1、OECD Competition Trends 2023OECD Competition Trends 2023OECD Competition Trends2023This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD.The opinions expressed andarguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OEC

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6、 area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.Please cite this publication as:OECD(2023),OECD Competition Trends 2023,OECD Publishing,Paris,https:/doi.org/10.1787/bcd8f8f8-en.ISBN 978-92-64-33932-3(pdf)ISBN 978-92-64-97819-5(HTML)ISBN 978-92-64-52388-3(epub)Photo cred

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8、tions.3 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Foreword This fourth edition of OECD Competition Trends presents unique insights into global competition trends based on data from 79 OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions.It analyses multi-year data on a large number of economic and legal indicators in the O

9、ECD CompStats database with a focus on the main developments in 2021.In doing so,OECD Competition Trends 2023 supports informed policy making and contributes to improving competition law and policy around the world.The OECD Competition Committee,which includes representatives of the worlds major com

10、petition authorities,is the premier source of policy analysis and advice to governments on how best to harness market forces in the interests of greater global economic efficiency and prosperity.For over 60 years,the OECD and its Competition Committee have taken a leading role in shaping the framewo

11、rk for international co-operation among competition agencies.The resulting recommendations,best practices and policy roundtables serve both as models and inspiration for national initiatives and as tools for sharing global best practices on competition law and policy.Competition officials from devel

12、oped and emerging economies are offered a unique platform from which to monitor developments in competition policy and enforcement,and to discuss new solutions for increasing effectiveness.The OECD CompStats database is the result of an initiative launched in 2018.The database compiles general stati

13、stics relating to competition agencies,including data on enforcement and resources and information on advocacy initiatives.The data are collected annually and currently covers the period 2015-21.The data are mainly presented at an aggregate level,combining the data of individual jurisdictions.The ag

14、gregate-level data includes an analysis(i)for all participating jurisdictions(“All jurisdictions”),(ii)comparing OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions,and(iii)per geographical region(Americas,Asia-Pacific,Europe and Middle East and Africa.As the role and scope of competition law and policy continue to evo

15、lve,the tools of competition authorities must constantly develop and incorporate lessons learned from others.This publication contributes to helping policy makers and competition enforcers to stay up to date with the different ways in which competition law and policy is applied throughout the world.

16、The publication was prepared by the OECD Competition Division,in particular a team composed of Wouter Meester,project leader;Daniel Westrik;and Aura Garca Pabn,all of the OECD Competition Division.The report benefited from comments and suggestions by Ori Schwartz and Antonio Capobianco,respectively

17、Head and Deputy Head of the OECD Competition Division.The report was prepared for publication by Erica Agostinho.The authors thank the individual competition authorities in the participating jurisdictions who provided the information on which much of this publication is based.4 OECD COMPETITION TREN

18、DS 2023 OECD 2023 Table of contents Foreword 3 Executive summary 6 1 OECD CompStats at a glance 9 Regional coverage of the OECD CompStats database 10 Available data in the CompStats database 10 Snapshot of competition resources and enforcement activity 10 2 Key developments in 2021 13 Competition st

19、aff grew much faster in 2021 than in the preceding years 14 Dawn raids recovered from the dip in 2020,but are generally still fewer than pre-pandemic 18 Leniency applications increased in Europe in 2021,but continued declining in the other regions 19 Authorities used more settlements and commitments

20、 in 2021 20 Cartel decisions increased in 2021 while abuse of dominance decisions remained stable 22 Fines increased significantly in all regions 24 Market studies continue to be an advocacy tool for competition authorities 26 The overall intervention rate in merger cases decreased in 2021 26 3 New

21、variables:bid-rigging and industry-analysis 31 Bid-rigging cases are most common in Asia-Pacific 32 Manufacturing seems most prone to cartels,while ICT had the most abuse of dominance decisions 33 Annex A.Sources of CompStats 36 Notes 41 FIGURES Figure 1.1.Regional coverage of the OECD CompStats Dat

22、abase 2021 10 Figure 1.2.Competition resources and enforcement activity,2021 11 Figure 2.1.Distribution of worldwide staff working on competition by region,2021 14 Figure 2.2.Percentage change in 2020-21 of the number of competition staff per jurisdiction 15 Figure 2.3.Average number of competition

23、staff per agency,2015-21 15 Figure 2.4.Competition staff per 1 million inhabitants,2015-21 16 Figure 2.5.Annual percentage change per jurisdiction of staff and budget in 2020-21(top)and between 2015-21(bottom)17 5 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 2.6.Average number of cartel dawn raids

24、for OECD,non-OECD jurisdictions and all jurisdictions,2015-21 18 Figure 2.7.Average number of abuse of dominance dawn raids for OECD,non-OECD and all jurisdictions,2015-21 19 Figure 2.8.Total leniency applications,2015-21 20 Figure 2.9.Percentage of cartel cases with a settlement,2015-21 21 Figure 2

25、.10.Percentage of abuse of dominance cases with a settlement or commitment,2015-21 22 Figure 2.11.Average number of cartel decisions,2015-21 23 Figure 2.12.Average number of abuse of dominance decisions,2015-21 24 Figure 2.13.Total fines imposed(abuse of dominance and cartel cases),2015-21 25 Figure

26、 2.14.Total fines imposed by type of infringement,2015-21 25 Figure 2.15.Average number of market studies 2015-21 26 Figure 2.16.Average merger intervention rate,2015-21 27 Figure 2.17.Percentage change in the number of merger notifications per jurisdiction in 2020-21 28 Figure 2.18.Average number o

27、f merger decisions,2015-21 28 Figure 2.19.Type of merger decisions,2015-21 29 Figure 2.20.Number of decisions with remedies and their percentage with respect to total merger decisions 30 Figure 2.21.Number of prohibitions and withdrawn mergers,2015-21 30 Figure 3.1.Average number of cartel and bid-r

28、igging decisions in 2021 32 Figure 3.2.Proportion of total cartel decisions that involved bid-rigging,2021 33 Figure 3.3.Number of cartel decisions per industry,2021 34 Figure 3.4.Number of cartel decisions per industry(top 10 industries)by region,2021 34 Figure 3.5.Number of abuse of dominance deci

29、sions by industry,2021 35 Figure 3.6.Number of abuse of dominance decisions per industry(top 10 industries)by region,2021 35 INFOGRAPHICS Infographic 1.Key facts and figures 8 TABLES Table A A.1.Competition Authorities in the OECD CompStats Database 38 Follow OECD Publications on:https:/ OECD COMPET

30、ITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Executive summary This report focuses on the main developments in global competition enforcement in 2021.A complete set of graphs covering all competition enforcement indicators,i.e.all indicators on all years(2015-21),can be found on the OECD CompStats website.The report

31、 consists of three chapters.Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of competition enforcement in the 79 participating jurisdictions.Chapter 2 describes the main developments in 2021 compared to 2020.Chapter 3 presents an analysis of three newly introduced variables:the number of bid-rigging(cartel)case

32、s and decisions by industry(separately for cartel and abuse of dominance cases).CompStats at a glance Compared to last years publication,this new edition of the OECD Competition Trends report includes one additional year of data(for 2021)and a net increase of seven jurisdictions.The OECD CompStats d

33、atabase now includes seven years of data for 79 jurisdictions.The newly added jurisdictions allowed for the creation of a new geographic region:“Middle East and Africa”(MEA).The region“Other”,which was included in previous editions,is excluded from this report.Several of the countries previously in“

34、Other”are now in“MEA”,but some have also been allocated to the other existing regions.Key developments in 2021 The most significant changes in 2021 are found in the number of competition staff,dawn raids,leniency applications,settlements and commitments,cartel and abuse of dominance decisions,fines

35、imposed,market studies,and merger activity.Competition staff-The average number of competition staff in the CompStats jurisdictions grew by 4.9%in 2021,with 57%of the jurisdictions increasing their headcount.However,this growth in the number of staff was uneven across geographic regions,with the Ame

36、ricas and Asia-Pacific driving the increase,while Europe and MEA staying relatively stable.When considering the number of competition staff per million inhabitants,the trend remains the same,with one exception:the growth in Europe exceeded the other regions.Dawn raids-The number of dawn raids conduc

37、ted by competition authorities recovered in all regions in 2021 after a significant decrease in 2020 due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.However,the pace of recovery varied among jurisdictions and geographic regions.Non-OECD jurisdictions seemed to bounce back faster,with the number of dawn

38、 raids in 2021 already exceeding 2019,while in OECD jurisdictions the increase was slower,with the number of dawn raids remaining below the number pre-pandemic.Leniency applications-Between 2015-20,leniency applications declined significantly across regions and jurisdictions.This overall decline con

39、tinued in all regions in 2021,except in Europe where applications 7 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 increased by 32%in 2021(although they remained below the number of applications in 2019 and previous years).Settlements and commitments-In 2021,the percentage of cartel and abuse cases that wer

40、e closed with a settlement or commitment generally increased.The increase in cartel settlements,which are more common than cartel commitments,predominantly came from OECD jurisdictions,where on average 44%of the cases ended with a settlement(compared to 29%in 2020).The percentage of abuse of dominan

41、ce cases with a settlement or commitment also increased significantly outside Europe.The percentage of cases increased in all regions except in Europe,where it decreased from 38.5%in 2020 to 20%in 2021.Cartel and abuse of dominance decisions-On average,CompStats jurisdictions took around eight carte

42、l decisions in 2021,which was 9%more than in 2020.This growth was in all regions except the Americas,where the average number of decisions decreased from seven to five.As for the average abuse of dominance decisions,they remained stable,at around three per jurisdiction.Regional differences exist as

43、the average decreased in Americas and MEA,while it increased in Europe and Asia-Pacific.Fines-Total(and average)fines imposed in cartel and abuse of dominance cases increased by 52.5%in 2021.Total fines grew in all regions.The highest growth was in Asia-Pacific,with an increase of 183%.While cartel

44、fines still account for the majority(68%)of total fines,there was a significant increase in the share of abuse of dominance fines from 17%in 2020 to 32%in 2021.Market studies-In 2021,market studies decreased by 4.6%,with a total of 166 market studies across 64 CompStats jurisdictions.However,this va

45、ried by region,with an increase in Europe,and a decline in the other regions,with the most significant decline in MEA.Merger activity and intervention-Merger notifications and decisions significantly increased in 2021,while the intervention rate the percentage of merger cases in which competition au

46、thorities intervened by either prohibiting a merger or approving it under certain conditions decreased,on average,from 2.5%in 2020 to 1.6%in 2021.This decrease in intervention rate was mostly driven by the significant increase in merger decisions(the denominator),as this was not matched by equivalen

47、t growth in intervention(the numerator).Although there was in fact also a decline in the absolute number of interventions,driven by a decline in the number of mergers approved with remedies,while the number of prohibited mergers increased.Thus,this net decrease in interventions,together with the sig

48、nificant increase in the number of merger decisions,lead to a substantial decrease in the intervention rate.New variables:bid-rigging and industry-analysis The OECD CompStats questionnaire included three new questions in 2021.One question referred to the number of cartel decisions that related to bi

49、d-rigging,while the other two new questions identified the number of cartel and abuse of dominance decisions by industry.In 2021,competition authorities in the CompStats jurisdictions took a total of 182 cartel decisions that related to bid-rigging,representing 34%of all cartel decisions.However,reg

50、ional differences were significant,with bid-rigging representing the highest percentage of all cartel decisions in Asia-Pacific(63%)and the lowest in MEA(16%).An analysis of the industries affected by cartel or abuse of dominance decisions in 2021 confirmed previous findings based on economic theory

51、 and empirical literature.The manufacturing industry seems most prone to cartels(representing close to 18%of all cartel decisions),while the ICT industry had most abuse of dominance decisions(accounting for 15%of all abuse of dominance decisions).Again,regional differences exist.For example,in Europ

52、e,the industry with the most cartel decisions was wholesale trade(21%of all cartel decisions in the region),while in Asia-Pacific this was construction(29%of all cartel decisions in the region).In abuse of dominance decisions,ICT was the most common in Europe(23%),while it was manufacturing in Asia-

53、Pacific(24%)and MEA(33%).8 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Infographic 1.Key facts and figures OECD Competition Trends 2023covers almost all global competition enforcement7years(2015-2021)79jurisdictions19.9 millionCompetition budgetsincreased 1%in 2021.126 staffCompetition agencies headcount

54、sgrew 5%2021.Mergers (average,all jurisdictions)Resources(average,all jurisdictions)Merger notificationssignificantly increased.021Total finesincreasedin all regions.Abuse of dominancesettlements andcommitmentsgenerally increased.The number ofcartel settlementswent up.Leniency application

55、s(total number,by region)0500300200021AmericasAsia-PacificEuropeMiddle Eastand AfricaCartel dawn raids(average,all jurisdictions)Competition authorities conductedmore cartel dawn raids.2.54.520202021All-but-oneregioncontinued to decline 9 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023

56、 OECD 2023 This chapter describes the changes in coverage of the report,as well as the creation of a new geographic region,compared to previous editions.It presents a snapshot of the competition resources and enforcement activity of the CompStats jurisdictions.1 OECD CompStats at a glance 10 OECD CO

57、MPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Regional coverage of the OECD CompStats database The coverage of the OECD CompStats database increased relative to the previous edition due to the inclusion of new jurisdictions and one additional year of data.In this report,the OECD CompStats database includes eight

58、new jurisdictions,covering a total number of 79 jurisdictions.1 All new jurisdictions are non-OECD jurisdictions and are located in three different regions:Asia-Pacific(one);2 the Americas(three);3 and the Middle East and Africa(MEA)(four).4 In fact,the addition in 2021 of four jurisdictions in MEA

59、allowed the creation of this separate geographic region for the analysis,replacing the category“Other”in previous editions.Some jurisdictions that were previously included in“Other”are now assigned to the other existing regions.Figure 1.1.Regional coverage of the OECD CompStats Database 2021 Source:

60、OECD CompStats database.The complete list of jurisdictions in each region is included in the Annex,together with the lists of the competition authorities that provided data in each jurisdiction.Available data in the CompStats database The OECD CompStats database temporal coverage increased from six

61、to seven years due to the additional year of data for 2021.The OECD CompStats website contains the underlying data for the figures in this report,aggregate and anonymously,as well as all of the figures from the previous version of the report(OECD Competition Trends 2022)updated for the new jurisdict

62、ions and additional year of data.Snapshot of competition resources and enforcement activity The general overview below provides a snapshot of competition resources and enforcement activity.Non-OECD4179OECD38Europe3479Middle Eastand Africa18Americas10Asia-Pacific17 11 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OEC

63、D 2023 Figure 1.2.Competition resources and enforcement activity,2021 CompetitionbudgetsCompetitionagency staffCarteldecisionsAbuse ofdominancedecisionsMergerdecisionsAmericas469.5mMean 29.3mMedian 7mEurope477.8mMean 15.9mMedian 9.3mAsia-Pacific259.5mMean 23.6mMedian 10.4mMiddle East and Africa112.2

64、mMean 12.5mMedian 4.8mAmericas2 766Mean 163Median 37Europe3 084Mean 93Median 57Asia-Pacific2 549Mean 212Median 136Middle East and Africa450Mean 56Median 34Americas85Mean 5Median 1Europe184Mean 6Median 3Asia-Pacific119Mean 12Median 5Middle East and Africa127Mean 14Median 7Americas85Mean 5Median 2Euro

65、pe69Mean 2Median 1Asia-Pacific21Mean 2Median 1Middle East and Africa53Mean 6Median 2Americas4 655Mean 291Median 35Europe4 144Mean 129Median 58Asia-Pacific2 379Mean 264Median 110Middle East and Africa1 124Mean 141Median 132Total8 849Mean 126Median 58Total515Mean 8Median 3Total228Mean 3Median 1Total12

66、 302Mean 189Median 57Total1.3bMean 20mMedian 9.3mOECDTotal3.7%3.7%4.2%Non-OECD2015-2021Annual growthOECDTotal0.7%0.9%-0.3%Non-OECD2020-2021OECDTotal2.1%2%2.6%Non-OECD2015-2021Annual growthOECDTotal4.9%3.9%8.4%Non-OECD2020-2021OECDTotal-4.5%-1.1%-8%Non-OECD2015-2021Annual growthOECDTotal-0.4%36.5%-27

67、.1%Non-OECD2020-2021OECDTotal-1%-1.3%-0.7%Non-OECD2015-2021Annual growthOECDTotal8.9%2.3%20%Non-OECD2020-2021OECDTotal6.6%6.3%7.7%Non-OECD2015-2021Annual growthOECDTotal40.9%42%35.8%Non-OECD OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Note:All measures based on the number of jurisdictions that

68、 provided all seven years of data(66 jurisdictions for nominal competition budget,70 jurisdictions for competition staff,68 jurisdictions for cartel decisions,67 jurisdictions for abuse of dominance decisions,and 65 jurisdictions for merger decisions).Nominal competition budget figures are in 2015 e

69、uros(non-euro currencies are converted using 2015 official exchange rates on 31 December 2015)to eliminate distortions due to currency fluctuations.Competition staff are staff working only on competition(excluding administrative staff or staff involved in other functions of the authority,such as con

70、sumer protection,public procurement,sector regulation).Source:OECD CompStats database.13 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 This chapter highlights the main global competition enforcement developments in 2021.It includes the most significant changes in variables such as competition staff,dawn ra

71、ids,leniency applications,use of settlements and commitments,enforcement decisions,market studies and merger activity.2 Key developments in 2021 14 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 While previous editions of OECD Competition Trends reports included a complete overview of all aspects of competi

72、tion enforcement around the globe,this years edition focuses specifically on the main developments in 2021.Consequently,the variables that demonstrated the most remarkable changes are discussed,which include:a higher-than-average increase in competition staff,a recovery in dawn raids,a continued dec

73、line in leniency applications in all-but-one region,an increase in the use of settlements or commitments,more cartel decisions,higher imposed fines,a lower number of market studies and increased merger activity.Competition staff grew much faster in 2021 than in the preceding years In 2021,the jurisd

74、ictions in the OECD CompStats database employed 8 848 competition staff,with a mean of 126 and median of 57 per jurisdiction.This represents an increase in total staff of 4.9%with respect to 2020,compared to a compound annual growth rate of only 1.6%over the period 2015 to 2020.However,while the dis

75、tribution of competition staff across regions is unbalanced(see Figure 2.1),so is its growth.Out of 70 jurisdictions that reported data on competition staff for both 2020 and 2021,40(57%)saw an increase in the number of competition staff in the past year,while 20(28%)witnessed a decrease,and there w

76、as no change in the ten remaining jurisdictions(see Figure 2.2).Figure 2.1.Distribution of worldwide staff working on competition by region,2021 Note:Data based on the 70 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for competition staff for seven years.Competition staff are staff

77、 working only on competition(excluding administrative staff or staff involved in other functions of the authority,such as consumer protection,public procurement,sector regulation).Source:OECD CompStats database.31%Americas29%Asia-Pacific35%EuropeJuridictions5%MEA 15 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD

78、 2023 Figure 2.2.Percentage change in 2020-21 of the number of competition staff per jurisdiction Note:Data based on the 70 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for competition staff for seven years.Competition staff are staff working only on competition(excluding administ

79、rative staff or staff involved in other functions of the authority,such as consumer protection,public procurement,sector regulation).Source:OECD CompStats database.Although the average number of competition staff grew in all regions in 2021,the Americas and Asia-Pacific were the main regions driving

80、 this growth.In the Americas,the average number of staff grew from 150 to 163,while Asia-Pacific saw its average headcount increase from 197 to 212.Europe and MEA saw very marginal increases in 2021 to 93 and 56 respectively.When considering the number of competition staff per million inhabitants,th

81、is trend remains mostly the same,growing in all regions except MEA,where it decreased slightly.Figure 2.3.Average number of competition staff per agency,2015-21 Note:Data based on the 70 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for competition staff for seven years.Competition

82、 staff are staff working only on competition(excluding administrative staff or staff involved in other functions of the authority,such as consumer protection,public procurement,sector regulation).Source:OECD CompStats database.-50%0%50%100%150%200%7293434547495153555

83、759600200021AmericasAsia-PacificEuropeMEAOECDNon-OECD16 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 2.4.Competition staff per 1 million inhabitants,2015-21 Note:Data based on the 70 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for comp

84、etition staff for seven years.Competition staff are staff working only on competition(excluding administrative staff or staff involved in other functions of the authority,such as consumer protection,public procurement,sector regulation).Source:OECD CompStats database and United Nations World Populat

85、ion Prospects database.It is also interesting to compare the change in staff per jurisdiction with the change in competition budget.Firstly,as expected,an increase in budget is generally associated with an increase in competition staff(see the positive correlations in Figure 2.5).However,while the l

86、arge majority of competition authorities increased both their budget and staff between 2015-21,a disproportionate number of authorities faced budget cuts in 2021(22 jurisdictions).Furthermore,out of those jurisdictions that had a reduction in budget in 2021,14 still had an increase in the number of

87、competition staff.This may partly explain why the aggregate growth in competition budget was not of the same magnitude as the increase in the number of competition staff.024686200202021Competition staff per 1 million inhabitantsAmericasAsia-PacificEuropeMEAOECDNon-OECD 17 OECD

88、COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 2.5.Annual percentage change per jurisdiction of staff and budget in 2020-21(top)and between 2015-21(bottom)Note:Data based on the 64 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for competition budget and staff for seven years.Nominal comp

89、etition budget figures are in 2015 euros(non-euro currencies are converted using 2015 official exchange rates on 31 December 2015)to eliminate distortions due to currency fluctuations.Competition staff are staff working only on competition(excluding administrative staff or staff involved in other fu

90、nctions of the authority,such as consumer protection,public procurement,sector regulation).Source:OECD CompStats database.-0-40-20020406080Budget percentage growth rate(%)Staff percentage growth rate(%)-40-30-20--10-505540Budget percentage growth rate(%)Staff perc

91、entage growth rate(%)18 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Dawn raids recovered from the dip in 2020,but are generally still fewer than pre-pandemic In 2020,government restrictions in response to COVID-19 meant that many competition authorities stopped performing dawn raids for most of the year.

92、However,in 2021,the number of dawn raids seemed to recover in all regions.The pace of recovery varied among jurisdictions,with an average number of dawn raids in cartel cases in non-OECD jurisdictions higher than in previous years,while the OECD average in 2021 was still lower than in 2019.Figure 2.

93、6.Average number of cartel dawn raids for OECD,non-OECD jurisdictions and all jurisdictions,2015-21 Note:Data based on the 56 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel dawn raids for seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.Dawn raids for abuse of dominance investi

94、gations,of which the majority take place in Europe and MEA,followed a similar trend,showing a recovery in 2021.The recovery was particularly swift in non-OECD jurisdictions,as their average number of abuse of dominance dawn raids in 2021 exceeded levels between 2015-20.OECD jurisdictions performed m

95、ore dawn raids in 2021 than in 2020 but still less than in 2019.024686200202021AllNon-OECDOECD 19 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 2.7.Average number of abuse of dominance dawn raids for OECD,non-OECD and all jurisdictions,2015-21 Note:Data based on the 53 jurisdic

96、tions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance dawn raids for seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.Leniency applications increased in Europe in 2021,but continued declining in the other regions According to the OECD Competition Trends 2022 report,leniency applic

97、ations declined in recent years across the globe.In 2021,this trend generally continued,with Europe being the only exception.In Europe,leniency applications increased by 32%in 2021,from a total of 65 applications in 2020 to 86 in 2021.This increase was noticeable in a significant number of jurisdict

98、ions,with a few that showed sharp increases.Despite this partial recovery,the number of leniency applications in Europe in 2021(86)was still lower than in 2019(96).MEA showed the largest decrease in leniency applications(-75%),followed by the Americas(-50%).00.511.522.5200021Al

99、lNon-OECDOECD20 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 2.8.Total leniency applications,2015-21 Note:Data based on the 51 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for leniency applications for seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.Authorities used more settlements a

100、nd commitments in 2021 Competition authorities use settlement and commitment procedures to terminate cartel and abuse of dominance investigations.Their use may help improve the allocation of an agencys resources by allowing staff to focus on other activities or cases.Thus,they may allow authorities

101、to adopt more decisions for a given amount of resources.Although settlements are most common for cartel cases and commitments for abuse of dominance investigations,some jurisdictions use both tools for either conduct.5 In 2021,on average,one in every three cartel cases was resolved by means of a set

102、tlement,an increase from 26%in 2020.This increase comes after a drop in 2020,so there was a return to levels previously observed in 2019.The increase came particularly from OECD jurisdictions,where on average 44%of the cases ended with a settlement(from 29%in 2020).On the contrary,the aggregate perc

103、entage of cartel cases that ended with settlements in non-OECD jurisdictions remained stable at 24%.Regionally,MEA and the Americas were the regions with the most prominent increases.In MEA,48%of cartel cases in 2021 included settlements(from 35%in 2020),while in the Americas the aggregate percentag

104、e was 28%in 2021(compared to 20%in 2020).However,the percentage in the Americas is still below that in the years 2015-19.Asia-Pacific also saw an increase in the percentage of cartel cases with settlements,namely from 17%in 2020 to 22%in 2021.The increase in Europe was slight,from 28%to 31%.01002003

105、00400500600200020202020202020202020202020202020202021All jurisdictionsNon-OECDOECDAmericasAsia-PacificEuropeMEATotal leniency applications 21 OECD

106、 COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 2.9.Percentage of cartel cases with a settlement,2015-21 Note:Data based on the 54 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel decisions and cartel settlements for seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.The use of settlemen

107、ts and commitments in abuse of dominance investigations overall also increased significantly in 2021.This increase occurred in all regions except Europe,where the percentage of cases decreased from 38%in 2020 to 20%in 2021.In Asia-Pacific,after a year without any settlements or commitments,almost 43

108、%of the abuse of dominance decisions in 2021 ended with a settlement or commitment.In the Americas,the percentage increased from 9%in 2020 to 19%in 2021 and MEA saw an increase from 18%in 2020 to 41%in 2021.00200021AmericasAsia-PacificEuropeMEANon-OECDOECDAll22 OECD

109、COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 2.10.Percentage of abuse of dominance cases with a settlement or commitment,2015-21 Note:Data based on the 60 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance decisions and decisions with settlements or commitments for se

110、ven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.Cartel decisions increased in 2021 while abuse of dominance decisions remained stable The recovery in the number of dawn raids,the increase in leniency applications in Europe and the rise in the use of settlements and commitments to close investigations seems

111、 to have led to an increase in cartel decisions by competition authorities.On average,CompStats jurisdictions took around eight cartel decisions in 2021,an increase from 7 in 2020.This increase occurred in all regions except the Americas,where the average number of cartel decisions decreased from 7

112、in 2020 to 5 in 2021.MEA was the region with the highest average number,namely 14 decisions per jurisdictions taken in 2021.00708090200202021AmericasAsia-PacificEuropeMEANon-OECDOECDAll 23 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 2.11.Average number of cartel de

113、cisions,2015-21 Note:Data based on the 68 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel decisions for seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.In contrast,the average number of abuse of dominance decisions stayed stable(around three per jurisdiction).While it decreased

114、 in Americas and MEA,it increased in Europe and Asia-Pacific.MEA was the region with the highest value,with around six decisions per jurisdiction on average in 2021.0552000002020202020202172

115、0020202020202021All jurisdictionsNon-OECDOECDAmericasAsia-PacificEuropeMEAAverage number of cartel decisions24 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 2.12.Average number of abuse of dominance decisions,2015-21 Note:Data based on the 67 ju

116、risdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance decisions for seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.Fines increased significantly in all regions The total fines imposed in cartel and abuse of dominance cases increased in all regions in 2021.The total amount

117、of fines imposed by all participating jurisdictions increased by 53%,from EUR 5.6 billion in 2020 to EUR 8.5 billion in 2021.The average amount of fines per jurisdiction increased from EUR 84.4 million in 2020 to EUR 128.8 million in 2021.Asia-Pacific showed the largest growth of 183%from EUR 0.21 b

118、illion in total in 2020 to EUR 0.6 billion in 2021.In MEA,total fines increased from EUR 0.68 billion in 2020 to EUR 1.24 billion in 2021,growing more than 80%.The increase in Europe was 43%(from EUR 3.73 billion in 2020 to EUR 5.33 billion in 2021)and 41%in the Americas(from EUR 0.93 billion in 202

119、0 to EUR 1.32 billion in 2021).0200020202020202020202020202020202020202021All jurisdictionsNon-OECDOECDAmericasAsia-PacificEuropeMiddle

120、 East and AfricaAverage number of decisions 25 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 2.13.Total fines imposed(abuse of dominance and cartel cases),2015-21 Note:Data based on the 62 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for all seven years.Fines are in 201

121、5 euros(non-euro currencies are converted using 2015 official exchange rates on 31 December 2015)to eliminate distortions due to currency fluctuations.Source:OECD CompStats database.While cartels still make up the majority of the fines(68%),there was a significant increase in the share of abuse of d

122、ominance fines in 2021 from 17%in 2020 to 32%.Figure 2.14.Total fines imposed by type of infringement,2015-21 Note:Data based on the 62 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for all seven years.Fines are in 2015 euros(non-euro currencies are converted using 2015

123、official exchange rates on 31 December 2015)to eliminate distortions due to currency fluctuations.Source:OECD CompStats database.024686200202020202020202020202020202020

124、202020202021AllNon-OECDOECDAmericasAsia-PacificEuropeMEA billion052001920202021 billionTotal abuse of dominance finesTotal cartel fines26 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Market studies continue to be an advocacy tool for competition authorities In 2

125、021,market studies decreased by 4.6%,with CompStats jurisdictions finalising a total of 166 market studies in 2021,compared 174 in 2020.Some regional differences exist:Europe saw an increase(from an average of 2.7 market studies per jurisdiction in 2020 to 2.9 in 2021),while the other three regions

126、saw a decrease,of which MEAs decrease was the most pronounced(from 2.6 in 2020 to 1.7 in 2021).Figure 2.15.Average number of market studies 2015-21 Note:Data based on the 64 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for market studies for seven years.Source:OECD CompStats datab

127、ase.The overall intervention rate in merger cases decreased in 2021 The average merger intervention rate(i.e.,the percentage of merger cases in which competition authorities have intervened,either by prohibiting a merger or by approving a merger under certain conditions)decreased from 2.5%in 2020 to

128、 1.6%in 2021.00.511.522.533.5200020202020202020202020202020202020202021All jurisdictionsNon-OECDOECDAmericasAsia-PacificEuropeMEAAverage number of

129、 market studies 27 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 2.16.Average merger intervention rate,2015-21 Note:Data based on the 65 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for all seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.The decline in the merger interventio

130、n rate was due to both a slight decrease in the number of mergers in which competition authorities intervened(the numerator)and,even more so,due to a significant increase in the number of merger decisions(the denominator).In 57 of 65 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that reported merger data

131、for seven years,there was an increase in merger notifications in 2021.The increase,on average,was 47%with respect to notifications in 2020.This increase was somewhat expected,as notified mergers had already started to pick up in the second half of 2020 after an initial decline that year as a result

132、of the COVID-19 pandemic that made some firms pause their merger activity given the economic uncertainty.While increased merger activity in 2021 has certainly played a major role in most jurisdictions,the change in merger notification thresholds in some jurisdictions may also have been a relevant fa

133、ctor.Such modifications can lead,and have led,to a significant change in the number of mergers that are required to be notified.For instance,in some jurisdictions,like the Philippines,the relevant legislation was altered to modify,even if temporarily,the merger notification thresholds.In others,thre

134、sholds levels changed as a result of being indexed to macroeconomic variables,such as gross national product in the United States.Finally,jurisdictions like Austria and Germany,recently introduced new criteria to notify transactions,particularly,transaction value thresholds,which could have had an i

135、mpact on the number of decisions that have been notified since their introduction.0.0%0.5%1.0%1.5%2.0%2.5%3.0%20002128 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 2.17.Percentage change in the number of merger notifications per jurisdiction in 2020-21 Note:Data based on the 6

136、5 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for all seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.In 2021,the average number of merger decisions increased by 41%(relative to 2020)to 189 per jurisdiction.However,regional differences exist.The Americas was the region with

137、 the largest increase,from an average of 160 decisions per jurisdiction in 2020 to 291 in 2021.Moreover,merger decisions increased in all-but-one of the jurisdictions in the region,more than doubling in some.The average number of merger decisions per jurisdiction increased 31%in Asia-Pacific,from 20

138、2 to 264,32%in MEA,from 107 to 141,and 19%in Europe,from 109 to 130.Figure 2.18.Average number of merger decisions,2015-21 Note:Data based on the 65 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for all seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.-100%-50%0%50%100%150%200

139、%250%300%350%729343454749563Percentage changeAverage change0500300200020202020202020202020202020202021

140、720021All JurisdictionsNon-OECDOECDAmericasAsia-PacificEuropeMEA 29 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 As in previous years,most mergers in 2021 did not raise competition issues,with 95%of the mergers cleared in Phase I without remedies,the highest this percentage has been over the pe

141、riod 2015-21.The remaining 5%required further investigation or intervention.Around 3.4%of mergers went into Phase II but did not require any intervention.Figure 2.19.Type of merger decisions,2015-21 Note:Data based on the 65 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data

142、for all seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.In 1.4%of merger decisions,competition authorities were able to resolve the identified competition concerns through a remedy in either Phase I or Phase II.In absolute values,this accounted for 167 transactions approved conditionally in 2021,which re

143、presents a decrease from 2020,when 196 transactions were subject to remedies.This is the second factor that contributed to the decrease in the intervention rate.88%90%92%94%96%98%100%200021Phase I ClearancesPhase II ClearancesPhase I Clearances with remediesPhase II Clearances

144、with remediesPhase II prohibitions(or trials)30 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 2.20.Number of decisions with remedies and their percentage with respect to total merger decisions Note:Data based on the 65 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for al

145、l seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.Although the intervention rate decreased on aggregate,29 mergers were prohibited in 2021(0.2%of merger decisions).This represents an increase of 38%from the 21 prohibited in 2020.Finally,41 merger notifications were withdrawn in 2021,compared to 51 in 202

146、0,which represents a decrease of close to 20%.Figure 2.21.Number of prohibitions and withdrawn mergers,2015-21 Note:Data based on the 65 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for all seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.0.0100.0120.0140.0160.0180.0200.0220.

147、0240500200021Proportion of remedies over total decisionsNumber of decisions with remediesYearDecisions with remediesPercentage of decisions with remedies00708090200202021Number of casesYearWithdrawn mergersProhibitionsProhibitions and

148、 Withdrawals 31 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 This chapter provides an analysis of new competition enforcement variables that have been included in the OECD CompStats:the number of cartel decisions that related to bid-rigging and the number of cartel and abuse of dominance decisions by indu

149、stry.3 New variables:bid-rigging and industry-analysis 32 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 The OECD CompStats questionnaire included three new questions in 2021.One question determined the number of cartel decisions that related to bid-rigging,while the other two new questions identified the n

150、umber of cartel and abuse of dominance decisions by industry.This chapter presents an analysis of these new variables.Bid-rigging cases are most common in Asia-Pacific The competition authorities in the CompStats jurisdictions took a total of 182 cartel decisions in 2021 that concerned bid-rigging.T

151、his represents 34%of all cartel decisions from the CompStats database in that year(537).On average,there were 2.5 bid-rigging cases per jurisdiction.Figure 3.1.Average number of cartel and bid-rigging decisions in 2021 Note:Data based on the 74 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provi

152、ded comparable data for all seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.The focus on bid-rigging decisions was most prevalent in Asia-Pacific in 2021(63%of cartel decisions in the region),while MEA was the region with the lowest percentage(16%).Europe and the Americas were in between both extremes,th

153、e percentage in the America(40%)was almost twice as high as in Europe(21%).There were 89 in Asia-Pacific(an average of 5.9 per jurisdiction),39 in Europe(an average of 1.2 per jurisdiction),34 in the Americas(an average of 2.1 per jurisdiction),and 20 in MEA(an average of 2.0 per jurisdiction).02468

154、101214AllOECDNon-OECDAmericasAsia PacificEuropeMEAAverage cartel decisionsAverage bid rigging decisions 33 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 3.2.Proportion of total cartel decisions that involved bid-rigging,2021 Note:Data based on the 74 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that

155、 provided comparable data for all seven years.Source:Manufacturing seems most prone to cartels,while ICT had the most abuse of dominance decisions In 2021,competition authorities in CompStats jurisdictions took 428 cartel decisions and 222 abuse of dominance decisions.Competition authorities classif

156、ied these decisions by industry,using two-digit NAICS codes,depending on the industry(or industries)that were affected by each decision.An analysis of the industries affected by the cartels or abuse of dominance in CompStats jurisdictions in 2021 has led to some interesting observations and confirme

157、d earlier findings.6 While manufacturing was the industry with most cartel decisions(79 cartel decisions in 2021,which represents almost 18%of total cartel decisions),followed by construction(69 cartel decisions,representing almost 16%of total cartel decisions),competition authorities participating

158、in CompStats took most abuse of dominance decisions in the ICT industry(34 decisions,representing 15%of all abuse of dominance decisions).When looking closer at the different jurisdictions,regional differences exist.With respect to cartel decisions,manufacturing was the most common industry in Ameri

159、cas and MEA(representing 28%of cartel decisions in each region).In Europe,the industry with the most cartel decisions was wholesale trade(21%of all cartel decisions in the region),and in Asia-Pacific it was construction(29%of the cartel decisions in the region).As for abuse of dominance decisions,tr

160、ansportation and warehousing was the industry with the most decisions in the Americas(26%of the abuse of dominance decisions in the region),ICT in Europe(23%),and manufacturing in Asia-Pacific and MEA(24%and 33%,respectively).0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%AllOECDNon-OECDAmericasAsia PacificEuropeMEA34 OECD

161、 COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 3.3.Number of cartel decisions per industry,2021 Note:Decisions by industry were classified according to two-digit NAICS codes.Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as follows:11 agriculture,21 mining,22 utilities,23 construction,31-33 manuf

162、acturing,42 wholesale trade,44-45 retail trade,48-49 transportation,51 ICT,52 finance,53 real estate,54 professional services,55 management,56 administrative services,51 education,62 health care,71 entertainment,72 Accom.And food,81 other services,and 92 public administration.Data based on the 75 ju

163、risdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for all seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.Figure 3.4.Number of cartel decisions per industry(top 10 industries)by region,2021 Note:Decisions by industry were classified according to two-digit NAICS codes.Their correspo

164、ndence with the legends in this graph is as follows:11 agriculture,21 mining,22 utilities,23 construction,31-33 manufacturing,42 wholesale trade,44-45 retail trade,48-49 transportation,51 ICT,52 finance,53 real estate,54 professional services,55 management,56 administrative services,51 education,62

165、health care,71 entertainment,72 Accom.And food,81 other services,and 92 public administration.Data based on the 75 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for all seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.00708090 0554045ManufacturingConstruc

166、tionWholesaleTradeRetail TradeTransportationProfessionalServicesHealthcareFinanceICTAdministrativeServicesAmericasEuropeAsia-PacificMEA 35 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Figure 3.5.Number of abuse of dominance decisions by industry,2021 Note:Decisions by industry were classified according to

167、 two-digit NAICS codes.Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as follows:11 agriculture,21 mining,22 utilities,23 construction,31-33 manufacturing,42 wholesale trade,44-45 retail trade,48-49 transportation,51 ICT,52 finance,53 real estate,54 professional services,55 management,56 adm

168、inistrative services,51 education,62 health care,71 entertainment,72 Accom.And food,81 other services,and 92 public administration.Data based on the 73 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for all seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.Figure 3.6.Number of a

169、buse of dominance decisions per industry(top 10 industries)by region,2021 Note:Decisions by industry were classified according to two-digit NAICS codes.Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as follows:11 agriculture,21 mining,22 utilities,23 construction,31-33 manufacturing,42 whole

170、sale trade,44-45 retail trade,48-49 transportation,51 ICT,52 finance,53 real estate,54 professional services,55 management,56 administrative services,51 education,62 health care,71 entertainment,72 Accom.And food,81 other services,and 92 public administration.Data based on the 73 jurisdictions in th

171、e OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for all seven years.Source:OECD CompStats database.055400510152025ICTManufacturing TransportationHealthcareWholesaleTradeUtilitiesProfessionalServicesFinanceOther ServicesAgricultureAmericasEuropeAsia-PacificMEA36 OECD COMPETITION TR

172、ENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Annex A.Sources of CompStats In 2018,under the guidance of the Bureau of the Competition Committee,the OECD Secretariat launched an initiative to develop a database of general statistics relating to competition agencies,including data on enforcement and information on advocacy in

173、itiatives.Some statistics related to competition authorities activities are already publicly available.However,this information is often dispersed,lacks consistency across time and jurisdictions,and is currently not used systematically to identify overall trends from which to draw policy lessons.Thi

174、s initiative fills this gap.The OECD Secretariat collects data annually from:(i)competition authorities in OECD countries;(ii)authorities in non-OECD jurisdictions that are Participants or Associates in the OECD Competition Committee;and(iii)agencies in jurisdictions that are neither OECD member nor

175、 a participant or associate in the OECD Competition Committee but have expressed an interest to join the database.Jurisdictions The OECD CompStats database currently covers data from competition agencies in 79 jurisdictions,of which 38 jurisdictions are OECD countries(including the European Commissi

176、on).7 There are four geographic regions used in the analysis:Americas,Asia-Pacific,Europe,and Middle East and Africa(MEA).The 79 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database are allocated to these geographic regions as follows(jurisdictions with an asterisk(*)are considered as OECD members for the d

177、ata analysis):Americas(18):Argentina,Barbados,Brazil,Canada*,Chile*,Colombia*,Costa Rica*,Dominican Republic,Ecuador,El Salvador,Mexico*,Nicaragua,Panama,Paraguay,Peru,Trinidad and Tobago,United States*,and Uruguay.Asia-Pacific(17):Australia*,Bangladesh,Brunei Darussalam,Chinese Taipei,Hong Kong(Chi

178、na),India,Indonesia,Japan*,Kazakhstan,Korea*,Malaysia,New Zealand*,Philippines,Singapore,Thailand,Uzbekistan,and Viet Nam.Europe(34):Albania*,Austria,Belgium*,Bulgaria,Croatia,the Czech Republic*,Denmark*,European Commission*,Estonia,Finland*,France*,Germany*,Greece*,Hungary*,Iceland*,Ireland*,Italy

179、*,Latvia*,Lithuania*,Luxembourg*,Malta,Montenegro,the Netherlands*,Norway*,Poland*,Portugal*,Romania,the Slovak Republic*,Slovenia*,Spain*,Sweden*,Switzerland*,Ukraine,and the United Kingdom*.MEA(10):Botswana,COMESA,Egypt,Israel*,Kenya,Mauritius,Saudi Arabia,South Africa,Tunisia,and the Republic of

180、Trkiye*.Period The OECD CompStats database contains seven years of annual data for the period 2015 to 2021.37 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Data The following areas are currently covered in OECD CompStats database.There are 34 variables in total.1.General information Budget Number of staff

181、Number of competition staff 2.Cartels and other anticompetitive agreements Number of decisions Number of decisions per industry Number of decisions related to bid-rigging Number of decisions on vertical agreements Number of cases with settlements or plea bargain Number of cases with negotiated/conse

182、nsual procedure for settling cases Number of leniency applications Number of ex-officio investigations launched Number of cases that used a dawn raid Total amount of fines imposed Number of companies fined Number of cases with fines on individual Number of cases with imprisonment of individual 3.Abu

183、se of dominance/unilateral conduct Number of decisions Number of decisions per industry Number of cases with settlements or plea bargain Number of cases with negotiated/consensual procedure for settling cases Number of investigations launched Number of cases that used a dawn raid Total amount of fin

184、es imposed Number of companies fined 4.Mergers and acquisitions Number of notifications Number of Phase One(or single phase)clearances Number of Phase One(or single phase)clearances with remedies Number of Phase Two clearances(after an in-depth investigation)Number of Phase Two clearances with remed

185、ies Number of Phase Two prohibitions(or trials)38 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Number of withdrawn notifications by merging parties in Phase Two 5.Advocacy Number of market studies Number of formal advocacy opinions issued to governments,regulators,legislators Number of advocacy events org

186、anised 6.Additional public data In order to enrich the database and allow for better and in-depth analysis,the Secretariat has added the following variables to the database:Gross domestic product(GDP,current prices,purchasing power parity)data from the World Bank development indicators database.For

187、some countries(Japan and Chinese Taipei),GDP data is from the International Monetary Fund(GDP,current prices,purchasing power parity).Population data from the United Nations World Population Prospects 2019 Year of implementation of competition law Year of establishment of competition agency Year of

188、adoption of merger control Characteristics of merger control regimes in CompStats(mandatory vs.voluntary merger notification,filing-fee requirements,selected criteria for establishing merger-notification threshold,use of simplified merger regime,and one-phase vs.two-phase approaches)Competition Auth

189、orities in the OECD CompStats Database The following competition authorities contributed with the information for the OECD CompStats Database.Table A A.1.Competition Authorities in the OECD CompStats Database Jurisdiction Competition authority(name in English)Albania Competition Authority of Albania

190、 Argentina National Antitrust Commission Australia Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Austria The Federal Competition Authority Bangladesh Bangladesh Competition Commission Barbados The Barbados Fair Trading Commission Belgium Belgian Competition Authority Botswana Competition and Consum

191、er Authority Brazil Administrative Council for Economic Defence Brunei Darussalam Competition Commission Brunei Darussalam Department of Competition and Consumer Affairs(DCCA)Department of Economic Planning and Statistics Ministry of Finance and Economy Bulgaria Commission on Protection of Competiti

192、on Canada The Competition Bureau Canada Chile National Economic Prosecutor Tribunal for the Defense of Free Competition Chinese Taipei The Fair Trade Commission of Chinese Taipei Colombia Superintendence of Industry and Commerce COMESA COMESA Competition Commission 39 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OE

193、CD 2023 Jurisdiction Competition authority(name in English)Costa Rica Commission for the Promotion of Competition Costa Rica Telecommunications Superintendency Croatia Croatian Competition Agency Czech Republic Office for the Protection of Competition Denmark Danish Competition and Consumer Authorit

194、y Dominican Republic National Commission for the Defence of Competition of the Dominican Republic Ecuador Superintendency for Control of Market Power Egypt Egyptian Competition Authority El Salvador Superintendency of Competition Estonia The Estonian Competition Authority European Commission Europea

195、n Commission Directorate-General for Competition Finland Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority France French Competition Authority Germany Federal Cartel Office Greece Hellenic Competition Commission Hong Kong,China Competition Commission(Hong Kong)Hungary Hungarian Competition Authority Icelan

196、d Icelandic Competition Authority India the Competition Commission of India Indonesia Indonesia Competition Commission Ireland Competition and Consumer Protection Commission Israel Israel Competition Authority Italy Italian Competition Authority Japan Japan Fair Trade Commission Kazakhstan Agency fo

197、r the Protection and Development of Competition Kenya Competition Authority of Kenya Korea Korea Fair Trade Commission Latvia Competition Council of the Republic of Latvia Lithuania Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania Luxembourg Competition Council Malaysia Malaysia Competition Commissi

198、on Malta Malta Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority The Office for Competition Mauritius Competition Commission of Mauritius Mexico Federal Economic Competition Commission Federal Institute of Telecommunications Montenegro Agency for Protection of Competition Netherlands Authority for Consumer

199、s and Markets New Zealand New Zealand Commerce Commission Nicaragua National Institute for the Promotion of Competition Norway Norwegian Competition Authority Panama Authority for Consumer Protection and Competition Defense Paraguay National Competition Commission Peru National Institute for the Def

200、ence of Free Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property Philippines Philippine Competition Commission Poland Office of Competition and Consumer Protection Portugal Portuguese Competition Authority Romania Romanian Competition Council Saudi Arabia General Authority for Competition Singap

201、ore Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore Slovak Republic Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic Slovenia Slovenian Competition Protection Agency South Africa Competition Commission of South Africa Spain The Spanish National Commission of Markets and Competition 40 OECD COMPETITION TR

202、ENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Jurisdiction Competition authority(name in English)Sweden Swedish Competition Authority Switzerland The Competition Commission Thailand Office of Trade Competition Commission Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago Fair Trading Commission Tunisia Competition Council of Tunisia Tr

203、kiye Turkish Competition Authority Ukraine Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine United Kingdom Competition and Markets Authority United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Competition Uruguay Commission for the Promotion and Defense of Competition Uzbekist

204、an Anti-monopoly committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan Viet Nam Vietnam Competition and Consumer Authority 41 OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2023 OECD 2023 Notes 1 The Russian Federation was excluded from the OECD CompStats database and the Peoples Republic of China did not provide information for 2021.2

205、 Uzbekistan.3 Nicaragua,Trinidad and Tobago,and Uruguay.4 Botswana,the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa(COMESA),Kenya,and Mauritius.5 In 2016,the OECD held a roundtable on Commitment Decisions in Antitrust Cases.While the majority of contributions stressed that commitments mostly apply

206、to unilateral conduct or anticompetitive merger investigations,others highlighted the possibility of using them,while limited,to finalise anticompetitive agreements cases.For instance,in cases that involve associations(Indonesia),or vertical agreements(Israel).Other jurisdictions stressed that they

207、also use them in specific circumstances for cartel cases(Singapore or South Africa).As for the use of settlements in unilateral conduct investigations,a relevant example is the European Commission,which in 2016,issued its first settlement decision under Article 102 TFEU,reducing by 30%the fine of Al

208、stoff Recycling Austria in exchange for co-operation.This settlement included the implementation of a structural remedy in addition to the fine(Case No.39 759).6 See,for instance,the OECD Roundtable(2015)on Serial Offenders:Why Some Industries Seem Prone to Endemic Collusion.7The Commission of the E

209、uropean Union(EU)takes part in the work of the OECD,in accordance with the Supplementary Protocol to the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.OECD Competition Trends 2023This report highlights worldwide competition enforcement trends using theunique OECD CompStats

210、 database that includes 34 variables covering competition authority resources,cartels,abuse ofdominance,mergers,andadvocacy.This report presents comparisons between geographic regions andtrends over time,allowing jurisdictions tounderstand how theirdata compares topeers andthebroader competition community.This edition focuses onthemain developments inglobal competition enforcement in2021,andcontributes tocontinuously improving competition law andpolicy around theworld.9HSTCQE*ddjdcd+PDF ISBN 978-92-64-33932-3