1、ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSSynthesis Report 2022 on Chinas Carbon NeutralityAcknowledgmentsThis report is the result of a collaborative effort between Energy Foundation China and a multi-team research consortium,coordinated by the Energy Foundation China and the University o

2、f Maryland Center for Global Sustainability and consolidated by a pool of specialists from both Chinese and international research institutions.The authors also acknowledge the high performance computing resources at the University of Maryland(http:/hpcc.umd.edu)made available for conducting the res

3、earch reported in this paper.Energy Foundation China and the project team would like to thank the reviewers that provide suggestions for improving the framing and analyses of this report.Reviewers(Listed by alphabetical order of last name)Richard Baron Director of the Trade Programme,European Climat

4、e Foundation;Executive Director,2050 Pathways PlatformJae Edmonds Chief Scientist and Battelle Fellow,Pacific Northwest National Laboratorys(PNNL)Joint Global Change Research Institute;College Park Professor of Public Policy,University of MarylandMichael Greenstone Milton Friedman Distinguished Serv

5、ice Professor in Economics;Director of the Becker Friedman Institute and the Interdisciplinary Energy Policy Institute,University of ChicagoAmory Lovins Cofounder and Chairman Emeritus,Rocky Mountain InstituteRobert Stowe Executive Director,Harvard Environmental Economics Program and Co-Director of

6、the Harvard Project on Climate AgreementsMassimo Tavoni Professor of Climate Change Economics,Politecnico di Milano;Director,RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the EnvironmentLord Adair Turner Chairman,Energy Transitions Commission;Senior Fellow and Former Chairman,Institute for New Econom

7、ic ThinkingShaoda Wang Assistant Professor,Harris School of Public Policy,University of Chicago;Faculty Research Fellow,National Bureau of Economic Research(NBER)John Ward Managing Director,Pengwern AssociatesMatthias Weitzel Project Officer,European Commission,Joint Research CentreHarald Winkler Pr

8、ofessor,Energy Research Center of University of Cape Town,Coordinating Lead Author of IPCC Sixth Assessment Report WGIIIChunping Xie Policy Fellow,Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the EnvironmentChangwen Zhao Director,Senior Fellow,Center for International Knowledge on Development,D

9、evelopment Research Center(DRC)of the State CouncilDisclaimer-Unless otherwise specified,the views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Energy Foundation China.Energy Foundation China does not guarantee the accuracy of the information and da

10、ta included in this report and will not be responsible for any liabilities resulted from or related to using this report by any third party.-The mention of specific companies,products and services does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by Energy Foundation China in preference to others

11、 of a similar nature that are not mentioned.Cover Photo:Energy FoundationRESEARCH CONSORTIUM AND AUTHOR TEAMCoordinating lead authors Energy Foundation China:Sha Fu University of Maryland:Sha YuLead authors(Listed by alphabetical order of institutions and authors)China Renewable Energy Engineering I

12、nstitute:Xiao Qin Energy Foundation China:Lingyan Chen,Xuan Du,Manqi Li,Chengcheng Mei,Zhuoxiang Yang International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis:Fei Guo,Volker Krey Harbin Institute of Technology,Shenzhen:Junling Liu Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory:Nina Khanna,Hongyou Lu,Nan Zhou Pek

13、ing University:Yazhen Wu Renmin University of China:Ke Wang Tsinghua University:Qimin Chai,Wenying Chen,Shu Zhang University of Maryland:Jenna Behrendt,Xinzhao Cheng,Leon Clarke,Nathan Hultman,Jiehong Lou Suggested CitationYu,S.,S.,Fu,J.Behrendt,Q.Chai,L.Chen,W.Chen,X.Cheng,L.Clarke,X.Du,F.Guo,N.Hul

14、tman,N.Khanna,V.Krey,M.Li,J.Liu,H.Lu,J.Lou,C.Mei,X.Qin,K.Wang,Y.Wu,Z.Yang,S.Zhang,and N.Zhou(2022).“Synthesis Report 2022 on Chinas Carbon Neutrality:Electrification in Chinas Carbon Neutrality Pathways.”Energy Foundation China,Beijing,China.Available at:https:/www.efchina.org/Attachments/Report/rep

15、ort-lceg-20221104/Synthesis-Report-2022-on-Chinas-Carbon-Neutrality-Electrification-in-Chinas-Carbon-Neutrality-Pathways.pdfELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSNovember 2022FOREWORDSince President Xi Jinping announced the carbon neutrality goal in September 2020,the world has experie

16、nced persistent ups and downs.Under the new dynamics,China reiterates its unwavering goal of achieving carbon neutrality before 2060.In 2021,China has submitted an updated version of nationally determined contributions with strengthened targets,set out the Mid-Century Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Em

17、ission Development Strategy,and shaped the 1+N policy framework guiding the nationwide carbon peaking and neutrality actions.As a non-profit charitable organization,Energy Foundation China(EF China)has been dedicated to promoting prosperity through safe and sustainable energy since its establishment

18、 in 1999.It has been consistently and strategically supporting research and policymaking that target a carbon-neutral future.To better inform the formulation and implementation of Chinas Mid-Century Strategy,EF China established its flagship Long-Term Strategy for Decarbonization Task Force(LTS)in 2

19、018,committed to exploring a multi-win low GHG emission development path for China.We hope this effort will help put China onto a trajectory of sustainable prosperity and carbon neutrality.Up to today,the LTS has initiated three flagship projects(LTS I,II,and III),engaged more than 30 top Chinese th

20、ink-tanks in over 50 high-level research projects,and formed a comprehensive research landscape covering all important sectors and thematic areas in Chinas decarbonization action.Encouraged by the success of the LTS I which presented an overall framework of Chinas carbon neutrality pathways in 2020,

21、we continued deepening it by shifting its focus to Chinas low-carbon transformation implementation roadmap for 2035 in LTS II,and to the technology and innovation supporting carbon neutrality in LTS III.In parallel,to introduce international perspectives,EF China has continued to collaborate with le

22、ading international think-tanks,including International Energy Agency(IEA),the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis,University of Maryland,Joint Research Centre(European Union),Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research(PIK),Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency(PBL),2050 Pa

23、thway Platform,and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,in LTS modeling and technical discussions.These frequent exchanges have empowered and served the field of climate and energy research and created a multilateral open intellectual platform for wider cooperation.Meanwhile,EF China has organized

24、international advisory roundtables and Economists Dialogues to underpin the strategic position of carbon neutrality in Chinas policymaking and to facilitate the development and mainstreaming of Carbon Neutrality Economics.Last but not least,the LTS Task Force has extended its working scope to suppor

25、t subnational decarbonization research and pilots in more than 15 cities and provinces,with the purpose to explore and demonstrate high-quality economic growth models that are compatible with the carbon neutrality vision.In 2020,we proudly launched our first synthesis report featuring comprehensive

26、views of Chinas new growth pathways toward a success in meeting the 2060 pledge and its long-term development goals.The report maps out the broad outlines of decarbonization and identifies key elements of strategy across the economy and within individual FOREWORD economic sectors.Regarded as one of

27、the five pillars(electrification,energy efficiency,power decarbonization,low carbon fuel substitution,and carbon dioxide removal)to achieve carbon neutrality,electrification,coupled with power system decarbonization,presents not only a feasible option to reach substantial emissions reduction in elec

28、tricity more quickly than in other sectors but also an opportunity to curb,and eventually reduce final energy consumption.Therefore,EF China has decided to proceed ahead with the deep-dive research into the role of electrification in Chinas grand carbon neutrality landscape,and the dynamics of the d

29、ouble transitions of the end-use sector and power sector.Today,we are even more excited to release our second synthesis report of the series.It is a collaborative achievement of 9 leading international research and modeling teams in climate change and has gathered a pool of experts to review and con

30、solidate the outcome.This report dives into the role of electrification and the associated electricity system transformation in achieving Chinas carbon neutrality goals,and identifies sectoral near-term actions and long-term strategies that reflect technology availability,regional disparity,and econ

31、omic costs.The proposed immediate action,long-term strategy,and policy frameworks will accelerate the electrification and power sector decarbonization and put China on a successful,low-emissions growth pathway.We stand in a time mixed with opportunities and challenges,competition and cooperation.Sus

32、tained research is needed to facilitate Chinas decarbonization and economic transition and EF China will continue supporting such endeavor.We will genuinely and unremittingly pursue multi-win solutions with all partners to create,develop,and share a sustainable future and to help narrate Chinas“New

33、Growth Story”.Here,I sincerely congratulate the author team on this marvelous triumph and thank all the expert friends for their continued and wholehearted support of EF Chinas development.I would also like to thank EF Chinas dream team,without whose efforts this gift cannot come so alive.Thank you!

34、Zou JiCEO&President of Energy Foundation China FOREWORD TABLE OF CONTENTS01 INTRODUCTION 0102 RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN CHINAS CLIMATE POLICIES 052.1 Recent Socioeconomic,Energy,and Emissions Trends 06Changing Economic,Energy,and Emissions Trends Since 2020 06Regional Disparity in Energy Deployment and

35、Emissions 082.2 Recent Policy Development 09Political Commitment to Climate Action 09The“1+N”Policy Framework 09Sectoral and Thematic Policy Development 12Policy Highlights 15Policy and Implementation Gaps 1503 THE PATHWAY TO NET ZERO BEFORE 2060 173.1 Scenarios 183.2 Emissions Pathways 193.3 Energy

36、 Transitions 22Primary Energy 22Final Energy 2504 THE ROLE OF ELECTRIFICATION IN END-USE SECTORS 294.1 Current Status 304.2 Future Electrification Pathways 324.3 Policy Implications 3505 ELECTRIFICATION ROADMAP FOR BUILDINGS 375.1 Current Status 385.2 Role of Building Electrification in Carbon Neutr

37、ality 395.3 Challenges and Opportunities 40Challenges 40Opportunities 415.4 Key Areas for Electrification 42Residential Space Heating 42Cooking 47Water Heating 47PV Onsite Use in Buildings 475.5 Key Policy Approaches 48TABLE OF CONTENTS 06 ELECTRIFICATION ROADMAP FOR INDUSTRY 516.1 Current Status 52

38、6.2 Role of Industry Electrification in Carbon Neutrality 536.3 Challenges and Opportunities 57Challenges 57Opportunities 586.4 Key Areas for Industrial Electrification 59Industrial Restructure and Upgrade 59Production Process Adjustment and Electric Substitution Technology 59Advanced Industrial Ele

39、ctrification Technology 606.5 Key Policy Approaches 6607 ELECTRIFICATION ROADMAP FOR TRANSPORTATION 687.1 Current Status 697.2 Role of Transportation Electrification in Carbon Neutrality 707.3 Challenges and Opportunities 73Challenges 73Opportunities 747.4 Key Areas for Transportation Electrificatio

40、n 75Electric Vehicle Manufacturing and Sales 75Charging Station Deployment 767.5 Key Policy Approaches 7608 THE POWER SYSTEM AND ELECTRIFICATION 788.1 Current Status 798.2 Transitions in the Electricity System 798.3 Challenges and Opportunities 83Challenges 83Opportunities 838.4 Key areas and Potent

41、ial of Electrification 85Supply Side Flexibility 85Load Side Flexibility 86Grid Side Flexibility 868.5 Key Policy Approaches 8709 CONCLUSIONS 909.1 Electrification in Meeting Chinas Carbon Neutrality Target 919.2 Areas of Future Research 92REFERENCES 94TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES02Figure 2.1Ti

42、meline of“1+N”Policies Released by July 2022.11Figure 2.2Timeline of Key Climate Policies Released in 2021 and 2022.1403Figure 3.1Emissions Pathways to Net-Zero GHG Emissions by 2060.19Figure B3.1Carbon Intensity Reduction in Alignment with Chinese Policy Targets.20Figure 3.2GHG Emissions by Sector

43、in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neu-trality Scenario.21Figure 3.3Primary Energy Transitions in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality Scenario:(A)Total Primary Energy,(B)Primary En-ergy by Technology.23Figure B3.2National Primary Energy Targets and Comparison with Mod-eling Analysis:(A)Share of Fossil an

44、d Non-Fossil Energy in Primary Energy,(B)Primary Energy per Unit of GDP.24Figure 3.4Primary Energy Share in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrali-ty Scenario.25Figure 3.5Final Energy Transitions in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neu-trality Scenario:(A)Total Final Energy,(B)Final Energy by Fuel.27Figure B3.

45、4Hydrogen Production Across Models in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality Scenario.2804Figure 4.1Final Energy Electrification Rate in the Updated NDC to Car-bon Neutrality Scenario.33Figure 4.2Electrification in Net-Zero Pathways in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality Scenario:(A)Per Capita Electr

46、icity Con-sumption Relative to GDP in China and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)Countries,(B)Final Energy Electricity Demand Across Models.33Figure 4.3Electrification Roadmap.36LIST OF FIGURES 05Figure 5.1Historical Trend of Electrification in the Buildings Sector of Chin

47、a,Japan and the U.S.38Figure 5.2 Building Final Energy Consumption in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality Scenario:(A)Total Final Energy,(B)Final Energy by Fuel.39Figure 5.3Electrification in the Buildings sector in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality Scenario.(A)Electricity Demand.(B)Elec-trifica

48、tion Rate.40Figure B5.1Ground-Source Heat Pumps Pumps for Space Heating.4506Figure 6.1Carbon Emissions from Chinas Manufacturing Subsectors in Figure 6.2Industry Final Energy Consumption in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality Scenario:(A)Total Final Energy,(B)Final Energy by Fuel.54Figur

49、e 6.3Electrification in Industry Sector in the Updated NDC to Car-bon Neutrality Scenario.(A)Electricity Demand.(B)Electrifi-cation Rate.54Figure 6.4Hydrogen Shares in Industry Sector in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality Scenario.55Figure 6.5Energy Consumption by Industrial Subsector in the PECE_

50、LIU 2021 model.56Figure 6.6Share of Energy Consumption by Industrial Subsector in the PECE_LIU 2021 model.56Figure B6.2Crude Steel Production in Top 5 Provinces.6407Figure 7.1Historical Trend of Share of Electrification in the Transporta-tion Sector of China,Japan and the U.S.70Figure 7.2Passenger T

51、ransportation Final Energy Consumption in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality Scenario:(A)Total Final Energy,(B)Final Energy by Fuel.71Figure 7.3Freight Transportation Final Energy Consumption in the Up-dated NDC to Carbon Neutrality Scenario:(A)Total Final Ener-gy,(B)Final Energy by Fuel.72Figure

52、7.4Electrification in the Transportation Sector in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality Scenario.72Figure 7.5Fuel Shares in Transportation Sector in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality Scenario.73LIST OF FIGURES 08Figure 8.1Electricity System Transition in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality Scena

53、rio.80Figure 8.2Total Electricity Capacity by Technology in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality Scenario.80Figure 8.3 Electricity Generation Shares in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality Scenario.81Figure 8.4Solar and Wind Capacity in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neu-trality Scenario.82Figure 8.5Rene

54、wable Energy Share(%)of Total Electricity Generation in(A)2030 and(B)2060 in Mainland Provinces.84LIST OF FIGURES 01INTRODUCTION SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS 01 Energy Foundation01INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 0102 SYNTHESIS REPOR

55、T 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSIn September 2020,President Xi pledged that China would peak its carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.In April 2021,he announced Chinas plan to strictly limit the incr

56、ease in coal consumption over the 14th Five Year Plan(FYP)and phase it down in the 15th FYP.In September 2021,President Xi made further pledges that China would stop building new coal-fired power plants overseas.Throughout 2021,President Xi and other high-level Chinese officials reiterated and reinf

57、orced Chinas commitment to the“30/60”goals on multiple occasions,signaling the countrys intention to accelerate low-carbon transition.These pledges communicate a serious commitment to climate change mitigation.But,like other countries moving forward on climate,the pathway to reach these goals is not

58、 free of obstacles or choices about which of many different possible roads China should take.Many of these obstacles are present today,as China implements its 14th FYP and perceives its 15th and subsequent FYPs on the horizon.Energy security is one of the top priorities of Chinas development strateg

59、y.Current world events pose new challenges to Chinas energy and economic development.In the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict,global energy markets are in turmoil with rising oil and gas prices.China,as an energy importer,has been experiencing higher energy costs and commodity prices.Domestically,

60、China has struggled with several power shortages in 2021 and 2022,making stable and reliable energy supply the countrys prime concern.Meeting Chinas climate pledges will require significant energy system transition.Ensuring energy security in this transition is a key priority.Electrification is a co

61、re part of Chinas pathway to carbon neutrality.Electrification of end-use sectors,coupled with demand-side measures and power system decarbonization,can help achieve a low-emissions future while promoting energy security.As the Chinese electricity mix is currently quite carbon intensive,transitions

62、in end-use sectors and the electricity system need to go hand in hand.By replacing fossil fuels in buildings,industry,and transportation with electricity generated from low-or zero-emissions fuels,significant CO2 emissions reduction can be achieved.Meanwhile,modernizing the grid system and using mor

63、e indigenous renewable resources in electricity generation can foster a flexible and reliable power system and improve energy security.This report is the second in a series of multi-institution reports that assess Chinas carbon neutrality transition.The first report,published in 2020,highlights Chin

64、as pathways towards carbon neutrality and transitions throughout the economy.This report provides an overview of Chinas new policies and energy and emissions trends since 2020.It also conducts deep dives into the role of electricity and focuses on the double transitions of electrifying end-use secto

65、rs and decarbonizing the electricity sector to achieve Chinas carbon neutrality target.It is developed based on new,multi-model,multi-institution analyses,deep-dive working papers on specific sectors,and an assessment of existing research(Box 1.1).It aims to:explore integrated strategies for Chinas

66、carbon neutrality transition,provide an updated understanding of pathways to carbon neutrality;present and synthesize both existing and new transition scenarios from multiple modeling and research teams;assess recent policy development in China;and analyze the alignment between Chinas near-term poli

67、cy targets and its long-term goals.This report particularly highlights the role of electrification and associated electricity system transformation in achieving Chinas“30/60”goals and identifies a set of near-term sectoral actions and long-term sectoral strategies that can be taken to accelerate ele

68、ctrification and power sector decarbonization to put China on a successful,low-emissions growth pathway.01INTRODUCTION SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS 03BOX 1.1:ANALYSES USED IN THIS REPORT 1 CO2 FFI refers to Fossil-Fuel Combust

69、ion and Industrial Process emissions,CO2 AFOLU refers to Agriculture,Forestry and Other Land Use.This report synthesizes a number of quantitative analyses from national and global models,including China DREAM,China TIMES,GCAM-China,MESSAGEix-China,AIM-China,PECE_LIU_2021,and PECE V2.0(see Table B1.1

70、 for detail).Participating models conduct analyses based on two coordinated scenarios:Updated Nationally Determined Contribution(NDC)to Carbon Neutrality and Original NDC to Carbon Neutrality.These scenarios achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2060,but have different peaking times(see Secti

71、on 3.1 for detailed scenario description).We do not attempt to harmonize assumptions across models,and the results shown in this report reflect model-specific interpretation of socioeconomic and technological development in China.Building on these modeling analyses,teams also developed deep-dive ana

72、lyses to address key issues and technology options for electrification in different sectors.These deep-dive papers include provincial-specific renewable energy investment needs,stranded assets and credit risks in Chinas coal power transition,and electrification and transition strategies in industry,

73、transportation,and buildings.Insights from these deep-dive papers are synthesized in this report to provide additional sectoral,spatial,and technological granularity to the analyses.These deep-dive papers are published with this report to provide additional context and information.TABLE B1.1:SUMMARY

74、 OF PARTICIPATING MODELING TEAMS Model NameOrganizationSpatial ResolutionModeling MethodsScenarios ModeledGases Modeled1Documentation/SourceGCAM-ChinaPacific Northwest National Laboratory(PNNL)/University of Maryland(UMD)Global(China is an independent region in GCAM)A dynamic recursive model that re

75、presents the behavior of,and interactions between,five systems:the energy system,water,agriculture and land use,the economy,and the climate.Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality;Original NDC to Carbon NeutralityCO2 FFI,CO2 AFOLU,CH4,F-Gases,N2O(GCAM,2022);(Calvin et al.,2019)AIM-China Beijing University

76、of TechnologyNationalThe currently used models and methods include:computable general equilibrium model;the dynamic economic model;the partial equilibrium model;the minimum cost optimization model,based on linear programming techniques described in detail and industry simulation models.Updated NDC t

77、o Carbon Neutrality;Original NDC to Carbon NeutralityCO2 FFI,CO2 AFOLU,CH4,F-Gases,N2O(IPAC,2020)INTRODUCTION 0104 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSModel NameOrganizationSpatial ResolutionModeling MethodsScenarios ModeledGases Mode

78、led1Documentation/SourceMESSAGEix-ChinaInternational Institute for Applied Systems Analysis(IIASA)Global(China is an independent region)Global systems engineering optimization model used for medium-to long-term energy system planning,energy policy analysis,and scenario development.Updated NDC to Car

79、bon Neutrality;Original NDC to Carbon NeutralityCO2 FFI,CO2 AFOLU,CH4,F-Gases,N2O(IIASA,2021);(Huppmann et al.,2019)China DREAMLawrence Berkeley National Laboratory(LBNL)NationalA bottom-up national energy system model whose primary drivers include physical and socioeconomic activity,energy intensit

80、y,and technology trends,built using the Low Emissions Analysis Platform(LEAP).Updated NDC to Carbon NeutralityCO2 FFI(LBNL,2022)China TIMESTsinghua UniversityNationalA dynamic linear programming energy system optimization model used for near-and long-term energy system analysis and climate change mi

81、tigation pathway development.Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality;Original NDC to Carbon NeutralityCO2 FFI(S.Zhang&Chen,2022)PECE_LIU_2021Harbin Institute of Technology,Shenzhen;Renmin University of ChinaNationalA national energy system model which focuses on Chinas long-term low-carbon transition roadm

82、ap for climate targets,built in Low Emissions Analysis Platform(LEAP)Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality;Original NDC to Carbon NeutralityCO2 FFI,CO2 AFOLU(J.Liu et al.,2021)PECE V2.0Energy Foundation China;Renmin University of ChinaNationalAn integrated energy system model,which is based on partial eq

83、uilibrium framework and quantifies the future energy demand,supply,and emissions.Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality;Original NDC to Carbon Neutrality CO2 FFI,CO2 AFOLU,CH4,F-Gases,N2O(Fragkos et al.,2021)02RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN CHINAS CLIMATE POLICIES SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:

84、ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS 0502RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN CHINAS CLIMATE POLICIES Energy FoundationRECENT DEVELOPMENT IN CHINAS CLIMATE POLICIES 0206 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS2.1 RECENT SOCIOECONOMIC,EN

85、ERGY,AND EMISSIONS TRENDS Changing Economic,Energy,and Emissions Trends Since 2020Starting in 2020,the Chinese economy has entered a new era marked by the“Dual Circulation”strategy(Xinhuanet,2020).This strategy emphasizes both expanded domestic markets(domestic circulation)and growing exports(intern

86、ational circulation).The carbon neutrality goal aligns with the“dual circulation”strategy of greater self-reliance through more clean energy resources and advanced clean technologies and facilitates Chinas complete transformation in both the economy and the energy system.In the past years,new trends

87、 in Chinas energy sector have been observed,including fast renewable expansion,an uptick in coal consumption,and a relatively steep increase in carbon emissions.With growing additions of renewables,Chinas dependence on coal has declined in recent years.China is the worlds biggest energy producer and

88、 consumer since 2009 and relies heavily on coal.In 2021,coal still supplied 56.0%of Chinas total energy consumption of 5.24 billion tonnes of standard coal equivalent(SCE),compared to 72.4%of 2.61 billion tonnes in 2005(NBS,2022c).Meanwhile,Chinas renewable energy capacity has expanded rapidly in re

89、cent years.China had a record expansion of renewables in 2020,a rapid expansion that continued during 2021,when the grid-connected wind power generation went up by 40.5%and solar power generation rose by 25.2%,compared to 8.4%increase of thermal power(CEC,2022a).Moreover,China installed slightly bel

90、ow 17 GW of offshore wind capacity in 2021,compared to 3 GW in 2020,an extraordinary expansion before the expiration of feed-in tariffs,making it operate almost half of the worlds installed offshore wind(CPNN,2022).At the end of June 2022,China had 2,446 GW of installed power capacity,of which,hydro

91、power,wind power,and photovoltaic(PV)reached 400 GW,342 GW and 336 GW,respectively,ranking the highest across the world(CEC,2022c).The amount of renewable power generation(including hydropower and biomass)in China reached 2,480 TWh,accounting for 29.7%of the annual power generation in 2021(The State

92、 Council,2022b).Chinas impressive growth in renewables is expected to well exceed the governments Nationally Determined Contribution(NDC)target of over 1,200 GW installed solar and wind power capacity by 2030.Since August 2021,the government has ended the central subsidies for new photovoltaic power

93、 projects and onshore wind projects.Stepping into the post-subsidy era for renewables,the National Development and Reform Commission(NDRC)announced its first batch of clean energy bases(large-scale solar and wind energy projects)for 97 GW in November 2021 and revealed the second batch of 455 GW in F

94、ebruary 2022,concentrated in the resource-rich desert area in northern China.In total,China nearly added 54.8 GW new renewable electricity generation capacity,accounting for 80%of the total newly-installed power generation capacity in the first half of 2022(NEA,2022a).Along with the national-level p

95、rojects,provincial-level targets and project pipeline installation reflect a far more aggressive deployment pace than the NDC target.Based on progress to date,Chinas 1,200 GW target will be met years earlier than 2030.The rapid expansion of renewable energy and related up-and down-stream industries(

96、manufacturing,installation,etc.)have become Chinas new growth drivers and created numerous job opportunities(CCICED,2022).As the largest producer of wind and solar energy,China claims the bulk of worldwide renewable energy related employment.With 5.37 million jobs in 2021,China accounts for 42.3%of

97、total renewable energy employment worldwide(IRENA&ILO,2021).Furthermore,China is the dominant producer of components for batteries and the 02RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN CHINAS CLIMATE POLICIES SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS 07largest

98、market for electric vehicles(EVs)as well.In 2021,new energy vehicles(NEVs)sales totaled 3.52 million,including electric vehicles(BEVs)(82.8%),plug-in hybrids(17.1%),and fuel cell vehicles(0.1%),an increase of 160%compared to 2020(MIIT,2022).Chinas EV market currently accounts for more than 50%of new

99、 EV sales globally.With an average 13.4%penetration rate of EVs in 2021,China has set national targets to reach 20%by 2025 and 40%by 2030.In the first half of 2022,the penetration rate of NEVs has already exceeded the target and reached 21.6%(CAICT,2022).Chinas EV industry has been and is expected t

100、o continue to trigger industry-wide changes and spark economic growth and job creation.Although Chinas hydrogen industry is in an early stage of development,the rising awareness of the importance of hydrogen at both the national and local levels has created a favorable environment for the hydrogen i

101、ndustry to boom in the near future.By 2050,hydrogen is expected to make up 10%of Chinas energy mix,with an output value of$1,772 billion(CHA,2020).The outbreak of Covid-19 led to more fluctuations in Chinas energy consumption and emissions.With a strict lockdown and plummeting output in early 2020,b

102、oth energy use and emissions temporarily fell,and Chinas economy hit a historical low growth rate(2.2%in 2020)in more than four decades.The government implemented a new infrastructure investment and business-oriented stimulus package to boost the economy,and Chinas economy saw a strong rebound,achie

103、ving 8.1%growth for 2021,the fastest in nearly a decade(The State Council,2022a).As a result,emissions rose in 2021,and,according to IEAs estimate,Chinas energy sector CO2 emissions increased by 750 Mt over the two-year period between 2019 and 2021(IEA,2022a).Another COVID-19 outbreak in early 2022(

104、especially in Shanghai and Beijing)exacerbated weak household consumption and worsened the troubled real estate market.Chinas economy grew by just 0.4%in the second quarter and only 2.5%in the first half,far below the official yearly goal of 5.5%in 2022(NBS,2022b).Energy consumption and emissions ap

105、pear highly likely to remain high in 2022 as a result of strong coal consumption,even in the context of the continued real estate slowdown and fast expansion of renewables.Entering 2022,the Russia-Ukraine crisis has exerted both short-and long-term impacts on Chinas energy industry.Chinas crude oil

106、imports from Russia hit a record level in 2022,as refiners bought up discounted Russian supplies.High global energy prices caused by the crisis and slower energy demand growth have resulted in Chinas lower energy imports.Chinas natural gas imports were down by 10%in the first six months of 2022,comp

107、ared to the same period in 2021;crude oil down by 3.1%,and coal down by 17.5%in the same period(China Economic Net,2022).The government has boosted domestic coal production to ensure supplies and energy security in a tight global market.Raw coal output reached 2.19 billion tonnes,up 11.0%over the fi

108、rst half of 2022(China Economic Net,2022).Also as a result of demand for electric vehicles booming globally and the crisiss impact on commodity markets,the market price of battery-grade lithium carbonate has risen outrageously(the price as of June 2022 was almost six times higher than in June 2021),

109、placing a financial strain on battery manufacturers and hindering Chinas adoption of EVs.A similar situation with silicon,a major material used in PV equipment,threw another price shock to Chinas PV market.Since the beginning of 2021,silicon has seen prices tripled,due to the rising demand from down

110、stream PV manufacturers driven by the rapid PV expansion,supply-side disruption of Chinas“Dual-control”policy(control the high energy use and high emissions projects),and the crisiss impact.The silicon price increase slowed the expansion of production capacity in the PV industry and further caused t

111、he total installed capacity of new PV projects in 2021 to be less than the expected.Owing to the rebound in coal use,Chinas carbon emissions have reached a record high in 2021 and may enter a carbon emissions plateau in the next few years.Driven by economic growth,Chinas carbon emissions had been on

112、 an upward track since the 1990s until 2013,when it reached a plateau.However,since 2017,coal consumption RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN CHINAS CLIMATE POLICIES 0208 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYShas witnessed an uptick,as the Chinese ec

113、onomy faced headwinds and the government sought to stimulate industrial growth.As of 2020,Chinas greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions reached around 13 GtCO2-equivalent(CO2-eq),equating to 9 tCO2-eq per capita.This accounts for about a quarter of global emissions,up from 10.2%in 1990.Nevertheless,the carbon

114、 intensity of GDP dropped from a peak of nearly 810 gCO2 in 2005 to 450 gCO2 over the year 2020(IEA,2021a,2021b).With rapid GDP growth and strong export performance,electricity demand in China grew by 10.3%in 2021,faster than economic growth of 8.1%(CEC,2022a).Half of the 790 TWh increase in electri

115、city demand was met by coal,and Chinas CO2 emissions(fossil fuel and industry,FFI)had reached a record high of 11.9 billion tonnes,accounting for 33%of the global total in 2021(IEA,2022a).Over the next few years,significantly growing renewable power will probably outstrip coal and become the dominan

116、t source to meet the rise in electricity demand.Regional Disparity in Energy Deployment and Emissions China is a vast country characterized by huge regional disparity.While Beijing and other places have already entered the carbon emissions plateau period,northwestern provinces such as Ningxia,Xinjia

117、ng,and Inner Mongolia have witnessed a fast emissions growth in the past decade.In addition,in 2021,Chinas 19 provincial governments approved new coal power plants(EFC,2022).The provinces with the most planned coal projects are Hunan,Shanxi,Shaanxi,and Guangdong (EFC,2022).As of 2021,Jiangsu,Guangdo

118、ng,and Henan are the leaders in wind capacity addition;while the top three provinces of Chinas new installed solar capacity are Shandong,Hebei,and Henan(NNECM,2022).Going back to 2021,although the decision-makers emphasize carbon peaking and carbon neutrality plans to be hierarchical and orderly,pla

119、nning and implementation vary across local governments.Under the current“Dual-control”mechanism,aimed at reducing energy intensity and limiting total energy consumption,some provinces curb dual-high projects and resort to power rationing to meet Dual-control targets.This partially results in a short

120、fall in coal and power supply.At the same time,the reopening of the global economy after the pandemic brought about a surging demand for Chinas export industries and the corresponding increased electricity demand,which coincided with the shortfall in coal supply and pushed up coal prices and costs o

121、f generating electricity.As the government strictly controls electricity prices,coal-fired power plants are reluctant to operate at a loss,hence many have reduced their output.China encountered a severe shortage of electricity that started in the summer in 2021 and rippled across most of eastern Chi

122、na.Energy-intensive industries,such as cement,steel,and aluminum smelting are among the industries most hit by the power outages.Silicon prices were also affected by the lack of power supply.To guarantee winter heat and power supplies,the NDRC had adopted a series of measures to lower down the recor

123、d-high coal prices.Coal producing companies are ramping up production,and coal-fired power plants are expanding coal procurement channels.The boost in coal production puts the production of raw coal at a record high of 4.07 billion tonnes for past years.Coal consumption as of 2021 has nearly reached

124、 the previous coal consumption peak in 2013 of 4.24 billion tonnes(NBS,2022a).There exists a large spatial mismatch between supply and demand of renewable energy in China.Most renewable energy sources are located in the northwest,while the highest power demand is in the southeast.This geographical m

125、ismatch,combined with the limited grid connections from renewable energy power plants to the electricity grid,underdeveloped cross-regional power transmission grids,lack of power trading systems across provinces,and restricted energy-storage facilities,has resulted in the continued curtailment(delib

126、erate reduction in output)of renewables and further hindered renewables development.As of the end of 2021,the wind curtailment rate the ratio of curtailed electricity to total wind 02RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN CHINAS CLIMATE POLICIES SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CH

127、INAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS 09generation exceeded 10%in Qinghai.The PV curtailment rate reached almost 20%in Tibet and nearly 14%in Qinghai(NNECM,2022).In addition,as the government speeds up the construction of clean energy bases concentrated mainly in northern China,fast expansion of the trans

128、mission capabilities connecting energy sources in the northwest with power-hungry needs in the east is becoming increasingly challenging.2.2 RECENT POLICY DEVELOPMENT 2021 is the first year of Chinas 14th Five-Year Plan(20212025).It also marks the first year of the nationwide endeavor to peak carbon

129、 emissions since President Xis announcement of the dual carbon,“30/60”,goals at the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2020.Throughout 2021,the political will in advancing the dual-carbon agenda has remained high.Important policy signals have been announced at national

130、and international meetings,and the“1+N series of policies directing carbon neutrality and carbon emissions peaking efforts were released.Political Commitment to Climate ActionThroughout 2021,the political will to marshal the entire nation to peak carbon emissions and reach carbon neutrality has stay

131、ed strong.President Xi and other high-level national officials reiterated and reinforced Chinas firm dedication to“30/60”goals in multiple important international events and venues.These goals are also reflected in Chinas updated NDC and Long-term Strategy.Domestically,the integral role of carbon pe

132、aking and carbon neutrality in achieving overall prosperity for China have also been emphasized on several high-level political occasions.For example,a top-level“Leaders Group on the Works of Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality”headed by Vice Premier Han Zheng and consisting of heads of ministries

133、involved in the work of peaking carbon emissions and reaching carbon neutrality,has been formed(You,2021).Serving as the high-level coordinator in climate neutrality,the Leaders Group holds regular plenary meetings to review progress and emphasizes priorities in achieving the climate goals(Boer,2022

134、;Xinhuanet,2021a).Entering 2022 the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its ramifications for the global energy supply have shaped the political agenda for co-prioritizing securing energy supply and achieving carbon neutrality.It was emphasized during the 13th National Peoples Congress that,while taking pro

135、active and prudent steps to advance dual carbon goals,China must also ensure the security of energy,food,and industrial and supply chains,echoing previous policy signals sent at a Politburo session earlier this year(Bloomberg News,2022;Global Times,2022).In addition,under the bleak macroeconomic cli

136、mate,the green economy that is closely associated with carbon neutrality is believed to be the new growth engine,which,in turn,enhances the political will at the highest levels to commit to climate actions.The“1+N”Policy FrameworkIn October 2021,China announced a“1+N”policy framework for carbon peak

137、ing and carbon neutrality,which consists of a series of implementation plans for CO2 emissions in key sectors and areas with a variety of supporting policies(MEE,2021c).On the eve of the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference,the highest-level guiding document for Chinas climate action,Workin

138、g Guidance for Carbon Dioxide Peaking and Carbon Neutrality in Full and Faithful Implementation of the New Development Philosophy(referred to as Working Guidance)was published by Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and State Council,setting out the fundamental principle of the countrys

139、future development.This document is known as the“1”RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN CHINAS CLIMATE POLICIES 0210 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSin“1+N”policy framework(Xinhuanet,2021b).The Working Guidance sets high-level goals for crucial

140、energy and carbon indicators by 2025,2030,and 2060(Table 2.1).Closely following the Working Guidance,China submitted its updated NDC and Chinas Mid-Century Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy,outlining the new goals and measures for climate change mitigation and adaptation and

141、 reaffirming the aforementioned climate targets.TABLE 2.1:GOALS SET IN THE WORKING GUIDANCE FOR CARBON DIOXIDE PEAKING AND CARBON NEUTRALITY.Goals2025 To establish an initial framework for a green,low-carbon,and circular economy.To greatly improve energy efficiency of key industries.To reduce energy

142、 consumption per unit of GDP by 13.5%compared to 2020 level.To decrease carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 18%compared to 2020 level.To increase the share of non-fossil energy consumption to around 20%.To increase forest coverage to 24.1%and to increase forest stock volumes to 18 billion m3

143、.2030 To align energy efficiency in key energy-consuming industries with international levels.To significantly reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP.To decrease carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by over 65%compared to 2005 level.To increase non-fossil energy consumption to around 25%.To i

144、ncrease total installed capacity of wind and solar power to over 1,200 GW.To increase forest coverage to 19 billion m3.To peak and to reach the plateau of carbon emissions,and carbon emissions start to decline.2060 To increase the share of non-fossil energy consumption to over 80%.To achieve carbon

145、neutrality.Soon later,a nation-wide carbon peaking action plan describing how China intends to peak its carbon emissions by 2030,known as the Action Plan for Carbon Dioxide Peaking Before 2030(referred to as the Action Plan below),was announced(Xinhuanet,2021c).It is regarded as the first in the“N”s

146、eries of policy,including the major actionable areas in the endeavor for peaking carbon emissions.The“1+N policy framework emphasizes that Chinas carbon mitigation action should take a whole-of-nation approach that features a balance between development and emissions reduction,between overall and lo

147、cal imperatives,and between short-term and long-term considerations.Guarding against risks is also highlighted in the Working Guidance,in line with the recent change of tone on coal-related policies during the first half of 2022.Into 2022,sectoral and thematic plans have been subsequently released t

148、o support carbon peaking action under the guidance of the Leadership Group,putting the“N”framework into shape.As outlined in Figure 2.1 below,sectoral plans have been sequentially released for industry,urban-rural construction,and agriculture and rural regions,while the mitigation efforts of the tra

149、nsportation sector are guided by a high-level implementation opinion on achieving the dual carbon goals.Also,guidelines to mobilize fiscal instruments and policies to achieve dual carbon goals and to synergize carbon reduction with pollution abatement have been released.Research into and drafting of

150、 action plans for iron and steel,petrochemicals,non-ferrous metal,electricity,oil,and gas are in full swing and might be unveiled in the coming months(NDRC,2021a).Additional enabling policies are on the way for instance,the action plan for using science and technology to support carbon emission peak

151、ing and carbon neutrality will be published by NDRC in the near future(NDRC,2021b).02RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN CHINAS CLIMATE POLICIES SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS 11FIGURE 2.1:TIMELINE OF“1+N”POLICIES RELEASED BY JULY 2022.By ann

152、ouncement timeOct2021Nov2021Dec2021Jan2022Feb2022Mar2022Apr2022May2022June2022July20222022“Working Guidance for Carbon Peaking and Neutrality”“Carbon Peaking Action Plan”Jinagsu:ImplementationOpinionsQingshai:ImplementationOpinionsImplementation Plan for Emissions Reduction andCarbon Sequestration i

153、n Agriculture and Rural AreasNingxia:CarbonPeakingActionPlanJiangxi:Carbon PeakingAction PlanImplementation Opinions ofTransportation SectorGuangxi:ImplementationOpinionsOpinions on Fiscal Support forCarbon Peak and Carbon NeutralityImplementation Plans for Synergizing theReduction of Pollution and

154、Carbon EmissionInner Mongolia:ImplementationOpinionsIndustryCarbon PeakingAction PlanUrban-Rural ConstructionCarbon Peaking Action PlanImplementation Opinions ofState-Owned EnterprisesShanghai:Implementation Opinions&Carbon Peaking Action PlansGuangdong:ImplementationOpinionsZhejiang:ImplementationO

155、pinionsJiangxi:ImplementationOpinionsJilin:Carbon PeakingAction PlanChongqing:ImplementationOpinionsIMPLEMENTATION OPINIONS:Implementation Opinions for Carbon Dioxide Peaking and Carbon NeutralityRECENT DEVELOPMENT IN CHINAS CLIMATE POLICIES 0212 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELE

156、CTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSSimilarly,subnational roadmaps to carbon emission peaking are being developed across the nation.By the end of July 2022,eleven provinces and cities have released their own guiding documents and/or carbon peaking action plans,as displayed on Figure 2.1

157、.The national carbon peaking goal is further broken down and manifested as quantitative targets in the subnational roadmaps,reflecting the overall philosophy of peaking CO2 emissions hierarchically and in an orderly progression across all regions by promoting green and low-carbon development compati

158、ble to local conditions.For example,to unlock the tremendous potential of green finances in the Greater Bay Area,Guangdong province has established a sound and prudent green finance service system to support climate actions and investments that lead to carbon peaking in the province(Peoples Governme

159、nt of Guangdong Province,2022).With as many as 37 sectoral,industrial,and thematic policies incorporated into the“1+N”framework,the next step will focus on synergistic efforts to advance towards the dual carbon goals and to design and implement detailed rulebooks(L.Zhang,2022).Sectoral and Thematic

160、Policy DevelopmentIn addition to the aforementioned“1+N”policies,important policies concerning the low-carbon transition at central and local levels that cover a wide range of sectors and cross-cutting topics have been released(see Figure 2.2).Since relevant work was launched years ago,the formulati

161、on and release of supporting policies are leading the entire policymaking process,including compulsory GHG emission information disclosure by carbon-intensive enterprises,the yearly updates of green bond endorsed projects catalog,and the development of ecological compensation mechanism(MEE,2021a,202

162、1b;PBC et al.,2021).New arrangements of supporting measures have been put into effect to facilitate the entire economy and society to engage actively with low-carbon transition.For example,last November,Peoples Bank of China rolled out a carbon emission reduction facility to mobilize social capital

163、in the development of clean energy,energy conservation,carbon reduction technologies,and other relevant key action areas(PBC,2021).Moreover,it is worth noting that China has put the development of a modern and new power system featuring a high proportion of stable renewable energy and secure grid co

164、nnection high on its national task list,especially during the 14th FYP period.As shown in Figure 2.2,beginning in May 2021,a series of planning documents have been released to map out the future development of key technologies and components of the new power system,such as expansion of pumped storag

165、e hydropower for energy security;hydrogen development as an alternative energy source and energy storage;other new energy storage technologies and projects;and energy pricing reform and interprovincial power trading schemes.Another milestone was the first anniversary of Chinas national emission trad

166、ing scheme(ETS)in July,2022.Until now,Chinas national ETS covers 2,162 key emitters in the power sector,which together contribute to 4.5 billion tonnes of CO2 emissions per year(MEE,2022b).Over the past year,the cumulative transaction volume of CEA(Carbon Emission Allowance)in the worlds largest car

167、bon market reached 194 million tonnes.The cumulative transaction value is around RMB 8.45 billion,with a carbon price fluctuating between 40 to 60 yuan per tonne(MEE,2022b;K.Wang et al.,2022).The current allowance allocation mechanism is based on emission intensity of emitters rather than an absolut

168、e cap on their emission amounts,and only the power sector is included.Parallel to the national market are the subnational ETS pilots,where emitting enterprises in cement,iron and steel,petrochemicals,paper making,and aviation industries conduct transactions to comply with their emission reduction go

169、als(Zeng et al.,2021).During the first and current compliance cycles,China Certified Emission Reductions(CCER)credits were allowed to be used to offset no more 02RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN CHINAS CLIMATE POLICIES SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALIT

170、Y PATHWAYS 13than 5%of emissions by each emitting entity,and a cumulative amount of 169 million tonnes were transacted by the end of 2021(Tan,2022).As regulations and standards on ecological compensation and environmental equity financing instruments take shape,the national CCER market is likely to

171、be rebooted late in 2022 or in 2023(Xu,2022).Energy FoundationRECENT DEVELOPMENT IN CHINAS CLIMATE POLICIES 0214 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSFIGURE 2.2:TIMELINE OF KEY CLIMATE POLICIES RELEASED IN 2021 AND 2022.TIMELINE OF CLI

172、MATE POLICIES RELEASED IN 2021 AND 2022By announcement time2020Jan2021Feb2021March2021April2021May2021June2021July2021Aug2021Sept2021Oct2021Nov2021Dec20212022Enhanced EnergyConservation and REUtilization Standards3060 GoalClimate FinancingGuidelinesEnterpriseGHG MRVValue RealizationEcological Produc

173、tsGreen BondCatalogue14th National FYPControl ofDual-HighProjectsEnergy Pricing ReformLaunch ofNational ETSUpdated NDC<SCOP 26 in GlasgowGuiding Opinions onEnhanced AQ ActionHigh-Quality Development of Resource-Intensive Regions“Working Guidance for Carbon Peaking and Neutrality”“Carbon Peaking Ac

174、tion Plan”Dual Control ofEnergy ConsumptionUrban-RuralGreen DevelopmentSynergetic Reductionof Pollution andCarbon EmissionsCoordinated Workof Climate Changeand EnvironmentalProtectionEcological ProtectionCompensationCarbon Emission in EIA-Industrial Parks Pilots14th FYPon CEEV SectorPlanningGreen De

175、velopmentof High-Tech ParksGuidingOpinionson CE14th FYPOn CleanProductionCarbonEmissionsin EIA-IndustryPilotsStandardizationNew EnergyStorage ProjectsCoalPowerRetrofitMRVfor ETSPBCCERFPSHLong-TermPlanningHydrogenDevelopmentModernEnergySystemsREMRVETSEIAGHGPBCRenewable EnergyMeasurement,Reporting,and

176、 Verification Emission Trading Scheme Environmental Impact Assessment Greenhouse GasThe Peoples Bank of ChinaCERFCEPSHFYPNDCCarbon Emission Reduction Facility Circular EconomyPumped Storage HydropowerFive Year PlanNationally Determined CommitmentCCEPLTSClimate ChangeEnvironmental ProtectionLong-Term

177、 Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategies02RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN CHINAS CLIMATE POLICIES SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS 15Policy Highlights The Working Guidance and Action Plan are two of the most high-level documents

178、concerning Chinas delivery of its climate commitment under the Paris Agreement.These documents highlight an array of policy areas as prioritized working fields in the coming years.Several new one-of-a-kind policies in Chinas climate endeavor are proposed.First,a new long-term climate goal:the share

179、of non-fossil energy consumption would be over 80%by 2060,together with accompanying goals to control the consumption of other types of fossil fuels,including the public commitment to peak oil consumption during the 15th FYP(20262030).Second,this marks the beginning of mainstreaming climate change a

180、nd the low-carbon mindset in overall socioeconomic development,at both national and subnational levels.All medium-and long-term plans should and would incorporate carbon emission peaking and neutrality goals.Specific action plans are formulated in different sectors and subnational territories to pro

181、mote and guarantee the achievement of the 30/60 goals.Third,it highlights the critical role played by subnational governments in the ultimate achievement of 30/60 goals.The subnational governance performance evaluation system will incorporate indicators related to peaking carbon emissions and carbon

182、 neutrality with great weights assigned.Accordingly,the oversight and assessment of carbon targets will be strengthened and be subjected to the Central Inspections on Environmental Protection.Local authorities have often prioritized economic development over climate and energy goals,and the Working

183、Guidance is believed to give them enough political motivation to overturn the economic-focused mindset(Hsu,2021).Fourth,the Working Guidance underscores the strength of market mechanisms and socioeconomic instruments,particularly stressing the imperative role of investment policies,green finance,and

184、 tax,fiscal,and pricing policies.It also,identifies the need to upgrade existing laws and regulations and formulate an auxiliary or supporting policy framework to cover several key areas,such as:deepening energy and power market reform;improving the measurement,reporting,and verification system;cont

185、aining irrational expansion of dual-high projects;upgrading the standardization system;and promoting a low-carbon lifestyle and working philosophy among the public and businesses.Finally,the Action Plan rolls out ten major action areas that cover almost all key sectors of Chinas economy,including en

186、ergy,industry,transportation,residential sector,urban-rural development,and circular economy.For each sector,the Action Plan lays out a brief roadmap,with key enablers and leverage points,to reduce energy consumption and shift towards sustainable methods.The holistically-designed Action Plan emphasi

187、zes that peaking carbon dioxide emissions and achieving carbon neutrality are two society-wide undertakings and should progress in tandem with Chinas transition to a high-quality growth mode.Policy and Implementation GapsThough a range of restrictive and quantitative targets is set to guide the low-

188、carbon transition,there are not a set of quantitative targets or dwindling cap on total carbon dioxide emissions at either national or subnational/sectoral levels.The current carbon market is not of a cap-and-trade design either.This indicates the absence of a nationwide and political recognition of

189、 carbon as a production factor,without which it will be hard for China to plan and implement an orderly peaking of carbon dioxide emissions at subnational and sectoral levels(Caijing,2021;Gao,2020;T.Ma,2020).The absence of these targets is also observed in the previously released 14th FYP and update

190、d NDC.However,releasing quantitative carbon emissions caps in the near RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN CHINAS CLIMATE POLICIES 0216 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSfuture may be on the horizon.In December,the Central Economic Work Conferenc

191、e discussed that China should expedite the shift from an energy-based dual control system to a carbon-based dual control system(Sino-German Cooperation on Climate Change,2021).Legislation still lags behind the fast-paced policymaking process in climate action.For example,the Renewable Energy Law and

192、 the Energy Conservation Law should be updated to accommodate the new restrictive targets and strict control over dual high projects.More important,a Climate Change Law or Climate Act is needed to grant legal status to the restrictive energy and carbon targets and to strengthen implementation from a

193、 law enforcement level.In addition,a Climate Act will also provide a legal basis for the establishment of the national carbon emission cap and facilitate the transition of carbon allowance allocation mechanism from performance-based to a cap on absolute amount by determining the initial allocation o

194、f carbon ownership(T.Ma,2020).Emissions inventory and a sound MRV(Measurement,Reporting,and Verification)system lay the very foundation of scientific and equitable carbon mitigation action and policies.The most updated official GHG inventory is available only for year 2014.Many sectors(e.g.,transpor

195、tation,industries,and agriculture)are still waiting for a standard MRV manual and inventory methodology to direct real-world MRV practices at all levels,be it sectoral or emitting unit level.Lacking reliable base data has already postponed the expanding of the national carbon market to include other

196、 industries,making it an urgent gap to be fulfilled as soon as possible(Tao,2022).Furthermore,to foster an honest and transparent transaction environment for future scaled up and development,governmental capacity to oversee MRV processes should be enhanced to eradicate data fraud events.In terms of

197、goal-setting,the“1+N”policy series has put forward clear-cut targets for the 14th FYP(for the year 2025)and the 15th FYP(for the year 2030).The next milestone in the policies jumps to 2060,missing the important year of 2035.According to the 14th FYP and Vision 2035,China should have basically achiev

198、ed the socialist modernization and the Beautiful China Initiative by then.2035 marks an important year point for the transition period from peaking.By 2035 Chinas carbon dioxide emissions would steadily decline after peaking;however,no quantitative and detailed targets for total carbon emission,carb

199、on intensity,total energy consumption,or energy intensity have been specified.The current landscape also lacks quantitative goal-setting for non-CO2 GHG emissions,such as methane,HFCs,N2O,PFCs,and SF6.Finally,several thematic areas are not given sufficient consideration in the current policy framewo

200、rk.They include cross-sectoral coordination at subnational level,an overall plan for orderly subnational action roadmaps,and enabling policies to take care of stranded assets for retired capacity and vulnerable communities.For example,transition risks became a major concern for subnational governmen

201、ts and sectors that have high dependence on fossil fuels.Yet no specific Action Area is dedicated to exploring and proposing a fair and just transition mechanism to help ease the pain exerted upon certain populations and enterprises,and to guarantee that no one is left behind in Chinas low-carbon tr

202、ansition.03THE PATHWAY TO NET ZERO BEFORE 2060 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS 1703THE PATHWAY TO NET ZERO BEFORE 2060 Energy FoundationTHE PATHWAY TO NET ZERO BEFORE 2060 0318 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:EL

203、ECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSTo better understand the different pathways for meeting ambitious climate targets,and to determine how near-term policies align with long-term goals,this report evaluated results from seven modeling teams(see Box 1.1)across two 2 In Chinas Mid-Centur

204、y Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy,China reiterated the goal of achieving carbon neutrality before 2060.In a speech delivered in 2021,Minister Xie mentioned that China is working towards net-zero GHG emissions by 2060.The target of net-zero GHG emissions by 2060 reflects ou

205、r understanding of Chinas long-term climate goals and is consistent with the target of achieving carbon neutrality before 2060.different scenarios that are defined by different near-term policy choices.This analysis can help to identify priorities for climate change mitigation policy and outline are

206、as of uncertainties across modeling teams.3.1 SCENARIOSThis years report explores two main scenarios designed to assess the implications of reaching net-zero GHGs before 20602(Table 3.1).The scenarios are identical in that they require GHG emissions to reach net-zero in 2060,but they differ in how q

207、uickly Chinas emissions peak before declining to meet 2060 goals.In the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality scenario,in line with the updated NDC submitted by China to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in October 2021,Chinas emissions peak before 2030(which means,between 2025 an

208、d 2030),allowing it to rapidly turn toward the long-term goal.To achieve the earlier peaking,this pathway would call for policies over the coming decade that are more ambitious than those are currently on the books.The Original NDC to Carbon Neutrality scenario explores the consistency of current po

209、licies that are aligned with Chinas original NDC submission from 2015 and the long-term goal.In this scenario,current policies are kept in place,and Chinas CO2 emissions do not peak earlier than 2030.The majority of this report focuses on the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality scenario.Model results s

210、hown in Chapters 49,if not specifically explained,are from the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality scenario.TABLE 3.1:SCENARIO DEFINITIONS.ScenarioNet-Zero GHG YearNet CO2 Emissions Peak YearAlignment with Near-Term PoliciesUpdated NDC to Carbon Neutrality2060Before 2030Aligns with updated NDC up to 20

211、30Original NDC to Carbon Neutrality20602030Aligns with first NDC submission up to 2030Not all models in this study include all GHGs.For models that only include CO2 emissions,net CO2 emissions were assumed to reach zero in 2050 in both scenarios.This assumption is based on the results from the scena

212、rios in this report and in the Synthesis Report 2020,which show that CO2 emissions will reach zero about ten years before total GHG emissions reach zero.In this sense,03THE PATHWAY TO NET ZERO BEFORE 2060 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY P

213、ATHWAYS 19a 2060 net-zero GHG goal is roughly equivalent to a 2050 net-zero CO2 goal.In addition,China DREAM and China TIMES do not include land-use sector emissions.Instead,they use an estimated amount of-500 MtCO2-eq annually from other sources in their reporting(Forsell et al.,2016).Land-use emis

214、sions from other models are either endogenously calculated or calculated based on emissions inventory or domestic expert estimates.3.2 EMISSIONS PATHWAYSTo achieve carbon neutrality before 2060,as shown by the multi-model results(see Figure 3.1),China needs to peak its CO2 emissions before 2030 and

215、dramatically reduce emissions afterwards.The peak amount of net CO2 emissions between 2025 and 2030 is within the range of 10.311.7 and 10.512.1 GtCO2.Chinas CO2 emissions from energy and industrial processes peak around the same time,with the range of 11.011.9 and 11.312.2 GtCO2 in the Updated NDC

216、to Carbon Neutrality and Original NDC to Carbon Neutrality scenarios,respectively.Chinas net CO2 emissions reach zero around 2050/2055 and get to about negative 0.61.8 GtCO2 by 2060 to offset remaining non-CO2 emissions.In terms of net GHG emissions,Chinas GHG emissions peak around 2025/2030 at the

217、level of 12.314.3 and 12.914.7 GtCO2-eq in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality and Original NDC to Carbon Neutrality scenarios,respectively,and get to around zero by 2060.FIGURE 3.1:EMISSIONS PATHWAYS TO NET-ZERO GHG EMISSIONS BY 2060.The left panel shows Chinas net CO2 emissions across models in U

218、pdated NDC to Carbon Neutrality pathways(green)and Original NDC to Carbon Neutrality pathways(blue).These two scenarios indicate larger variations in system transition and emissions reduction in the near term across models and between scenarios.The right panels show normalized trajectories(2015=1)of

219、 emissions reductions for non-CO2 GHGs.Absolute emission levels of non-CO2 GHGs are not used here due to large inventory uncertainties:CH4 30%;N2O 60%;F-gases 30%(Shukla et al.,2022).Net CO22020203020402050206003,0006,0009,00012,00015,000Emissions(MtCO2)F GasesN2OCH42020 2040 20600.00.51.01.50.00.51

220、.01.50.00.51.01.5Index(2015=1)Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality Original NDC to Carbon Neutrality-3,000THE PATHWAY TO NET ZERO BEFORE 2060 0320 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSNon-CO2 emissions in China were about 2 GtCO2-eq in 201

221、5.Among them,CH4,N2O and F-gases(HFCs,PFCs,and SF6)account for about 56%,31%,and 12%,respectively(ICCSD,2020).The multi-model results show that non-CO2 emissions peak around 2025-2030.N2O and CH4 decline relatively quickly,between 2025/2030 and 2040.The near-term F-gases emissions trend varies acros

222、s models before 2030,but after 2030,emissions decline rapidly(see Figure 3.2).CH4 emissions are mainly from coal extraction and from livestock and rice cultivation of the agricultural sector(about 0.54 and 0.47 GtCO2-eq in 2015,respectively)(ICCSD,2020).In the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality scenar

223、io,driven by the phase-out of coal use in the energy sector and reduction in coal production,CH4 emissions decrease significantly over time,with 6080%reduction between 2020 and 2060.Most of the remaining emissions are from the agricultural sector.N2O is emitted mainly from fertilizer use,manure mana

224、gement,and certain industrial processes,about 0.6 billion GtCO2-eq in 2014(ICCSD,2020).With more effective use of fertilizer,better manure management,and improved pipeline controlling in related industrial processing,models indicate a range of 4595%reduction of N2O emissions between 2015 and 2060.F-

225、gases emissions primarily come from the production processes of refrigerants,blowing agents for foams,etc.There are larger variations across models on F-gases emissions reduction,as models indicate different rates of reduction in HFCs,PFCs,and SF6.Not all models could submit all three F-gases,so onl

226、y four models are included in the panel.F-gas emissions are reduced by 4071%by 2060,as compared to 2020 emissions.BOX 3.1:HOW DO CHINAS CARBON INTENSITY TARGETS ALIGN WITH NET-ZERO PATHWAYS?Chinas 14th FYP targets reducing the carbon intensity(i.e.,energy CO2 per unit GDP)of the country by 18%in 202

227、5 compared to 2020.In addition,Chinas updated NDC requires carbon intensity reduction by over 65%in 2030 compared to the 2005 level.The multi-model results show that Chinas 14th FYP and updated NDC targets on carbon intensity reduction are roughly aligned with the net-zero transition pathways but ca

228、n be further enhanced.All the participating models achieve these targets in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality scenario(see Figure B3.1).FIGURE B3.1:CARBON INTENSITY REDUCTION IN ALIGNMENT WITH CHINESE POLICY TARGETS.Carbon intensity is measured as energy-related CO2 emissions per unit of GDP.To a

229、ssess the alignment with Chinas 14th FYP target(18%reduction in energy CO2 per unit of GDP between 2020 and 2025),we use modeling results for 2020 and beyond.To assess the alignment with Chinas updated NDC target(over 65%reduction in 2030 compared to the 2005 level),we use model data for models that

230、 report 2005 data and use historical 2005 CO2 emissions and GDP data for models that do not have 2005 data.Historical data is from the Chinese Energy Statistical Yearbook(CESY).GDP assumptions are not harmonized across models in this study,and,therefore,changes in carbon intensity reflect difference

231、s in both the rate of economic growth and mitigation pathways across models.120%100%80%60%40%20%0%-20%Percent Change Compared to 2020Percent Change Compared to 200518%20402020200520052060FIGURE 3.2.2:ENERGY RELATED C02 PER GDP REDUCTIONS IN ALIGNMENT WITH POLICY TARGETS14th five year plan commits 18

232、%reduction in energy CO2 per unit of GDP by 2025,and NDC commits to a 65%reduction by 2030120%100%80%60%40%20%0%-20%20202040206065%Updated NDC to Carbon NeutralityOriginal NDC to Carbon NeutralityCESY03THE PATHWAY TO NET ZERO BEFORE 2060 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICAT

233、ION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS 21As shown by the multi-model results in Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2,in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality scenario CO2 emissions from the industrial sector peak around 20202025 with the amount of emissions about 4.24.8 GtCO2,then decrease to about 0.41.4 GtCO

234、2 in 2050 and to 0.090.5 GtCO2 in 2060.Although the industrial sector would not be fully decarbonized by the mid-century,models indicate 6992%reductions by 2050 and 8798%reductions by 2060,compared to 2020 levels.CO2 emissions from the transportation sector peak between 20252035 across models,at the

235、 level of 1.041.3 GtCO2.In order to achieve net-zero GHG emissions by 2060,2020 emissions need to be reduced by about 54100%in 2050 and by 84100%in 2060.As for the buildings sector,the peak time of its CO2 emissions is quite uncertain with different models.For the involved seven models,three models

236、in 2015,two models in 2020,and two models in 2025,the amount of peak emissions of the buildings sector ranges from 0.650.81 GtCO2,and such peak emissions need to decrease significantly,by about 70100%,in 2060.The modeling analysis indicates that CO2 emissions from the electricity sector peak around

237、20202025,with an amount of 3.84.9 GtCO2,and reach zero or negative emissions between 2040 and 2050 across models.Four of the models indicate that the electricity sector would be a source of negative emissions to offset the remaining emissions from the energy system.However,estimates for negative emi

238、ssions from AFOLU and the electricity sector vary,highlighting uncertainty in potential offset from these sectors.For land sinks,the range across models was about negative 100650 MtCO2 in 2050 across scenarios,with one model estimating AFOLU offset(including other CDR)of about negative 1,300 MtCO2.S

239、everal models foresee biomass with carbon capture,utilization and storage in the electricity sector being a significant source of negative emissions,with estimates ranging from negative 500900 MtCO2,while three models project limited negative even positive emissions from the power sector by 2050.FIG

240、URE 3.2:GHG EMISSIONS BY SECTOR IN THE UPDATED NDC TO CARBON NEUTRALITY SCENARIO.“Other”includes“Heat,Solids,Gases,and Liquids(which includes feedstock use,upstream oil refining,heating,coal to gas/oil).China DREAM and China TIMES do not include land use sector emissions,instead they use an estimate

241、d amount of-500 MtCO2-eq annually.Land use emissions from other models are either endogenously calculated or calculated based on emissions inventory or domestic expert estimates.Some models run through 2050,therefore are not included in the 2060 chart.MESSAGEix-China estimates for 2030 are lower tha

242、n other models,because it assumes rapid retirement of coal plants under low-carbon scenarios.Historical data is from the Chinese Energy Statistical Yearbook(CESY).And the AFOLU result for PECE 2.0 includes other CDR.20060CESYPECE V2.0 PECE_LIU_202102,5005,0007,50010,000Emissions(MtCO2 e)A

243、FOLU Buildings Electricity Industry NO2Other TransportationGCAMChina AIM-China MESSAGEixChina PECE V2.0 PECE_LIU_2021 China TIMES China DREAMGCAMChina AIM-China MESSAGEixChina PECE V2.0 PECE_LIU_2021 China DREAMChina DREAMChina TIMESGCAMChinaAIM-China MESSAGEixChina THE PATHWAY TO NET ZERO BEFORE 20

244、60 0322 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSTABLE 3.2:RANGES ACROSS MODELS OF DIRECT EMISSIONS CHANGE COMPARED TO 2020 LEVELS IN UPDATED NDC TO CARBON NEUTRALITY SCENARIO.Emission percent changes were calculated in relation to modeled

245、 2020 values,and sectors that exceed 100%indicate emissions have negative emissions.Sector203020502060MinimumMaximumMinimumMaximumMinimumMaximumIndustry-10%-40%-70%-90%-85%-100%Buildings5%-50%-40%-95%-70%-100%Transportation25%-10%-55%-100%-85%-100%Electricity5%-65%-100%-120%-100%-120%33.3 ENERGY TRA

246、NSITIONS3 Mean power sector emissions reduction is the same in 2060 and 2050,because of rounding.This suggests that emissions reduction in the power sector will largely occur in the near-term,and may level out between 2050 and 2060.4 Range across models without MESSAGEix-China is 6471%by 2030.5 Rang

247、e across models without MESSAGEix-China is 3845%coal share of primary energy by 2030.Primary EnergyMeeting Chinas net-zero commitment requires a rapid transition of the energy system,from fossil fuels to a new system dominated by low-carbon fuels.Our results suggest slow but continued growth in prim

248、ary energy demand in the near-term followed by a decline after mid-century(Figure 3.3).There is significant agreement among base-year primary energy across models,and differences after 2025 are largely due to different assumptions about coal phase-out and energy supply make-up.In the Updated NDC to

249、Carbon Neutrality scenario,fossil primary energy,including fossil fuels with carbon capture,utilization and sequestration(CCUS),declines from 7985%in 2020 to 46714%in 2030,and less than 16%in 2060.The fossil fuel with the largest and most rapid decline across models is coal,which comprises the major

250、ity of Chinas primary energy supply today.Coal declines from 5162%of total primary energy supply today to 1845%5 by 2030 and less than 6%by 2060.Gas may increase until about 2040,then decline(Figure 3.4),suggesting that it may be relied on during the transition to renewable energy and other low-carb

251、on sources.03THE PATHWAY TO NET ZERO BEFORE 2060 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS 23FIGURE 3.3:PRIMARY ENERGY TRANSITIONS IN THE UPDATED NDC TO CARBON NEUTRALITY SCENARIO:(A)TOTAL PRIMARY ENER-GY,(B)PRIMARY ENERGY BY TECHNOLOGY.Al

252、l results were calculated using the average efficiency method.Historical data is from the Chinese Energy Statistical Yearbook(CESY).The rapid reduction and increase in MESSAGEix-China primary energy is due in part to rapid retirement of coal plants under low-carbon scenarios,the fast growth of renew

253、ables,and conversion between direct equivalent and average efficiency substitution methods.02,0004,0006,0002000202020402060Mtce/yrCESY China TIMES GCAMChinaAIMChinaMESSAGEixChina PECE V2.0PECE_LIU_2021 China DREAM(A)20302050206002,0004,0006,000Other Geothermal SolarWindBiomass w/ccus Biomass w/o ccu

254、s Hydro NuclearGas w/ccus Gas w/o ccus Oil w/ccusOil w/o ccus Coal w/ccus Coal w/o ccus(B)China TIMESGCAMChinaAIMChinaAIMChinaAIMChina MESSAGEixChina PECE V2.0 PECE_LIU_2021 China DREAMChina TIMESGCAMChina MESSAGEixChina PECE V2.0 PECE_LIU_2021 China DREAMChina TIMESGCAMChina MESSAGEixChina PECE V2.

255、0 PECE_LIU_2021 China DREAM Energy FoundationTHE PATHWAY TO NET ZERO BEFORE 2060 0324 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSBOX 3.2:HOW ARE NATIONAL PRIMARY TARGETS ALIGNED WITH MODELING ANALYSIS?6 Range across models without MESSAGEix-

256、China is 2936%non-fossil primary energy of the total primary energy in 2030.7 Range across models without MESSAGEix-China is 8488%non-fossil primary energy of the total primary energy in 2060.8 Range across models without MESSAGEix-China is 6%12%solar share of primary energy by 2030.9 The wind power

257、 maximum declines from 2050 to 2060,because the model with the highest percentage of wind power in primary energy reports only through 2050.No models suggest wind power would decline between 2050 and 2060.In response to declining use of fossil fuel resources,there is a significant growth in cleaner

258、energy.Energy supply make-up varies across models,particularly for two key resources solar and wind,which depend on a range of economic and policy choices in the near-and long-term.In the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality scenario,solar and wind contribute 620%8 and 715%,respectively,by 2030,and by 2

259、060,2633%and 1830%9(Figure 3.4).By 2060,solar and wind combined become the dominant fuel source,providing over 50%of total energy supply.The remaining supply will come from biomass(with or without CCUS),hydro power,nuclear,and To accelerate the long-term transition from fossil fuels,several short-te

260、rm targets have been adopted.Most models show greater savings than the 13.5%below 2020 primary energy per unit of GDP target,with a 1431%reduction by 2025,compared to 2020.Modeling analysis also shows non-fossil share of primary energy meets or exceeds Chinese policy targets in 2025.Non-fossil energ

261、y use in 2030 is affected by peaking times.In the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality scenario,models shows 29546%of non-fossil primary energy,exceeding the national target of 25%non-fossil primary energy in 2030.Non-fossil share continues to increase to 84977%by 2060,exceeding the 80%target outlined i

262、n Chinas long-term strategy.Higher non-fossil targets indicated by modeling analysis suggest that there is room for higher ambition and more rapid system transition.Near-term policy targets can be reassessed in the light of increasing long-term ambition as to whether they are aligned with long-term

263、carbon neutrality goals and sufficient to facilitate expedient coal phase-out and renewable transition.FIGURE B3.2:NATIONAL PRIMARY ENERGY TARGETS AND COMPARISON WITH MODELING ANALYSIS:(A)SHARE OF FOSSIL AND NON-FOSSIL ENERGY IN PRIMARY ENERGY,(B)PRIMARY ENERGY PER UNIT OF GDP.Non-fossil sources inc

264、lude solar,wind,geothermal,hydro,biomass with and without CCUS,and nuclear.Fossil sources include coal,oil and gas with and without CCUS.These figures exclude one model,MESSAGEix-China,which had rapid fossil reduction in primary energy.202020402060100%80%60%40%20%0%100%80%60%40%20%0%Share of Total P

265、rimary EnergyPercent Change Compared to 2020202020402060FIGURE 3.3.2:NATIONAL PRIMARY ENERGY TARGETS:NON-FOSSIL SHARES IN PRIMARY ENERGY;PRIMARY ENERGY PER GDP MER.Non-Fossil sources include solar,wind,geothermal,hydro,biomass with CCS and nuclear.Fossil sources include coal,oil and gas.14th Five Ye

266、ar Plan commits to 15%,20%and 25%of non-fossil share of Primary Energy in 2020,2025 and 2030,and 13.5%reduction in Primary Energy per unit of GDP by 2025.(A)100%80%60%40%20%0%20202040206080%15%20%25%(B)13.50%202020402060Updated NDC to Carbon NeutralityOriginal NDC to Carbon NeutralityCESY03THE PATHW

267、AY TO NET ZERO BEFORE 2060 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS 25fossil with CCUS.Biomass with CCUS projections vary across models in the mid-century,with GCAM-China anticipating lower AFOLU negative emissions and higher industry emi

268、ssions,therefore adopting more biomass with CCUS to meet mitigation targets.FIGURE 3.4:PRIMARY ENERGY SHARE IN THE UPDATED NDC TO CARBON NEUTRALITY SCENARIO.Fossil sources include fossil fuels with and without CCUS.Historical data is from the Chinese Energy Statistical Yearbook(CESY).OilSolarWindCoa

269、lGasNuclear2000202020402060200020202040206020002020204020602000202020402060200020202040206020002020204020600.0%5.0%10.0%15.0%20.0%0%10%20%30%0.0%5.0%10.0%15.0%0%10%20%30%0%20%40%60%0.0%5.0%10.0%15.0%20.0%Share of Primary EnergyCESYChina TIMES GCAMChinaAIMChinaMESSAGEixChina PECE V2.0PECE_LIU_2021 Ch

270、ina DREAMThe growth of nuclear energy is uncertain,driven by uncertainties in costs,policies,and other non-technical factors.Most models have a similar base-year share of nuclear in primary energy,of less than 2%.Projections of nuclear energy across models fall within two groups.One group has relati

271、vely conservative assessment of nuclear energy,with nuclear making up roughly 10%of total primary energy by 2060.The other group shows more optimistic assessment of nuclear energy,with more than 20%of nuclear by 2060;as a result,this group of models shows either less shares of fossil fuels with CCUS

272、 or less renewables.The differences in nuclear deployment reflect model differences in costs,deplorability,and policy choices.CCUS becomes increasingly prominent after 2030,from less than 500 MtCO2/yr,to up to 8503,172 MtCO2/yr by 2050,in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality scenario.CCUS could pote

273、ntially play a role in refining,hydrogen production,power,and end-use sectors to offset emissions.Our results suggest that CCUS would be deployed most extensively in the power sector,given the high level of emissions from the power sector,matching between emission sources and storage reservoirs,and

274、negative emission opportunities,such as biomass with CCUS(S.Yu et al.,2019).Additional factors for CCUS deployment include geological potential for onshore CCUS storage,which varies by province(S.Yu et al.,2019).Final EnergyThe transformation pathways of end-use sectors show consistency across model

275、s.All models indicate that the final energy demand would peak around 20252030,then drop rapidly(Figure 3.5).THE PATHWAY TO NET ZERO BEFORE 2060 0326 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSHowever,the amount of the final energy demand var

276、ies significantly,with a range of 3,2504,000 Mtce/yr and 2,4003,700 Mtce/yr at the peak and the carbon-neutral time point(2050),respectively.This is caused mainly by different energy service 10 Model range without AIM-China,which assumes a high level of electrification in transportation,is 2946%in 2

277、050.11 Models may use different reporting methods for solar in end-use sectors.Some models include BIPV in the electricity sector,while others include it in the buildings sector.demand projections,various scale of energy efficiency technologies deployment,and diverse portfolios of fuel alternatives.

278、BOX 3.3:DIFFERENCES IN HISTORICAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION ACROSS MODELS.End-use electricity consumption shows a substantial increase before 2030,while hydrogen does not increase rapidly until 2030.The overall electrification rate in 2050 varies from about 4970%,with industry,transportation,and building s

279、ector electrification rates of 4265%,2961%10 and 6088%,respectively.The share of hydrogen in total final energy demand,which includes hydrogen consumed in the building,industry,and transportation sectors,in 2050 varies from about 27%.Despite the different assumptions about the solar water heaters,bu

280、ilding integrated photovoltaics(BIPV)11,etc.,an increase of solar energy is observed in models,with a range of 18218 Mtce/yr in 2050.Therefore,the above factors collectively contribute to a significant decline in traditional fossil fuel consumption(Gases,Liquids,and Solids)in end-use sectors.Differe

281、nces in base-year(2015)energy data across models are caused mainly by different data sources used for model calibration.Models calibrate historical energy consumption to different energy statistics.Global models MESSAGEix-China and GCAM-China model use IEA energy balances,while national models China

282、 DREAM,China TIMES,AIM-China,PECE_Liu_2021,and PECE V2.0 calibrate historical energy consumption based on China Statistical Yearbook and China Energy Statistical Yearbook.Differences in sectoral scope and methodologies between IEA energy balances and Chinese statistics result in base-year discrepanc

283、ies across models.Additional efforts were taken to adjust base-year energy use and ensure that sectoral scope is the same across models in this report.Remaining differences in 2015 energy use in buildings,industry,and transportation across models are primarily caused by two factors.First,model calib

284、ration can be affected by changes in energy statistics across years.For example,although both models use IEA energy balances,MESSAGEix-China uses the 2017 IEA energy balances,and GCAM-China uses the 2019 IEA energy balances.Chinas total and sectoral energy use in 2015 in these two versions of IEA en

285、ergy balances are different,resulting in base-year differences between MESSAGEix-China and GCAM-China.Second,models sometimes make specific adjustments to energy balances in the calibration process,leading to different base-year energy use across models.For example,the statistical methods adopted by

286、 the China Statistical Yearbook include only fuel consumption by transportation companies in the transportation sector.Transportation energy use by manufacturing facilities and households are accounted for in other sectors.As a result,models that adopt Chinese statistics made model-specific assumpti

287、ons on reallocating fuel consumptions from industry,buildings,and agriculture to the transportation sector,which leads to slight differences in sectoral energy consumption across models.03THE PATHWAY TO NET ZERO BEFORE 2060 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS

288、CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS 27FIGURE 3.5:FINAL ENERGY TRANSITIONS IN THE UPDATED NDC TO CARBON NEUTRALITY SCENARIO:(A)TOTAL FINAL ENERGY,(B)FINAL ENERGY BY FUEL.Historical data is from the Chinese Energy Statistical Yearbook(CESY)and the International Energy Agency(IEA).01,0002,0003,0004,000200020202

289、0402060Mtce/yrIEACESYChina TIMES(A)203020502060China TIMES GCAMChina AIMChinaAIMChinaAIMChinaMESSAGEixChinaPECE V2.0PECE_LIU_2021 China DREAM01,0002,0003,0004,000ElectricitySolarGasesSolids(B)GCAMChinaAIMChinaMESSAGEixChinaPECE V2.0 PECE_LIU_2021 China DREAMChina TIMES GCAMChina MESSAGEixChinaPECE V

290、2.0PECE_LIU_2021 China DREAMChina TIMES GCAMChina MESSAGEixChinaPECE V2.0PECE_LIU_2021 China DREAM Energy FoundationTHE PATHWAY TO NET ZERO BEFORE 2060 0328 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSBOX 3.4:ROLE OF HYDROGEN IN ACHIEVING CAR

291、BON NEUTRALITY IN CHINAAs a clean and sustainable secondary energy,hydrogen energy is an important energy carrier for Chinas energy system transition.Hydrogen energy has the potential for storage applications across time and space and is an important way to achieve deep decarbonization in the end-us

292、e sector.Currently,about 85%of hydrogen is used as industrial feedstocks in methanol production,ammonia production,and petroleum refining industries.Although only a limited amount of hydrogen is currently used as energy input,hydrogen energy will become more commonly used in the next 15 years.In the

293、 Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality scenario,545 Mtce of hydrogen would be used as an energy source in the industrial and transportation sectors by 2035.After that,hydrogen energy will enter a period of rapid diffusion.Hydrogen energy consumption increases to 43175 Mtce in 2050 and further expands to

294、57250 Mtce in 2060,with the share of the freight transportation sector rising to 3658%of total hydrogen energy consumption.Road freight,hydrogen ironmaking,and oil refining are the main sources of the popularization of hydrogen energy,while hydrogen use in the building sector(natural gas blended hyd

295、rogen combustion)and the power system(hydrogen storage)also contributes to hydrogen expansion.At this stage,hydrogen in China is mainly produced from fossil energy,such as coal gasification to hydrogen,steam methane reforming,and naphtha reforming to hydrogen.These technologies,although technically

296、mature and suitable for large-scale production,do not meet the future requirements of clean,low-carbon,and green hydrogen energy.New hydrogen production technologies,such as water electrolysis,nuclear energy hydrogen production,and biomass hydrogen production,have the advantages of flexible producti

297、on and low pollution.Green hydrogen accounts for 70%of the total hydrogen production after 2040 in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality scenario.The vast majority of models favor the use of water electrolysis for hydrogen production,due to the decreasing price of electrolyzers and promotion of renew

298、able energy sources.With its ability to contribute to negative emissions,biomass to hydrogen with CCUS technology also has a bright future.Hydrogen energy can enable large-scale decarbonization production in hard-to-electrify industries,such as steel and chemical production,and reduce oil consumptio

299、n in the transportation sector,making it an important technological option for the industrial and transportation sectors.The hydrogen energy industry chain is divided into several links,including hydrogen production,storage and transportation,refueling,and end-use.The industry chain is long and requ

300、ires much new infrastructure.As a result,there is a large demand for research and development(R&D)in each of these segments.Although the cost of hydrogen production and end-use has declined in recent years,there are still problems of low conversion efficiency and harsh production conditions.To accel

301、erate hydrogen production and deployment,it is critical to mobilize significant investment to improve the distribution system and cultivate the whole industry chain to support the sustainable development of hydrogen energy.It is also important to prioritize R&D into sectors that cannot directly elec

302、trify or adopt energy efficiency measures,as it is unclear what the future cost,availability,applications,and efficiency of hydrogen technologies will be(Ueckerdt et al.,2021).FIGURE B3.4:HYDROGEN PRODUCTION ACROSS MODELS IN THE UPDATED NDC TO CARBON NEUTRALITY SCENARIO.02020402060Mtce/yr

303、China TIMES GCAMChinaAIMChinaMESSAGEixChina PECE V2.0PECE_LIU_2021 China DREAM04THE ROLE OF ELECTRIFICATION IN END-USE SECTORS SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS 2904THE ROLE OF ELECTRIFICATION IN END-USE SECTORS Photo by American P

304、ublic Power Association on UnsplashTHE ROLE OF ELECTRIFICATION IN END-USE SECTORS 0430 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSThe electrification of a wide range of energy end uses across industry,transportation,and building sectors,coup

305、led with the rapid decarbonization of power supply,is an important pillar of Chinas strategy for achieving carbon neutrality.Electrification,energy efficiency,power decarbonization,low-carbon fuel substitution,and carbon dioxide removal are regarded as the five pillars needed to achieve carbon neutr

306、ality(Edenhofer et al.,2014;IEA,2020a;IRENA,2019;Keramidas et al.,2020;S.Yu et al.,2020).To achieve Chinas 2060 carbon neutrality goal,electrification combined with power decarbonization could contribute to 61%of total carbon reduction,and electrification alone would reach 27%(K.Wang et al.,2021).El

307、ectrification is such an important low-carbon transition option,not only because it will be feasible to achieve substantial emissions reductions in electricity more quickly than in other sectors,but it also offers the opportunity to curb,and eventually reduce,final energy consumption due to signific

308、antly higher efficiencies in many applications.Promoting electrification in the context of carbon neutrality requires comprehensive and cross-sectoral integration.Enhanced coordination between end-use sectors and the power sector will help develop cost-effective and efficient policies.However,curren

309、tly,each end-use sector in China has proposed some electrification goals which are disaggregated,unsystematic and lacking inter-sectoral linkages.4.1 CURRENT STATUSChina has been pursuing increasing electrification in end-use sectors for years.The economy-wide electricity share of final energy use w

310、as about 27%in 2019(IEA,2021d).Electricity use per capita was approaching 5,600 KWh,already exceeding the UK and Italy,and close to Germany and France.Several policies have been implemented with a target of expanding electrification in the buildings,transportation,and industry sectors(Table 4.1).How

311、ever,Chinas electrification rates in the residential and commercial building sector are still below the average of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)and the United States(Table 4.2).The buildings sector has the highest electrification rate in all end-use sectors,with th

312、e electrification rate reaching 26%in residential,and 45%in commercial buildings in 2019 (IEA,2021d).Industry already meets close to a third of its total energy needs from electricity,and,despite leading the world in electrification of road transport,only 4%of all transport is electrified in China(T

313、able 4.2).Energy Foundation04THE ROLE OF ELECTRIFICATION IN END-USE SECTORS SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS 31TABLE 4.1:KEY ELECTRIFICATION POLICIES IN CHINA.SectorPolicy NameOutcomeBuildingsImplementation Plan for Carbon Emissio

314、n Peaking in Urban-Rural ConstructionSets a 65%building electrification rate by 2030,pushes for full electrification of new buildings(20%new public buildings in 2030).BuildingsGuiding Opinions on Advancing the Replacement by Electricity(2016)and Energy Supply and Consumption Revolution Strategy(2016

315、-2030)Urban and rural electrification as a key area in reshaping energy consumption(NDRC&NEA,2016a)could be treated as the key policies to drive that process.Total Final energy13th FYP on Energy DevelopmentChina set targets to increase the share of electricity in final energy consumption to 27%in 20

316、20(from 25.8%in 2015)and for fuel-switching to electricity(across all end-use sectors),to lead to a total of 450 TWh of demand(NDRC&NEA,2016a).Power,Buildings,Transport14th FYP(2021-2025)and Guiding Opinions on Further Advancing the Replacement by Electricity(2022)Promotes coal-to-electricity switch

317、ing,the expansion of recharging infrastructure and clean heating and industrial furnace management in Northern areas(The State Council,2021),and the 14th FYP on modern energy system and Guiding Opinions on Further Advancing the Replacement by Electricity further set up targets to increase the share

318、of electricity in final energy consumption to 30%in 2025(NDRC&NEA,2022a,2022b).TransportChinas NEV Industry Development PlanStrategy for innovation in automotive technologies,including EVs.Targets for the share of NEVs(battery,plug-in and fuel-cell electric vehicles)in light-duty vehicle sales:20%by

319、 2025(General Office of the State Council,2020).TransportAction Plan for Carbon Dioxide peaking before 2030By 2030,the share of incremental vehicles fueled by new and clean energy will reach around 40%,carbon emission intensity of commercial vehicles measured on the basis of converted turnover will

320、be cut by about 9.5%compared with 2020(The State Council,2021).BuildingsClean Heating12 Plan for Northern China in Winter(201721)Targets 70%of clean heating coverage in northern regions by 2021(up from 34%in 2016).To tackle air pollution in the provinces of Beijing,Tianjin,Hebei,Henan,Shanxi and Sha

321、ndong,it sets a specific target for 28 Chinese cities to use 100%clean energy sources for heating by 2021.The plan also set targets for expanding solar,biomass,and geothermal heating in buildings(NDRC&NEA,2017).Industry2016 Guiding Opinions on Advancing the Replacement by Electricity and 2022 Guidin

322、g Opinions on Further Advancing the Replacement by ElectricityIdentified key sectors and regions for electrification,as well as measures to promote industrial electric boilers for steam demand,particularly textiles and wood processing on the southeastern coast,and electric furnaces in various sector

323、s,including metal processing,ceramics,mineral wool,and glass(NDRC&NEA,2016a,2022b).12 According to the Clean Heating Plan,clean heating refers to the use of natural gas,electricity,geothermal heat,biomass,solar energy,industrial waste heat,clean coal-fired(ultra-low emission),nuclear energy and othe

324、r clean energy sources to achieve low-emission and low-energy heating methods through high-efficiency energy consumption systems.It includes the whole heating process with the goal of reducing pollutant emissions and energy consumption.THE ROLE OF ELECTRIFICATION IN END-USE SECTORS 0432 SYNTHESIS RE

325、PORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYSTABLE 4.2:COMPARISON OF SECTORAL ELECTRIFICATION RATE BETWEEN CHINA AND THE OECD AVERAGE IN 2019.Electrification rate is defined as the share of electricity consumption in end-use final energy consumption(IEA,2

326、021d).SectorsChinaOECD AverageUnited StatesOECD EuropeIndustry28%32%24%35%Transportation4%1%0.2%2%Residential Buildings26%37%46%26%Commercial Buildings45%54%54%50%13 All the model results from this section and forward,if not specifically explained,are from the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutralityscenari

327、o.Existing electrification rates in China suggest there is room for growth across all end-use sectors,even in sectors where electrification is higher or comparable to the OECD average.The State Grid estimates that electrification during the 14th FYP could result in 600 TWh of additional consumption(

328、nearly 8%of annual electricity consumption in 2020),while the China Electricity Council estimates that the share of electricity in final energy consumption could reach 38%by 2035(CEC,2020;State Council Information Office of the Peoples Republic of China,2020).4.2 FUTURE ELECTRIFICATION PATHWAYS Acco

329、rding to our results,the share of electricity in final energy in China is projected to grow to 6173%in 2060 in the Updated NDC to Carbon Neutrality scenario13(Figure 4.1).This doesnt include indirect use of electricity for making other final forms of energy,such as the use of electrolysis to produce

330、 hydrogen,and synthetic fuels accounting for most of the difference.Electricity becomes the main energy carrier in all end-use sectors,though trends vary significantly.While end-use electricity demand will likely increase through mid-century,per capita electricity will likely not exceed consumption

331、in other OECD countries(Figure 4.2).Challenges of pervasive electrification remain high in the industry sector and freight transportation sector,with alternative fuels,such as hydrogen and bioenergy,potentially serving as options in the longer-term,when emissions will need to be driven out of the ha

332、rd-to-decarbonize sectors.04THE ROLE OF ELECTRIFICATION IN END-USE SECTORS SYNTHESIS REPORT 2022 ON CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY:ELECTRIFICATION IN CHINAS CARBON NEUTRALITY PATHWAYS 33FIGURE 4.1:FINAL ENERGY ELECTRIFICATION RATE IN THE UPDATED NDC TO CARBON NEUTRALITY SCENARIO.Historical data is from th

333、e Chinese Energy Statistical Yearbook(CESY)and the International Energy Agency(IEA).The electrification rate of PECE V2.0 does not include the electricity from distributed PV in building and industry.AIMChinaFIGURE 4.2:ELECTRIFICATION IN NET-ZERO PATHWAYS IN THE UPDATED NDC TO CARBON NEUTRALITY SCENARIO:(A)PER CAPITA ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION RELATIVE TO GDP IN CHINA AND ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO