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1、STUDYChina has become an increas-ingly visible player in UN devel-opment work.In light of the financial and political resources at its disposal,however,Chinas engagement has largely re-mained moderate and selective.China is taking an increasingly assertive and long-term ap-proach towards changing so

2、me of the traditional contours of UN development work,with the Global Development Initiative as the most recent example.Contrary to Western Member States,China can capitalise on the combination of its roles as a superpower and a UN pro-gramme country to expand ties with the UN,notably through South-

3、South cooperation.CHINAS EXPANDING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PILLARGLOBAL AND REGIONAL ORDERMax-Otto Baumann,Sebastian Haugand Silke WeinlichNovember 2022The Selective Long-term Approach of a Programme Country SuperpowerCHINAS EXPANDING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOP

4、MENT PILLARGLOBAL AND REGIONAL ORDERThe Selective Long-term Approach of a Programme Country Superpower Content 1 INTRODUCTION .22 DRAWING THE CONTOURS:MONEY AND PEOPLE .5 2.1 Chinas funding .5 2.2 Chinese staff .12 3 COLOURING THE PICTURE:KEY DIMENSIONS OF CHINAS ENGAGEMENT .18 3.1 China-led initiat

5、ives .18 3.2“Chinese language”.22 3.3 Chinas approach to leadership .25 3.4 Chinas diplomacy and alliances .294 CONNECTING THE DOTS:PATTERNS IN CHINAS ENGAGEMENT.335 COMING TO TERMS WITH CHINAS ENGAGEMENT:FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS .36 References .40 List of Tables and Figures .44 List of Abbreviatio

6、ns .452FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG CHINAS EXPANDING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PILLARDespite this remarkable Chinese outreach,there has been relatively little scholarly engagement with Chinas evolving role in UN development work.The literature has mostly fo-cused on other aspects of

7、 Chinas approach to the broader UN system:Chinas role in the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC)(ISHR 2021;see Taskinen 2020),in particular with regard to the UNs human rights pillar(Inboden 2019;Okano-Heijmans and van der Putten 2018;Piccone 2018;Zhang and Buzan 2019);th

8、e UN Security Council and peacekeeping(Fung 2018;Lagon and Lou 2018;Lanteigne 2019;Primiano 2019);and global gov-ernance more generally(Beeson and Li 2016;Mao 2019).The lack of attention to development-related matters at the UN surprises,given that China has marked development as a key policy field

9、through its more advanced involvement with international development banks and high-powered bilateral initiatives such as BRI.Academic work that address-es Chinas role in the UN development system mostly focus-es on funding(Mao 2020;Morris et al.2021)and staffing is-sues(Fung and Lam 2021)that are a

10、menable to quantitative analysis but cover only a section of Chinas rising engage-ment with the UN development work(for an exception,see Chen et al.2020).For many observers,and in particular those from the West-ern world,5 Chinas engagement with the UN development system is inherently ambiguous.In r

11、ecent years,China has sent mixed signals about its intentions,giving rise to two di-verging narratives about its growing role in UN develop-ment work.On the one hand,China has publicly declared its commitment to UN multilateralism and the 2030 Agen-da.It has made considerable and diverse efforts to

12、bring in its expertise in poverty alleviation and other develop-ment-related issues to help implement the Sustainable De-velopment Goals(SDGs).Key Chinese policy documents,such as the 2021 white paper“Chinas International Devel-opment Cooperation in the New Era”or the advertisement of the GDI,furthe

13、r nourish the expectation that China as-pires to fulfil the role of a good international citizen,and 5 When we refer to“Western world”,“Western countries”or“West”,we broadly mean members of the Western European and Others Group(WEOG),which is one of five regional groups at the UN.It brings together

14、28 members,some of which share a geographic back-ground in Europe and all of which self-identify as democracies.It in-cludes inter alia members of the European Union,the United King-dom,Canada,Australia,New Zealand and the United States.The1 Peoples Republic of Chinas2 expanding influence in the Uni

15、ted Nations(UN)has become a defining feature of to-days world politics.Observers watch with keen interest,in some cases also with concern,as the worlds new super-power intensifies its engagement with the UNs develop-ment pillar.Since around 2015,a number of events and ini-tiatives have signalled Chi

16、nas readiness to significantly step up its support for and interest in the UN development sys-tem.3 During the 2015 UN Sustainable Development Sum-mit,where the 2030 Agenda was adopted,Chinese leader Xi Jinping delivered a landmark speech,asking the UN to take on a“leading role”and pledging an“initi

17、al”2 billion US dollars for South-South cooperation(MOFA 2015).The Belt and Road Initiative(BRI),set up in 2013,soon evolved into a major platform for seeking closer cooperation with UN agencies(Haug 2022a).In 2016,China initiated the UN Peace and Development Fund(UNPDF),established in the UN Secret

18、ariat,with 200million US dollars pledged over ten years.The UNPDF channels resources for projects through the UN(Mao 2020).In 2019,a Chinese national became Di-rector-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO),the fifth leadership position occupied by a Chinese national in the UN developm

19、ent system.4 Among the most recent steps was the announcement of the“Global Devel-opment Initiative”(GDI)at the UN General Assembly in 2021,a global complement to the BRI,which was connect-ed with the pledge to“strengthen cooperation with UN de-velopment agencies,enhance strategic coordination,and j

20、ointly promote work in priority areas”(Peoples Republic of China 2021a).1 We would like to thank all interviewees and colleagues who sup-ported the drafting process with their insights and critical feedback.All errors remain our own.2 In this study,“China”refers to the Peoples Republics government.W

21、hile we are aware that Chinas foreign policy like that of other states is not necessarily fully coherent and is subject to domes-tic power struggles,we focus on China as a member state in the UN context and thus do not differentiate between different entities or voices within the Chinese government.

22、3 There is no authoritative definition of the UN development system.For the purpose of this study,the term refers to the ensemble of enti-ties belonging to the UN Sustainable Development Group.4 In addition to the FAO,entities that have had Chinese leadership in-clude the World Health Organisation(W

23、HO),the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs(DESA),the UN Industrial Development Organization(UNIDO)and the International Telecommunication Union(ITU).ICAO has also been headed by a Chinese national but does not belong to the UN Sustainable Development Group.1INTRODUCTION13INTRODUCTIONnorms

24、and governance processes(Foot 2020).Many(West-ern)observers contribute these efforts to a broader pattern across areas including international law,trade,and internet governance(Gomez Martos 2019;Ginsburg 2020).Many states in the Global South,in contrast,appear to have a more benign view of Chinas ri

25、se,not free of concerns but certainly informed by the expectation that it heralds a more balanced world order that will open up political and eco-nomic opportunities and allow for new intellectual cur-rents.6 It is against this backdrop and the debate about Chinas global rise,also and particularly a

26、mong Western countries,that the study at hand examines Chinas role in UN develop-ment work.The research question addressed here is:How has Chinas engagement expanded throughout the UN development pillar,and what are the implications of this expansion?The studys main objective is to provide systemati

27、c evidence on Chinas growing engagement with UN develop-ment pillar.It puts an explicit focus on power dynamics that can be observed at the UN,also highlighting reactions by Western countries and others.7 The study contains two parts:The first is a systematic overview of Chinas funding to the UN and

28、 the representation of Chinese nationals among UN staff.The second section is a more in-depth ex-amination of select dimensions of Chinese engagement,which enables us to pin down key characteristics of Chinas ambiguous role in the UN development system.Reference points for analysing and assessing Ch

29、inas role include UN norms and rules,some of them explicit,like UN Charter stip-ulations on the neutrality of international civil servants,and others more implicit,such as the practice of consensus-driv-en decisions.This study also compares and contrasts Chinas engagement practices with those of oth

30、er Member States,particularly Western powers.As researchers at a Germany-based research institute,our positionalities influence our research,also and maybe par-ticularly on questions related to global power shifts.8 They condition how our interlocutors perceive us and answer our questions,as well as

31、 our own understanding of multilateral-ism and the UN.We have sought to productively engage with this issue by jointly and critically reflecting on how our positionalities might subconsciously impact our research,discussing this study and its findings with colleagues from different backgrounds,and p

32、roviding transparency concern-ing the sources and criteria we use to make sense of Chinas engagement.The study is structured as follows.In the next chapter,we provide a quantitative overview of Chinas engagement with the UN development system,focusing on financial contribu-tions,the representation o

33、f Chinese nationals in UN staff 6 On China-Africa relations,for instance,see Ryder 2021;Alden and Large 2019.7 We also draw on accounts that deal with Chinese domestic discus-sions but do not engage with them in detail.8 On the relevance of positionalities in research on international devel-opment p

34、olitics,see Haug 2019.that it embraces the UN as a forum and vehicle for that pur-pose.The expansion of its influence in terms of leadership positions,funding,and policy initiatives can be regarded as a positive signal that China is engaging in the existing mul-tilateral system instead of circumvent

35、ing it and initiating new structures.On the other hand,and from a more geopolitical point of view,China has been increasingly open and even confronta-tional about its desire to see a“transformation oftheglob-al governance architecture andworld order”come to frui-tion,as articulated in the China-Russ

36、ia-Statement from Fe-bruary 2022.The main features of the“new era”demand-ed by China(along with Russia,for that matter)can be read as nothing less than a dismissal of what they perceive to be the key features of the current world order.The joint state-ment addresses Western proponents of the current

37、 order by saying that:“they i.e.,Western powers interfere inthein-ternal affairs ofother states,infringing their legitimate rights andinterests,andincite contradictions,differences andcon-frontation,thus hampering thedevelopment andprogress ofmankind,against theopposition from theinternational commu

38、nity”(Russian Federation and Peoples Republic of China 2022).These sentiments,which were also palpable earlier,such as in Xis 2015 speech at the UN in New York(MOFA 2015),indicate that Chinas expanding footprint in UN development work can also be read through the broad-er question of geopolitical ri

39、valry and the conflict over do-mestic political systems.Chinas ambiguous stance on Rus-sias war on Ukraine has raised the stakes even further,as have events related to a recent report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights that found serious human rights violations in Xinjiang,one

40、 of Chinas autono-mous regions(OHCHR 2022).UN officials reported strong pressure from both China and Western Member States con-cerning the reports eventual publication.Overall,the quest for power and influence within and over the global govern-ance system is in full swing;this is also playing out in

41、 the field of UN development.The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated the ambig-uous nature of Chinas involvement in the UN development system.For instance,China quickly provided substantial support to developing countries,an indication that China might be growing into the role of“a responsibl

42、e sharehold-er”(Lagon and Lou 2018,239).Meanwhile,there were al-so severe disruptions to the World Health Organizations(WHO)crisis response caused by Chinas refusal to share da-ta,facilitate research on the origin of the virus,and include Taiwan(Feldwisch-Drentrup 2020).Another example of friction b

43、etween the two narratives was Chinas successful attempt to install its own candidate as leader of FAO.For some,this was understood as China bringing its undisputed experience in agricultural development to the UN.Mean-while,(Western)public commentary focused on the robust diplomatic campaign,reading

44、 it as a direct challenge to Western power at the UN(see Jaura 2019).Such critical as-sessments are arguably also inspired by Chinas well-docu-mented stance on human rights in the UN Human Rights Council and Chinese efforts to fundamentally reshape UN 4FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG CHINAS EXPANDING ENGAG

45、EMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PILLARacross different levels,and changes over time.The descrip-tion of these two aspects,which can be considered key sources of power at the UN,provides an indication of how Chinas engagement has evolved in recent years.The third chapter supplements and bui

46、lds on the quantitative ap-proach with a qualitative analysis that takes a closer look at key dimensions of Chinas engagement with the UN devel-opment system,notably(i)the promotion of China-led initi-atives,(ii)attempts to integrate Chinese normative concepts(“Chinese language”in diplomatic terms)i

47、nto UN proceed-ings,(iii)the leadership style as it plays out in conference settings and within individual UN bodies,and(iv)diplomacy and alliance practices.These four dimensions can be consid-ered typical avenues for Member States to exert influence at the UN.While we focus on general patterns that

48、 can be ob-served across different organizations,we are also keen to provide a nuanced picture that shows how Chinese activi-ties and behaviour can vary across sites and contexts.Ag-gregating findings from the second and third chapters,the fourth chapter identifies and discusses four cross-cutting f

49、eatures that characterise Chinas approach to UN develop-ment work.We find that,by and large,Chinas engagement with the UN development system has increased.Neverthe-less,it is still moderate considering the financial and political resources China has at its disposal.At the same time,Chi-nas engagemen

50、t puts a strong emphasis on selected arenas and specific topics and reflects a long-term commitment to changing features of the UN development system that have been particularly dear to Western countries.More generally,Chinas engagement cultivates a dual position as both a pro-gramme country and an

51、increasingly assertive superpower shaping the UN development work.The fifth chapter con-cludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings and some recommendations.Our study does not intend to cover the entire multifaceted UN development pillar.That said,we do analyse changes in personne

52、l and funding across UN entities and choose sever-al entry points across the system to gain a more extensive picture.For a more in-depth analysis,we focus specifically on the Department of Economic and Social Affairs(DESA)in the UN Secretariat in New York,the Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO)wi

53、th headquarters in Rome,the UN In-dustrial Development Organization(UNIDO)with headquar-ters in Vienna,and the UN Development Programme (UNDP)based in New York.The first three were selected because they are,or were until recently,led by a Chinese national.In addition,the UNDP was selected for contra

54、st and because of its central role in UN development work,which results from its broad mandate,financial resources,and relevance for both developing and developed countries.The UNDPs strong suit is operational activities.While the FAO and UNIDO also serve normative functions,they too focus on operat

55、ional activities.The situation is different with DESA,which has a strong normative mandate and supports mem-ber-state negotiations on economic and social concerns,and less of a focus on operational activities.In addition to the in-depth analysis of these UN bodies,we also analysed a selection of dec

56、ision-making processes rele-vant to UN development work at the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC).Our period of investigation is 20152022,although some data reaches further back in time.The study builds on and triangulates both quantitative and qualitative data.The forme

57、r stems from UN databases and statistical material,while the latter is mostly based on insights from UN reports and resolutions,academic work,grey literature,as well as semi-structured interviews and background conversations.Between Decem-ber 2021 and July 2022,we conducted 40 interviews with UN sta

58、ff,Member State representatives,and experts at var-ious levels.Experts ranged from technical staff to ambassa-dors at UN duty stations(New York,Rome,Geneva,Vienna and Beijing)as well as political or regional groupings(nota-bly Western and Southern Member States).Given the polit-ically sensitive natu

59、re of the topic,interview data is present-ed anonymously.5This chapter offers a systematic overview of Chinas growing engagement across the UN development pillar through the funding it provides(2.1)and the representation of Chinese nationals among UN staff(2.2).The mostly quantitative ap-proach take

60、n here is descriptive and provides a foundation for the analysis in the subsequent chapters.While the focus is on Chinas current financial and staff footprint in the UN,the chapter also provides select historical timelines to high-light the evolution of Chinas engagement with UN develop-ment work.It

61、 also compares Chinas funding and staff data to that of other Member States,particularly Western powers that have traditionally been the largest contributors to the UN development system(see Baumann/Weinlich 2020).2.1 CHINAS FUNDINGConventional“follow the money”wisdom suggests that fi-nancial contri

62、butions are an appropriate starting point for examining Chinas engagement with the UN development system.The numerical nature of financial contributions al-lows for the identification of financial engagement patterns over time and across UN entities and for a comparison of Chinas contributions to th

63、ose of other Member States(Mao 2020;Mao and Weinlich 2021;Morris et al.2021).Financial contributions to multilateral bodies can be linked to both di-rect and indirect political influence.The Bretton Woods In-stitutions,for instance,give countries with large contribu-tions a greater say.Voluntary ear

64、marked contributions,in turn,allow states to fund an(often selective)part of a mul-tilateral agenda(see Sridhar and Woods 2013;Reinsberg 2017).The UN General Assembly formally operates on the“one seat,one vote”principle,which makes the link be-tween financial contributions and influence less obvious

65、.An analysis of Chinas engagement with the UN development system through the lens of political influence therefore re-quires a careful differentiation between the UNs different funding modalities and their specific political implications(see Weinlich et al.2020).Building on the overview provid-ed in

66、 Table 1,this chapter first presents data on the evolu-tion of Chinas contributions to the UN development sys-tem.It then discusses the main funding modalities before CONDITIONS UNDERLYING ARMS CONTROL POLICIES 2DRAWING THE CONTOURS:MONEY AND PEOPLETable 1The main funding modalities and their implic

67、ations on power and influence in the UNSource:Authors own elaboration,based on definitions in UN CEB 2022.Funding modalityDefinition&CharacteristicsRelevance for power and influenceAssessed contributions“Fixed amount contributions calculated based on an agreed formula that UN Member States undertake

68、 to pay when signing a treaty.”The UN Secretariat and the Specialized Agencies receive assessed contributions.The formula is primarily based on a states share of the global economy.This modality aims to decouple contributions from influence,as both the amounts owed and their use are collectively dec

69、ided,typically by consensus.However,a larger share can translate into general influence in collective decision-making.Voluntary core contributions“Voluntary untied contributions.”These are general contributions to the budget of UN entities.No legal or political obligation exists to provide such reso

70、urces.They mostly go to Funds and Programmes.Being unrestricted,they support the autonomy and flexibility of recipient entities.Because they are voluntary and unrestricted,the amount of these resources signals general support to recipient UN entities and trust in them.They provide contributors with

71、leverage proportional to their volume,as funding depends on contributors discretion.Voluntary non-core(i.e.,earmarked)contributions“Grants earmarked by the contributor to a specific programme or project.”UN Funds,Programmes and,to a lesser extent,Specialized Agencies have come to rely on these volun

72、tary grants.“Local resources”,defined as“contributions from programme countries for use in support of their own development framework,”are a relevant subcategory.These grants buy direct influence over the specific activities of recipient entities,which are accountable to the respective contributor f

73、or their implementation.6FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG CHINAS EXPANDING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PILLARfinally turning to the allocation of Chinese contributions across the UN development system and Chinas financial po-sition in individual organizations.EVOLUTION AND SIZE OF CHINAS

74、CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UN DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM As Figure 1 shows,Chinas contributions to the UN develop-ment system have grown significantly over the last decade.Its total contributions of roughly 451million US dollars in 2020(the last year for which there are system-wide figures)are more than four time

75、s the size of its contributions in 2010.During the same period,the total revenue of the UN development system only approximately doubled,rising from 23.5 billion US dollars in 2010 to 41.2 billion US dollars in 2020(numbers in constant 2019 US dollars).Comparing these figures with funding provided b

76、y other Member States allows Chinas contributions to be put into perspective.With the amount of 451million US dollars,China ranked 14th in the list of largest contributors in 2020(see Table 2),before Australia and France but far behind smaller Western coun-tries such as the Netherlands and Switzerla

77、nd.In terms of global burden sharing,Chinas contribution translates into 1.5percent of the Member State contribution total.The United States and Germany,in turn,account for 28.1 and 16.3percent,respectively.In relative terms,Chinas contri-butions are rather small.Compared with Western heavy-weights,

78、China seems to break with the assumption that the status of an economic and political superpower should be reflected in funding for the UN development system.Chinas contributions to the UN development system also appear rather modest when compared to its bilateral ex-penses for international develop

79、ment.It is estimated that from 2013 to 2017(i.e.,the first five years of the Belt and Road Initiative),Chinas overseas development finance pro-gramme amounted to 85,4 billion US dollars a year on aver-age,significantly more than the United States spent on for-eign aid,at 37 billion US dollars annual

80、ly(AidData 2021:11).The level of UN development contributions has also been considerably lower than Chinas investments in multilateral development banks.At the World Bank,for example,Chi-nas percentage of International Development Association votes reached 2.42percent in 2022,translating into the ra

81、nk of 9th among Member States and positioning China in the group of largest stakeholders(World Bank n.d.).CHINAS FUNDING MIXAs Figure 1 indicates,Chinas funding profile is dominated by assessed contributions,i.e.obligatory membership fees.In 2020,these made up approximately two-thirds(US$302.7millio

82、n,or 67percent)of its contributions.Germa-nys share of assessed funding is a mere 3.1percent,while the United States share is 6.4percent.This relatively high Figure 1Chinese contributions to the UN development system(20102020)Source:Authors own elaboration,based on UN DESA*All figures in this sectio

83、n are based on the annual statistical annexes on funding for operational activities published by UN DESA20001620172018 2003002001000USD MillionCore contributions(assessed&voluntary)Voluntary core contributionsAssessed contributionsNon-core contributions developmentNo

84、n-core contributions humanitarian7share of assessed contributions has implications for making sense of Chinas engagement with the UN development system.The following subsections analyse the three main funding modalities more closely.Assessed contributionsAs the formula used to calculate assessed con

85、tributions re-lies heavily on Member States economic performance,the dominant role of assessed contributions in Chinas funding mix means that Chinas growing financial engagement with the UN development system has mainly been a corollary of its economic growth trajectory.9 While Chinese diplomats hav

86、e not objected to the gradual increase in the share allot-ted to them by means of the intergovernmentally agreed-up-on scale of assessments,the rise in assessed contributions can hardly be taken to reflect a strategic decision to em-9 Chinas GDP(PPP)increased from roughly$4,000 in 1999 to more than$

87、16,000 in 2019.For an overview and graphic illustration,see Ghosh 2019.brace UN development work.The overall formula behind calculating assessed contributions has not changed since 2000(see Haug et al.2022)and,over the last 20 years,has resulted in substantially growing assessments for China.The Chi

88、nese share increased from slightly less than 1percent in 2000 to 3.2percent in 2010 before skyrocketing to 15per-cent for the 20222024 period.Now,China is the second largest contributor to the UNs regular budget behind the United States,whose assessment is fixed at 22 percent.While Chinas future eco

89、nomic growth is difficult to predict,some observers estimate that the countrys regular budget share at the UN will match the United States as soon as 2028(Mir 2019).The dominance of obligatory contributions in Chinas funding mix also means that its growing financial footprint in the UN has been felt

90、 mostly in the UN Secretariat and some Special-ized Agencies that rely to a significant degree on assessed contributions.In 2020,the main recipients of Chinas as-sessed contributions were the UN Secretariat(US$121.5mil-CONDITIONS UNDERLYING ARMS CONTROL POLICIESTable 2Ranking of total contributions

91、for operational activities to the UN development system by Member State(2020)Notes:Operational activities can be development-related or humanitarian aid.The table does not include collective donors such as the European Commission or the global vertical funds,which are largely funded by Wes-tern Memb

92、er States.The table includes local resources,which,in the case of China,amount to 30.5 million US dollars(China would drop by three ranks if local resources were not considered).All numbers are for 2020.Source:Authors own elaboration,based on UN DESA 2022RankCountryAssessed contributions (US$in mill

93、ions)Voluntary contribution (US$in millions)Total (US$in millions)Share of total Member State contributions(%)1United States5508,0448,59428.12Germany1564,8404,99616.33United Kingdom1112,2302,3417.74Sweden 231,6661,6895.55Japan2191,1731,3924.66Norway201,0881,1083.67Canada768479233.08Netherlands358588

94、932.99Denmark145695831.910Switzerland305275571.811Saudi Arabia294915201.712Italy864144991.613Korea(Republic of)574214781.614China3031484511.515Australia543824361.416France1083064141.417Belgium203013211.018Finland112592700.919Dominican Republic22492510.820Russian Federation611732340.8Total of all Mem

95、ber State contributions2,55328,03730,590lion),FAO(47.5),ILO(41.4),WHO(36.2),UNESCO(29.4),and UNIDO(17.4),with minor amounts going to IOM(6.1),WMO(1.7),and other smaller entities.The position as the second largest contributor adds to Chinas political weight,notably in budget negotiations,where China

96、has joined other large con-tributors in demanding more cost-effectiveness and limits on further spending increases.In the Specialized Agencies,the influence that comes with assessed contributions may be di-minished by the voluntary funding they also receive.At the FAO,for instance,Chinas 12percent s

97、hare in assessed contri-butions translated into only 3.1percent of total revenue;vol-untary contributions accounted for 74percent of the FAOs total income in 2021.In this context,a considerable increase in assessed contributions is of limited relevance(FAO 2022a).Voluntary core contributionsVoluntar

98、y core contributions are also referred to as“multilat-eral contributions”(Weinlich et al.2020:26)as they support the autonomy of entities and,thus,their ability to implement their mandates.They are similar to assessed contributions but give donors more leverage.Chinas voluntary core contribu-tions h

99、ave only been reported on separately since 2017;be-tween 2017 and 2020,they grew modestly from 36.3million to 38.8million US dollars(Figure 1).The more notable finding is that this category remains rather small in Chinas funding mix,accounting for only 8.4percent of Chinas total contribu-tions for o

100、perational activities.However,as it is mainly the UN Funds and Programmes(such as UNDP,UNICEF,and UNFPA)that rely on these resources,the finding may also indicate that China has so far avoided investing significantly in the UN entities in which Western providers play dominant roles,mak-ing only symb

101、olic contributions instead.As Figure 2 shows,the bulk of Chinas voluntary core contributions goes to the IFAD,a Rome-based international financing institution that receives funding inter alia through replenishments.China has a heightened interest in IFAD because of the organizations focus on poverty

102、 reduction and food security in rural areas(Mao 2020).10 In addition,the IFAD is the only UN entity that links financial contributions and voting shares.In comparison to its contributions to the IFAD,Chinese core contributions to other UN entities are minuscule(Figure 2).Voluntary earmarked contribu

103、tionsSimilar to voluntary core contributions,China has also only expanded the use of earmarked resources from 42.2million US dollars in 2010 to 55.8 in 2020,with ups and downs in be-tween.The UNs overall budget almost doubled over the same period.So far,China has not embraced earmarking as a key fun

104、ding modality in contrast to established Western con-tributors in either Funds and Programmes,which traditionally rely on voluntary contributions almost exclusively,or in Spe-cialized Agencies,where earmarked contributions also often make up the majority of income.In 2020,only 17.4percent(US$78.4mil

105、lion)of Chinese funds were provided as ear-marked contributions(UN DESA 2022).For other major do-nors,such as the United States and Germany,earmarked con-10 IFAD also hosts the China-IFAD South-South and Triangular Coopera-tion Facility.8FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG CHINAS EXPANDING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE

106、UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PILLARtributions typically represent a much higher share of their overall UN spending(75percent and 73percent,respective-ly).As a heavy reliance on earmarked funding reduces the au-tonomy and flexibility of UN organizations,this trend among Western Member States has been i

107、dentified as a key problem for the UN development system(Weinlich et al.2020).China has not been a proponent of this trend but has used voluntary non-core contributions for its own purposes.The peak in Chinas earmarked funding to the UN development system in 2017 can be attributed to Chinas focus on

108、 the BRI.At the first Belt and Road Forum for International Coopera-tion held in Beijing in 2017,Chinas government pledged a total of RMB 2 billion(approximately US$283.7million)in emergency food aid to countries within the BRI,channelling it through the World Food Programme(WFP)(Mao 2020).11 Accord

109、ing to UN DESA figures,WFP received 73.8million US dollars in earmarked contributions from China in that year.Allocations in 2020,in turn,reflect Chinas response to the COVID-19 pandemic,resulting in exceptionally high contri-butions to the WHO(Figure 3).China may also have stepped up its funding to

110、 WHO in reaction to the Trump administra-tions threat to withhold funding from the organization over its handling of the pandemic.It is also not surprising to see that the FAO and UNIDO,both headed by a Chinese nation-al in that year,are major recipients of Chinese contributions,although absolute nu

111、mbers have remained modest.Interestingly,China contributes comparatively few earmarked resources to the smaller entities in the Secretariat that per-form functions for the entire UN development system,such as the Development Coordination Office.While these entities are generally covered by the UNs r

112、egular budget,Western donors support some of them with voluntary contributions.Out of 14 such entities,12 China contributed only to the budg-ets of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific(US$1.7million in 2020)and UN DESA(US$4.0mil-lion);the former focuses on the world region

113、that China be-longs to and the latter being led by a Chinese national.In comparison,overall contributions to UN DESA were 77.3mil-lion US dollars in 2020,mostly coming from Western donors,with Germany alone contributing 7.9 million US dollars.When it comes to the UN Development Cooperation Office an

114、d the UN Resident Coordinator system to which this office provides managerial and substantive support,China made a singular contribution of 2million US dollars in 2019 when the new system was put in place(UNSDG n.d.)but so far has not provided any additional resources.Western Member States,in turn,h

115、ave invested more heavily.In 2021 alone,Germany provided 11.7 million US dollars and the United States 21.5million US dollars.During negotiations on UN develop-ment system reform,countries negotiated about how to bal-11 Chinese funding explicitly dedicated to BRI-related processes does not seem to h

116、ave continued at these initial levels,arguably also because of geopolitical tensions over UN engagement with the BRI;see sec-tion3.1.12 This includes:UN-ECE,UN-ECA,UN-ECLAC,UN-ESCAP,UN-ESCWA,UN-DOS,UN-DCO,UN DESA,UN-DRR,UN-DMSPC,UN-DGC,UN-RISD,UNSSC,and UNOPS.9CONDITIONS UNDERLYING ARMS CONTROL POLI

117、CIESFigure 3Allocation of Chinese non-core contributions,excluding local resources(2020)Source:Authors own elaboration based on UN DESA 2022.Figure 2Allocation of Chinese voluntary core contributions to UN entities for operational activities(2020)Source:Authors own elaboration based on UN DESA 2022.

118、302520151050US$MillionUS$MillionWHOFAOUNIDOWFPUNICEFUNESCOUN-DESAUNHCRUNUNODC206420IFADUNICEFUNHABITATUNDPUNFPAUNEPUNWOMENUNODCUNAIDSITC10FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG CHINAS EXPANDING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PILLARance the Resident Coordinators multiple functions.Some f

119、a-vored a more political role,while others did not.China sided with many global South countries that expressed opposition to the more political and normative role of Resident Coordi-nators(Chen et al.2020).China provided another seven percent(US$30.5million)of earmarked resources in 2020 that were e

120、armarked for oper-ational UN activities within Chinese borders;these are“local resources”dedicated to domestic purposes.The bulk of these contributions went to the UNDP country office(US$25 million),followed by WFP(US$2.9 million)and UNFPA(US$2.0million)at considerably lower amounts.It is also notew

121、orthy that China has contributed very little to UN pooled funds in recent years,an earmarked funding modal-ity that the UN promotes as a better alternative to tightly earmarked project and programme funding.In the UN fund-ing compact adopted in 2019,Member States agreed on a collective target of 16p

122、ercent of earmarked funding for de-velopment-related resources to be channelled through pooled funds(UNSG 2019).The UN funding statistics for 2020 record no Chinese contributions to pooled funds for development-related activities and only payments of 0.5mil-lion US dollars to humanitarian pooled fun

123、ds.CHINAS POSITION AMONG THE TOP-TEN CONTRIBUTORS TO INDIVIDUAL UN ENTITIESChina is among the top 10 donors in eleven UN entities(Ta-ble 3).This list results from a combination of Chinas high lev-els of assessed contributions,its targeted use of an overall modest amount of voluntary contributions,as

124、 well as con-text-specific factors(such as the absence of Western donors in certain UN entities).13 Chinas first rank at UNESCO is a re-sult of the United States leaving the organization in 2018.The United States had traditionally been UNESCOs largest contributor.Relative to the funding share of oth

125、er Member States,China is financially most dominant at UNIDO,anoth-er UN entity where major Western states,including the US,the UK and France,have given up their membership because of the perceived irrelevance and ineffectiveness of the organ-ization,while China has invested a comparatively sizeable

126、 amount of voluntary contributions.UNIDO is also among those entities that have been led by Chinese nationals.Chi-nas financial attention to the UN Economic and Social Com-mission for Asia and the Pacific also stands out,as it is the only Regional Commission China provided voluntary finan-cial contr

127、ibutions to in 2020.Chinese nationals have ob-tained three out of 25 leading posts in the Commissions senior management team,notably heading the divisions for transport and energy,two crucial aspects of BRI,as well as the Centre for Sustainable Agricultural Mechanisation,a re-gional institution of t

128、he Commission based in Beijing.UN DESA is somewhat of a contradiction to the previously de-scribed pattern wherein China chooses smaller entities with fewer resources and less Western presence and entities with Chinese officials in leadership positions(see also Mao 2020)for its targeted investments.

129、Although Chinese nationals have headed the department in the UN Secretariat for the last 13 years,it only ranked eighth for voluntary contribu-13 These figures do not represent all funding flows to these entities,only the subset that is spent on development-related and humanitarian ac-tivities.Using

130、 different data sources that count overall contributions,Morris et al.(2021:40)list ITU,UN HABITAT,and the UN Capital Fund as additional organizations where China was among the top 10 do-nors in 2019.Please note that this study uses numbers for 2020.Table 3UN entities in receipt of funding for opera

131、tional activities where China ranks among the top-ten contributors(2020)Source:Authors own elaboration,based on UN DESA 2022.Total contribution (US$million)Voluntary contributions (US$million)Share of total entity income (%)Share of voluntary contributions(government donors only)(%)Chinas rankUNESCO

132、34.85.59.93.41UNIDO26.7 9.316.612.21WMO2.0 0.311.28.42ILO41.9 0.58.20.33ESCAP1.7 1.77.57.53FAO57.1 9.63.91.74WHO55.2 19.03.51.56ITC0.8 0.82.42.46IFAD25.7 25.76.96.96UN DESA4.0 4.05.15.18UNCTAD1.0 1.03.33.3911tions in 2020.14 While UNESCO,UNIDO,and UN DESA are comparatively small entities within the

133、UN development sys-tem,it is noteworthy that China,mostly on account of its as-sessed contributions,has risen to rank fourth and sixth at the FAO and WHO,respectively,two financially large and politi-cally central UN organizations.UN ENTITY EXPENSES IN CHINAChinas engagement in the UN cannot be sepa

134、rated from the UNs engagement in China.At the domestic level,the UN maintains a considerable financial presence in China,which makes China different from Western countries.As a UN programme country,China hosts a UN Resident Coordi-nator that represents all UN entities present on the ground.In 2020,t

135、he 21 UN entities currently part of the UN Sustain-able Development Cooperation Framework for China collec-tively spent 144.9million US dollars in China.This figure means that China ranks 43rd among the largest UN pro-gramme countries,after Ecuador(42nd)and before Hondu-ras(44th).In middle-income co

136、untries,including China,the UN typically relies almost entirely on non-core contributions and local resources contributed by the host government it-14 At the time of writing,it was unclear to what extent Chinese contribu-tions to trust funds such as the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund($200millio

137、n over 10 years to advance peace and development objec-tives,pledged in 2016)are included in the present dataset.self.As China has not recently faced any large-scale human-itarian crises and has the capacity to deal with smaller crises itself,the overall pattern for UN expenses in China shows a clea

138、r and unsurprising focus on development-related activi-ties.Furthermore,there is a sizeable share of local resources(21percent)that has significantly grown over the last five years and an extraordinarily high share of core resources(39.2percent),given that China has been an upper-mid-dle-income coun

139、try since 2012(Figure 4).Normally,core al-locations to middle-income countries are reduced over time to the minimum required to institutionally run the country offices.However,they have significantly grown in China since 2015 and appear to also fund programmatic activities.Regarding the financial fo

140、otprint of individual UN entities in China,the list is topped by UNDP and UNICEF,two organi-zations that globally receive only small voluntary contribu-tions from China(Figure 5).Financially speaking,China has remained a net recipient programme country for both enti-ties.The same is true for the oth

141、er UN Funds and Pro-grammes(UNFPA,UNHCR,UN-Habitat,UN-Women)ex-cept for the WFP and UNRWA.Together,the Funds and Pro-grammes received 38.8million US dollars in voluntary con-tributions from China and spent 96.1million US dollars in China in 2020,not including local resources.The relatively substanti

142、al expenses by UNIDO and,to a lesser extent,ILO are also noteworthy.With relatively small budgets,these two entities are not in the group of the largest(financially speaking)UN country offices in most programme countries.CONDITIONS UNDERLYING ARMS CONTROL POLICIESFigure 4UN development system expens

143、es in China(2015 and 2020)Note:Local resources are not counted as part of development and humanitarian(non-)core expenses and thus are only counted onceSource:Authors own elaboration based on UN DESA 2017;2022007080Development core Development non-core Humanitarian core Humanitarian non-c

144、ore Local resources 2015202012FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG CHINAS EXPANDING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PILLAR2.2 CHINESE STAFFFew issues in the UN have been as persistently contested as the representation of Member States in the UN body of civil servants.The UN Charter explicitly sta

145、tes that the guiding principle for filling UN positions should be individual perfor-mance:“The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of ef-ficiency,competence,and integrity

146、”(UN 1945,art.101 3).The founders of the UN also deemed it necessary to soften the principle of merit-based nominations by a vague provi-sion for geographical balance:“Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geograph-ical basis as possible”(UN 1945,art.101 3).

147、Geographic balance can serve to bring a broad spectrum of perspectives to the UN,ideally generating the type of supranational out-look required to act on global interests.The multinational composition of the international civil service may enable the flow of information in both directions,from Membe

148、r States governments to the UN and the other way around.It can,however,also enable Member States to further bilateral in-terests(Weiss 1982).Representation can be sought as a tool to“exercise control,gain prestige and secure resources”(Parizek and Stephen 2021:205).In particular,larger states may re

149、alistically aim to achieve a critical mass in terms of staff representation and/or key positions to exercise considerable informal influence over agendas and policies.Recent academic literature has focused on how the emerg-ing powers of Brazil,Russia,India,China,and South Africa(BRICS states)have ai

150、med to gain greater representation in international organizations(Parizek and Stephen 2021).Moreover,a recent study examining China in the UN ana-lysed how staff politics is employed by Beijing as a means to strengthen its“discursive powers”to promote a global governance system more attuned to Chine

151、se interests(Fung and Lam 2021).However,even if representation is linked to power,it may not always be a direct function of it.Start-up costs for newcomers and social networking ef-fects can make it difficult for emerging powers to achieve greater representation in line with their economic power(Par

152、izek and Stephen 2021).Representation,and the means employed to promote candidates,can also come with rep-utational risk.International organizations,in turn,might attempt to co-opt powerful Member States and access their resources,networks,and political influence by re-cruiting their nationals.Figur

153、e 5Expenses of UN entities in China,focus on the top 10 entities(2020)Source:Authors own elaboration based on UN DESA 2022.UNDPUNICEFUNIDOILOWHOFAOUNHCRUNFPAWFPUNEPOthers2,78,343,239,723,36,46,24,93,83,62,913DRAWING THE CONTOURS:MONEY AND PEOPLETHE BIGGER PICTURE:CHINESE NATIONALS IN THE UN SYSTEM15

154、Chinas staff representation in the UN system has changed considerably in recent years,also in comparison to other Member States and members of the OECD and other BRICS countries in particular.Overall,China has seen a continuous and significant increase in its share of UN staff over the last decade.A

155、s Figure 6 shows,Chinese staff at the UN has grown at a faster pace than staff from OECD and other BRICS countries for the last decade.In absolute numbers,Chinese nationals in the UN category“interna-tional professionals”went up from 316 in 2000 to 867 in 2020 out of a total of 41,420,meaning that C

156、hina almost 15 The data presented in this section covers the entire UN system which is larger than the UN development system.The system-wide report-ing of UN personnel statistics by the UN Chief Executives Boards does not allow us to focus specifically on UN entities,because the UN Sec-retariat is r

157、eported as one entity even though it encompasses multi-ple departments,only some of which belong to the UN development system.Yet,the error should be small.The bulk of the 41,420 staff in the category“international professional”(2020)work in the UN devel-opment system(CEB 2021,138).Furthermore,this

158、category does not include the UNs considerable number of peacekeeping personnel.tripled its footprint in 20 years.In contrast,US nationals in the same category grew only by a factor of 1.8 in the same period(from 1,914 to 3,452).As a result,while still small compared to its main geopolitical counter

159、part,China has increased its share of UN staff both in relative and abso-lute terms.While staff increases are an important parameter for re-cent change,it is also necessary to look at the share of to-tal staff in order to understand Chinas current position and its trajectory towards catching up with

160、 other great powers.As mentioned above,the UN Charter places the principle of merit-based appointments over the principle of geographic representation,arguably because the latter can reinforce the influence of national interests within the organization(Weiss 1982).Throughout the UNs history,however,

161、staff composition has been a highly political is-sue.Faced with an increasing number of Member States from different world regions in the wake of decolonization processes,the UN General Assembly defined a norm for geographic representation early on.The formula used to define staff representation tar

162、gets is mainly based on Member States contributions to the regular budget(pri-marily based on Member States economic capacity)with Figure 6Relative changes in staff representation compared to the year 2000Notes:The numbers cover the entire UN system and refer to the category of“international profess

163、ionals”(this excludes national staff employed inside China and staff in administrative support functions).Source:Authors own calculations based on annual reports on personnel statistics by the Chief Executives Boards for Coordination(for the 2021 version,see UNSCEB 2021).3,02,52,01,51,00,50,0OECDChi

164、naBRICS(without China)2000200520002014FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG CHINAS EXPANDING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PILLARadjustments for population size,ensuring both a minimum representation for small states and greater representation for larger populations(UNSG 20

165、18:6).The ideal staff rep-resentation put forward through this formula reflects a compromise of the principles of financial power and“one seat,one vote”.The formula only applies to the UN Secretariat and UN en-tities attached to it.It also covers only those positions marked as“geographic positions”;

166、it currently applies to 3,126 out of 5,444 positions funded through the regular budget.The total staff of the UN Secretariat stood at 36,827 in 2020(UNSG 2021a:17).While the formula thus applies only to a fraction of UN staff,it reflects the ac-cepted norm for geographic representation.Applying it t

167、o the entire UN system allows us to get a sense of how balanced the geographic representation of UN staff is and what role China occupies in the larger picture.Figure 7 compares four large Western Member States(United States,Japan,Germany,and United Kingdom)with China and other Southern powers(Brazi

168、l,India,and South Afri-ca).Of these countries,China is the most underrepresent-ed.If recent years can serve as an indicator for the medi-um-term future,this gap might actually widen if Chinas economy continues to grow at rates that push up the staff target,making it increasingly unrealistic for staf

169、f in-creases to keep pace.CHINESE STAFF AT DIFFERENT LEVELSFocusing on the representation of Chinese nationals at dif-ferent levels of seniority offers a more detailed picture of Chinas position in the composition of UN staff.There has been a notable change in the last decade related to executive le

170、adership positions.Reflecting Deng Xiaopings man-tra of“keeping a low profile”,China did not hold any ex-ecutive leadership position during the first decades of its UN membership.This somewhat changed in 2006 when Margaret Chan of Hong Kong,who held both Chinese and Canadian citizenship,became the D

171、irector-General of the WHO.16 The number of Chinese UN executive leaders subsequently grew to two in 2007(when Sha Zukang be-came head of DESA,a position that Chinese nationals have continued to hold until today),three in 2013(when Li Yong assumed the leadership of UNIDO),and five in 2015(with Haoli

172、n Zhao becoming Secretary-General of ITU and Fang Liu taking the lead at the ICAO).In 2019,Qu Dongyu was elected Director-General of the FAO,returning the number of Chinese UN executive leaders to five(out of a total of around 40)after Margaret Chan had left office in 2017.In that year,China held mo

173、re leadership positions in UN Specialized Agencies than any other Member State,leading to the first wave of debates notably in the Unit-ed States about China wanting to take over the UN(Whineray 2020;see also Lynch 2020;The Economist 16 On Margret Chans election and a discussion of identity-related

174、ques-tions,see Shen 2008.2019).In contrast to working-level staff,the candidacy of executive leaders often receives substantial political sup-port from their respective countries.In the case of Qu Dongyu,Chinese influence behind the scenes appears to have been extraordinarily robust(Jaura 2019;see a

175、lso Lynch and Gramer 2019).The fact that China has held the UN DESA leadership position over four consecutive terms has raised eyebrows.However,having successive leaders from the same country is not uncommon:the first five UNDP Administrators were all US nationals,and all eight Executive Directors o

176、f UNICEF to this day have also hailed from the United States.Besides,the Western members of the UN Security Councils permanent five(P5)have all had their strongholds within the UN Secretariat,with US na-tionals in charge of the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs(previously the Depa

177、rtment for Polit-ical Affairs)since 2007;UK nationals heading the UN Of-fice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs since 2007;and French nationals leading the UN Department of Peace Operations(previously the Department of Peace-keeping Operations)since 1997.17 With its successful con-secutive

178、 claims to the leadership position at UN DESA,Chi-na thus seems to have embraced a key feature of Western powers staff practices at the UN.Executive leaders are part of the wider UN category of senior staff that includes the Deputy Secretary-General(currently Amina Mohammed),the ranks of Under-Secre

179、-tary-General(USG)and Assistant Secretary-General(ASG),as well as“officers of equivalent rank”.Senior staff ap-pointments other than the head of agencies receive less media attention but are often equally political.National representation in this category is another indicator of in-formal power in t

180、he UN.While there is no comprehensive system-wide overview of senior staff data,two available datasets provide helpful insights(see Figure 8).An internal UN compilation of senior staff that includes UN Funds and Programmes(notably UNDP,UNFPA,and UNICEF)shows that,as of February 2022,China with four

181、senior staff po-sitions is broadly on the same level as other large Member States;however,it is considerably behind the US,which has 23 such positions(UN 2022).The other dataset is based on UN press releases and contains information on senior appointments across the UN system.It is of particu-lar in

182、terest to this study because the rate of appointments indicates either change or perpetuation of the senior staff composition.When looking at appointments in the period 20152020,a noteworthy finding is that the United States and the United Kingdom,both strongly represented or even overrepresented in

183、 terms of overall staff,have also secured a comparatively high number of senior staff posi-tions.China,as an emerging superpower and the UNs most populous Member State,in turn,has gained fewer positions of this type than other BRICS countries,with the exception of Brazil.This suggests that China has

184、,until re-cently,not been on a trajectory of catching up with other large UN Member States.17 For details on different parts of the UN Secretariat,see UN n.d.-a.15DRAWING THE CONTOURS:MONEY AND PEOPLEFigure 8Senior staff by nationalitySource:authors own elaboration,based on information from the Unit

185、ed Nations University(n.d.)and UN 2022.*The coverage of this compilation is rather idiosyncratic;it includes Special Representatives that lead political missions but not Resident Coordinators.Figure 7Geographical representation of selected Member States in the UN system(2020,in percent)*The norm for

186、 the targets was reconstructed from the absolute numbers presented in the UNs 2021 report on staff composition of the Secretariat,referring to“geographical staff”only(3,126 in total).Importantly,the UN does not define precise targets,only“desirable ranges”of+/15 percent around an unspecified target.

187、The“target”in the diagram is the middle of the higher and lower end of the ranges.The actual share refers to the re-presentation in the category“international professional”of a given country across the UN system according to the UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination(CEB)personnel statistics(wit

188、h a total of 41,270 in 2020).The United States target is significantly higher than that of China despite the size of Chinas economy and the fact that it has approximately four times the United States population.This is due to the gap in the assessed contribu-tions,the main factor for determining the

189、 desirable ranges.In 2020,the United States assessment was 22 percent of the regular budget,whereas Chinas assessment was 12 percent.Source:Authors own elaboration based on annual reports on personnel statistics by the Chief Executives Boards for Coordination(for the 2021 version,see UNSCEB 2021)and

190、 UNSG 2021(Table 2).percentUSIndiaGermanyJapanUKRussiaFranceChinaBrazilSouth AfricaUSChinaJapanGermanyUKBrazilIndiaSouth Africa403530252021086420TargetShareSenior staff with duty station in and away from New York(2022)Appointments of senior staff 20152020,system-wide8,42,12,43,54,51,12,80

191、,714,48,95,84,13,22,31,80,416FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG CHINAS EXPANDING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PILLARAt the lowest end and,formally,on the outside of staff hi-erarchies are interns.As Figure 9 shows,the number of Chi-nese interns in the UN Secretariat and the entities directly

192、 linked to it has more than tripled from 2008 to 2019.18 In-terns often join the pool from which the future internation-al workforce is recruited;they have also acquired valuable knowledge of how international organisations work and bring networks with them upon their return.Interns consti-tute the

193、fastest-growing category of Chinese nationals in the UN.Given the considerable costs connected with in-terns extended stays in New York and other UN locations,this significant increase might simply reflect recently ex-panded capacity as a result of Chinas economic growth.However,the Chinese governme

194、nt also appears to engage in efforts to systematically increase the number of interns,including through scholarship programmes and agreements with UN organizations(Fung and Lam 2021:1154).In 2018,there were more Chinese interns(652)in the UN Secretariat and its related entities than interns from the

195、 United States(510)or Germany(222)(UNSG 2020).18 Numbers here do not include interns in funds,programmes,and spe-cialized agencies.CHINESE NATIONALS IN THE UN DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM The general trend of increasing Chinese staff numbers is al-so reflected in the UN development system,including the entiti

196、es that are the focus of this paper.19 The FAO,UNDP,and UNIDO have all seen a significant increase in Chinese nationals(Figure 10).In all three organizations,the absolute number of Chinese nationals increased approximately by a factor of five between 2000 and 2020.This is significantly more than the

197、 growth in Chinese staff across the UN sys-tem,where representation grew by a factor of three over the same period.It is only in the case of the FAO that there appears to be a link between the onset of Chinese leader-ship in 2019 and an increase in Chinese staff:In the first year of Director-General

198、 Qu Dongyus tenure,the number of Chinese staff jumped from 57 to 81.The increase at the UNDP in 2020 goes back to an incoming cohort of Chinese Junior Professional Officers(JPOs).In relative terms,the number of Chinese nationals in 2020 remained limited:At 19 No data is available for the UN DESA spe

199、cifically,as it belongs to the UN Secretariat;see footnote 14.Figure 9Total number of interns in the UN Secretariat(and related entities)from Germany,China,and the United States(20082019)Source:Authors own elaboration,based on annual reports of the UN Secretary-General(for the 2020 version,see UNSG

200、2020).20082009200004003002001000GermanyChinaUSA17DRAWING THE CONTOURS:MONEY AND PEOPLEthe UNDP,they accounted for 1.8percent,at the FAO for 4.7percent,and at UNIDO for 6.7percent(for Germany,the numbers are 2.8percent,4.0percent,and 9.3percent re-spectivel

201、y).The increase in staff is less apparent with regard to a key function of the recently reformed UN development system,namely Resident Coordinators.Resident Coordinators lead UN country teams and are direct representatives of the UN Secretary-General in a programme country.At the time of writing in

202、August 2022,there was only one Chinese nation-al serving as Resident Coordinator out of 112 positions,whereas French nationals hold 8,the United States 6,the United Kingdom 5,Germany 4,India 3,and Brazil 1 such position(s).Japan is not represented,nor are Russia or South Africa(UNINFO n.d.).Figure 1

203、0Chinese UN staff in select entities(20002020,UN staff category“international professional”)Source:Authors own elaboration based on annual reports on personnel statistics by the Chief Executives Boards for Coordination(for the 2021 version,see UNSCEB 2021).UNDPUNIDOFAO90807060504030202010

204、2008FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG CHINAS EXPANDING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PILLARFunding and staff composition are obvious categories for ex-amining and comparing Member States standing at the UN,as relevant data is readily available.The third chapter builds o

205、n this numerical analysis by focusing on the examination of mostly qualitative data,including reports,resolutions,and interview accounts,to take a closer look at key dimensions of Chinas engagement with the UN development system.More specifically,we analyse the promotion of China-led in-itiatives(3.

206、1),attempts to integrate“Chinese language”into UN proceedings(3.2),Chinese leadership style as it plays out in conference settings and within individual UN bodies(3.3),and Chinese diplomacy and alliance practices(3.4).These di-mensions bring together different ways Member States seek influence at th

207、e UN and empower comprehensive insight in-to the characteristics and particularities of Chinas engage-ment.While this study focuses on key patterns,we are also keen to provide a nuanced picture that shows how Chinese behaviour can vary across sites and contexts.3.1 CHINA-LED INITIATIVESA central fea

208、ture of Chinas engagement with the UN devel-opment system is the promotion of China-led initiatives.While a number of Member States across the board have set up initiatives with UN entities in the form of trust funds,for instance China has been particularly active in designing its own set of coopera

209、tion mechanisms.By doing so,it has built on and benefitted from its particular position within the UN development architecture.Most UN entities with de-velopment-related mandates have long operated a two-pronged approach to Member States by implementing op-erational activities in programme countries

210、,on the one hand,and having donor countries,on the other hand,pro-vide the bulk of funding for these activities.China is argua-bly the foremost example of an expanding group of Mem-ber States that falls outside this pattern.Against the backdrop of rising income levels,an increasing number of countri

211、es have outgrown or graduated from typical UN de-velopment support structures.20 Like most upper middle-in-20 When UNDP was set to close its country office in the Republic of Ko-rea,for instance,the Korean government initiated a new partnership framework with the UNDP.Together,they opened the UNDP S

212、eoul Pol-icy Centre;this is a concrete example of how a high-income country can continue in-country collaboration with a UN development e countries,China still has a sizable UN in-country pres-ence that increasingly engages with Chinese initiatives abroad.Being both a UN programme country and an inf

213、lu-ential international cooperation provider allows China to combine these roles to further its interests.While Western donors approach UN entities mostly as project implement-ers while also supporting their semi-autonomous operation-al work,normative function,and advocacy efforts through voluntary

214、core contributions from afar,China can make use of UN entities with offices in Beijing as facilitators or brokers that bring together developing countries,providers,and other stakeholders in line with Chinese foreign policy con-cerns.ENTITY-SPECIFIC INITIATIVESUN entities led by a Chinese national h

215、ave set up numerous initiatives focused on thematic issues,modalities,and/or ge-ographic areas of particular relevance to China.In some cas-es,these initiatives are tailored towards the work of and are developed through the UN entity in question,with Chinas footprint being of a more indirect nature.

216、They are not nec-essarily targeted at China as such;instead,these initiatives focus on knowledge transfer or capacity building and often serve to connect traditional donors with developing coun-tries.In UNIDO,for instance,the Programme for Country Partnership aims at building“multi-stakeholder partn

217、er-ships”and serves to“facilitate the mobilization ofpartners and resources”(UNIDO n.d.-a).Set up under the leadership of Li Yong(20132021),it has been an open secret within the organization that the Programme builds on Chinese ex-perience with special economic zones and is geared towards Chinas bil

218、ateral partners,including Cambodia,Ethiopia,and Kyrgyzstan(UNIDO n.d.-a).Although Chinese financial contributions have been comparatively small,China was the only international partner engaged in all ten Programme for Country Partnership(PCP)countries in 2020.21At the FAO,the Hand-in-Hand Initiative

219、 and its key“match-making”component are a cornerstone of Qu Dongyus re-form agenda.This initiative offers tools to provide capacity 21 UNIDO-related dynamics discussed in this study reflect the situation under Li Yongs leadership which lasted until November 2021.3COLOURING THE PICTURE:KEY DIMENSIONS

220、 OF CHINAS ENGAGEMENT19COLOURING THE PICTURE:KEY DIMENSIONS OF CHINAS ENGAGEMENTsearch and knowledge centres that focus on the use of big data for global strategic concerns.25 Others highlight that Chinas resources,contacts,and knowledge were instru-mental for the UN to engage on new digital topics.

221、26SOUTH-SOUTH AND TRIANGULAR COOPERATIONThe UN development system has long been engaged in sup-porting cooperation among developing countries,often termed South-South cooperation,in various ways.Most UN development entities have established structures to engage with and mainstream their support for

222、South-South and tri-angular cooperation(Haug 2022a).China has been a key partner for the expansion of different entities South-South portfolios.In line with the framing of China as the worlds largest developing country,Chinas government has made use of references to the South and South-South coopera

223、tion to promote its developing partnerships,often to highlight its links with Asian,African,or Latin American partners(see Kohlenberg and Godehardt 2021;Haug and Kamwengo 2022).The UNs presence in China proper has often played a central facilitating role,and this growing engagement with Chinas devel

224、opment cooperation abroad has also changed funding and partnership structures.27 25 Interviews with member state representatives,February and May 2022.26 Interview with UN official,April 2022.27 In China,the UN country team currently consists of 21 members,most of which belong to the UN Sustainable

225、Development Group;see UN-SDG 2021.UN development offices in upper middle-income countries building to some of the worlds poorest countries,including Ethiopia,Haiti and Yemen(FAO n.d.),and has a strong focus on big data.Hand-in-Hands Geospatial Platform has inte-grated a substantial number of databas

226、es.Strengthening the UNs capacities and functions regarding data is in line with agreed-upon UN policies and part of Secretary-Gener-al Guterres“Quintet of Change”reforms to better equip the UN for ongoing and future crises(UNSG 2022b).A cause for concern,however,is that key positions related to dat

227、a at the FAO have been filled by Chinese nationals22 and that the FAO management appears to be eager to shield the area of data policy from intergovernmental oversight(Baumann 2022).China has also bolstered data initiatives with funds for South-South Cooperation at FAO,among others(see Ta-ble 3).The

228、 FAO has been collaborating closely with DESA,which is another UN entity headed by a Chinese national,on data-related processes.Notably,they have collaborated by aligning FAO efforts with the DESA-led UN Global Platform dedicated to providing data for SDG monitoring.23 With its overall responsibilit

229、y for supporting the advancement of the global statistical system,DESA has taken up the topic of ge-ospatial information under Chinese leadership.China host-ed the first UN World Geospatial Information Congress in 2018 and was particularly keen on hosting one of DESAs four Regional Hubs for Big Data

230、.24 For some Western ob-servers,this cooperation through Chinese-led UN entities is part of a broader but implicit Chinese strategy to initiate re-22 Interview with member state representative,May 2022.23 ITU,which is also a Chinese-led UN entity,has been engaged with the FAO on data-related issues

231、as well,see FAO 2020a.24 Interview with independent expert,April 2022;see also UN-CEBD n.d.-a and UN-CEBD n.d.-b.Table 4Selected UN trust funds established by China*In 2015,China established its own South-South Cooperation Assistance fund through which it also funds cooperation with UN entities.Init

232、ially,$2 billion were pledged.In 2022,the fund was rebranded as Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund and linked with the Global Development Initiative(MOFA 2015;2022c).Sources:FAO 2020b;UN n.d.-b;UNEP n.d.-a;MOFA 2021Title AmountsUN Peace and Development Trust Fund(PDTF)US$200 million

233、 pledged over 10 years in 2016US$100 million received by 2020Extended to 2030PDTF Sub-Fund:2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Expenditures between 2016 and 2020 at about US$41 millionChina-FAO South-South Cooperation Trust FundPhase 1(20092015):US$30 million(contributed)Phase 2(20152020):US$50

234、million(contributed)Phase 3(2020):US$50 million(pledged)UNEP China Trust FundSince 2013:annual pledges of US$2 millionUNESCO-China Funds-in-Trust Since 2012:annual contributions of US$2 million20FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG CHINAS EXPANDING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PILLARUNDP China

235、 was one of the early actors working to set up triangular pilot projects with the Chinese government in African countries(including Zambia and Ghana),support-ed by funding from Western donors such as Denmark or the United Kingdom.28 Over time,these South-South sup-port projects laid the foundation f

236、or a programmatic area within the UNDP country office in Beijing.The Centres of Excellence established by China are another mechanism the country has used in its collaboration with UN entities to promote the Chinese development experience abroad.29 One of the earliest of its kind was the Internation

237、al Pover-ty Reduction Centre in China,set up with the support of UNDP(IPRCC n.d.).The UNIDO Centre for South-South In-dustrial Cooperation(UNIDO n.d.-b),in turn,is only a cen-tre by name.As a project set up between UNIDO and dif-ferent Chinese government entities,it does not have any major resources

238、 of its own and has mostly been support-ing travel and study tours for Chinese officials and their foreign guests.30 At the FAO,in turn,China has long been hailed as“the major participator,supporter and promoter of the SSC Programme”(FAO 2015:2).While China has been actively involved in FAOs South-S

239、outh cooperation support schemes since the 1990s,it was with the estab-lishment of the China-FAO South-South Cooperation Trust Fund in 2008 that collaboration took off in a more sub-stantive way.Activities implemented with Trust Fund re-sources in collaboration with the FAO have been almost exclusiv

240、ely dedicated to supporting Chinese bilateral co-operation with African countries,mostly on agricultural technologies(FAO 2015).China has arguably become the most visible South-South cooperation provider at the UN as well as elsewhere.In nu-merical terms,there is a positive correlation between the l

241、evel of funding individual UN entities receive from the Chi-nese government and the extent to which they engage with South-South cooperation support(Haug 2021a:32).At the same time,a substantial and growing number of UN entities have witnessed China-related controversies con-nected to their South-So

242、uth work(Haug 2022a).In the con-text of rising geopolitical tensions,some entities have re-duced(the visibility of)their engagement with Chinese programmatic instruments and/or have dismantled their South-South cooperation unit in order to avoid the creation of separate lines of work that might caus

243、e Western suspi-cion.31 At a programmatic level,Executive Board discussions at UNDP and elsewhere have led to heated debates about such as China receive less core funding from headquarters and rely more on local resources,i.e.funding directly provided by host govern-ments.This means that,in these se

244、ttings,UN country offices have a stronger link with and arguably less independence from their hosts,as certain funding streams depend directly on government counterparts that are also the main interlocutors for designing and implementing UN projects and programmes.28 For a detailed project assessmen

245、t,see UNDP 2019.29 For a detailed analysis of how China engages with UN entities for transferring development-related policies to other locales,see Wais-bich and Haug 2022.30 Interviews with UN officials,March 2022.31 For the case of the UN Environment Programme,see Haug 2022a,28.the extent to which

246、 UN cooperation with China-the-pro-gramme-country should be funded through core resourc-es32 and include support for activities ostensibly related to China-the-international-cooperation-provider.33 For many Western representatives,the increasingly substantial focus on South-South cooperation support

247、 provided by UN coun-try offices in Beijing is at odds with traditional UN in-coun-try work(see Haug 2022a;2022b).For the UN,in turn,South-South cooperation offers a growing field of engage-ment contributing to an alternative business model for UN work in low and middle-income countries(see Haug 202

248、1a).34 Overall,UN entities have seen a considerable ex-pansion of their South-South cooperation engagement with and for China.That line of work,however,has been increasingly and visibly politicized and contested through pushbacks from Western Member States.35 It is mainly due to China that South-Sou

249、th cooperation is no longer a minor niche topic at the UN but,in many ways,has moved to the centre of sometimes heated debates about multilateral co-operation.BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVEBuilding on and often in addition to UN support for South-South cooperation,the Belt and Road Initiative(BRI)is a mor

250、e recent framework for UN collaboration with China.Since its proclamation by Xi Jinping in 2013,BRI has been a broad,and many say purposefully vague,umbrella or platform for infrastructure-related engage-ment abroad that is part of a geo-economic strategy to strengthen Chinas global connectivity.Its

251、 initial focus was on establishing land transport and trade linkages across Eurasia to reduce Chinas dependence on maritime shipping routes.To date,around 140 countries(more than two thirds of UN membership)have reportedly signed BRI-related agreements with the Chinese govern-ment.36 In China itself

252、,different segments of society from state-owned companies to academics know that they are expected to contribute to BRI as a major endeavour aimed at positioning China as a global economic heavyweight.37 Out of the 36 entities that comprise the UN Sustainable Development Group,31(over 85percent)have

253、 had some level of visible engagement with BRI-related processes through projects or participation in high-level meetings.20 of them(over 50percent)have also signed an MoU on the BRI with Chinese government entities.38 As far as pub-32 Interview with independent expert,March 2022;interview with mem-

254、ber state representative,March 2022.33 Interviews with UN official,April 2022;interview with independent expert,April 2022.34 Interviews with member state representatives,February 2022.35 While Western Member States often cite a lack of transparency in South-South cooperation or support processes as

255、 a major concern,many have perceived the rise of China as a South-South cooperation provider as a serious challenge to their traditionally dominant assis-tance provider positions(see Haug 2021;2022).36 For details,see Nedopil 2022.37 Interview with independent expert,February 2022.38 For details,see

256、 Haug 2022b;see also UNSDG 2020.21COLOURING THE PICTURE:KEY DIMENSIONS OF CHINAS ENGAGEMENTlicly available evidence is concerned,the UNDP,UNIDO,DESA,and FAO have all been among the strongest UN entity BRI supporters.39 The concrete roles UN entities are supposed to play in sup-porting the BRI have b

257、een far from clear-cut.Given the vague character of the BRI as an umbrella covering a range of infrastructure-related economic development processes,the potential options for engagement are varied.The UN Peace and Development Trust Fund,of which China is the sole contributor and decisive force of th

258、e steering commit-tee(UNPDF n.d.-a),offers a central tool for steering funding towards projects and programmes in line with BRI objectives(UNPDF n.d.-b;see also Tang and Siu-fung 2020;Mao 2020,2528).Some UN entities have joined Chinese attempts to contribute to the“greening”of the BRI,i.e.focusing o

259、n the ecological footprint of China-led infrastructure projects.40 Other agencies have been asked to provide operational sup-port similar to the UNs engagement with South-South co-operation.Beyond concrete work on the ground,however,UN engagement arguably serves a more general purpose:In a context o

260、f rising geopolitical tensions,the UNs visible role in projects and MoUs is supposed to buttress the legitimacy of BRI-related processes;for UN entities,in turn,BRI has provided another reference for expanding their partnership 39 For a more comprehensive overview,see Haug 2022b.40 On UNEPs engageme

261、nt,see UNEP n.d.-bwith China as an increasingly active geo-economic player,and with the substantial number of Member States that have signed BRI-related agreements(Haug 2022b;see Deng 2021).While attempts to make use of the UN-BRI relation-ship to strengthen cooperation profiles have gone both ways,

262、they have also been watched suspiciously by Member States outside the BRI community.Western Member States,in particular,as well as India and Japan,have raised concerns about how UN entities engage with the BRI.41 They have highlighted that UN support for Chinas infrastructure initia-tive is at odds

263、with multilateral good practices and have re-peatedly tried to make sure references to the BRI do not make it into official UN documents.42 Due to the above-described pressure,and in an increasingly polarised environment,UN entities have recently become more cautious in their engagement with the BRI

264、.A review of major UN documents between 2013 and 2021 includ-ing development-related resolutions and flagship reports shows that references to BRI peaked in 2019 and since de-clined(Figure 11).Due to Western criticism,many UN entities that initially signed an MoU or set up a project with explicit re

265、ference to the BRI have become more reluctant to engage.UNIDO is a case in point.Under the leadership of Li Yong 41 For details,see Haug 2022b.42 Interview with member state representative,February 2022;interview with UN official,November 2021.Figure 11“Belt and Road”in selected UN documents(2013202

266、1)Source:Authors own elaboration based on a review of 17 sources published in regular intervals by the UN,including six resolutions regularly debated in the Second Committee and ten flagship reports and documents regularly published by individual UN entities(including DESA,FAO,UNDP,and UNIDO).0,50,4

267、0,30,20,00021Number of times“Belt and Road”is mentioned per document(on average)22FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG CHINAS EXPANDING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PILLAR(2013-2021),and given the absence of the United States and other major Western powers,UNID

268、O would have been an ideal platform for expanding BRI-related engagement.Moreover,UNIDOs mandate to promote sustainable indus-trial development could arguably be a perfect complement to the BRI focus on large economic infrastructure projects.However,UNIDOs proactive and visible engagement with BRI r

269、emained limited.In addition,UNIDO leadership decided to remove ostentatious references to the BRI,reportedly to not provoke Western Member States.43 The Bridge for Cities initiative that UNIDO then set up to carry on China-focused work may have had“BRI(dge)”in its name but soon ex-panded its focus t

270、o include stakeholders from Member States unconnected to the BRI.44 At the UNDP,in turn,the change in the organisations stance towards the BRI fol-lowed more explicit pressure.While they had set up a team at the regional level to work on BRI-related topics with countries in the Asia Pacific region,i

271、nterviews confirmed that US representatives threatened to withdraw voluntary contributions from the organization if the UNDP continued to work on BRI-related initiatives.As a result,the position of BRI advisor was abolished in 2021.The UNDP,a traditional stronghold of Western donors within the UN de

272、velopment system,has discontinued its support for BRI-related activi-ties.45 All of this shows that UN development entities that were initially eager to work with China are now caught be-tween two poles.They have to navigate carefully so as not to upset Western powers,who are demanding that they re-

273、ject Chinas advances,or offend China itself,which expects its ideas on how to implement multilateral agendas to be taken into account and promoted.46 3.2 “CHINESE LANGUAGE”Language at the UN matters.Diplomats spend countless hours debating words and sentences of inter-governmental-ly agreed-upon tex

274、ts,be it at the General Assembly and ECOSOC,or,to a lesser degree,in governing bodies of UN entities.While the effects of each individual decision might not be immediately apparent,taken together,they form a recognised body of international agreements and express formulations and ideas that underpin

275、 the international or-der.In recent years,a controversy has emerged in UN diplo-macy around the advent of“Chinese language”in texts and development-related processes.The term“Chinese lan-guage”is slightly misleading as the dispute is entirely about English-language terms.At the heart of the matter a

276、re at-tempts by China and its allies to introduce terms like“a com-munity of shared future for mankind”,“people-centred de-velopment”,“win-win”,or“mutually beneficial cooperation”into UN resolutions and other documents.While some of these phrases build on a long trajectory of South-South sol-idarity

277、,they have become central to Chinas more recent ef-43 Interview with UN official,March 2022.44 Interview with UN official,March 2022.45 Interview with UN official,November 2021.46 Interview with UN officials,February and July 2022.forts to strengthen its discursive power at the UN,raising concerns a

278、mong Western Member States.Some have com-piled lists of key Chinese terms and their variations in order to help their diplomats identify and push back against“Chi-nese language”.47 For external observers,the diplomatic attention given to the seemingly inconspicuous terms promoted by China may feel e

279、ntirely misplaced.On its face,nothing appears to be wrong.How language can turn into a battleground can be best un-derstood by looking at two levels:When China uses specific terms,it claims validity for these terminologies and asks oth-ers to accept what it stands for.At the same time,the con-tent o

280、f these terms is understood to signify a new world or-der based on a set of norms and values that differs from the current normative architecture(see Table 5).The crucial term“a community of shared future for mankind”encapsulates Xi Jinpings key foreign policy doctrine,first articulated in 2013 and

281、presented globally in the UN General Assembly in 2015 under the vision of“a new kind of international relations with win-win cooperation at its core”(UN General Assembly 2015a:19).As highlighted in the introduction,there are two interpretations of this proposition.First,the doctrine can be read as p

282、ositioning China as a responsible global citizen that identifies itself as part of a larger community whose welfare is critical to Chinas destiny an agenda of advancing com-mon interests(Nathan and Zhang 2022).In the geopolitical reading,however,the new doctrine is seen as an effort to advance China

283、s interests and power globally:This shared future promotes China at the centre of a global partnership network,guiding states to achieve peace and prosperity,with international recognition that Chinas authoritarian governance system is preferable to democratic systems.Therefore,achieving this shared

284、 future means creating an international political environment that is more hospitable to Chinas domestic governance model,while also facilitating Chinas global leadership.(Fung and Lam 2021:1152;see Yang 2021;Eisenman 2021)The emphasis leader Xi Jinping puts on“a new model of re-lations”(Xi 2017)mak

285、es clear that,in a geopolitical reading,the intention is to replace or at least fundamentally alter the current model.Importantly,Western notions of democracy and human rights are fundamentally at odds with Chinas political system and the norms on which it is based(Yang 2021:309)and have no credibil

286、ity in the eyes of the Chinese government,which sees them as“pretext”for interferences in the internal affairs of other states which“incite divisions and confrontation in the world”(Russian Federation and Peoples Republic of China 2022;see Rolland 2020).By put-ting forward language linked to the new

287、 model,China is working towards an alternative strategic narrative for global governance while simultaneously requesting and testing the support of other Member States.Looking at the language used is,therefore,a way to examine change in global power 47 Interviews with member state representatives,Fe

288、bruary and March 2022.23COLOURING THE PICTURE:KEY DIMENSIONS OF CHINAS ENGAGEMENTTable 5Chinese diplomatic“language”and its interpretations*For examples of the combination of“no individual”and“no country”,see Permanent Mission 2021 and Xi 2022.Source:Authors own elaboration.Term or phraseMeaning“com

289、munity of/with shared future for mankind”(or“humankind”),also “community of common destiny for mankind”As Xis central foreign policy frame and“strategic narrative”(Yang 2021),this phrase comes with various interpretations:It is a frame for Chinas engagement in the global governance of various policy

290、 fields,in particular the environment,to advance common global interests(see Xi in UNGA 2015;Xi 2017;Yang 2021:306;Zhang 2018:198).It serves to ensure partners,both regionally and globally,of Chinas peaceful intentions,offering a“new type of international relationship”to maintain a favorable interna

291、tional environment for Chinas development(see Russian Federation and Peoples Republic of China 2022;Zhang 2018:198,201).It carries Chinese discontent with the Western-dominated,liberal international order and advances an alternative vision of a better,more democratic and harmonious global order(see

292、Peoples Republic of China 2021b;Eisenman 2021:5;Russian Federation and Peoples Republic of China 2022;Yang 2021:306;Xi in UNGA 2015).It is frame for creating regional spheres of influence and for promoting and measuring Chinas global leadership ambitions(see Eisenman 2021:6;Russian Federation and Pe

293、oples Republic of China 2022;Xi 2017;Xu and Guo 2016;Yang 2021:306;Yu 2018).It reflects a Sino-centric world order that echoes the historic Chinese tributary state system and the notion of a superior Chinese culture(see Zhao 2017:293;Zhang 2018:198)“winwin/mutually beneficial cooperation”This term i

294、s key to Chinas vision of a new global order:It presents an alternative to the“old”form of state relations,rejecting Cold War politics and promising equal relationships among all states(see Peoples Republic of China 2021b:48;Rudyak 2021:11).It carries the Chinese understanding of human rights as a m

295、atter to be dealt with through amicable state cooperation,in contrast to international accountability and individual rights(see Oud 2021:36).It comes with the expectation that beneficiaries of Chinese support reciprocate by showing political support(see Danzhi 2019;Eisenman 2021:12;Rudyak 2021:11;Xu

296、 and Guo 2016).From the perspective of Western Member States,it is seen as emphasizing economic benefits(of the state)over sustainable development needs(of the individual)and as a tool to create political dependence(see Germany and UK in UNGA 2020a;internal government documents).“peoplecentred”This

297、term originates from the field of human rights.It is at the center of the ideological differences between China and Western powers:It presents Chinas concept of human rights according to which development as the improvement of living standards is the basis and vehicle for advancing human rights(see

298、Amnesty International n.d.;Peoples Republic of China 2021a:46;Xu in Xinhua 2022;He 2020).It reflects a concept of governance that emphasizes the control by the Chinese Communist Party,or the state more generally,as steward of national development(see Peoples Republic of China 2021b:8 and 41;He 2020)

299、.For the Chinese Communist Party,it marks the ideological differences to Western concepts of governance,democracy and human rights which are seen as a threat to Communist Party rule(see Peoples Republic of China 2013;2021a;2021b).In the UN context,Western Member States see this term as undermining t

300、he universality of human rights and the human-rights based approach that anchors the 2030 Agenda(see Germany in UNGA 2020a;internal government documents).“leave no country behind”This phrase is often used together with*(or instead of)“leaving no one behind”,a key principle of the 2030 Agenda:It high

301、lights the development needs,and in fact rights,of states as a condition for leaving no individuals behind(see UN DESA 2021;MOFA 2022a and 2022b;Xinhua 2022).From a Western state perspective,it puts the state at the center and is therefore a threat to the 2030 Agendas focus on individuals(internal g

302、overnment documents).24FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG CHINAS EXPANDING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PILLAR(Yang 2021).While language has long been used as an in-strument of control in China domestically(Schoenhals 1992),the UNs more recent endorsements of Chinese concepts are interpreted

303、 as global acknowledgements of Chinas contri-bution to global governance and serve as international legit-imation in domestic debates(Rolland 2020:46).PUSH FOR“CHINESE LANGUAGE”IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONSThe push for inserting“Chinese language”in develop-ment-related UN resolutions can be char

304、acterized as persis-tent,selective,not overly forceful,and(for now)largely un-successful.It appears that early on in Chinas new phase of engagement with the UN development system around 2015,China was able to make some inroads.This might be attributed to the vague nature of these phrases,leaving dip

305、lomats of other Member States wondering about their meaning.48 In more recent years,however,Western Mem-ber States have mounted a principled resistance,making only a few tactical concessions.The 2030 Agenda(UNGA 2015b)contains more terms generally associated with“Chi-nese language”than most succeedi

306、ng resolutions,includ-ing key terms like“people-centred”,“shared prosperity”,and“win-win cooperation”.Another General Assembly resolution stands out with regard to Chinese language:In 2019,China introduced a resolution on rural poverty at the Second Committee,which seems to be the only General Assem

307、bly resolution that contains the slogan“shared fu-ture for humankind”;it also features the phrase“win-win cooperation”(UNGA 2019).In addition,the resolutions 2020 version contains the phrase“shared prosperity”(UN-GA 2020b).A Western diplomat described this resolution as a potential vehicle for intro

308、ducing“Chinese language”into UN resolutions,the assumption being that if just one resolution contains these terms,they can be referenced as agreed language elsewhere.49 Western Member States voted against the resolution,while the majority of the UNs membership has supported it.The United States note

309、d the“unnecessary inclusion of politicized language”and criti-cized that the“text reflected the domestic policies and po-litical ideology of a single member State”(UNGA 2020a).Other Western members issued similar statements.With re-gard to an ECOSOC resolution on financing for develop-ment adopted w

310、ith the formulation“to ensure that no country or person is left behind”(UN ECOSOC 2021),West-ern diplomats said they accepted the formulation in this resolution in exchange for keeping“Chinese language”out elsewhere.50The insertion of“Chinese language”into UN resolutions has been fended off by Weste

311、rn and other Member States on many occasions.A broader analysis of other recurring 48 Interview with member state representatives,January 2022.49 Interview with member state representative,February 202250 Interview with member state representatives,February 2022.resolutions51 at the Second Committee

312、 shows that“Chi-nese language”has made almost no inroads into General Assembly resolutions.Only the term“people-centred”,which can be considered agreed language from the 2030 Agenda resolution,appears three to six times a year across all resolutions(starting in 2015).Incidentally,China has not often

313、 been the one to introduce this language;instead,it has come from other Group of 77(G77)states.52 Other terms and phrases like“win-win”,“shared future for hu-mankind”,and“shared prosperity”do not appear at all in this set of General As sembly resolutions.The last two Quadrennial Compre hen sive Poli

314、cy Review resolutions from 2016 and 2020 both contain the term“people-centred”but only in a relatively vague formulation(“people-centred set of universal and transformative Sustainable Develop-ment Goals”).53 The finding is the same for documents adopted in the gov-erning boards of individual UN ent

315、ities.At the UNIDO,Chi-na has not pushed for“Chinese language”in resolutions in recent years,54 although there have been controversies around references to the BRI and GDI(see sections 3.1.and 3.4).China has recently become more active on the UNDP board but has neither advocated for the insertion of

316、 new language an exception is Chinas advertisement of the BRI(see section 3.1)nor opposed existing language that re-flects the UNs human rights framework.55 Regarding the FAO,interview data and a systematic review of council and conference verbatim records produced no data indicating that“Chinese la

317、nguage”was promoted or even used by ei-ther Qu Dongyu or Member State diplomats since 2019.“CHINESE LANGUAGE”IN UN ENTITY DOCUMENTSGiven the limited endorsement of“Chinese language”in in-tergovernmental resolutions,one might assume that UN enti-ties studiously avoid using contested language.Converse

318、ly,entities might increasingly employ some of these terms to re-flect Chinas expanding influence as part of attempts to bal-ance the perspectives of their various global constituencies.While it is difficult to prove a negative,our systematic review 51 GA resolutions on International trade and develo

319、pment,”“Follow-up to and implementation of the outcomes of the International Confer-ences on Financing for Development”,“Promoting sustainable con-sumption and production patterns for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,building on Agenda 21”;“Operational activities for

320、 development of the United Nations sys-tem”,“South-South cooperation”,“Development cooperation with middle-income countries.”52 Interview with member state representatives,February 2022.53 The pandemic might have played an additional role in limiting the scope of the debate over language.Given that

321、the diplomats were not able to meet in person,Member States agreed to limit the number of paragraphs under negotiation,thus reducing opportunities(interview with member states representatives,February 2022).54 Interviews with UN officials,March 2022.55 Interviews with member state representatives,Ja

322、nuary and February 2022.25COLOURING THE PICTURE:KEY DIMENSIONS OF CHINAS ENGAGEMENTof recurring UN flagship reports over the last decade56 sug-gests that the UN development system has not(yet)adopted“Chinese language”to any meaningful extent.The term“shared future for humankind”does not appear in an

323、y or-ganizational document we reviewed.The“Global Sustaina-ble Development Report”from 2019 uses the words“peo-ple-centred”14 times.The“Industrial Development Reports”,a UNIDO publication series,has used the term“win-win”17 times and“shared prosperity”11 times since 2011.However,these two publicatio

324、ns appear to be outliers.Considering the wider body of reports analysed for this study,it would be a stretch to report a trend in the frequency of“Chinese lan-guage”in UN documents.The FAOs“The State of Food and Agriculture”Report used the term“win-win”twice in 2020 but had also used it occasionally

325、 before Qu Dongyu became Director-General of the FAO.Overall,it appears that even the UN entities that are or have been led by Chinese nationals have not become vehicles for the dissemination of these terms.At DESA,there seems to have been no major push for it,and attempts to change lan-guage from w

326、ithin the organization would likely be unsuc-cessful because DESAs work is often closely linked to inter-governmental processes that usually undergo detailed member-state negotiations.57 Even in the FAO and UNIDO,such a push does not seem to have occurred.Documents such as strategic frameworks,newsl

327、etters,and published speeches by the respective Director-Generals do not use these terms.While concerned about Chinas growing clout in the UN development system,interview partners from Western Member States did not highlight“Chinese lan-guage”as a central area of concern in these organisations.58 Co

328、ncomitantly,according to our interviews,there has not been a push from Chinese executive leaders to reduce their entities human rights commitments or the civil society ap-proach through internal administrative processes.Admitted-ly,the FAO and UNIDO are not at the forefront of normative questions;ne

329、vertheless,they have organizational policies and administrative units concerned with these issues.CHINA-SPECIFIC UN DOCUMENTS:NO RIGHTS-BASED LANGUAGE OR REFERENCES TO CIVIL SOCIETYIf there is hardly any“Chinese language”to be found in global UN reports and documents,then something opposite to that

330、is also true:UN documents that originate in China,such as the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework(UNSDCF)for China and the country programme documents of UN agencies operating in China,either do not 56 Research period:20102022.Reports included in the analysis:Indus-trial Development Rep

331、ort,Global Sustainable Development Report,Financing for Sustainable Development Report,SG Report on oper-ational activities for development,SG Report on SSC,Sustainable De-velopment Outlook,The State of Food and Agriculture,The Sustainable Development Goals Report,World Economic Situation and Prospe

332、cts.57 Interviews with independent experts,March and April 2022.58 Interviews with UN officials,March 2022.contain words that reflect the UNs human rights frame-work or use them in ways that can counteract their intend-ed meaning.In the UNSDCF,the document that defines the thematic priorities of the

333、 UN development entities active in China for the period 20212025,rights-based language is concentrated in only one sentence:“China shares and con-tributes,through its progress in implementation of the 2030 Agenda,to the vision of a world of universal respect for hu-man rights and human dignity,the rule of law,justice,equal-ity and non-discrimination”(UNSDG 2020b:9).This sen-tence reaffirms the Chi