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1、WHOLE-OF-NATION CLIMATE-SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT MISSING IN ACTIONResponding to Australias climate & security failureaslcg.orgAUSTRALIA HAS REPEATEDLY IGNORED THE RISKS AND IS ILL-PREPARED FOR THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF DEVASTATING CLIMATE IMPACTS AT HOME AND IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC, THE HIGHEST-RISK

2、REGION IN THE WORLD.Photo: Aerial view of tractor ploughing a paddock affected by drought in the far west of NSW.1Missing in ActionMISSING IN ACTION: RESPONDING TO AUSTRALIAS CLIMATE & SECURITY FAILURE Published September 2021 by Australian Security Leaders Climate Group, Canberra ACT. Admiral Chris

3、 Barrie AC (Retd), Air Vice-Marshal John Blackburn AO (Retd), Colonel Neil Greet (Retd), Cheryl Durrant, Major Michael Thomas (Retd) & Ian Dunlop.Cover Photo: Australian Defence Force helicopter landing as part of the deployment of 3,000 soldiers to assist in bushfire-affected areas after they ravag

4、ed the south coast of Australia (January 16, 2020).Designed by: Aer Design 2 Snapshot 3 Prevent. Prepare. Protect. 4 About the ASLCG 5 Foreword 6 Australia: Missing in action 10 The climatesecurity nexus 16 Climatesecurity physical risks 22 Australias climate vulnerability 26 Managing existential cl

5、imate risk 30 Responding to climatesecurity risks 36 Conclusion: An unprecedented peacetime mobilisationCONTENTS2aslcg.orgSNAPSHOTClimate change now presents a grave, and potentially existential, threat to society and human security.Today, unimaginable new climate extremes confront us: record-breaki

6、ng droughts and floods, cruel heatwaves, unstoppable bushfires, broken infrastructure, and coastal inundation. Worse is expected to come.In vulnerable countries, governments have collapsed and civil wars have erupted, forcefully displacing millions of people looking for a safe haven.Instability is o

7、n the march. A new insecurity shadows our lives and the relations between nations.Responding adequately to the climate threat is fundamental to the survival of the nation.But Australia has repeatedly ignored the risks and is ill-prepared for the security implications of devastating climate impacts a

8、t home and in the Asia-Pacific, the highest-risk region in the world.Unless rectified, this will place great pressure on the Australian Defence Force, and emergency and disaster relief agencies, to pick up the pieces in the face of accelerating climate impacts. Higher levels of warming will stretch

9、them beyond their capacity to respond.Australia is falling behind its allies, and is failing its responsibilities as a global citizen and its duty to protect its own people.ASLCGs assessment is that inaction by Australian governments has left the nation poorly prepared to face global warmings conseq

10、uences. National leadership has been absent and Australia has been “missing in action” on climatesecurity risks.Many of the solutions are at our disposal. Australia has the ability to act now, and needs to act now.Focus should be on the root causes of climate warming, principally eliminating emissio

11、ns much faster than proposed, rather than just the responding to the symptoms.In this report, ASLCG propose to the government a set of initial actions in a climate and security plan to Protect, Prevent and Prepare, starting with a realistic assessment of the risks.3Missing in ActionPREVENT. PREPARE.

12、 PROTECT. Summary: A ClimateSecurity Risk Action Plan for AustraliaDemonstrate leadership Acknowledge climate disruption is an existential risk to society, a threat to the stability of nations, and the relationships between them if we act too late, or inadequately. Seize the initiative by conducting

13、 informed, national public conversations and working with all levels of government, communities, business and academia in carrying out regular National Climate Risk Assessments. Show the Australian people that our leaders care by committing to protecting the Australian people with actionable and cre

14、dible climate plans to safeguard our future. Assess climate risks Appoint an independent, expert panel to urgently conduct a comprehensive Climate and Security Risk Assessment, using the best available information. Establish an Office of Climate Threat Intelligence. Assess the threats and impacts of

15、 climate disruption with brutal honesty, identifying the worst, as well as most likely, cases and considering the full range of possibilities.Coordinate and cooperate Coordinate a holistic, whole-of-government approach, building capacity across the public service and government agencies, and at all

16、levels of government. Cooperate with big and small AsiaPacific governments to build alliances for climate action, understanding that cooperation rather than conflict is key to responding to the climate crisis. Build an Australian National Prevention and Resilience Framework with coherent processes a

17、cross critical areas including energy and water, logistics, health, industry and agriculture, research and environment. Act and invest with urgency Protect the most vulnerable communities, nations and ecological systems. Prevent devastating climate impacts by mobilising all the resources necessary t

18、o reach zero emissions as fast as possible. Cooperate to develop the global capacity to prevent irreversible tipping points and drawdown greenhouse gases back to safer conditions in the long term. Prepare to manage the risks and respond to the challenges of living in a climate-change-disrupted world

19、 with a responsibility to prepare and prevent.4aslcg.orgABOUT THE ASLCGThe ASLCG Executive membership comprises senior leaders with a depth of career experience in defence, national security, policy and risk assessment. Admiral Chris Barrie AC (Retd) is former Chief of the Defence Force. Chris Barri

20、e retired in 2002 after 42 years in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). Since then, he has worked on strategic leadership issues as consultant, teacher and mentor at Oxford University, the National Defense University in Washington DC and at the Australian National University. Air Vice-Marshal John Blac

21、kburn AO (Retd) is former Deputy Chief of the Royal Australian Air Force and currently the Chair of the Institute for Integrated Economic Research-Australia and also a consultant in the field of defence and national security. He has extensive experience across the fields of strategy, policy, plannin

22、g, operational command, capability development and materials acquisition.Colonel Neil Greet (Retd) is a former Australian Army officer with operational service in Iraq and Timor Leste, who led projects in several remote indigenous communities and played a key role in Defences response to Victorias 2

23、009 Black Saturday disaster. He is a Director of the Institute of Integrated Economics Research, and the consultancy Collaborative Outcomes. Cheryl Durrant is former Director of Preparedness & Mobilisation, Australian Department of Defence, and was the Defence partner with the Australian National Re

24、silience Taskforces Disaster Vulnerability Profiling Project. Cheryl served 15 years with the Australian Army, specialising in strategic intelligence, information operations and domestic security.Major Michael Thomas (Retd) a former Australian Army officer and is a non-resident Senior Fellow with th

25、e Washington-based Center for Climate & Security where he co-leads the Indo-Pacific Program. He is also a council member with the International Military Council on Climate and Security and author of The Securitisation of Climate Change (2017).Ian Dunlop is a Member of the Club of Rome. He was former

26、ly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chair of the Australian Coal Association, CEO of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, and chair of the federal governments first emissions trading taskforce, with wide experienced in risk management.5Missing in ActionFOREWORDProf. R

27、ear Admiral Neil Morisetti CB RN (Retd)Wherever we live today, we face many challenges to our prosperity and wellbeing. At the top of the threat list is the impact of a changing climate, whose consequences pose a threat to global and human security that will impact on all of us; there is nowhere to

28、hide!These risks are now widely recognised by security agencies and governments around the world. Whether it be the immediate impact of harsher and more extreme weather conditions or the onset of long-term trends, including warming and rising sea levels, the results are frequently greater water and

29、food insecurity, or loss of homes and livelihoods. In many instances this results in unplanned movements of populations, or a call for greater disaster relief and humanitarian assistance,Over the last two years the world has experienced an unparalleled series of climate change-related extreme weathe

30、r events, including Australias “black summer” bushfires, which required the mobilisation of military personnel in response. Similarly, wildfires in Europe and North America in 2021, and record-breaking floods are a wake-up call to governments.There are also geostrategic consequences, as the world ha

31、s seen in Syria and the Sahel, where movements of population have contributed to greater insecurity. At the same time the rapid warming of the Arctic is changing that regions strategic terrain.Recent reports from the worlds scientists show that some warming impacts will be upon us quicker than previ

32、ously expected, providing an increased sense of urgency to international policy makers and all nations; the time for talking is over, action is required “this day”.Addressing these challenges, both in terms of driving down emissions and reducing the risks, is a whole-of-society issue requiring leade

33、rship at all levels, particularly by national governments. It sits squarely on their shoulders, and perhaps more so on those of Australia, for not only is the Australian continent particularly vulnerable to climate change, but the country is one of the worlds largest fossil fuel exporters.The 2018 I

34、mplications of climate change for Australias national security report by the Australian Senate concluded that a full assessment of the risks was an urgent task and a strategic priority, if the country was not to continue to lag behind its allies and the global community in responding to climate chan

35、ge. Undertaking a comprehensive climate and security risk assessment is now a critical action if the country is to have a sound national and regional security policy. A security policy that does not reflect the impact of a changing climate is a flawed policy! The formation of the Australian Security

36、 Leaders Climate Group is very welcome, bringing as it does the expertise and understanding of a community with unique security experience to the climate policy table. The Missing in Action report should be read by all politicians, the defence and emergency sectors, and the general public; its polic

37、y proposals are a necessary first step in Australia being able to respond appropriately to this twenty-first-century threat.Professor Rear Admiral Neil Morisetti CB RN (Retd) spent 37 years in the Royal Navy and was Commander UK Maritime Forces before becoming Commandant of the Joint Services Comman

38、d and Staff College. A former UK Foreign Secretarys Special Representative for Climate Change, he is now Vice Dean (Public Policy) in the Faculty of Engineering Sciences and Professor of Climate, Resource Security at University College London and an International Fellow of ASLCG.6aslcg.orgAUSTRALIA:

39、 MISSING IN ACTION We know there is no more important task than understanding and preparing to deal with potential threats to our country and safeguarding peoples lives. Underestimating security risks can be fatal, not only for military personnel but for the wider community. We saw this during the B

40、lack Summer fires that devastated our country. AT A GLANCE World-leading scientists and analysts and the UN Security Council recognise that climate change poses an existential threat to human civilisation. The Pacific Islands Forum has recognised climate change as the single greatest threat to the l

41、ivelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples in the region. The USA has made climate change a key security concern and identified it as the top foreign policy priority. Whilst the world has recognized the threat and begun to mobilise, in Australia leadership has been lacking. As a result, Austr

42、alia is “missing in action”. A 2018 Australian Senate Inquiry noted the failure to adopt a fully integrated approach to climate-security risks and recommended a comprehensive climate and security risk assessment. That is yet to happen. 7Missing in ActionOur assessment is that Australia is ill-prepar

43、ed to deal with global warming, which is the greatest security threat facing Australia and requires decisive policy action. A UN report has ranked Australia last out of 193 countries for climate action amongst UN members.1That is why we formed the Australian Security Leaders Climate Group as a non-p

44、artisan network of Australian security and policy professionals drawn from all services with the aim of fostering national discussion and action. Our experience gives us unique insights into Australias lack of preparedness in facing existential climate risk. ASLCGs aim is not to securitise climate c

45、hange, but to apply military prevention, preparedness and leadership practice to the climate challenge. Eliminating carbon emissions as rapidly as possible is an essential step in reducing the security risks of climate change.Australians, concerned about the future, their livelihoods, their well-bei

46、ng and those they love, want to live in a prosperous and safe society. It is the first duty of a government to make this happen, to “protect the people”. But when it comes to climate change, governments from both sides of politics have failed in this duty to ensure Australians future.Australia can t

47、ake a lead from our allies. Hosting a climate and security panel on 22 April 2021, as part of US President Bidens Leaders Summit on Climate, US Secretary of Defence Lloyd J. Austin III commenced with these words: “Today, no nation can find lasting security without addressing the climate crisis. We f

48、ace all kinds of threats in our line of work, but few of them truly deserve to be called existential. The climate crisis does.”2The evidence is clear. Policies enacted as a result of national emission-reduction commitments under the Paris Agreement will result in climate warming of around 3C by 2100

49、,3 and perhaps 4C or more when non-linear changes are taken into account. In 2020, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that: “Under unchanged policies, emissions will continue to rise relentlessly, and global temperatures could increase by an additional 25C by the end of this century incr

50、easing the risk of catastrophic outcomes across the planet.”4The impacts of 3C of warming will likely be existential for some nations and peoples. Existential risk is understood as an adverse outcome that could curtail sustainable development and threaten the very sovereign existence of communities

51、and states alike. All current members of the UN Security Council recognise that climate change poses an existential threat to human civilisation.5 A 2018 Australian Senate Inquiry found climate change is “a current and existential national security risk”.6 It recognised that Australia and its neighb

52、ours are in the region most exposed to climate impacts, and that climate change is: threatening the health of Australians, their communities, businesses and the economy; heightening the severity of natural hazards; increasing the spread of infectious diseases; and creating growing water insecurity t

53、hreats to agriculture. It also noted the failure so far to adopt a fully-integrated, whole-of-government approach to climatesecurity risks. Whilst it prompted some low-level response, there was no substantial policy response from the government. Photo: Smoke haze from wildfires covers the city skyli

54、ne in Sydney, Australia. (Brendon Thorne/Bloomberg).8aslcg.orgAll members of the Pacific Islands Forum, including Australia, supported the 2018 Boe Declaration at which all Forum leaders “reaffirm that climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of th

55、e peoples of the Pacific and our commitment to progress the implementation of the Paris Agreement”.7Climate impacts will have big consequences for human security for our Pacific and Asian neighbours. They are already facing chronic water shortages that will get worse, threats to low-lying cities and

56、 island states, extended and more intense heat waves, more damaging typhoons, and much more.These threats will also impact Australia in many new ways: disruptions to vital imports and our export markets as production fails and supply chains are interrupted, and breakdowns in social cohesion and stat

57、e failure in the region. In Australia, policymakers, defence mandarins and security analysts have by-and-large focused on traditional but narrow security concepts and downplayed or ignored the issue of climate disruption and human security. But climate change requires different thinking about securi

58、ty, so that it is not seen as only about defence from armed attacks, but rather needs to involve all levels of government, as well as relevant industry sectors and the wider society. Climate is also an urgent strategic priority. Australia is falling behind its allies, and is failing in its responsib

59、ilities as a global citizen, as a major strategic defence ally, and to its own people. In the past decade, no Australian government has produced a dedicated assessment of climate and security risks. The 2016 Defence White Paper had several mentions of climate issues mainly in relation to the Pacific

60、 and state fragility, disaster relief and vulnerability of defence assets but accorded them no strategic significance. And the 2015 National Climate Resilience and Adaptation Strategys cursory focus on regional issues was largely confined to the Pacific, adaptation measures and disaster risk. In nei

61、ther case has there been any significant policy follow-up concomitant with the full spectrum of climatesecurity risks.By way of contrast, US President Bidens “Tackling the climate crisis at home and abroad” Executive Order put the climate crisis “at the center of US foreign policy and national secur

62、ity” and directs the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence and others to analyse the security implications of climate change and incorporate them into modeling, simulation, war-gaming and other analyses.8We are on the front-line of climate-driven security threats, but Australia

63、s last national security risk assessment was conducted in 2013, and it has been more than three years since the Final Report of the Senate Inquiry into the Security Implications of Climate Change recommended a comprehensive climate and security risk assessment. Australian governments, up until now,

64、have not undertaken such a task, which is now necessary and overdue.9Missing in ActionWithin the Department of Defence (DoD), some steady, but limited, work has been done on the vulnerability of assets to inundation, extreme heat and bushfire, and the resilience of equipment and the health of person

65、nel to more extreme climate conditions. As a highly political issue, engagement within the DoD has been difficult, with little expertise and interdisciplinary skill-sets to fully grasp the challenges. Amongst the intelligence agencies there is little evidence that climate and security issues have re

66、ceived the strategic priority they need. Some work has focussed on tactical issues around climate diplomacy, Indian Ocean analysis prompted by the French government, and some activity related to the Senate inquiry. The government appeared unprepared for the diplomatic fallout in the Pacific created

67、by Australias pro-coal climate policies, and the belated understanding of Chinese initiatives in the region led to some catch-up analysis on climate and security issues amongst near neighbours and in the Pacific. There have been concerning signs that the existential nature of climate-security risk i

68、s not grasped. Speaking in April 2019 on the ABC, Nick Warner, then Director-General of the Office of National Intelligence, did not include climate amongst Australias biggest threats, in sharp contrast to surveys by the World Economic Forum of global public and private sector leaders, which rank cl

69、imate in the top global threats and risks. Warner emphasised that intelligence “doesnt look at worst-case scenarios If you go around putting forth worst-case scenarios all the time you will alarm and probably alarm needlessly so that is exactly what we dont do.”9 It is unclear whether this represent

70、s the prevailing view. Understanding the worst-case is precisely what our intelligence agencies need to do. In the climate context, it is the high-impact “fat-tail” outcomes that we have to guard against. The capacity of the Australian Public Service (APS) to provide advice on climate issues has bee

71、n diminished. This was one reason why the government was caught unprepared by the depth and extent of the 2017-19 drought across eastern Australia, which resulted in a scramble within the APS to play policy catch-up. Likewise for the Pacific. Due to the highly politicised nature of climate change, t

72、he APS has struggled to find its voice on credible policy suggestions. A high-level departmental head group on systemic climate risks fell into dormancy. Former APS personnel report experiences in which initiating new work on climate change could not be overtly identified as climate focussed because

73、 that may lead to the project being closed down. It is important for the APS to reestablish a “frank and fearless” voice on climate policy choices. Australia has a record of being ill-prepared at a national level for predictable climate threats such as extreme bushfire seasons and heatwaves, extreme

74、 drought and the water crisis in the Murray-Darling Basin, increasing aridification and loss of reliable croplands, and coastal inundation. There is no evidence that there has been a systematic analysis of how severe climate disruption across the AsiaPacific could impact supply chains and the Austra

75、lian economy, for example. This is one clear case, amongst many, that Australia is “missing in action” on this most fundamental issue.10aslcg.orgTHE CLIMATE-SECURITY NEXUS AT A GLANCE Recent events in Syria and across the Sahel demonstrate that the security consequences of climate change are already

76、 manifesting. Interactions between intersecting crises such as food and water insecurity and fragile states can become accelerants to instability in unexpected ways. By 2030, the world could face a perfect storm of food, water and energy crises. Australia and the AsiaPacific, with more than half of

77、the worlds population, are located in a “disaster alley” for climate change. Climate change poses an increasing threat to peace, can undermine livelihoods, increase involuntary migration and reduce the ability of states to provide security. 11Missing in ActionIn 2010, an extreme heatwave, lack of ra

78、in and unprecedented wildfires devastated more than a third of cultivable land in Russia, the worlds fourth largest grain exporter, and reduced wheat production by 30%. In response, the Russian government banned wheat exports for several months. At the same time, severe droughts in China and the Ukr

79、aine contributed to a global wheat shortage and a doubling of the global price in late 2010. In those countries most dependent on wheat exports which are in the Middle East and North Africa the tripling of the spot price triggered food riots and the Arab Spring uprisings in late 2010.The Middle East

80、, North Africa and Mediterranean regions have experienced a drying trend over the last few decades. 60% of Syria saw the worst long-term drought in millenia from 2007-11, and severe crop failures. By 2009, more than 800,000 Syrians in rural areas had lost their livelihood, and 23 million people had

81、been driven into extreme poverty. Approximately 1.5 million people migrated to the cities which, on top of another 1.5 million refugees who had fled from the war in Iraq, forced up rents dramatically and created social unrest. Facing a food and economic crisis, and government reductions in subsidies

82、 for basic goods, Syrians erupted in protest in early 2011, inspired by the Arab Spring. What followed was social breakdown, state failure, civil war and the rise of Islamic State. After ten years, Syria remains the worlds largest refugee crisis with more than half of the population displaced. Whils

83、t the region may have suffered political upheaval without the drought, it is the congruence of climate change and social vulnerability that has caused a greater disaster.The wider consequences of the Syrian war included regional destabilisation, and mass migration which contributed to the rise of po

84、pulist right-wing governments in Europe, and impacted on the Brexit referendum in which almost three-quarters of prospective “Leave ” voters cited immigration as the most important issue in the referendum.10The Arab Spring, the Syrian war and Europes refugee dilemmas are key examples of how reciproc

85、al interactions between intersecting crises become accelerant to instability in unexpected ways. There are climate change components to the conflicts in many countries across the Maghreb and the Middle East, and the role of desertification in fueling war and displacement across the Sahel. These even

86、ts vividly illustrate the climate and security nexus. Climate change, drought and desertification can worsen water insecurity and trigger food crises, resulting in humanitarian disasters, instability and civil unrest, forced migration and internal displacement, and war within and across borders. The

87、re are increasing burdens on military forces, whether in providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, or because political leaders decide to intervene in the conflicts. Such events may lead to geopolitical tensions and realignment, such as the changed tone of Middle East politics following

88、 Russias intervention in Syria. Former Director of War Studies for the Australian Army, Dr Albert Palazzo says that human systems especially for food and water depend on efficient interactions with natural systems, and climate change renders natural systems less predictable and makes human systems l

89、ess efficient. This imperils the capacity of the state to fulfil its obligations especially its social contract to protect the people as the efficiency of production declines and disorder increases.12aslcg.orgA report for the UK Ministry of Defence published in November 2019, A Changing Climate: Exp

90、loring the Implications of Climate Change for UK Defence and Security, uses a scenario with a 3.5C temperature rise by 2100 to forecast climate change implications for the military. It says that as early as 2030, the world would face a perfect storm of food, water and energy crises: “The demand for

91、food and energy is estimated to rise by 50% by 2030, while water demand has been projected to increase by 30 percent” so that “in regions where food shortages are combined with poor governance, climate change could contribute to civilian protests, rioting and an increased likelihood of violent confl

92、ict.”11Climate change and extreme climate events may impact human security in many other ways, including resource competition (for example over water) and increased rivalry between states, unmanageable health emergencies and pandemic spread, rising sea-levels inundating infrastructure and fertile fa

93、rming land, and economic and trade disruptions and supply chain degradation.Climate change poses an increasing threat to peace, can undermine livelihoods, increase involuntary migration and reduce the ability of states to provide security. It can amplify existing vulnerabilities, especially where th

94、ere is existing conflict and weak or failing governments, thus exacerbating or “multiplying” the negative effects of other drivers of change, and disproportionately affecting the more vulnerable. Australia and the AsiaPacific region are a “disaster alley” for climate change, with more than half the

95、worlds population, low-lying small island states, and most of the large cities vulnerable to sea-level rise. Nations in the Coral Triangle face the loss of their coral systems, the regions most populous nations India and China will face increasing chronic water insecurity, and more extreme heatwaves

96、 will become unbearable in south and south-east Asia. The consequences for Australia will be enormous: displaced people and nations, the economic impacts on major trading partners, supply chain disruption, geopolitical tensions (along the Himalayas as one example), the need for more development supp

97、ort, and increasing demands for humanitarian aid and disaster relief. There will be increasing calls on the military for support and humanitarian aid, including in their own countries, such as that required in response to the record-breaking “black summer” bushfires in Australia in 2019-20. Armed fo

98、rces have, and will continue to, adapt to this changing environment, and consider climate change impacts on infrastructure, installations, equipment and the capacity of personnel to operate in more extreme climate conditions. The failure to address the root causes of climate warming will result in g

99、reat pressure on the Australian Defence Force and emergency and disaster relief agencies to pick up the pieces in the face of accelerating climate impacts. Higher levels of warming may stretch them beyond their capacity to respond.The Australian Chief of Defence Forces, General Angus Campbell, has i

100、dentified climate change (“an unstable planet”) as one of the three issues central to the security challenges Australia will encounter in redefining boundaries for the 21st century land force.1213Missing in ActionINSIGHT A global climate & security approachBy Cheryl Durrant, former Director of Prepa

101、redness & Mobilisation, Australian Department of DefenceSecurity, as the duty of a government to “protect the people” is often perceived in national and military terms. But today the greatest risks to human society are existential and global: such as biotechnology, artificial intelligence and techno

102、logical disruption, and environmental risks.13Responding successfully to these risks requires global cooperation and collaboration.Placing primary emphasis on fragmentary national responses is misplaced. This is a lesson that may be learned from the Covid-19 responses, and from Syria, where climate

103、disruption exacerbated the conflict and fragmented responses in Europe threatened regional cooperation. Building on concepts of human security, new global security approaches frame risk at a planetary level and include risks to species and the environment, between humans and the ability of the envir

104、onment to support us, between humans and pathogens as well as the risks to orderly relations between peoples and nations. Emphasis shifts from response to prepare and prevent.A global security perspective can open the door to participation for a far wider group of people, increasingly dissolving the

105、 boundaries between “domestic” and “international” affairs and policies.14By moving from the limited focus of national security to also include concrete human and global notions of security and safety, a narrative can be constructed that is more nuanced than a traditional security agenda, as is disc

106、ussed in the recent UN Security Council report on the issue.15Photo: The UN Security Council, New York. (TIMOTHY A. CLARY/AFP via Getty Images)14aslcg.orgCASE STUDYThe looming food & water crisisThe impact of climate change on the health and wellbeing of peoples and nations starts with one element a

107、bove all others: water and the ability to grow food.Between 1970 and the mid-1990s, the amount of economically available water per person globally dropped by more than 35%, according to the United Nations. One estimate projects a gap of 40% between global water requirements and accessible, reliable

108、water supply by 2030.16 In 2010, almost 2.4 billion people were living in watersheds with less than 1000 cubic metres per capita per year (defined as chronic water shortage); and approximately 800 million people were living in watersheds with less than 500 cubic metres per capita per year (extreme w

109、ater shortage).17Today, approximately 1.8 billion people around the world lack access to safe drinking water and nearly two billion people lack access to sanitation. By 2035, “more than 30 countries nearly half of them in the Middle East will experience extremely high water stress, increasing econom

110、ic, social, and political tensions”.18 Countries already experiencing water stress or far worse include Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Israel, Syria, Yemen, India, China, and parts of the United States. As the worlds population and living standards continue to grow, the projected climate impacts on th

111、e nexus of water, food, and energy security become more profound. By 2030, population growth and a burgeoning global middle class will result in a worldwide demand for 35% more food and 50% more energy, compared to 2014.19Scientists project the subtropical zone will experience a 510% reduction in pr

112、ecipitation for each degree Celsius of global warming. At 3C of warming, water availability will decrease sharply in the dry tropics and subtropics, affecting about two billion people worldwide, and agriculture may become nonviable in the dry subtropics. Indias national water supply is forecast to f

113、all 50% below demand as early as 2030.20 A World Bank report on Chinas water situation foresees “catastrophic consequences for future generations,21 unless water use and supply can quickly be brought back into balance. Pakistan will face severe water scarcity by 2025 and is “one of the most water-st

114、ressed countries in the world”.22 In the Middle East and North Africa, drought is leading to instability and water weaponization.23Water insecurity is not the only threat to food production: compounding and cascading impacts of climate change will undermine food security on an increasing scale. Thes

115、e include the loss of corals and fish stocks in the Coral Triangle, coastal inundation and more extreme floods, changed precipitation patterns, droughts and aridification, and fires. Even without accounting for all these simultaneous hazards, scientists say that 2C of warming around 2040 in Southeas

116、t Asia will reduce per capita crop production by one-third.24And scientists now believe that for every degree of additional warming, average agricultural yields are likely to decline by up to 10 per cent; as well as higher concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere already having a serious effect on th

117、e nutritional quality of most of the worlds major crops grains, soya, corn and rice. 2515Missing in ActionRISING GREENHOUSE GASES WILL RESULT IN A MORE FRAGMENTED, UNSTABLE AND DANGEROUS WORLD, BUT THE TRADITIONAL SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO GRASP THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF THE THREA

118、TS POSED BY CLIMATE CHANGE.Photo: Hagadera Refugee Camp south of Dadaab, Kenya as severe drought continues to ravage East Africa.16aslcg.orgCLIMATESECURITY PHYSICAL RISKSThe social, economic, political and security consequences of climate warming are driven by physical changes in the Earths climate

119、system. Understanding those changes, and particularly the worst-case scenarios, is the key starting point for analysing climatesecurity risks.AT A GLANCE Global warming is now 1.2C, likely to reach 1.5C around 2030 and 2C before 2050 on the higher emissions trajectories. Climate change is already da

120、ngerous, with tipping points likely passed for large-scale systems such as coral reefs, Arctic sea ice and West Antarctica; other tipping points are dangerously close. Even well below 2C there is a significant risk of triggering cascading climate tipping points, in which passing one tipping threshol

121、d will trigger further threshold events. Sea-level rise takes place over many centuries and will likely exceed more than one metre this century. US government agencies have a high scenario of 2.5 metres by 2100.17Missing in ActionCurrent warming and projections The global average warming trend is no

122、w above 1.2C, compared to the late nineteenth century, and accelerating. Warming is projected to: reach 1.5C around 2030; reach 2C before 2050 for both the higher emission scenarios; and reach 3C around 2060 for the current, high-emissions scenario.26 These results are based on models that do not in

123、clude the full range of amplifying system feedbacks. Dangerous climate change At just 1.2C of warming, climate disruption is already dangerous, with tipping points very likely already passed for large-scale systems including coral reefs, Arctic sea-ice27 and West Antarctic Ice Sheet glaciers.28 Part

124、s of East Antarctica might be similarly unstable.29 One-quarter of the Himalayan and Tien Shan ice sheets have already been lost.30 There is debate about whether the Amazon rainforest is also close to tipping,31 and strong evidence that before or around 1.5C the Greenland ice sheet will reach its ti

125、pping threshold.32 Around 2030 and with warming at 1.5C, there is a risk of blue-water Arctic summers33 as sea-ice extent collapses and regional warming is amplified to be three times the rate of the global average. The risk will grow substantially that Arctic carbon stores including permafrost34 an

126、d boreal forests will suffer substantial, accelerating and unstoppable carbon losses.35Sea levels On average, sea-levels rise 10 to 20 metres for each 1C of climate warming. The polar ice sheets have great thermal inertia, so this takes place over many centuries to millenia. The last time there were

127、 no polar ice caps, 3640 million years ago, the temperature was around 34C warmer and sea levels were 70 metres higher than at present.36 In past climates, with atmospheric carbon dioxide levels similar to today, sea levels were around 25 metres higher than at present.37 The US Army Corps of Enginee

128、rs, for planning purposes, uses sea-level rise scenarios of one and two metres by 2100, whilst other US agencies have a high scenario of 2.5 metres.38Photo: Australian Army Blackhawk helicopter flies over flooded Fitzroy River in Rockhampton after a paralyzing deluge (January 8, 2011).18aslcg.orgTip

129、ping points Tipping points for major climate systems may occur as global heating pushes temperatures beyond a critical threshold, leading to accelerated and irreversible impacts. Interactions between these climate systems could lower the critical temperature thresholds at which each tipping point is

130、 passed. In some cases, passing one threshold will trigger further threshold events, for example, where substantial greenhouse gas releases from polar permafrost carbon stores increase warming, releasing even more permafrost carbon in a positive feedback, but also pushing other systems, such as pola

131、r ice sheets, past their threshold point. In 2018, scientists proposed a “Hothouse Earth” scenario in which non-linear system feedbacks and their mutual interaction cascade to drive Earths climate to a “point of no return”, whereby further warming would become self-sustaining, that is, without furth

132、er human emissions.39 This, they said, could be triggered at 2C, perhaps even lower. Even well below 2C and aiming for 1.5C of global warming in the Paris Agreement target range there is a significant risk of triggering further cascading climate tipping points. In a study released in June 2021 expli

133、citly looking at the physical interactions among the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets, the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation and the Amazon rainforest, analysts found that the polar sheets are often the initiators of cascade events, with Greenland and West Antarctica at risk of pass

134、ing their tipping points within the 1.5C2C Paris range.40Earth system tipping pointsA Arctic sea iceArctic sea ice is in a death spiral: “The trend is clear: Summer ice covers half the area it did in the 1980s, and because it is thinner, its volume is down 75%” (Voosen, P 2020, Science, 25 August).

135、“The Arctic is currently experiencing an abrupt climate change event climate models underestimate this ongoing warming” (Jansen, E et al. 2020, Nature Climate Change, 10:714721).B Greenland Ice SheetThe Greenland Ice Sheet is already close to a tipping point, previously estimated to be around 1.6C (

136、Robinson, A et al. 2012, Nature Climate Change, 2:429-432). Some researchers say it has already passed a tipping point (Arenschield, A 2020, phys.org, 13 August).C Boreal forestIncreasing wildfires and dieback threaten the historic carbon sink of the North American boreal forests. As fires continue

137、to increase in size, frequency and intensity, the area of young forests that experience combustion will likely increase and have a key role in shifting the boreal carbon balance (Walker, XJ et al. 2019, Nature 572:520523).D Atlantic circulationThe Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) h

138、as slowed 15% since the mid-20th century (Caesar, L et al. 2018, Nature 556:91-196), and the rate of change is accelerating. The near-term loss of summer Arctic sea ice will drive an accelerating rate of ice mass loss from Greenland, and contribute to a further slowdown of AMOC.ABCIDHGEFTipping poin

139、tConnectivitySource: PNAS 105:Missing in ActionE Amazon rainforestThe forest systems are already oscillating to non-forest ecosystems in eastern, southern & central Amazonia (Lovejoy, TE et al. 2018, Science Advances, 4:eaat2340.) The Amazon is near the tipping point of switching from rai

140、nforest to savannah (Harvey, F 2020, The Guardian, 5 October). F West Antarctic Ice SheetThe Amundsen Sea sector of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) has most likely been destabilized and ice retreat is unstoppable for the current conditions. No further acceleration in climate change is necessary

141、to trigger the collapse of the rest of the WAIS on decadal time scales (Rignot, E et al. 2014, Geophys. Res. Lett. 41:35023509).G Wilkes Basin, East AntarcticaPartial deglaciation of the East Antarctic Ice Sheet (EAIS) is likely for the current level of atmospheric carbon dioxide (DeConto, RM et al.

142、 2016, Nature 531:591597). Parts of East Antarctica might be similarly unstable to West Antarctica (Lenton, TM et al. 2020, Nature 575:592-595).H Coral systemsCoral systems are in a death spiral of more frequent bleaching and inadequate recovery time. Three-quarters of the Great Barrier Reef has alr

143、eady been lost, and at 1.5C the reef is likely to bleach two years in every three on average (King, AD et al. 2017, Nature Climate Change, 7:412416), whereas recovery takes a decade or more. I PermafrostSome scientists consider that 1.5C appears to be something of a “tipping point” for extensive per

144、mafrost thaw (Vaks, A. et al. 2013, Science, 340:183-186). The 2019 Arctic Report Card concludes permafrost ecosystems could already be releasing as much as 1.1 to 2.2 billion tons of CO2 per year. 20aslcg.orgRisk of losing control In a 2019 followup to the “Hothouse Earth” analysis, researchers sai

145、d that: “The evidence from tipping points alone suggests that we are in a state of planetary emergency: both the risk and urgency of the situation are acute If damaging tipping cascades can occur and a global tipping point cannot be ruled out, then this is an existential threat to civilization. No a

146、mount of economic costbenefit analysis is going to help us. we might already have lost control of whether tipping happens.”41 The evidence points to the Hothouse Earth scenario being active by the time the world hits 3C. This is likely to be a state where humanity may have lost control of whether mo

147、re tipping points are reached, though many of them may well have been activated by this point. The Arctic could become a vessel of greenhouse gases pouring from permafrost, boreal forests and possibly sub-sea methane clathrate stores. Climate dynamics on the journey to 3C or more of warming will be

148、significantly shaped by non-linear processes and sudden changes, pushing many large elements of the climate system from one discrete state to another, and cascades of system-level changes. Impacts in 2020.42 Severe flooding hit large parts of Africa and Asia, helping trigger a locust plague in the H

149、orn of Africa, which occurred after several years of drought affecting food security among local communities, causing local food riots in the midst of the pandemic. Extreme drought affected many parts of South America, with estimated farming losses nearing $3 billion in Brazil alone, and further los

150、ses in Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. The largest wildfires ever recorded burned in forests of North America and Southeast Australia, some with such fierce power that they were comparable to a moderate volcanic eruption. Record temperatures over 3035C were observed both in the Siberian and Europea

151、n Arctic. Cyclone Amphan hit India and Bangladesh and was the costliest tropical cyclone on record for the North Indian Ocean, while Typhoon Goni, which crossed the Philippines, was one of the most intense cyclones ever to hit land. Photo: Army vehicles enter Townsville to help evacuate flood-affect

152、ed people from Townsville (February 4, 2019).21Missing in ActionCASE STUDY The disrupted world at 3C On a high-emissions trajectory, global average warming will reach 3C around 2060. In this world, the poorest nations will suffer first and most deeply from climate change, but no region will escape.

153、3C would be “catastrophic” for the worlds poorest three billion people, mostly subsistence farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, by megadroughts, heat waves, or heavy floods.43The structures of societies will be severely tested, and some will crash, with a study by t

154、wo US national security think-tanks concluding that 3C of warming and a 0.5 metre sea-level rise would likely lead to “outright chaos” and “nuclear war is possible”.44At 3C, water availability will decrease sharply in the lower-latitude dry tropics and subtropics, and affect almost two billion peopl

155、e worldwide. Agriculture will become nonviable in the dry subtropics.45 Southern Europe would be in permanent drought, and the Sahara will jump the Mediterranean as Europeans begin a long trek north. Water flows into the great rivers of Asia will be reduced by the loss of more than one-half, and per

156、haps much more, of the Himalayan ice sheet. The average drought in Central America would last 19 months longer. In northern Africa, the figure is 60 months longer: five years.46Aridification will emerge over more than 30% of the worlds land surface,47 most severely in southern Africa, the southern M

157、editerranean, west Asia, the Middle East, rural Australia and across the south-western United States.Most regions in the world will experience a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events, including heat waves, floods and storms. Food production will be inad

158、equate to feed the global population and food prices will skyrocket, as a consequence of a one-fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutritional content of food crops, a catastrophic decline in insect populations, aridification, monsoon failure and chronic water shortages, and conditions to

159、o hot for human summer habitation in significant food-growing regions.48The lower reaches of the agriculturally-important river deltas such as the Mekong, Ganges and Nile will be inundated, and significant sectors of some of the worlds most populous cities including Kolkata, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzh

160、ou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Miami inundated and/or abandoned.49Deadly heat conditions will persist for more than 100 days per year in West Africa, Central America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, which together with land degradation, aridification, con

161、flicts over land and water, and rising sea levels will contribute to up to a billion people being displaced. Refugee conventions may give way to walls and blockades.50 22aslcg.orgAUSTRALIAS CLIMATE VULNERABILITYAT A GLANCE Australia is already hot and dry and the most vulnerable continent to climate

162、 change. Catastrophic wildfires are having increasingly dire effects on the landscape and contributing to ecosystem collapse in World Heritage areas. Most of Australia can expect extreme summer temperatures of more than 50C by centurys end. Australias supply chains and trading relationships are prec

163、arious, being a geographical distant island in a hyper-connected global economy. Climate impacts on agriculture have the potential to significantly threaten food production in Australia.23Missing in ActionCountries in the southern hemisphere subtropics, such as Australia, are projected to experience

164、 the largest impacts on economic growth due to climate change.51 Australia is already hot and dry and the most vulnerable continent. Coral systems are healthy only when warming is less than half a degree Celsius.52 With warming now 1.2C, the Great Barrier Reefs extent has been reduced to one-fifth o

165、f its area 50 years ago. When warming reaches 1.5C, ocean heatwaves similar to those that caused severe bleaching in 2016 are likely to occur two in every three years,53 but corals take more than a decade to recover. This is a death cycle; the reef as an ecosystem will likely be lost by 2030.After t

166、he 2016 Tasmanian World Heritage bushfires, fire ecologist David Bowman declared “this is system collapse”.54 Seven years earlier, just after the Black Saturday, Prof. David Karoly told a European conference “We are unleashing hell on Australia”, with catastrophic wildfires ravaging the landscape.55

167、 Yet in 2019, the Federal Government refused to meet with retired senior firefighters who were ringing alarm bells. For eighteen months, a draft national government plan to respond to the increasingly dire effects of fires and other natural disasters lay gathering dust in Canberra.2019 was the hotte

168、st and driest on record in Australia. New South Wales experienced the states driest soil conditions on record, with farms devoid of stock, temperatures too hot for cattle to breed and coastal rivers not flowing. Climate warming is creating a longer fire season with more extreme fire danger days. The

169、 unprecedented 2019-20 summer bushfire storm killed or displaced three billion animals and 85,000 square kilometers of forest was lost. The fires were worse than the high-end projections of fire impacts in 2100. Like the Great Barrier Reef, those forest ecologies are likely in a death cycle: climate

170、 and fire conditions similar to 2019 are likely to occur more often than the time it takes the forests to recover. Those bushfires witnessed the largest domestic military mobilisation in Australias history of some 6,500 soldiers.The fires also exposed infrastructures climate vulnerability, with some

171、 fire-ravaged regional areas losing all telecommunications capacity, water and electricity utilities, banking services, and logistical land access for relief services and food supplies; in some cases for months. Australias supply chains are precarious, being a geographically distant island in a hype

172、r-connected global economy. In an emergency where supply chains are disrupted, domestic oil and petrol supplies would last only weeks, and military capacity to move and fly would be compromised. The initial months of Covid-19 found Australias national emergency health stockpile virtually empty, with

173、 the nations pandemic response undermined by an incapacity to source sufficient supplies of basics such as PPE. The loss of wealth from climate change impacts on agriculture and labour productivity may reach $A4.2 trillion by 2100 under a business-as-usual scenario.56 Over coming decades, agricultur

174、e production is expected to decline, with major export commodities including wheat, beef, dairy and sugar projected to fall 910% by 2030 and 1319% by 2050. Overall declines of agriculture exports of 1163% by 2030 and 1579% by 2050 depend on the level of adaptation and warming.57 24aslcg.orgThe Murra

175、y-Darling Basin accounts for approximately half of Australias irrigated agricultural production. Prof. Ross Garnaut warned of the Basins likely fate more than a decade ago: on the current high-emissions trajectory, irrigated agriculture output in the Basin would halve by 2050. And it would end by 21

176、00, accompanied by a 40% drop in pasture productivity in south-eastern Australia.58In fact, the reality is worse than the projections. CSIRO data shows that annual Basin inflows have almost halved over the last 20 years.59The Paris goal is to hold warming to 1.52C, but current policy commitments by

177、nations are on a warming path of 3C and more, once system feedbacks are included. At 4C of warming, annual rainfall in southern Australia falls by half, particularly in winter and spring. The Australian wheat industry is highly sensitive to climatic influences. In Garnauts hot, dry scenario, wheat y

178、ields fall to zero in many regions.60There is also strong evidence to suggest that climate change will impact the quality as well as quantity of food produced. The nutritional content of major food crops such as potatoes, wheat, corn, soybean and rice is likely to lower with increased atmospheric CO

179、2, potentially leading to deficiencies in iron, zinc and protein.61Climate impacts on agriculture have the potential to significantly threaten food security in Australia, particularly through the consequences of reduced yields. Globalisation exposes food supply systems in Australia to rising resourc

180、e prices and increases in global demand, compounding challenges associated with economic and population growth, biodiversity and climate change impacts and increasing resource competition for land and water.62Most of Australia can expect extreme temperatures of more than 50C by centurys end. Global

181、warming of 2C implies an average 3C warming over land, 4-5C in the regions that are drying, 5-6C in summer average temperatures in dry regions, and 6-8C hotter for individual days during heatwave conditions in dry regions such as Australia. Marine and land heatwaves will become more frequent and int

182、ense, and thunderstorms will dump more rain and worsen floods as the globe heats up.Residential and commercial buildings are highly vulnerable to climate change impacts, particularly in coastal areas, where development is concentrated. Future losses in residential property values may total $A571 bil

183、lion by 2030, $A611 billion by 2050 and $A770 billion by 2100, concentrated on 5-6% of properties.63 The costs of extreme weather are projected to rise to $A91 billion per year annually by 2050 and $A117 billion per year by 2100.64The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) reports that: “Austr

184、alians are already exposed to a broad range of the hazards that climate change is amplifying. Twenty per cent of our national GDP and 3.9 million of our people are in areas with high to extreme risk of tropical cyclones, and about 11% of GDP and 2.2 million people are in places with high and extreme

185、 risk of bushfire.”65A sea level rise of 1.1 metres could place $A266 billion of emergency services infrastructure at risk, including 258 police, fire and ambulance stations as well as 75 hospitals and health services.66 An increased burden on health services is expected due to extensive health chal

186、lenges that are forecast with various climate impacts, compounded by existing public health issues and an ageing population. 25Missing in ActionAUSTRALIA IS A GEOGRAPHICALLY DISTANT ISLAND IN A HYPER-CONNECTED GLOBAL ECONOMY, MAKING ITS SUPPLY CHAINS PRECARIOUS. IN AN EMERGENCY WHERE SUPPLY CHAINS A

187、RE DISRUPTED, DOMESTIC OIL SUPPLIES WOULD LAST ONLY WEEKS, AND MILITARY CAPACITY TO MOVE AND FLY WOULD BE COMPROMISED.Photo: Devastating floods inundated Brisbane city, Australia, 2011.26aslcg.orgMANAGING EXISTENTIAL CLIMATE RISKAT A GLANCE The world is currently heading towards levels of warming wi

188、th impacts that will be catastrophic. Forecast levels of warming will make some nations and regions unliveable with the worlds poorest facing an existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. Existential climate risk requires a prudent, precautionary risk-management approach with attention g

189、iven to the “fat-tail”, high-end possibilities whose consequences would be devastating for human society. There is a fragility at the highest levels of corporate and public service leaderships with their ability to spot, identify and handle unexpected non-normative events perilously inadequate. Succ

190、essful risk management requires thinking “outside the box”, rather than in silos, to avoid a failure of imagination.27Missing in ActionThe world is currently heading to 34C of warming. Prof. Kevin Anderson, Professor of Energy and Climate Change in the School of Mechanical, Aerospace and Civil Engin

191、eering at the University of Manchester, says that a 4C future “is incompatible with an organised global community, is likely to be beyond adaptation, is devastating to the majority of ecosystems and has a high probability of not being stable”.67 The World Bank has warned that “there is no certainty

192、that adaptation to a 4C world is possible”.68 Amongst other impacts, 4C would in the long run melt both polar ice caps, with a sea-level rise of around 70 metres. 3C of warming would be catastrophic and make some nations, and regions, unliveable. Researchers looking at existential climate risks prop

193、ose a “dangerous” risk category of warming greater than 1.5C, and a “catastrophic” category for warming of 3C or more.69 They describe the impacts of 3C of warming on the worlds poorest: “This bottom three billion population comprises mostly subsistence farmers, whose livelihood will be severely imp

194、acted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom three billion of the worlds population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-metre rise in sea level poses an existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate.”70There is

195、now broad recognition that climate risks are existential: from the UN Secretary-General to the US Secretary for Defense, across the scientific community, and in the Australian Senates report into climate and security risk. The seriousness of the threat was also emphasised by the latest report from t

196、he IPCC. When such threats exist to the very foundation of modern human societies and the complex and fragile globalised network within which they co-exist, the normal approach to risk management is not appropriate. Focusing on middle-of-the-range outcomes may result in unexpected catastrophic event

197、s that should have been foreseen. Existential risks are not amenable to the learn-from-failure approach of conventional risk management, nor can reliance be placed on the institutions, moral norms, or social attitudes developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks.The following gui

198、delines are appropriate for assessing such climate risks:711. Use the best available information in an open, transparent and inclusive manner, drawing from diverse sources and methods of analysis, whether this is proven science, or expert judgment. A best estimate is usually better than no estimate

199、at all.2. Take a normative approach to managing risks, setting targets and developing strategy, assessing risks in relation to objectives, or interests. Start from an understanding of what it is that we wish to avoid; then assess its likelihood. Be explicit about value judgments, recognising that th

200、ey are essentially subjective.3. Recognise that the science of climate change is inherently complex because it describes the dynamics of a multi-dimensional, non-linear system, involving many subsystems and networks of adverse cascade effects; and recognise that climateeconomy models are of limited

201、use.4. Identify the worst, as well as most likely, cases. Properly assess the full range of possibilities, recognising that a very low probability may correspond to a very high risk, if the impact is catastrophic.28aslcg.org5. Apply the precautionary principle when faced with uncertain threats that

202、may cause systemic ruin, implementing measures to ensure those threats do not materialise, to the extent that is possible. 6. Take a holistic view and integrate responses whether that be across government departments, or across national and regional boundaries recognising that complexity cannot be t

203、reated in separate “silos”.A prudent, precautionary risk-management approach means a hard-nosed look at the real risks. The “fat-tail”, high-end possibilities may be damaging beyond quantification and the potential consequences would be devastating for human society. It is important to understand th

204、e potential of, and plan for, the worst that can happen, and be pleasantly surprised if it doesnt.Risk analysis must account for system complexity and radical uncertainty. The science of climate change is inherently complex because it describes the dynamics of a multi-dimensional, non-linear system,

205、 involving many subsystems and networks of adverse cascade effects.72 Some responses to increasing levels of greenhouse gases are relatively linear and able to be projected well by climate models, such as near-term increases in temperature, increasing levels of atmospheric water vapour, more intense

206、 wind events, longer heat waves and so on. In this arena, climate models are very valuable. But other responses are non-linear, characterised by sudden changes, rather than smooth progress, which take the system from one discrete state to another, possibly with system cascades. Factors contributing

207、to this non-linearity include the existence of tipping points where a threshold exists beyond which large, system-level change will be initiated, and positive feedbacks or self-reinforcing loops driving further change. In a period of rapid warming, most major tipping points once crossed are irrevers

208、ible on human time frames.In complex systems, small changes can sometimes lead to large divergences in future state. The risks of climate change to human interests will depend not only on the direct impacts of changes in the physical climate, but also on the response of complex human systems such as

209、 the global economy, food markets, and the system of international security.73Successful risk management requires thinking “outside the box”, rather than in silos, to avoid a failure of imagination, but this is a skill rarely found at the senior levels of government and global corporations. A “failu

210、re of imagination” was, for example, identified as one of the reasons for the breakdown in US intelligence around the 9/11 attacks in 2001, and for banks and regulators not anticipating the 2008 GFC.A 2016 report, Thinking the unthinkable, based on interviews with top leaders around the world, found

211、 that: “A proliferation of unthinkable events has revealed a new fragility at the highest levels of corporate and public service leaderships. Their ability to spot, identify and handle unexpected, non-normative events is perilously inadequate at critical moments.”74 The report identified a deep relu

212、ctance, or what might be called “executive myopia” amongst top leaders in both the public and private sectors, to see and contemplate even the possibility that “unthinkables” might happen, let alone how to handle them. The rate and scale of change is much faster than most are even prepared to conced

213、e or respond to. 29Missing in ActionCASE STUDYA billion people displaced by climate disruption? By Admiral Chris Barrie AC (Retd) Former Chief of the Australian Defence ForceThere is a pressing need to rethink global refugee governance to better support those displaced and fleeing from overwhelming

214、climate-change impacts. Current governance structures are simply inadequate. Estimates of displacement numbers over coming decades illustrate the problem.The Syrian war, in part driven by climate factors an epochal drought and a climate-driven spike in wheat prices and the Arab Spring led to the int

215、ernal and external displacement of 13.5 million Syrians, more than half of the population. 6.8 million Syrians are refugees and asylum-seekers, and another 6.7 million people are displaced within Syria.75 A Rand report for the UK government concludes that “Rising sea levels in coastal regions and se

216、vere droughts in the Sub-Saharan region are likely to trigger population displacement. Other drivers of displacement could include natural resource shortages and competition as drinking water becomes scarcer and crop yields lower, or as crops are destroyed by extreme weather as in China where severa

217、l studies indicate that crop yields for rice, wheat and maize will decrease.”76Could climate-security consequences include a billion displaced people? In 2007 senior US national security analysts concluded that: “Perhaps the most worrisome problems associated with rising temperatures and sea levels

218、are from large-scale migrations of people both inside nations and across existing national borders potentially involving hundreds of millions of people. The more severe scenarios suggest the prospect of perhaps billions of people over the medium or longer term being forced to relocate. The possibili

219、ty poses an enormous challenge even if played out over the course of decades” (emphasis added).77 A 2020 study on extreme heat found that “over the coming 50 years, one to three billion people are projected to be left outside the climate conditions that have served humanity well over the past 6000 y

220、ears”, and that at 3C of warming “near unliveable” extremes are projected to “envelop 1.2 billion people in India, 485 million in Nigeria and more than 100 million in each of Pakistan, Indonesia and Sudan”.78 Another study from 2020 reached a similar conclusion: warming of 2C could provide more than

221、 500 million people with additional incentives to emigrate, whilst warming of 3C could provide additional incentive-to-emigrate to well over a billion people.79 In 2017, researchers wrote of “the likelihood of approximately half of the population exposed to deadly heat by 2050”, which “could pose ex

222、istential risks to humans and mammals alike unless adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most (sic!) of the population to safer climates” (emphasis added).80 The 2018 Global Catastrophic Risks report says that even

223、 for 2C of warming more than a billion people may need to be relocated.81Responding effectively to climate change will require greatly increased co-operation globally and regionally.30aslcg.orgRESPONDING TO CLIMATE-SECURITY RISKS AT A GLANCE Climatesecurity risk analysis should be based on a concept

224、 of human security which is people-centred and includes economic, health, environmental, community and political security. The path from physical climate impacts to security consequences is complex; the risks will increase and multiply and are likely being underestimated. Australia faces domestic ri

225、sks that are both immediate increasingly intense bushfires, cyclones, rain, drought and heatwaves and cumulative risks such as rising sea levels, aridification, natural systems destruction and health impacts. Climate policymaking is affected by the “inertia paradox”, where there is a delay between e

226、missions and their physical effects, providing an illusory opportunity for political delay on the basis that events are not yet critical. Climate-proofing development for fragile or brittle states should be a priority for conflict prevention.31Missing in ActionThe approach to climatesecurity risks m

227、ust be a holistic one based on a concept of human security which is people-centred and includes economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security, with instability and fragility understood as “the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the

228、 state, system, and/or communities to manage, absorb, and mitigate those risks”.82Such risks for Australia are both domestic and global. Domestic risks are both immediate such as the impacts of increasingly extreme bushfires, cyclones, extreme rain and inundation, and drought and extended and more i

229、ntense heatwaves and those that are cumulative such as rising sea levels, changing precipitation patterns, water availability and desertification, impacts on natural systems, health impacts of extreme heat and the geographical spread of diseases. Global risks include economic impacts overseas that d

230、irectly affect Australias exports and supply chains and imports; those that result in a humanitarian aid/disaster relief response from Australia; those that result in Australia committing military forces into an arena of conflict; and those that have geopolitical implications.Climate disruption may

231、start with growing food and water insecurity; however, social upheaval follows. But virtually no-one anticipated the crisis in Syria.Or the Global Financial Crisis. At the London School of Economics in 2008, Queen Elizabeth questioned: “Why did no one foresee the timing, extent and severity of the G

232、lobal Financial Crisis?” The British Academy answered a year later that “a psychology of denial” gripped the financial and corporate world, and that it was “the failure of the collective imagination of many bright people to understand the risks to the system as a whole”.83This is the crunch point in

233、 climate and security analysis: how to understand the complex path from physical climate impacts to security consequences. It is particularly challenging to map first-order physical climate warming effects onto the second-order impacts in the social and security spheres because it depends on the res

234、ponses of complex human systems which cannot be reduced to probabilistic terms. In a complex world, systemic risks can arise from interactions between changes in the physical climate and human systems, so that small changes can lead to large divergences in the future state.Given the range of these i

235、ssues and the complexities, how can climatesecurity risk be effectively analysed? In the first instance there is a need to understand: Direct physical risks from the climates response to greenhouse gas emissions globally. This is no trivial task. In July 2021, the world witnessed a series of extreme

236、 climate events including unforeseen, record-destroying “dome” heatwaves and unprecedented flooding across the Northern Hemisphere, more intense than climate model projections. As were Australias 2019-20 bushfires. Former UK Met Office chief scientist Prof Dame Julia Slingo told BBC News: “We should

237、 be alarmed because the IPCC models are just not good enough”, and Oxford Professor Tim Palmer says: “It is impossible to say how much of an emergency we are in because we dont have the tools to answer the question.”84 So even with the more direct climate security risks from extreme events today, th

238、ere is no straightforward answer to the question: “How bad could it be?”Photo: An Australian Army Chinook flight during the evacuation of local civilian residents on as bushfires burn Across East Gippsland ( January 2, 2020 ) .32aslcg.org Indirect risks generated by the interaction of climate change

239、 and complex human systems, where a number of destabilising processes can interact, producing unexpected outcomes. There are many facets: increasing natural resource competition/conflict, livelihood insecurity, human mobility, food price spikes and food insecurity, extreme weather events challenging

240、 government responses, and international tensions.85 The convergence of such climate and other risks results in compound security threats. Take one example: will the loss of the ice sheets (already well underway) in the Himalayan and Tien Shan ranges and Tibetan Plateau where all the major rivers of

241、 Asia arise exacerbate regional geopolitical tensions as water shortages in India, Pakistan and China become more critical and dam construction and control of rivers flowing from these ranges through several nations become flashpoints? China has 20% of the worlds population but only 6% of potable wa

242、ter. There are long-standing border disputes between India, Pakistan and China, and all three are nuclear-armed. To the north-west, Central Asia, including Afghanistan, will suffer increasingly dire water insecurity, and internal displacement and regional conflict over water rights is possible in th

243、is strategic zone that stretches to Iran. In Bangladesh, relatively small increases in sea levels will displace tens of millions of people, and India has surrounded the country with a formidable climatesecurity fence guarded by tens of thousands of troops; India faces the twin perils of unliveable h

244、eat and chronic water shortages; there has been a shift westward of the Indian summer monsoon, and rainfall has become more variable; and Pakistan may become a failed state, plagued by internal and neighbouring conflicts, acute water deficits, new heat extremes and a history of civilian societymilit

245、ary tensions. South Asia has some of the worlds largest cities and river deltas most vulnerable to inundation, as does China. These are complex issues to analyse. Risks dependent on emissions path. What are the risks if the world does manage to keep warming well below 2C? And what are the risks if i

246、t does not, as the probability of a “Hothouse Earth” outcome increases with higher levels of warming? What are the geopolitical risks associated with a failure to decarbonise, and the consequences of unilateral actions to cool the planet, for example, by atmospheric sulfate injections, if there is a

247、 failure to form a global governance framework? If there is an unacceptable risk that the world is heading for widespread societal disruption and collapse, then assessments need to be made about actions necessary to prevent that outcome, even if those actions such as a full-spectrum mobilisation of

248、resources for the climate battle are themselves disruptive of the status quo. The understanding of climate-security risks and how to reduce those risks is improving. Key insights into climate impacts on security and peace (see box, page 33) summarises some important lessons: the fact that these risk

249、s will increase and multiply; the importance of governance capacity and flexibility (or the lack of it); the recognition that the risks are likely being underestimated; and acknowledgement that assessing and managing risks is challenging in a changing risk landscape. 33Missing in ActionINSIGHTS Clim

250、ate impacts on peace & security The risks that climate change impacts pose to international peace and security are real and present.86 Climate change impacts inhibit peace by undermining human security, which increases the risk of violent conflict, as well as increasing the impact of other drivers o

251、f conflict and fragility. Climate change impacts affect competition and conflict over natural resources such as land and water. Climate change impacts can create new disputes over natural resources, especially in areas where conflict management mechanisms are weak. Infrastructure development (such a

252、s dams) and increasing water withdrawal can harm downstream countries and spur diplomatic tensions. Closer cooperation across transboundary river basins is required. Climate change impacts undermine livelihoods, affect human mobility, and push people into illegal coping mechanisms, including non-sta

253、te armed groups. Partly in response to climate impacts, internal migration is likely to grow, which may create tensions with underserved host communities and stretch capacities in rapidly growing urban areas. Climate change impacts contribute to extreme food price spikes and food insecurity. This ha

254、s already contributed to protests (e.g. the Arab Spring) and conflict, and risks to food production will increase. Extreme weather events challenge government effectiveness and legitimacy. Adequate relief responses can avoid grievances and large negative responses following disasters. The unintended

255、 consequences of poorly designed climate and security policies carry their own risks. Military responses to conflict can add further pressure on climate-sensitive livelihoods if planning disregards climate vulnerability. Climate-related security risks are particularly significant where governance me

256、chanisms are weak or failing. Context and governance play a large role in determining how climate-related security risks manifest, and climate change impacts inhibit peace by adding to existing pressures. We are very likely underestimating the scale and scope of climate-related security risks. Many

257、climate-related security risks remain under-researched because of the complexity of cascading risks, and the difficulty of clear attribution, as well as indirect effects through impacts on health and inequality, for example. Climate-related security risks will increase and multiply in the future. Im

258、pacts will intensify with further warming, and climatic tipping points are creating large uncertainties over future climatic changes and their effects on societies, and might be a source of sudden and large risks. Our capacities to assess and manage climate-related security risks lag behind the chan

259、ging risk landscape. Assessment tools and early warning systems rarely address climate-related security risks. Conflict-affected countries are not sufficiently accounted for in funding and programming.34aslcg.orgMilitary responses to challenges abroad will be affected by domestic capability that its

260、elf is suffering from climate impacts. We cannot think that our military can just be prepared for the next war, because the systems and environment in which the military operates are also changing. The World climate and security report 2021 (see box, page 35) identifies both the changing nature of c

261、limatesecurity risks, and some key responses. The impact of climate stressors or shocks is dependent on exposure and vulnerability, so “climate-proofing development for fragile or brittle states should be a priority for conflict prevention. Assistance should be aimed at climate resilience challenges

262、 such as water security, food security, and disaster preparedness”.87Perhaps the key question is the relationship between efforts to mitigate physical climate change by reducing/eliminating its causes, and actions to reduce warming and drawdown the level of atmospheric greenhouse gases and efforts t

263、o adapt by actions that moderate damages from actual or expected impacts. What effort should be put into each response? A 2017 survey of global catastrophic risks by the Global Challenges Foundation (GCF) found that: “In high-end climate scenarios, the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to

264、model, with a high likelihood of human civilisation coming to an end.”88 The GCF says that despite scientific evidence that risks associated with tipping points “increase disproportionately as temperature increases from 1C to 2C, and become high above 3C”, political negotiations have consistently di

265、sregarded the high-end scenarios that could lead to abrupt or irreversible climate change. It concludes that “the world is currently completely unprepared to envisage and, even less, deal with the consequences of catastrophic climate change”.89There is a truism that the world should adapt to those c

266、limate impacts that cant be mitigated, and mitigate those to which the world cannot adapt. Therefore, a key question is how much adaptation is possible. As previously discussed, 34C is regarded as catastrophic to existential, but there is an unacceptable risk that 2C of warming, and perhaps less, co

267、uld trigger the “Hothouse Earth” scenario and drive warming towards the 34C. Is it reasonable then to assume that the world can adapt to 3C of warming? It appears not, and, even at 2C there is an unacceptable risk that many of the most important climate systems will have passed tipping points by the

268、n. And the precautionary approach (see page 27) should be applied when faced with uncertain threats that may cause systemic ruin, implementing measures to ensure those threats do not materialise, to the extent that is possible. This is the key understanding in analysing and responding to climatesecu

269、rity risks: if primary emphasis is not placed on mitigation mobilisation to address the causes and ensure that the higher-end threats do not materialise, the idea that the world can adapt to the consequences of higher levels of warming is an impractical one, poorly grounded in the evidence. This is

270、the “adaptation trap” of one-sided emphasis on adaptation and “resilience” approaches at the expense of mitigation, which climatesecurity responses must seek to avoid. Adaptation is vital, but there is a point beyond which the frog cannot adapt to the water in the saucepan that is starting to boil a

271、round it. Climate policymaking is affected by what may be called the “inertia paradox”: inertia in the climate system (the delay between emissions and their physical effect) provides an illusory opportunity for political inertia or delay (on the basis that events are not yet critical), but unstoppab

272、le and catastrophic climate disruption may be in the pipeline for those emissions, even as political will and the time horizon are limited. This inertia is perhaps the greatest risk.35Missing in ActionINSIGHTSWorld climate & security report 2021In June 2021, the International Military Council On Cli

273、mate And Security released The world climate and security report 2021.90 Key findings included: The convergence of climate change and other risks creates compound security threats for states and societies. Climatesecurity risks will continue to intensify across all regions, with new disasters hittin

274、g before societies can recover from or adapt to the impact of previous ones. Experts anticipate all climatesecurity phenomena presenting severe-to-catastrophic risks by as soon as 2031, with water, ecosystem, health, and national security climate threats posing the most consistent risk. Of particula

275、r concern in the short term will be direct environmental impacts, including precipitation changes, sea-level rise, and more severe natural disasters, as well as the subsequent effects that those impacts will pose to agricultural, economic, and healthcare systems worldwide. Over the next 30 years, “i

276、nstability within nations” is likely to be more severe than “instability between nations”. Climate-proofing development for fragile or brittle states should be a priority for conflict prevention. Assistance should be aimed at climate resilience challenges such as water security, food security, and d

277、isaster preparedness, as well as recovery mechanisms that encourage investments in renewable energy and adaptive capacities. Reducing climaterelated security risks requires multiple different actors across many fields, to include peacebuilding, mediation, disaster preparedness, climate adaptation an

278、d climate mitigation. Militaries will be increasingly overstretched as climate change intensifies. While direct climate change effects regularly threaten military infrastructure and threaten to reduce readiness, the most pressing security threats will come from climate change-induced disruptions to

279、social systems. Predictive modeling and climate risk assessment methodologies should be embraced to better prepare for and prevent climate security risks, and integrated into militaries regional security plans and force readiness assessments. The global governance system is ill-equipped to deal with

280、 the security risks posed by climate change. In some cases international law is modeled on outdated understandings, while in other cases law or norms to manage certain climate security risks do not yet exist. States and international actors must take urgent action to update and develop international

281、 law and mechanisms to include environmental and climate security impacts. 36aslcg.orgCONCLUSION: AN UNPRECEDENTED PEACETIME MOBILISATIONTIME IS SHORTTime to respond is short. Avoiding catastrophic outcomes requires a mobilisation of resources across the globe for rapid, large-scale mitigation, the

282、building of capacity to drawdown atmospheric CO2 to a safe level, and whatever efforts are efficacious to preserve threatened ecosystems, particularly in the Arctic.BEYOND ADAPTATIONThe human and political impacts at 3C would be profound, and particularly in our region of the world, with state failu

283、re, military conflicts, and an epic and essentially unsolvable humanitarian crisis. The world cannot reasonably adapt to this level of warming.CODE REDThe scientific evidence is that the world will reach 1.5C in the next decade regardless of the short-term emissions trajectory, and 2C by 2050, even

284、if emissions are substantially reduced. Currently, global emission-reduction actions will lead to around 3C of warming, and more once significant carbon-cycle feedback loops which are now becoming active are taken into account.INSECURITY & CRISISEven 2C of warming would transform Australia: both for

285、 the changes within the country, and the external impacts. In Australia, and in the region, aridification of the dry subtropics will add to water insecurity at home and a water crisis in Asias biggest and most populous states. EXISTENTIAL THREATImpacts of 34C of warming would be catastrophic to exis

286、tential; even 2C of warming would mean that many of the largest elements of the climate system the cryosphere, carbon stores, circulatory systems would have been irrevocably transformed.REGIONAL IMPACTSFood insecurity will deepen across Asia; some low-lying Pacific Islands will be unfit for habitati

287、on; agriculturally productive river deltas and low-lying valleys from the Ganges to the Mekong will become inundated, and some of Asias biggest cities will slowly succumb to rising seas, from Jakarta to Shang-hai. Disasters caused by more extreme climate events will become more intense and frequent;

288、 states will become unstable and/or fail; and regional geopolitical tensions are likely to rise. RISK CONCLUSIONS 37Missing in ActionILL-PREPAREDOur assessment is that Australia is ill-prepared to deal with the consequences of global warming, which requires decisive policy action, both in terms of m

289、itigating the threat, and an understanding of, and preparedness to respond to, climatesecurity risks. FATEFUL CHOICEWe have a choiceAn unprecedented peacetime mobilisation to protect, prevent and prepare or Further procrastination and a descent into instability and social breakdown. INTEGRATIONTo be

290、 ready and able, Australia needs integration across all levels of government, and a whole-of-government approach at the national, state and local levels; one way or another almost every federal government department will need to be involved: defence and intelligence, emergency response and aid, fore

291、ign affairs and trade, health and social services, industry and transport, research and education, and so on.GET READYA number of specific actions should be taken as a matter of urgency as a precursor to making the government fit-for-purpose on climatesecurity risks, including:a. Appointment of an i

292、ndependent, expert panel to urgently conduct a comprehensive Climate and Security Risk Assessment, using the best available information;b. The establishment of a specific Office of Climate Threat Intelligence that can provide an integrated flow of analysis to government and departments;c. Establishm

293、ent of a National Climate Risk Assessment, as occurs in the US, where a high-level experts group works with relevant agencies to provide a regular, publicly-available assessment of climate trends, risks and impacts; and d. The preparation of a policy of Responsibility to Prepare and Prevent (R2P2),

294、which systematically and holistically addresses climatesecurity risks.RESPONSE CONCLUSIONS 38aslcg.orgOur action plan has four themes: Demonstrate leadership, Assess climate risks, Coordinate and cooperate, and Act and invest with urgency.Demonstrate leadershipThe first duty of a government is to “p

295、rotect the people”: their safety and wellbeing, their livelihoods and health. Despite some mistakes along the way, we have seen government at state and federal levels commiting to protect the Australian people from Covid-19 with a set of policies and actions that have required national, coordinated

296、leadership for a “zero community transmissions” policy and action to prevent spread from lockdowns to large government deficits that were not politically easy.Secondly, that leadership has been open about the risks and the solutions, the modelling and the choices, the costs and the benefits, and the

297、 long-term outcome. Money has not been spared in boosting research, getting the best expert advice, and communicating what needs to be done.Thirdly, usual administrative arrangements have been put to one side, as necessary, to build integrated and whole-of-government responses, including the establi

298、shment of the national cabinet and new administrative arrangements in the states. We urge that similar energy and application be applied to climatesecurity risks with demonstrable leadership to: Show the Australian people that our leaders care by committing to protecting the Australian people with i

299、maginative and credible climate plans to safeguard our future. Acknowledge climate disruption as an existential risk to society and a threat to the stability of nations and the relationships between them if we act too late, or inadequately. Seize the initiative by conducting informed, national publi

300、c conversations and working with all levels of government communities, business and academia in carrying out regular National Climate Risk Assessments.Assess the risksThe risks have been elaborated at length in this report, including their existential character and the need for a precautionary appro

301、ach to risk management. Once again, the Covid-19 response shines a light on managing the risks, at least in the outset. Governments were very frank about the risks, especially those at the high-end of the range of possibilities. In many cases, more ICU beds were prepared than it turned out were nece

302、ssary, because the other possibility not enough beds was not to be countenanced. What would happen if a similar approach was taken to climate disruption, where policymakers erred on the side of being over-prepared, rather than under-prepared?PREVENT. PREPARE. PROTECT. A ClimateSecurity Risk Action P

303、lan for Australia39Missing in ActionThere is a need for an urgent, expert review of climatesecurity risk as a building block to a full policy. Ongoing analysis from an Office of Climate Threat Intelligence with new governance structures could break down bureaucratic silos, give longer-term perspecti

304、ves and provide regular assessments by consistent monitoring and assessment of climate change risks.Actions should include: Appoint an independent, expert panel to urgently conduct a comprehensive Climate and Security Risk Assessment, using the best available information. Establish an Office of Clim

305、ate Threat Intelligence. Assess the threats and impacts of climate disruption with brutal honesty, identifying the worst, as well as most likely, cases and considering the full range of probabilities.Coordinate and cooperateSome of governments most notable risk-management failures have been due to “

306、thinking in silos” and not adopting a coordinated, whole-of-government or whole-of-system approach to understanding risks, of which the failures to foresee and be adequately prepared for the 2019-20 “black summer” bushfires and the Covid-19 pandemic are but two notable examples. The need to integrat

307、e risk analysis, policies and action across federal government departments, and between all levels of government, cannot be overemphasised. Coordination is also important in Australias response to a changing climate. We have witnessed the consequences of being ill-prepared for the impacts of some ex

308、treme climate events, such as bushfires, and the lack of readily-available equipment when Covid-19 affected Australia. Our oil energy supply lines are insecure, as is our national logistical capacity in the face of cyclones and floods. An Australian National Resilience Framework is required for thes

309、e, and broader, issues.On climate action, cooperation not conflict is key. Writing recently in the Financial Times on security and cooperation, Harvard professor and former US Treasury secretary Lawrence Summers argued that: “Coronavirus is helping to usher in a world where security depends more on

310、exceeding a threshold of cooperation with allies and adversaries alike than on maintaining a balance of power.”91The world needs a robust climate pact for security, which involves all the major emitting countries, including China, which is today the worlds biggest emitter. But the US is the greatest

311、 historical source of emissions, and together the US and China account for 40% of todays global emissions. Before the Paris climate talks in 2015, the US and China announced their own climate deal. And, in the lead-up to President Bidens 2021 Climate Summit, there was a joint China-US statement that

312、 climate change “must be addressed with the seriousness and urgency that it demands”.92 The US and China must work together for a climate and security pact, and Australia should be on board. 40aslcg.orgActions should include: Coordinate a holistic, whole-of-government approach, building capacity acr

313、oss the public service and government agencies, and at all levels of government. Cooperate with big and small AsiaPacific governments to build alliances for climate action, understanding that cooperation rather than conflict is key to responding to the climate crisis. Build an Australian National Pr

314、evention and Resilience Framework with coherent processes across areas including energy and water, logistics, health, industry and agriculture, research and nature. Act and invest with urgency: Protect, prevent and prepareClimate impacts disportionately fall on the most vulnerable and socio-economic

315、ally disadvantaged communities. Building their capacity to withstand and respond to climate shocks is a key task in ameliorating climatesecurity risks, both in Australia and globally, and preventing social breakdown, conflict and forced displacement. But, as discussed in this report, reducing the ri

316、sks through adaptation strategies will not be effective at the higher levels of warming that are on the horizon. “Resilience and adaptation buys us time, but ultimately there is no way to insulate ourselves from the massive disruption that would be caused by unmitigated climate change,” says Michael

317、 E. Mann.93 Due to some inertia between emissions and impacts, hard and fast reductions right now in greenhouse gas emissions provide the best opportunity to manage climatesecurity risks.Being prepared demands a focus on “inclusive and integrated responses that build resilience against both climate

318、and conflict risks and include a special focus on no regret options in the face of uncertainty and shifting probabilities of climate-related hazards and future socio-political developments”.94 The Australian Government should adopt a policy of responsibility to prepare and prevent, which systematica

319、lly and holistically addresses climate security risks, with national, regional and international adaptability, to decrease the probability of instability and conflict, and promote adaptive pathways and sustainable development. The complex, transnational and cross-sectoral nature of climate risks dem

320、ands such a comprehensive approach.Actions should include: Protect the most vulnerable communities, nations and natural systems. Prevent devastating climate impacts by mobilising all the resources necessary to reach zero emissions as fast as possible. Develop the capacity to prevent irreversible tip

321、ping points and draw down greenhouse gases back to safer conditions in the long term. Prepare to manage the risks and respond to the challenges of living in a climate-change-disrupted world with a responsibility to prepare and prevent.We have called Australias response so far to climate-security ris

322、ks “missing in action” because, right now, there is no greater duty for those who have served our nation than to speak out about the need to protect people and their safety. This is the crucial decade to shift Australias focus to “leading in action” to address the great climate challenge we face.41M

323、issing in ActionFOOTNOTES1 Mazengarb, M 2021, Australia ranked dead last in world for climate action in latest UN report, RenewEconomy, 1 July.2 Austin, LJ 2020, Secretary Austin remarks at Climate Change Summit, US Department of Defence, Washington DC, 22 April.3 CAT 2021, The CAT Thermometer, Clim

324、ate Action Tracker, climateactiontracker.org/global/ cat-thermometer, accessed 21 May 2021.4 IMF 2020, Mitigating climate change: growth- and distribution-friendly strategies, in World Economic Outlook Report, October, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 5 UN 2021, The UN Security Council an

325、d Climate Change, Security Council Research Report, United Nations, New York NY, 21 June.6 Commonwealth of Australia 2018, Implications of climate change for Australias national security, The Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra ACT, 17

326、May. 7 PIF 2018, Boe Declaration on Regional Security, Pacific Islands Forum, forumsec.org/2018/09/05/ boe-declaration-on-regional-security.8 Biden, J 2021, Executive Order on tackling the climate crisis at home and abroad, The White House, Washington DC, 27 January. 9 Edraki, F 2019, Spy chief Nick

327、 Warner on the security threats facing Australia, from terrorism to North Korea, ABC Radio National, 6 April. 10 Glasser, R 2019, Preparing for the age of disasters, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra ACT. 11 Cox, K et al. 2020, A changing climate: Exploring the implications of climate

328、change for UK defence and security, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA and Cambridge Cambs.12 Campbell, Lt. Gen A. 2016, Chief of Army opening address to the 2016 Chief of Armys Exercise, Australian Army, 6 September.13 University of Cambridge, n.d., A science of global risk, Centre for the Study of

329、Existential Risk, University of Cambridge, cser.ac.uk/research/science-global-risk/14 Slaughter, A-M 2020, Redefining national security for the post-pandemic world, Project Syndicate, 3 June. 15 UN 2021, op. cit.16 WRG 2009, Charting our water future: Economic frameworks to inform decision-making, W

330、ater Resources Group (McKinsey and Company).17 King, D et al. 2016, Climate change: A risk assessment, Centre for Science and Policy, University of Cambridge, Cambridge Cambs.18 NIC 2017, Global trends: Paradox of progress, US National Intelligence Council, Washington DC.19 CNA MAB 2014, National se

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332、k water, The Guardian, 6 July 2013.22 World Bank 2005, Pakistan country water resources assistance strategy Water economy: Running dry, World Bank report 34081-PK, Washington DC.42aslcg.org23 King, MD & LeHane, R 2021, Drought is leading to instability and water weaponization in the Middle East and

333、North Africa, The Center for Climate and Security, 30 April. 24 Glasser, R 2019, op. cit.25 Porritt, J 2020, Hope in hell: A decade to confront the climate emergency, Simon & Schuster UK.26 Masson-Delmotte, V et al. (eds) 2021, Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the In

334、tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press. In press. Chapter 4 states: “With regards to global warming levels (GWL) of 1.5C, 2.0C, and 3.0C, we note that there is unanimity across all of the CMIP6 model simulations that GSAT change relative to 18501900 will rise above: 1) 1

335、.5C following SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0, or SSP5-8.5 (on average around 2030); 2) 2.0C following either SSP3-7.0 or SSP5-8.5 (on average around 2043), and 3) 3.0C following SSP5-8.5 (on average around 2062).”27 Dickie, G 2020, The Arctic is in a death spiral. How much longer will it exist?, The Guardian, 1

336、3 October. 28 Rignot, E 2014, Global warming: its a point of no return in West Antarctica. What happens next?, The Guardian, 18 May. 29 Lenton, TM et al, 2019, Climate tipping points too risky to bet against, Nature, vol. 575, pp. 592-595.30 Associated Press 2019, Cold War spy satellite images show

337、Himalayan glaciers are melting fast, ABC News, 20 June; Naik, G 2015, Central Asia mountain range has lost a quarter of ice mass in 50 years, study says, The Wall Street Journal, 17 August.31 Qin, Y et al. 2020, Carbon loss from forest degradation exceeds that from deforestation in the Brazilian Ama

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339、 Khurshudyan, I et al. 2020, Rapid Arctic meltdown in Siberia alarms scientists, Washington Post, 4 July. 35 Turetsky, MR et al. 2019, Permafrost collapse is accelerating carbon release, Nature, 30 April.36 Hansen, JE & Sato, M 2012, Paleoclimate implications for human-made climate change in Berger,

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344、4, pp. 10315-10323. 44 Campbell, K, et al. 2007, The age of consequences: The foreign policy and national security global climate change, Centre for Strategic and International Studies & Centre for New American Security, Washington DC. 45 Campbell, KM et al., 2007, op. cit. 43Missing in Action46 Wal

345、lace-Wells, D 2019,The devastation of human life is in view”: what a burning world tells us about climate change, The Guardian, 2 February. 47 “Beyond 2050, as much as 44 percent of the planets land areas will be exposed to drying. This will lead to severe drought conditions throughout southern Euro

346、pe, North America (mainly the eastern and southwestern United States and Mexico), much of southeast Asia, and most of the Amazon, affecting about 1.4 billion people. In the latitude bands between 30 degrees N and 30 degrees S the probability of multi-decadal drought will rise to 80 percent” ( Xu, Y

347、& Ramanathan, V 2017, op. cit.).48 Heat and droughts threaten regions that produce much of the worlds food. Food prices are expected to raise 23 percent by 2030, making food markets more volatile, and under heat stress the nutritious content of food crops is declining” (Ramanathan, V et al. 2018 Cli

348、mate extremes and global health , Foreign Affairs, 31 July 2018), “In the tropics and sub-tropics, geographic areas that include the worlds hungriest people, climate change could cause crop yields to fall 10 to 20 percent or more between now and 2050” (Thornton, P 2012, Recalibrating food production

349、 in the developing world: global warming will change more than just the climate, CCAFS Policy Brief 6, CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security). “Under current production systems and practices, our models indicate aggregate crop yields in the USA could decrease during

350、 the end of the century (20502100) by 8%19% under the mildest scenario (RCP 2.6), and by 20%48% under the most severe scenario (RCP 8.5).” (Ortiz-Bobea, A et al. 2019, Unpacking the climatic drivers of US agricultural yields, Environmental Research Letters, vol. 14, 064003.) “Climate models project

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360、018, op. cit. 67 Roberts, D 2011, The brutal logic of climate change, Grist, 6 December. 68 World Bank 2012, Turn down the heat: Why a 4C warmer world must be avoided, World Bank, Washington DC.69 Xu, Y & Ramanathan, V 2017, op. cit.70 Xu, Y & Ramanathan, V 2017, op. cit.71 Drawing on King, D et al.

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