. While Commission officials and others rightly claim that the GDPR has “become a model for large parts of the world,” they are less willing to acknowledge the costs asso-ciated with it 9, from a more difficult regulatory environment for tech sta

127、rtups to an inability to provide sophisticated da-ta analytics that could accelerate vaccine distribution in the COVID-19 pandemic.10 Third, senior political leadership in the EU can find itself bound by regulators, the former pursuing high strategic stakes, the latter asserting narrow legal norms.

128、Indepen-dent Data Protection Agencies (DPAs), whose independence is protected by law, have a narrow focus on GDPR enforce-ment, with other objectives like innovation, sustainability, tech adoption fallingoutside their mandate. DPAs and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) set a high bar for GDPR en-f

129、orcement and limited the Commissions ability to maneuver. For instance, on multiple occasions, the Commission has negotiated data flow agreements with the United States The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act12No. 27 | November 2021REPORTthat were later invalidated by the Euro

130、pean Court of Justice (ECJ) because they did not meet GDPR criteria.11CAPACITY TO DEFINE THE PROBLEMThe EU is able to successfully identify challenges to its ability to achieve global leadership status as a technological rule-maker and innovator. However, it lacks the ability to successfully priori-

131、tize its challenges; often has a blind spot for challenges of its own creation; and fosters strategic gaps between institutional actors.AGENDA-SETTINGIn broad terms, the EU is an active and, at times, ambitious agenda-setter. The European Union has long centered dig-ital policy at the core of its wo

132、rk and devoted resources and effort to articulating its agenda. EU action often reflects dominant contemporary political narratives and rising technologies, with the agenda recently shifting from a mar-ket to a geopolitical orientation. The Commission has, at several junctures, framed its digital ag

133、enda in the context of broader strategic narratives. The EU has the ability to synthesize disparate member state and institutional inter-ests into broad strategies reflective of technological trends and the geopolitical environment. In recent discourse, two stand out as the EU has moved from a narra

134、tive around the Digital Single Market to digital sovereignty.In the context of awareness of the deficiencies in Europes ICT landscape, the Commission formulated the 2015 Digital Single Market Strategy, launched by then-Commission Vice President Andrus Ansip, which aimed to assemble Europes fragmente

135、d market landscape into a unitary space for con-sumers, businesses, start-ups, civil society, and regulators. The DSM centered around three interlocking elements: 1) seeking to promote access, 2) increasing fairness and in-novation, and 3) encouraging economic growth. Its primary mode of action was

136、removing internal market barriers and delivering visible user benefits, a plan meant to promote cross-border commercial activity in digital services. At the 11 In the 2015 Schrems I and 2020 Schrems II decisions, the court invalidated the commissions findings in light of PRISM mass surveillance prog

137、rams revealed by Edward Snowden.12 Carl Bildt, Building a Transatlantic Digital Marketplace: Twenty Steps Toward 2020 (see note 7), p.19.13 Council of the European Union, “EU to ban data localisation restrictions as ambassadors approve deal on free flow of data,” June 29, 2018: (accessed March 11, 2

138、021).14 Nadine Brockmann, “Digitale Souvernitt im Fokus von BMWi und BITKOM,” Basecamp, May 22, 2015: (accessed March 11, 2021).15 Erste Lesung, “German EU Council Presidency: Digital Sovereignty” (October 20, 2020): (accessed March 11, 2021).time, EU innovation czar Robert Madelin summed up the DSM

139、s guiding logic stating, “the most important thing Eu-rope creates is not the law but the space.” 12 The DSM includ-ed a number of legislative measures aimed at knitting the EU closer together, for instance eliminating geo-blocking, allowing greater cross-border portability of online content, and ea

140、sing e-commerce parcel delivery. This effort was championed by multiple Council presidencies, with the 2017 Estonian EU Council Presidency deeming the free move-ment of data the “5th freedom” alongside the free move-ment of goods, services, capital, and people.13As the transatlantic triple shocks of

141、 Snowden, Trump, and Cambridge Analytica entered Europes policy bloodstream, discourse particularly in Germany increasingly focused on the framework of digital sovereignty. Its concept of sov-ereignty centered on the individual citizen and their ability to control the storage, transfer, and processi

142、ng of personal data as a fundamental right. However, implicitly, it also ad-dressed cybersecurity and access denial to snoops like the NSA, and carried with it strong potential data localization effects.By 2015, it grew to encompass a broader innovation indus-trial base. The current German definitio

143、n of digital sover-eignty is based around three principles: 1. A market landscape that allows for competition and the development of new business models independent of dominant players; 2. Access to trustworthy technology adhering to strong regulations; and 3. Framework conditions at the German and

144、European levels that allow for high standards for data sovereignty.14 This definition reflects the ordoliberal traditions of inno-vation and industrial development in Germany, albeit with a harder geopolitical edge. And it was reaffirmed by Ger-man Chancellor Angela Merkel at the November 2019 In-te

145、rnet Governance Forum: “In my understanding, digital sovereignty does not mean protectionism or the dictates of government agencies as to what information can be dis-seminated, but rather describes the ability to shape the digital transformation in a self-determined manner, wheth-er as an individual

146、, a single person, or as a society.” 15 In some The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act13No. 27 | November 2021REPORTways, the regulation- and market-building DSM agenda and the industrial policy-centered “digital sovereignty” agenda were a complimentary division of labor betw

147、een the EU and its largest member state.At the same time, the French have consistently urged Eu-rope to adopt a notion of digital sovereignty centered on innovation, industrial build-up, and control of data with-in European territory. This desire reflects a long tradition of interventionist, state-c

148、entric industrial policy in France. The German and French notions cohabitate in a sort of stra-tegic ambiguity, currently under active negotiation with each other as digital sovereignty takes form in projects like Gaia-X and others working toward the development of greater semiconductor production c

149、apacity. The Commissions greater geopolitical emphasis, President von der Leyens leadership, and the COVID-19 crisis com-bined to spark a deep rethink of the EUs position on tech-nological access and control. This has fueled the accurate perception that digital single market creation is not enough,

150、a recognition that has become a through line in EU agen-da-setting.16 Across the board, from Macron to Merkel, and from the Commission to the European Parliament (EP), Eu-rope is defining its quest for digital sovereignty as a “third European way of digitization which contrasts with the US-American

151、and Chinese approach.” 17 Supply shortages in medical goods and semiconductors, and increased demand for remote work during the recent COVID-19 crisis, have led to an even stronger emphasis on industrial shortcom-ings within the EU. Now, digital sovereignty is largely seen to include all aspects of

152、technology, especially the digital infrastructure needed to both communicate, generate and process data.Generally, Europes approach to digital sovereignty lacks the defined objectives and outcomes that characterized the DSM Strategy. The drawbacks are clear. But it also has advantages. The French co

153、mmissioner for industry, digital rights groups, and German ordoliberals can all embrace the term “digital sovereignty.” The strategic flexibility derived from this catch-all term gives actors in Europe both the Commission and individual member states the ability to take ownership and drive initiativ

154、es from the ground up. 16 “While a strong single market, open competition and trade policy are critical assets for the EUs economic success and resilience, a massive scale-up of investments is also necessary.” See: European Commission, “Roadmap: Communication on a Europes digital decade: 2030 digita

155、l targets” (February 10, 2021), p. 2: (accessed March 11, 2021).17 Julia Pohle, “Digital sovereignty A new key concept of digital policy in Germany and Europe,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (2020): (accessed March 11, 2021).18 Less than two weeks after the commission blocked the Alstom-Siemens Rail merg

156、er.19 European Commission, “Joint Declaration on Processor and Semiconductor Technologies,” December 7, 2020, p. 3: (accessed March 11, 2021).This -la-carte approach impacts agenda-setting with mixed, at times muddled results. For instance, when dis-cussing digital sovereignty achievements during it

157、s 2020 Council Presidency, Germany emphasized industrial policies on in cloud computing, quantum computing, semi-conductors/micro-processers, digital identities, and da-ta governance. The German Presidency also allowed major new legislative proposals on issues including platforms and the market domi

158、nance of online gatekeepers, which re-main in the purview of the Commission, and areas like the digital services tax, where Germany remains principally ambivalent. In the past, the clear accent reinforced in the 2000 Lisbon Agenda was on economic competitiveness and innovation. As the EU moves towar

159、d 2030, that emphasis has expanded to include components addressing access and control of key technologies. Already in February 2019, France and Germa-ny issued a 14-point Franco-German Manifesto for a Euro-pean Industrial Policy Fit for the 21st Century.18 In it, France and Germany began to outline

160、 specific areas: massive in-dustrial investment, changes to Europes regulatory frame-work, and new measures to protect Europes industrial base. The document pointed favorably to new policy devel-opments around Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) that allow for greater deployment o

161、f state aid in microelectronics, questioned the impact of compe-tition policy that could prevent the emergence of Europe-an tech champions, and advocated more active screening of investment, public procurement access, and trade policy to ensure consistency with strategic autonomy and an evolv-ing de

162、finition of digital sovereignty. In December 2020, 18 EU telecommunication ministers signed a joint letter stat-ing that Europe needs the capacity to “design and eventually fabricate the next generation of trusted, low-power proces-sors, for applications in high-speed connectivity, automated vehicle

163、s, aerospace and defense, health and agri food, ar-tificial intelligence, data-centres, integrated photonics, su-percomputing and quantum computing.”19 Other IPCEIs are in the works on network infrastructure equipment, cloud computing, hydrogen power, and batteries.The Biden administration also spar

164、ked a reset of European agenda-setting around tech policy. More strident calls to wall off digital dependences have paused in some corners of the Commission and select member states as both attempt The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act14No. 27 | November 2021REPORTto synchro

165、nize the EUs digital regulatory, standard-setting and market access agenda with renewed EU-US coopera-tion in the Trade and Technology Council. Diverging views on these issues could give rise to new intra-European ten-sions, with Germany and smaller northern European states on one side and France on

166、 the other, and elements of the Commission divided between both camps.20 What is nevertheless clear is that, in contrast to the DSM - which included specific targets largely related to mar-ket standardization and liberalization Europes quest for digital sovereignty places greater emphasis on the EU

167、and member states taking a more interventionist role in shaping the digital environment. Through the post-COVID-19 Next-GenerationEU recovery plan, IPCEIs, and national industri-al policy, that focus is in four areas: 1) public investment in connectivity; 2) a stronger industrial and technological r

168、ole in strategic areas of the digital supply chain; 3) building a “real data economy” as the engine for job and value creation in Europe; and 4) a business environment that encourag-es competition against the backdrop of dominant US tech players, particularly in light of accelerated technological ad

169、option due to pandemic-related lockdowns.21 Even ef-forts to create a uniform single market environment in ar-eas like neutral data brokerage and the responsibilities of gatekeepers by and large raise regulatory conditions and call for greater state intervention rather than liberalizing conditions.

170、CAPACITY TO SET THE AGENDAThe EU is able to craft an agenda that is flexible and responsive to what it perceives as key challenges. It can synthesize perspectives, particularly those of large member states, into a broad policy nar-rative, often taking advantage of strategic ambiguities that mask dif

171、ferences between key actors. POLICY FORMULATIONEuropes digital tech policy formulation is ambitious and heavily informed by geopolitical circumstances. Questions remain, however, as to how the EU can translate its objec-tives into effective action and to what extent it can enlist 20 Angela Merkel et

172、 al., Letter to Ursula von der Leyen (March 1, 2021): (accessed March 11, 2021).21 European Commission, “Europes moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation,” May 27, 2020: (accessed March 11, 2021).22 European Commission, “A Europe fit for the digital age”: (accessed March 11, 2021).23 These

173、 include DG CONNECT, DG JUST, DG COMP, DG GROW, DG HOME, DG MOVE, and DG TRADE. Additionally, regulatory bodies across data protection (the European like-minded democracies in its efforts. Two broad dimen-sions characterize Europes efforts to develop policy to shape its technological environment. Fi

174、rst, Europes rec-ognition that the global ICT landscape does not reflect its values. In addressing this, the EU is making an aggressive bid to bring its market power to bear to rewrite the worlds digital rulebook. The European Union is in the midst of re-inforcing its role as a digital technology re

175、gulator through a set of policy initiatives clustered around core legislation on digital platforms and data services namely, the Digital Services Act (DSA), Digital Markets Act (DMA), Data Gover-nance Act (DGA), and AI Regulation and Data Act. Addition-ally, the EU is developing softer law elements

176、that deal with media pluralism and disinformation, data governance, ar-tificial intelligence, cloud computing, and cyber. This also encompasses Europes ability to shape the norms and stan-dards environment, an area of priority as Europe aims to put itself in the position to “set standards, rather th

177、an follow those of others.” Second, Europe perceives deficits in the control of critical and emerging technologies and has accordingly begun to raise its industrial policy profile in response. These efforts include classical industry support in the form of direct state investment, increased R&D, eff

178、orts to encourage open stan-dards in areas where European players lack incumbent sta-tus, and investments in human capital much of it funded through the 2021 post-pandemic Recovery and Resilience Fund (RFF), a “620 billion” bazooka for which 20 percent of member state investment must go to digitizat

179、ion. In-creasingly, the Commission is also working with member states to sharpen market access tools like export controls, enhanced investment screening, academic openness, and strategic use (and exemptions) from competition rules, all in order to shape its digital technology environment.22European

180、tech policy transmission is structurally diffuse given structural and philosophical frictions within the Eu-ropean Union. It is also characterized by multilevel gov-ernance where regional public sector actors and private players often lead.Much of this is intentionally designed, reflecting the decen

181、-tralized, interdisciplinary nature of tech policy in Europe. Even at the Commission level, responsibilities are divided throughout the organization with multiple commissioners and directorates-general holding lead competencies.23 The Commission has, however, struggled with this fragmented The Digit

182、al Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act15No. 27 | November 2021REPORTpolicy transmission landscape. In 2019, the incoming Com-mission attempted to streamline tech policy by placing it in the hands of Margarethe Vestager, the coordinating execu-tive vice president for a “Europe fit for

183、the Digital Age,” but many of the core tech competencies data protection, dig-ital trade, disinformation, and cybersecurity remain out-side her institutional purview. As a result, policy formulation often reflected long, deliberative processes and subsequent compromises, a reality that often leads t

184、o contradictory policy objectives. Moreover, other public institutions have constrained the Commissions ability to use competition au-thority to advance a level playing field for tech actors oper-ating in Europe.24 Many cases have raised questions about the Commissions ability to authoritatively neg

185、otiate with key partners. For example, the EU-US Privacy Shield agree-ment on the free flow of personal data across the Atlantic and its predecessor, the Safe Harbor Framework, were both struck down on the basis of how the European Court of Jus-tice interpretes fundamental rights and subsequent ruli

186、ngs by member state Data Protection Authorities (DPAs). These interpretations leave out the key role that European mem-ber state intelligence communities play, for example, in bulk data collection, and EU member state intelligence services are not a part of data agreement negotiations with third cou

187、ntries. This fragmented policy structure is reflected at the member state and subnational levels as well. In Germany, policy for-mulation is scattered across ministries and agencies. This has led to conflicting priorities and outlooks based largely on different institutional cultures. For instance,

188、recent de-bates around certification procedures for trusted 5G equip-ment providers in Germanys IT-Sicherheitsgesetz 2.0 have pitted the Defense Ministry, the Federal Foreign Office, and the Interior Ministry on the one hand against the Econom-ic Ministry, Chancellery, and Federal Office for Informa

189、tion Security (BSI) on the other. In the absence of a head of gov-ernment with a clearly defined point of view, this kind of diffuse distribution of power makes strategic coherence in tech policy difficult. The Commission recognizes difficulties in coordinating consistency. DG Connect has been desig

190、nated a coordi-nating hub for the EUs February 2020 Digital Strategy and was given the task of “analysing global market and technol-ogy developments and providing geostrategic perspec- Data Protection Supervisor/Broad), telecommunications (BEREC), technical standards (CEN-CENELEC), and cybersecurity

191、 (Enisa).24 Javier Espinoza et al., “Apple wins landmark court battle with EU over 14.3bn of tax payments,” Financial Times, July 15, 2020: (accessed March 11, 2021).25 European Commission, “Coordination of Digital Strategy and Green ICT (Unit F.1)”: (accessed March 11, 2021).26 European Commission,

192、 “Digital Single Market Strategic Group (DSM SG),” March 7, 2019: (accessed March 11, 2021).tives.” 25 This is a useful innovation to link implementation of Europes digital ambitions with the need to anticipate both technological and international changes. Moreover, it is directly linked to the RFF

193、allocation process. The Com-mission also maintains the DSM Strategic Group, a body co-ordinated by DG Connect that meets three times annually to incorporate member states, non-member states, and the Commission in a process that tests and refines ideas and definitions, and provides a sounding board a

194、nd opportunity to establish buy-in for pending policy initiatives. The group does not, however, incorporate non-state actors or have a mandate to evaluate previous initiatives. But these bodies can lack sufficient political weight to ad-dress difficult tradeoffs, the ranking of priorities, the rank-

195、ing of priorities, and those assessments necessary to create a consistent through line in tech policy that bridges objec-tives in critical areas. Agendas are broadly set by Germany, France, and the commission. While this can lead to neces-sary policy breakthroughs, the diffuse power centers can al-s

196、o create long policy formation delays and reflect Byzantine processes meant to satisfy conflicting stakeholders.26CAPACITY FOR POLICY FORMULATIONThe EUs decentralized distribution of policymaking in digital tech-nology combined with the lack of a strong executive creates diffi-culties and inconsiste

197、ncies in policy formulation. The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act16No. 27 | November 2021REPORTPOLICY IMPLEMENTATIONEurope is entering into a new phase in its efforts to imple-ment its ambitious technology policy agenda. It is premature to judge its success. But in general

198、policy implementation, several trends and limitations are worth noting. Steady Regulatory Centralization and its Limitations Brussels, backed by some member states, has long attempt-ed to draw tech regulatory policy toward itself. The Com-missions latest policy push is tied to a clear impulse to cen

199、tralize enforcement authority in Brussels. All of the cor-nerstone tech legislative proposals the Digital Services Act, Digital Markets Act, Data Governance Act, and AI rules are regulations. Each sees a greater role for the Commission in enforcement, with the DSA draft going the furthest and making

200、 the Commission the ultimate regulator on content moderation. It is unclear whether this power centralization will make it through the negotiating process unscathed, but the intent is clear: establish greater enforcement consisten-cy by making the Commission the central authority at the expense of n

201、ational regulators.The logic is rooted in the Commissions responsibility for the functioning of the internal market (Art. 114, TFEU). Over-all, the Commissions aim is to move steadily toward a more uniform regulatory environment for platforms and indus-trial data, to match its efforts on personal da

202、ta with GDPR. There is pushback, however. Some larger states are already looking to claw back Commission-centered authority in new draft proposals. The true zenith of tech regulatory centralization was perhaps reached when the Commission rolled out its regulatory proposals; but the moment could be f

203、leeting the European Council has already moved to pick it apart. Nevertheless, the steady move toward digital regulatory frameworks is marked by a stealth centralization toward the Commission combined with federated oversight board structures like the European Data Protection Board. The process of i

204、mplementing policy can be arduous. For ex-ample, lifting roaming charges took ten years to implement and still contains a number of carve outs around areas such as data usage. The draft ePrivacy Regulation is a prime ex-ample of the EUs occasional inability to simply conclude matters in a timely fas

205、hion.27 Caught in the push-and-pull, the regulations ultimate passage has been delayed by more than two years and is only inching slowly forward.28 But long 27 The draft ePrivacy regulation was meant to update the 2002 e-privacy directive (Directive 2002/58/EC), to address rules governing user priva

206、cy on electronic communications, specifically pertaining to browsers, cookies, and messaging apps.28 Philip Grill and Samuel Stolton, “Mixed emotions as Council finally adopts position on ePrivacy text,” EURACTIV, February 11, 2021: (accessed March 11, 2021).implementation lags can create uncertaint

207、y and ultimately impact the degree to which the regulation ends up being fit for its purpose, given continual technological development. The Rate of Technological Adoption vs. Rate of Regulatory Adoption The pace of regulatory progress lags behind an ever-accel-erating technology development product

208、 cycle, impacting the ability to future-proof policy. Technological develop-ments in facial recognition, biometrics, IoT, and autono-mous decision making are outpacing the policy environment addressed in the GDPR, which itself took six years to enact, from the first draft legislation until its entry

209、 into force in 2018. Quantum computing will have a similar issue with en-cryption and cybersecurity rules. This is especially true as new technologies and use cases emerge. Consideration for platform regulation for the legislative proposals that ulti-mately became the DSA and DMA began as early as 2

210、013 and have yet to be concluded. They will likely last at least two more years, as negotiations with the European Council and Parliament move through multiple iterations. Legislative proposals for artificial intelligence remain limited, despite multiple expert bodies at the EU (e.g., High Level Exp

211、ert Group) and national (e.g., Bundestag AI Enquete Commis-sion) levels. The dynamics of technological change demand that the EU revisit the rules environment for both personal as new forms of AI-based processing and decision making come online and non-personal data.The EU is working to anticipate t

212、echnological trends to properly shape its regulatory objectives. For instance, as da-ta processing moves from centralized computing facilities to connected objects, it is looking toward data governance and cloud structures that can provide guardrails for tech-nological change. Still, with the policy

213、 cycle lagging years behind the ICT product cycle, it is difficult to chart a regu-latory trajectory that can anticipate emerging tech areas. As a result, policy implementation can in some cases unin-tentionally hamper the EUs competitiveness internationally, reduce its technological sovereignty, in

214、crease its depen-dence on external actors, and thus reduce the EUs capacity to act.Enforcement Arbitrage and Capacity Even as the EU steadily accumulates control over many as-pects of tech regulation, actual enforcement of regulations The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act17N

215、o. 27 | November 2021REPORTremains uneven across the bloc. In GDPR enforcement, for example, public Data Protection Authorities reflect the EUs subsidiarity principle with decisions made at the national and in Germanys case, Lnder level. This has given rise to some degree of enforcement arbitrage, a

216、nd data protec-tion enforcement has thus been uneven across the EU. Big Tech players have shopped for favorable enforcement juris-dictions, with most landing on Ireland.29 Ireland has worked to foster the most favorable environment to attract outside, non-European tech investment and has been accuse

217、d of demonstrating some aspects of enforcement capture. Re-latedly, compliance capacity can play a somewhat hidden role in unevenness across the EU. Take, for example, cyber incident reporting to national cyber authorities in accor-dance with national transpositions of the EU Network and Information

218、 Security (NIS) directive. The fact that the Neth-erlands and Germany have the highest level of cyber inci-dent reporting is not an indicator of vulnerability. Quite the opposite it demonstrates the degree to which the private sector feels legal and cultural pressure to observe breach notification r

219、equirements.29 The Irish Data Protection Commission (DPC) issued its first GDPR related fine in December 2020, more than two years after the law came into force. The fine, 450K lodged against the social media platform, Twitter, has been criticized by other EU DPAs and privacy rights advocates. Natas

220、ha Lomas, “Twitter fined $550K over a data breach in Irelands first major GDPR decision,” TechCrunch, December 15, 2020: (accessed March 11, 2021).30 European Commission, “Communication on a Europes digital decade: 2030 digital targets,” 2021, p. 2: (accessed March 11, 2021).31 European Commission,

221、“Secure 5G networks: Questions and Answers on the EU toolbox,” January 29, 2020: (accessed March 11, 2021).The Limits of Coordinating InstrumentsIn areas where the Commissions regulatory authority is lim-ited, but a clear strategic interest exists in raising awareness and driving convergence, the EU

222、 has begun making more frequent use of coordinating mechanisms with a variety of policy instruments. But as the Commission itself acknowl-edges, “the still limited convergence across member states including a different pace of implementation of essential EU legislation” has hindered the EUs ability

223、to complete the Digital Single Market.30In tech policy, two recent examples stand out. First, the 2020 5G Toolbox, developed under the auspices of the NIS Coordinating Group, established a set of uniform bench-marks which member states could use to assess cyber-security risks in 5G networks based on

224、 a coordinated risk assessment report. As such, member states agreed to raise security requirements, diversify sourcing, and restrict risky supplier involvement (e.g., Huawei). It also flags potential Commission instruments competition, trade, and certifi-cation that can be used to support security.

225、31 Because 5G connectivity might increase IoT adoption, it is seen as in-Huawei Trusted Vendor Regime StatusSource: Own GraphicThe Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act18No. 27 | November 2021REPORTcreasing the cross-border nature of telecommunications coverage. While there has

226、been concern regarding 5G cyber risk, it is clear that this has not led to harmonization, as not-ed by the European Court of Auditors.32 Second, the EUs mechanism for investment screening of inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) into projects of critical “European interest” 33 focuses on more inst

227、itutional-ized information-sharing, broad criteria that member states may draw on, and coordination between member states and the Commission. Germany, in anticipation of new guidelines, drafted amendments to its own screening mechanisms. They reflect a significant shift from previous strategic sec-t

228、or screening around raw materials and manufacturing to a preponderance of instruments targeting Germanys tech sector including its nascent startups in areas like health 32 M. Apelblat, “EU auditors on 5G: Economic potential and security risks,” The Brussels Times, January 13, 2021: (accessed March 1

229、1, 2021).33 European Commission, “EU foreign investment screening mechanism becomes fully operational,” October 9, 2020: (accessed March 11, 2021).34 European Commission, “Secure 5G networks: Questions and Answers on the EU toolbox,” January 29, 2020: (accessed March 11, 2021).AI. However, the tool

230、has its limits. First, the EU has limited authority to uniformily define security interests the will-ingness to block US tech investment, for instance, is under active discussion in some member states, while others see no threat. Ultimate decision-making power rests with indi-vidual member states, o

231、pening up the possibility of lateral vulnerabilities based on divergent risk perceptions. Second, member states lack a uniform sense of capacity currently, eight member states have no form of investment screening at all.34 Third, again, Europe is confronted with hard choic-es created by potentially

232、conflicting objectives. Decisions to limit non-European investment into the start-up com-munity, for example, could exclude potential US and Asian venture capital at a time when the paucity of risk-oriented capital is seen as a defining hurdle in Europes tech scene.Number of GDPR Enforcement Cases t

233、hat have Included PenaltiesSource: CMS, “GDPR Enforcement Tracker,” 2021: (accessed November 19, 2021).The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act19No. 27 | November 2021REPORTA Latecomer to the National Security Dimensions of Tech-nology PolicyEuropes most successful industrial p

234、rojects like Airbus, Gal-ileo, and the European Council for Nuclear Research (CERN) have recognized dual-use applications in certain technol-ogies as geopolitical grounds for their indigenous devel-opment and control in Europe. That said, the shift toward digital regulation as the basis for European

235、 tech policy was largely coupled with a de-emphasis of the military implica-tions that regulation could lead to. The EU continues to lack a means of assessing what its new rules on data governance, cloud, AI, and digital market power might mean for Europe-an military capacity. With the movement towa

236、rd greater state aid for the tech sector has come growing member state and Commission in-terest in integrated strategies that recognize the need for fact-based policy on ethical development and the usage of emerging, disruptive technologies in military contexts. The connective tissue between both th

237、e EU and allied civilian tech community and Europes militaries is simply too weak given the strategic nature of general-purpose technolo-gies. The EU has started to make a more concerted effort to bridge NATO, EU, and state emerging technology objectives, a policy area which extends beyond arms cont

238、rol and lethal autonomous weapons systems. This is particularly true in examining funding instruments like the 202127 Multian-nual Financial Framework (MFF). The Commissions recent Action Plan on “synergies between civil, defense and space industries” is an impressive example of a new approach to Me

239、mber States with Investment Screening Mechanisms Notified to the European CommissionSource: Own Graphic. Current states without Investment Screening Law: Ireland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Croatia, Estonia, Sweden, Bulgaria, GreeceThe Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act20No. 27 | No

240、vember 2021REPORTfind cross-cutting complementarity in funding, recognizing spillovers between civilian and military research.35 The Ac-tion Plan which includes 11 actions and flagship projects in drone technology, secure space-based communication, and space traffic management reinforces general aim

241、s outlined in the digital dimensions like more effective moni-toring, operational standardization, and a recognition of the more general-purpose character of several emerging tech-nologies. But incorporation of military applications into EU technology strategy and planning continues to be uneven the

242、 2021 Digital Compass, for instance, ignores the dual-use nature of key enabling technologies like cloud/edge com-puting, semiconductors, and quantum computing entirely. 35 European Commission, “Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries,” February 2, 2021: (accessed March

243、11, 2021).CAPACITY TO IMPLEMENT POLICYThe delicate process of moving the EU toward an “ever closer” digital and technology union hits limits in enforcement capacity, differences in compliance culture, and constraints on the mandate for the EU to ennact policy. The mismatch between the pace of techno

244、logical development and regulatory implementation also poses a challenge for the EU.Number of Company Breaches Affecting Personal Data Reported to State AuthoritiesSource: Joseph Johnson, “Number of personal data breaches in Europe 2018-2021, by country,” Statista, February 15, 2021: (accessed July

245、2021).The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act21No. 27 | November 2021REPORTIMPACT CAPACITYThe EUs Impact At Home In 2030, Europe will be benchmarking its policy success on the basis of the 30 legislative proposals part of the Digital Single Market and a new slate of proposals

246、in the current Digital Regulatory Package and post-pandemic Tech In-dustrial Policy. Assessing the impact of EU initiatives has traditionally been politically fraught. In the case of the Dig-ital Single Market, the Commission largely failed to give a backend assessment of its overall market impact,

247、one of the results of which has been that it has not always been con-fronted with hard truths of policy failures in acute terms. At the DSMs 2014 inception, the Commission estimated 250 billion in additional growth including hundreds of thousands of jobs by 2019 through its implementation.36 However

248、, the EU has yet to assess and review the program according to these standards. The outcomes are, at best, clearly mixed. But a clear assessment does not exist in any official capacity. The Commission maintains a Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) that provides a detailed mapping of enterprise

249、 tech adoption and usage across EU member states in five broad areas: 1) connectivity, 2) human capital, 3) use of in-ternet services, 4) integration of digital technology, and 5) digital public services.37 This gauge of member state perfor-mance is useful in examining the degree of convergence (or

250、lack thereof) across the EUs Digital Single Market. However, it has largely steered clear of a critical analysis of the impact of EU tools and funding benchmarked to specific targets. Moreover, it does not define weaknesses and critical depen-dences. In other words, while the DESI is a snapshot of i

251、n-ternal trends of the Digital Single Market, it lacks a critical edge that would allow the EU to anticipate trends, pinpoint weaknesses in its own approach, and reflect the deeper geo-political dimension of Europes quest for digital sovereignty. Such a process is highly ambitious and resource-inten

252、sive. In its October 2020 Council conclusions, member states asked the Commission to do just that. They asked the Com-mission to outline a Roadmap for the Digital Decade 2030 and present a comprehensive Digital Compass “which sets out the EUs concrete digital ambitions for 2030.” 38 The Dig-ital Com

253、pass is meant to provide consistent monitoring of 36 European Commission, “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe,” May 6, 2015: (accessed March 11, 2021).37 Each of these areas has a wide list of subsets that are dealt with including: 1) connectivity (e.g., broadband coverage, pricing, spectru

254、m management approaches); 2) human capital (e.g., digital skills, ICT specialists, access barriers), 3) use of internet services (e.g., e-commerce, regular internet users); 4) integration of digital technology (e.g., digital intensity, cloud usage, cross-broader e-commerce); and 5) digital public se

255、rvices.38 European Council, “A digital future for Europe,” last reviewed May 6, 2021: (accessed July 20, 2021).39 Angela Merkel et al., Letter to Ursula von der Leyen (March 1, 2021): (accessed March 11, 2021).EU digital targets and the key performance indicators cur-rently lacking in the EUs digita

256、l benchmark, the DESI. It would standardize Europes lines of effort with targets and monitoring mechanisms across a diverse set of digitaliza-tion policy areas ranging from industrial projects aimed at strengthening the EUs innovation industrial base to com-pleting the DSM. Leaders have called for s

257、trong concrete targets (e.g., that all EU households should have gigabit in-ternet, and all populated regions 5G coverage by 2030) and a monitoring process that is “permanent, recurrent and built on a wide societal, scientific and economic basis.” 39 Given the qualitative differences in digital poli

258、cy and high-ly differentiated resort responsibilities, both within EU in-stitutions and at all levels of national, regional, and local government, a system of “transparent” benchmarks across portfolios and a monitoring process that accompanies the EUs public digital transformation effort complete wi

259、th a “traffic light” rating system is long overdue. The EU set the stage for realistic and transparent benchmarking which should theoretically build on and cover gaps in the DESI. Like other efforts including the European Semester for monitoring fiscal policy and the EU Strategic Compass for develop

260、ing joint threat analysis and monitoring across cri-sis management, resilience, capability, and partnerships a true assessment of success and failure in digital regulation and industrial policy would be highly political. Examining whether the Digital Compass is able to find its legs as an in-depende

261、nt, objective, and credible assessment will be key to determing how EU policy improves Europes technological capacity to act. Some Digital Compass targets are extremely ambitious, particularly the effort to produce 20 percent of the worlds high-end semiconductors in Europe by 2030. Other con-crete t

262、argets are deceptively unambitious. Meeting many of these targets would not require any major course correc-tion conditions will essentially be met even if the EU fol-lows a path between the baseline and worst-case scenarios in this forecasting exercise. For instance, the Digital Com-pass sets the g

263、oal of doubling the number of European tech unicorns start-ups with a market value of over 1 billion between 2021 and 2030. But between 2010 and 2020, the EU increased the number more than fivefold from 10 to over 53. The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act22No. 27 | November

264、2021REPORTASSESSING THE EUS IMPACT AT HOMEThe EU is improving its ability to assess the domestic impact of its digital agenda, complimenting the DESI with the Digital Com-pass and RFF monitoring. But blind spots around failures and at times unambitious targets contine to hinder effective impact asse

265、ssments. The EUs Impact in the Outside World The EU remains the worlds most important digital tech-nology regulator. Leading the way as a “first mover” on da-ta governance and strong competition enforcement culture, Europe has demonstrated the greatest influence on the da-ta environment and tech mar

266、ket power both at home and abroad through its ability to regulate. Its capacity to shape algorithms has been less pronounced, partially because its role in regulating data has had upstream effects on its ca-pacity to develop and commercialize cutting edge ICT based on algorithms, at least in the bus

267、iness-to-consumer (B2C) space that is poised to change through a series of new draft regulations. That regulatory strength is based on the threat of denying access to the EUs 448 million citizens. It is also worth not-ing that the GDPRs success comes as a function of the EUs immence market size. Eve

268、n as global tech companies have made the GDPR the lingua franca of data protection, the EU has racked up only a limited number of agreements with states to demonstrate that their data protection laws are “essentially equivalent” to that of the EU. This odd asymme-try is slowly dissipating as states

269、like Argentina, South Korea, Japan, and Kenya, as well as subnational powers like Cali-fornia with the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA), model data protection laws after the EU. However, it shows that the market access incentive for private companies is driving the GDPRs role as a global standar

270、d rather than the EUs ability to bend states to its normative will. The same could also be the case on content moderation, cookie policies, and other aspects of data governance. The EUs discourse on digital competition, market tipping, and network effects, as well as revisions related to content mod

271、eration, target-ed advertising, and algorithm transparency are already hav-ing an impact on global discourse. The pending wave of EU regulation will provide a test case to monitor Europes abil-ity project power on both private, non-European tech com-panies interested in market access as well as its

272、ability to shape governance norms with non-European powers from California to China. But the Brussels effect on tech is only as strong as the EUs market power. In 2010, Europes share of the global econ-omy was 21.5 percent, while the United States accounted for 23 percent. In the years since, the US

273、 economy boomed and Europe experienced uneven growth, but largely stood still. At the dawn of the 2020s, the United States had in-creased its relative share of the global economy, account-ing for 25 percent, while Europe accounted for less than 17.5 percent. With the decline in its market relevance,

274、 the EUs most important geopolitical asset its market weight is also diminishing.Europe is overrepresented in technology norms coali-tions, technical standard-setting bodies, and important, multi-stakeholder internet governance forums, and many of its member states are agenda-setters. For instance,

275、France led in the creation of the Organisation for Economic Co-op-eration and Developments (OECD) Global Partnership on AI and the Paris Call for Stability in Cyber Space. EU mem-ber states also consecutively chaired the last three internet Governance Forum (IGF) meetings, an important agen-da-setti

276、ng board. The EU has joined like-minded states, like the US, in past efforts to protect the multi-stakeholder sys-tem of internet governance. By virtue of its technical expertise, financial resources, dy-namic civil society, and large grouping of member states, Europe has, in the past, been able to

277、saturate these bodies and largely shape global rules to reflect European values and be consistent with European standards. However, evi-dent by the loss of relevance of the EU market vis-vis the United States, the EU has not been able to leverage this po-sition to its advantage. Additionally, prepon

278、derant European representation has long been questioned and is increasingly coming under strain as states like China and Russia bid for technical standard-setting ecosystems. As a geostrategic corrolary to Chinas Digital Silk Road, Beijing is pushing for seats in standards-setting bodies and, in som

279、e cases, is cre-ating new regional standard-setting bodies with itself as the hegemonic actor within these new arrangements. ASSESSING THE EUS IMPACT IN THE WORLDFrom GDPR to competition policy, the EU has proven itself a signi-ficant global tech rule maker. That capacity is a function of market siz

280、e, however, and could diminish if not strengthened by innova-tion capacity. The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act23No. 27 | November 2021REPORTGermanys Role with Regard to the EUs Capacity to Act Germany has been a driving force in Europes efforts to shape its tech landscape

281、. German nationals occupy key Commission roles associated with tech policy, German Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) often serve as rapporteurs on key digital regulation files, and German industry telecommunications, automotive, and media in particular have been skilfully aligning European t

282、ech reg-ulation with their interests. Germanys ability to “flood the zone” in Brussels with tech policy personnel has had an im-mense normative impact on the trajectory of European dig-ital tech policy.First, Germany often effectively hoists an ordoliberal frame-work onto some of the EUs most import

283、ant digital regu-latory instruments. Prescriptive regulations like the GDPR are rooted in the notion that rules, particularly those based in German legal traditions, are best adept at setting dig-ital market frameworks. German ordoliberal scepticism of market concentration and anti-competitive pract

284、ices has also been a source of broad Commission mandates to ag-gressively address Big Tech market dominance. In these two areas, Germany is quite comfortable with EU-centered power. Both are correspondingly strong instruments and al-so strong projections of global regulatory power. Second, Berlin sy

285、stematically anticipates EU-level policy ac-tion, shapes its domestic legislation in advance of Brussels policy formulation, and thus creates reference conditions (and facts on the ground) for EU lawmakers. Europes data protection philosophy the basis for the GDPR emerged in Germany in the 1980s bef

286、ore being hoisted on the EU. Ger-manys 2017 NetzDG played a key role in shaping the content moderation frameworks that fed into the Digital Services Act (DSA). Germanys 2015 IT Security Law intentionally in-teracted with, anticipated, and contributed to the ultimate framework for the NIS Directive.

287、It replicated this antici-patory policy strategy in reforming the cyber law, the so-called IT-Sicherheitsgesetz 2.0, in anticipation of the 2021 NIS Directive reform. The 2017 German Datenethikkommis-sion established a framework for assessing application and risk categories for artificial intelligen

288、ce, a framework largely reflected in the EUs February 2020 AI White Paper, and the basis for the 2021 draft AI Act. Germanys 10th Amendment to the Act Against Restraints of Competition (GWB-Digital-isierungsgesetz) framed the debate on digital market power of dominant platforms, and Germany, togethe

289、r with France, provided legal architecture for the tipping classification for the Digital Markets Act. Third, and perhaps most decisive for the 2030 period, is Germanys political influence on European industrial policy. Germany is traditionally more interested in Europes reg-ulatory ability than in

290、its industrial policy ledger. However, Germany has grown somewhat comfortable with the pur-suit of ICT industrial policy at the European level, historical-ly the focus of the French government. As such, it has made significant movement in Frances direction. In the February 2019 Franco-German Manifes

291、to for a European Industrial Policy Fit for the 21st Century, France and Germany outline three specific areas: massive industrial investment, chang-es to Europes regulatory framework, and new measures to protect Europes industrial base.But it remains unclear if Germany is truly ready to cross the in

292、dustrial policy Rubicon at the European level. In the re-cent past, Germany has played a significant role in limiting, slowing, and even vetoing European tech policy ambitions. Germanys 2017-18 policy formation on artificial intelligence grappled with balancing regulatory and industrial policy as-pe

293、cts before ultimately deciding on an “AI Made In Germany” industrial strategy. The commitment to 20 percent of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and the use of pooled funds remain controversial and, even though the coronavi-rus pandemic has spurred German backing for a large num-ber of indu

294、strial policy initiatives, it is possible that Germany will course-correct after the crisis. Even within the German government, tensions appear to be emerging. Whereas the Economic Ministry (BMWI) has closed ranks behind an am-bitious, EU-wide industrial vision for emerging disruptive technologies,

295、serious doubts about a pooled EU industrial policy on emerging technology remain. Across all areas, negotiating a logic for tech policy “digital sovereignty” will require efforts to bridge shades of differ-ence between Germany, France, the Commission as well as other member states and constituents.

296、More than anything, that could depend on how comfortable Berlin becomes with pursuing a Europe-wide technology industrial policy, some-thing that Germany has historically been only half-hearted-ly committed or actively opposed to.The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act24No. 27

297、 | November 2021REPORTStocktaking: Assessment of Capacity to Act as a Whole As the battle for digital technology competition heats up, the EUs success in advancing its capacity to act will be de-termined along the following dimensions: Regulatory power the EUs ability to establish rules governing th

298、e development and use of technology at home and to effectively shape global tech governance in a way that advances Europes objectives. Innovation power Europes ability to both develop and, perhaps more importantly, commercially harness new technologies as a source of Europes global industrial compet

299、itiveness vis-vis peer competitors like the United States and China. Market power the means by which the EU is able to instrumentalize access to its market and deepen unfet-tered access within its market as a means of bending non-European tech players to European rules and cre-ating conditions to en

300、courage cross-border digital ser-vices that support scalability and homegrown technology companies. Brussels is experiencing a sense of existential distress about what technological changes mean for Europes industrial base, external digital dependencies, and ultimately, its reg-ulatory prowess. With

301、 an eye toward 2030, there is an acute awareness that the EU cannot “rest on regs.” As the baseline and best-case scenarios indicate, the EUs regulatory posi-tion is a function of market size, a factor in relative decline. Its regulatory influence could slowly displace or break away 40 First, the Di

302、gital Strategy outlined a plan to enforce “fair” use of platform dominance. Other areas touched on include content moderation, cloud infrastructure and cyber security. Second, the Data Strategy focused on creating nine sector-based data spaces allow data to flow freely across the EU, mandatory data

303、sharing (including with governments) and includes GDPR reform proposals. It will include standardized forms of industrial data and IoT. Much of the strategy will be bundled in the Data Governance Act and draft Data Act in 2021. Third, the Artificial Intelligence White Paper addresses the regulatory

304、environment for AI considering new testing standards for “trustworthy” AI in “high-risk” areas which is essentially anything that touches human lives.suddenly in what evolutionary theorists call punctuated equilibria. The best-case 2030 scenario underscores that Europes ca-pacity to shape its digita

305、l environment is ultimately depen-dent on a benign international order in which states and other multi-stakeholder actors work cooperatively together to set rules. But in light of the rising tech conflict between democratic and authoritarian states, such an era of coop-eration seems unlikely. As suc

306、h, Europes efforts must be predicated on the second-best operating environment: a confident, high-performing European digital economy em-bedded in an open, democratic, rules-based digital order. This need is particularly acute as the prospect of internet fragmentation, data localization, and greater

307、 instrumental-ization of digital dependencies as political weapons become a more pressing possibility. Given these likelihoods, the baseline and worst-case 2030 scenarios enter more clearly in the realm of the possible. The European Union is often able to identify its deficiencies and set an agenda

308、both strategically as it has done in the Digital Single Market and quest for digital sovereignty and specifically as it has done in DESI and recently updated through the Digital Compass and national RFF plans. On the regulatory side, the Commission is moving forward with its “Digital Package” 40 bro

309、adly centered on digital sovereignty in three areas: data governance, algorithms (particularly AI/machine learning), and platform regulation, as well as coor-dination on issues surrounding secure 5G infrastructure, in-vestment, exports, and cybersecurity; and on the industrial side, toward new, post

310、-pandemic IPCEIs in areas like semi-conductors, edge computers, and batteries. However, the EUs hydra-like structure in tech policy for-mation and implementation often prevents coherent, time-ly action, due to the diffuse distribution of competencies across Commission portfolios, DGs, national minis

311、tries, and often highly independent (and narrowly focused) regula-tors. Without a strong executive and given the trend toward more interventionist tech policy, the Commission and its member states must determine which actors have the big picture in mind and are capable of pursuing it with consis-ten

312、t, effective action.Additionally, obstacles to completing the EUs Digital Single Market will always continue to be present. Language, con-sumer taste, culture, online behavior, taxation, and regis-The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act25No. 27 | November 2021REPORTtration mod

313、els remain evident “non-tariff barriers to trade” in digital services. A glance at Europes fragmented e-com-merce market where big players like Amazon, eBay, and AliExpress dominate, followed by national champions (e.g., Otto and Real.de in Germany; Allegro in Poland; B in the Netherlands; Fnac and

314、La Redoute in France) demon-strates that limitations remain. In that way, the DSM will always be somewhat asymptotic it will never cross the fin-ish line. In areas of Big Data pattern detection, machine learning, and AI, network effects are a key factor in creating the econo-mies of scale necessary

315、for cutting edge applications. In the race for data access, Big Tech be it Chinese or American has been able to establish competitive advantages at home which have allowed them an indigenous data well from which to draw when developing technologies. Moreover, they have been able to expand their offe

316、rings over time, increasingly moving into new areas in media, artificial intelligence, smart home assistants, cloud infrastructure, and even inter-net cable infrastructure. The data access feedback loop is a function of market, capital access, talent availability, and regulatory environment which th

317、e EU has not been able to match. Europe will not be able to achieve its capacity to act alone, and any conception of digital sovereignty that attempts to wall off Europes market to provide space for indigenous players to dominate is unlikely to succeed. An alternative ap-proach would be building res

318、ilience through strong allianc-es based on strategic interdependencies, and policy choices that strengthen incumbent commitments to shared dem-ocratic norms and values. Joining forces with like-minded actors would provide Europe an opportunity to reduce its weaknesses and advance its capacity to act

319、. Capacity to Define the ProblemCapacity to Set the AgendaCapacity to Implement PoliciesCapacity for Policy FormulationImpact CapacityIN SUMMARY: CAPACITY TO ACT ACROSS THE FIVE STAGES OF THE POLICY CYCLESource: Authors compilationThe Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act26No. 2

320、7 | November 2021REPORTImplications and Recommen-dations Derived from the Monitoring Exercise Europe aspires to attain peer status both in innovation ca-pability and rule-setting with the United States and China by 2030. Achieving this aim will not be easy. It will require sustained high-level engag

321、ement, investment, and hard choices. As an overarching goal, Europe should strive to address some of the policy cycle deficiencies identified in this study. They include the need to: PROVIDE HONEST ASSESSMENTS OF PREVIOUS TECH INDUSTRIAL AND REGULATORY POLICY FAILURES, TRADE-OFFS, AND MEMBER STATE S

322、HORTCOMINGS. The European Union should engage in an open stocktak-ing of successes and failures in past tech policy choices and initiatives. Confronting where and why state-backed proj-ects like Euronet, Quero, DeMail, the Andromede cloud project, and others fell short will be essential for success-

323、ful implementation of new IPCEI projects, Gaia-X, and RRF digitization initiatives. Even the GDPR, the EUs signature rule-making achievement, which has transformed glob-al data protection, has confronted Europe with trade-offs and disadvantages that policymakers are often reluctant to acknowledge. T

324、his should include ex-post, ex-ante, and real-time iterative monitoring and benchmarking iterative monitoring and benchmarking processes that accompany new projects and regulatory implementation in real time. The Digital Compass is a good start. It will be important for not only identifying laggards

325、 (as the DESI does), but also identifying why lags in implimentation arise. FOCUS ON THE EUS INCUMBENT TECH STRENGTHS IN SHAPING IN-NOVATION INDUSTRIAL POLICY. Europe has incumbent strengths in sensors, smart industrial machinery, B2B capabilities in areas like logistics, and robot-ics strengths it

326、should leverage to secure a more substan-tial production role in IoT. It should direct a combination of government-funded R&D, incentives for commercialization, and investment screening intended to keep and build out in-novation capacity in Europe, especially in areas like artifi-cial intelligence,

327、quantum computing, cloud computing, and semiconductors. Europe must also continue to capitalize on its market, which solidifies its status as a dominant regula-tory power and allows it to export European values through both its technology and rules.ALLOW FOR HARD-NOSED PRIORITIZATION IN SETTING STRA

328、TEGIC OBJECTIVES. A central tension at the heart of Europes approach to digital policy is that tension between external competitiveness and internal cohesion. One can see it expressed in the AI White Paper, for example, which speaks of Europe as an aspiring “ecosystem of excellence” that leads in R&

329、D, value chain de-velopment, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) competitiveness. On the other hand, it speaks of an “eco-system of trust” which preserves and expands fundamen-tal rights, consumer rights, and sustainability. The EU and its member states must be more capable of creating prio

330、ri-ty hierarchies in tech regulatory and industrial policy objec-tives. Setting effective and consistent policy remains tied to the ephemera of secondary and tertiary objectives like local economic development, untargeted R&D, politically difficult decisions about roles of non-European actors, susta

331、inability, and social cohesion. This might require even greater tight-ening of portfolios falling under the digital tech policy um-brella within the Commission and a greater willingness of member states, particularly large ones, to elevate narrowly defined policy effectiveness above other objectives

332、.The Digital Technology Environment and Europes Capacity to Act27No. 27 | November 2021REPORTEMBED EUROPES DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY MORE EXPLICITLY IN THE CONTEXT OF SIMULTANEOUS AT TIMES COMPLEMENTARY ACTION WITH LIKE-MINDED PARTNERS. Buoyed by the Biden Administrations entry into office, the EU

333、 has already embraced that trajectory: “The EU can on-ly succeed in its digital transformation if it builds its Dig-ital Decade in an outward looking manner. it needs to strengthen its capacity to project its digital goals into its international cooperation promoting its human-cen-tric, rules-based

334、approach. This requires the development of partnerships and alliances that can underpin Europe-an investment in infrastructure, capacity building and the enabling environment, as well as fostering regulatory co-operation notably with like-minded partners.”41 The EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council,

335、 in particular, will be an ear-ly test for Europes ability to leverage its relationship with a like-minded power to shape both the global regulatory landscape and bolster its tech industrial resilience. Europe must use the next ten years to close the existing gap in innovation, digital regulation, and tech industrial capaci-ty to make it a trendsetter, a co-equal digital power with the United States and China. This vision of Europe as a trendset-ter is ambitious, but achievable.41 Communication on Europes Digital Decade: 2030 digital targets:” (accessed November 8, 2021)