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1、 2022 Boston Consulting Group1Four Futures for the Global Food SystemNOVEMBER 07,2022 By Shalini Unnikrishnan,Shruthi Baskaran-Makanju,Alan Iny,Chris Mitchell,Matt Westerlund,and Torsten KurthThe cost of food is rising rapidly,and hunger is on the increase.What will ittake to build a better way to f
2、eed the world?What might the global food system look like in 5,10,or 15 years?Various futuresare imaginable.Perhaps Africa will have achieved far more food sovereignty.Protectionism might cause food prices to rise dramatically.A few Global Northcountries might dominate agricultural trade,displacing
3、smallholder farmerselsewhere.Orjust maybethe world might come together,collaborating to slow 2022 Boston Consulting Group2climate change,boost global agricultural trade,and relieve hunger among theworlds most vulnerable populations.It is,of course,impossible to know exactly what the future holds in
4、store.No onecan accurately forecast precisely how climate change will affect global foodproduction.Thats because climate change and other factorssuch as geopoliticalconflict,high debt burden among low-and medium-income countries(LMICs),and major advances in agricultural technologiesthat will affect
5、the food systemover time are deeply interconnected and subject to very high levels of uncertainty.Unquestionably,the combined impact of COVID-19 and Russias invasion ofUkraine has stressed an already fragile global food system to the breaking point.Prior to the war,a grim combination of inequitable
6、food distribution,increasingprotectionism,enormous amounts of food waste and loss,and overdependence ona few crops had led to massive malnutrition and outright hunger.More recently,exports of Ukrainian and Russian wheat,fertilizer,and other key products havedisappeared from markets worldwide.As we d
7、escribed in a recent article,theeffects of this change have been dire:rapidly rising prices for the food needed nowand for the inputs and fuel required to produce and move the food that the worldwill need tomorrow.As efforts to relieve the immediate impact of the food crisis continue,stakeholdersinc
8、luding governments,multilaterals,NGOs,and the private sectormust alsolook to the future.Will concerted efforts to relieve the current food crisis andstabilize the food system succeed?Or will they fail to provide sufficient food andthe means to grow it equitably and economically?Will the almost$700 b
9、illion inannual subsidies dedicated to supporting the food system make a difference in thenext decade?This article lays out four scenarios for the future.These scenarios are not forecasts.Rather,they represent our best efforts to envision the contours of a stretched-but-plausible world in which we m
10、ight have to operateor rather several versions ofsuch a worlddepending on how certain key factors and their underlying 2022 Boston Consulting Group3uncertainties play out.Our hope is that examining these scenarios will promotethoughtful consideration of what the global food system might look like in
11、 5 to 15years,provide the basis for stakeholders to prepare for a wide range of as-yet-undetermined contingencies,and encourage stakeholders to devise strategies andactions for building the most abundant,equitable,and resilient food system wecan.The Status QuoAlthough Russias invasion of Ukraine is
12、the immediate cause of the current foodcrisis,at least three other factors have been instrumental in exacerbating it.TheCOVID-19 pandemic disrupted global supply chains and food systems,dramaticallyincreasing food prices and leaving up to 1.6 billion peopleone-fourth of theworlds populationwithout a
13、ccess to adequate food.The pandemic alsoexacerbated the massive debt burden borne by LMICs,as they directed scarcefunds toward defending their populations against the disease,making it moredifficult for them to offset fast-rising food,fertilizer,and fuel costs.And finally,theeffects of climate chang
14、e are having a significant deleterious impact on farmingyields.Climate change has had devastating impacts on global agriculture already.Landdegradation has reduced the productivity of 23%of the worlds agricultural land(especially in Africa and South Asia),and up to$577 billion in annual agricultural
15、production is at risk from pollinator loss.As the world gets closer to the 1.5Ctemperature increase threshold,the agricultural sector is absorbing an estimated25%of the total damage and losses from climate-related disasters.In the emergingdebate over payments from historically high-emitting countrie
16、s to emergingmarkets for loss and damages caused by climate change,the food system hasstarted to feature prominently.Yet these impacts have only further exposed the inherent fragility of the globalfood system.Global agriculture produces enough food to feed the world,but asmuch as 30%of the food prod
17、uced is lost or wasted,even as increases in crop yields 2022 Boston Consulting Group4are slowing.And a rise in protectionism and trade wars has limited the equitabledistribution of available food and caused global food prices to rise.Moreover,the global food system depends heavily on just a few crop
18、s and offerslimited support for diverse,nutritious diets.This level of concentration increasesthe systems exposure to the catastrophic effects of sudden adverse events.Meanwhile,at a global level,smallholder farmersa large proportion of whom arewomenproduce most of the worlds food but receive an ave
19、rage of just 4%of thefinal price of food as payment for their work.In short,our global food systems severely lack resilience and are highly vulnerableto external shocks,as the crisis brought on by COVID-19,climate change,and thewar in Ukraine all too clearly demonstrates.Factors and UncertaintiesIn
20、generating our scenarios,we focused on three overarching factors that are sureto impact global food systems over the next five years:the state of the worldsagriculture,climate change,and global economic and geopolitical dynamics.Howeach of these factors plays outand how they affect the Global North
21、and theGlobal Southis subject to high levels of uncertainty.The state of the worlds agriculture will largely determine the kinds of foodrequired and the capacity of global food systems to grow and distribute enough tofeed the world.Four key variables will govern this factor:production and trade,thec
22、haracteristics of various agricultural supply chains,new technology andinnovation,and shis in food demand and consumption.The impact of climate change on global agriculture over the next five years ishighly uncertain.It will be determined not just by the effects of natural andhuman activity on land,
23、ocean,atmosphere,and weather events but also by thenature and extent of the policies,strategies,and technological innovationsdesigned to address those effectsand by worlds willingness to act.These impactsare even more difficult to forecast as we look beyond the next 15 years.2022 Boston Consulting G
24、roup5Global economic and geopolitical dynamics include a range of uncertainties,including the level of country debt following the COVID-19 pandemic and futurecapital market flows,borrowing capacity,credit ratings,prices,inflation,andeconomic growth.Geopoliticsincluding the outcome of the war in Ukra
25、ine,theemergence of other conflicts,changing power dynamics among countries andregions,and the rise of nationalismwill also play a significant role.And thepossibility and potential impacts of future pandemics can only be guessed at.Four ScenariosAll of these uncertainties are evolving in parallel,cr
26、eating a highly complexenvironment that renders attempts to sort out a probable future essentiallyimpossible.Under such conditions,scenarios are an especially useful way toponder different stretched-but-plausible future states that may face stakeholders inthe global food system and to develop approp
27、riate responses to them.Each of the scenarios discussed belowwhich we call“Uneven Progress,”“TheRise of Africa,”“Every Country for Itself,”and“Coordinated Step Forward”offersa distinct vision of the middle-term future,developed through carefulconsideration of how the various key factors noted above
28、might play out.Asvaluable as the scenarios may be in efforts to imagine what the future might looklike,their core value lies in their capacity to trigger thinking about the strategicimplications of each one,as well as about plans and potential actions needed asthe future unfolds,regardless of what f
29、orm it ultimately takes.Although future events will not match any of the scenarios exactly,each scenarioentails strategic repercussions for the three stakeholder groupsgovernments,multilateral and social sector organizations,and private sector companiesthathave major stakes in the food systems of th
30、e future,and each suggests no-regretsmoves that each stakeholder group should consider taking aer weighing thestrategic implications.(See the exhibit.)2022 Boston Consulting Group6SCENARIO 1:UNEVEN PROGRESSGlobal coordination stalls,but a few breakout nations among high-incomecountries(HICs)in the G
31、lobal North lead a policy-driven development agenda andpromote the uptake of existing climate-smart technologies.Meanwhile,inequityworsens as extreme weather decimates the Global South,food availability declines,and prices increase unevenly across the world.In this scenario,global supply chains beco
32、me concentrated and dominated bycountries such as Canada and the Nordics that build on their low-carbon exports.Agricultural technology remains focused on industrial and contract farming,displacing smallholder farmers around the world.The Global South suffers in the 2022 Boston Consulting Group7face
33、 of ongoing high debt,as the worldand especially Europeprepares forincreased numbers of climate refugees.This scenario has a number of strategic implications:SCENARIO 2:THE RISE OF AFRICA Private sector companies that adapt nimbly to the breakout countriesregulatory agenda will reap benefits,while t
34、heir slower-moving rivals losemarket position.If climate-focused countries begin to dominate the globalagenda,companies that invest in decarbonizing their supply chains anddeveloping climate-resilient agricultural inputs and healthier processed foodsare likely to benefit the most.Nurturing strong re
35、lationships with keygovernments could help promote joint investments toward a more resilientfood system.Multilateral organizations hoping to persuade countries around the world toact in unison on climate and food goals will meet resistance,but social sectororganizations could gain considerable backi
36、ng from breakout countries insupport of their own climate and food security agendas.Doubling down onclimate mitigation and food system resilience efforts could reduce somenegative impacts.For example,multilaterals could push for national climateadaptation strategies and encourage bilateral creditors
37、,including the privatesector,to restructure debt for debt-distressed countries.Governments in breakout countries will benefit generally from favorableagricultural yields and from the shi of power in their favor,resulting inconsiderably higher-than-average GDP growth.But most LMICsespeciallythose in
38、climate-vulnerable geographieswill face greater internal inequality.To weather the impacts of this scenario,LMIC governments should invest induty-free protocols through regional trading blocs,including strengtheningfood and fertilizer import facilities and developing integrated decision supportsyste
39、ms across data sets and government ministries to tackle climateuncertainties.2022 Boston Consulting Group8In this scenario,Africa accelerates its agriculture potential through unprecedentedSouth-South cooperation,technology transfers,and private sector investments,especially from countries such as I
40、ndia and China.Overall,food availability andproductivity increase,prices drop,and hunger declines,but the benefits are notdistributed evenly across the continent.Moreover,intensified agriculture leads tobacksliding on climate goals.This scenario imagines a world in which reduced global trade results
41、 in morepowerful regional trading blocs.Shorter food staple supply chains lead tointensified agriculture,notably in Africa,thanks in part to rapid adoption oftechnological advances in climate-smart agricultural inputs.At the same time,however,increased protein consumption on the continent and a lack
42、 ofinternational consensus on climate policy cause greenhouse gas(GHG)emissionsto increase there and elsewhere.The strategic implications of this scenario are as follows:Private sector companies that have strong commercial investments in Africa(specifically in climate-smart technologies that can boo
43、st production of localcrops and encourage regenerative farming techniques)will be well-positionedunder these conditions to boost production and take advantage of untappedagricultural capacity.Given the potential for disruptions in global trade,companies that shore up their supply chains will also pr
44、osper.Multilateral organizations will probably be able to work successfully withHIC and LMIC governments to ensure equitable growth,and the role of socialsector NGOsespecially those with a grassroots presencein providingtechnical assistance is likely to expand.Both multilaterals and NGOs will playcr
45、itical roles in coordinating public-private sector partnerships to boostclimate-smart production,providing official development assistance andtechnical support to reduce debt in Africa,and supporting higher-valueprocessing activities.2022 Boston Consulting Group9SCENARIO 3:EVERY COUNTRY FOR ITSELFA
46、self-sufficiency narrative takes root globally,leading to significant reductions inglobal agricultural trade.By necessity,alternative foods such as millet replaceglobal commodities.However,limited climate action leads to a point of no return.Resource-rich countries benefit;others suffer.In this scen
47、ario,a significant increase in protectionism has wide-reaching negativeeffects.Food costs rise and availability declines as global trade collapses by 20%.Supply chains are disrupted and profits in private sector agricultural decline.Thefailure to stem global warming leads to extreme weather events a
48、nd furtherreductions in agricultural yields.Countries rush to protect their populations,butinequality and social unrest increases.We see a number of strategic implications under these conditions:Governments in Africa that can maintain strong governance and low levelsof debt will be better positioned
49、 to drive equitable growth within theirborders.But those with high levels of debt may be forced to rely on resourceextraction,further exposing those in the most climate-vulnerable geographiesto the impacts of climate change.In general,African governments thatestablish clear incentives for climate-sm
50、art agriculture and investments inlocal infrastructure such as storage facilities will emerge on top.Private sector companies with global reach will face major challenges astrade and supply chains break down and volatility increases,while companieswith strong localized presences will come to dominat
51、e their markets.Privatesector companies that adopt more“glocal”approaches to sourcing,procuring,and accessing resources will be able to reap the benefits of local opportunitieswhile limiting their reliance on global networks.This will strengthen theirability to offset the challenges arising from the
52、 breakdown of trade and globalsupply chains,and to meet consumer demand within their borders.2022 Boston Consulting Group10SCENARIO 4:COORDINATED STEP FORWARDSpurred by a food system disaster exacerbated by Russias invasion of Ukraine,greater global coordination in climate policy and agriculture gai
53、ns momentum.This promotes adoption of existing climate-friendly innovations.The private sectoris pressured to follow along,especially benefitting companies that made earlystrategic bets on green ventures.In this future,collective action yields to numerous benefits.Global trade rises,andsupply chains
54、 grow more resilient and transparent,significantly reducing foodwaste and loss.Demand shis toward more nutritious,environmentally consciousMultinationals may find it beneficial to spin off local business units in somecircumstances.Multilateral organizations will likely be severely hampered by the la
55、ck ofglobal cooperation and by limited funding,and organizations in the socialsector will struggle to scale their operating models across disconnected,uncooperative countries.To offset the decline in international cooperation,multilaterals may need to encourage donor governments to embrace amassive
56、recommitment to aid and investment goalsincluding debt reliefprograms for smallholder farmersand to initiate a dialogue for bilateral debtforgiveness and a fundamental restructuring of monetary instruments.Fortheir part,NGOs that can counteract resistance to cooperation through deep,in-country prese
57、nce may be better situated to identify and cultivate key localpartnerships to overcome these challenges.Governments in countries that are well-endowed with resources will thrive asglobal trade dwindles,but the negative impacts of climate change willaccelerate in countries most exposed to global warm
58、ing.Governmental actionwill be critical in reducing the risk of food price volatility and the resultingpotential for unrest.LMIC governments will be more resilient in this scenarioif they invest in strengthening strategic grain reserves and alternativecommodities through local value chains and in im
59、proving local infrastructure.2022 Boston Consulting Group11foods such as plant-based proteins.A global consensus emerges on slowing globalwarming,leading to investment in climate-friendly and humane agriculturalpractices,including better protection of arable land and decreased GHG emissions.This sce
60、nario has the following strategic implications:Private sector companies that lead in helping mitigate global warming willoutperform their slower-moving,slow-to-innovate peers in a world wherecooperation is essential.As the private sector faces increasing regulatory andconsumer pressures to act more
61、transparently and sustainably,companies thathave simplified and shortened their supply chains for staple crops,invested inalternative nutritious grains to create triple bottom line impactsocial,environmental,and economicand scaled up techniques for sustainablesourcing and food and packaging waste re
62、duction will reap the benefits.Thesecompanies can balance the desire for near-term profits with consideration ofthe market potential and resulting long-term business gains in LMICs.Multilateral and social sector organizations will be able to significantlyexpand funding and programs that target food
63、security and climate goalsthrough collective action.They may also push for climate financecommitments focused on adapting to the impacts of global warming andincreasing development aid to support climate adaptation and mitigation.Governments in countries with strong climate regulations will dominate
64、 theglobal stage,while those in countries more vulnerable to global warming willmitigate negative impacts through collective action.In this scenario,LMICgovernments that have already begun creating demand for a range of diversecrops via subsidies,minimum price supports,and public procurement will be
65、better positioned to achieve food sovereigntyas will HIC governments thathave clearly defined the policies and actions necessary to facilitate thetransition to a green economy,including more aggressive targets for emissionsreductions and carbon neutrality.2022 Boston Consulting Group12No-Regret Move
66、sAs important as it is for stakeholders in the public,private,and social sectors toprepare for the wide range of potential contingencies indicated by the fourscenarios,it is even more critical for them to begin taking actions that are likely topay off under any circumstances,with little or no forese
67、eable downside.Theseinclude various activities broadly designed to reduce the impact of future foodcrises,mitigate global warming,promote global trade,increase global equity,andimprove supply chain resilience.Private Sector.Companies in the private sector companies need to pursue arobust Global Nort
68、h and Global South engagement strategy.Food companiesshould invest in technologies and delivery models that prioritize climate-smartproduction of staples and nonstaples,such as disease-and drought-resistant seeds.By diversifying their sourcing strategies and value chains,and reducing food waste,they
69、 can help stabilize food prices and protect against future shocks.All companieswill benefit from strategies to reduce emissions and invest in green technologies(including energy transition plans)and circularity.They should also work to reducethe productivity gap in the Global South by promoting tech
70、nology transfers.Abetter balance between boosting near-term profits and capturing the GlobalSouths market potential will likely mean long-term business gains.Social Sector.Multilaterals and NGOs must double down on humanitarianassistance to the worlds most vulnerable populations and advocate for and
71、support negotiations to pursue national climate adaptation strategies.To that end,they should urge donor countries to recommit to climate goals in agriculture,including providing increased development assistance to LMICs to support theirefforts to mitigate the causes of climate change and adapt to i
72、ts effects.Multilaterals should also advocate for restructuring LMIC debt to increase capitalflows,including debt relief programs for smallholder farmers,and they shouldestablish alliances among governments,NGOs,and private sector companies toboost food production.Finally,they should promote a susta
73、inable and just energy 2022 Boston Consulting Group13transition to the benefit of all,including efforts to develop and improve biofuels toavoid competition with food and to use nonfossil fuels for electrification.Public Sector.HIC donor governments should increase their climate-relateddevelopment as
74、sistance,with the goal of reaching equality targets based on theGini index of global wealth distribution.For their part,LMIC governmentsespecially those in Africa and South Asianeed to rethink their food and climatepolicies and incentives,committing to actions such as industry tax exemptions,time-bo
75、und subsidies,minimum selling prices,and strategic grain reserves.Greaterinvestment in integrated climate analytics will help countries monitor and supportdecision making during agricultural and food crises.And the development of duty-free protocols through regional trading blocs,combined with stren
76、gthened importfacilities for food and fertilizer,would promote trade in agricultural inputs andproducts where they are most needed.Equitability,Sustainability,ResiliencyOur fragile global food system was already stretched to the breaking point.But thedual blows of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war i
77、n Ukraine are now causing itto snap in several places.Its lack of resilience has generated severe shocks thathave wreaked havoc globally on the accessibility and affordability of high-qualityfood.The goal of this exercise has been to imagine several possible futuresstemming directly from the systems
78、 current state,with the aim of triggering actionon the part of all stakeholders to bring about a more resilient,affordable,nutritious,and equitable food system.The probability that any of the scenarios weve imagined will come to passprecisely as described is quite small.But that doesnt detract from
79、their value tostakeholders looking for guidance in preparing for the global food systems highlyuncertain future,whatever it looks like.All stakeholders should consider the contingent actions that we outline for each ofthe four scenarios.But far more important than these are the no-regret moves that
80、2022 Boston Consulting Group14we sincerely hope stakeholders will adopt to help create a fairer,more resilientfood systemone that can provide healthy,nutritious,sustainable food for all andensure secure livelihoods for the farmers and food workers who grow anddistribute it.The authors wish to thank
81、Pilar Pedrinelli,Nicole Barman,Emily Fletcher,and DavidLee for their contributions to this article.2022 Boston Consulting Group15AuthorsShalini UnnikrishnanManaging Director&PartnerChicagoShruthi Baskaran-MakanjuPrincipalSeattleAlan InyPartner&Director,Creativity&ScenariosNew YorkChris MitchellManag
82、ing Director&PartnerNairobiMatt WesterlundManaging Director&PartnerChicagoTorsten KurthManaging Director&Senior PartnerBerlinABOUT BOSTON CONSULTING GROUPBoston Consulting Group partners with leaders in business and society to tackle theirmost important challenges and capture their greatest opportun
83、ities.BCG was thepioneer in business strategy when it was founded in 1963.Today,we work closely withclients to embrace a transformational approach aimed at benefiting all stakeholders 2022 Boston Consulting Group16empowering organizations to grow,build sustainable competitive advantage,and driveposi
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85、iquely collaborative model across the firm andthroughout all levels of the client organization,fueled by the goal of helping our clientsthrive and enabling them to make the world a better place.Boston Consulting Group 2022.All rights reserved.For information or permission to reprint,please contact BCG at .To find the latest BCG content and register to receive e-alerts on this topic or others,please visit .Follow Boston Consulting Group on Facebook and Twitter.2022 Boston Consulting Group17