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1、World Intellectual Property Report 2019 The Geography of Innovation: Local Hotspots, Global Networks World Intellectual Property Report 2019 The Geography of Innovation: Local Hotspots, Global Networks Except where otherwise indicated, this work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
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8、thers of a similar nature that are not mentioned. WIPO, 2019 World Intellectual Property Organization 34, chemin des Colombettes, P.O. Box 18 CH-1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland ISBN: 978-92-805-3095-7 Attribution 3.0 IGO (CC BY 3.0 IGO) Printed in Switzerland Table of contents Foreword 4 Executive summa
9、ry 8 Technical notes 123 Acronyms 128 Chapter 1 The changing global geography of innovation 15 1.1 Concentration of innovation in urban hotspots 16 1.2 Networks and the global spread of innovation 21 1.3 Conclusions 25 Chapter 2 Global networks of innovation hotspots 31 2.1 The two sides of global k
10、nowledge production 33 2.2 Global networks of collaboration and sourcing 41 2.3 Local innovation and global networks of innovative hubs 51 Chapter 3 Auto and tech companies the drive for autonomous vehicles 61 3.1 Definitions 62 3.2 Technological evolution of the automotive industry 62 3.3 Technolog
11、ical shift 66 3.4 Competition and cooperation in AV 66 3.5 Role of geography in AV technology 69 3.6 AV innovation, countries and cities 69 3.7 Is AV technology changing the geography of innovation in automotive industry? 76 3.8 Potential positive and negative impacts of AVs 76 Chapter 4 Plant biote
12、chnology connecting urban innovation and rural application 87 4.1 The rising importance of plant biotechnology 88 4.2 The innovation landscape of plant biotechnology 96 4.3 The innovation network of plant biotechnology 103 4.4 Future of plant biotechnology 105 Chapter 5 Policy perspectives: the case
13、 for openness 113 5.1 The economics of openness 113 5.2 Openness in the age of falling R and specialized niche clusters, where the density of inventors and scientific authors is high in a given field but not high enough generally to be a global hotspot. Innovation is geographically concentrated in a
14、 limited number of areas The emerging landscape of global hotspots and niche clusters shows that inventive and scientific activity within each country is persistently concentrated in a few large, cosmopolitan and prosperous urban areas. In the U.S., hotspots around New York, San Francisco and Boston
15、 accumulated roughly a quarter of all U.S. patents filed from 2011 to 2015. In China, those around Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen increased their share from 36 percent to 52 percent of all Chinese patents during the same period. Less than 19 percent of all inventive and scientific output worldwide i
16、s generated by inventors or researchers located outside hotspots and niche clusters. Despite the big change in the global innovation picture, more than 160 countries the vast majority still generate little innovation activity and do not host any hotspot or niche cluster. 10 World Intellectual Proper
17、ty Report 2019 Big cities are not necessarily hubs of innovation Not all large metropolitan areas are innovation dense. For example, North America hosts most hotspots in dense urban areas along the east and west coasts, while many dense inland urban areas do not have an equivalent density of innovat
18、ion. Asia, Latin America and Africa host many dense urban areas with no corre- sponding innovation density. Despite high populations, top metropoles for example, Cairo, Bangkok, Santiago de Chile, Kuala Lumpur and Cape Town in South Africa only have a modest degree of innovation density in some spec
19、ialized fields. And less dense urban areas can sometimes host niche clusters. Some examples are Ithaca in the U.S., Stavanger in Norway and Bern in Switzerland, which are highly innovative cities due to the strong innovation footprint of local academic institutions, industries or, sometimes, the pre
20、sence of a single company. Collaboration is increasingly the norm Data show that teams are involved in an increasing majority of scientific papers and patents. In the early 2000s, teams already produced 64 percent of all scientific papers and 54 percent of all patents. By the second half of the 2010
21、s, these figures had grown to almost 80 percent and 70 percent, respectively. Most high-income economies also show rising inter- national collaboration. The forces pushing academia and companies to cross borders seeking partners for innovation are manifold. The scientific community has a long tradit
22、ion of engaging in international collabora- tion. Multinational companies also seek efficiency gains from the international division of their R by the 2010s, this share had risen to 38 percent. Western European companies saw a similarly sharp increase, from 9 percent to 27 percent in the same period
23、. Such international patent sourcing still mostly happens between companies and inventors from high-income economies. In the 1970s and 80s, 86 percent of the international patent sourcing was between multinational companies and inventors from the U.S., Japan and Western European countries. However,
24、this share fell to 56 percent in the 2010s. Middle-income economies are new players in MNC networks Two main developments explain this fall. On the one hand, multinationals from these countries increasingly outsourced R between tech firms, and between automakers and tech firms. The emerging collabor
25、ation network is an amalgam of all the above: none is mutually exclusive, and they co-exist. Automotive and IT firms stay tied to their traditional clusters The top automakers and top IT giants still strongly favor home-based sites for their inventive activities. There is some shift in geography at
26、the margins, so it might be too early to give a definitive answer to whether AV technology will change the geography of innovation in the automotive industry. Innovation is sown in biotech labs and harvested in agricultural clusters Crop biotechnology is an industry where innovation has to be adapte
27、d to local agro-ecological conditions. While most plant biotechnology inventions may come from high-income countries for example, the U.S., Western Europe and East-Asian countries they still need adapting to different climate and soil conditions. Most of the transgenic crops used in emerging middle-
28、 income countries during the late 1990s were locally adapted germplasms of their North American coun- terparts. As a result, plant biotechnology innovation clusters exist in many parts of the world. However, the data show that crop biotech innovation in many countries in Africa, Latin America, the C
29、aribbean and Asia is geographically concentrated. The landscape of plant biotech innovation A handful of countries accounts for the bulk of biotech inventive and scientific output. The U.S., Germany, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea accumulate more than 55 percent and 80 percent of all crop bi
30、otech articles and patents, respectively. Only Argentina, Australia, India, Israel, Mexico and Singapore join them in the list of countries hosting crop biotech hotpots; and, except for Australia, they all have only one. There is a geographic divide between where plant biotech innovation occurs and
31、where transgenic crops are farmed. In most cases, the crop biotechnology hotspots are located in large metropolitan areas, either in global innovation hotspots or in specialized niche clusters with strong biotech competences. This also holds for developing countries, where the national crop biotechn
32、ology clusters are typically located in large urban areas, such as So Paulo in Brazil and Cape Town. Some clusters are close to rural areas such as Viosa in Brazil or Irapuato in Mexico. Where they are, their presence is usually associated with influential public institutions, such as universities,
33、international agri- cultural research centers and/or national agriculture research systems. Increasing privatepublic collaboration Private firms, particularly the four major agrobusi- ness companies Bayer and BASF from Germany, ChemChina and Corteva Agriscience from the U.S. undertake a large part o
34、f the R it may spill from one to the other. Firms more successfully exploit economies of scale and scope if they learn from the experience of other firms. Skilled workers disseminate tacit knowledge when they interact with other skilled workers, change organizations or migrate. Most empirical eviden
35、ce points to knowledge spillovers being extremely geographically concentrated. This is mainly due to the high costs associated with codifying, exchanging and absorbing knowledge. While informa- tion, such as data, flows increasingly freely across orga- nizations and regions, spillovers of knowledge
36、what is needed, for example, to interpret data are “stickier.” Firms, academic organizations and individuals have to actively interact, collaborate and, sometimes, move to make knowledge flow. The concentration of knowledge spillovers can, therefore, be both a consequence and a trigger of the agglom
37、eration of innovation. Innovative firms will move where knowledge spillovers are higher, reinforcing spillovers in that region and crowding out non-innovative firms to the periphery.13 This joint innova- tion and spatial co-evolution can determine a regional development path, which can be largely ir
38、reversible. While previous regional technological endowments are likely to shape subsequent creation of innovation, not all innovative regions follow the same trajectory. In the 1930s, both Princeton, New Jersey site of RCA Laboratories and Silicon Valley were home to close technological antecedents
39、 of the IT industry; but they developed very different innovative paths. Silicon Valleys remarkable IT innovation trajectory grew out of the pre-existing and mutually supporting manufactur- ing industries of power grid tubes, microwave tubes and silicon components. These industries enriched the nort
40、hern Californian IT innovation ecosystem with related technological capabilities and new manage- ment approaches easily transposable to the nascent IT industry. Princeton and other East Coast hubs had a much narrower technological IT ecosystem based on few large companies.14 In this sense, more dive
41、rsified agglomerations have a greater probability of successfully transitioning to a new technological capability than narrowly special- ized ones.15 The literature abounds with stories of how narrowly specialized economies are locked into their technologies and do not transition after negative dema
42、nd shocks or technology shifts. It seems that technological innovation is more likely to occur in regions with a broader portfolio of technical compe- tences, especially when it is easy to recombine these. Dominant industries tend to monopolize talent, supplies of economic factors of production, suc
43、h as capital or entrepreneurship, and attention. Such resource concentration potentially crowds out other activities and can channel the evolution of regional economies down different pathways. For instance, Detroit the “Motor City” is held up as a case of over-specialization. And yet there are high
44、ly specialized centers of mechani- cal engineering and automotive technology that have mastered subsequent waves of technology, such as Stuttgart in Germany. Boston was once narrowly specialized in mill-based industries, but now it is a high- tech center. The capacity for regional economic evolu- ti
45、on is governed by possibilities for moving into related varieties of technologies and technological capacity.16 However, technological relatedness and complementar- ity are not the entire story. There are many examples of regions that capture major new sectors with little technological relation to t
46、heir previous activities. Los Angeles was not a major mechanical engineering region in the 1920s and 1930s when it became the aircraft-engi- neering center of the United States and, by the 1940s, the worlds biggest aerospace cluster. Los Angeles also had no background in the entertainment industry w
47、hen the movie studios were established there around 1915. Detroit had fewer antecedents in mechanical equipment than Illinois in the 1890s, but rapidly became the center of U.S. car technology and manufacture. In these, and many other examples, there were techno- logical windows of opportunity. Thes
48、e ruptures in tech- nological relatedness largely obviate the advantages of pre-existing agglomeration and create a relatively flat playing field for a short time in the early days of a technologys existence. 20 World Intellectual Property Report 2019 To sum up, the interaction between innovation an
49、d geography reflects the juxtaposition of individual, organizational and technological antecedents. Saxenians(1994) seminal comparison of Bostons Route128 and Silicon Valley shows that the types of entrepreneurship, production organization and system coordination experienced by existing firms and actors in a region will shape how that region evolves economi- cally and what kinds of new activities it can generate and capture. Can policy mold the forces of innovation agglomeration? There is little systematic, large-scale evidence of the success of pol