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1、Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 1BARRIERS TO CLEAN ELECTRIFICATION SERIESSUPPLY CHAINSBetter,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chainsVersion 1|June 2023Insights BriefingBetter,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 3The
2、 Energy Transitions Commission(ETC)is a global coalition of leaders from across the energy landscape committed to achieving net-zero emissions by mid-century,in line with the Paris climate objective of limiting global warming to well below 2C and ideally to 1.5C.Our Commissioners come from a range o
3、f organisations energy producers,energy-intensive industries,technology providers,finance players and environmental NGOs which operate across developed and developing countries and play different roles in the energy transition.This diversity of viewpoints informs our work:our analyses are developed
4、with a systems perspective through extensive exchanges with experts and practitioners.The ETC is chaired by Lord Adair Turner who works with the ETC team,led by Faustine Delasalle(Vice-Chair),Ita Kettleborough(Director),and Mike Hemsley(Deputy Director).The ETCs Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean
5、energy technology supply chains was developed by the Commissioners with the support of the ETC Secretariat,provided by SYSTEMIQ,and support from the European Climate Foundation(ECF).This report constitutes a collective view of the Energy Transitions Commission.Members of the ETC endorse the general
6、thrust of the arguments made in this publication but should not be taken as agreeing with every finding or recommendation.The institutions with which the Commissioners are affiliated have not been asked to formally endorse this briefing paper.This report looks to build upon a substantial body of wor
7、k in this area,including from the IEA and IRENA,and ETC knowledge partners BNEF.The ETC team would like to thank the ETC members,member experts and the ETCs broader network of external experts for their active participation in the development of this report.The ETC Commissioners not only agree on th
8、e importance of reaching net-zero carbon emissions from the energy and industrial systems by mid-century but also share a broad vision of how the transition can be achieved.The fact that this agreement is possible between leaders from companies and organisations with different perspectives on and in
9、terests in the energy system should give decision-makers across the world confidence that it is possible simultaneously to grow the global economy and to limit global warming to well below 2C.Many of the key actions to achieve these goals are clear and can be pursued without delay.Learn more at:www.
10、energy-transitions.org to Clean Electrification SeriesThe ETCs Barriers to Clean Electrification series focuses on identifying the key challenges facing the transition to clean power systems globally and recommending a set of key actions to ensure the clean electricity scale-up is not derailed in th
11、e 2020s.This series of reports will develop a view on how to“risk manage”the transition by anticipating the barriers that are likely to arise and outlining how to overcome them,providing counters to misleading claims,providing explainer content and key facts,and sharing recommendations that help man
12、age risks.An Insights Briefing will be developed for each barrier,covering the context and major challenges,and assessing the impact of deploying key solutions.These Insight Briefings will be accompanied by a series of Solution Toolkits,which lay out a set of key actions that need to be taken by the
13、 most important group of stakeholders(e.g.,governments,renewables developers,grid operators,civil society)and outlines supporting case studies.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 4ETC CommissionersMr Shaun Kingsbury,Chief Investment Officer Just ClimateMr.Bradley And
14、rews,President,UK,Norway,Central Asia&Eastern Europe Worley Mr.Jon Creyts,Chief Executive Officer Rocky Mountain Institute Mr.Spencer Dale,Chief Economist bp Mr.Bradley Davey,Executive Vice President,Head of Corporate Business Optimisation ArcelorMittal Mr.Jeff Davies,Chief Financial Officer L&G Mr.
15、Pierre-Andr de Chalendar,Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Saint Gobain Mr.Agustin Delgado,Chief Innovation and Sustainability Officer Iberdrola Dr.Vibha Dhawan,Director General The Energy and Resources Institute Mr.Craig Hanson,Managing Director and Executive Vice President for Programs World Re
16、sources Institute Dr.Thomas Hohne-Sparborth,Head of Sustainability Research at Lombard Odier Investment Managers Lombard Odier Mr.John Holland-Kaye,Chief Executive Officer Heathrow Airport Dr.Jennifer Holmgren,CEO LanzaTechMr.Fred Hu,Founder,Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Primavera Capital Ms.
17、Rasha Hasaneen,Chief Product and Sustainability Officer AspenTechMs.Mallika Ishwaran,Chief Economist Royal Dutch Shell Mr.Mazuin Ismail,Senior Vice President PetronasDr.Timothy Jarratt,Director of Strategic Projects National GridMr.Greg Jackson,Founder and CEO Octopus EnergyMr.Alan Knight,Group Dire
18、ctor of Sustainability DRAXMs.Zoe Knight,Managing Director and Head of the HSBC Centre of Sustainable Finance HSBC Ms.Kirsten Konst,Member of the Managing Board RabobankMr.Mark Laabs,Executive Chairman Modern Energy Mr.Martin Lindqvist,Chief Executive Officer and President SSAB Mr.Johan Lundn,Senior
19、 Vice President,Project and Product Strategy Office VolvoMr.Rajiv Mangal,Vice President,Safety,Health and Sustainability Tata SteelMs.Laura Mason,Chief Executive Officer L&G CapitalDr.Mara Mendiluce,Chief Executive Officer We Mean Business Mr.Jon Moore,Chief Executive Officer BloombergNEFMr.Julian M
20、ylchreest,Executive Vice Chairman,Global Corporate&Investment Banking Bank of America Mr.David Nelson,Head of Climate Transition Willis Towers WatsonMs.Damilola Ogunbiyi,Chief Executive Officer Sustainable Energy For All Mr.Paddy Padmanathan,Vice-Chairman and Chief Executive Officer ACWA Power Mr.KD
21、 Park,President Korea ZincMs.Nandita Parshad,Managing Director,Sustainable Infrastructure Group EBRD Mr.Alistair Phillips-Davies,Chief Executive SSE Mr.Andreas Regnell,Senior Vice President,Head of Strategic Development Vattenfall Mr.Menno Sanderse,Head of Strategy and Investor Relations Rio Tinto M
22、r.Siddharth Sharma,Group Chief Sustainability Officer Tata Sons Private Limited Mr.Ian Simm,Founder and Chief Executive Officer Impax Asset Management Mr.Sumant Sinha,Chairman,Founder and Chief Executive Officer ReNew Power Lord Nicholas Stern,IG Patel Professor of Economics and Government Grantham
23、Institute LSEDr.Gnther Thallinger,Member of the Board of Management,Investment Management,Sustainability Allianz Mr.Simon Thompson,Senior Advisor Senior Adviser,Rothschild&CoMr.Thomas Thune Andersen,Chairman of the Board rsted Dr.Robert Trezona,Founding Partner,Kiko Ventures IP GroupMr.Jean-Pascal T
24、ricoire,Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Schneider Electric Ms.Laurence Tubiana,Chief Executive Officer European Climate Foundation Lord Adair Turner,Chair Energy Transitions Commission Senator Timothy E.Wirth,President Emeritus United Nations FoundationBetter,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energ
25、y technology supply chains 5ContentsIntroduction 6Chapter 1 Context:Importance of supply chains for the energy transition 7Chapter 2 Mapping clean energy supply chains and assessing risks 10Framework for assessing supply chain risks 10Mapping and risk assessment across technologies 13Solar 16Wind 18
26、Batteries 20Grids 23Heat Pumps 24Electrolysers 26Chapter 3 Cross-cutting supply chain risks 281.Market tightness risks 282.Environmental and social considerations 333.High concentration of supply chains 37Chapter 4 Key actions and recommendations 40Chapter 5 Conclusion 49Acknowledgements 50Better,Fa
27、ster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 6IntroductionIntroductionThe path to a net-zero global economy will require huge growth in clean energy technology deployment,with rapid scaling required of both clean energy supply and end-use decarbonisation technologies.Despite positive
28、recent progress,including widespread legislated national commitments to net-zero by mid-century,and some ambitious sector targets,1 several barriers limit the pace and scale of the transition.These include overall uncertainty about the pace of clean tech deployment in some markets,where government-b
29、acked incentives or market design play a key role,and issues around execution including planning and permitting delays,lack of infrastructure availability(e.g.,grids),and supply chain volatility.If unresolved,these barriers risk delaying and/or increasing the costs of the energy transition,putting a
30、 global net-zero emissions trajectory by mid-century at risk.As part of the ETCs Barriers to Clean Electrification series,this Insights Briefing focuses on the issue of supply chain risks.2 The importance of supply chain issues for the energy transition has recently come to the fore in light of the
31、Covid-19 pandemic and Russias war in Ukraine.In 20212022,as the global economy re-started following the pandemic prices for commodities and raw materials(e.g.,steel,copper),and shipping and freight rates shot up,leading to cost increases for wind turbines and batteries.3 Furthermore,these dynamics h
32、ave served to catalyse a series of policy choices to relocate the production of clean energy technologies such as the US Inflation Reduction Act,and the European Unions Green Deal Industrial Plan adding further complexity and new dynamics.Building resilience and managing risks to reduce potential bo
33、ttlenecks as much as possible is therefore critical.This Insights Briefing addresses two main questions:Where and to what extent could there be bottlenecks to clean energy supply chains,looking out to 2030?What are the key actions that policymakers and industry can take to mitigate these?The scope o
34、f this Briefing covers:Six major backbone technologies for energy sector decarbonisation:solar photovoltaics(PV)wind lithium-ion batteries(for electric vehicles,and storage)large-scale grids domestic heat pumps electrolysersThree major steps across supply chains:mining and processing of raw material
35、s manufacture and assembly of key components major transport and logistics inputsWe do not cover issues relating to construction and installation,or related workforce skill issues(which are highly localised),but forthcoming ETC work will address these issues as they relate specifically to the expans
36、ion of the electricity grid.Three major risk areas across supply chains:market tightness(i.e.the ability of supply to meet demand to 2030 for key materials and components)environmental and social concerns concentration of production across countries or companiesThis Insights Briefing is accompanied
37、by an EU Policy Toolkit,which summarises the EUs position across clean energy supply chains and major policy priorities.1 For example,commitments to power sector decarbonisation in the US and the UK by 2035.2 Other insights in this series include:ETC(2023),Streamlining Planning and Permitting to Acc
38、elerate Wind and Solar Deployment;Material and Resource Needs for the Energy Transition(forthcoming),and Grids(forthcoming).3 BNEF(2022),Lithium-Ion Battery Price Survey;BNEF(2022),2H Global Wind Market Outlook;BNEF(2022),2H Wind Turbine Price Index.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy techno
39、logy supply chains 7Chapter 11Context:Importance of supply chains for the energy transitionThe significant transformation across the energy system required over the coming decades means that clean energy technologies need to scale rapidly.Globally,installed capacity of wind and solar will need to gr
40、ow between 2.54 times by 2030,and electric vehicle(EV)sales six-fold,under a net-zero scenario Exhibit 1.1.The energy transition is already underway in 2022,wind and solar annual capacity additions grew 25%on the previous year,setting a new record for annual deployment(350 GW combined).4 Overall,the
41、 economics of clean energy technologies are becoming increasingly attractive.5 In power generation,wind and solar are now cheaper than new fossil in countries representing over 95%of electricity generation,and cheaper than existing fossil in countries representing 60%of electricity generation.6 Acro
42、ss the world,many countries such as the UK and the US have set clear decarbonisation targets supported by appropriate policies and implementation mechanisms,such as large-scale government auctions for renewable electricity backed by long-term contracts.7 However,the pace and scale required for the t
43、ransition raises a number of challenges.As clean energy technology deployment scales,strengthening supply chains will be critical to ensuring low costs and avoiding disruptions.These supply chains demonstrate varying degrees of complexity,intensity of material use,exposure to international trade,and
44、 footprints across different countries.But in almost all cases,the rapid growth in deployment needed will require a large mobilisation of capital,resources and coordination across multiple players.Global economic and geopolitical volatility has already led to some disruption,making it clear that the
45、 costs Exhibit 1.1The energy transition will require massive capacity additions of new technologies,by 2030 wind and solar grow 2.54x and EV sales 6x from current levelsStorage and EVsSolar940 GWCapacity in 20221240 GW10m EV sales,90 GWh of stationary storage70 million km0.2 MtH2200m units24002600 G
46、WRequired size in 203049005100 GW6080m EV sales,1500 GWh of stationary storage100 million km20 MtH2600m unitsWindT&D GridsElectrolysersHeat Pumpsx 2.5x 4x 6x 1.5x 100 x 3Source:Systemiq analysis for the ETC;BNEF(2023),Interactive data tool Power capacity;ETC(2021)Making clean electrification possibl
47、e;ETC(2021)Making the hydrogen economy possible.4 BNEF(2023),Interactive Data Tool Capacity&Generation.5 Systemiq(2023),The Breakthrough Effect:How to Trigger a Cascade of Tipping Points to Accelerate the Net Zero Transition.6 BNEF(2022),2H 2022 LCOE Update.7 UK Government(October 2021),Plans unveil
48、ed to decarbonise UK power system by 2035;US Government(April 2021),President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction Target Aimed at Creating Good-Paying Union Jobs and Securing U.S.Leadership on Clean Energy Technologies.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chai
49、ns 8Chapter 1and pace of the energy transition are at stake.While some of these patterns are now easing,recent volatility has led to short-term increases in the price of wind turbines and batteries Exhibit 1.2;though the cost of equivalent fossil-fuelled technologies in these sectors has also increa
50、sed.8Supply chain shocks have the potential to derail the energy transition by increasing the costs of key technologies and,in worst-case scenarios,creating absolute shortages of key supplies;this in turn could slow down the pace of the overall transition.9 As an example,a prolonged increase in the
51、price of materials could significantly slow the pace of lithium-ion battery cost declines;given the importance of battery costs in total EV production costs(around 2030%),this could lead to a later“cost parity”date between EV and Internal Combustion Engine(ICE)vehicles,pushing up consumer prices and
52、 slowing the uptake of EVs.10Finally,it is interesting to note that the effects of supply chain“shocks”for clean energy technologies differ to those for fossil fuels.For current fossil use,the challenge around energy security requires ensuring the availability of fuel supply to keep the system runni
53、ng avoiding queues at the pump,for example.Volatility and shocks to fossil fuel supply thus have strong,tangible impacts directly on consumers.Instead,for clean energy technologies,the current challenge is around barriers to building out the new low-carbon energy system at pace.A trend of increasing
54、 material prices would raise the cost of a new EV or a wind turbine,but it would not impact the ability or cost of current users to drive their EVs or power generation from wind turbines.Exhibit 1.2In recent years,disruption in global supply chains has led to price rises for wind and batteries051015
55、2025005006007008000200252001920212013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025123450.00.51.01.5FORECASTFORECAST0.971.00141151+3%+7%Solar PV capex benchmark 2022$/W(DC)ModuleInverter,BoP*EPC*OtherSolar:slowing of price reductions in 2022 due to tight supply for polysilicon and i
56、ncreased freight costs,alongside higher commodity prices,but expected to keep falling from 2023.Wind turbine price by signing date 2022$m/MWTurbine PriceInstallationWind:cost increases driven by increasing prices of copper,aluminium and steel from 2020 onwards,alongside higher freight and shipping c
57、osts;however,prices have been falling in China.Li-ion battery survey price 2022$/kWh(LHS);%of total price(RHS)Cell PricePack PricePrice share of cathode materials Batteries:first-ever price rises in 2022 as prices of cathode materials(Li,Ni,Co)have risen sharply in past year;will take several years
58、to recover to previous trend.Note:*EPC=Engineering,procurement and construction.BoP=Balance of plant.Source:BNEF(2022),4Q Global PV Market Outlook;BNEF(2022),Lithium-Ion Battery Price Survey;BNEF(2022),1H Global Wind Market Outlook;BNEF(2022),1H Wind Turbine Price Index.8 E.g.,LCOEs for gas turbines
59、 and coal rose by 19%and 9%,respectively,in the second half of 2022.BNEF(2022),2H LCOE Update.9 Furthermore,supply chain risks could also lead to profitability concerns for major suppliers,therefore also contributing to bottlenecks.This issue is covered in Box A later in this Briefing.10 Average bat
60、tery pack prices rose by 7%in 2022,driven by higher raw material costs.BNEF(2022),Lithium-ion battery price survey.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 9Chapter 1Current state Today,clean energy supply chains are set within the context of an interdependent global econ
61、omy,though with a large share of supply based predominantly in China,in particular for the production of mass-manufactured components and technologies(e.g.,solar panels,batteries).Chinas leading role goes far beyond its sizable domestic needs and has been supported by a range of factors including:lo
62、w manufacturing costs(including lower energy costs as well as historically labour costs),abundant supplier networks,significant domestic production of industrial materials,economies of scale,and clear domestic policy for clean energy sectors.11 As with most global manufacturing around the world to d
63、ate,particular stages in the production of clean energy technologies have been carbon intensive,although grid emissions intensities are declining or projected to decline by the end of this decade,including in China.12Emerging dynamicsWhile the decade to 2020 saw a relatively stable economic environm
64、ent within which several clean energy technologies experienced continual cost declines,several recent trends have combined to create a more challenging environment,in particular:The Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the fragility of global supply chains,as bottlenecks emerged in global trade due to shut
65、downs in key locations.Russias invasion of Ukraine led to renewed focus on the issue of energy security,as Russia restrained gas exports to Europe,leading to a surge in energy prices.A major acceleration is now required in the pace of clean energy technology deployment to match the widespread adopti
66、on of net-zero emission targets.This changing landscape is leading to new strategic priorities for countries and companies.Across the globe,a re-think is underway around how to reinforce both energy security and industrial competitiveness,in particular through the potential for“near-shoring”(and“fri
67、end-shoring”),defined as a transfer of business activity to within a domestic border.Several pieces of legislation stand out in this regard:In August 2022,the United States passed the Inflation Reduction Act(IRA),a historic bill for climate legislation which will allocate at least$369 billion in inc
68、entives for clean energy,and also includes many provisions for domestic production across multiple clean energy technology supply chains.13 The IRA is part of a wider policy package,which together provides federal and state spending of nearly approximately$1 trillion over the next decade.14 In respo
69、nse,the EU has set out a strategy to support its own domestic production;the recently announced Green Industrial Deal Plan,of which the Net Zero Industry Act(NZIA)is part,sets targets for increasing domestic supply across raw materials and clean energy technologies,along with supporting measures.15
70、Currently,there is existing EU support for clean energy technology manufacturing in place(e.g.,via EU Innovation Fund and European Investment Bank loans),which some estimate is broadly in line with IRA-level spending on manufacturing support;however,EU-level support remains fragmented across a numbe
71、r of instruments.16 EU funding and policy approaches are discussed in more detail in the accompanying EU Policy Toolkit.India has also set out provisions across its trade and domestic manufacturing policy,which include Production Linked Incentive schemes to boost domestic manufacturing for EVs and s
72、olar PV modules,as well as import tariffs on solar modules manufactured in China.17However,the growing global clean energy system means this is not a“zero-sum game”,as this Insights Briefing will discuss further on.It is critical that national strategies for supply chains continue to foster stabilit
73、y at the global level,essential for a smooth transition.The final chapter of this Insights Briefing outlines key considerations for policymakers and industry that reflect both a set of beneficial actions at the global level for supply chains,as well as some considerations for domestic priorities.11
74、IEA(2023),Energy Technology Perspectives.12 For example,the high carbon intensity of polysilicon production.See e.g.,IEA(2022),Special report on solar PV global supply chains.13 Bipartisan Policy Center(2022),Inflation reduction act summary:Energy and climate provisions.14 Other packages include the
75、 IRA New Loan and Loan Guarantee Authority,the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act,and the CHIPS&Science Act.Kaya Advisory/Inevitable Policy Response(2022),The US discovers its climate policy:A holistic assessment and implications.15 EU Commission(2023),The green deal industrial plan:Putting Euro
76、pes net-zero industry in the lead.16 Bruegel(2023),How Europe should answer the US Inflation Reduction Act.17 Note that there are also approved manufacturer lists and local content requirements but these have been temporarily suspended.S&P Global(2022),Indias solar power prospects compromised by ste
77、ep import duty,commodity hikes;Indian Ministry of Heavy Industries(2022);PV Magazine(2022),Indian government approves second phase of solar manufacturing incentive scheme.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 10Chapter 22Mapping clean energy supply chains and assessing
78、 risksThis chapter provides a mapping of supply chains across selected key clean energy technologies and presents an overview of the key risks that could emerge across this landscape until 2030.It will cover in turn:A framework for assessing risks across supply chains.An overview of the supply chain
79、 structure and risk assessment for each technology.Framework for assessing supply chain risksThe analysis in this report is based around three key dimensions for supply chain risks,all of which could lead to higher prices,shortages for key inputs,or delays in manufacturing and deployment.1.The risk
80、of market tightness,resulting from an imbalance between supply and demand.2.Environmental and social concerns.3.The high concentration of production across geographies/companies.Across these dimensions,the analysis considers whether the risk is primarily a short-term phenomenon,likely to be disrupti
81、ve in the next 13 years,or whether it could be a more sustained longer-term pressure point out to 2030.The analysis also specifically excludes supply chain risks arising from trade tensions,18 which are often in themselves responses to perceived risks around high concentration of production.1.Risk o
82、f market tightnessThe issue of market tightness or the inability of supply to keep pace with growing demand can be present at different supply chain stages,from materials,to manufactured components,to transport markets.Three factors determine the severity of risk:Demand:What is the outlook for deman
83、d to 2030?Can material/component inputs be easily substituted in response to high prices or shortages?Can material intensity be reduced?Is the material/component used widely across energy transition technologies or the broader economy?Supply:What is the outlook to 2030?Are there any barriers to scal
84、ing up supply at pace,in terms of mines,factories for components,equipment,or transport inputs(e.g.,vessels)?Have there been upward revisions to recent supply outlooks?Is there any evidence of the market showing long lags or unresponsiveness to price signals?Timing:How long are market imbalances exp
85、ected to last for?Are these likely to be short-lived phenomena which are part of global supply chain volatility for any market,or are they likely to be protracted crunches over several years?In turn,there are several features of supply chains which shape the ability of the market to respond more qui
86、ckly or more slowly:Lead times:There is significant variation across lead times across stages of supply chains.Broadly,mining is the most supply-inelastic area,with timescales for new large-scale mining projects ranging between 520 years,depending on the material type and project location.19 Lead ti
87、mes for building new factories for components and transport inputs are generally lower,under 5 years Exhibit 2.1.There may be scope to accelerate such timescales,and discussions in both the US and the EU may lead to provisions to speed up the planning and permitting of strategic projects but this is
88、 still somewhat uncertain.20 Complexity of supply chains:Within the component space,there is also significant variation across the complexity and barriers to entry for different supply chains,which will depend on factors such as a higher 18 For example,the likelihood of one particular country introd
89、ucing measures such as tariffs,export quotas or bans for materials,components or products.19 IEA(2021),The role of critical minerals in clean energy technologies.20 BNEF(2023),Europes Bid to Reshore Clean Tech Pulls its Punches;Brookings(2023),How to reform federal permitting to accelerate clean ene
90、rgy infrastructure.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 11Chapter 2number of subcomponents,greater specialisation and specificity for components and transport inputs,and higher regulatory specificity(e.g.,different efficiency standards for heat pumps across different
91、geographies).21 Broadly,across the technologies in the scope of this report,there are two different levels of complexity:Lower complexity,mass-produced products,such as solar PV modules and lithium-ion battery cells.More complex products,such as wind turbines,where specifications can be more tailore
92、d to specific needs and locations,and where the transport and logistics is more complex given the need to transport very large components;for example,some larger wind turbine components can no longer be transported via rail.222.Environmental and social concerns Clean energy technology supply chains
93、can be associated with several environmental and social impacts,including lifecycle carbon emissions,local environmental impacts,and incidences of child and forced labour,and low paid and/or artisan mining.If not addressed,these could prevent mining and manufacturing from scaling as rapidly as is re
94、quired.Key considerations to assess the level of risk include:Carbon:What are the embedded carbon emissions of production across materials,components,transport steps,and the final product?This can be best assessed using a lifecycle emissions intensity which compares to the technology it is displacin
95、g.23 Local pollution,nature,and biodiversity:Is there significant local air or water pollution,tailings production,and how well are these managed in different locations?What are the requirements for natural resources(e.g.,water),and does the land footprint of development have a significant impact on
96、 nature/biodiversity?Human rights and social concerns:Are there any concerns around the use of child labour,or forced low paid labour?Are the impacts on local communities being managed appropriately?Many of these impacts are concentrated at the mining stage and the ETC is planning on addressing thes
97、e in detail in an upcoming report on Material and Resource Needs for the Energy Transition.Exhibit 2.1Timescales for mining projects are longer than for manufacturing and transportAverage observed lead time for selected supply chain steps Years(MinMax)0510152025Small-scale mine(discovery to producti
98、on)Large-scale mine(discovery to production)Solar PV moduleproduction plant EV assembly plantCommercial Truck(Class 8)(time for delivery)Wind installation vessels(time for delivery)Refinery210525250.52131224MiningTypical mine lead times range from 47 years for lithium or smaller-scale projects,but c
99、an be as high as 1520 for large nickel and copper mines.Brownfield expansions can also be much faster.Building new refining capacity is faster than new mines.ManufacturingFactory lead times depend on the components but are typically less than 5 years.Transport and logisticsTypical lead times to buil
100、d new transport inputs vary but are very short,except for shipping.Source:IEA(2021),The role of critical minerals in clean energy transitions;IEA(2023),Energy technology perspectives;Petavratzi and Gunn(2022),Decarbonising the automotive sector:a primary raw material perspective on targets and times
101、cales.21 Malhotra and Schmidt(2020),Accelerating low-carbon innovation.22 US DoE(2022),Wind Energy Supply Chain Deep Dive Assessment.23 See e.g.,IEA(2023),Energy technology perspectives;PowerShift(2023),Metals for the energy transition.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply ch
102、ains 12Chapter 23.High concentration of production across geographies/companies The final risk dimension is whether there is excessive concentration of production at any stage in a specific geography,or across a small number of companies(e.g.,a monopoly or oligopoly market structure).Key considerati
103、ons for this risk include:Single point of failure:Is there a significant concentration of production in a single mine site,factory,country,or company that could lead to outsized disruption if there was a highly localised shock?Market concentration in a small group of companies:Is there a significant
104、ly high concentration of production in a limited number of companies that could lead to distortion on pricing?Market concentration in one or a small group of countries:From a global perspective,diversified supply chains are likely to be more resilient in the face of disruptive global geopolitical de
105、velopments.High levels of concentration(e.g.,around 75%or above of production)in one or few countries is assessed as a risk.However,these risks are balanced against considerations of energy security.What is defined as an“excessive”level of concentration will depend on a specific country perspective.
106、Critically,one dimension that is not considered a risk is a diversified base of producers whose ownership is concentrated within a small number of countries,within reasonable limits(e.g.,a majority of battery manufacturers are headquartered in Asia but have operations globally).From a risk assessmen
107、t perspective,as long as the location of production is diversified,concentrated ownership from a single country or small group of countries is unlikely to pose any major issues so long as this position is not an overwhelming proportion of the overall market.Box A Profitability across clean energy su
108、pply chainsRecently,there have also been concerns over the profitability of some manufacturers in clean energy sectors,for example in the European wind industry.1 Supply chain dynamics can play a role in driving profitability concerns for example,higher commodity prices in 2022 have lowered the marg
109、ins of wind turbine manufacturers,unable to pass on higher costs to developers based on current contracts Exhibit 2.2.However,overall profitability depends on a wider number of factors,including revenue models and market design,market size,time taken from contract to payment,and the complexity of th
110、e product(e.g.,a mass-produced product with lower barriers to entry could lead to lower margins).Concerns over profitability could also potentially impact supply chain stability in themselves if they were to lead to bankruptcies of major suppliers in this sector.Overall,this issue is a more complex
111、risk and a systematic assessment of profitability prospects across clean energy supply chain players is outside the scope of this report.1 Financial Times(January 2023),Europes wind industry flags further weakness in 2023 despite energy demand.Exhibit 2.2High exposure to commodity prices has helped
112、drive up wind turbine prices in past few years and hit profitabilityMetal and total wind turbine price Thousand$/MW20002202004006008001,0000Compressed marginsMaterial costSteelAluminiumNeodymiumCopperTurbineSource:BNEF(2023),Transition metals outlook.Better,Faster,Cl
113、eaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 13Chapter 2Mapping and risk assessment across technologiesExhibit 2.3 presents an overview of supply chain structures across six key technologies and highlights trends that could influence the shape of these supply chains to 2030,including the com
114、position of raw materials,components,and transport needs.The following sections cover conclusions from risk assessments across each technology.Sources:Solar PV:IRENA(2021),Critical minerals for the energy transition;IEA(2021),The role of critical minerals in clean energy transitions;Fraunhofer ISE(2
115、022),Photovoltaics Report;BNEF(2023),Transition metals outlook;Hallam et al.(2022),The silver learning curve for photovoltaics and projected silver demand for net-zero emissions by 2050;IEA(2022),Special report on solar PV global supply chains;BNEF(2023),1Q Global PV market outlook;US DoE(2022),Sola
116、r photovoltaics supply chain deep dive assessment.Wind:US DoE(2022),Wind Energy Supply Chain Deep Dive Assessment;BNEF(2021),Wind Trade and Manufacturing:A Deep Dive;BNEF(2022),2H Wind turbine price index;BNEF(2023),Offshore wind expansion under threat from vessel shortage;BNEF(2020),35 MW Wind turb
117、ines to lower material demand;BNEF(2023),Transition metals outlook.Batteries:BNEF(2022),Long-term electric vehicle outlook;BNEF(2022),Lithium-ion battery price survey;BNEF(2023),Sodium-ion batteries make inroads in passenger cars;McKinsey&Co.(2022),Lithium mining:How new production technologies coul
118、d fuel the global EV revolution;US DoE(2022),Energy storage supply chains deep dive assessment;He et al.(2021),Considering critical factors of silicon/graphite anode materials for practical high-energy lithium-ion battery applications;Nat Bullard(2023),Decarbonization:The long view,trends and transi
119、ence,net zero.Grids:BNEF(2023),New energy outlook:Grids;BNEF(2020),Copper and Aluminium Compete to Build the Future Power Grid;BNEF(2021),Power grid long-term outlook;US DoE(2022),Electric grid supply chain review;BEIS/National HVDC Centre(2021),HVDC supply chain overview;Alassi et al.(2019),HVDC Tr
120、ansmission:Technology review,market trends and future outlook.Heat pumps:IEA(2022),The Future of Heat Pumps;BEIS(2020),Heat Pump Manufacturing Supply Chain Research Project.Electrolysers:BNEF(2022),Global electrolyzer outlook 2030;BNEF(2022),Electrolysis system CAPEX by 2050 updated forecast;EPO and
121、 IRENA(2022),Patent insight report.Innovation trends in electrolysers for hydrogen production;ITM-Power(2021),Green Hydrogen:An Electrolyser Manufacturers Perspective;Bristowe,G.;Smallbone,A.(2021),The Key Techno-Economic and Manufacturing Drivers for Reducing the Cost of Power-to-Gas and a Hydrogen
122、-Enabled Energy System;Vattenfall(2022),Vattenfall aims to build the worlds first offshore hydrogen cluster in the Netherlands.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 14Chapter 2Exhibit 2.3Supply Chains Mapping Overview Major Raw Materials (Mined or Processed)Major Compo
123、nents (Manufacturing)Transport and LogisticsFinal ProductSolar PV Steel Aluminium Glass Copper Quartz metallurgical grade silicon(MGS)Silver Polysilicon Ingot Ethylene vinyl acetate(EVA)Fluorinated polymers(PVF,PVDF)Wafer Cell PV Module Installation system:inverter and mounting system International
124、shipping Local trucking Local mounting and installationSolar plant/rooftop solarMajor trends:Solar PV modules are designed to be highly mass-manufactured and can be easily stacked,trucked and shipped.Around half of all solar PV modules manufactured in 2021 were traded between countries.Continuing ef
125、ficiency increases at 2%p.a.,with absolute module efficiencies expected to reach 25%by 2030,drive continuous decreases in materials content per GW of solar capacity at wafer and module level,e.g.,steel content expected to fall 15%by 2030,silicon 20%.Specific innovation to drive down both silicon usa
126、ge and silver demand from solar is also taking place,helping reduce demand further.Thin-film technologies likely to make up only Module Pack:Cathode active materials,Anode active materials,Electrolyte,Separator,Casing Battery management system:Electronics/semiconductors,Sensors International shippin
127、gBattery with management systemMajor trends:Batteries are designed to be highly mass-manufactured and are typically produced close to electric vehicle assembly factories.Battery chemistry choices and development key determinant of materials:Low-cobalt nickel-manganese-cobalt(NMC)batteries reduces de
128、mand for cobalt,increases demand for nickel.Lithium-iron-phosphate(LFP)batteries reduces demand for nickel and cobalt,increases demand for lithium.Development of sodium-ion batteries(commercially competitive by late 2020s)reduces demand for lithium.Substitution of graphite with silicon increases bat
129、tery energy density and reduces demand for graphite.Continuing battery energy density and packing efficiency improvements through to 2030(reaching 250 Wh/kg)help drive continuous decreases in materials needed to achieve a given vehicle range,driving down material content for EVs.*Notes:*This can be
130、achieved through a mix of battery cathode and anode chemistries,reduced voltage losses,or improving the packing efficiency of cells within a pack.BNEF estimate that battery energy density at the pack level doubled from 87 Wh/kg to 166 Wh/kg between 201020,and could reach over 240 Wh/kg by the end of
131、 this decade.CATL have recently announced a semi-solid state battery capable of reaching an energy density up to 500 Wh/kg see PV Magazine(2023),CATL launches 500 Wh/kg condensed matter battery.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 15Chapter 2Exhibit 2.3Supply Chains M
132、apping Overview Major Raw Materials (Mined or Processed)Major Components (Manufacturing)Transport and LogisticsFinal ProductGrids Bauxite Copper Iron ore Lead Metal alloys:bronze,stainless steel,zinc Wood Aluminium Steel Concrete Polymers Power lines:Conductors,Towers for transmission lines,poles fo
133、r distribution lines,Insulators Substations:Transformers,Switchgears,Circuit breakers,Capacitor banks,Bus bars Subsea Installation Vessels Truck Rail Heavy cranesLow/high voltage power lines;Distribution substationsMajor trends:Grid supply chains are characterised by relative ease of global transpor
134、t substation equipment is easily stacked and transported;cables are easily wound into reels or drums.However,there is potentially constrained supply of subsea installation vessels for cabling(there are only seven in the world).Aluminium and copper are substitutable in overhead lines(aluminium often
135、favoured because lower cost and weight for same conductivity),but copper is better suited for underground and submarine lines due to higher intrinsic conductivity,higher strength,and better thermal resistance.Technology evolution pointing to different impacts for materials intensity:Greater undergro
136、unding and offshoring of power lines will result in an increase in average material intensity,due to needs for greater thickness for higher temperatures,and protective layers.Materials intensity may be mitigated by replacements of HVAC by HVDC lines(AC needs three conductors,DC two).Increased use of
137、 residential solar and storage could reduce overall pace and scale of grid expansion required.Heat Pumps Steel Copper Nickel Aluminium Polymers Refrigerant Lubricating oil Pump and/or fan Heat exchangers(evaporator,condenser)Compressor Expansive valve Wiring and chips Insulation Pipework Housing Int
138、ernational shipping Local truckingHeat pumpMajor trends:Heat pumps can be easily mass-manufactured(similar to air-conditioning units)and currently have a lower level of international trade,due to the need to adapt to local laws with specifications on recycling,efficiency,voltage etc.,as well as need
139、 for careful handling to avoid refrigerant leakage.Some variation among material needs for different types of residential heat pumps,such as the most common type,air-source heat pumps(ASHPs)(over 80%of current market),and ground source heat pumps(GSHPs).ASHP require slightly more steel and copper th
140、an GSHPs,but less polymers and cement mortar for underground closed loop systems.Natural refrigerants(e.g.,propane,CO2,ammonia)could replace synthetic working fluids with higher GWP intensity(F-gases).Electrolysers Steel Nickel/Titanium Copper Aluminium Zirconium Graphite Platinum group metals(PGM)P
141、olymers Electrolyser stack:Cathode,Anode,Electrolytes,Separator,Membrane,Bipolar plates,Frames and sealing Other system components International shipping Rail TruckElectrolytic H2 plantMajor trends:Current electrolysers are modular and easily stackable,no issues for global trade.Plans for offshore e
142、lectrolysers(e.g.,by Vattenfall)would need to be manufactured for offshore use,transportable in containers.Variation among material needs for Alkaline and Proton exchange membrane(PEM)technology(alkaline is 80%of the market).Alkaline requires nickel,zirconium;PEM requires PGM titanium.Ongoing innova
143、tion to reduce and adapt materials requirements:Development of hybrid anion exchange membrane(AEM)electrolysers without PGM and with higher performance than alkaline.Development of Solid Oxide Electrolyzers,requiring no copper,graphite,polymers,titanium or PGM,less nickel and more zirconium,scandium
144、 and yttrium.Might gain 5%market share by 2030.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 16Chapter 2SolarSolar PV supply chains are characterised by strong demand for four key materials(silicon,aluminium,copper,and silver),and a highly competitive manufacturing value chain
145、 with significant Chinese production at all stages.The current manufacturing pipeline could be sufficient to produce up to 1 TW of solar by 2030.24 Solar panels are easily traded globally,with large volumes of imports from China to Europe and India,while the US mainly imports from other Southeast As
146、ian countries,following a ban on Chinese imports.25The following section presents conclusions from the risk assessment for solar across the three main dimensions:1.There could be possible market tightness across key materials(copper,silver),but the manufacture of solar components should be able to s
147、cale rapidly.There could be pressure leading to high prices for silver(as solar demand is 10%of the market,and this could increase as solar deployment rises rapidly)as well as copper.26 The potential for high copper prices is discussed in more detail in the next chapter,as it affects all clean energ
148、y technologies.Polysilicon shortages are not a concern.Supply of polysilicon(the high-purity version of silicon used in solar PV)has experienced two major boom-bust cycles in the past fifteen years,impacting the cost of solar PV modules.27 The most recent price cycle,where prices rose five-fold betw
149、een early 2021 to year-end 2022,led to a subsequent rapid expansion in polysilicon production capacity and an ensuing fall in prices throughout early 2023.28 Although such price cycles have lead to a short-term slowing of price declines for solar PV modules,they have tended not to disrupt long-term
150、cost declines Exhibit 2.4.29 A key component of solar panels are the encapsulant and backsheet layers of a module,which rely on ethylene vinyl acetate(EVA)and fluorinated polymers such as Polyvinyl fluoride(PVF)or Polyvinylidene fluoride(PVDF).30 Though there is no shortage of these materials,high n
151、atural gas prices(which lead to higher input costs)together with rapidly rising demand from solar could lead to high prices for both sets of materials but these only make up a small fraction of overall solar module costs.31Although shipping and freight costs rose sharply in 202122,these have now fal
152、len back to pre-pandemic prices.Future blockages are also likely to be short-term trends,rather than longer term disruption.Exhibit 2.4Although polysilicon shortages lead to short-term price cycles,solar module prices keep falling regardlessSolar-grade silicon spot price(LHS);Solar module price(RHS)
153、LHS=$/kg,log scale;RHS=$/W,log scale0.11.010.01101001,0002005POLYSILICON SHORTAGEPOLYSILICON SHORTAGE20023Solar-grade silicon spot price(LHS)Monocrystalline Si module price(RHS)Source:BNEF(2023),Interactive data tool Solar spot price index;Bernreuter Research(2023),Polysilicon Price Trend
154、;Our World in Data(2023),Solar PV Module Price.24 IEA(2023),The state of clean technology manufacturing.25 IEA(2022),Solar PV global supply chains.26 Hallam et al.(2022),The silver learning curve for photovoltaics and projected silver demand for net-zero emissions by 2050.27 See e.g.,Bernreuter Rese
155、arch(2023),Polysilicon price trend.28 BNEF(2023),1Q Global PV market outlook.29 BNEF(2022),4Q Global PV market outlook.30 PVF and PVDF are polymers with high resilience which have a complex value chain,starting from fluorspar mining and hydrofluoric acid production.See e.g.,ThunderSaidEnergy(2022),S
156、olar:capacity growth through 2030 and 2050?31 ThunderSaidEnergy(2022),Ethylene vinyl acetate:Production costs?;ThunderSaidEnergy(2022),Solar:capacity growth through 2030 and 2050?Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 17Chapter 22.Environmental and social concerns are s
157、evere across the solar supply chain,particularly in relation to polysilicon.Polysilicon production in Xinjiang makes up around 30%of total supply,where there is currently very heavy use of coal power,leading to high life-cycle emissions for the production of solar PV modules(although rapid renewable
158、s deployment should decrease this in coming years).32 Further,there have been allegations of the use of forced labour and human rights abuses in both the supply of coal power and the production of polysilicon in this region.33 This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.3.The solar supply ch
159、ain is highly geographically concentrated.The solar supply chain is highly concentrated in China,from polysilicon production through to module assembly.The current wafer-to-module value chain is very highly concentrated in China,with over 70%of 2021 manufacturing capacity for wafers,cells and module
160、s Exhibit 2.5.34 The past five years have seen some diversification to the rest of Southeast Asia,with increased production in Malaysia,Vietnam,and Thailand,but together these make up less than 10%of the market and are focused only on the simplest production stage of module assembly.Although a large
161、 fraction of Chinese production is to meet domestic demand,35 the very high levels of concentration could be a cause for concern if trade tensions arise in coming years or if production comes under strain in key regions.36From a company perspective,the manufacturing capacity of solar modules is quit
162、e diversified,with strong levels of competition throughout most of the value chain;the top-five module manufacturers controlled around 45%of total commissioned capacity in 2022.37Exhibit 2.5Thanks to higher economies of scale and lower costs,China has progressively grown its share in the PV module s
163、upply chain Polysilicon:cost competitiveness of global manufacturing plants Y axis:polysilicon variable production cost($/kg);X axis:2022 estimated production(t)020406080100Polysilicon WafersCellsModules0246800200,000400,000600,000800,0001,000,0001,200,0001,400,0002022 estimated productio
164、n(t)Weighted average cost:8.2Low costs driven mainly by cheap electricity co-located with production,as well as large economies of scale.PV supply chain:share of global manufacturing capacity by geography and supply chain step Share of global solar PV manufacturing capacity,2021,%40%of 2021 capacity
165、 installs were in China.ChinaAPACN.AmericaEuropeIndiaRoWSource:BNEF(2023),1Q Global PV market outlook;IEA(2022),Solar PV global supply chains.Polysilicon variable production cost($/kg)32 IEA(2022),Solar PV global supply chains.33 The Breakthrough Institute(2022),Sins of a solar empire;Murphy&Elim/Sh
166、effield Hallam University(2021),In broad daylight.34 IEA(2022),Solar PV global supply chains.35 Chinese domestic installations were approximately 70 GW in 2021,compared to approximately 180 GW of installations and 350 GW of manufacturing capacity.IEA(2023),Energy technology perspectives.36 For examp
167、le,in 2022 factory fires in Xinjiang,and droughts throughout Sichuan,both led to temporary decreases in production.See e.g.,PV Magazine(2022),China polysilicon producer shuts down factory due to fire;Bloomberg(2022),Power crunch in Sichuan adds to industrys woes in China.37 BNEF(2023),Interactive da
168、ta tool Solar equipment manufacturers.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 18Chapter 2WindWind supply chains are characterised by strong demand for steel and aluminium,and a need for rare earth elements in permanent magnets.Crucial components are turbine blades and th
169、e nacelle,which houses the gearbox and generator.The production of wind turbines is fairly distributed geographically;for example,both European and Chinese domestic capacity is sufficient to meet their respective domestic demand.381.Shorter-term periods of price volatility are more likely(as the glo
170、bal wind industry is current experiencing),driven by high exposure to commodity price volatility and a supply chain increasingly characterised by higher complexity components.Over 90%of total material mass for turbines is steel,where there are no availability or supply concerns,39 though it can driv
171、e a large fraction of total costs and are exposed to commodity price volatility.The spike in steel prices throughout 202122 has contributed to a rise in input material costs for wind turbines and tighter margins for manufacturers Box A.Demand for rare earth elements from turbines is also expected to
172、 grow sharply,raising some scope for supply risks.Most wind turbines need significant amounts of neodymium(as well as dysprosium and praseodymium),with the highest demand arising in permanent magnet-based wind turbines these materials are used in high-performance magnets that convert the rotation of
173、 turbine blades into electricity.40 There is potential to shift to less rare earth-intensive turbine designs,41 but other factors(e.g.,performance)typically dominate design choice.Supply of rare earths from China can expand rapidly in response to high prices,and there is also new supply expected in
174、Myanmar and the USA.42Specialised wind turbines and vessels could be a bottleneck to offshore wind growth in the coming decade.The growing size of offshore wind turbines is causing fleet operators to hold back investing in new vessels,as they wait for certainty around what size and type will be requ
175、ired.BNEF currently expect shortages of foundation installation vessels from 2027 onwards,whereas there should be enough turbine installation vessels through to 2030.43 This could hold back approximately 10 GW of installations in China by 2030,and approximately 25 GW across the rest of the world,equ
176、al to around 15%of expected offshore wind installations by 2030.4438 BNEF(2023),Wind Data Hub.39 For example,wind power currently makes up approximately 1%of global steel demand and is expected to rise to 56%at most over coming decades.BNEF(2023),Transition metals outlook.40 EU Commission Joint Rese
177、arch Centre(2020),The role of rare earth elements in wind energy and electric mobility.41 For example,by using synchronous generators or induction-based generators.See e.g.,IEA(2021),The role of critical minerals in clean energy transitions.42 IEA(2023),Energy technology perspectives.43 BNEF(2023),O
178、ffshore wind expansion under threat from vessel shortage;see also H-BLIX/Wind Europe/Polish Wind Energy Association(2022),Offshore wind vessel availability until 2030:Baltic sea and Polish perspective.44 Ibid.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 19Chapter 22.Environme
179、ntal and social concerns are low for wind power.Even though wind turbines use large amounts of concrete and steel,life-cycle emissions for wind power are very low(25 years),and rising capacity factors leading to very short carbon payback timescales.Environmental concerns are mainly linked to the min
180、ing of rare earth elements.This was historically poorly regulated in China,and is linked to production of toxic waste and local air pollution,46 but environmental standards in China have improved in recent years following tighter government regulation.473.Rare earth supply chains are highly concentr
181、ated in China,and while wind component manufacturing is diversified,all recent growth has been in China.Mining and refining of rare earth elements is highly concentrated in China.China accounts for around 60%of the worlds rare earth mining,90%percent of rare earth processing,and 95%of high-strength
182、rare earth permanent magnet production.48Turbine production capacity in China and Europe is sufficient to meet domestic demand over coming years Exhibit 2.6.However,much of future manufacturing capacity is being built in China.According to BNEF,all new investment and announced investment in 2021 and
183、 2022 for wind turbines came from the Asia-Pacific region.49Exhibit 2.6Wind turbine manufacturing tends to be regionally distributed,with Europe and China able to meet current domestic demand,but some concentration exists for key componentsWind demand and domestic production capacity*GW2022555520303
184、4232030777320221622100%Nacelle14368%8%1559%59%Blade11319%49%Tower5032%38%Generator4335%47%Gearbox6914%33%BearingChinaEuropeWind demandDomestic production capacityShare of total number of factories for wind turbine parts,2021%ChinaEuropeIndiaUSBrazilOtherNote:*2030 capacity additions are taken from B
185、NEFs short-term forecast;manufacturing capacity is taken from BNEF(2023),Interactive data tool Wind turbine market shares,and is assumed to remain constant from 202530.Source:BNEF(2023),Interactive data tool Wind turbine market shares;BNEF(2021),Wind Trade and Manufacturing:A Deep Dive.45 UNECE(2021
186、),Lifecycle assessment of electricity generation options;Pehl et al.(2017),Understanding future emissions from low-carbon power systems by integration of life-cycle assessment and integrated energy modelling.46 See e.g.,Ali(2014),Social and environmental impact of the rare earth industries;BBC Futur
187、e/Tim Maughan(2015),The dystopian lake filled by the worlds tech lust.47 Shen et al.(2020),Chinas public policies toward rare earths,19752018.48 IEA(2023),Energy technology perspectives;Wood Mackenzie(2022),Can the rest of the world repel Chinas magnetic pull over rare earth metals?49 BNEF(2023),Eur
188、opes Bid to Reshore Clean Tech Pulls its Punches.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 20Chapter 2Batteries Most future demand for batteries will come from electric vehicles,with a much smaller segment from stationary energy storage Exhibit 2.7.Batteries vary widely in
189、 terms of chemistries,with most currently relying on five key raw materials:lithium,graphite,nickel,cobalt,and manganese.50 EVs also have high requirements for copper and rare earth elements,as well as semiconductor chips.Current battery manufacturing is concentrated in China,with EV assembly spread
190、 across China,the USA,and Europe.Batteries face three significant challenges to scaling rapidly,alongside a range of more minor,specific risks:1.Price spikes due to tight markets could be an issue for some key battery materials,although innovation is a driver in reducing requirements for some minera
191、ls;there are few concerns around scaling battery manufacturing.Mining:The lithium market could be tight through to 2030 there may be shortages of high-purity refined nickel,but cobalt demand should not be a problem.Supply of both nickel and cobalt has expanded rapidly in the past few years,although
192、supply of high-purity class 1 nickel could still be a blockage.51 The rapid shift to low-cobalt NMC and cobalt-and nickel-free LFP batteries is reducing the scale of the challenge,especially for cobalt Exhibit 2.8.52 However,the risk of lithium shortages is high:demand is difficult to substitute(sod
193、ium-ion batteries will likely only have a significant market share post-2030,and even then may likely be limited to smaller vehicles)and supply needs to expand even more quickly than current pipelines suggest see also detailed discussion in Chapter 3,and Exhibit 3.3.Components:Expanding cathode mate
194、rial production at pace could prove challenging.Significant capacity expansions are planned:the IEA estimate around 14 Mt per annum of cathode production in 2030,and BNEF estimate a total pipeline of up to 24 Mt of announced projects well in excess of potential demand of 1012 Exhibit 2.7Demand for b
195、atteries will grow ten-fold to 2030,driven by adoption of passenger battery electric vehicles,though this remains below net-zero trajectoryAnnual battery capacity demand*TWh020202025203011 TWh announced battery production capacity in pipeline.Passenger vehicles make up 65%of battery deman
196、d in 2030.BEV passengerStationary storageBEV commercialOther(Consumer electronics,E-buses,2/3-wheelers)Additional demand required for net-zero trajectoryNote:*Demand forecast is for BNEFs Economic Transition Scenario,which is driven by techno-economics and current market trends.Source:Systemiq analy
197、sis for the ETC;BNEF(2022),Long-term electric vehicle outlook;Benchmark Mineral Intelligence(2022),Lithium ion battery gigafactory assessment November.50 The scope of this analysis focuses on lithium-ion batteries as the dominant technology for clean energy(e.g.,in EVs and stationary storage).51 BNE
198、F(2022),2H Battery metals outlook.52 NMC=Nickel-Manganese-Cobalt;LFP=Lithium-Iron-Phosphate.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 21Chapter 2Mt in 2030.53 However,new projects could be delayed due to the high complexity of engineering,production,procurement and constru
199、ction,coupled with potential bottlenecks for key equipment such as kilns.These delays are most likely in Europe and North America,where a rapid expansion in capacity is planned over coming years,starting from a low base.Manufacturing:There are very few concerns around scaling battery assembly.Announ
200、cements of planned production capacity for 2030 add up to over 10 TWh,which is well in excess of demand implied even by a net-zero pathway.54 A significant proportion of this capacity may not be built,as some battery companies fail to gain EV manufacturer supply nominations and,as a result,cannot at
201、tract finance.However,given the intensity of competition,the need for EV manufacturers to secure supply,and the scale of public subsidies available,it is unlikely that battery production capacity will be a serious constraint on EV supply.2.Mining of battery materials has some environmental and socia
202、l risks but these are being addressed by manufacturers throughout the supply chain.Each material has a particular set of challenges,including water use(for lithium),carbon intensity(lithium and nickel),and links to human rights abuses and child labour(cobalt).This is discussed in more detail in Chap
203、ter 3.There are also concerns around embodied carbon emissions further down the supply chain,as the refining of materials into key precursors(e.g.,lithium carbonate)often requires significant energy inputs and high temperatures above 800oC,leading to high emissions in coal-intensive grids.Manufactur
204、ing of batteries is also currently emissions-intensive,partly due to heavy coal use in Chinese power grid.Exhibit 2.8Li-ion battery industry is shifting rapidly to lower cobalt and lower nickel chemistries,driving down demand projectionsPassenger vehicle battery market share%0%25%50%75%100%201520202
205、0252030203505010050%reduction in forecast demand due to technology and materials substitution0350202020222024202620282030NMC(111)NMC(532)NMC(622)NMC(811)NMC(721)NMC(955)N(M)CAL(N/M)OL(M)FPProjected future cobalt demand Thousand metric tonnes2019 BNEF forecast2020 BNEF forecast2021 BNEF fo
206、recast2022 BNEF forecastNote:N=Nickel,M=Manganese,C=Cobalt,F=Iron,P=Phosphate,O=Oxygen,A=Aluminium.Source:BNEF(2022),Long-term electric vehicle outlook.53 1012 Mt assumes roughly 1.5 kg of cathode material per kWh of battery capacity,based on a maximum battery demand of 7 TWh in 2030.See IEA(2023),E
207、nergy technology perspectives;BNEF(2023),Interactive data tool Equipment manufacturers.54 Benchmark Mineral Intelligence(2022),Lithium ion battery gigafactory assessment November;BNEF(2023)Interactive data tool Battery cell manufacturers.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply
208、chains 22Chapter 2It should be noted that electric vehicles already have lower life-cycle emissions than combustion vehicles,even when using emissions-intensive batteries and grids.55 There is the potential to decarbonise production throughout the supply chain in coming decades,both from electrified
209、 high-temperature heat(for refining),and the decarbonisation of the power grid(for battery manufacturing).This is already occurring including in China but must happen faster.There is a clear opportunity for the coming generation of refining and manufacturing to set high standards for environmental a
210、nd social performance whilst meeting growing demand.563.High concentration of supply chain in China across all stages.There are risks around the concentration of raw material supply and processing:the mining of cobalt(70%DRC),nickel(45%Indonesia),lithium(50%Australia,26%Chile)is heavily concentrated
211、.57 The same is true at the refining stage,where China dominates the supply of refined and processed forms of these materials.58 Whilst the distribution of reserves is somewhat physically constrained due to resource endowments,there is a larger opportunity to re-balance the location of refining oper
212、ations,for example as incentivised by recent policy announcements in the US and Europe.Furthermore,the downstream supply chain is also highly concentrated in China,which produces over 80%of the market for anodes,cathodes,electrolytes and battery cells Exhibit 2.9.59 Even though a large fraction of t
213、his production is to meet growing domestic demand,such a high level of concentration leaves individual companies and countries exposed to sole-supplier risks,and could lead to supply blockages if trade tensions worsen.It is worth noting that manufacturing of innovative cathode chemistries with lower
214、 critical metal requirements(notably,LFP and Na-ion)is currently almost entirely in China meaning shifting production of these new technologies to the US or Europe could be even more challenging.60Similar to the case for solar PV,there is intense competition across companies in the battery supply ch
215、ain.The largest battery manufacturer is CATL,which controls around 18%of current global manufacturing capacity,and the ten largest manufacturers have around 60%of the total.61Exhibit 2.9China holds major share across EV supply chainCountry market share of production stage,2022%SeparatorElectrolyteAn
216、odeCathodeCellEV production89%84%58%10%26%90%94%94%OtherS.KoreaJapanEuropeUS/N.AmericaChinaSource:BNEF(2022),Localizing clean energy supply chains comes at a cost;BNEF(2023),Interactive data tool.55 See e.g.,Ricardo Energy(2020),Determining the environmental impacts of conventional and alternatively
217、 fuelled vehicles through LCA.56 See e.g.,Minviro(2021),Shifting the lens.57 USGS(2023),Mineral commodity summaries.58 IEA(2022),Global supply chains of EV batteries;IEA(2023),Energy technology perspectives.59 BNEF(2023),Interactive data tool Battery equipment manufacturers.60 There are currently on
218、ly two LFP cathode manufacturers in N.America,and one in Europe BNEF(2023),Interactive data tool Battery equipment manufacturers.61 BNEF(2023),Interactive data tool Battery equipment manufacturers.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 23Chapter 2GridsGrid supply chains
219、 are characterised by high material needs for copper and aluminium,globally competitive markets for components,and relative ease of global transport.62 Overall,grid supply chains are not expected to face any major impediments to scaling,though there could be a higher risk of bottlenecks in some spec
220、ialised areas.1.Some market tightness risks exist due to copper requirements and the need to rapidly scale more specialised components.There could be constraints in copper supply;however,this is substitutable in overhead lines.For the more common overhead power lines(representing 7080%of new power l
221、ine additions to 205063),aluminium has been favoured given its lower cost and lower weight for the same level of conductivity.For underground and submarine cables,which are growing in share,other properties of copper higher intrinsic conductivity,higher strength,and better thermal resistance make co
222、pper better suited.64 The potential for high prices of copper is discussed in more detail in the next section.The supply of large-scale transformers and subsea high-voltage cabling could slow down the expansion of power grids.High-power,large-scale transformers are seeing longer lead times and risin
223、g costs,especially in the United States to the extent that these were included in the Defense Production Act passed by President Biden in 2022 to spur production of key technologies.65 Manufacturing of this component requires labour-intensive specialised design,with a single unit costing at least$4
224、million,and a surge in demand is expected in the United States,many of these units are operating past their technical deadlines.66 For high-voltage subsea cabling,challenges arise both in the production of the cables,and low numbers of subsea cable installation vessels(there are only seven in the wo
225、rld).672.There are some concerns around the use of fluorinated gases(F-gases)in grid infrastructure,but regulation is already pushing for reduced use.F-gases are widely used as insulation throughout the grid system,including in transformers,substations and switchgear.However,F-gases have a very stro
226、ng impact as greenhouse gases if they leak.68 Innovation is ongoing to develop equipment with lower-GWP gases,69 and regulation is also being introduced to help the phase-out of F-gases.3.There is some level of concentration across production of key grid equipment,but not at the level of other clean
227、 energy technologies.Across conductors and transformers,China,Central and Eastern Europe,and Mexico are net exporters of key grid equipment,while Western Europe and North America are dependent on imports.70As mentioned in the introduction,while out of scope for this report,there are important potent
228、ial skill constraints in electricity grid expansion,which will be assessed in detail in our forthcoming work on issues relating to transmission and distribution grid development.62 The scope of“grids”for this analysis covers major physical infrastructure for transmission and distribution infrastruct
229、ure,including power lines(overhead/underground/submarine;low-voltage to high-voltage),mounting structures(towers and poles),and substations(e.g.,transformers,switchgears,etc).Microgrids are excluded from this analysis.63 BNEF(2021),Power grid long-term outlook.64 BNEF(2021),Copper and aluminium comp
230、ete to build the future power grid.65 US DoE(2022),Electric grid supply chain review;T&D World(2022),Transformative times:Update on the US transformer supply chain;E&E News(2022),How a transformer shortage threatens the grid.66 E&E News(2022),How a transformer shortage threatens the grid.67 US DoE(2
231、022),Electric grid supply chain review;BEIS/National HVDC Centre(2021),HVDC supply chain overview;Alassi et al.(2019),HVDC Transmission:Technology review,market trends and future outlook.68 For example,SF6 has a global warming potential(GWP)around 23,000 times higher than carbon dioxide.US Environme
232、ntal Protection Agency(2022),Sulfur Hexafluoride(SF6)Basics.69 See e.g.,Schneider Electric(2020),Schneider Electric wins industrial energy efficiency award at Hannover Messe for SF6-free medium voltage switchgear;Siemens Energy(2023),The path to zero:F-gas-free power transmission.70 OEC(Accessed Feb
233、ruary 2023),Electric conductors,nes 80%of supply for a particular material/product;ensure diversified and free flow of trade for clean energy supply chains.Priority areas are mining of cobalt and rare earths;refining of all energy transition materials;manufacturing supply chain of solar and batterie
234、s.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 46Chapter 4Trade-offs in supply chain localisation Policy choices around near-shoring will be in part driven by geopolitical considerations.But it is important to understand the potential trade-offs to guide an optimal policy app
235、roach.Re-locating production could in many cases impose an initial increase in the cost of key technologies as production shifts from locations which currently benefit from large economies of scale and acquired experience.For example,BNEF estimates that the capital costs of building out solar PV man
236、ufacturing capacity from polysilicon through to modules are currently almost four times higher in the EU and the US than in China.149This effect can be thought of as“restricting”a clean energy technology to a particular region or market,pulling it backwards and up along its cost curve,or“learning cu
237、rve”Box C.Localisation strategies should therefore be designed to ensure that the overall global effect does not severely impact costs of the transition.They also need to reflect realistic assessment of trade-offs involved across three dimensions.Local value add,with local production generating a do
238、mestic GDP contribution and tax revenues.However,this would need to be weighed against any subsidies required to successfully relocate production away from least-cost locations.Employment,with potential to increase domestic jobs in manufacturing.However,as manufacturing is increasingly automated,the
239、 total employment impact may be limited;in many countries indeed,domestic employment creation in residential building retrofit and installation is likely to be more significant than in manufacturing(for example as noted in Box B for residential heat pump installation).Geopolitical considerations,wit
240、h localisation reducing import dependency which might create vulnerabilities in periods of geopolitical stress.Furthermore,setting out strong measures to relocalise production(e.g.,the US IRA)could be used as a tool to shape global economic trade and investment decisions in line with a countrys poli
241、cy preferences.However,while some diversification will be possible,countries and companies cannot eliminate all dependencies without incurring significant cost increases.Box C Defining learning curvesMany technologies go through a process of cost decline over time,as increases in capacity see scale
242、effects reduce the costs of manufacture.The rate at which this progress takes place is captured via a“learning rate”,defined as the reduction in cost for each doubling of technology capacity deployment.For example,learning rates for solar,batteries and wind over the past decade have been 28%,17%,and
243、 13%respectively.1,2,3“Learning curves”are a graphical representation of the learning rate.For a more detailed discussion and examples across clean energy technologies,see Malhotra and Schmidt3,and Way et al.4In terms of“near-shoring”,as mentioned,this could restrict a clean energy technology to a p
244、articular region or market,pulling it backwards and up along its learning curve.Following this initial increase in costs,the pace of future cost declines would depend on a mix of policy choices and market dynamics Exhibit 4.4.There are two potential scenarios:1.A slowdown in deployment and permanent
245、ly higher costs,due to a mix of:Higher ongoing costs(labour,energy,financing).More restrictive regulations which constrain rapid scale-up of mining,refining or manufacturing.Finite size of market at regional/national scale,setting a limit to economy of scale driven cost reductions.Overly-stringent r
246、equirements for localisation all component supplies,even where additional costs are high and risks from import reliance limited.2.An accelerated shift back down along learning curve resulting from:Companies sharing learning between factories in different regions,accelerating productivity improvement
247、s regardless of factory location.Global sharing of faster innovation,incentivised by particular policies or industrial strategies paired with near-shoring.More robust,less volatile supply chains that are not as disrupted by external shocks.An overall faster than expected growth in clean energy deplo
248、yment as all countries pursue aggressive decarbonisation and as companies in all countries pursue technological leadership.1 BNEF(2022),4Q Global PV market outlook;2 BNEF(2022),Lithium-ion battery price survey;3 Malhotra and Schmidt(2020),Accelerating low-carbon innovation;4 Way et al.(2022),Empiric
249、ally grounded technology forecasts and the energy transition.149 BNEF(2022),Building solar factories to rival China wont be cheap.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 47Chapter 4Exhibit 4.4Near-shoring would lead to higher costs,moving back and up the learning curve;b
250、ut a mix of policy and market dynamics could bring rapid cost declines after a few yearsSolar Example:Initially,near-shoring dynamics can be seen as moving back and up a clean energy technology learning curve,and a range of factors will influence how costs come down in future years Solar learning cu
251、rve:US$/W(Y-axis);MW(X-axis)1,000,00010,0001001Deployment0.010.10101100Price1,000,00010,0001001Deployment0.010.10101100Price213B3A212Initially,higher capital and other input costs may lead to higher prices/LCOEs.Near-shoring restricts a clean energy technology to a particular region,pulling it backw
252、ards along the deployment curve.23AA slowdown in deployment and permanently higher costs from:Higher ongoing costs(labour,energy,finance)Slower regulation,increased bureaucracy Smaller market size at regional/national scale Protectionist policies/trade barriers23BAn accelerated shift back down along
253、 learning curve could be due to:Global sharing of faster innovation Companies sharing learning between factories in different regions More robust,less volatile supply chains A faster-than-expected growth in clean energy deploymentsHistorical prices28%Learning curveSource:BNEF(2022),4Q Global PV mark
254、et outlook;Helveston et al.(2021),Quantifying the cost savings of global solar photovoltaic supply chains;Way et al.(2022),Empirically grounded technology forecasts and the energy transition.Focusing localisation strategies and effective implementationSupply chain localisation strategies are likely
255、to be most effective if they carefully consider key sectors and implementation Exhibit 4.5,including that they:Reflect the different market dynamics and supply chain complexity of different sectors.Solar PV,battery and electrolyser production will be concentrated in very large-scale factories drivin
256、g large economy of scale and learning curve effects;simple production subsidies can be effective in influencing location decisions,but it is important to ensure that these do not come at expense of global technology transfer.Wind turbine supply and installation(particularly offshore)entail a more co
257、mplex supply chain but one which is inherently local;the challenge is therefore less to induce a shift in production location,than to ensure that the supply chain develops fast enough to support deployment targets.Are aligned with a countrys distinctive energy transition pathway and natural comparat
258、ive advantage.For example,given the UKs focus on offshore wind,developing a strong domestic supply chain should be a key priority.Similarly,the very widespread use of two-and three-wheelers in Southeast Asian countries creates a big opportunity to build large-scale local manufacturing capacity in el
259、ectric two-and three-wheelers and related batteries.Focus on the location of production and related supply chains rather than the ownership of companies,thus maximising the potential for global transfer of technology and know-how while achieving the economic and security benefits of increased local
260、production and reduced import reliance.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 48Chapter 4Exhibit 4.5Ensuring diversified,resilient and secure supply trade-offs of near-shoringWhere near-shoring is strategically beneficial,develop a suite of actions to maximise benefits
261、of near-shoring of value chainsKey ActorsIndustryPolicymakersDeveloping a strategic vision of material and clean energy technology requirements by governments to plan required supply chain built-out ahead of time,e.g.,by setting out government strategy on critical raw materials or convening expert f
262、orums for discussion with industry.This could include understanding links with other sectors(e.g.,defence),and import/export volumes.Understand clearly the considerations of near-shoring trade-offs for a particular geography or company,including assessments of local industrial strategy,policy regime
263、,energy and labour costs etc.Near-shoring should focus on areas where there is strong growth/potential in a particular country,e.g.,electric two-wheelers in Indonesia,offshore wind in UK.For technologies earlier along deployment paths,clear policy targets should provide certainty for large-scale gro
264、wth in domestic demand,ahead of a scale-up in domestic supply chains(e.g.,ICE bans).Only using gradual build-ups in domestic production/content requirements,to allow domestic supply chains to scale at a reasonable pace.Providing incentives for construction of domestic production capacity,tied to acc
265、elerated permitting alongside explicit requirements for higher environmental and social standards than in existing production.This should go with community engagement,to achieve local consent for new projects.Priority Areas:Ensure that near-shoring is aligned with areas of growth/strength for a coun
266、try;government incentives for near-shoring should not distort market and competition.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 49Conclusion5ConclusionSupply chain volatility has emerged as an important trend in the clean energy landscape,with the Covid-19 pandemic and glob
267、al economic recovery,as well as Russias invasion of Ukraine,feeding into higher prices.Securing resilient supply chains will be critical to ensuring a smooth progression of the energy transition.This analysis has shown that while,at the global level,there are no inherent barriers to the scale-up of
268、supply chains,clear actions from policymakers and industry must help to navigate challenges.Three major cross-cutting challenges emerge:There could be tight markets for some key input materials,notably for some raw materials(lithium,copper)as well as shorter-lived volatility or delays for some more
269、complex components.There are specific environmental and social risks especially relevant to solar PV and batteries.There is a high degree of concentration of production across many steps of clean energy technology supply chains.In some instances,managing these challenges may involve some trade-offs
270、between the speed of the transition and reducing environmental and social impacts,or localisation of production.A critical priority for governments is to set out a clear strategic vision for the energy transition,supported by sectoral targets.Overall,the more clarity over the shape and timeline of t
271、he future transition,the more likely that supply chain challenges can be solved by market competition and private investment.Furthermore,governments can play an important role to shape incentives and introduce regulation that reduces market balance challenges,and must also set out regulation to ensu
272、re that supply chains for the growing clean energy sector minimise social and environmental risks.Overall,the role of industry in driving innovation to reduce the scale of the challenge will be key one that has already been demonstrated,such as in the evolution of battery technology away from materi
273、als perceived to have higher supply challenges(e.g.,cobalt).Industry must also lead responsibly on social and environmental risks to ensure that the transition continues to have buy-in across society.As the current political discussion centres on opportunities around relocation of clean energy suppl
274、y chains,this Insights Briefing has outlined clear steps to ensure that any effort around relocation is carefully considered.The pace and scale of clean energy deployment means that all countries should be able to benefit from growing markets and grasp new opportunities around industrial competitive
275、ness and energy security.However,in some cases,relocation of production is likely to entail short-term cost increases for the energy transition which will require careful balancing against political priorities.Ensuring a balanced approach that can support a low-cost,fast-paced global energy transiti
276、on,as well as meeting domestic political priorities,is vital.The accompanying EU Policy Toolkit to this Insights Briefing takes a closer look at the key issues and required responses from a European perspective.The energy and geopolitical crisis resulting from Russias invasion of Ukraine has acceler
277、ated Europes imperative to turn away from fossil fuels,and therefore the need to ensure that clean energy deployment is not held back by supply chain issues.Furthermore,Europe is currently in a position of import dependency across many parts of clean supply chains,in particular with higher exposure
278、towards the upstream sector(importing raw materials)150 a risk that is being addressed through policy proposals as part of the Green Deal Industrial Plan.150 EU Joint Research Council(2023),Supply chain analysis and material demand forecast in strategic technologies and sectors in the EU A foresight
279、 study;Eurometaux(2022),Metals for clean energy:Pathways to solving Europes raw materials challenge.Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 50AcknowledgementsAcknowledgementsThe team that developed this report comprised:Lord Adair Turner(Chair),Faustine Delasalle(Vice-Ch
280、air),Ita Kettleborough(Director),Mike Hemsley(Deputy Director),Elena Pravettoni and Leonardo Buizza(Lead authors)with support from Hugo Stevens,Anne-Wietje Zwijnen,Laurene Aubert,Hannah Audino,Carl Khl,Philip Lake,Elizabeth Lam,Hugo Liabeuf,Tommaso Mazzanti,Shane OConnor,Viktoriia Petriv,Caroline Ra
281、ndle(SYSTEMIQ).The team would also like to thank the ETC members and broader network of experts for their input:Clive Turton(ACWA Power);Elke Pfeiffer(Allianz);Nicola Davidson(ArcelorMittal);Abyd Karmali OBE(Bank of America);Antoine Vagneur-Jones(BNEF);Gareth Ramsay(bp);David Mazaira(Credit Suisse);
282、Tanisha Beebee(DRAX);Adil Hanif(EBRD);Sarah OBrien,Rebecca Collyer and Mlissa Zill(European Climate Foundation);Eleonore Soubeyran(Grantham Institute,London School of Economics);Matt Gorman(Heathrow Airport);Abhishek Joseph(HSBC);Francisco Laveron(Iberdrola);Chris Dodwell(Impax Asset Management);Ben
283、 Murphy(IP Group);Gaia de Battista(Just Climate);Jaekil Ryu(Korea Zinc);Freya Burton(LanzaTech);Simon Gadd(L&G);Khangzhen Leow(Lombard Odier);Jazib Hasan(Modern Energy);Steve Smith(National Grid);Rachel Fletcher(Octopus Energy);Emil Damgaard Gann(rsted);Rahim Mahmood(Petronas);Vivien Cai and Summer
284、Xia(Primavera Capital);James Schofield(Rabobank);Manya Ranjan(ReNew Power);Jonathan Grant(Rio Tinto);Cate Hight and Greg Hopkins(RMI);Emmet Walsh(Rothschild&Co.);Daniel Wegen(Royal Dutch Shell);Emmanuel Normant(Saint Gobain);Vincent Minier,Thomas Kwan and Vincent Petit(Schneider Electric);Brian Dean
285、(SEforAll);Martin Pei(SSAB);Alistair McGirr(SSE);Abhishek Goyal(Tata Group);Somesh Biswas(Tata Steel);A K Saxena(TERI);Reid Detchon(United Nations Foundation);Mikael Nordlander(Vattenfall);Niklas Gustafsson(Volvo);Rasmus Valanko(We Mean Business);Rowan Douglas(Willis Towers Watson);Jennifer Layke(World Resources Institute);Paul Ebert,Greg Pitt and Dave Oudenijeweme(Worley).Better,Faster,Cleaner:Securing clean energy technology supply chains 51