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1、GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AT A TURNING POINTTHE ROLE OF THE G20This book collects contributions from international leading experts on how the Italian Presidency of the G20 in 2021 could advance a renewed global governance agenda. The Covid-19 pandemic has impacted every nation in the world, highlighting how

2、 globally interconnected we are. To mitigate the health, social and economic effects of the Covid-19 crisis, the world needs effective global responses. However, multilateral cooperation has been facing dramatic headwinds before and after the Covid-19 pandemic. The G20 could play a key role in revit

3、alizing multilateral cooperation, by pushing for new ways and means to deal with global challenges. In this context, the authors explore four key areas which would require fresh global coordination: global trade, digitalization, demographic patterns and circular economy.GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AT A TURNIN

4、G POINT edited by Ettore Greco, Fabrizio Botti and Nicola Bilotta edited byEttore Greco, Fabrizio Botti and Nicola Bilotta9788833653334_204_MP_4SEGUICI SUI SOCIAL NETWORK18.00EUROIAI Research Studies5IAI Research Studies1. Andrea Dess, Ettore Greco (edited by), The Search for Stability in Libya. OSC

5、Es Role between Internal Obstacles and External Challenges, 20182. Lorenzo Kamel, Asli Selin Okyay (edited by), Realizing Youth Potential in the Mediterranean. Unlocking Opportunities, Overcoming Challenges, 20183. Lorenzo Kamel (edited by), Youth and Africa, 20204. Nicola Bilotta and Fabrizio Botti

6、 (edited by), Development Finance in Challenging Times, 20215. Ettore Greco, Fabrizio Botti and Nicola Bilotta (edited by), Global Governance at a Turning Point The Role of the G20, 2021IAI Research Studies are monographs written by one or more authors (IAI or external experts) on key global issues,

7、 mainly linked to international politics and international relations. The aim is to promote greater and more up to date knowledge of emerging issues and trends and help prompt public debate.IAI is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli. IA

8、I seeks to promote awareness of international politics and to contribute to the advancement of European integration and multilateral cooperation. Its focus embraces topics of strategic relevance such as European integration, security and defence, international economics and global governance, energy

9、, climate and Italian foreign policy; as well as the dynamics of cooperation and conflict in key geographical regions such as the Mediterranean and Middle East, Asia, Eurasia, Africa and the Americas.ISSN 2611-867X ISBN 978-88-3365-333-4IAI Research Studies 5GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AT A TURNING POINTTHE R

10、OLE OF THE G20edited by Ettore Greco, Fabrizio Botti and Nicola BilottaEdizioni Nuova CulturaThis book has been realized in the framework of the project “The Role of the G20 in Pro-moting Global Governance: Challenges and Opportunities of the Italian Presidency in 2021”, funded by the Italian Minist

11、ry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MAECI) and the Compagnia di San Paolo Foundation.This publication benefits from the financial contribution of the Compagnia di San Paolo Foundation and of the Policy Planning Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Interna-tional Cooperation p

12、ursuant to art. 23-bis of Presidential Decree 18/1967. The positions expressed are exclusively those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the posi-tions of the Compagnia di San Paolo Foundation and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.Series EditorLorenzo Kamel

13、First published 2021 by Edizioni Nuova CulturaFor Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)Via dei Montecatini 17 I-00186 Romewww.iai.itCopyright 2021 Edizioni Nuova Cultura - RomaISBN: 9788833653334ISSN: 2611-867XCover design: Marco PigliapocoCover photo: ktsdesignGraphic Composition: by Marco Pigliapoc

14、oThe unauthorized reproduction of this book, even partial, carried out by any means, including photocopying, even for internal or didactic use, is prohibited by copyright.5Table of ContentsList of Contributors .7List of Abbreviations .9Foreword, by Lorenzo Kamel .13Introduction Reframing Goals and P

15、riorities of the G20 Agenda, by Ettore Greco .151. The Role of the G20 in Promoting Global Governance: Challenges and Opportunities for the Italian Presidency in 2021, by Nicola Bilotta and Fabrizio Botti .251. Introduction and summary .252. Origin and evolution of the G20 .263. Changes in the geopo

16、litical environment and domestic policy attitudes .294. Proposals for reform .30Conclusion .34References .352. WTO Reform: The Role of the G20, by Axel Berger and Clara Brandi .391. The state of international trade cooperation .422. Key issues and the positions of major WTO members .453. The role of

17、 the G20 .56Conclusions .603. The G20s Work on the Digital Economy and the Future of Work: International Context, Progress and the Way Ahead, by Paul Twomey .711. International cooperation .722. Initiatives undertaken in the G20 .793. The impact of Covid-19 .894. The potential role of the G20 .90Ref

18、erences .944. The Challenges of an Ageing Society, by Paola Subacchi .1011. The state of international cooperation .1042. Initiatives within the G20 context .1063. Ageing: An agenda for the G20 .108Conclusion .111References .1135. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular Economy, by

19、 Martin Charter and Ichin Cheng .1151. The impact of Covid-19 .1202. Conceptual and definitional issues .1223. CE plans launched by the EU and national governments around the world .1234. CE policy instruments .1275. The state of play of CE international initiatives .1346. CE initiatives within the

20、G20 framework .140Conclusions and recommendations .141Appendices .147References .149Appendix: Chapter 2, Tables 2-8 .1556Table of contents7List of ContributorsNicola Bilotta, Researcher, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).Fabrizio Botti, Senior Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Rese

21、arch Fellow, “Guglielmo Marconi” University.Martin Charter, Director, Centre for Sustainable Design at the Busi-ness School for the Creative Industries, University for the Creative Arts (UCA) and Professor of Sustainable Innovation at UCA.Ichin Cheng, Director and co-founder, Sustainable Innovation

22、Lab.Ettore Greco, Executive Vice President; Head of the Multilateralism and global governance programme, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).Paola Subacchi, Professor of International Economics, Global Policy Institute at Queen Mary University of London and E-Economics.Paul Twomey, Distinguished Fe

23、llow, Centre for International Govern-ance Innovation (CIGI).9List of Abbreviations10YFP10-Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production3RReduce, reuse, recycleAACEAfrican Alliance on Circular EconomyABAppellate BodyACWGAnti-Corruption Working GroupADBAsian Development BankA

24、EASIJAfricaEurope Alliance for Sustainable Investment and JobsAIArtificial intelligenceAPECAsia-Pacific Economic CooperationASEANAssociation of Southeast Asian NationsBRICSBrazil, Russia, India, China and South AfricaCECircular economyCEAPCircular Economy Action Plan (EU)CEFSPCircular Economy Financ

25、e Support Platform (EU)CEMEuropean Circular Economy MissionCENEuropean Committee for StandardizationCENELCEuropean Committee for Electrotechnical StandardizationCEOChief executive officerCEREWGResource Efficiency Working Group (EU)CRMCritical raw materialCSOCivil society organizationCSWGClimate Sust

26、ainability Working Group (EU)CTECommittee on Trade and Environment (WTO)DETFDigital Economy Task Force (G20)DFFTData Free Flow with TrustDSUDispute Settlement Understanding10Global Governance at a Turning Point The Role of the G20ECESPEuropean Circular Economy Stakeholder PlatformECOSOCEconomic and

27、Social Council (UN)EEBEuropean Environmental BureauEESCEuropean Economic and Social CommitteeEGAEnvironmental Goods AgreementEIBEuropean Investment BankEMFEllen MacArthur FoundationEPRExtended producer responsibilityEUEuropean UnionG20Group of TwentyGADDigital Agenda Group (Mercosur)GDPGross domesti

28、c productGGEGroup of Governmental Experts (UN)GHGGreenhouse gasGPAAgreement on Government ProcurementGPFIGlobal Partnership for Financial InclusionGTAGlobal Trade AlertIBSAIndia, Brazil and South AfricaICTInformation and communications technologyICTSDInternational Centre for Trade and Sustainable De

29、velopmentIECInternational Electrotechnical CommissionIFIInternational Financial InstitutionILOInternational Labour OrganizationIMFInternational Monetary FundIMOInternational Maritime OrganizationInREIndian Resource EfficiencyInRPIndian Resource PanelIRPInternational Resource PanelISIndustrial symbio

30、sisISOInternational Organization for StandardizationITAInformation Technology AgreementITUInternational Telecommunications UnionIUUIllegal, unreported and unregulatedJICEJoint Initiative on Circular Economy (EU)11List of AbbreviationsMCSMaterial-Cycle SocietyMERCOSURMercado Comn del SurMSMEMicro-, s

31、mall- and medium-sized enterpriseNGOnon-governmental organizationOECDOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentPACEPlatform for Accelerating the Circular EconomyPAGEPartnership for Action on Green EconomyR&DResearch and developmentREResource efficiencySCPSustainable Consumption and Produ

32、ctionSDTSpecial and Differential TreatmentSMMSustainable Materials ManagementROKRepublic of Korea (South Korea)SCPSustainable consumption and productionSDGSustainable Development GoalSDRSpecial Drawing RightSDTSpecial and Differential TreatmentSOEState-owned enterpriseSPSSanitary and PhytosanitarySU

33、NSymbiosis User NetworkTBTTechnical Barriers to TradeTCP/IPTransmission Control Protocol/Internet ProtocolTFATrade Facilitation AgreementUKUnited KingdomUNUnited NationsUNCTADUnited Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUNDPUnited Nations Development ProgrammeUNEPUnited Nations Environment Prog

34、rammeUSUnited StatesVATValue-added taxVRPValue-retention processWBCSDWorld Business Council for Sustainable DevelopmentWCEFWorld Circular Economy ForumWEFWorld Economic Forum12Global Governance at a Turning Point The Role of the G20WHOWorld Health OrganizationWRAPWaste and Resources Action Programme

35、WTOWorld Trade Organization13ForewordThe Covid-19 pandemic has impacted every nation in the world, high-lighting how globally interconnected we are. To mitigate the health, social and economic effects of the Covid-19 crisis, the world needs effec-tive global responses. However, multilateral cooperat

36、ion has been facing dramatic headwinds before and after the Covid-19 pandemic. The G20 could play a key role in revitalizing multilateral cooperation, by pushing for new ways and means to deal with global challenges. The Italian Pres-idency of the G20 in 2021 is providing fresh political impulse for

37、 the G20 to advance a renewed global governance agenda.Before the Covid-19 pandemic, global trade, digitalization, demo-graphic patterns and circular economy have emerged as key areas which would require fresh global coordination. The Covid-19 pandemic appears to have amplified the challenges and op

38、portunities related to these pri-orities, opening up a window for developing new multilateral answers.Structural transformations of global trade patterns, persistent pro-tectionist tendencies and growing geopolitical tensions have under-mined the main functions of the World Trade Organization (WTO),

39、 eroding its rule-making role and paralysing its dispute settlement sys-tem. The impact of Covid-19 pandemic on world trade and the lack of coordination in policy responses have further highlighted the need to improve the global trade architecture. Moreover, the Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the

40、 digitalization process, throwing into sharp relief its challenges and opportunities. As the digital transformation is advancing at a quick pace, it is essential that global and national decision-makers explore new multilateral ways and means to deal with its far-reaching impact on economy and socie

41、ty. In the aftermath of the Covid-19 crisis, circular economy approaches have the potential to play a crucial role in stimulus packages by promoting a green, low-carbon and circular post-coronavirus economic recovery. Finally, even before the Covid-19 14Lorenzo Kamelpandemic, both, advanced and deve

42、loping economies, have been expe-riencing unprecedented shifts in their demographic profiles, presenting challenges as well as opportunities for both individual countries and the world economy.As the G20 tends to act jointly in a case of emergency, the Italian Pres-idency of the G20 in 2021 has a un

43、ique chance to provide a fresh impulse to the global governance agenda.Lorenzo KamelRome, May 202115Introduction Reframing Goals and Priorities of the G20 AgendaEttore GrecoThis volume presents the results of a research project entitled “The Role of the G20 in Promoting Global Governance: Challenges

44、 and Opportuni-ties of the Italian Presidency in 2021” which the Istituto Affari Internazi-onali (IAI) conducted in 2020 with the support of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the Compagnia di San Paolo of Turin. The project aimed at investigating the challenge

45、s and pol-icy priorities of the Italian Presidency of the G20 in 2021 in light of the changing international scene and the most recent developments of the G20 agenda. It focused on four central themes of the G20 agenda in the belief that they would remain on top of it even during Italys G20 Presi-de

46、ncy in 2021: the reform of the WTO, aging society, circular economy, and the impact of digitalization on the labour market. Those themes were chosen by the IAI research team after consulting with Italys G20 Sherpa Group in mid-2019, that is, at a relatively early stage of the process of the definiti

47、on of the G20 Presidencys agenda. Indeed, all four themes have figured prominently in the activities of the G20 working groups and are expected to be given central attention at several key G20 events and the final summit of the Group. In 2020, within the framework of the project, the IAI organized f

48、ive international conferences to discuss the priorities of Italys G20 Presidency: one for each of the aforementioned themes and a final one dedicated to a more general discussion about the prospects of the G20 Presidency. The five conferences were organized around dis-cussion panels which saw the pa

49、rticipation of think tankers, scholars, decision-makers and representatives of international organizations. In 2021, the IAI has furthered its research effort on the role of the G20 as a scientific advisor to the Italian Presidency and as the Co-Chair of Think 16Ettore Greco20 (T20), one of the offi

50、cial engagement groups of the G20 which brings together a wide network of think thanks working on the G20 agenda and more generally on global governance issues.The background just outlined helped to shape the structure of this volume. The first chapter, authored by Nicola Bilotta and Fabrizio Botti,

51、 offers an overview of the role of G20 in the global governance architecture examining both its shortcomings and its comparative advantages with respect to other organizations and international players. After illustrating the historical development of the Group, with a focus on the impact of the mos

52、t recent international dynam-ics and the gradual expansion of its agenda, the chapter discusses the reform proposals of its governance structures, assessing their pros and cons. The authors argue that while legitimacy and repre-sentativeness remain key issues, the Group, even in its present con-figu

53、ration, has the potential of making a crucial contribution to the advancement of the global governance agenda.The second chapter by Alex Berger and Clara Brandi analyses the cur-rent crisis of the World Trade Organization (WTO), discussing its main causes, the various reform proposals that have been

54、 put forward to address it and the role the G20 can play in fostering the ongoing reform efforts. Numerous factors including the global power shift, protectionist drives, the rise of global value chains, the growing complexities of the trade system, and the new technological challenges such as digit

55、alization have played a role in what appears to be an existential crisis that has seriously undermined all three core functions of the WTO (rule-making, negotia-tion and dispute settlement). The authors examine in detail the state and prospects of the debate over the reform of the WTO, including the

56、 various positions of WTO members. Noting that only recently has the G20 made serious commitment to the WTO reform, they argue that the Group has a key role to play in moving the WTO reform agenda forward, by helping to keep up momentum for reform and promoting a “grand bargain” covering all differe

57、nt issue areas. Thanks to its wide agenda, the G20 can, they add, address the trade issues through an integrated approach that takes into consideration the inseparable health and environmental problems.In the chapter which follows (No. 3), Paola Subacchi discusses what the G20 can do to address the

58、problem of ageing, an increasingly topical 17Introductionissue that has acquired a growing prominence in the Groups agenda in the last few years. Notwithstanding the huge regional differences, age-ing, a phenomenon driven by big and rapid changes in fertility and life expectancy, has become a source

59、 of concern for an increasing number of countries, including China. This is due to the shrinking labour force, a potential decline in productivity and increased dependency ratio, that is, the ratio of economically active persons to inactive ones. The Covid-19 pandemic has had different impacts on th

60、e various age groups. This has amplified, in many ways, the effects of ageing. The author examines what has been done so far at the international level, particularly within the G20, to deal with the social and economic implications of ageing. She underlines that the initiatives have been fragmented

61、because of the lack of mechanisms for international coordination and comprehensive data to monitor their results. Improvements in data collection is therefore essential, she argues, and so is a more thorough analysis of the impact of ageing on fiscal sustainability and income inequalities. The G20,

62、the author concludes, can play a significant role, in conjunction with other organizations, notably the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, in fostering a global dialogue based on this holistic approach to the ageing issue.The fourth chapter, written by Paul Towney, examines the w

63、ide-rang-ing impact of artificial intelligence (AI) technology on the future of work and what the G20 can do to promote international agreements to regulate the rapidly developing AI applications that have been accelerated by the Covid-19 pandemic. Noting that digital economy has been more condu-civ

64、e than other areas of the technology debate to international consensus building, he emphasizes that several initiatives have been undertaken to promote international cooperation on a wide spectrum of issues related to the governance of AI technology at the various levels national, regional, internat

65、ional although the results have been limited and the cooperation mechanisms remain embryonic. The author examines how and to what extent the problems associated with AI technology have been addressed by the various multilateral bodies, focusing on the initiatives undertaken in the G20 since 2015. Su

66、ch initiatives have covered a wide range of issues including digital trade, smart mobility, digital skills in training and edu-cation and the protection of privacy and human rights. In the concluding 18Ettore Grecosection, the author recommends a set of new initiatives that the G20 can undertake to

67、ensure that the implications of AI technology are addressed by the Group in a more systematic and holistic way.In the fifth chapter, Martin Charter and Ichin Cheng offers a compre-hensive analysis of the circular economy (CE) concept, the prospects of its concrete application as a key component of t

68、he green transition and the national and international action aimed at supporting its implemen-tation. The authors underline that CE concept has become a central ele-ment of the pursuit of new models for sustainable and resilient growth, but note that it reflects various concerns and motivations and

69、 as such it needs to be discussed and clarified. The G20 can contribute, according to the authors, to this essential effort to define, standardize and measure circularity. They underline that while the discussion about CE remains concentrated on the problem of waste, it has started to address the pr

70、ob-lem of how economic and social systems can manage differently prod-ucts, materials and components. A section of the chapter is specifically devoted to the relevance of CE in the various economic sectors. Such sec-toral analysis is crucial to shed more light on the actual opportunities for the CE

71、implementation. The authors also provide a detailed analysis of the programmes launched by national governments and international institutions as well as other stakeholders to achieve circularity includ-ing new mechanisms allowing reuse, such as recycling and remanufac-turing, a more efficient use o

72、f resources and waste management, invest-ment in new materials and green public procurement. Recent trends that seem to have accelerated by the Covid-19, such as the diminishing reliance on China as a major manufacturing hub and the growing role played by regional supply chains as opposed to global

73、ones is signifi-cantly changing the outlook for the implementation of the CE concept. The chapter also examines the role played so far by the G20 in promoting the CE paradigm and offers an articulated set of recommendations on the new initiatives that the G20 can undertake to foster the economic and

74、 social transformations needed to ensure circularity. Key areas on which the G20 should concentrate, according to the authors, are, in par-ticular, synergy between CE and de-carbonization and other aspects of the green transition, the application of the new technologies to CE plans, and the promotio

75、n of CE governance in developing countries.19IntroductionOverall, each of the chapters addresses the implications of the health crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. What follows is an updated anal-ysis of the role of the G20 that focuses on the impact of the pandemic but also takes into account m

76、ore recent developments in the international cooperation environment.No doubt that the Covid-19 pandemic remains a top priority for the G20. The international system of multilateral cooperation has so far failed to provide an adequate collective response to the pandemic. Efforts to ensure desperatel

77、y needed international coordination have been limited. Moreover, the outbreak threatens to transform into an endemic disease. This calls for a long-term strategy that the G20 should help promote and coordinate.The G20 has indeed the potential to provide the political impetus needed to galvanize glob

78、al solidarity in the fight against the outbreak and reinforce the mandates and instruments of global health govern-ance. By doing so, it would make a crucial contribution to the preserva-tion, and possibly revitalization, of the global multilateral system.One of the bodys main responsibilities is en

79、suring policy coordina-tion and preventing major powers from pursuing disruptive competitive policies and strategies in times of crisis. This is the essential function it was able to perform at the early stages of the 2008 financial crisis. To some extent, and provided that geopolitical tensions bet

80、ween the most powerful international players do not spiral out of control, the G20 could prove a vital instrument to help fill the leadership vacuum on display at the global level.The Covid-19 emergency has laid bare various adverse aspects of interdependence, and several national leaders have indul

81、ged in beg-gar-thy-neighbour policies. The resulting climate of mistrust has become a serious obstacle to collaborative initiatives, even goals of obvious com-mon interest such as global vaccination.The crisis has also exacerbated geopolitical rivalries, especially between the United States and Chin

82、a, whose bilateral relations are criti-cal to global stability. The Covid-19 outbreak has also exposed structural weaknesses in the global governance system. Multilateral organizations such as the World Health Organization have come under attack from var-ious quarters for alleged inefficiencies and

83、missteps.20Ettore GrecoIn the first stages of the pandemic the G20 countries took significant steps to prevent the crisis from causing major destabilizing effects on the world economy, including the suspension of debt service payment owed by the most fragile countries and an oil supply agreement to

84、stabi-lize an energy market deeply shaken by an unprecedented demand col-lapse. More generally, given the global nature of the Covid-19 shock and its economic effects, the G20, whose members account for about 90 per cent of global economic output, need to play an increasingly prominent and active ro

85、le in fostering and coordinating international efforts to deal with the outbreak, including providing guidelines for the post-cri-sis recovery.Reversing former US President Trumps unilateralism, which had done big damage to a number of key international cooperation regimes, the Biden administration

86、is working towards a relaunch of multilateral cooperation efforts. This new attitude is providing, in several sectors, considerable diplomatic space for new deals aimed at reinforcing global governance instruments. Under the Italian presidency, the G20 is should continue to make full use of this win

87、dow of opportunity, by focusing, in particular, on issues on which a higher degree of convergence has emerged of late such as climate change.The current international environment is characterized by a broader space for multilateral action in comparison with the recent past, but at the same time by p

88、ersistent tensions and geopolitical rivalries among major powers. In this context the G20 can significantly contribute to trust and confidence building and assert itself as a driving force for the advancement of global governance. Taking into account the most press-ing global challenges and the main

89、 past achievements the growing body of positions and documents adopted under the successive presi-dencies which represents what can be termed as the acquis of G20 the G20 should concentrate on the following tasks.Promoting new and increasingly needed international measures in the fight against Covid

90、-19. The G20 should promote innovative strategies to enhance global health cooperation drawing from the lessons of the Covid-19 pandemic. It should in particular concentrate on promoting the “One Health” approach that emphasizes the need to create synergies between anti-pandemic measures at the loca

91、l, national and global level 21Introductionand to address the connections between the health of humans and that of animals as well as the links with the protection of environment, includ-ing biodiversity. The Group could also facilitate the creation of mech-anisms to ensure reliable and timely data

92、and information sharing on both the evolution of the Covid-19 pandemic and the future ones and the health measures enacted or being developed in the various regions. By doing so, it would play a fundamental confidence-building role. The G20 should also coordinate efforts to provide funds to enhance

93、healthcare structures and capacities in developing countries and foster the digital transformation of health systems.Promoting cooperation to preserve supply chains. The G20 will proba-bly continue to have difficulty resuming its traditional role of promoter of a free-trade agenda given the profound

94、 disagreements among mem-ber states and persistent trade tensions. Reform of the WTO does not appear within easy reach although, as we have seen, the G20 countries have recognized that profound changes of its mechanisms and rules are needed. The Italian presidency hopes that some progress can be mad

95、e at the G20 Summit. However, the Group has a crucial role to play in promot-ing cooperation to preserve essential supply chains and prevent the erec-tion of new disruptive barriers. In particular, ensuring a smooth flow of medical equipment a critical component of the anti-pandemic strategy would g

96、reatly contribute to restoring mutual confidence. Moreover, and not less important, the G20 can give a crucial support to the ongoing efforts to reach an agreement within the WTO to temporarily ease intel-lectual property protections for Covid-19 vaccines. Such a deal would give a boost to vaccine m

97、anufacturing and distribution worldwide. Going beyond current debt relief efforts. The G20-endorsed debt relief initiative for the poorest countries should be considered as only a first step. The suspension of debt payments, set to be expire in June 2021, was prolonged until the end of the year, as

98、advocated by the Italian pres-idency. The G20 economic and finance ministers also reached an agree-ment for a new allocation of special drawing rights (SDRs) to be used for the financial support of the most fragile countries. However, as the financial situation of the targeted countries has continue

99、d to deterio-rate, other much more incisive debt-relief measures, including outright debt cancellation, will need to be taken. The G20 could play a crucial 22Ettore Grecorole in building consensus within the International Monetary Fund and among leading economies around such objectives and in induci

100、ng pri-vate lenders to take analogous steps.Continuing its role of maintaining global financial stability. The Inter-national Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international financial insti-tutions have repeatedly warned of a new global financial crisis. New vulnerabilities are likely to emerge in the w

101、ake of the pandemic. The G20 has a unique responsibility in maintaining global financial stability by exercising the monitoring, supervisory and regulatory functions of the Financial Stability Board. It would also be a critical player should the need emerge for new rules to stabilize the financial s

102、ystem. Other long-lasting goals on the G20 agenda, such as reform of IMF governance, including its quota system, and coordination between development financial institutions have acquired even greater relevance since the outbreak of the pandemic.Helping promote the stability of global commodity price

103、s. As mentioned, the G20 has been involved in the efforts to deal with the recent oil price shock. Those efforts, which have a critical monetary policy component, had a relatively limited effect on energy markets, but the latter are likely to remain highly volatile for a prolonged period. More broad

104、ly, the vola-tility of commodity prices may undermine the economic and social sys-tems of several developing countries. The stability of global commodity markets will therefore need to remain high on the G20 agenda.Serving as a forum in which to discuss issues that have been at the cen-tre of ongoin

105、g USChina disputes. Some USChina disputes are strictly bilateral and can be addressed only through bilateral diplomacy. Others, however, could find multilateral resolutions or at least be alleviated by multilateral agreements. This applies to several policy sectors, includ-ing trade, finance and tec

106、hnological competition, all fields in which the G20 has tried to develop a distinctively prominent global role. In this respect, G20 diplomacy should also be seen as an instrument to facili-tate a rapprochement between Washington and Beijing. A case in point is the flurry of allegations between the

107、two countries about the respective responsibilities in dealing with or even in triggering the pandemic. Success by the G20 in promoting common stances and initiatives to address the Covid-19 challenge along the lines sketched out above would 23Introductioncontribute to lessening tensions between the

108、 two powers, reducing the global risks associated with the possible further aggravation of their geopolitical rivalry. Bidens multilateral attitude provides significant new opportunities for the G20 to play this role as a facilitator.Facilitating global fiscal agreements. While fiscal policy is doom

109、ed to remain mostly a national preserve even plans for a “fiscal union” within the EU continues to meet strong resistance there is a growing awareness that joint international action in the fiscal field can facilitate the efforts to address such global issues as growing inequalities, tax eva-sion an

110、d elusion and the related distortions and tensions at the national and international level. The recent preliminary agreements reached within the G20 to impose more effective levies on web giant companies and to harmonize corporate taxes seem to indicate that the G20 can be a driving force also behin

111、d the efforts to eliminate the biggest and most disrupting fiscal disparities that have a negative impact on economic competition and social cohesion and deprive governments of essential financial resources.Further developing its norm setting role. Increasingly, the G20 has been able to approve sign

112、ificant documents spelling out norms and parameters on a variety of global issues. This important G20 “acquis” need to be preserved and expanded. One example is the application of new technologies: G20-led deals can significantly contribute to prevent-ing highly destabilizing tech-wars. The search f

113、or global norms aimed at ensuring responsible behaviour and facilitating cooperation should also be extended to fields that still remain largely unregulated such as migra-tion management. A further expansion of the G20 norm setting role would greatly help to improve its reputation and increase its l

114、egitimacy.251The Role of the G20 in Promoting Global Governance: Challenges and Opportunities for the Italian Presidency in 2021Nicola Bilotta and Fabrizio Botti1. IntroductIon and summaryThis chapter analyses the evolution of the role played by the G20 over the years. The purpose is to identify the

115、 main challenges the G20 is facing in promoting global policy coordination and the factors that have contrib-uted to its main achievements.The G20 was created to improve international policy coordination and give greater visibility to the leading emerging economies, which are increasingly interconne

116、cted in the global economy. It played an impor-tant role in promoting a joint response to the great financial crisis of 2008 in terms of macroeconomic policy cooperation, containment of trade restrictions and reform of the international financial architecture.Since then the forum has faced a set of

117、political setbacks due to a num-ber of factors: the divergent views on which policies should be adopted to revive growth in the aftermath of the crisis, the conflicting views among European members on how to deal with their crisis and, more recently, the growing geopolitical tensions between the US

118、and China, notably with respect to trade issues and exchange rate policies.The mechanism of rotation of the countries that host the G20 has led to expansion of the topics covered. Beyond economic and financial policy 26Nicola Bilotta and Fabrizio Bottimatters a number of issues have been added such

119、as agriculture, food secu-rity, climate change and infrastructure. This has led to a proliferation of working groups, study groups and task forces which resulted in increased engagement of business, labour, nongovernmental organisations, women and think tanks. Most of these work streams however have

120、 not produced tangible results in terms of new institutional arrangements or concrete pol-icy actions and there is an urgent need to refocus on main strategic issues.The G20 has been increasingly exposed to criticisms of insufficient effectiveness in coping with complex global challenges and lack of

121、 legit-imacy, due to its inadequate representativeness. Various proposals for reforms, like the creation of a permanent secretariat or the broadening of membership with the adoption of a constituency-based system, sim-ilar to that of the Bretton Woods Institutions, have not made any pro-gress and th

122、e current political environment does not seem ripe to revive the discussion on these issues.The Italian presidency of the G20 will come at a time in which most countries will still be recovering from the economic fallout of the global health crisis which is expected to produce one of the sharpest co

123、ntrac-tions of economic activity in history. Contrary to most recent crises, the current one has affected most advanced economies and may also have a dramatic impact on the less developed countries. This G20 could offer an opportunity to find a joint response on how to recover from the crisis and pr

124、event it from happening again.2. orIgIn and evolutIon of the g20The G20 was founded in 1999, after the Asian financial crisis, as an annual forum for the finance ministers and central bank governors of 19 countries, representing the largest developed and emerging econ-omies, along with the EU. At th

125、at time, it was felt that effective policy coordination could no longer be confined to clubs like the G7 or the G8 and required the inclusion of the leading emerging economies. Today, the G20 countries represent around 80 per cent of global GDP and 75 per cent of all global trade.An important develo

126、pment took place in 2008 when, in the face of the worst financial crisis since the end of World War II, US President G.W. 271. The Role of the G20 in Promoting Global GovernanceBush decided to escalate representation in the G20 to the level of the countries leaders.The 20082009 G20 summits with the

127、heads of states were, according to most analysts and scholars, quite successful in mitigating the impact of the worldwide financial crisis.1 A broad agreement was reached on the monetary and fiscal policies necessary to revive growth and the actions to be taken to restore confidence in the internati

128、onal financial system. The participating countries also jointly affirmed their willingness to avoid protectionism and maintain liberal trading norms. In 2009, during the Summit hosted in the US, the G20 countries established the “Frame-work for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth” which was conc

129、eived as the mechanism to encourage G20 members to assess and coordinate national policies in order to promote growth. Important results were also achieved in some initiatives regarding of reform of the international monetary system which led to an increase in the resources of the inter-national fin

130、ancial institutions (IFIs), a revamping of the debate on the role of the special drawing right (SDR) and a shift of quotas in favour of the emerging economies.2Since 2010, with the recovery of global growth and the fading of finan-cial tensions, the political consensus that characterised the previou

131、s sum-mits started eroding. The G20 countries started disagreeing on whether to encourage further expansionary fiscal policies, on the long-standing issue of exchange range manipulation and on how to promote adjustments for countries with excessive surplus.3 Fragmentation of positions eventually 1 S

132、uman Bery, “The G20 Turns Ten: Whats Past Is Prologue”, in Bruegel Policy Contributions, No. 20 (November 2018), p. 9, https:/www.bruegel.org/?p=28339; Christian Oliver, Chris Giles and Alan Beattie, “Forget Summit Failures, Look at G20 Record”, in Financial Times, 12 November 2010, https:/ Carlo Mo

133、nticelli, Reforming Global Economic Governance. An Unsettled Order, Lon-don/New York, Routledge, 2019.3 Martin Wolf, “Economics Failed Us Before the Global Crisis”, in Financial Times, 20 March 2018, https:/ Tony Payne, “The Global Governance of Global Crisis: Why the G20 Summit Was Created and What

134、 We Still Need It to Do”, in SPERI Papers, No. 17 (November 2014), http:/speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Paper-17-Global-Goverance-G20-Summit.pdf.28Nicola Bilotta and Fabrizio Bottiprevailed. The discussions also ended up being dominated by the European crisis and the contrasts on h

135、ow to address it.4Since 2010, the performance of the G20 has been contradictory. According to the G20 Information Centre, during the latest seven sum-mits between 2013 and 2019, leaders made 1,482 commitments.5 How-ever, as highlighted by Kaul, most of those are just a repetition of previ-ous commit

136、ments made either in other G20 summits or in other inter-national fora. Furthermore, the vagueness of these promises was rarely translated into concrete actions.6In addition, the G20 meetings have been addressing a broader set of topics, besides the macroeconomic issues, as host countries have added

137、 new priorities like agriculture, food security issues, energy effi-ciency, climate change and the financing of infrastructures. It is how-ever widely recognised that most of these work streams have not pro-duced tangible results in terms of new institutional arrangements or concrete policy actions.

138、An important recommendation made by the group of eminent persons set up by the G20 to review its modus operandi has been that “The role of the G20 in the global financial architecture should be reset. It should focus on developing political consensus on key strategic issues and cri-sis response. Thi

139、s requires freeing up space from its current crowded agenda and devolving work to the IFIs”.74 One of the key moments of tension was the Deauville summit on 19 October 2010 when Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and President Nicolas Sarkozy of France agreed that in future, sovereign bailouts woul

140、d require that losses be imposed on pri-vate creditors. That statement ignited financial pressures on the highly indebted coun-tries that made much more costly the adjustment of their imbalances. Carlo Monticelli, Reforming Global Economic Governance, cit., p. 61.5 John J. Kirton, “The G20s Growing

141、Legitimacy”, in G20 Analysis, 25 October 2019, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/biblio/Kirton-G20_Growing_Legitimacy.html.6 Inge Kaul, “The G2010: Time to Shift Gears”, in South African Journal of Interna-tional Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 2019), p. 563-582.7 G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Finan

142、cial Governance, Making the Global Financial System Work for All, October 2018, p. 9, https:/www.globalfinancialgovern-ance.org/report-of-the-g20-epg-on-gfg.291. The Role of the G20 in Promoting Global Governance3. changes In the geopolItIcal envIronment and domestIc polIcy attItudesIn the post-war

143、era, the US has traditionally played a role of leadership in shaping the institutions of global governance. Under the Trump adminis-tration the US withdrew from the Paris climate accord, from the Iranian nuclear deal and from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Trump also tar-geted global trade, introduc

144、ing tariffs against Chinese and the European imports. The US disengagement policy is grounded on the view that mul-tilateralism has provided advantages to foreign countries at the expense of the US, and that the benefits gained by the US have been absorbed by the financial industry at the expense of

145、 the real economy. The US is thus putting increasing pressure on the international rule-based system.These difficulties are a symptom of deeper problems which have affected multilateralism in the past years, and which resulted in the failure of the Doha round or of the Copenhagen negotiation on clim

146、ate change in 2009 due to the opposition of China, the US, South Africa, India and Brazil. In his term in office Trump was only an unpredictable accel-erator of a rising trend that has been questioning the positive effects of globalization and multilateralism.On its part the EU has strong political

147、interests in preserving an inter-national rule-based system, as it benefits from an open world economy. The EU, however, does not have the ability to exercise an adequate influ-ence on global governance because of its internal divergences in several fields such as security and foreign relations. The

148、 EU has also been expe-riencing a decline of its relative economic importance in the world econ-omy and, with Brexit, will lose a key economic and military member of its union.Finally, also Chinas approach towards multilateralism has evolved. Whereas during the Hu-Jintao administration (20022012) Ch

149、ina main-tained a passive approach in the international community, under the leadership of Xi China has shown a proactive attitude and promoted the creation of new global institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or global projects such as the One Belt One Road initi-ative. With

150、the retreat of the US as a champion of multilateralism, China has tried to consolidate its global influence as a safeguard of the global governance system. However, Chinas adherence to the international 30Nicola Bilotta and Fabrizio Bottirule-based system is ambiguous as it has been extremely select

151、ive. Fur-thermore, China lacks the political legitimacy in the international arena which is necessary to lead the reform of the global governance system.There are also serious doubts on the ability of China and the EU to act in coordination to support the international rule-based system. The US and

152、the EU have been able to positively work together on global gov-ernance issues because of their similar political and economic systems, whereas China and the EU have very different systems. Moreover, the current international system has failed in transforming China and Rus-sia into “market democraci

153、es”, and this has encouraged the US to change its international engagement strategy.8In addition to geopolitical evolution, one has to take into account the growing public perception that globalisation has negatively affected the conditions of life for low and middle classes, a sentiment that has fu

154、elled the rise of populist parties and the lack of confidence in international fora. In 2018, an opinion poll carried out by Bertelsmann Stiftung in several G20 countries showed that while the idea of international coop-eration is very popular 83 per cent of respondents expected national governments

155、 to cooperate only 45 per cent have a positive opinion on the G20 summits and 41 per cent think that the G20 forum actually con-tributes to solving global problems.94. proposals for reform4.1. Organizational structureSome analysts have stressed that the G20 forum lacks continuity and implementation

156、monitoring. Currently an informal and temporary sec-retariat set by the host country is in charge of planning and management 8 Jean Pisani-Ferry, “Can Multilateralism Adapt?”, in Bruegel Opinions, 3 July 2018, https:/www.bruegel.org/?p=26623.9 Christina Tillmann, “The G20 Is Turning 20. Time to Take

157、 Stock of Multi-lateralism”, in Future of Democracy Policy Briefs, No.6/2018 (November 2018),p. 3,https:/www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/policy-brief-6-2018-the-g20-is-turning-20-time-to-stock-of-multilateralism.311. The Role of the G20 in Promoting Global Governancefor t

158、he G20 summit. Even though organisation of the summit and super-vision of the implementation of plans and promises is a complex process, a continuity in organisational structure does not exist. This also affects the ability of the G20 forum to ensure continuity and institutional mem-ory among summit

159、s.One of the proposals frequently made is to establish a permanent sec-retariat which could enhance the coordination between members and international organisations, improve the capability to monitor imple-mentation of G20 recommendations, and mitigate the discretion of each host country in selectin

160、g agenda priorities. A proposed option would be to establish a small permanent structure at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with the function of ensuring continuity and coordination between the rotating presidencies.10However, others argue that the current flexibility of the G20s infor-mal str

161、ucture enables the forum to offer quick responses in time of crisis and to adapt to sudden challenges, lowering negotiation costs.11 A short-term solution could be to introduce a multi-annual work stream which could provide the rotating presidencies with some guidance, helping to establish a continu

162、ity of priorities and monitoring of implementation.To improve inclusiveness and effectiveness, the G20 forum has cre-ated various engagement groups which are representatives of different civil society stakeholders. Their role is to discuss the major issues affect-ing their own area of interest and t

163、o provide the G20 forum with pol-icy recommendations. These recommendations are non-binding but are usually taken into account during the G20 discussions and negotiations. Today, the G20 forum comprises seven engagement groups: Business 20 (B20) and Youth 20 (Y20) since the Korean Presidency in 2010

164、; Labour 20 (L20) since the French Presidency in 2011; Think Tank 20 (T20) since 10 Ignazio Angeloni, “The Group of 20: Trials of Global Governance in Times of Crisis”, in Bruegel Working Papers, No. 2011/12 (December 2011), p. 27, https:/www.bruegel.org/?p=6263.11 Felicity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal

165、, “Organization without Delegation: Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs) and the Spectrum of Intergovernmental Arrangements”, in The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2013), p. 193-220.32Nicola Bilotta and Fabrizio Bottithe Mexican Presidency in 2012; Civil Socie

166、ty 20 (C20) since the Russian Presidency in 2013; Women 20 (W20) since the Turkish Presidency in 2015; and Science 20 (S20) since the German Presidency in 2016.124.2 Legitimacy and representativenessWhen the G20 summit was initially created, leaders positively cooper-ated, also producing a supportiv

167、e political environment towards global actions. Nevertheless, the internal political changes in key G20 members and the end of an acute time of crisis have reversed this attitude.13 If an international institution lacks legitimacy, its member governments are likely to weakly support it, undermining

168、its effectiveness.14 The Ber-telsmann Stiftung opinion poll cited earlier certainly speaks to this sit-uation, showing that while the idea of international cooperation is very popular 83 per cent of respondents expect national governments to cooperate only 45 per cent of them have a positive opinion

169、 on the G20 summits and 41 per cent think that the G20 forum actually contributes to solving global problems.15 In Western countries, there is an increasing public perception that globalisation has had a negative economic impact on the condition of their national low and middle classes, fostering an

170、 increasing consensus towards nationalism, protectionism and bilateral agreements and simultaneously undermining the legitimacy of interna-tional forums.Since the G20 summit has served as the forum to identify and propose policy for global challenges, legitimacy is seen by some as potentially 12 As

171、stressed by Harris-Rimmer and Byrne, these engagement groups have three main functions: (i) influencing the working agenda; (ii) providing the summit with dif-ferent perspectives; and (iii) pressuring the forum to include topics other than macro-economic issues. See Susan Harris Rimmer and Caitlin B

172、yrne, “Feminist Approaches to Global Economic Governance: The G20 as a Platform for Step-Change?”, in Steven Slaughter (ed.), The G20 and International Relations Theory. Perspectives on Global Sum-mitry, Cheltenham/Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2019, p. 157-182.13 Clara Brandi, “Club Governance and Leg

173、itimacy: The Perspective of Old and Rising Powers on the G7 and the G20”, in South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 2019), p. 685-702, https:/doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2019.1697354.14 Ibid.15 Christina Tillmann, “The G20 Is Turning 20”, cit., p. 2-3.331. The Role of

174、the G20 in Promoting Global Governancea structural weakness. First, some fear that the G20 could have under-mined the credibility of pre-existing multilateral institutions (such as the IMF or the United Nations), also creating resentment among non-G20 countries.16 For example, in 2010 Norways foreig

175、n minister, Jonas Gahr Stre, described the G20 forum as “the greatest setback”17 for interna-tional cooperation since WWII, arguing that the G20 lacked any interna-tional legitimacy, as it did not have a clear mandate or function.Furthermore, others have argued that the G20 forum might have a repres

176、entation issue as it does not include 173 countries in the pro-cess, leaving out low/middle countries and underrepresenting Africa.18 The presence of South Africa and Saudi Arabia does not imply a proper representation of Africa and the Middle East, respectively. For instance, Nigeria, which has 200

177、 million people and is the largest economy in Africa, is not a permanent member of the G20 summit. It is not also clear if the original selection of members is subject to adjustments following eventual major shifts in the global distribution of economic power.It has also been argued that Europe is o

178、verrepresented with France, Germany, Italy and the EU as permanent members in addition to Spain and the European Central Bank which are permanent invited guests.19 Others have also mentioned the absence of some of the big economies such as Switzerland which has a higher GDP than some of the current

179、G20 members (Argentina, Saudi Arabia) and has the most powerful 16 Jakob Vestergaard, “The G20 and Beyond. Towards Effective Global Economic Governance”, in DIIS Reports, No. 2011:04 (March 2011), https:/www.diis.dk/en/research/g20-and-beyond.17 Jonas Gahr Stre, “One of the Greatest Setbacks Since W

180、orld War II”, in Spiegel Online, 22 June 2010, https:/www.spiegel.de/international/europe/norway-takes-aim-at-g-20-one-of-the-greatest-setbacks-since-world-war-ii-a-702104.html. See also, Andrew Ward, “Norway Seeks Representation at the G20”, in Financial Times, 8 Novem-ber 2009, https:/ Jakob Veste

181、rgaard, “The G20 and Beyond”, cit., p. 52.19 Barry Carin et al., “Making the G20 Summit Process Work: Some Proposals for Improving Effectiveness and Legitimacy”, in CIGI G20 Papers, No. 2 (June 2010), https:/www.cigionline.org/node/3471; John J. Kirton, Joseph P. Daniels and Andreas Freytag (eds.),

182、Guiding Global Order. G8 Governance in the Twenty-First Century, Aldershot, Ash-gate, 2001.34Nicola Bilotta and Fabrizio Bottibanking and financial sector globally.20To cope with this issue the G20 has been working on improving the dialogue with non-member countries through the invitation of regiona

183、l and international organisations and guest countries as well as the intro-duction of individual members advisory processes with neighbour-ing states.21 However, the lack of an institutionalised framework for non-member interaction leaves the invitation of non-members and other international organis

184、ations up to the host country, making the legiti-macy of this practice questionable.Several options for reform have been proposed, demanding a new geometry for the G20 composition with the aim of finding an optimal bal-ance between representativeness and effectiveness. It has for instance been propo

185、sed to adopt a constituency-based system of representation which would allow the inclusion of a wider number of members without excessively enlarging the total numbers of those “sitting at the table”.22 This would also make it possible to periodically adjust membership to reflect changing realities

186、of the global economy.conclusIonDespite the G20 having faced endogenous and exogenous challenges, it is still the forum which is best equipped to foster international policy coor-20 Paola Subacchi and Stephen Pickford, “Legitimacy vs Effectiveness for the G20: A Dynamic Approach to Global Economic G

187、overnance”, in Chatham House Briefing Papers, No. 2011/01 (October 2011), https:/www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/1011bp_subacchi_pickford.pdf. See also Sobhy Amr, The Rise of the G20 and the Fall of G8, Birkbeck College, University of London, unpublished.21 Permanent guest invitees are the

188、following: African Union, Association of South-east Asian Nations, Financial Stability Board, International Labour Organization, Inter-national Monetary Fund, Spain, New Partnership for Africas Development, Organisa-tion for Economic Cooperation and Development, United Nations, World Bank Group, Wor

189、ld Trade Organization.22 Jakob Vestergaard and Robert H. Wade, “Establishing a New Global Economic Council: Governance Reform at the G20, the IMF and the World Bank”, in Global Policy, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 2012), p. 257-269.351. The Role of the G20 in Promoting Global Governancedination, as it a

190、ccurately reflects the current global balance of power.23While the time is not ripe for major changes in its working practices, it would be important to follow up on the recommendation of the Eminent Persons working group to use this forum to develop political consensus on key strategic issues and c

191、risis response. And at a time when the world is facing a crisis of unprecedented magnitude and nature, there is a high expectation on the part of public opinion and the international commu-nity that global leaders will use the upcoming G20 forum to produce a joint plan of action, as they did during

192、the 2008 financial crisis.A coordinated global effort is necessary not only to contain the health crisis but also to prevent a situation where the ensuing economic cri-sis produces major disruptions in the global economy. This does not mean that the work programmes that the Italian presidency launch

193、ed in preparation for the G20 presidency should be discontinued, but that they should be adapted to the new emerging priority.referencesSobhy Amr, The Rise of the G20 and the Fall of G8, Birkbeck College, Uni-versity of London, unpublishedIgnazio Angeloni, “The Group of 20: Trials of Global Governan

194、ce in Times of Crisis”, in Bruegel Working Papers, No. 2011/12 (December 2011), https:/www.bruegel.org/?p=6263Suman Bery, “The G20 Turns Ten: Whats Past Is Prologue”, in Bruegel Policy Contributions, No. 20 (November 2018), https:/www.brue-gel.org/?p=28339Clara Brandi, “Club Governance and Legitimac

195、y: The Perspective of Old and Rising Powers on the G7 and the G20”, in South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 2019), p. 685-702, 23 It has been said that the G20 represents the best compromise between legitimacy (accurate representation of the power balance), effici

196、ency (a compact group of poli-cy-makers) and effectiveness (the inclusion of leaders who can really shape a global agenda). Barry Carin et al., “Making the G20 Summit Process Work: Some Proposals for Improving Effectiveness and Legitimacy”, cit., p. 4.36Nicola Bilotta and Fabrizio Bottihttps:/doi.or

197、g/10.1080/10220461.2019.1697354Barry Carin et al., “Making the G20 Summit Process Work: Some Propos-als for Improving Effectiveness and Legitimacy”, in CIGI G20 Papers, No. 2 (June 2010), https:/www.cigionline.org/node/3471G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance, Making the Global F

198、inancial System Work for All, October 2018, https:/www.globalfinancialgovernance.org/report-of-the-g20-epg-on-gfgSusan Harris Rimmer and Caitlin Byrne, “Feminist Approaches to Global Economic Governance: The G20 as a Platform for Step-Change?”, in Steven Slaughter (ed.), The G20 and International Re

199、lations The-ory. Perspectives on Global Summitry, Cheltenham/Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2019, p. 157-182Inge Kaul, “The G2010: Time to Shift Gears”, in South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 2019), p. 563-582John J. Kirton, “The G20s Growing Legitimacy”, in G20 Anal

200、ysis, 25 Octo-ber 2019, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/biblio/Kirton-G20_Grow-ing_Legitimacy.htmlJohn J. Kirton, Joseph P. Daniels and Andreas Freytag (eds.), Guiding Global Order. G8 Governance in the Twenty-First Century, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001Carlo Monticelli, Reforming Global Economic Governance. A

201、n Unsettled Order, London/New York, Routledge, 2019Christian Oliver, Chris Giles and Alan Beattie, “Forget Summit Failures, Look at G20 Record”, in Financial Times, 12 November 2010, https:/ Payne, “The Global Governance of Global Crisis: Why the G20 Sum-mit Was Created and What We Still Need It to

202、Do”, in SPERI Papers, No. 17 (November 2014), http:/speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Paper-17-Global-Goverance-G20-Summit.pdfJean Pisani-Ferry, “Can Multilateralism Adapt?”, in Bruegel Opinions, 3 July 2018, https:/www.bruegel.org/?p=26623Jonas Gahr Stre, “One of the Greatest Setback

203、s Since World War II”, in Spiegel Online, 22 June 2010, https:/www.spiegel.de/interna-tional/europe/norway-takes-aim-at-g-20-one-of-the-greatest-set-371. The Role of the G20 in Promoting Global Governancebacks-since-world-war-ii-a-702104.htmlPaola Subacchi and Stephen Pickford, “Legitimacy vs Effect

204、iveness for the G20: A Dynamic Approach to Global Economic Governance”, in Chatham House Briefing Papers, No. 2011/01 (October 2011), https:/www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/1011bp_sub-acchi_pickford.pdfChristina Tillmann, “The G20 Is Turning 20. Time to Take Stock of Mul-tilateralism”, in F

205、uture of Democracy Policy Briefs, No.6/2018 (November 2018), https:/www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/pub-lications/publication/did/policy-brief-6-2018-the-g20-is-turning-20-time-to-stock-of-multilateralismFelicity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal, “Organization without Delegation: Informal Intergovernmental

206、Organizations (IIGOs) and the Spec-trum of Intergovernmental Arrangements”, in The Review of Inter-national Organizations, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2013), p. 193-220Jakob Vestergaard, “The G20 and Beyond. Towards Effective Global Eco-nomic Governance”, in DIIS Reports, No. 2011:04 (March 2011), https:/ww

207、w.diis.dk/en/research/g20-and-beyondJakob Vestergaard and Robert H. Wade, “Establishing a New Global Eco-nomic Council: Governance Reform at the G20, the IMF and the World Bank”, in Global Policy, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 2012), p. 257-269Andrew Ward, “Norway Seeks Representation at the G20”, in Fin

208、ancial Times, 8 November 2009, https:/ Wolf, “Economics Failed Us Before the Global Crisis”, in Financial Times, 20 March 2018, https:/ Reform: The Role of the G20Axel Berger and Clara Brandi*Discussions on the reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have intensified over the last few years, an

209、d the often uncoordinated trade-policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic further highlight the need to strengthen multilateral trade cooperation. The need for reform was recognized by the leaders of the G20 (Group of Twenty) at their Bue-nos Aires summit in 2018 when they acknowledged that the “mul

210、tilat-eral trading system is currently falling short of its objectives”. Amid this sober assessment, G20 leaders committed to “support the necessary reform of the WTO to improve its functioning” and to “review progress at our next Summit”.1 Key issues in the ongoing debate about WTO reform include t

211、he hotly contested topics of dispute settlement; Special and Dif-ferential Treatment (SDT) for developing countries; transparency and committee work; and the need to update WTO rules on digital trade, fisheries and industrial subsidies as well as technology transfer.WTO-reform discussions take place

212、 in the context of various tracks within and outside the organizations formal structures. Numerous propos-als for reform have been tabled and discussed in the WTOs General Council by its more than 40 members. Informal clusters, such as the Ottawa Group, have also advanced the discussion on WTO refor

213、m. Furthermore, trilateral * We would like to thank Florian Gitt for excellent research assistance.1 G20, G20 Leaders Declaration. Building Consensus for Fair and Sustainable Develop-ment, Buenos Aires, 1 December 2018, point 27, https:/europa.eu/!hn48Tw.40Axel Berger and Clara Brandimeetings betwee

214、n the United States, the European Union and Japan as well as regional clusters such as the African Group have contributed to discussions on the reform challenges facing the body. WTO-reform issues were discussed during the G20s Japanese presidency in 2019, continue during its Saudi Arabian presidenc

215、y in 2020 and will most likely also figure prominently on the agenda of the upcoming Italian G20 presidency in 2021.An analysis of the various positions of WTO members on the multiple issues on the reform agenda (see Tables in the Appendix) illustrates that there are strongly differing views across

216、WTO member states. Dispute settlement (Table 2 in the Appendix) is a particularly contentious topic, with the US remaining highly critical of an independent and judicialized dispute-settlement system and having rejected all proposals for reform thus far. The definition and status of developing count

217、ries in the WTO (Table 3 in the Appendix) also remains highly controversial with China, India and South Africa, among others, strongly rejecting the US proposal for reform. While the ongoing discussions on new rules in the WTO (see Table 6 in the Appendix for digital trade, Table 7 for fisheries sub

218、sidies and Table 8 for industrial subsidies) are also heated, there are, addition-ally, some less-debated and more technical issues above all, transpar-ency (Table 4 in the Appendix) and committee work (Table 5) that might entail the potential to forge a compromise and make progress on WTO reform. T

219、herefore, in the light of the contrasting views of WTO members and the complex reform agenda, one key question is how the process of WTO reform can be facilitated.Against this backdrop, the chapter discusses which roles the G20 can play in the increasingly dynamic and overlapping discussions on refo

220、rm-ing the WTO not least in the light of the fact that the groups members have been actively submitting multiple proposals for WTO reform over the past few months (see Table 1). The G20s importance stems from the fact that it brings together leaders from economically significant countries, represent

221、ing 80 percent of world trade, as well as relevant international organizations. It additionally brings together governmental and, increas-ingly, also societal actors from traditional as well as emerging powers. Furthermore, the G20 is a dialogue-oriented forum that can operate rela-tively freely, ir

222、respective of formal mandates or negotiation settings. How can these properties be exploited in order to advance reform of the WTO?412. WTO Reform: The Role of the G20Table 1 | WTO reform proposals: Overview across issues and countries (G20 members in bold letters)CountryWTO Council & Committee proc

223、eduresDevelopmentDispute settlementE-commerceFisheriesIndustrial subsidies / SOEs / Technology transferTranspa-rency / Notifica-tionsAlbaniax Argentina xx xAustraliax xxx xBolivia xx x xBrazil xx Canada xxx xChile x ChinaxxxxxxxColombia x Costa Rica xx xCuba xx x xEcuador xx x xEuropean Unionxxxx xx

224、Honduras x Hong Kongxxxx Icelandxxx India xx x xJapan xx xxSouth Koreax xx Malawi xx x xMexico xx Moldovax Montenegro x New Zealandxxxx xNorth Macedoniax Norwayxxx Oman xx x xPanamax Paraguay x Philippines x Qatarx Russia x Singaporexxxx 42Axel Berger and Clara BrandiSouth Africa xx x xSwitzerlandxx

225、x Taiwanx xx xThailandx x Tunisia xx x xTurkeyx Uganda xx x xUkraine x x USA xxxxxxUruguay xxx Zimbabwe xx x xThis chapter has been written in preparation for the Italian G20 pres-idency in 2021. Its goal is not to provide technical solutions to the vari-ous reform dimensions but to offer a short ov

226、erview of the state of inter-national trade cooperation (Section 1, below) and the positions of key stakeholders on different reform dimensions (Section 2). It discusses the role of the G20 in the multi-track process of WTO reform, and proposes initiatives to be advanced during Italys G20 presidency

227、 (Section 3). The final section offers summarizing conclusions.1. the state of InternatIonal trade cooperatIonThe WTO is currently being challenged by the greatest crisis since its foundation 25 years ago. The organization has been hailed as a multi-lateral-cooperation success due to its increasingl

228、y broad membership; substantial coverage of trade-related policy areas; strong secretariat; and, crucially, its independent, rules-based two-stage dispute-settle-ment system. However, the WTO and its members have responded inad-equately to the challenges of an increasingly complex trading system tha

229、t has seen the rise of global value chains, significant power shifts and growing geopolitical rivalry, as well as the emergence of new global challenges such as digitization and climate change. The symptoms of the WTOs crisis are manifold and relate, inter alia, to an inability to adopt new rules, p

230、revent protectionism and settle disputes.First and foremost, the negotiation of new rules has stalled. The WTO rule book is outdated and out of sync with current trade-related chal-432. WTO Reform: The Role of the G20lenges. The recent Doha Round of trade negotiations proved difficult from the begin

231、ning, and reached an impasse in 2008 amid deep division between developed and emerging countries. Instead of a comprehensive package of multilateral rules, WTO members were able to deliver merely a piecemeal approach. The only notable multilateral outcomes were the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA)

232、, which was adopted in 2013 and went into effect in February 2017, and the agreement to end export subsidies for agricultural products, adopted in 2015. As for multilateral agreements between groups of like-minded members, there has been success in updat-ing the Information Technology Agreement (ITA

233、) and the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) but negotiations on new accords such as the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) have stalled.At the last WTO Ministerial Conference in 2017, three proponent groups announced fresh joint initiatives to advance new issues such as electronic commerce;

234、 domestic regulations; investment facilitation; and micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). While the suc-cess of these sectoral initiatives among subgroups of WTO members is all but certain, rule-making predominantly continues to take place out-side of the WTO in the context of regiona

235、l trade agreements. Key unre-solved issues are digital trade, fisheries subsidies and support for state-owned enterprises, as well as forced technology transfer.Second, while multilateral trade cooperation since the Second World War led to a significant reduction of average tariffs, new forms of pro

236、-tectionism have appeared. The Global Trade Alert (GTA) monitoring initiative shows that G20 countries increasingly use “murky” forms of protectionism,2 such as subsidies and export-related measures, to dis-criminate in favour of their own domestic producers several of these are today still permitte

237、d due to loopholes in the WTO rules on subsidies. Tariff increases, although much discussed since 2017, only account for a relatively small amount of the total number of harmful policy instru-2 Richard Baldwin and Simon Evenett (eds), The Collapse of Global Trade, Murky Pro-tectionism, and the Crisi

238、s: Recommendations for the G20, London, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), 2009, https:/www.alexandria.unisg.ch/235299/1/Murky_Protectionism.pdf.44Axel Berger and Clara Brandiments and they cover relatively small trade volumes.3 Despite the recent focus on trade tensions between the US and

239、China, resorting to trade protectionism goes well beyond these two major powers. If one only counts major trade-distorting measures that implicate more than 10 bil-lion US dollars of trade, 15 jurisdictions have implemented such “jumbo protectionism” measures in the past three years alone.4 In the l

240、ight of this new wave of protectionism, it is no wonder that the WTOs Director General complains of the unwillingness of members to report about the implementation of trade policies.5Third, in addition to the stalling of rule-making and the monitoring and regulation of the wave of new protectionism,

241、 the WTOs system for adjudicating trade disputes is seriously compromised. While the US has been discontented with the functioning of the WTOs dispute-settle-ment system for around a decade, the Trump Administration has been most empathic in characterizing the Appellate Bodys (ABs) way of exercising

242、 its powers as “overreach”.6 Against this backdrop, the US has since 2017 blocked the filling of vacancies on the AB. Since the terms of two more AB members elapsed in December 2019, and since the num-ber of members is now below the minimum of three required to hear an appeal, the work of the body h

243、as been suspended since that point. 3 Simon J. Evenett and Johannes Fritz, Jaw Jaw not War War. Prioritising WTO Reform Options, The 24th Global Trade Alert Report, London, CEPR Press, 2019, https:/www.globaltradealert.org/reports/47.4 Ibid.5 In its annual Overview of Developments in the Internation

244、al Trading Environment, the WTO Director-General observes that the “overview of the compliance and timeli-ness of Members notifications to the WTO illustrates that, with a few exceptions, com-pliance with notification requirements of the various WTO Agreements remains very uneven. the general sense

245、is that progress on this front remains too slow. The lack of compliance with notification obligations across WTO bodies is problematic because it undermines individual agreements and more generally the operation of the multilat-eral trading system.” See WTO, Overview of Developments in the Internati

246、onal Trading Environment. Annual Report by the Director-General (2018): October 2017 to October 2018 (WT/TPR/OV/21), 27 November 2018, p. 115, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/TPR/OV21.pdf.6 United States, Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dis

247、pute Settlement Body, Geneva, 25 February 2019, https:/geneva.usmission.gov/?p=57191.452. WTO Reform: The Role of the G20In April 2020, a total of 19 WTO members including the EU, Canada and China launched an interim appeal-arbitration mechanism based on WTO rules; this mechanism shall be used as a

248、replacement until the official AB has been put in place again, which is not likely to happen any time soon given the heated debate about its functioning.In view of these major crisis symptoms, a great number of proposals have been put forward by experts and members. These reform propos-als, as well

249、as the positions of major WTO members, will be summarized in the following section.2. Key Issues and the posItIons of major Wto membersDiscussions on WTO reform are not new. Indeed, they began not long after the organizations creation in 1995. For example, at its tenth anni-versary, the so-called Su

250、therland Report was launched a high-level panel report on “The Future of the WTO”.7 Not long after that, the Warwick Commission, another expert group, published its report on WTO reform options.8 In 2011, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) launched the E15 Initiat

251、ive, which brought together multiple institutions and experts to develop ideas for how to reform the global trade system.9 And in 2013, the Panel on Defining the Future of Trade convened by former WTO Director-Gen-eral Pascal Lamy published another report.10 However, it is no exaggera-7 Peter Suther

252、land et al., The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium, Geneva, WTO, December 2004, https:/www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/future_wto_e.htm.8 Warwick Commission, The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward?, Cov-entry, University of Warwick, Decem

253、ber 2007, https:/warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/worldtrade/report.9 See, for example, Manfred Elsig, The Functioning of the WTO: Options for Reform and Enhanced Performance, Geneva, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum, 2016, https:/ T

254、alal Abu-Ghazaleh et al., The Future of Trade: The Challenges of Convergence. Report of the Panel on Defining the Future of Trade convened by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, Geneva, WTO, 24 April 2013, https:/www.wto.org/english/res_e/pub-46Axel Berger and Clara Brandition to say that the impact o

255、f these documents on WTO reform has been limited at best.In the light of the escalating crisis, there has been a recently intensi-fied and growing debate on reforming the WTO. Since the last WTO Min-isterial Conference in December 2017, this debate has picked up speed among both members of the organ

256、ization and independent academic experts alike. For instance, in 2018, the High-Level Board of Experts on the Future of Global Trade Governance published a report containing reform recommendations for the organization11 and in 2019, the Global Trade Alert devoted itself to outlining WTO-reform optio

257、ns.12Among WTO members, the latest reform movement has been led by the EU, which has responded in large part to the criticisms put forward by the US. The Union tabled a proposal for WTO reform in September 2018.13 Its proposal was backed by Canada, which published a note on the subject14 and initiat

258、ed a meeting of like-minded WTO members the so-called Ottawa Group. The group met for the first time in Octo-ber 2018, and then during the 2019 World Economic Forums annual meeting in Davos and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Ministerial Council Meeting in May 2019.

259、 Another reform track is based on the Trilateral Meetings of the Trade Ministers of the US, EU and Japan. In September 2018, at the fourth get-together of lications_e/future_of_trade_e.htm. For a summary, see also the synthesis prepared by Bernard Hoekman, “Proposals for WTO Reform: A Synthesis and

260、Assessment”, in Amrita Narlikar, Martin Daunton and Robert M. Stern (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 743-775.11 Matteo Fiorini et al., WTO Dispute Settlement and the Appellate Body Crisis: Insider Perceptions and Members Revealed P

261、references, Gtersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019, https:/www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/publikationen/publikation/did/wto-dispute-settlement-and-the-appellate-body-crisis-detailed-survey-results.12 Simon J. Evenett and Johannes Fritz, Jaw Jaw not War War, cit. For recent insights by academics, see a

262、lso Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “How Should WTO Members React to Their WTO Crises?”, in World Trade Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (July 2019), 503-525.13 European Commission, WTO Modernisation. Introduction to Future EU Proposals, Concept Paper, September 2018, https:/trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/157331.htm

263、.14 WTO, Strengthening and Modernizing the WTO: Discussion Paper. Communication from Canada (JOB/GC/201), 21 September 2018, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/Jobs/GC/201.pdf.472. WTO Reform: The Role of the G20the Trilateral Meetings, there was explicit agreement on the

264、 necessity for WTO reform.15 The BRICS grouping (comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and IBSA (the International Relations and For-eign Ministers of India, Brazil and South Africa) both published state-ments on WTO reform in 2019 and 2018, respectively16 as did the African Grou

265、p in the WTO.17At the G20 Buenos Aires summit in December 2018, G20 leaders managed to agree to support WTO reform. This was no small feat, as a month earlier the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit had failed to issue a joint statement on WTO reform due to diverging views between the US

266、 and China. At the G20 Osaka summit in June 2019, the G20 Leaders Declaration endorsed the G20 Ministerial Statement on Trade and Digital Economy, which included several issues concern-ing WTO reform and details of the commitment to resolve them.At the WTO itself, the debate on reform has intensifie

267、d since the autumn of 2018, with well over 40 member states submitting proposals to the General Council and other WTO bodies (see Table 1). Against this backdrop, the remainder of this section summarizes key issues on WTO reform and the positions of important WTO members in order to out-line the pre

268、sent state of play on the following: discussion on dispute settlement (Subsection 2.1); Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) for developing coun-tries (Subsection 2.2); WTO transparency and notifications (Subsection 2.3); WTO committee work (Subsection 2.4); and discussions on potential new WTO

269、rules on digital trade, fisher-15 US, EU and Japan, Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European Union, Paris, 31 May 2018, https:/trade.ec.eu-ropa.eu/doclib/html/156906.htm.16 BRICS, BRICS Summit Media Statement, Osaka, 28 June 2019, htt

270、p:/en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5424; India, Brazil and South Africa, IBSA Joint Statement on the Reform of the Multilateral System, New York, 27 September 2019, https:/www.mea.gov.in/bilat-eral-documents.htm?dtl/31871.17 WTO, African Group Declaration on WTO Issues (WT/L/1054), 28 December 2018, https:

271、/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/L/1054.pdf.48Axel Berger and Clara Brandiies and industrial subsidies, as well as technology transfer (Sub-section 2.5).182.1 Dispute settlementIn the light of the current AB paralysis, reforming its dispute-settle-ment mechanism is essenti

272、al for the future of the WTO (see Table 2 in the Appendix for an overview of all relevant proposals submitted to the WTO General Council). In February 2019, the US summarized its crit-icism of the AB in a statement at a meeting of the WTO dispute-settle-ment body.19 In essence, the US has asked WTO

273、members to return to the rules of the WTOs Understanding on Rules and Procedures Govern-ing the Settlement of Disputes (the Dispute Settlement Understanding DSU) as they had been codified in 1995. In response to this criticism, the EU, Honduras, Taiwan, Thailand and other WTO members have pro-posed

274、amendments to reform the DSU. More specifically, the EU along with China, Canada and India proposes to reform it by making it legally possible to agree on an exceeding of the 90 days rule as deadline for cir-culating the AB report. It proposes doing so by allowing an AB member to complete a pending

275、appeal in cases in which a hearing has already taken place by limiting the scope of findings of the AB conditional on the necessity for the resolution of the dispute and by implementing further communication channels to address concerns on AB approaches.20 Most further proposals pursue the same dipl

276、omatic approach on amending 18 For an overview of the key issues, see also Tsuyoshi Kawase, “Uphill Battle for WTO Reform Toward MC12”, in Japan Spotlight, No. 228 (November/December 2019), p. 23-26, https:/www.jef.or.jp/journal/pdf/228th_Special_Article_01.pdf.19 The key concerns of the US on the A

277、B are the frequent disregard of the compul-sory 90-day deadline for report, members not leaving after their term has ended, the expansion of authority in reviewing of panels factual findings, the practice of uttering advisory opinions that could be interpreted as making law, the practice of increasi

278、ng the significance of past decisions to near-binding precedent and the exceeding of limits by taking decisions that surpass the text of the WTO agreements. See United States, Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, cit.20 WTO, Communication from the Europe

279、an Union, China, India and Montenegro to the General Council (WT/GC/W/753/Rev.1), 10 December 2018, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/W753R1.pdf.492. WTO Reform: The Role of the G20the DSU in order to create a legal framework for current semi-rule-ac-cordingly cond

280、ucted practices. Moreover, the EU again, together with China, Canada and India proposes improving the ABs independence by expanding the tenure of the bodys members to 68 years while limiting it to a single term. Additionally, they suggest increasing the number of AB members from seven to nine and in

281、troducing AB membership as an exclusive occupation in order to address the appellate bodys perceived lack of efficiency.21New Zealands Permanent Representative to the WTO and Chair of the General Council, Ambassador David Walker, was appointed in February 2019 to search for a potential compromise on

282、 AB reform. In November 2019, he presented principles meant to increase the bodys efficiency (e.g. by placing stricter limits on its reports and timeframes) while addressing the USs concerns and its request to return to the rules of the DSU as established for the WTOs creation in 1995. Yet, the US h

283、as mostly disregarded all reform suggestions, leading to a deadlock on this essential issue.222.2 Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) for developing countriesWTO rules imply that developing countries receive SDT for instance, longer time periods for implementing WTO commitments or exemptions fr

284、om certain obligations. Moreover, the organizations members are allowed to adopt general systems of preferences under which tariffs on imports from developing countries are cut back or cancelled altogether. At the same time, the WTO rules do not include clear criteria to define “developing countries

285、”. Instead, such countries within the organization 21 Ibid.22 On the debate on reforming the dispute settlement mechanism, see also Matteo Fiorini et al., WTO Dispute Settlement and the Appellate Body Crisis, cit.; and Anabel Gonzlez and Euijin Jung, “Developing Countries Can Help Restore the WTOs D

286、ispute Settlement System”, in PIIE Policy Briefs, No. 20-1 (January 2020), https:/ as well as Jennifer Anne Hillman, A Reset of the World Trade Organ-izations Appellate Body, Washington, Council on Foreign Relations, 14 January 2020, https:/on.cfr.org/31puJOf.50Axel Berger and Clara Brandiare design

287、ated on the basis of self-selection regardless of whether they are rich or poor, large or small. It is argued by some members that this “self-designation” approach, which entails China being regarded as a developing country, represents an immense challenge for negotiating new agreements in the WTO.2

288、3In February 2019, the US suggested the introduction of objective cri-teria for “developing countries” in the WTO (see Table 3 in the Appendix for an overview of the SDT-relevant submissions to the organization). According to the US proposal, it should be made impossible to hold on to this status if

289、 the country in question is a member of the OECD or the G20, a high-income country or accounts for at least 0.5 percent of global merchandise trade.24 Major developing countries including China, India and South Africa strongly rejected the US proposal in a statement sub-mitted in February 2019.25 As

290、 a compromise between these opposing fac-tions, the EU proposed a “graduation” mechanism that foresees countries flexibly graduating through different stages of preferential treatment, either horizontally or case-by-case, supported by a substantial exami-nation of their development objectives. On be

291、half of the Ottawa Group, Norway put forward a proposal that seeks to differentiate between the categorization of nations and the promotion of development.While the current debate on SDT has reached an impasse between the US and its critics26 above all, China, but also the G20 members India and 23 C

292、lara Brandi and Wallace S. Cheng, “The Disputed Status of Developing Countries in the WTO”, in DIE Blog, 14 March 2019, https:/blogs.die-gdi.de/?p=9124.24 WTO, Draft General Council Decision. Procedures to Strengthen the Negotiating Function of the WTO. Decision of X Date (WT/GC/W/764), 15 February

293、2019, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/W/764.pdf. See also: Revision (WT/GC/W/764/Rev.1), 25 November 2019, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/W764R1.pdf.25 See WTO, An Undifferentiated WTO: Self-Declared Development Status Risks

294、Insti-tutional Irrelevance. Communication from the United States (WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1), https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/W757R1.pdf. In July, a revised statement was submitted, this time not signed by China, which had submitted its own overarching proposal for WTO r

295、eform, including the issue of SDT, in May 2019.26 For more recent literature on SDT in the WTO, see also Patric Low, Hamid Mam-douh and Evan Rogerson, Balancing Rights and Obligations in the WTO: A Shared Respon-512. WTO Reform: The Role of the G20South Africa the ongoing discussion on the status of

296、 developing coun-tries in the WTO might play a constructive role in a horse-trade across different controversial issues, and thus help to promote reform of the organization (see below). In the meantime, Taiwan has declared that it no longer falls into the developing-country category and Brazil and t

297、he Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) announced that they were also giving up their developing-country status, which can be interpreted as sign of being open to a potential compromise.272.3 Transparency and notificationsA key function of the WTO is to increase transparency concerning its member

298、s trade policies. Members are required to submit notifications on their trade measures to the relevant WTO subsidiary bodies, coun-cils and committees in order to assess the implementation of their obli-gations under WTO agreements. Yet, there are compliance challenges regarding this notification ob

299、ligation, thereby undermining the WTO role of securing transparency.28To promote transparency, the EU, Japan and the US drafted a joint proposal on notification procedures at their Trilateral Meeting in 2018.29 One key element of the reform proposal is the suggestion that members that do not file a

300、notification one year after the deadline would be sub-ject to sanctions. In June 2019, a larger group of members comprising Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan and the US submitted a joint proposal to the WTO (see Table 4 in sibility, Stockholm, Government Of

301、fices of Sweden, December 2018, https:/www.swe-denabroad.se/globalassets/ambassader/fn-geneve/documents/balancing-rights-and-obligations-in-the-wto.pdf; or Clara Brandi and Wallace S. Cheng, “The Disputed Status of Developing Countries in the WTO”, cit.27 See also Anabel Gonzlez and Euijin Jung, “De

302、veloping Countries Can Help Restore the WTOs Dispute Settlement System”, cit.28 For a discussion of these challenges and potential ways out, see e.g. Bernard Hoekman, “Urgent and Important: Improving WTO Performance by Revisiting Working Practices”, in Journal of World Trade, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2019),

303、p. 373-394.29 US, EU and Japan, Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European Union, cit.52Axel Berger and Clara Brandithe Appendix for an overview of all relevant proposal submitted by WTO members) requesting sanctions but also taking acc

304、ount of the capacity limitations of developing countries by proposing to use the charge levied as sanction as a basis for technical assistance for complying with notifi-cation obligations.30 In response, several developing countries, including India and South Africa, submitted a statement pitted aga

305、inst the use of sanctions, and suggested obligations to notify the WTO that take better account of the resource limitations of developing countries.31As many of the worlds large trading powers including the US, the EU and also China32 agree on the importance of improving the trans-parency role of th

306、e WTO, there might be potential to forge a compromise with other G20 members, including India and South Africa, that achieves this goal while also taking adequate account of the challenges faced by developing countries. In that context, the way forward might also entail not only reflecting on how no

307、tification obligations are enforced but also reviewing them and pondering what type of information is really needed and how the practice of notifications might be adapted to make them more useful to WTO members.3330 WTO, Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Require-ments Un

308、der WTO Agreements. Communication from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, and the United States. Revision (JOB/GC/204/Rev.2), 27 June 2019, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc

309、.aspx?filename=q:/Jobs/GC/204R2.pdf.31 WTO, An Inclusive Approach to Transparency and Notification Requirements in the WTO. Communication from Cuba, India, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (JOB/GC/218), 27 June 2019, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/direct-doc.aspx?filename=q:

310、/Jobs/GC/218.pdf. See also Revision (JOB/GC/218/Rev.2), 22 July 2019, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/Jobs/GC/218R2.pdf.32 See WTO, Chinas Proposal on WTO Reform. Communication from China (WT/GC/W/773), 13 May 2019, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?fi

311、le-name=q:/WT/GC/W773.pdf.33 Bernard Hoekman, “Urgent and Important: Improving WTO Performance by Revisiting Working Practices”, cit.532. WTO Reform: The Role of the G202.4 WTO committee workAnother challenge is to make the WTOs councils, groups and commit-tees more active and efficient (see Table 5

312、 in the Appendix for an over-view of the relevant submissions by WTO members). In October 2019, 18 WTO members, including the G20 members EU and Australia, endorsed a joint proposal for procedural guidelines that includes recommenda-tions for preparing meetings as well as for procedures for discussi

313、ons and for informal resolutions by chairpersons.34Overall, the issue of improving the work of WTO bodies does not seem to entail many controversial perspectives and could offer some room for making progress regarding WTO reform. One promising way forward might be to conduct an internal or external

314、WTO-wide review of the per-formance of the various bodies within the organization.352.5 New WTO trade rulesAs indicated above, there are several trade issues that the current WTO agendas do not adequately tackle, including digital trade (e.g. e-com-merce), fisheries subsidies and technology transfer

315、. The WTOs rules thus need to be updated to address key trade issues of the present and future.2.5.1 Digital tradeAt the Ministerial Conference in 2017, more than 70 WTO members published a joint declaration on digital trade. After some exploratory discussions, at a gathering during the World Econom

316、ic Forum in 2019, these WTO members underlined their aim to start negotiations for a new agreement on digital-trade rules. At the G20 Osaka Summit later in 2019, 34 WTO, Procedural Guidelines for WTO Councils and Committees Addressing Trade Concerns. Draft General Council Decision. Communication fro

317、m Australia; European Union; Hong Kong, China; Republic of Korea; New Zealand; Norway; Panama; Singapore; Switzerland; the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Tur-key; and Ukraine. Revision (WT/GC/W/777/Rev.1), 18 July 2019, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.a

318、spx?filename=q:/WT/GC/W777R1.pdf.35 Bernard Hoekman, “Urgent and Important: Improving WTO Performance by Revisiting Working Practices”, cit.54Axel Berger and Clara BrandiG20 members initiated the Osaka Track an effort to make progress on rule-making on digital trade in the WTO. Since the kick-starti

319、ng of nego-tiations in the organization, the EU, the US, Canada, Brazil, Japan and Singapore, among others, have submitted draft texts on digital-trade rules. Yet, the views of central member states diverge substantially (see Table 6 in the Appendix). The US values free data flows across borders and

320、 favours, for example, the prohibition of source-code-disclosure and data-localization demands.36 China, on the other hand, favours the reg-ulation of data flows.37 The EU in turn prioritizes the protection of per-sonal information and considers free data flows across borders only as a subordinate g

321、oal.38 While the G20 leaders managed to agree on a dec-laration on “Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT)” in 2019, this seeming agreement on the free flow of data contains continuing discrepancies across the US, Chinese and EU perspectives on digital trade.392.5.2 Fisheries subsidiesFisheries subsidies

322、have already been on the Doha agenda, but negotia-tions stalled when the Doha talks became deadlocked. The adoption of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and, espe-cially, target 14.6.1 on regulating subsidies that lead to illegal, unre-ported and unregulated (IUU) fishing as we

323、ll as overcapacity and over-fishing sparked a new attempt to find agreement in the WTO. At the 36 WTO, Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce. Communication from the United States (INF/ECOM/23), 26 April 2019, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/direct-doc.aspx?filename=q:/INF/ECOM/23.pdf.37 WTO, Jo

324、int Statement on Electronic Commerce. Communication from China (INF/ECOM/19), 23 April 2019, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?file-name=q:/INF/ECOM/19.pdf.38 WTO, Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce. EU Proposal for WTO Disciplines and Commitments Relating To Electronic Commerce

325、. Communication from the Euro-pean Union (INF/ECOM/22), 26 April 2019, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/INF/ECOM/22.pdf.39 On recent proposal for digital trade, see, for example, Wallace S. Cheng and Clara Brandi, “Governing Digital Trade A New Role for the WTO”, in DIE

326、 Briefing Papers, No. 6/2019, https:/doi.org/10.23661/bp6.2019; or Joshua P. Meltzer, “A WTO Reform Agenda. Data Flows and International Regulatory Cooperation”, in Brookings Working Papers, No. 130 (September 2019), https:/brook.gs/30dGoeM.552. WTO Reform: The Role of the G20Ministerial Conference

327、in 2017, WTO members decided on the goal of adopting an agreement on fisheries subsidies at the following Ministe-rial Conference originally planned to take place in June 2020. Key stick-ing points in the talks (see Table 7 in the Appendix) remain the regula-tion of IUU fisheries subsidies and SDT f

328、or developing countries. China40 and India,41 for example, defend exemptions from subsidy restrictions for (self-designated) developing countries, stressing among other things the importance of those subsidies for artisanal fishermen, while the US is highly skeptical of such exemptions and proposes

329、linking flexibilities to production volumes rather than to development status.42 Further pro-posals address the issue of vessels not flying the flag of the subsidizing member and possible prohibitions on subsidies to those vessels.2.5.3 Industrial subsidies and technology transferThere are also disc

330、ussions around the regulation of industrial subsidies and potential new rules on forced technology transfer (see Table 8 in the Appendix for proposals on both topics submitted to the WTO). Dur-ing their Trilateral Meeting in May 2018, trade ministers from the US, the EU and Japan agreed on the need

331、to create more effective rules on subsidies, strengthen the regulation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and generate a new list of prohibited subsidies; they also voiced concern about forced technology transfers to host countries.43 In May 2019, China 40 WTO, A Cap-based Approach to Address Certain

332、 Fisheries Subsidies that Contribute to Overcapacity and Overfishing. Communication from China (TN/RL/GEN/199), 3 June 2019, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/TN/RL/GEN199.pdf.41 WTO, Article X: Special and Differential Treatment. Communication from India. Revision (TN/R

333、L/GEN/200/Rev.1), 5 March 2020, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/TN/RL/GEN200R1.pdf.42 WTO, A Cap-based Approach to Addressing Certain Fisheries Subsidies. Submission of Australia and the United States (TN/RL/GEN/197), 22 March 2019, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/

334、directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/TN/RL/GEN197.pdf. See also Revi-sion (TN/RL/GEN/197/Rev.2), 11 July 2019, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/TN/RL/GEN197R2.pdf.43 US, EU and Japan, Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and th

335、e European Union, cit.56Axel Berger and Clara Brandiin turn voiced concern over the discriminatory treatment of SOEs in the areas of subsidy regulation and investment examination for security purposes.44 At a Trilateral Meeting in January 2020, the EU, Japan and the US reiterated their agreement on

336、strengthening WTO rules on indus-trial subsidies by proposing to add new types of unconditionally prohib-ited subsidies to the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.45 Their proposal is meant to close a loophole in WTO rules on “market and trade distorting” subsidies that allows Chi

337、nese firms that are strongly supported by the state to gain advantage over companies in other countries. The proposal also calls for better notification of distort-ing subsidies and for shifting the burden of proof to the subsidizing gov-ernment to prove that permitted forms of state aid have not ge

338、nerated an unfair advantage. Other rule changes would put pressure on coun-tries to notify the WTO of any subsidies that they provide or face being reported by another government and having the measures banned. The EU, Japan and the US also supported new rules to undermine the forced technology-tran

339、sfer practices of third countries, which is meant to put a halt to the practice of pressuring foreign firms into sharing their tech-nology with Chinese companies. The three parties hope to make pro-gress on these issues through a multilateral agreement.In the light of the complex agenda on WTO refor

340、m, and the stark dif-ferences of opinions between countries on possible reform options, the question arises of how this process at the WTO can be supported. One key forum to facilitate WTO reform is the G20. The following section will discuss the G20s role in the WTO reform debate.3. the role of the

341、 g20Since the first meeting of the G20 at the leaders level in Washington, DC in November 2008, international trade has been an important part of the 44 Ibid.45 US, EU and Japan, Joint Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan, the United States and the European Union, Wash

342、ington, 14 January 2020, https:/trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/158567.htm.572. WTO Reform: The Role of the G20groups agenda. The key commitment of G20 leaders during the global financial crisis was to “refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new ex

343、port restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports”.46 This so-called anti-protectionism pledge was rep-licated and confirmed in subsequent summit declarations, and G20 lead-ers asked the OECD, WTO and the United Nations Conference on Trade a

344、nd Development (UNCTAD) to monitor its implementation. Despite general commitments to the multilateral trading system, few trade-pol-icy initiatives were advanced by G20 leaders,47 who were largely preoc-cupied with the global and European financial crises. It is therefore no wonder that G20 summitr

345、y had little impact on the multilateral trading system and the WTO, which at the time was sliding into a deep institu-tional crisis, at its core. The WTOs Doha Development Round has been completely deadlocked since 2008, and commitments to its conclusion have disappeared from G20 declarations. Furth

346、ermore, since 2017 trade has been one of the most controversial issues on the G20s annual agenda, and leaders have backtracked on key commitments such as support for the multilateral trading system and the anti-protectionism pledge.48Against the backdrop of the recent intensification of trade tensio

347、ns, serious commitments to WTO reform have been made only in recent years. At their summit in Buenos Aires in 2018, G20 leaders made a landmark commitment to “support the necessary reform of the WTO to improve its functioning”.49 The Osaka summit in 2019 reaffirmed the 46 G20, G20 Leaders Declaratio

348、n. Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Washington, 15 November 2008, point 13, http:/georgew-bush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/11/20081115-1.html.47 These, for instance, include the support for the WTO negotiations on trade facili-tation in 2013.48 Axe

349、l Berger and Simon J. Evenett, “The Trump-Induced G20 Stress Test on Trade: Did the German Presidency Pass?”, in Global Summitry, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 2017), p. 124-140, https:/doi.org/10.1093/global/guy002; Simon J. Evenett et al., Mend It, Dont End It: The Case for Upgrading the G20s Pledge on Pr

350、otectionism, T20Argentina Policy Brief, https:/www.g20-insights.org/?p=9217.49 G20, G20 Leaders Declaration. Building Consensus for Fair and Sustainable Develop-ment, cit., point 27.58Axel Berger and Clara Brandicommitment and agreed “that action is necessary regarding the func-tioning of the disput

351、e settlement system consistent with the rules as negotiated by WTO members”.50 The trade ministers meeting before the leaders summit was more specific about the dimensions of WTO reforms citing, among other issues, the need to fulfil notification requirements and the strengthening of committees and

352、working bodies. Furthermore, they emphasized the need to agree on discipline on fisheries subsidies and to advance discussions under the Joint Statement Initiatives in particular, those on electronic commerce.51In the light of the fact that the urgency to reform the WTO has never been greater, and i

353、n view of the fact that multiple proposals for such reform are on the table, what role can the G20 play in promot-ing reform of the organization? The relevance of the G20 stems from its economic importance, covering 80 percent of world trade, and the fact that it includes major trading powers from b

354、oth the Global North and South. It does not adopt legally binding rules but promotes policy dialogue among its members in order to enhance international coop-eration, initiate actions by international organizations and coordi-nate domestic reform processes. The dialogue-oriented nature of G20 discus

355、sions on the level of working-group delegates, trade ministers and leaders outside the formal negotiation forums at the WTO can play an important role in promoting joint understanding on major challenges and broker compromise on key controversial issues. The G20, furthermore, has developed an increa

356、singly dense interaction with non-state actors, the so-called “Engagement Groups”, who usu-ally support multilateral approaches to deal with current trade chal-lenges and who can be effective facilitators of policy dialogue and joint understanding.5250 G20, G20 Osaka Leaders Declaration, Osaka, 29 J

357、une 2019, point 8, https:/europa.eu/!vk44tt.51 G20, G20 Ministerial Statement on Trade and Digital Economy, Tsubuka, 9 June 2019, http:/trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/157920.htm.52 The G20 Engagement Groups that represent business (B20), think tanks (T20), civil society (C20), labour (L20), women or

358、ganisations (W20), youth (Y20), science (S20) and cities (U20).592. WTO Reform: The Role of the G20However, despite the fact that the G20 brings together a smaller group of systemically important countries with the hope of facilitating more effective decision-making, the main obstacles to agreement

359、and greater ambition reflect those prevalent in the multilateral setting of the WTO. Nevertheless, there are several ways in which the G20 can support reform discussions at the WTO.53 It is necessary to leverage the strengths of the G20 as an informal forum for cooperation between heads of state and

360、 governments, but without weakening the WTO as a central forum for discussing reforms to the multilateral trade system. In this context, the G20 should focus on promoting dialogue on the objectives and issues of WTO members rather than on technical details. Most of all, there is also a need to impro

361、ve communication between actors and to build mutual trust.First, G20 leaders can help to keep up the momentum for reform. The decision to emphasize WTO reform at the 2018 G20 leaders summit has been a key impetus. The Italian G20 presidency should engage key stakeholders of the trading system, inclu

362、ding the relevant international organizations, in a dialogue on the deficiencies and benefits of an effec-tive, legitimate and inclusive multilateral trading system. In close coor-dination with the G20 Troika (the holders of the previous, current and subsequent presidencies), the Italian presidency

363、should propose a mul-ti-year agenda to prioritize WTO reform. The presidency should include the G20 engagement groups in this dialogue, and seek their input on sub-stantive reform options. One option in this respect is to initiate an emi-nent trade-expert group that reports on an annual basis on the

364、 process.Second, another hope is that the G20 can help to promote dialogue on possible compromises across the different issue areas of WTO reform. As Table 1 underlines, various important proposals on relevant issues have been submitted to the WTO by members of the G20. The organization seems very u

365、nlikely to agree on one dimension of reform without con-53 Axel Berger and Clara Brandi, “The G20 and the Future of the Global Trading System”, in DIE Briefing Papers, No. 10/2016, https:/www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/BP_10.2016.pdf; Axel Berger and Clara Brandi, “The G20 Summit and the Future of the

366、 World Trade Organization”, in The Current Column, 3 December 2018, https:/www.die-gdi.de/en/the-current-column/article/the-g20-summit-and-the-future-of-the-world-trade-organization.60Axel Berger and Clara Brandisidering others. Since convergence of WTO members positions on sin-gle-issue areas is no

367、t very likely, it might be an option to work towards a “grand bargain” across different issue areas. One possibility for making progress might involve a group of larger developing countries, building on the aforementioned offers by Brazil and South Korea to relinquish their demand for SDT in exchang

368、e for US agreement on the nomination of AB members.54 The G20 can play a key role in facilitating discussions about such issue linkages in order to promote a systemic approach to WTO reform.Third, the G20 has the potential to help bring together different actors from policy arenas other than trade,

369、including the environment and health.55 More integrated and coherent policy-making of this sort is needed in view of the fact that a functioning multilateral trading system is a key enabling factor in achieving the SDGs. Trade in goods and ser-vices can be a key enabler of domestic growth and revenu

370、e creation, it can help to diffuse environmental technologies and it can help to tackle global health challenges by providing medical equipment and medicine. The Italian presidency should thus consider engaging finance, environ-ment and health ministers in discussion about WTO reform. Joint minis-te

371、rial conferences or joint deliverables of the various G20 work streams can be effective tools in promoting WTO reform.conclusIonsAmid an increasingly dynamic debate about the reform of the WTO, which is taking place against the backdrop of geopolitical rivalry, this chapter investigates the role of

372、the G20. The crisis in the WTO manifests itself in the inability of the organization to update its rule book in order to address new challenges such as digitalization, sustainable develop-54 Anabel Gonzlez, “A Quid Pro Quo to Save the WTOs Appellate Body”, in DIE Blog, 18 March 2020, https:/blogs.di

373、e-gdi.de/?p=11063.55 See, for example, Steffen Bauer, Axel Berger and Gabriela Iacobuta, “With or With-out You: How the G20 Could Advance Global Action Towards Climate-Friendly Sus-tainable Development”, in DIE Briefing Papers, No. 10/2019, https:/doi.org/10.23661/bp10.2019.612. WTO Reform: The Role

374、 of the G20ment and state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, the organization has proved unable to effectively curb new forms of protectionism, such as subsidies or export-related measures, that are often not prohibited by its rules. Last but not the least, the WTOs dispute-settlement system has plunge

375、d into a deep crisis due to the US veto on appointing replacements for outgoing AB members.While discussion on WTO reform is anything but new, it has recently picked up speed in particular, due to the G20s high-level commitment to it at the summit in Buenos Aires in 2018. Over the past few years, mo

376、re than 40 WTO members have issued proposals on various issue-specific reforms. A review of the position of major trade powers on key issues such as dispute settlement, SDT, transparency and notifications, com-mittee work and new trade rules reveals marked differences between country positions. At t

377、imes, these differences run along traditional fault-lines. On dispute-settlement reform, for example, the positions of the EU and China are closer than those of either party and the US. On SDT, Brazil and South Korea have decided to forgo their developing-country status while other major emerging co

378、untries such as China, India and South Africa defend this status. Sometimes, these differences reflect princi-pled approaches for example, on dispute settlement, SDT or multilat-eral agreements at other times, they are of a rather technical nature (for example, on improving committee work).The G20 c

379、an play a key role by moving the complex WTO reform agenda forward. As a leaders forum of systemically significant econo-mies, it can promote high-level policy dialogue as well as joint under-standing and trust in order to enhance international cooperation. The Italian chair has an opportunity to us

380、e its G20 presidency in 2021 to uphold momentum for WTO reform by engaging key stakeholders and could initiate a multi-year reform agenda as well as an eminent trade-expert group. Second, the Italian chair may leverage the G20s potential to promote dialogue on compromises across different issue area

381、s of WTO reform. Third, the G20 can bridge policy silos and engage finance, environment or health ministers to discuss comprehensive WTO reforms.62Axel Berger and Clara BrandireferencesTalal Abu-Ghazaleh et al., The Future of Trade: The Challenges of Conver-gence. Report of the Panel on Defining the

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383、don, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), 2009, https:/www.alexandria.unisg.ch/235299/1/Murky_Protectionism.pdfSteffen Bauer, Axel Berger and Gabriela Iacobuta, “With or Without You: How the G20 Could Advance Global Action Towards Cli-mate-Friendly Sustainable Development”, in DIE Briefing Pa

384、pers, No. 10/2019, https:/doi.org/10.23661/bp10.2019Axel Berger and Clara Brandi, “The G20 and the Future of the Global Trading System”, in DIE Briefing Papers, No. 10/2016, https:/www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/BP_10.2016.pdfAxel Berger and Clara Brandi, “The G20 Summit and the Future of the World Tr

385、ade Organization”, in The Current Column, 3 December 2018, https:/www.die-gdi.de/en/the-current-column/article/the-g20-summit-and-the-future-of-the-world-trade-organizationAxel Berger and Simon J. Evenett, “The Trump-Induced G20 Stress Test on Trade: Did the German Presidency Pass?”, in Global Summi

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429、S/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/W777R1.pdfWT/GC/W/773 Chinas Proposal on WTO Reform. Communication from China, 13 May 2019, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/direct-doc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/GC/W773.pdfWT/L/939 Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes. Decision, 27 November 2014, https:/doc

430、s.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/L/939.pdfWT/L/1054 African Group Declaration on WTO Issues, 28 December 2018, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?file-name=q:/WT/L/1054.pdfWT/MIN(15)/43 Special Safeguard Mechanism for Developing Country Members. Ministerial Dec

431、ision, 19 December 2015, https:/docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN15/43.pdfWT/TPR/OV/21 Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment. Annual Report by the Director-General (2018): October 2017 to October 2018, 27 November 2018, https:/docs.wto.org/dol

432、2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/TPR/OV21.pdf713.The G20s Work on the Digital Economy and the Future of Work: International Context, Progress and the Way AheadPaul TwomeyThe nature of competition between states over technology has shifted in the last 25 years. It has moved from competition

433、 around telecom-munications and broadcasting standards between three main play-ers the United States (US), the European Union (EU) and Japan to one around permissions for 5G deployment and, more broadly, around the governance of the internet and artificial intelligence (AI) in which standards are on

434、ly part of the debate. In this new environment, the two main supply-side protagonists are China and the US. Japan and the EU have somewhat similar interests to the US but lack the sort of national champions that they had in the era of disputes about mobile-telecom-munications standards.While these p

435、owers are competing for economic advantage from a supply-side perspective, they nearly all share similar concerns about the impact of the new technologies on the demand side. The discussion of AI technology and its impact on the future of work has tended to be more conducive to international consens

436、us building than other areas of tech-nology debate.Several initiatives have been recently undertaken to promote interna-tional coordination and cooperation on a wide spectrum of issues related to AI-technology governance: developing common standards and principles; ensuring public trust and confiden

437、ce in AI technologies, including through consumer protection and cybersecurity; strengthening digital infrastruc-72Paul Twomeyture; bridging the digital divide; and providing training opportunities and social protection. Several international and regional organizations have launched specific program

438、mes to address those issues, although the results have been so far rather limited, and the cooperation mechanisms remain embryonic. Technological innovation and the impact of the digital economy have become increasingly prominent in the agenda of the G20. Given its composition and modus operandi, th

439、e group seems well-suited to play a significant role in international efforts to deal with the far-reach-ing implications of AI technology. This chapter will address the pattern of G20 consensus building amid a broader environment of increasingly frac-tious disputes about technology by examining fou

440、r aspects of the issues involved: (1) the state of international cooperation and the positions of the major actors; (2) initiatives undertaken in the G20 context; the impact of Covid-19; and (3) the potential role of the G20.1. InternatIonal cooperatIonA useful prism through which to view internatio

441、nal cooperation is afforded by examining the agenda of the various multilateral bodies involved.1.1 The United NationsThe generally recognized “peak” organization for international cooper-ation is the United Nations (UN). However, within the core UN organs over the last several years there has been

442、little discussion of the future of technology and work. No clear link has been made between this topic and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), although some relevant events have been coordinated around the UN General Assembly over the last several years. There was some high-level reference to

443、digitization and the future of work issues in the 200315 history of the World Sum-mit for the Information Society, but its main focus was on addressing digital-divide issues and disputes over the appropriate mechanisms for internet governance. In 2015, a high-level meeting of the UN General Assembly

444、 reviewed the implementation of the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society by the UN General Assembly, and reaffirmed its commitment733. The G20s Work on the Digital Economy and the Future of Workto build a people-centered, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society wher

445、e everyone can create, access, utilize and share information and knowledge, enabling individuals, com-munities and peoples to achieve their full potential in promoting their sustainable development and improving their quality of life premised on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the Unit

446、ed Nations and respecting fully and upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.1One area in which there have been long-standing and increasing ten-sions among member states in the main organs of the UN is in the discus-sion of cyber norms and cybercrime. A Group of Governmental Experts (GGE

447、) convened by the Secretary-General to develop a set of norms for cyberspace came up with a proposed set in 2015. Since then, however, Russia and China in particular have acted in the UN to thwart the full adoption of these norms. Ironically, the origin of the United Nations GGE lay in a move by Rus

448、sia to establish a new cyber-arms-control treaty in the early 2000s. The group was convened and produced three successive UN Groups of Governmental Experts reports in 2010, 2013 and a con-sensus report in 2015. But follow-on meetings in 2017 failed to reach a consensus on the next steps, which resul

449、ted in two separate resolutions going to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 2019. A state-ment by the US and other Western powers2 pushed for a new GGE on rule norms and responsible state behaviour. The other resolution, pro-moted by Russian and China, called for an open-ended Working Gr

450、oup of ECOSOC to develop a new cybercrime convention. The First Commit-tee (Disarmament and International Security) approved the two sepa-rate proposals to create working groups to develop rules for states on 1 UN General Assembly, Resolution adopted on 16 December 2015: Outcome Document of the High

451、-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Overall Review of the Implemen-tation of the Outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society (A/RES/70/125), p. 2, https:/undocs.org/en/A/RES/70/125.2 Joint Statement on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace, 23 September 2019, https

452、:/www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-advancing-responsible-state-behav-ior-in-cyberspace.74Paul Twomeyresponsible behaviour in cyberspace.3The Russian resolution was adopted partly because it appealed to many developing and small member states who wanted to participate in a more universal UN process.

453、It was also seen as favouring a state-led governance approach based on territorial integrity and sovereignty and a move away from the previously agreed language of the 2015 GGE report. Furthermore, Western governments have expressed concerns that a new UN treaty would undermine the cross-border prov

454、isions of the existing Budapest Treaty on cybercrime.4 This pattern, played out in the General Assembly, has been similar to that in many international organizations: a clash between liberal open-internet states and non-lib-eral cyber-sovereignty states.1.2 The International Telecommunications Union

455、 (ITU) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)This collision between different philosophies of how the internet should operate is particularly noticeable in members interactions in the Inter-national Telecommunications Union. The ITU is responsible for develop-ment and international coor

456、dination on radio and telecommunications standards. A recent example of the long history of this philosophical 3 Allison Peters, “Russia and China Are Trying to Set the U.N.s Rules on Cybercrime”, in Foreign Policy, 16 September 2019, http:/bit.ly/2LYwyIz; Owen Daugherty, “UN to Form Cybercrime Comm

457、ittee in Move Opposed by US, EU”, in The Hill, 28 December 2019, https:/ Summer Walker, Cyber-Insecurities? A Guide to the UN Cybercrime Debate, Geneva, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, March 2019, https:/wp.me/pagYoN-7ak; Shannon Vavra, “The U.N. Passed a Resolution that Giv

458、es Russia Greater Influence Over Internet Norms”, in CyberScoop, 18 November 2019, https:/ See further: Shannon Vavra, “World Powers Are Pushing to Build Their Own Brand of Cyber Norms”, in CyberScoop, 23 September 2019, https:/ Josh Gold, “Two Incompatible Approaches to Governing Cyberspace Hinder

459、Global Consensus”, in Leiden Security and Global Affairs Blog, 16 May 2019, https:/leidensecurityandglobalaffairs.nl/articles/two-incompatible-approach-es-to-governing-cyberspace-hinder-global-consensus; Josh Gold, “The First Ever Global Meeting on Cyber Norms Holds Promise, But Broader Challenges R

460、emain”, in CFR Blog, 30 September 2019, https:/www.cfr.org/blog/first-global-meeting-cyber-norms.753. The G20s Work on the Digital Economy and the Future of Workclash has been provided by Study Group 13 of the Telecommunications Directorate. Chinese multinational technology company Huawei has sugges

461、ted the concept of a new internet protocol to replace the exist-ing TCP/IP protocol (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol), which is at the heart of the global internet. This new proposed protocol would allow potentially more efficient addressing and network manage-ment than the existing

462、standard. But it has “hooks” that allow govern-ments or carriers to censor, specifically identify and potentially surveil their citizens. Notably, the new proposal would allow a central part of the network to cut off data going to and from a particular address. This new effort within the ITU is seen

463、 by civil-liberties groups and other gov-ernments as another attempt to try to establish a sovereign-state-type internet structure, which would allow governments to silence activists and others and to potentially link real names to internet users.It is also another example of China and other nations

464、 trying to move internet standard-setting away from multi-stakeholder bodies, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force, to multilateral organizations in which gov-ernments have clear control. The Huawei proposal has not been received well in the international internet technical community. While m

465、any govern-ments are developing national strategies on AI, the limited discussions on the topic in the UN system have been quite cooperative. For instance, the AI for Good summit is hosted each year in Geneva by the ITU in partnership with UN sister agencies, XPRIZE Foundation and the Association fo

466、r Com-puting Machinery. It promotes a global and inclusive dialogue on AI, includ-ing its use for the acceleration of progress towards the SDGs.The ITU has a number of groups focusing on the future of AI includ-ing a focus group on machine learning for future networks, one on AI for autonomous and a

467、ssisted driving, one on environmental efficiency for AI and other emerging technologies, and a focus group on artificial intelligence for health.5 The UNDP has run side events to the General Assembly on the digital future of development, and has its own focus on trying to digitize its work.65 ITU we

468、bsite: ITU-T Focus Groups, https:/www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/focusgroups.6 UNDP, The Digital Future of Development, 12 September 2019, https:/www.undp.76Paul Twomey1.3 The International Labour Organization (ILO)The UN agency that has focused most strongly on possible technolog-ical impacts on the future o

469、f work has been the International Labour Organization, which produced a major report in 2019.7 This drew on two years worth of work by a high-level Global Commission on the Future of Work headed by the Prime Minister of Sweden and the Pres-ident of South Africa. That report found, among other things

470、, that new technologies are bringing opportunities but also challenges to working lives. It indicated that new technologies are resulting in greater levels of worker autonomy, regardless of where people work, and also resulting in reduced commuting time. The downsides were identified as longer hours

471、, increased ambiguity between paid work and personal time, and high levels of stress. The further work of the ILO Research Programme, which lasted four years, has focused on issues of the social contract and the future of work, inequality, income security, labour relations, the gen-der dialogue, cli

472、mate change and demographic shifts, and the need for new skills. The member states agreed that the achievement of a sustain-able future for people needed a human-centred approach to the future of work. This includes investing in skills, social protection and strong support for gender equality.1.4 Th

473、e Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-opment (OECD)The other international organization that is deeply invested in the issues of technology and the future of work is the OECD the topic has, in fact, been a major focus of its work.8 Similarly, the OECD has concentrated org/content/undp/e

474、n/home/news-centre/news/2019/the_digital_future_of_develop-ment.html.7 ILO website: The Future of Work, https:/www.ilo.org/global/topics/future-of-work.8 See OECD website: The Future of Work: http:/www.oecd.org/future-of-work; and Digital economy, https:/www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy. See also: Tra

475、de Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC), OECD Focus on the Future of Work TUAC Recommendations, 26 October 2018, https:/tuac.org/news/oecd-focus-on-the-future-of-work-tuac-recommendations.773. The G20s Work on the Digital Economy and the Future of Workon the development and related policies f

476、or AI.9 It also surveys in detail the policies being developed by its member states.10 Indeed, it was the agreed OECD principles on AI that formed the basis of the G20 adopted principles in 2019. It is worth noting that the OECDs multi-stakeholder approach resulted in two principles specifically foc

477、used on employment (fair transitions) and organizational change (safe workplace). Through-out the development of the G20s work on technology and the future of work, the OECD has become an important research partner for each G20 presidency. The OECDs Going Digital process has a “jobs” pillar, and ben

478、-efits from its four stakeholder groups. It has a measurement framework that contributes to the G20.111.5 Regional organizationsThe regional organization with by far the most significant policy and financial resources dedicated to digitalization and the future of work is the EU, under its Digitaliza

479、tion and Social Pillars. The Union has estab-lished 20 principles and rights to ensure a fair and well-functioning labour market, acknowledging the challenges produced by the irrevers-ible trend towards the digitalization of the economy. The EU approach emphasizes skilled-workforce development and t

480、he establishment of new labour relations.Other regional organizations have mostly focused on skills-gap issues. For instance, the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) forum released a report in 201812 on the effects of digital technology on labour productivity, and urged members to help people a

481、lready in the workforce to acquire new skills and upgrade themselves to be able to tackle the complexities of new technologies. Other APEC statements on 9 See OECD website: Artificial Intelligence, https:/www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai.10 See OECD, Artificial Intelligence in Society, Paris, OECD, 201

482、9, p. 121 ff., https:/doi.org/10.1787/eedfee77-en.11 E.g. European Commission website: Shaping Europes Digital Future, https:/europa.eu/!gn83MB.12 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), APEC Regional Trends Analysis. The Digital Productivity Paradox, November 2018, https:/www.apec.org/Publication

483、s/2018/11/APEC-Regional-Trends-Analysis-The-Digital-Productivity-Paradox.78Paul Twomeythese issues have also focused on the need for skills development.13In December 2017, the Common Market Council of the South Ameri-can trade bloc MERCOSUR established the Digital Agenda Group (GAD) with the objecti

484、ve of “promoting the development of a Digital MERCO-SUR”. In the first half of 2018, the GAD negotiated its first Action Plan (201820). While a wide-ranging document, in terms of the future of work, the Action Plan only contains commitments to developing digital skills: (1) development of a common f

485、rame of reference for the develop-ment of digital skills and computational thinking; and (2) development of common online training systems and programmes.14At the 2015 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Tele-communications Ministerial Summit, ministers adopted a five-year plan AIM2020 wi

486、th a vision to “Propel ASEAN Towards a Digitally Enabled Economy that is Secure, Sustainable, and Transformative; and to enable an Innovative, Inclusive and Integrated ASEAN Community”. AIM2020 structures ASEAN ICT (Information and Communications Technology) cooperation activities into eight Strateg

487、ic Thrusts, which cover various issues of digital transformation.15Both the Commonwealth and the African Union have addressed tech-nology and the future of work though the need for skill development, particularly among the young.1613 ILO, APEC Economies Adopt New Cooperation Framework to Address Fut

488、ure of Work Issues, 15 May 2017, https:/www.ilo.org/hanoi/Informationresources/Publicinforma-tion/newsitems/WCMS_554070; “APEC Workshop Promotes Innovative Work Skills in Digital Age”, in The Voice of Vietnam, 19 July 2019, https:/english.vov.vn/society/apec-workshop-promotes-innovative-work-skills-

489、in-digital-age-400286.vov14 MERCOSUR, Acuerdo de reconocimiento mutuo de firmas digitales en el MERCOSUR, 12 December 2019, https:/www.mercosur.int/?p=11370.15 (i) Economic Development and Transformation; (ii) People Integration and Empowerment Through ICT; (iii) Innovation; (iv) ICT Infrastructure

490、Development; (v) Human Resource Development; (vi) ICT in the ASEAN Single Market; (vii) New Media and Content; and (viii) Information Security and Assurance.16 See Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth Cyber Declaration, London, 2018, https:/thecommonwealth.org/commonwealth-cyber-declaration; also

491、supporting youth and social development: Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth Secretar-iat Strategic Plan 2017/18 2020/21, 1 June 2017, https:/thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/inline/CommonwealthSecretariatStrategic_Plan_17_21.pdf; and youth 793. The G20s Work on the Digital Economy and the

492、 Future of Work2. InItIatIves undertaKen In the g20The G20 has been exploring the topics of the future of work, employment and education in the digital age/digital economy since 2015. The impact of digitization was first referred to in the 2015 Antalya Statement of Heads of Governments: “We are livi

493、ng in an age of Internet economy that brings both opportunities and challenges to global growth.”17 The state-ment referred to ICT security issues and the digital divide, calling for no intellectual property theft, the protection of privacy and support for the UN GGE. It closed, “We are committed to

494、 help ensure an environment in which all actors are able to enjoy the benefits of secure use of ICTs.”The G20 started explicit policy discussion on the digital economy under the Chinese presidency in the Hangzhou Summit process in 2016, in which G20 members engaged in a comprehensive discussion on t

495、he digital economy, innovation and the new industrial revolution. The Chi-nese presidency convened a G20 Digital Economy Task Force (DETF), which was to solidify the following year under the German presidency. Officials discussions throughout the Chinese process focused on three lines of conversatio

496、n: (1) support for entrepreneurship; (2) improved science and technology cooperation; and (3) broader discussions about the impact of the digital revolution on the economy.The Hangzhou Summit picked up the impulse of the Antalya Summit regarding digitalization in its “G20 Digital Economy Development

497、 and Cooperation Initiative” statement.18 This statement analysed the global economy as a digitized world. Its most significant aspect was the agree-ment by the groups members on a set of common principles to promote the development of and cooperation in the digital economy: promoting innovation; ca

498、lling for greater partnership in sharing knowledge and education initiatives: Sydney Perlotto et al., “Africas Future. Youth and the Data Defin-ing Their Lives”, in AUC Policy Briefs, September 2019, https:/au.int/en/node/37828.17 See G20, G20 Leaders Communiqu, Antalya, 16 November 2015, http:/www.

499、g20.utoronto.ca/2015/151116-communique.html.18 See G20, G20 Digital Economy Development and Cooperation Initiative, Hangzhou, 5 September 2016, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160905-digital.html.80Paul Twomeyexperiences; recognizing that the digital economy touches almost all economic and social sec

500、tors; promoting policy flexibility while also calling for comprehensive policies to promote inclusion in the digital economy; recognizing the need for enabling and transparent legal, regula-tory and policy environments; and fostering open, competitive markets.Considering the tensions that have now a

501、risen between China and the liberal democracies, it is worth noting the full liberal agenda agreed to under the Chinese presidency on the final principle supporting the flow of information.19 The statement then went on to outline a series of policy recommendations that were generally pro-growth (esp

502、ecially for micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises MSMEs), inclusive, protective of intellectual property and international standards, and encouraging of transparent digital-economy policy-making.In 2017, Germany established the first G20 Digital Economy Minis-terial Meeting and created an over

503、all perspective on digital policy with the G20 Roadmap on Digital Economy and the Ministerial Declarations. In doing so, the DETF took forward the 2015 G20 Leaders Statement, “Blueprint on Innovative Growth”,20 and ensured consistency with the G20 Digital Economy Development and Cooperation Initiati

504、ve and the G20 New Industrial Revolution Action Plan.21 Under the German G20 presidency, the first digital ministerial process was set up signifying the importance of digitalization in the G20 agenda.19 Ibid.: “G20 members recognize that freedom of expression and the free flow of information, ideas,

505、 and knowledge, are essential for the digital economy and benefi-cial to development . We support ICT policies that preserve the global nature of the Internet, promote the flow of information across borders and allow Internet users to lawfully access online information, knowledge and services of the

506、ir choice”.20 G20, G20 Blueprint on Innovative Growth, Hangzhou, 5 September 2016, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160905-blueprint.html.21 See G20, G20 New Industrial Revolution Action Plan, Hangzhou, 5 September 2016, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160905-industrial.html.813. The G20s Work on the D

507、igital Economy and the Future of WorkThe German Government structured discussion on the digital econ-omy and the future of work in several ministerial forums. Not surpris-ingly, the German G20 presidency placed an emphasis on “Industry 4.0”, stressing the need for the digital transformation of indus

508、try and changes to training and capacity building. The 2017 discussions were also influenced by the topics and positions being discussed by G20 mem-ber states and other stakeholders in the Future of Work project in the ILO. In developing the programme, German officials worked closely with colleagues

509、 in the OECD in order to build on the existing German domestic digital agenda to provide a blueprint for possible topics and background data.22 As the year of discussions among member-state offi-cials progressed, it became clear that the challenge for the presidency was to balance materials and stat

510、ements that could be useful for each member, and for the whole, while respecting each countrys stage of dig-ital development. Hence, the statements sought to establish connections between the core digital-economy/future-of-work concerns and more peripheral issues including the infrastructure concern

511、s of some coun-tries (for instance, Japan), education strategies for digitalization in oth-ers (e.g. Argentina), digital security (many countries), and cybersecurity (the US and other Western nations). This expansion of issues into which the digital economy reaches continued to be a challenge for fu

512、ture pres-idencies particularly in the areas of where to draw the boundaries of the Digital Economy Task Forces remit, and whether the issues should be distributed among other working groups.The G20 Labour and Employment Ministers Meeting in May 2017 set out a statement, “Towards an Inclusive Future

513、: Shaping the World of 22 See OECD, Bridging the Digital Gender Divide. Include, Upskill, Innovate, Paris, OECD, 2018, https:/www.oecd.org/internet/bridging-the-digital-gender-divide.pdf. For instance, an OECD study “Key Issues for Digital Transformation in the G20” was pre-sented at the Digital Min

514、isterial Meeting. Importantly, the OECD study was a product of multistakeholder inputs. A multistakeholder forum preceded the Ministerial meeting. Another OECD report which covered digital and work dimensions was the “Bridging the Digital Gender Divide” prepared under the sponsorship of the Australi

515、an government in preparation for the 2018 G20.82Paul TwomeyWork”,23 recognizing the challenges produced by digitalization on the labour market.24 The ministers also agreed to a set of G20 Priorities on the Future of Work,25 revolving around adapting working skills and pro-moting social protection.26

516、A month later, the G20s Digital Economy Ministers approved the outcome of the work of the DETF. Their declaration27 set out a series of visions and some detailed plans (such as reaffirming a commitment, made in Hangzhou, to the goal of connecting the next 1.5 billion people by 2020) under three broa

517、d headings: (1) harnessing digitalization for inclusive growth and employment; (2) digitizing production for growth; and (3) strengthening trust in the digital world.Importantly, the ministers outlined their future programme in three agreed statements: (1) a Roadmap for Digitalisation: Policies for

518、a Digital Future; (2) Digital Skills in Vocational Education and Training; (3) G20 Priorities on Digital Trade.28The Roadmap for Digitalisation laid out future expectations and work 23 G20 Labour and Employment Ministers, Towards an Inclusive Future: Shaping the World of Work, Bad Neunahr, 19 May 20

519、17, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/170519-la-bour.html.24 Ibid.: “The resilience and inclusiveness of our economies and societies will depend on how we shape the future of work, tackle uncertainty and foster economic security. We need to respond to critical challenges, including more frequent occupa

520、tional changes, labour market segmentation, employment polarisation, geographical differ-ences, as well as gaps in social protection resulting in part from the rise in non-stand-ard forms of employment and the growing platform economy.”25 G20 Labour and Employment Ministers, Annex A: G20 Priorities

521、on the Future of Work, Bad Neunahr, 19 May 2017, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/170519-la-bour-annex-a.html.26 Ibid.: (i) Strengthening skills development and adaptation throughout the work-ing life; (ii) Promoting adequate social protection and social security coverage for all workers, including th

522、ose in non-standard forms of employment; (iii) Encouraging social dialogue including collective bargaining for adaptable and fair work arrangements and working conditions; (iv) Harnessing the opportunities of structural change for new and better jobs. (v) Monitoring trends and exchanging good practi

523、ces.27 G20 Digital Ministers, G20 Digital Economy Ministerial Declaration: Shaping Dig-italisation for an Interconnected World, Dsseldorf, 7 April 2017, http:/www.g20.uto-ronto.ca/2017/170407-digitalization.html.28 Ibid.: see annexes.833. The G20s Work on the Digital Economy and the Future of Workun

524、der 11 headings. These promoted expanding digital technologies to the “unconnected”, fostering competition, supporting MSMEs, promoting trust and consumer protection. The one new area was a call for encour-aging the continued development of the internet of things (IoT) and the digitalization of prod

525、uction. The roadmap is also important because it was endorsed by the G20 heads of governments in the 2017 Hamburg Statement.29 This was the first time that the subject of digitization and future of work had been broadly discussed by the heads of governments.30In 2018, Argentina focused on digital go

526、vernment, the digital gender divide, infrastructure deployment and the measurement of the digital economy, in addition to creating the G20 Repository of Digital Policies. The Digital Economy Ministers issued a declaration, which noted that it was essential to continue work on further understanding t

527、he market impact of emerging technologies and new business models like online platforms, and the need to advance a fair, predictable, transparent, competitive and non-discriminatory business environment. One notable aspect of Argen-tinas presidency was the closeness of the Argentinian officials, civ

528、il soci-ety and businesspeople tasked with leading the Secretariat and the other engagement groups of the G20 like the T20, B20, L20, etc. They knew each other from the usual run of business in Buenos Aires. They were also able to leverage a digitalization round-table process already under way withi

529、n the Argentinian Government. The result was a close interchange of ideas. For instance, the Think 20 policy brief on AI31 was discussed in some detail in the DETF. Throughout the Argentinian process, the various engagement groups felt that their inputs were being considered by the Secretariat and t

530、he numerous official working groups.The Argentinian presidency placed the Future of Work agenda across several workstreams, including the Employment Working Group, the 29 G20, G20 Leaders Declaration: Shaping an Interconnected World, Hamburg, 8 July 2017, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/2017-G20-lead

531、ers-declaration.html.30 It is worth reading the “Harnessing Digitization” section of the Statement to see the breadth of issues Heads of States recognized being affected by digitization.31 Paul Twomey, Building on the Hamburg Statement and the G20 Roadmap for Dig-italization Towards a G20 Framework

532、for Artificial Intelligence in the Workplace, T20 Argentina Policy Brief, 19 June 2018, https:/www.g20-insights.org/?p=7709.84Paul Twomeynewly created Education Working Group and the DETF under the “Sherpa” track as well as under the Finance track. Argentinas DETF theme was in line with its presiden

533、cys focus on sustainable development, and also represented the interests of regional partners like Brazil, Chile and Mex-ico. The Argentinian officials faced a similar problem to that of earlier DETFs: how to include the various topics raised by G20 members while still trying to keep a boundary to t

534、he task forces work and focus on com-plete deliverables. They also quietly bemoaned the lack of a G20 full-time secretariat, which could have acted as a repository of corporate memory they relied heavily on officials from the preceding German presidency and other members of the DETF in order to ensu

535、re an understanding of continuity. The one topic that Argentinian officials particularly pushed was education reform for a digital world in the developing world an issue that they considered to be pressing in Latin America.A reflection of this emphasis was the first ever joint meeting of the G20 min

536、isters responsible for education, labour and employment. They released their declaration in September 2018,32 making recommenda-tions on developing skills for an inclusive Future of Work (both North/South and gender-based) and promoting a whole-of-government and multi-stakeholder approach to skills

537、governance. In addition the Minis-ters of Employment and Labour also released the “Fostering Opportuni-ties for an Inclusive, Fair and Sustainable Future of Work” declaration,33 which set out a set of recommendations to promote innovative and coor-dinated skills-development policy while promoting fa

538、irness through formalizing and improving labour conditions. They also called for social protection to be more sustainable, adaptable and responsive to the new platform and “gig” economies.Significantly, the ministers also agreed on a set of “Policy principles for promoting labour formalization and d

539、ecent work in the Future of Work 32 See G20 Education, Labour and Employment Ministers, G20 Joint Education and Labour and Employment Ministers Declaration 2018, Mendoza, Argentina, 6 September 2018, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/2018-09-06-education-and-employment.html.33 G20 Labour and Employment

540、 Ministers, Fostering Opportunities for an Inclusive, Fair and Sustainable Future of Work, Mendoza, Argentina, 7 September 2018, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/2018-09-07-employment.html.853. The G20s Work on the Digital Economy and the Future of Workand in the platform economy”,34 which included pr

541、omoting fair treatment in working conditions, access to social protection, the formalization of all work, and training opportunities for all workers regardless of the type of employment relationship. They called on members, in dialogue with busi-ness, to identify and define basic guidelines, drawing

542、 on applicable inter-national labour standards that digital platforms should follow. This was the first statement by the G20 on the increasingly controversial area of the impact of internet platforms and the associated gig economy.The broad extent of the work of the DETF under the Argentinian pres-i

543、dency became clear with the announcement of the G20 Digital Economy Ministerial Declaration (the “Salta Declaration”) and its accompanying four statements.35 Very detailed recommendations were included in the papers on: (1) G20 Digital Government Principles; (2) Bridging the Digital Gender Divide; (

544、3) Measurement of the Digital Economy; and (4) Accelerating Digital Infrastructure for Development.36The challenge of how to ensure the transfer of corporate memory to the subsequent Japanese presidency emerged in 2019. Government offi-cials and heads of the engagement groups from Argentina and, to

545、a cer-tain extent, Germany dedicated significant time to supporting the Jap-anese Government and engagement group partners. Because of planning for the hosting of the Rugby World Cup and the Olympic Games, the Jap-anese presidencys work plan had to be compressed. While adopting the broad range of is

546、sues on digitization that had emerged out of Argentina, the unique areas of emphasis for Japan lay in supporting ageing popula-tions; promoting sustainable infrastructure; developing financial-tech-nology skills among G20 members, especially developing countries; and 34 Ibid.35 See G20 Digital Minis

547、ters, G20 Digital Economy Ministerial Declaration, Salta, Argentina, 24 August 2018, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/2018-08-24-digital.html. The statement set out what it called a “Digital Agenda for Development” under various areas: principles to increase efforts to digitally transform G20 governme

548、nts; reviewing OECD recommendations to overcome the digital gender divide; measuring the digital economy; and sets of principles similar to previous years on overcoming the digital divide, encouraging MSMEs and promoting consumer protection.36 Ibid.: see annexes.86Paul Twomeyhuman-centric AI. This e

549、mphasis was clear in the ministerial declara-tions. The labour and employment ministers committed to human-cen-tred future-of-work policy priorities:37 adapting to demographic change, including accepting a longer working life and recognizing long-term care work as a new job opportunity in an ageing

550、society. New forms of work were recognized, while the call for formalization of jobs continued.The theme of the first ever joint meeting of Trade and Digital Econ-omy Ministers was the design and implementation of digital policies to maximize a human-centred future society.38 One new topic was that

551、of a human-centered future society an inclusive, sustainable, safe, trustwor-thy and innovative society achieved through digitalization.39 One highly significant, and in some ways surprising, decision of these members was the propagation of a set of G20 Principles on Artificial Intelligence.40Over r

552、ecent years, there has been an increasing call by technical and scientific leaders, trades unions41 and civil society and by technology 37 See G20 Labour and Employment Ministers, Shaping a Human-Centered Future of Work. Ministerial Declaration, Matsuyama, Ehime, Japan, 2 September 2019, http:/www.g

553、20.utoronto.ca/2019/2019-g20-labour.html.38 Ministers made proposals in the following areas which had been also addressed in previous year: trust and the free flow of data, security, governance innovation in the digital economy related to the digital economy, the SDGs.39 See G20 Trade Ministers and

554、Digital Economy Ministers, G20 Ministerial State-ment on Trade and Digital Economy, Tsubuka, Ibaraki, Japan, 9 June 2019, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2019/2019-g20-trade.html.40 While recognizing the benefits which may result from AI the ministers also noted that “AI, like other emerging technologies,

555、 may present societal challenges, including the transitions in the labor market, privacy, security, ethical issues, new digital divides and the need for AI capacity building. To foster public trust and confidence in AI technol-ogies and fully realize their potential, we are committed to a human-cent

556、ered approach to AI, guided by the G20 AI Principles drawn from the OECD Recommendation on AI”. Like all G20 statements the Principles statement is non-binding.The principles include “inclusive growth, sustainable development and well-being”, “human- centered values and fairness”, “transparency and

557、explainability”, “robustness, security and safety” and “accountability”. The principles also offer “guidance for consideration by policy makers with the purpose of maximizing and sharing the benefits from AI, while minimizing the risks and concerns, with special attention to international cooperatio

558、n and inclusion of developing countries and underrepresented populations”.41 See UNI Global Union, Top 10 Principles for Workers Data Privacy and Protec-873. The G20s Work on the Digital Economy and the Future of Workcompanies themselves42 for governments to intervene to ensure that human control an

559、d values are mandated in AI development. In May 2019, important progress was made when the 35 member countries of the OECD agreed on the OECD Principles on Artificial Intelligence.43 These comple-mented the AI Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI adopted by the Euro-pean Commissions High-Level Exper

560、t Group on AI in April 2019.44AI policies and the question of how to implement the 2019 G20 Prin-ciples on AI were among the discussions at the first meeting of the DETF for the Saudi Arabian presidency in February 2020.45 Other points of discussion included: improving cross-border data flows and lo

561、wer barriers; shaping the future of technology applications in urban centres, and smart mobility; advancing measurement approaches for the digital economy, which would enhance evidence-based policy-making; cybersecurity measures aimed at improving the resilience of global economic systems; and addre

562、ssing growing global concerns, including economic losses from cyberattacks.tion, Nyon, 2018, http:/www.thefutureworldofwork.org/docs/10-principles-for-workers-data-rights-and-privacy; TUAC, OECD Recommendation on Artificial Intelli-gence Calls for a “Fair Transition” Through Social Dialogue, 22 May

563、2019, https:/tuac.org/news/oecd-recommendation-on-artificial-intelligence-calls-for-a-fair-transi-tion-through-social-dialogue; and Anna Byhovskaya, “Is Artificial Intelligence Let Loose on The World of Work?”, in Workers Voice OECD, 15 January 2020, https:/ Cf. Microsoft, The Future Computed. Artif

564、icial Intelligence and Its Role in Society, Redmond, Microsoft Corporation, 2018, https:/ OECD website:, OECD Principles on Artificial Intelligence, http:/www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles.44 Cf. European Commission High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, Eth-ics Guidelines for Tr

565、ustworthy AI, 8 April 2019, https:/europa.eu/!bC37vJ.45 See G20 Digital Economy Task Force (DETF), Emerging Technologies and Cyber Resilience on G20 Table, Riyadh, 2 February 2020, https:/g20.org/en/media/Docu-ments/G20SS_PR_First Digital Economy Taskforce Meeting_EN.pdf; G20 Trade Min-isters and Di

566、gital Economy Ministers, G20 Ministerial Statement on Trade and Digital Economy, cit.88Paul TwomeyIn an important process innovation, the Saudi Arabian presidency arranged for the DETF to join an expert audience for the G20 Cybersecu-rity Dialogue. “The event was organized to extend the discussions

567、on cybersecurity challenges to business leaders, academics and civil soci-ety representatives to shape an inclusive debate on the matter.”46The DETF held its second virtual meeting in April 2020 to discuss the “G20 Roadmap Toward a Common Framework for Measuring the Digital Economy” report. Particip

568、ants included G20 members, experts from international organizations and key stakeholders including busi-nesses. Following up an agenda initiated by the Argentinian presidency in 2018,47 the task force discussed a suite of fundamental indicators for the joint adoption and monitoring of trends in jobs

569、, skills and growth in the digital economy aiming to measure these areas as well as the effects on them. Participants also discussed the policy relevance and statistical feasibility of such indicators. The DETF is seeking to set out a conceptual framework for the measurement of the digital economy,

570、and to identify areas of work for future action.48There was certainly surprise in OECD circles when the G20 adopted its principles, considering that the OECD principles reflect the liber-al-democratic values of its members. But the G20 discussions on AI had started in 2015 with the Chinese presidenc

571、y, and had continued within the DETF through to the Japanese presidency. 46 Ibid.47 See the toolkit document prepared for the 2018 meeting: G20 DETF, Toolkit for Measuring the Digital Economy, January 2019, http:/www.oecd.org/g20/summits/buenos-aires/G20-Toolkit-for-measuring-digital-economy.pdf; an

572、d more work done at the OECD: OECD, Measuring the Digital Transformation: A Roadmap for the Future, Paris, OECD, March 2019, p. 19-27, https:/doi.org/10.1787/9789264311992-en.48 See G20 DETF, G20 Digital Economy Task Force Tackles Critical Common Chal-lenges, Riyadh, 5 May 2020, https:/g20.org/en/me

573、dia/Documents/G20SS_PR_G20%20Digital%20Economy%20Working%20Group%20Meeting_EN.pdf.893. The G20s Work on the Digital Economy and the Future of Work3. the Impact of covId-19As for the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, while the “new normal” is yet to settle, long-term changes are likely to include:1. T

574、he surge in teleworking remaining to a significant degree, and firms having to adapt their organizational models to it. This will also bring calls for clearer guidelines and assessment of workers well-being and productivity levels.2. The increased surveillance of consumers and employees at work-plac

575、es in order to trace the virus spread probably being main-tained or, at least, “mothballed” to be used in responding to future infections. If not carefully regulated and time constrained, such tools are likely to raise workplace and consumer monitoring to a higher level than hitherto.3. The collecti

576、on of data from workers for the Covid-19 response exacerbating policy issues around whether or not workers data should be treated as personal data for privacy purposes.4. The adoption of online and contactless technologies during the pandemic accelerating a trend for the adoption of robotics and AI,

577、 with a negative impact on some jobs. Much has been made of the impact of AI and related robotics on jobs especially since Carl Benedikt Freys and Michael A. Osbornes 2013 paper esti-mating that 47 per cent of jobs in the US were “at risk” of being automated over the next 20 years.49 Debate has ensu

578、ed on the exact nature of this impact: the full or partial erosion of existing job tasks and the impacts across sectors and across developed, emerging and developing economies. Whatever the specifics, the results are clearly going to be very significant for G20 economies and their citizens. And, if

579、the rate of adoption continues to out-pace previous major technological adoptions,50 the scale of social 49 Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?”, in Oxford Martin School Working Papers, 17 September 2013, https:/www.oxfor

580、dmartin.ox.ac.uk/publications/the-future-of-employment.50 See discussion in Steve Lohr, “A.I. Will Transform the Economy. But How Much, 90Paul Twomeydislocation is likely to be greater which provides even stronger reasons for the G20 to work now on an action plan on how to fulfil the 2019 G20 Princi

581、ples on AI (including a timeline) and set up a monitoring framework.5. Geopolitical pressures will increasingly be echoed in national digital-technology policies, reflecting the narrative battle that has already ensued over the causes of the Covid-19 pandemic. Examples include the disputes about the

582、 role of Huawei in the global roll-out of 5G networks and the increasing sanctioning by the US of robotics and AI companies that it deems “represent a significant risk of supporting procurement of items for military end-use in China”.514. the potentIal role of the g20In the arena of the digital econ

583、omy and the future of work, the G20 has shown itself to be a surprisingly effective model for building consensus on issues that affect nearly every economy in the world. While inter-state interaction on technology issues in other international forums has often been fractious, the discussions in the

584、G20 and, especially, the DETF have been robust but have mostly avoided conflict. This success can be attributed to several factors: Outside periods of crisis (such as 200809), the G20s culture has become one of building consensus around statements of aspira-tion. Even when the statements outline com

585、mitments to prin-ciples, these are explicitly non-binding on digital-economy and future-of-work issues. This path-forward nature of G20 negoti-ations has been a useful way to keep the groups member states heading in a broad common direction especially on demand-and How Soon?”, in The New York Times,

586、 30 November 2017, https:/ See, for instance: US Department of State, Commerce Department to Add Two Dozen Chinese Companies with Ties to WMD and Military Activities to the Entity List, 22 May 2020, https:/merce.gov/node/2948.913. The G20s Work on the Digital Economy and the Future of Workside issue

587、s such as the impact of technologies on work, but also on supply-side issues such as principles on AI or principles on labour relations in regard to the platform economy. Issues that have emerged in statements have normally been on the officials and engagement bodies agenda for several years, and ha

588、ve been allowed to mature by successive presidencies before appearing in a ministerial statement. This is despite the challenge of balancing a complex set of issues and handing them on from one presidency to another. Additionally, the lack of an organ for passing on corporate memory (such as a secre

589、tariat) has made this handover process ad hoc and variable from year to year. The leadership of particular presidencies has had a particular impact on G20 output both in the year of incumbency and in influencing subsequent presidencies. The small scale of the G20 has meant that while there are undou

590、bt-edly certainly groupings and differences in perspective among its members, the incentive for pursuing global influence politics that is present in organs such as the United Nations is absent. In con-trast to the dispute in the UN over cybercrime and cyber norms, the G20 does not have 193 countrie

591、s that need to be courted.While the G20 process has been broadly successful, there are four issues that may confront the upcoming Italian presidency. They are laid out below.4.1 Ensuring memory transferThere have been a number of calls for a permanent G20 secretariat since French President Nicolas S

592、arkozys proposal, first made in 2010. But there is no consensus for such a move among the groups members. As noted above, the OECD has been a useful partner for various presiden-cies but at present there is not even a common site for all the various G20 websites and, indeed, much important public da

593、ta from past meetings has been lost. One avenue that should be explored is partnering further with the engagement groups of the G20 in order to offer aspects of a sec-retariat function. Perhaps the B20 or the T20 could undertake to host a long-term website-preservation project for the G20, without i

594、nterfering 92Paul Twomeywith the flexibility of each successive presidency. Another useful move would be to have the T20 and the OECD liaise as to how to commission research from OECD staff and the think-tank community to input into the working groups. Keeping a central record of research and policy

595、 briefs for ongoing reference would also be a useful step without moving into the arena of a permanent secretariat (a version of such a record is already convened by the Global Solutions Initiative).524.2 The future of the DETFThe Digital Economy Task Force has grown since the Hangzhou Sum-mit into

596、a grouping with an increasingly complex set of issues before it reflecting the role that digital technologies play in underpinning nearly all sectors of the global economy. It now produces major ministe-rial statements and policy statements. But the challenge for each pres-idency lies in where to dr

597、aw the boundaries of its work and to manage the overlap with the established working groups of the G20.53 Nonethe-less, the DETFs interim nature now seems to have passed. A number of people in the G20 community coming from an information-technology/communications background have privately argued tha

598、t the task force should now be made into a working group. Others, coming from a digi-tizing-government background, have argued that this task force should be a smaller unit providing case studies and technical input to the other working groups in order to bring digital issues to each working groups

599、attention. This author thinks that the task force has now assumed an important long-term responsibility to oversee the policy commitments made on AI: measuring the digital economy, the platform economy and the future of work (although here more could be done by the task force 52 See G20 Insights web

600、site: Policy Briefs, https:/www.g20-insights.org/policy_briefs.53 The working groups of the G20 are: Agriculture Working Group, Anti-Corruption Working Group (ACWG), Development Working Group, Employment Working Group, Framework for Growth Working Group, Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, G

601、reen Finance Study Group, HealthWorking Group, International Financial Architec-ture Working Group, Sustainability Working Group (Energy and Climate) and the Trade and Investment Working Group.933. The G20s Work on the Digital Economy and the Future of Workwith the G20 Employment Working Group). Fur

602、thermore, the task force is now addressing the governance issues of emerging technical capa-bilities (like AI) that do not naturally fall within the existing working groups mandates.One obstacle is that national delegates represent either technology ministries or foreign ministries, so face-to-face

603、meetings are often dif-ficult as the relevant knowledge varies among delegates. France has addressed this challenge through a 20-year tradition of appointing a Digital Ambassador.4.3 Expanding the interaction between working groups and the DETF with engagement groups and expertsAs several officials

604、from various presidencies have shared with the author, it is clear that if private-sector, civil-society and other experts can be brought into discussions with the various government officials involved, then the type of consideration encountered in the working groups/DETF would be so much richer. Th

605、is is difficult to coordinate when there is no secretariat and interactions among officials occurs only three or four times before the ministerial meetings. The multi-stake-holder approach to the discussion of digital issues has been relevant for countries, with side events happening in Germany, Arg

606、entina and Japan. There is still a great deal of room for improvement on how these spaces are used in the context of the discussion. Usually, the limited time avail-able and the pressure to produce a declaration make it difficult to find space for more innovative ideas.One simple step would be to ar

607、range for the engagement groups to give written input to the working groups and DETF, either before or after the first meeting of officials. By that time, the engagement groups would have settled into the general topics of discussion, and much of their thinking could be transferred from one-year pre

608、sidency to another. A good example of this is the Think 20, which has to date developed 287 peer-reviewed policy briefs on the G20 work agenda. As is happening this year with the DETF, at least experts from the engagement groups could then be asked to meet in person with officials during the meeting

609、s of officials. These two simple steps would both enrich consideration at the official levels and further bind the engagement groups into the G20 94Paul Twomeyprocess. The political reality is that if the participants in the engagement groups begin to become disillusioned with the G20 and its levels

610、 of inclu-siveness, media and broader disillusionment will follow.4.4 The next steps on principles for responsible stewardship for trustworthy AIUnder Japans presidency, the G20 endorsed the principles that were drawn largely from the OECD 2019 Principles. These are centred on human values, fairness

611、, transparency, clarity, robustness, security, safety and accountability. Being (necessarily) broad in tone, these princi-ples now require specific steps towards implementation through regula-tory actions especially because current practices by many AI systems do not fully reflect them. Both the Sau

612、di and Italian presidencies have an important challenge to shape and coordinate AI policies, and to make practical recommendations to G20 leaders on how their national govern-ments can implement these principles.The G20 would be well positioned to: (1) formulate an action plan on how to fulfil the p

613、rinciples (including a timeline, as it has in the case of past growth and gender targets) and set up a monitoring framework; and (2) bridge the “silos” of the DETF and the Employment Working Group in order to address future-of-work issues (the Italian presidency could, for example, host a joint meet

614、ing on digital issues and employment).A further political issue that might confront the Italian presidency is that some less-liberal members of the G20 will have more experience of what the wording involved actually means in terms of AI deployments, and may wish to limit the commitments that they ha

615、ve made in the AI statement. The goal should be to keep all the members committed and allow no watering-down of the statements provisions.referencesAsia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), APEC Regional Trends Analy-sis. The Digital Productivity Paradox, November 2018, https:/www.apec.org/Publicati

616、ons/2018/11/APEC-Regional-Trends-Analy-sis-The-Digital-Productivity-ParadoxAnna Byhovskaya, “Is Artificial Intelligence Let Loose on The World of 953. The G20s Work on the Digital Economy and the Future of WorkWork?”, in Workers Voice OECD, 15 January 2020, https:/ Secretariat, Commonwealth Cyber De

617、claration, London, 2018, https:/thecommonwealth.org/commonwealth-cyber-declarationCommonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth Secretariat Strategic Plan 2017/18 2020/21, 1 June 2017, https:/thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/inline/CommonwealthSecretariatStrategic_Plan_17_21.pdfOwen Daugherty, “UN t

618、o Form Cybercrime Committee in Move Opposed by US, EU”, in The Hill, 28 December 2019, https:/ Commission High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelli-gence, Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, 8 April 2019, https:/europa.eu/!bC37vJCarl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, “The Future of Employm

619、ent: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?”, in Oxford Martin School Working Papers, 17 September 2013, https:/www.oxford-martin.ox.ac.uk/publications/the-future-of-employmentG20, G20 Blueprint on Innovative Growth, Hangzhou, 5 September 2016, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160905-blueprint.h

620、tmlG20, G20 Digital Economy Development and Cooperation Initia-tive, Hangzhou, 5 September 2016, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160905-digital.htmlG20, G20 Leaders Communiqu, Antalya, 16 November 2015, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/151116-communique.htmlG20, G20 Leaders Declaration: Shaping an Inte

621、rconnected World, Hamburg, 8 July 2017, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/2017-G20-lead-ers-declaration.htmlG20, G20 New Industrial Revolution Action Plan, Hangzhou, 5 September 2016, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160905-industrial.htmlG20 Digital Economy Task Force (DETF), Emerging Technologies and C

622、yber Resilience on G20 Table, Riyadh, 2 February 2020, https:/g20.org/en/media/Documents/G20SS_PR_First Digital Economy Task-force Meeting_EN.pdf96Paul TwomeyG20 DETF, G20 Digital Economy Task Force Tackles Critical Common Challenges, Riyadh, 5 May 2020, https:/g20.org/en/media/Docu-ments/G20SS_PR_G

623、20%20Digital%20Economy%20Working%20Group%20Meeting_EN.pdfG20 DETF, Toolkit for Measuring the Digital Economy, January 2019, http:/www.oecd.org/g20/summits/buenos-aires/G20-Toolkit-for-meas-uring-digital-economy.pdfG20 Digital Ministers, G20 Digital Economy Ministerial Declaration, Salta, Argentina,

624、24 August 2018, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/2018-08-24-digital.htmlG20 Digital Ministers, G20 Digital Economy Ministerial Declaration: Shaping Digitalisation for an Interconnected World, Dsseldorf, 7 April 2017, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/170407-digitalization.htmlG20 Education, Labour and Em

625、ployment Ministers, G20 Joint Education and Labour and Employment Ministers Declaration 2018, Men-doza, Argentina, 6 September 2018, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/2018-09-06-education-and-employment.htmlG20 Labour and Employment Ministers, Annex A: G20 Priorities on the Future of Work, Bad Neunahr,

626、 19 May 2017, http:/www.g20.uto-ronto.ca/2017/170519-labour-annex-a.htmlG20 Labour and Employment Ministers, Fostering Opportunities for an Inclusive, Fair and Sustainable Future of Work, Mendoza, Argentina, 7 September 2018, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2018/2018-09-07-employment.htmlG20 Labour and Em

627、ployment Ministers, Shaping a Human-Centered Future of Work. Ministerial Declaration, Matsuyama, Ehime, Japan, 2 September 2019, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2019/2019-g20-labour.htmlG20 Labour and Employment Ministers, Towards an Inclusive Future: Shaping the World of Work, Bad Neunahr, 19 May 2017, h

628、ttp:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/170519-labour.htmlG20 Trade Ministers and Digital Economy Ministers, G20 Ministerial Statement on Trade and Digital Economy, Tsubuka, Ibaraki, Japan, 9 June 2019, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2019/2019-g20-trade.html973. The G20s Work on the Digital Economy and the Future

629、of WorkJosh Gold, “The First Ever Global Meeting on Cyber Norms Holds Prom-ise, But Broader Challenges Remain”, in CFR Blog, 30 September 2019, https:/www.cfr.org/blog/first-global-meeting-cyber-normsJosh Gold, “Two Incompatible Approaches to Governing Cyberspace Hin-der Global Consensus”, in Leiden

630、 Security and Global Affairs Blog, 16 May 2019, https:/leidensecurityandglobalaffairs.nl/articles/two-incompatible-approaches-to-governing-cyberspace-hin-der-global-consensusInternational Labour Organization (ILO), APEC Economies Adopt New Cooperation Framework to Address Future of Work Issues, 15 M

631、ay 2017, https:/www.ilo.org/hanoi/Informationresources/Publicinformation/newsitems/WCMS_554070Joint Statement on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace, 23 September 2019, https:/www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-ad-vancing-responsible-state-behavior-in-cyberspaceSteve Lohr, “A.I. Will Tr

632、ansform the Economy. But How Much, and How Soon?”, in The New York Times, 30 November 2017, https:/ Acuerdo de reconocimiento mutuo de firmas digitales en el MERCOSUR, 12 December 2019, https:/www.mercosur.int/?p=11370Microsoft, The Future Computed. Artificial Intelligence and Its Role in Soci-ety,

633、Redmond, Microsoft Corporation, 2018, https:/news.micro- for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Artificial Intelligence in Society, Paris, OECD, 2019, https:/doi.org/10.1787/eedfee77-enOECD, Bridging the Digital Gender Divide. Include, Upskill, Innovate, Paris, OECD, 2018, https:/www.oecd

634、.org/internet/bridging-the-digi-tal-gender-divide.pdfOECD, Key Issues for Digital Transformation in the G20. Report prepared for a joint G20 German Presidency OECD Conference, Paris, OECD, 2017, https:/www.oecd.org/g20/key-issues-for-digital-transfor-mation-in-the-g20.pdf98Paul TwomeyOECD, Measuring

635、 the Digital Transformation: A Roadmap for the Future, Paris, OECD, March 2019, https:/doi.org/10.1787/9789264311992-enSydney Perlotto et al., “Africas Future. Youth and the Data Defining Their Lives”, in AUC Policy Briefs, September 2019, https:/au.int/en/node/37828Allison Peters, “Russia and China

636、 Are Trying to Set the U.N.s Rules on Cyber-crime”, in Foreign Policy, 16 September 2019, http:/bit.ly/2LYwyIzTrade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC), OECD Focus on the Future of Work TUAC Recommendations, 26 October 2018, https:/tuac.org/news/oecd-focus-on-the-future-of-work-tuac-recommen

637、dationsTUAC, OECD Recommendation on Artificial Intelligence Calls for a “Fair Transition” Through Social Dialogue, 22 May 2019, https:/tuac.org/news/oecd-recommendation-on-artificial-intelli-gence-calls-for-a-fair-transition-through-social-dialoguePaul Twomey, Building on the Hamburg Statement and t

638、he G20 Roadmap for Digitalization Towards a G20 Framework for Artificial Intelli-gence in the Workplace, T20 Argentina Policy Brief, 19 June 2018, https:/www.g20-insights.org/?p=7709UN Development Programme (UNDP), The Digital Future of Develop-ment, 12 September 2019, https:/www.undp.org/content/un

639、dp/en/home/news-centre/news/2019/the_digital_future_of_develop-ment.htmlUN General Assembly, Resolution adopted on 16 December 2015: Out-come Document of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes of the World Summit on the Information

640、Society (A/RES/70/125), https:/undocs.org/en/A/RES/70/125UNI Global Union, Top 10 Principles for Workers Data Privacy and Pro-tection, Nyon, 2018, http:/www.thefutureworldofwork.org/docs/10-principles-for-workers-data-rights-and-privacyUS Department of State, Commerce Department to Add Two Dozen Chi

641、nese Companies with Ties to WMD and Military Activities to the Entity List, 22 May 2020, https:/merce.gov/node/2948Shannon Vavra, “The U.N. Passed a Resolution that Gives Russia Greater Influence Over Internet Norms”, in CyberScoop, 18 November 2019, 993. The G20s Work on the Digital Economy and the

642、 Future of Workhttps:/ Vavra, “World Powers Are Pushing to Build Their Own Brand of Cyber Norms”, in CyberScoop, 23 September 2019, https:/ Summer Walker, Cyber-Insecurities? A Guide to the UN Cybercrime Debate, Geneva, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, March 2019, https:/wp.m

643、e/pagYoN-7ak1014.The Challenges of an Ageing SocietyPaola SubacchiThe G20 (Group of Twenty) countries both advanced and developing economies are experiencing an unparalleled shift in their demographic profiles. The world is ageing: the estimated proportion of the 2020 pop-ulation aged 60 years and o

644、ver is significant in many countries, and stands at 13.5 per cent globally. Almost a quarter of the world popula-tion is aged under 15 (24.1 per cent), but the growth pace of this group is slower than that of the over-60s. Between 2010 and 2020, the over-60 age group grew by 37.4 per cent while the

645、under-15 group grew by only 5.7 per cent.1There are significant regional differences. Europe and North America are already demographically mature, with 24.8 per cent of their popula-tions aged 60 years and over, and 16.7 per cent aged under 15 years. In eastern and southern Asia, the proportion of t

646、he populace aged 60 and over (16.6 per cent) is similar to that under 15 (19.4 per cent) while sub-Saharan Africa, and North Africa together with the Middle East have a large share of children (42.3 and 30.4 per cent respectively for the under-15s) against a small share of older people (4.7 and 8.8

647、per cent respectively for the 60-and-over bracket).21 UN Population Division, World Population Prospects 2019, https:/population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population.2 Population estimates for 2020, UN Population Division, World Population Pros-pects 2019, File POP/8-1: Total population (both sex

648、es combined) by broad age group, region, subregion and country, 1950-2100 (thousands), Estimates, 1950-2020, August 2019.102Paola SubacchiThe dramatic transformation of the populations age structure has been driven by changes in mortality first in early life and then in later life. Life expectancy a

649、t birth in developed countries has increased stead-ily from approximately 65 in the mid-1950s to the current 79.3 Even more significantly, life expectancy at 60 has increased; a 60-year old individual residing in a developed country can now expect to live until they are almost 81.4 Between 1950 and

650、2020, the number of over-60 persons more than tripled in the developed world. Within this age cohort, the over-90 group has grown at the strongest pace. There are now almost 12.5 million people aged over 90 in developed countries; in 1950, there were just over 700,000.5Along with changes in mortalit

651、y, there have been significant develop-ments in fertility. The total fertility rate (i.e. live births per woman) dropped worldwide from 4.97 in 1950 to the current 2.47. In developed countries, total fertility rate fell from 2.82 to 1.64, which is below the replacement level. In the least-developed

652、countries, fertility levels have fallen from 6.53 in 1950 to the current 4.00.6 Changes in mortality and life expectancy, coupled with changes in fertility, have resulted in a stronger expansion in the older age group than the younger one. The United Nations (UN) pre-dicts that there will be over 2

653、billion people aged 60 and above worldwide in 2050, and one in five people in developing countries will be aged 60 or over. In ten G20 countries, the aged 60 and over now comprise more than 20 per cent of the total population, outstripping the under-15s (see Table 1). This trend is due to continue,

654、making ageing a critical topic for the G20.3 UN Population Division, World Population Prospects 2019, File MORT/7-1: Life expectancy at birth (both sexes combined) by region, subregion and country, 1950-2100 (years), Estimates, 1950-2020, August 2019. This steady increase has been signif-icant espec

655、ially for women.4 UN Population Division, World Population Prospects 2019, File MORT/13-1: Life expectancy at age 60 (both sexes combined) by region, subregion and country, 1950-2100 (years), Estimates, 1950-2020, August 2019.5 Population estimates for 2020, UN Population Division, World Population

656、Pros-pects 2019, File POP/8-1, cit.6 Population estimates for 2020, United Nations, Population Division, World Pop-ulation Prospects 2019, File FERT/4: Total fertility by region, subregion and country, 1950-2100 (live births per woman), Estimates, 1950 - 2020, August 2019.1034. The Challenges of an

657、Ageing SocietyTable 1 | Demographic transition in G20 countriesG20 countryPopulation (millions)under 15 (millions)60 and over (millions)under 15 as % total60 and over as % totalArgentina45.19611.0447.02124.415.5Australia25.5004.9205.55319.321.8Brazil212.55944.01929.85720.714.0Canada37.7425.9549.3961

658、5.824.9China1,439.324254.930249.77617.717.4France65.27411.52317.52017.726.8Germany83.78411.69323.99114.028.6India1,380.004361.018139.61026.210.1Indonesia273.52470.94127.52425.910.1Italy60.4627.85218.04213.029.8Japan126.47615.74443.41212.434.3Mexico128.93333.31014.49225.811.2Russia145.93426.79732.706

659、18.422.4Saudi Arabia34.8148.5982.03724.75.9South Africa59.30917.0825.06228.88.5South Korea51.2696.43111.87012.523.2Turkey84.33920.19311.02123.913.1United Kingdom67.88612.00016.56817.724.4United States331.00360.81175.71818.422.9Source: UN Population Division, World Population Prospects 2019, Database

660、.We should celebrate the fact that we live longer and are healthier than our predecessors, but there are challenges as well as opportunities in the current demographic transition. A shrinking labour force, a potential decline in productivity, an increased dependency ratio and the growing number of e

661、lderly especially those aged 80 and above change the dynamics of the labour market, threaten economic growth and the sus-tainability of public finances, and affect the impact of conventional mac-roeconomic policies.In this chapter, I examine this demographic transition against the backdrop of the G2

662、0s policy agenda, assessing the existing level of policy cooperation and raising issues that need to be included in the agenda. I start by looking at the state of international cooperation, and then exam-ine what the G20 has done so far and what it has pledged to do in the future. My starting point

663、and, to some extent, the key question of this chapter is whether the interests of the G20 member states vis-vis 104Paola Subacchiageing are truly aligned, given that not all of them are grappling with this transition. Indeed, ageing is prevalent in the advanced economies of the G20 notably, those of

664、 Japan; Italy; France; Germany; Canada; the United Kingdom; and, to a lesser extent, the United States. These coun-tries are members of the G7, yet even within this group there are signifi-cant differences (see Table 1). Figures also show that the middle-income countries are experiencing a much fast

665、er growth rate of their over-60 populations than the low- and high-income ones exacerbating the mid-dle-income “trap”. China, in particular, is ageing rapidly; in late 2019, the State Council launched a national plan to respond to population ageing.1. the state of InternatIonal cooperatIonJapans Pri

666、ority Agenda for the G20 Osaka Summit 2019 ranked the chal-lenges of an ageing society as its sixth priority (out of seven). This was the first time that the G20 had looked at ageing,7 but the theme was not new to the international agenda. The UN General Assembly convened the first World Assembly on

667、 Ageing in 1982, which produced the 62-point Vienna International Plan of Action on Ageing8 that the General Assem-bly adopted and then endorsed in the same year (Resolution 37/51).9 This document the first published by an international organization on the subject provided the basis for the formulat

668、ion of policies and programmes. It identified the areas in which action was needed such as health and nutrition, protection of elderly consumers, housing and environment, family, social welfare, income security and employment, and education and offered 62 policy recommendations based around research

669、, data collection, analysis, and training and education.In 1991, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Principles 7 John Kirton, “Japans Priority Agenda for its G20 Osaka Summit 2019”, in G20 Analysis, 1 December 2018, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/181201-kirton-osa-ka-priorities.html

670、.8 UN website: Ageing, https:/www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/ageing.9 UN General Assembly, Question of Aging, 3 December 1982, https:/undocs.org/en/A/RES/37/51.1054. The Challenges of an Ageing Societyfor Older Persons,10 which listed 18 entitlements aimed at preserving and improving independen

671、ce, participation, care, self-fulfilment and dig-nity. The following year, the International Conference on Ageing met to follow up on the Plan of Action and adopted a Proclamation on Ageing.11 Following the conferences recommendation, the UN General Assembly declared 1999 the International Year of O

672、lder Persons. The International Day of Older Persons is celebrated every year on 1 October.Action on behalf of the elderly progressed in 2002 when the Second World Assembly on Ageing was held in Madrid. Aiming to design inter-national policy on ageing for the 21st century, it adopted a Political Dec

673、-laration and the Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing.12 This document called for changes in attitudes, policies and practices at all levels in order to fulfil the enormous potential of ageing. The documents specific recommendations for action set three priority areas: (1) older persons an

674、d development (in particular, social protection); (2) advanc-ing health and well-being into old age; and (3) ensuring enabling and supportive environments.In 2015, all UN member states adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)13 as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development14 to end

675、poverty, protect the planet and improve the lives and prospects of everyone. Tangentially, this includes ageing by recognizing that devel-opment will only be achievable if it is inclusive of all ages. SDG 10 aims to “ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome”, and pledges to “by 20

676、30, empower and promote the social, economic and 10 UN General Assembly, Implementation of the International Plan of Action on Ageing and Related Activities, 16 December 1991, https:/undocs.org/A/RES/46/91.11 UN General Assembly, Proclamation on Ageing, 16 October 1992, https:/undocs.org/A/RES/47/5.

677、12 United Nations, Political Declaration and Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing. Second World Assembly on Ageing, Madrid, Spain, 8-12 April 2002, New York, United Nations, 2002, https:/www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/Madrid_plan.pdf.13 UN website: About the Sustainable Development Go

678、als, https:/www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/?p=45262.14 UN website: The Sustainable Development Agenda, https:/www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/?p=46650.106Paola Subacchipolitical inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnic-ity, origin, religion or economic or other statu

679、s”.15 Empowering older persons in all dimensions of development including promoting their active participation in social, economic and political life is one way to ensure inclusiveness and reduce inequalities. In 2019, the theme of the International Day of Older Persons16 “The Journey to Age Equalit

680、y” was aligned with SDG 10, and focused on coping with existing and pre-venting future old-age inequalities.These are all commendable initiatives, but they are fragmented and their implementation is difficult to monitor because many countries lack age-disaggregated data. This in turn has led to too

681、much anecdo-tal, descriptive and self-defined information with little evaluation of the relationship between output and policy impact, and a difficulty in comparing countries.17 Greater national capacities are needed in many countries to provide guidelines in assessing progress. Guidance on data col

682、lection, including timescales for reporting, is an area in which coordi-nated action would have a significant impact.2. InItIatIves WIthIn the g20 contextI have already mentioned the fact that the G20 is a relatively latecomer to this issue, with ageing only becoming part of its agenda in 2019 on th

683、e initiative of Japan the G20 member with the highest proportion of over-60s (see Table 1). The two main contributions on ageing to the 2019 G20 agenda came from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), together with the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI), an

684、d the World Health Organization (WHO) health has been on the G20 agenda since 2017. Both contributions focus on empow-ering elderly people through better health care and financial inclusion 15 UN website: Goal 10 Targets, https:/www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/?p=71.16 UN website: International Da

685、y of Older Persons, https:/www.un.org/en/events/olderpersonsday.17 Asghar Zaidi, ”Implementing the Madrid Plan of Action on Ageing: What Have We Learned? And, Where Do We Go from Here?”, in HDialogue blog, 29 January 2018, http:/hdr.undp.org/en/node/2832.1074. The Challenges of an Ageing Societyin o

686、rder to reduce the inequalities in terms of health conditions and financial provisions that are, for many, intrinsic to ageing.In the WHO “Contribution to G20 2019 Presidency on Health-related Issues”,18 the organization recommends that the G20 take up two issues related to public health:1) To call

687、for a Decade of Healthy Ageing and generate a global move-ment with measures that foster healthy and active ageing, and access to affordable good-quality primary health care for conditions such as dementia.2) To call on relevant stakeholders to scale up action on dementia in line with the “Global ac

688、tion plan on the public health response (2017-2025)”, which has been adopted by ten G20 countries, through the imple-mentation of a national dementia strategy.The 2019 G20 Osaka Leaders Declaration draws on the WHO rec-ommendations and commits to “promote healthy and active ageing” and “implement a

689、comprehensive set of policies to address dementia, including promoting sustainable provision of long-term care as well as inclusive societies aiming to improve quality of lives of people with dementia and caregivers”.19In their “G20 Fukuoka Policy Priorities on Aging and Financial Inclu-sion 8 Key S

690、teps to Design a Better Future”20 the GPFI and the OECD identify financial inclusion as a way to empower elderly people; reduce pressures on social security, including the pension system; contain old-age poverty; and improve intergenerational equality. They highlight eight policy measures that the G

691、20 should implement:1. data gathering to assess which policies are working;2. strengthening digital and financial literacy;3. supporting lifetime financial planning;18 World Health Organization, WHO Contribution to G20 2019 Presidency on Health-Re-lated Issues, Geneva, 12 February 2019, https:/www.w

692、ho.int/ageing/g20-feb-2019.pdf.19 G20, G20 Osaka Leaders Declaration, Osaka, 29 June 2019, point 31, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2019/2019-g20-osaka-leaders-declaration.html.20 Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) and OECD, G20 Fukuoka Policy Priorities on Aging and Financial Inclusion -

693、8 Key Steps to Design a Better Future, 2020, https:/www.gpfi.org/node/1221.108Paola Subacchi4. identifying and addressing the diverse needs of older people there isnt one “size” that fits all;5. innovating and harnessing inclusive technologies;6. tackling financial abuse and fraud perpetrated on old

694、er people;7. encouraging stakeholder engagement; and8. targeting key audiences and addressing vulnerabilities.The Osaka Leaders Declaration has taken on board the G20 Fukuoka Pol-icy Priorities on Aging and Financial Inclusion in order “to strengthen finan-cial inclusion in the aging society”, recog

695、nizing that “demographic changes, including population aging, pose challenges and opportunities for all G20 members, and that these changes will require policy actions that span fis-cal, monetary, financial, labour market and other structural policies”.21These commitments are good steps in the right

696、 direction but over-all, they are too generic and lack depth. Even the recommendations offered by the WHO Contribution and the G20 Fukuoka Policy Priorities are short of practical and measurable goals. Furthermore, they address some aspects of ageing without framing the issue against a wider pol-icy

697、 context. For instance, the Fukuoka Policy Priorities do not recognize that existing constraints, such as historically low interest rates and the falling individual-savings rate, could undermine financial sustainability and independence for many old people in the years to come.3. ageIng: an agenda f

698、or the g20So far at the G20 level, the response to ageing has been patchy mainly focusing on health and welfare. What is missing is a coordinated macro-economic approach that brings together fiscal sustainability with mon-etary policy and structural reforms. At their meeting in Fukuoka in June 2019,

699、 the G20 finance ministers and central-bank governors acknowl-edged the need for such a coordinated approach. Their communique22 21 G20, G20 Osaka Leaders Declaration, cit.22 G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Communiqu, Fukuoka, Japan, 9 June 2019, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2019/2019

700、-g20-finance-fukuoka.html.1094. The Challenges of an Ageing Societyrecognized that ageing requires a combination of fiscal, monetary, finan-cial and structural policies in the following policy areas:(1) productivity and growth; (2) public spending; (3) tax; (4) mone-tary policy; (5) financial instit

701、utions; (6) cross-border capital flows; and (7) migration.This means, in practice, investing in education and skill formation, enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending, rede-signing the tax system to tackle old-age inequality, assessing the links between ageing and monetary poli

702、cy, and considering immigration pol-icies and the movement of critical workers in relation to population age-ing. These points should provide a framework for the G20 to discuss and address ageing.There are a number of steps that the G20 can put in place in order to develop such a policy framework. A

703、bove all, it should create a new work-ing group on ageing to bring together what has been done so far at the international level and to take a fresh look at the challenges of an ageing population. This working group should address the following items: Improvements in data collection and better defin

704、itions. For example, from a health-care perspective there are significant differences within the broad group of over-65s, and these differences need to be taken into account for the sustainability of social-security sys-tems. Health conditions set limits to how long we can extend the working life a

705、key point in any discussion about pension-system reforms. Survey figures show that health conditions play a sig-nificant role in individuals decisions to stay in paid employment after they reach state-pension age. Still-active individuals tend to concentrate in the “younger” end of the over-65 group

706、: only a small minority (4 per cent of men and 2 per cent of women) are still in work past 75 years of age. Rethink the economic contribution of “active” retirees. In many G20 member states, active and healthy retirees roughly in the age group 6574 contribute to the domestic economy by providing chi

707、ld-care and, increasingly, care for their very old parents. Calculating the contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) of this domestic work would help in reassessing the economic burden of population ageing. Set against the context of the unpaid contribution of many 110Paola Subacchielderly peopl

708、e, the dependency ratio which is crudely calculated as non-working-age individuals compared with working-age ones becomes less precise in assessing the economic burden of ageing. Consider the distributional effects of the reform of pension systems, and prevent old-age poverty. To address the issue o

709、f reducing the economic burden of ageing and maintaining fiscal sustainability, countries have reformed or are reforming their pension systems, mainly via a mandatory increase in the retirement age and a reduction of pension benefits for example, by modifying bene-fit-calculation formulas such as th

710、e inflation-indexation compo-nent. Recognizing that many retirees contribute to the domestic economy, as discussed in the previous point, could be the start-ing point of a discussion about how retirees with limited pension benefits especially women could earn a minimum wage. Preserve intergeneration

711、al equity. Intergenerational differences in income growth, especially post-global-financial crisis (and, most likely, post-pandemic too), inevitably reflect on savings and thus on the accumulation of assets notably, houses. Individu-als financial debt decreases with age. Most of it, such as student

712、debt, is accumulated early in life. As a result, individuals and households find it difficult to save; according to surveys, about 55 per cent of people interviewed indicate low income as the main reason for not contributing towards a pension. The younger gen-erations “constrained” saving capacity r

713、eflects on wealth accu-mulation, with the result that intergenerational inequality in the distribution of wealth has widened.23 For instance, using home ownership as a proxy for wealth, in the UK nearly three-quarters of pensioners live in homes that are owned outright (compared to roughly 1 in 5 of

714、 the working-age population). Saving towards retirement during their working life is critical for many people to avoid old-age poverty. But falling savings rates among the 23 David Amaglobeli et al., “The Future of Saving: The Role of Pension System Design in an Aging World”, in IMF Staff Discussion

715、 Notes, No. 19/01 (January 2019), https:/www.imf.org/media/Files/Publications/SDN/2019/SDN1901.ashx.1114. The Challenges of an Ageing Societyyounger generations mean that even countries that successfully manage public expenditure on pensions risk not having finan-cially self-sufficient pensioners. T

716、ake a long-term view on the impact of ageing on fiscal sustainabil-ity, and link it to income/wealth inequalities. Todays young people grappling with low wages, precarious jobs, high housing costs and no savings are tomorrows “squeezed” pensioners. Falling relative income levels and ageing will cont

717、inue to put pressure on public spending, despite the savings achieved through various pension reforms. Policy action should focus on helping low-to-me-dium-income households to save more for retirement, especially in countries with mixed private and public systems, in order to ensure that future pen

718、sioners wont face poverty in retirement. Consider the impact of historically low interest rates on pension-sys-tems sustainability. Preserving intergenerational equity may become increasingly difficult under current monetary-policy con-ditions. Low interest rates increase the liabilities of defined-

719、ben-efits pension schemes pay-as-you-go as well as private and reduce the income from defined-contributions pension schemes. At the same time, population ageing may continue to depress real interest rates, limiting the policy space for monetary policy; undermining the profitability of financial inst

720、itutions; and, ulti-mately, threatening global financial stability.24conclusIonThe international policy debate is still grappling with the complexity of ageing and the long-term implications of the current demographic transi-tion. Many policy areas have not been sufficiently explored such as, for ex

721、ample, the impacts of intergenerational inequality and the falling sav-ings rate on the financial independence of future pensioners. A broader 24 IMF, Global Financial Stability Report: Lower for Longer, October 2019,https:/www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2019/10/01/global-financial-stabilit

722、y-report-october-2019.112Paola Subacchimacroeconomic approach to ageing is needed that brings together fiscal, monetary and structural policies.Despite current divergences, the G20 countries, with a few possible exceptions, are facing or will soon be facing the challenges of ageing. Thus, this is a

723、policy area in which efforts must be coordinated. In addi-tion, unlike other policy areas such as, for example, climate change and the green economy ageing is rather uncontroversial, and so it should be relatively easy for the Italian presidency to gather support and ensure consensus around policy o

724、bjectives. Of course, the challenges of age-ing being a long-term issue, becoming more acute in the next decade or so, the Covid-19 emergency might result in crowding out such long-term issues and focusing the G20 action on short-term crisis-resolution measures. But this would be a mistake. Apart fr

725、om locking the G20 into a perennial crisis-resolution mode with the implication of rendering it ineffective during normal times the differential impact of Covid-19 by age group and the overall impact on health care, welfare and social pol-icies display some significant overlapping with the effects o

726、f ageing. In particular, the Italian presidency should concentrate on the implications of Covid-19-driven fiscal policy and monetary policy for an ageing pop-ulation. As monetary policy has become even more extreme as a result of the pandemic, and fiscal policy more stretched, the challenges of an a

727、geing population are going to be even more pressing.There are lessons and good practices that can be shared, as well as scope for coordination. Thus, it would be advisable for the G20 to establish a working group on ageing in order to bring together exper-tise in different policy areas from health a

728、nd health care to data gath-ering and macroeconomic policies and to coordinate policy action. Planning ahead and creating resilience should be the objectives of such a group, with clearly measurable and implementable policy measures. As ageing is a known trend, we should prepare and mitigate its imp

729、act, and contain the risks.1134. The Challenges of an Ageing SocietyreferencesDavid Amaglobeli et al., “The Future of Saving: The Role of Pension Sys-tem Design in an Aging World”, in IMF Staff Discussion Notes, No. 19/01 (January 2019), https:/www.imf.org/media/Files/Publi-cations/SDN/2019/SDN1901.

730、ashxG20, G20 Osaka Leaders Declaration, Osaka, 29 June 2019, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2019/2019-g20-osaka-leaders-declaration.htmlG20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Communiqu, Fuku-oka, Japan, 9 June 2019, http:/www.g20.utoronto.ca/2019/2019-g20-finance-fukuoka.htmlGlobal Partnership

731、 for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) and OECD, G20 Fuku-oka Policy Priorities on Aging and Financial Inclusion - 8 Key Steps to Design a Better Future, 2020, https:/www.gpfi.org/node/1221International Monetary Fund (IMF), Global Financial Stabil-ity Report: Lower for Longer, October 2019, https:/www.imf.

732、org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2019/10/01/global-financial-stability-report-october-2019United Nations, Political Declaration and Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing. Second World Assembly on Ageing, Madrid, Spain, 8-12 April 2002, New York, United Nations, 2002, https:/www.un.org/en/even

733、ts/pastevents/pdfs/Madrid_plan.pdfUN General Assembly, Implementation of the International Plan of Action on Ageing and Related Activities, 16 December 1991, https:/undocs.org/A/RES/46/91UN General Assembly, Proclamation on Ageing, 16 October 1992, https:/undocs.org/A/RES/47/5UN General Assembly, Qu

734、estion of Aging, 3 December 1982, https:/undocs.org/en/A/RES/37/51World Health Organization, WHO Contribution to G20 2019 Presidency on Health-Related Issues, Geneva, 12 February 2019, https:/www.who.int/ageing/g20-feb-2019.pdfAsghar Zaidi, ”Implementing the Madrid Plan of Action on Ageing: What Hav

735、e We Learned? And, Where Do We Go from Here?”, in HDialogue blog, 29 January 2018, http:/hdr.undp.org/en/node/28321155.The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular EconomyMartin Charter and Ichin Cheng*A transition towards a more resource-efficient and circular economy (CE) has earned g

736、rowing political attention across the globe. The CE con-cept is increasingly viewed as a central component in the worlds pursuit of new models for sustainable, “green” and resilient growth. Building greater social, environmental and economic resilience in a post-pan-demic world is now a central topi

737、c of discussion among policy-makers and commentators globally. Several countries in Europe and Asia have adopted CE strategies, and momentum is also growing elsewhere for instance, in Canada.1 CE measures are now a core component of both the * The authors thank and acknowledge the valuable and insig

738、htful comments made by the following individuals: Michael Bennett, Policy Officer for Circular Economy & Ecodesign at the European Commission DG GROW; Laurent Bontoux, Foresight Specialist/Senior Pol-icy Analyst at the European Commission Joint Research Centre; Augusta Maria Paci, Tech-nology Direct

739、or at the Italian National Research Council; Nick Robins, Professor in Practice for Sustainable Finance at the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics, Co-Director of Inquiry into the Design of a Sus-tainable Financial System, United Nations Envi

740、ronment Programme (UNEP); Walter Stahel, Founder-Director of the Product-Life Institute, Geneva; David Wheeler, Co-Founder of the Academy for Sustainable Innovation, Canada. The arguments expressed in this report are solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of any othe

741、r party. All reasonable measures have been taken to ensure the quality, reliability, and accuracy of the information in this report. This report is intended to provide information and general guidance only. Any decisions made based on the information and guidance in this report are the readers respo

742、nsibility.116Martin Charter and Ichin ChengEurope Unions (EUs) 2050 long-term strategy to achieve a climate-neutral Europe and Chinas current Five Year Plan. Japan, as a global front-runner in the development of CE, included it as a priority at the Group of Twenty summit during its G20 presidency in

743、 2019.2 The Italian Government has decided to explore CE as one of the main priorities for international cooper-ation during Italys upcoming G20 presidency, in 2021.CE is an ambitious paradigm that stems from concerns about such issues as the efficient use of resources, waste management, material re

744、cycling and an environment-friendly transformation of business models. As such, it aims to complement and integrate with the social, economic, educational and health objectives identified by international organizations, including the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Develop-ment Goals (SDGs). CE is n

745、ot a wholly new concept; it blends the princi-ples underlying many schools of thought, including resource efficiency. The transition to a CE at global, regional, national and local levels would benefit from the development of common standards e.g. CE terms and definitions. A global, multi-stakeholde

746、r consensus would help to pro-gress the development of circular business models, products, technolo-gies and services; allow the creation of “bridges” to broader social and economic goals; and potentially unleash more funding opportunities.Four key benefits of a transition to a CE are commonly refer

747、red to in the literature: (1) reduced extraction of virgin natural resources; (2) reduced exposure to (geopolitical) supply risk(s); (3) reduced environ-mental pressures; and (4) new economic opportunities.3US management consulting firm McKinsey has predicted that by 2030, adopting CE principles wil

748、l generate a net economic benefit of 1.8 trillion euro in Europe as well as substantial environmental and social 1 Canada Government website: Circular Economy, 2 December 2019, https:/www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/news/2019/12/circular-economy.html.2 Felix Preston, Johanna Lehne and La

749、ura Wellesley, “An Inclusive Circular Econ-omy: Priorities for Developing Countries”, in Chatham House Research Papers, May 2019, https:/www.chathamhouse.org/node/39058.3 Andrew McCarthy, Rob Dellink and Ruben Bibas, “The Macroeconomics of the Circular Economy Transition. A Critical Review of Modell

750、ing Approaches”, in OECD Envi-ronment Working Papers, No. 130 (16 April 2018), https:/doi.org/10.1787/19970900.1175. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular Economybenefits.4 Dublin-based professional-services company Accenture has forecast that CE could generate 4.5 trillion US do

751、llars of additional eco-nomic output globally by 2030.5In order to facilitate the transition towards CE at a global level, supra-national institutions and national governments will need to explore more deeply the policy implications of the CE paradigm and its poten-tial synergies with other policy o

752、bjectives. This includes its relationship with any post-pandemic recovery, and the continuing need to ensure economic competitiveness in a world in which labour-market changes are increasingly driven by digital technology, automation and artificial intelligence.The G20 is a forum focused on advancin

753、g international cooperation and coordination among 20 major developed and emerging-market coun-tries. It accounts for more than two thirds of global material resource use,6 and has, on average, higher growth rates for material use than the rest of the world. Based on current trends, the amount of ma

754、terial used in G20 countries is expected to increase from 65.4 billion tonnes in 2015 to 142.2 billion tonnes by 2050.7 Global material use has tripled in the past few decades, and in the absence of specific measures to counter such a trend it is expected to further double by 2060.84 Ellen MacArthur

755、 Foundation, Deutsche Post Foundation and McKinsey Center for Business and Environment, Growth Within: A Circular Economy Vision for a Com-petitive Europe, June 2015, https:/www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/publications/growth-within-a-circular-economy-vision-for-a-competitive-europe.5 Peter Lacy an

756、d Jakob Rutqvist, Waste to Wealth. The Circular Economy Advantage, Basingstoke/New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.6 Material resources include biomass (like crops for food, energy and bio- based materials, as well as wood for energy and industrial uses), metals (such as iron, alu-minium and copper u

757、sed in construction and electronics manufacturing), non-metallic minerals (used for construction, notably sand, gravel and limestone), and fossil fuels (in particular coal, gas and oil for energy).7 International Resource Panel (IRP), Resource Efficiency for Sustainable Develop-ment: Key Messages fo

758、r the Group of 20, Paris, UN Environment Programme (UNEP), 2018, http:/ European Commission, A New Circular Economy Action Plan (Ares/2019/7907872), 23 December 2019, https:/eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=pi_com:Ares(2019)7907872.118Martin Charter and Ichin ChengIncreased material use w

759、ill also have an impact on climate change. According to the International Resource Panel (IRP), resource-efficiency approaches could reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions by 60 per cent by 2050.9 Transitioning towards CE has enormous potential to reduce CO2 emissions and to mitigate the impact of

760、 climate change. It would entail the eventual elimination of the linear conversion of hydro-carbons to CO2 and its replacement with enhanced energy-efficiency, bio-energy and carbon capture, utilization and storage technologies,10 and more circular strategies.Unlike the traditional linear “take-make

761、-consume-throw away” model of consumption and production, the CE model aims to achieve sustainable growth by retaining value in products, materials and com-ponents for as long as possible in economic and social systems.11“Designing for the CE” thus requires shifting focus from waste man-agement and

762、resource recovery to the objective of “closing the loop” in both biological and technical cycles (Appendix B). A circular economy is one in which products, materials and components are better designed and better maintained and are repaired, reused, refurbished, remanu-factured and finally recycled r

763、ather than being thrown away.CE policy initiatives to close, extend and narrow material loops are largely initiated at national level (see Table 1, below).12 For instance, Extended producer responsibility (EPR) schemes, landfill taxes and industrial partnerships to encourage ecodesign are generally

764、imple-9 Paul Ekins et al., Resource Efficiency: Potential and Economic Implications, Paris, UN Environment Programme (UNEP), March 2017, http:/ The position of the authors is that CE must be seen as vital component and enabler of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and notes t

765、hat CE links directly to several of the individual Sustainable Development Goals. For the purposes of this paper, direct discussion over energy is taken to be outside of the scope of CE.11 Martin Charter (ed.), Designing for the Circular Economy, London/New York, Rou-tledge, 2018.12 Green Growth Kno

766、wledge Platform (GGKP), “Can International Trade Increase Resource Efficiency?”, in GGKP Webinars, 8 December 2015, https:/www.greengrowth-knowledge.org/node/141517.1195. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular Economymented within national jurisdictions.13 Greater focus is therefo

767、re needed in specific areas in order to enable a global transition to CE: interna-tional cooperation, global governance, trade, supply/value chains, stand-ardization, of products/processes and economic incentives e.g. taxes on virgin raw materials and investment frameworks.This chapter focuses on th

768、e “state of the art” in CE, international coop-eration and policy-making and highlights major global actors, stake-holders and initiatives related to CE. Some issues are explored from a macroeconomic perspective, some from a regional one and some at the level of organizations and products. It also o

769、ffers recommendations to enhance the role of the G20 in promoting the transition to CE through short-term and medium-term actions as well as initiatives aimed at longer-term systemic change.Table 1 | Selected policy instruments used by developed countries to drive CETypePolicyExampleEconomic instrum

770、entsLandfill taxationLandfill tax in Denmark, the Netherlands and the UKCarbon taxCarbon tax in the Netherlands, Norway and SwedenContainer deposit legislationAB Svenska Returpak in SwedenInfrastructure investmentUK Recycling and Waste LP fund for smaller-scale recyclingDifferentiated VAT rateReduce

771、d VAT rates in China for secondary raw materialsInformation-basedLabellingEU Ecolabel; Der Grne Punkt in GermanyPublic education programmesEU public information campaign on environmental damage caused by plastic wasteSkills and trainingScotland Skills Investment PlanEcodesignExtended producer respon

772、sibility (EPR)India 2016 E-Waste Management Rules; Canada-wide Action Plan for Extended Producer ResponsibilityEcodesign requirements: durability, repairability, recyclabilityEUs Eco-Design Directive13 OECD, Extended Producer Responsibility. Updated Guidance for Efficient Waste Management, Paris, OE

773、CD , 2016, https:/doi.org/10.1787/9789264256385-en.120Martin Charter and Ichin ChengOther regulationsWaste prevention standardBS 8001: 2017 a framework standard for implementing the CE in organizationsVoluntary agreementsEuropean PVC industry voluntary agreement; WRAPs Courtauld Commitment to reduci

774、ng private-sector food wasteWaste shipments: proper enforcementUK Transfrontier Shipment of Waste RegulationsPublic procurement and innovationGreen public procurementDutch governments Green DealTargeted public R&DEU Circular Economy Finance Support Platform; EU InnovFin, backed by Horizon 2020; Inno

775、vate UKPilot zonesCE industrial parks in China; eco-industrial parks in ScandinaviaSource: Felix Preston, Johanna Lehne and Laura Wellesley, “An Inclusive Circular Economy: Priorities for Developing Countries”, cit., p. 41.1. the Impact of covId-19The Covid-19 pandemic is causing profound transforma

776、tions world-wide. The coronavirus has disrupted global supply chains, creating major challenges in sourcing products, components and raw materials from countries around the world. Arguably, itis also fuelling a backlash against globalization.14While the pandemic is still unfolding daily as this chap

777、ter is writ-ten, its global economic, social and environmental impact has not fully emerged and it is important to learn lessons in real time rather than to wait until the end of the crisis. As Covid-19 has shown, our challenges are increasingly global in nature and require systemic solutions at a g

778、lobal level. The decisions that we make now to tackle this threat will affect us for generations to come. The present crisis has also illustrated the worldwide challenges that we face in developing solutions to halt global warming15 and transitioning to a CE. As emphasized by European 14 Peter S. Go

779、odman, “A Global Outbreak Is Fueling the Backlash to Globalization”, in The New York Times, 5 March 2020, https:/ Christiana Figueres and Tom Rivett-Carnac, “Our Approach to Covid-19 Can Also Help Tackle Climate Change”, in New Scientist, No. 3276 (4 April 2020), https:/ The G20: Accelerating the Tr

780、ansition to a Global Circular EconomyCommission President Ursula von der Leyen, the “circular economy will make us less dependent and boost our resilience”. She signalled that sus-tainability had been elevated to a top security priority, after the viral outbreak exposed the EUs vulnerability vis-vis

781、 global supply chains.16The epidemic may, in particular, have the following eventual impacts:1) The world might move from a globalized economy to one based on regional “bloc economies” centred around the EU; North America; Asia; and, in the longer term, Africa. This major potential shift will have p

782、ro-found implications for the global economy and for the transition towards CE. In particular, with more production migrating back to individual countries (so-called “re-shoring” in opposition to the hitherto more common offshoring), there may be more opportunities to design “closed loop” models bas

783、ed on increased national and localized consumption and production.2) The world is moving away from reliance on China as a major manu-facturing hub. Some companies are accelerating the re-shoring of manu-facturing activities from China in order to shorten global supply chains.17 Such actions, which a

784、lso reflect growing protectionist drives, reduce the business risks associated with global supply chains that have been exposed by Covid-19. They have therefore come to be seen as a way to increase resilience in case of further economic shocks.3) Recent commitments to ban single-use plastics might r

785、emain unmet in the short term for hygiene reasons.18 Citizens around the globe 16 Ewa Krukowska and Nikos Chrysoloras , “Europe Signals Pandemic Made Green Agenda Top Security Priority”, in Bloomberg, 16 April 2020, https:/ For example, on the same day that Japan announced that it would spend upward

786、s of 2.2 billion US dollars to get its corporations out of China and either back to Japan or spread throughout southeast Asia, White House National Economic Coun-cil Director Larry Kudlow said the US should “pay the moving costs” of every Amer-ican company that wants to move out of China in the earl

787、y of April of 2020. Kenneth Rapoza, “Kudlow: Pay the Moving Costs of American Companies Leaving China”, in Forbes, 10 April 2020, https:/ Starbucks announced in March 2020 that it would be temporarily paus-ing the use of ceramic mugs amid the Covid-19 outbreak, with all drinks being 122Martin Charte

788、r and Ichin Chengare now increasingly taking precautions to increase domestic hygiene amid the pandemic, like wearing single-use disposable gloves or masks in public. This may lead to increased marine litter in a number of coun-tries.19 The likely resulting increase in hazardous waste calls for meas

789、-ures that can ensure damage limitation and mitigation.202. conceptual and defInItIonal IssuesUnlike the “traditional”, linear economic model used since the Industrial Revolution and based on a “take-make-consume-throw away” pattern of consumption and production, the CE model aims to achieve environ

790、men-tally and economically sustainable growth by retaining value in prod-ucts, materials and components for as long as possible in economic and social systems.21 CE means moving away from the generation of waste and the recovery of materials towards “closing the loop” in both biolog-ical and technic

791、al cycles. Those materials can then be fed back into new rounds of manufacturing or different cycles of reuse, and reutilized com-ponents can be incorporated in new products (e.g. reused plastic bump-ers in some heavy-goods vehicles).Many definitions of CE are used worldwide, and there is a lack of

792、con-sensus over the term.22 In addition, there are numerous terms associ-ated with CE whose usage differs widely. The authors involvement in the core team of BS8001:2017,23 for example, identified confusion over spe-served in disposable cups for the time being in the US and Canada, Victoria For-ster

793、, “Starbucks Wont Fill Your Reusable Cup Anymore Over Coronavirus Fears”, in Forbes, 4 March 2020, https:/ Kelly McCarthy, “Single-Use Plastic Gloves Seem Like a Good Idea During Corona-virus, But Heres the Problem”, in ABC News, 7 April 2020, https:/abcn.ws/2JJWBmg.20 Ibid.21 Martin Charter (ed.),

794、Designing for the Circular Economy, cit.22 Ibid.; Julian Kirchherr, Denise Reike and Marko Hekkert, “Conceptualiz-ing the Circular Economy: An Analysis of 114 Definitions”, in Resources, Conserva-tion and Recycling, Vol. 127 (December 2017), p. 221-232, https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2017.09.005

795、.23 British Standards Institution (BSI), Framework for Implementing the Principles of 1235. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular Economycific CE-related terms such as “upcycling” and “remanufacturing”. This lack of standardization has now been recognized by the International Org

796、anization for Standardization (ISO), which has set up a new technical committee, TC323, that is progressing the development of four stand-ards including one covering terms and definitions.As indicated above, the discussion, which has thus far concentrated on the problem of waste, is now starting to

797、address the problem of value e.g. how to retain value in products, materials and components for as long as possible in economic and social systems.24 However, at present, most of the worlds focus is still primarily on narrower, “downstream” issues such as waste management and materials recycling. Po

798、licy, stand-ards and government initiatives will increasingly set their sights higher up the value chain, concentrating on the ecodesign of new products and the repair, reuse, refurbishment and remanufacture of existing products that are already in use.Today, the implementation of comprehensive appr

799、oaches to CE is still very limited. To accelerate the transition to global CE and a circular soci-ety, the long-standing environmental imperative of the 3 Rs Reduce, Reuse, Recycle will need to be extended towards a large spectrum of objectives (see the 12 “Rs in Appendix A).253. ce plans launched b

800、y the eu and natIonal governments around the WorldAs stated above, policy action that aims to close, extend or narrow mate-rial loops is commonly considered at the national level.26 For instance, EPR schemes, landfill taxes and ecodesign policies are generally imple-mented within national jurisdicti

801、ons. More broadly, waste management and materials recovery are also taken forward at a national level, and the Circular Economy in Organizations. Guide, London, BSI, May 2017.24 Martin Charter (ed.), Designing for the Circular Economy, cit.25 Ichin Cheng, “Why Asia Matters: Circular Economy in Japan

802、, China and Taiwan”, in Martin Charter (ed.), Designing for the Circular Economy, London/New York, Rout-ledge, 2018.26 GGKP, “Can International Trade Increase Resource Efficiency?”, cit.124Martin Charter and Ichin ChengCE initiatives are largely enacted through national policies.27 The con-cept of C

803、E is taking root around the world especially in Europe and Asia28 and there are numerous examples of CE action undertaken by G20 countries (see Appendix B). Europe, in particular, is at the forefront in promoting the CE agenda globally. The European Commissions Cir-cular Economy Action Plan (CEAP) p

804、olicy package was passed in 2015, and a great deal of progress has since been published. In March 2020, the Commission published a new action plan, CEAP 2.0,29 that highlighted various initiatives to support a global transition to CE. For example, the European Plastics Strategy aims at an internatio

805、nal agreement on plas-tics and promotes the uptake of the EUs CE approach on plastics. The Commission has proposed a Global Circular Economy Alliance in order to identify knowledge and governance gaps that hinder the advancement of a global CE and to build partnerships with other major economies, in

806、cluding those of China and African countries. Under CEAP 2.0, the Commission has also started discussions on an international agreement on the management of natural resources, and is working to ensure that free-trade agreements and the International Platform on Sustainable Finance reflect the enhanc

807、ed objectives of the CE. One of the actions of CEAP in 2015 was to develop a mandate for CEN/CENELC (the Euro-pean Committee for Standardization and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization) to incorporate CE aspects into ener-gy-related products. Standards related to critical raw

808、 materials (CRMs), repair, reuse, durability and remanufacturing have now been published.30In parallel with Commission developments, several EU member states such as Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Spain, France and Ger-27 OECD, Extended Producer Responsibility. Updated Guidance for Effici

809、ent Waste Management, cit.28 Ibid.29 European Commission, A New Circular Economy Action Plan. For a Cleaner and More Competitive Europe (COM/2020/98), 11 March 2020, https:/eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0098.30 European Environmental Citizens Organisation for Standardisati

810、on (ECOS), M/543 Series of Horizontal Standards on Material Efficiency Soon to Be Finalised, 20 Janu-ary 2020, https:/ecostandard.org/?p=2744.1255. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular Economymany have developed proactive CE policies at the national or regional level. In 2016, t

811、he Dutch Government set a dual objective at national level: reduce the use of virgin raw materials by 50 per cent by 2030 and become a “100% circular economy” by 2050. Sweden and Austria have blazed a trail by putting in place new policy instruments e.g. tax reduc-tions to incentivize product repair

812、. In France, a “Roadmap for the CE” 50 measures for a “100% Circular Economy” has been launched; and Germany has undertaken a Resource Efficient Programme for the sus-tainable use and conservation of natural resources.In 2017, Italy established a national strategic framework to increase circularity

813、in the Italian economy. It calls for a “change of paradigm” and a new way in which to consume, produce and do business.31 The coun-trys national strategy is based on an action plan that includes various CE demonstration projects aimed at promoting the regenerative bioec-onomy, improving the use of e

814、conomic tools, implementing public pro-curement and e-commerce.32 The Italian Government has also identified international cooperation in the CE field as one of the main priorities of its G20 presidency in 2021.The United Kingdom (UK) has not explicitly used the term “circular economy” in its policy

815、. In Britain, the Waste and Resource Action Pro-gramme (WRAP) was established in 2010 to promote sustainable waste management and fund a significant number of CE-related projects.33 The United States (US) has also not used the term CE. It has adopted the Sus-tainable Materials Management (SMM) appro

816、ach, which aims at a more productive use of materials throughout their life span.A group of Asian countries is setting up CE strategies focused on 31 Italian Ministry for the Environment and Ministry of Economic Development, Towards a Model of Circular Economy for Italy. Overview and Strategic Frame

817、work, November 2017, http:/consultazione-economiacircolare.minambiente.it/node/21.32 Circular Economy Network (CEN) and ENEA, Report on Circular Economy in Italy 2019. 10 Proposals and Research Summary, April 2019, https:/circulareconomy.europa.eu/platform/en/node/2298.33 Italian Ministry for the En

818、vironment and Ministry of Economic Development, Towards a Model of Circular Economy for Italy, cit.126Martin Charter and Ichin Chengmanaging waste, and is implementing the 3 “R” principles.34Japan has proved to be the global front-runner in the development of CE. Its strat-egy is based on a comprehe

819、nsive long-term legislative framework aim-ing towards a circular society. At the turn of the Millennium, the country announced that the year 2000 was to be “the first year of Japanese Cir-cular Society”, and a Fundamental Law for Sound Material-Cycle Society (MCS) was passed in 2001. This approach w

820、as underpinned by legisla-tion related to resource efficiency, waste and several sector-specific ini-tiatives. As a result, Japan had, by 2014, implemented advanced materi-als-recycling systems35 with 98 per cent of metals recycled and 7489 per cent of the materials from home appliances recovered.36

821、 In compar-ison, the EU had a 32.2 per cent e-waste recycling rate in 2015.37 Japan also holds the highest number of patents related to CE technologies glob-ally (28 per cent). Strategically, 2018 was an important year for Japan as it moved into the third phase of its strategy towards a circular soc

822、iety and, in the same year, it also hosted the World Circular Economy Forum.China provides another long-term example. The Chinese Government aims to address environmental problems in parallel with maintaining economic growth. The Peoples Republics Circular Economy Promotion Law came into force in 20

823、08, and it is now promoting CE as a national strategy focused on the greening of its industry and the reduction of waste. CE has become one of the key national policies with which to build Chinas “Ecological Civilization”, guided by the countrys 12th (201115) and 13th (201620) Five Year Plans, and t

824、he Made in China 2025 Strategy.38India has not adopted CE terminology, but the Indian Resource Effi-ciency (InRE) strategy released by the Indian Resource Panel (InRP) in 34 Ichin Cheng, “Why Asia Matters: Circular Economy in Japan, China and Taiwan”, cit.35 Ibid.36 H. Itoh, “The Recent Trend of E-w

825、aste Recycling and Rare Metal Recovery in Japan”, in WIT Transactions on Ecology and the Environment, Vol 180 (2014), https:/doi.org/10.2495/WM140011.37 De Groene Zaak, Governments Going Circular. A Global Scan, Dutch Sustainability Business Association, February 2015, http:/ Ichin Cheng, “Why Asia

826、Matters: Circular Economy in Japan, China and Taiwan”, cit.1275. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular Economy2017 detailed the way in which CE approaches such as recycling, reuse, repair and remanufacture could support improvements in resource effi-ciency. The InRE strategy iden

827、tifies numerous opportunities associated with a more resource-efficient economy, including the development of industries focused on reprocessing waste (e.g. the reuse of construc-tion and demolition waste in new building products) and job creation in green product certification, eco-labelling and gr

828、een marketing.394. ce polIcy InstrumentsExperience from advanced CE countries suggests that many different policies can be used to support the implementation of CE (see Table 1).40 A variety of actions can thus facilitate the transition. Key CE pol-icy-instrument areas include economic instruments,

829、information-based policy, regulations and public procurement. Developed countries have introduced financial incentives such as reduced value-added tax (VAT) on repaired products, as well as EPR policies and labelling schemes to help consumers choose more “circular” products. Other examples include e

830、conomic instruments like landfill taxes in Denmark, the Neth-erlands and the UK. An independent, evidence-based study completed for the European Commission covering product policy and CE highlights a number of demand- and supply-side policy recommendations.Some of the measures enacted in developed c

831、ountries have been adopted and/or are now being considered in emerging and developing nations. For example, China, Colombia, India, Nigeria, Thailand, Indone-sia and the Philippines are considering adopting EPR schemes for the management of plastic waste.4139 Felix Preston, Johanna Lehne and Laura W

832、ellesley, “An Inclusive Circular Econ-omy: Priorities for Developing Countries”,cit.40 Ibid.41 Ludwig O. Federigan, “An Extended Producer Responsibility Policy for PH”, in The Manila Times, 19 July 2018, https:/ and Basten Gokkon, “Indonesia leans on businesses to do more about plastic waste”, in Mo

833、ngabay, 12 November 2018, https:/ Charter and Ichin ChengCE measures, including new waste and recycling laws, are expected to account for “half of the EUs effort to achieve net-zero carbon emis-sions by 2050. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has recently stated that CE is “the numb

834、er one priority” of the European Green Deal.42Under the aegis of the European Green Deal, the Commission has, as stated above, recently published the CEAP 2.0 to accelerate the tran-sition towards a CE in Europe. The CEAP 2.0 was published in March 2020 together with the EUs New Industrial Strategy

835、in order to mobilize industrial sectors and value chains towards a model of sustainable and inclusive growth, ensuring resource-efficient and clean resource cycles.Over the past three years, the issue of plastics has become a high political priority in many G20 member countries. A ministerial decla-

836、ration issued at the UN Environment Assembly in 2019 aimed at “sig-nificantly reducing single use plastics by 2030”. In addition, the Inter-national Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted an action plan to target plastic litter from ships.43G20 global CE initiatives should focus on actions with the gre

837、atest possible impact in increasing sustainable resource use. In the context of globalized value and supply chains, the use of a sector-based approach is likely to be a useful strategyfor developed and developing countries alike. Such an approach might focus on the following:4.1 Climate change and d

838、ecarbonizationBy early 2020, over 1,400 local governments in 28 countries had made climate-emergency declarations and set up policy priorities to tackle cli-mate change. However, to what extent these plans will be implemented in the post Covid-19 situation is an open question.There should be greater

839、 clarity over the links between CE activities 42 Frdric Simon, “Circular Economy Erected As Number One Priority of European Green Deal”, in Euractiv, 13 November 2019, https:/ European Commission, Leading the Way to a Global Circular Economy: State of Play and Outlook (SWD/2020/100), 11 March 2020,

840、https:/ec.europa.eu/environment/cir-cular-economy/pdf/leading_way_global_circular_economy.pdf.1295. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular Economyand climate change. A study related to seven European countries has shown that national CO2 emissions can be reduced by 66 per cent and

841、 new jobs created by shifting to a CE.44A paper, “Completing the Picture How the Circular Economy Tackles Climate Change”, published by the UK-based Ellen MacArthur Founda-tion in 2019 emphasizes the link between CE and the achievement of cli-mate goals by governments and businesses. The paper highl

842、ights the fact that while 55 per cent of the climate-change challenge can be addressed through renewable-energy systems the other 45 per cent needs to be addressed by a CE transformation in how we make and use products.454.2 Agriculture, water and foodThe literature has hitherto paid limited attenti

843、on to the problem of how to integrate CE with food-security and agricultural-development plans. Incorporating CE could offer interesting policy opportunities for developing countries particularly those with ambitious targets for the advancement of their agricultural sectors. Tanzanias National Devel

844、op-ment Vision 2025, for example, aims to transform the East African coun-try “from a low productivity agricultural economy to a semi-industri-alized one led by modernized and highly productive agricultural activ-ities” supported by industrial and service activities. Opportunities for 44 Anders Wijk

845、man and Kristian Sknberg, The Circular Economy and Benefits for Society. Jobs and Climate Clear Winners in an Economy Based on Renewable Energy and Resource Efficiency. A Study Pertaining to Finland, France, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden, Club of Rome, 2015, https:/clubofrome.org/?p=11053; Ander

846、s Wijkman and Kristian Sknberg, The Circular Economy and Benefits for Society. Jobs and Climate Clear Winners in an Economy Based on Renewable Energy and Resource Efficiency. A Study Per-taining to the Czech Republic and Poland, Club of Rome, 2015, https:/circulareconomy.europa.eu/platform/en/node/2

847、77; Anders Wijkman and Kristian Sknberg, The Circu-lar Economy and Benefits for Society. Jobs and Climate Clear Winners in an Economy Based on Renewable Energy and Resource Efficiency. A Study Pertaining to the Norwegian econ-omy, Club of Rome, 2016, https:/www.avfallnorge.no/fagomraader-og-faggrupp

848、er/rapporter/the-circular-economy-and-benefits-for-society.45 Ellen MacArthur Foundation, Completing the Picture. How the Circular Economy Tackles Climate Change, 26 September 2019, https:/www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/publications/completing-the-picture-climate-change.130Martin Charter and Ichin

849、 ChengCE approaches to minimize input requirements while adding value to agricultural outputs and creating new asset loops can be found along the entire food value chain, from production to processing to consumption.464.3 Construction and BuildingThe construction sector uses billions of tons of mate

850、rials from sand to gravel and iron ore, to biotic resources such as wood and food. According to one estimate, more than one third of global material consumption is accounted for by construction materials and the building sector.47 The production of these materials requires an amount of energy repres

851、ent-ing more than 40 per cent of GHG emissions associated with global mate-rials production. Such raw-material consumption is predicted to grow faster than urban populations, and to reach an estimated 90 billion tons by 2050 (from 40 billion tons in 2010).48 The high demand for such raw materials fa

852、r exceeds what the planet can sustainably provide, and con-tributes significantly to climate change (today, concrete alone is respon-sible for 9 per cent of total GHG emissions).494.4 Textiles, clothing and fashionThese are a fundamental part of everyday life, and an important sec-tor in the global

853、economy. The 1.3 trillion US dollars clothing industry employs more than 300 million people worldwide along its value chain. After the oil industry, textiles and clothing form the second-largest pol-luting sector in the world. The sector accounts for 10 per cent of global CO2 emissions, 25 per cent

854、of chemical emissions and is second only to agriculture as a consumer of water. One kilogram of textile material 46 European Commission, Leading the Way to a Global Circular Economy: State of Play and Outlook, cit.47 Ellen MacArthur Foundation & ARUP, Urban Buildings System Summary, March 2019, http

855、s:/www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/assets/downloads/Buildings_All_Mar19.pdf.48 Ibid.49 European Commission, Leading the Way to a Global Circular Economy: State of Play and Outlook, cit.1315. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular Economyrequires approximately 100150 litres of wat

856、er.50The CE is one of the strategic areas of innovation for the future devel-opment of the textiles, clothing and fashion sector. The industry has begun engaging with the CE in multiple ways. Many global brands are supporting the transition to circularity by nurturing and scaling inno-vation,51 and

857、leading companies have made commitments, at CEO (Chief executive officer) level, to creating a circular fashion system.524.5 ICT, e-waste and CRMsE-waste is one of fastest-growing global challenges in economies increas-ingly based on information and communications technology (ICT). How-ever, in a “c

858、losed loop” world, components could be reused or consumer electronics could be repaired and e-waste could be a valuable resource for many new products. In addition, there have been growing concerns over the reliance on the use of CRMs53 in advanced technologies e.g. rare-earth elements for smartphon

859、es or cobalt for electric vehicles.54 Increased demand in certain sectors will impact on prices, creating intense competition as some materials become increasingly scarce and more expensive.50 Carmen Busquets, 4 Reasons Fashion Is the Second Largest Polluter, 29 March 2017, https:/ C&A Foundation we

860、bsite: Circular Fashion, https:/www.candafoundation.org/impact/circular-fashion.52 Global Fashion Agenda, CEO Agenda 2019, https:/ The European Commission produced a list of 27 CRMs that includes raw materi-als that have reached or exceeded thresholds of economic importance and supply risk to Europe

861、. From its original list of 14 CRMs in 2011, the EU expanded its total of des-ignated CRMs to 27 in 2017. Those 27 CRMs include 17 rare earth metals (REMs), also known as rare earth elements (REE). European Commission, 2017 List of Critical Raw Materials for the EU (COM/2017/490), 13 September 2017,

862、 https:/eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0490.54 Felix Preston, Johanna Lehne and Laura Wellesley, “An Inclusive Circular Econ-omy: Priorities for Developing Countries”, cit.132Martin Charter and Ichin Cheng4.6 Crosscutting issuesCE processes aim to retain value in products,

863、components and materials within the economic and social systems for as long as possible through better design (ecodesign) and through repair, reuse, refurbishment and remanufacturing all considered value-retention processes (VRPs).55Ecodesign: Design specifications are typically responsible for abou

864、t 75 per cent of a products manufacturing costs, and an estimated 80 per cent of product-related environmental impacts are determined at the design and development phase.56 So, without an emphasis on design-ing-out waste and retaining value in products, components and mate-rials, the pursuit of CE c

865、an only be an incremental affair. Ecodesign (including circularity considerations) requires a team approach and the engagement and involvement of a range of internal business functions and external stakeholders. Several options are available to designers to improve product circularity at different l

866、ifecycle stages. Incorporating circularity means adopting an extended lifecycle perspective design-ing for durability, longevity or multiple uses or lives, while delivering the same or greater value to customers.Repair: A campaign led by the non-governmental organization (NGO) the European Environme

867、ntal Bureau (EEB) has influenced policy in the EU related to the repair of consumer electronics, home appliances and other products.57 Citizen-led repair activities are also on the move. Repair cafs community-led workshops focused on the repair of prod-ucts by volunteers now number nearly 3,000 worl

868、dwide and were con-tinuing to grow consistently pre Covid-19.58The “Right to Repair” movement has spread from the US across the Atlantic to Europe.59 EU environment ministers have proposed various 55 Nabil Nasr et al., Redefining Value. The Manufacturing Revolution. Remanufactur-ing, Refurbishment,

869、Repair and Direct Reuse in the Circular Economy, Paris, UNEP Interna-tional Resource Panel, 2018, https:/www.resourcepanel.org/node/712.56 Smallpiece Trust, Design for Production. Seminar Notes, Leamington Spa, 1989.57 EEB website: Right to Repair, https:/eeb.org/tag/right-to-repair.58 Repair Caf we

870、bsite: About Repair Caf, https:/repaircafe.org/en/about.59 Roger Harrabin, “EU Brings in Right to Repair Rules for Appliances”, in BBC News, 1 October 2019, https:/www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-49884827.1335. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular Economymeasures to induce manufactu

871、rers to make products that last longer and are easier to repair than in the days of “built-in obsolescence. The right to repair a core component of the European Commissions CEAP 2.0.Remanufacturing: This practice is a key element in global CE transi-tion, offering huge potential economic opportuniti

872、es and environmental benefits. In 2011, the US led the worlds remanufacturing efforts fol-lowed by the EU, in which Germany took 70 per cent of the market. Today, China is the fastest-growing market in the sector, with a value projected to be 290 billion US dollars by 2020. However, remanufacturing

873、accounts for only 2 per cent of production in the US and just 1.9 per cent in Europe, leaving ample opportunity for further development.60Systemic change: At local level, a CE can be operationalized where waste (or value) from one industrial process becomes an input into another process (industrial

874、symbiosis IS). IS means a designed pro-cess whereby one firms waste becomes a raw material for another. It has already been implemented in Kalundborg, Denmark; in Yokohama, Japan; and in Ulsan, South Korea and is being piloted in eco-industrial parks in China.61“ Future “closed loop” systems will ne

875、ed to factor in the location of waste exchanges and materials banks in order to facilitate the process. Creating and optimizing resource “loops” along value and supply chains could help to meet the material needs of growing popula-tions through drastically lower rates of per capita primary-resource

876、use.European front-runner countries have incorporated IS in their Smart Specialisation Strategies. For example, in Finlands southern Pijt-Hme region, CE and IS have been embedded in the Regional Development Strategy and the RIS3 Strategy in the Regional Land Use Strategy.62 In Italy, the National Ag

877、ency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustaina-ble Economic Development (ENEA) has developed IS in three regions Sicily, Lazio and Emilia-Romagna and established the countrys first national IS network, “SUN Symbiosis User Network”. This network 60 Nabil Nasr et al., Redefining Value. The Manufacturi

878、ng Revolution, cit.61 Ichin Cheng, “Why Asia Matters: Circular Economy in Japan, China and Taiwan”, cit.62 Venelina Varbova and Ruslan Zhechkov, Uptake of Industrial Symbiosis in Euro-pean Regions. A Policy Learning Platform Event, Helsinki, 22-23 May 2019 follow up brief, https:/www.interregeurope.

879、eu/industrialsymbiosis/conclusions.134Martin Charter and Ichin Chengaims to promote and share knowledge among stakeholders, and identify new opportunities to implement the CE through IS.63In addition, the traditional lifecycles of products need to be reas-sessed in order to take account of the CE as

880、 product circularity focuses on extending the value of products, components and materials across multiple lifecycles. There is therefore a need for a new understanding of product lifetime. For example, products, materials and components may go through various loops as they are returned for repair, r

881、euse, refur-bishment, remanufacturing or recycling in economic and social systems.645. the state of play of ce InternatIonal InItIatIves5.1 International trade and financeWhile current CE policies have been mostly developed at the national and regional levels, there is increasing awareness that a tr

882、ansition towards a CE has broad linkages with international trade. This, for instance, takes place through global value chains as well as trade in second-hand goods, end-of-life products, secondary materials or non-hazardous waste and in trade in related services.65There is increasing awareness of t

883、he opportunities and challenges related to international trade resulting from a global transition towards CE. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) policy guidance on resource efficiency emphasizes the need to better address trade-related obstacles to resource efficiency

884、in supply chains, such as export restrictions on secondary materials, secondary goods and used products.66 Moreover, shared approaches and measure-63 Italian Ministry for the Environment and Ministry of Economic Development, Towards a Model of Circular Economy for Italy, cit.64 Hans-Christian Eberl

885、and Martin Charter (eds), Products and Circular Economy. Policy Recommendations Derived from Research & Innovation Projects, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2020, https:/doi.org/10.2777/15587.65 Shunta Yamaguchi, “International Trade and the Transition to a More Resource Effic

886、ient and Circular Economy. A Concept Paper”, in OECD Trade and Environment Working Papers, No. 2018/03 (October 2018), https:/doi.org/10.1787/18166881.66 Ibid.1355. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular Economyment standards can also have a strong positive effect. Dialogue on reg

887、-ulation and practical cooperation between countries can help too for example, if it covers the waste hierarchy, waste management and the use and standardization of secondary raw materials.67The World Trade Organization (WTO) and free-trade agreements provide useful platforms from which to further e

888、xplore CE issues within the context of trade and the environment. This process might be under-taken, in particular, through a number of WTO committees including those covering Trade and Environment (CTE): Rules; Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures; and Agr

889、iculture and Committee on Development. In addition, the next WTO Ministerial Conference may provide an opportunity to deepen dialogue around CE-related issues.68As mentioned earlier, the transition to a CE at a global level needs a common definition and globally agreed standards that help to promote

890、 more circular business models, goods, technologies and services. This is also essential to enable the flow of funding into the sector.The financial sector has a key role to play in facilitating a shift to a CE. It can, for example, provide financial resources for circular invest-ments; offer insura

891、nce products suitable for circular practices, such as leasing and sharing; and develop rating systems and information-dis-closure requirements that can help to improve transparency around CE-related business risks. In early 2017, the European Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB) underto

892、ok a joint initiative called the Circular Economy Finance Support Platform (CEFSP) in order to pro-mote coordination and knowledge exchange among key stakeholders and to implement actions needed to enhance investments in the CE. The CEFSP has produced recommendations to improve the “bankability” of

893、CE projects, coordinate funding activities and share good practice. It has worked with the EIB to provide financial assistance and explore syner-67 European Commission, Leading the Way to a Global Circular Economy: State of Play and Outlook, cit.68 Shunta Yamaguchi, “International Trade and the Tran

894、sition to a More Resource Efficient and Circular Economy”, cit.136Martin Charter and Ichin Chenggies with the EUs action plan on financing sustainable growth.The EIB also set up the Joint Initiative on Circular Economy (JICE).69 JICE is a partnership between the EUs largest national CE promotional b

895、anks and institutions. The Bank aims to invest at least 10 billion euro in the CE by 2023 in order to support projects that prevent and elimi-nate waste, increase resource efficiency and promote circular business models. JICE is working on harmonizing CE definition; on sharing knowl-edge about CE ac

896、tivities; on CE advisory facilities; and on creating a new, dedicated CE financing platform.70The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Africa Bank have also developed CE intiatives of their own. However, these initiatives have seemingly had a limited role in advancing global cooperation among financial

897、institutions.Managing the global CE transition demands a deep understanding of trends and issues related to global trade and sustainable consumption and production (SCP) patterns. Unfortunately, financial institutions suf-fer from several knowledge gaps including on: developing definitions, taxonomy

898、 and tools to measure the circu-larity of projects; identifying the risks related to linear business models and review-ing credit-risk assessment methods to account for those risks; strengthening risk-sharing financial instruments, advisory sup-port and creating a pool of experts available for finan

899、cial institu-tions in order to assess the technological risk of innovative circu-lar technologies; and clearly identifying financial instruments that are appropriate for financing CE projects, and increasing awareness and knowledge of the CE within the financial sector.7169 Arnold Verbeek views on “

900、Financing the Circular Economy and Closing the Investment Gap”, in Chatham House Circular Economy Conference,1 April 2020, https:/www.chathamhouse.org/file/59604.70 Ibid.71 Ibid.1375. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular Economy5.2 Other multilateral initiativesSeveral multilate

901、ral initiatives aim to promote global CE cooperation:The Partnership for Action on Green Economy (PAGE)72 PAGE was launched in 2013 in order to support those countries that wish to adopt sustainable economic policies and embrace greener and more inclusive growth objectives. The partnership brings to

902、gether five UN agencies.73 Their combined mandates, expertise and networks can offer support to countries embarking on models of inclusive green economy, ensuring coherence and avoiding duplication.The 10-Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production (10YFP) Also known as th

903、e “One Planet Network”, the UNs 10YFP was adopted in 2012 at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). It marks a global commitment to accelerate the shift towards SCP, in both developed and developing countries. It is a multi-stakeholder partnership that is organized into six programmes:

904、Public Procurement, Buildings and Construction, Tourism, Food Sys-tems, Consumer Information, and Lifestyles and Education. The 10YFP implicitly includes activities related to CE.The Platform for Accelerating the Circular Economy (PACE) PACE was launched in 2017 as a publicprivate collaboration mech

905、anism and pro-ject accelerator for the CE. The World Economic Forum (WEF) hosts and facilitates the platform. It aims to develop blended financing models in order to help create and adjust enabling policy frameworks to address specific barriers to advancing CE, and to bring in publicprivate col-labo

906、rations in order to scale its impact.74 The Global Leadership Group 72 Partners of PAGE include 10YFP, Green Economy Coalition, Global Green Growth Institute, Green Growth Knowledge Platform, SWITCH Africa Green, SWITCH Asia, UN Environment Finance Initiative, UN Environment Inquiry, UN-REDD Program

907、me, UNDP-UNEP Poverty-Environment Initiative. PAGE implicitly includes activities on CE but not explicitly. See PAGE website: About PAGE, https:/www.un-page.org/node/3.73 UN Environment Programme (UNEP); International Labour Organization (ILO); UN Development Programme (UNDP); UN Industrial Developm

908、ent Organization (UNISO); and UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITR).74 Sitra website: The Platform for Accelerating the Circular Economy (PACE), https:/www.sitra.fi/?p=103503.138Martin Charter and Ichin Chengof PACE currently includes over 40 CEOs, government ministers and heads of internat

909、ional organizations committed to leading a portfolio of CE projects and activities. Projects are focused on a number of areas: plastics, electronics, food, bioeconomy, business models and market transformation.75The World Circular Economy Forum (WCEF) The WCEF is an annual global conference on CE th

910、at helps to facilitate network building and knowledge exchange. It was established in 2017 by the Finnish Govern-ment and its innovation agency, Sitra. First held in Finland in that found-ing year, the WCEF then met in Japan in 2018 and in Finland, again, in 2019. Plans were drawn up for it to be ho

911、sted in Toronto, Canada in 2020, but this has now been put back to 2021; it will mark the first time that the international forum has taken place in North America.76European Circular Economy Missions (CEMs)77 The European Com-mission has organized a series of high-level political and business meet-i

912、ngs in third countries in order to communicate and promote the CE. From2016 to 2019, these CEMs took place in Chile, China (2016); South Africa, Colombia (2017); Japan and Indonesia, India (2018); and Mexico, Singapore, Malaysia, Senegal (2019). Other CEMs planned for 202021 focus on sub-Saharan Afr

913、ica (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda); Asia (South Korea, Vietnam, China, India and Japan); North America (Canada); and South America (Brazil and Costa Rica).78The African Alliance on Circular Economy (AACE) In 2017. The Alli-ance was founded by three countries Rwanda, Nigeria and South A

914、frica along with UNEP and the World Economic Forum. AACE creates an alli-ance of African countries represented at the Ministerial level who share best practices, undertake collaborative projects and advocate circular economy programmes and practice.75 World Economic Forum website: Circular Economy a

915、nd Material Value Chains, https:/www.weforum.org/projects/circular-economy.76 Canada Government website: Circular Economy, cit.77 European Commission website: Circular Economy Missions to Third Countries, https:/ec.europa.eu/environment/international_issues/missions_en.htm.78 European Commission, Le

916、ading the Way to a Global Circular Economy: State of Play and Outlook, cit.1395. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular EconomyThe AfricaEurope Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs (AEASIJ) The European Commission launched AEASIJ in September 2018 in order to highlight the

917、 EUs interest in building a strong partnership and cooperation with Africa. This isaimed at enhancing opportunities for sustainable growth and creating local employment through new busi-ness models and mutually beneficial trade relations.79The European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform (ECESP) E

918、CESP is a joint initiative by the European Commission and the European Eco-nomic and Social Committee (EESC) that was established in 2017. It brings together European stakeholders from member states in order to promote the exchange of ideas, policies and best practice related to CE.80 An annual conf

919、erence is organized in Brussels.Business-driven CE networks Several business-driven CE networks have been established, including WBCSD “Factor 10” and the Ellen MacArthur Foundation (EMF) CE100.The WBCSD “Factor 10” This initiative started at the WEF in 2018, with over 30 leading companies across 16

920、 sectors joining forces to imple-ment CE through the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). The aim of the WEF is to scale up CE from sustainability depart-ments to all business functions and value chains, with a focus on practical actions at a company level. The “Factor 10” ini

921、tiative aims to capture eco-nomic and sustainability benefits by implementing scalable solutions to resource-use challenges. Three priority areas are highlighted: (1) devel-oping transformative cross-value chain solutions that unlock circular opportunities for business; (2) generating CE knowledge i

922、n order to help businesses to understand the “landscape”, (3) best practice and leading examples; and (3) amplifying the business voice globally.81The Ellen MacArthur Foundation Circular Economy 100 (CE100) The CE100 Network was established in 2013 and provides a platform for busi-79 European Commis

923、sion website: Circular Economy Missions to Third Countries, cit.80 Website of the European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform: About the Plat-form, https:/circulareconomy.europa.eu/platform/en/about-platform.81 WBCSD, 30 Leading Companies with a Combined Revenue of USD $1.3 Trillion Join Forces t

924、o Implement the Circular Economy, 23 January 2018, https:/www.wbcsd.org/Programs/Circular-Economy/Factor-10/News/launching-Factor10.140Martin Charter and Ichin Chengness communities to learn, share knowledge and put ideas into practice. Its membership includes a diverse range of global companies inc

925、luding Apple, BASF, Cisco, Coca-Cola, Dell, HP, IBM, Ikea, ING Bank, Kingfisher, Marks & Spencer, Michelin, Microsoft, Orange, Steelcase, Tetrapak, Veo-lia and Walmart.82Individual business initiatives There has also been a marked increase in business engagement with CE, as companies increasingly se

926、e their profitability and long-term success as being dependent on CE-related issues. A growing range of companies have been adopting innovative CE approaches these include H&M Foundations Global Change Award to call for ideas to make the fashion industry circular.6. ce InItIatIves WIthIn the g20 fra

927、meWorKThe G20 also regularly engages with key stakeholders who are important for CE policies in its engagement groups each suffixed “20”, as they fall under the G20 umbrella. These stakeholders include NGOs from the fol-lowing areas: business (B20), civil society (C20), labour (L20), think tanks (T2

928、0), youth (Y20), science (S20), women (W20) and urban (U20). All these groups hold major events during a G20 presidency, and the outcomes contribute to the deliberations of G20 leaders. The current G7 (the smaller group comprising Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United King-dom and the Un

929、ited States) and G20 processes that are of particular inter-est for advancing the global transition to a CE include the G7 Alliance on Resource Efficiency (2015), the G7 Action Plan to Combat Marine Litter (2015) and the G20 Resource Efficiency (RE) Dialogue (2017).The last-named process (the G20 RE

930、 Dialogue) first took place under the German G20 presidency in 2017. It focuses on closer cooperation on the efficient and sustainable use of natural resources. A key outcome of the G20 RE Dialogue was the G20 RE Roadmap on Energy Transitions and Global Environment for Sustainable Growth in June 201

931、9.8382 Ellen MacArthur Foundation website: Members, https:/www.ellenmacarthur-foundation.org/our-work/activities/ce100.83 G20 Resource Efficiency Dialogue, Roadmap for the G20 Resource Efficiency 1415. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular EconomyThe G20 RE Roadmap aims to share

932、actions and good practice, strengthen and mainstream resource-efficiency policies, improve the measurement of resource efficiency, encourage innovation and create opportunities, encourage multi-stakeholder engagement and cooperate with other international initiatives. Tackling marine litter has beco

933、me a major global concern, and a series of initiatives was launched by the G7/G20 between 2017 and 2019. These include the Marine Litter Action Plan (2017), the Future of the Seas and Oceans working group (2017), the Innovation Challenge to Address Marine Plastic Litter (2018) and the Implementation

934、 Framework for Action on Marine Plastics Litter (2019).84 In 2019, the G20 leaders also endorsed the “Osaka Blue Ocean Vision” a commitment to reduce additional pollution from marine plastic litter to zero by 2050.85conclusIons and recommendatIonsThe G20 should seek the maximum possible integration

935、of CE initiatives with other major policy areas.In a post-pandemic economic environment, it is vital that CE be “mainstreamed” into broader policy priorities e.g. economic recovery and social resilience in a climate-constrained and increasingly digital and automated world. The G20 can play a crucial

936、 role in highlighting the impact of Covid-19 on CE, and in identifying the global-governance instruments best suited to address health problems in close connection with economic and financial measures.Clearer links between CE and the UNs 10YFP on SCP should be estab-lished. There should be a more ex

937、plicit discussion over how to create a synergy between CE policies and SCP. Also, there needs to be greater clarity over the goals and mission of the proposed European Commis-Dialogue, Tokyo, 9-10 October 2019, https:/g20re.org/pdf/Roadmap_for_the_G20_Resource_Efficiency_Dialogue.pdf.84 European Com

938、mission, Leading the Way to a Global Circular Economy: State of Play and Outlook, cit.85 European Commission website: Multilateral Relations G7/G8 And G20 - Public Events, https:/ec.europa.eu/environment/international_issues/relations_g20_events_en.htm.142Martin Charter and Ichin Chengsion Global CE

939、 Forum in order to avoid a duplication of efforts with the World CE Forum led by the Finnish Government and Sitra.The G20 should establish a framework to manage CE within a prod-uct policy that helps to illustrate the potential use of demand-side and supply-side policy tools. To avoid long-term prob

940、lems, there needs to be a recognition of trade-offs for example, between implementing CE pol-icy approaches and the impact on energy and water consumption. The Group of Twenty should collect examples of best practice in CE design e.g. design for preventative maintenance, repair, refurbishment, reman

941、-ufacturing and (materials) recycling. The G20 should consider valuing research and innovation assets so as to reflect and define the advanced technologies (advanced materials, photonics, nanotechnologies, artifi-cial intelligence, etc.) needed to encompass and respond to the emerging needs, and to

942、maximize the impacts on society and businesses.The Group of Twenty should consider the development of a “top-run-ner” programme to drive CE within firms in individual countries, build-ing on the Japanese approach on energy. It should develop CE leadership awards for governments, businesses and civil

943、 society organizations (CSOs) possibly working with the WEF and other policy stakeholders identified earlier in the paper (e.g. the B20, the C20 and so on).G20 governments should demonstrate leadership in cooperative action in support of the CE under the Italian G20 presidency to speed up a global C

944、E transition. The G20 should mainstream CE into the Resource Efficiency Working Group (CEREWG) and expand the G20 Climate Sus-tainability Working Group (CSWG) to explicitly cover CE issues.86 An expert working group should be established to develop new perspec-tives based on sound international coll

945、aboration on CE.Define, standardize and measure circularity A recent European Com-mission paper on product policy and CE has highlighted a lack of shared 86 Within G20, the Energy Sustainability Working Group (ESWG) was established in 2013 to cover the energy-related issues. In 2017, there was recog

946、nition that energy policy and climate change issues were closely linked and the CSWG was established under the Sustainability Working Group (SWG). In 2018, under the Argentine presi-dency, CSWG was separated from ESWG and became one of the Working Groups in the Sherpa process.1435. The G20: Accelera

947、ting the Transition to a Global Circular Economydefinitions and indicator sets that could allow comparison between the circularity performance of products and services within and across sec-tors. A more harmonized approach would help to improve and standard-ize key CE performance data across economi

948、c sectors. This would facil-itate comparability and the exchangeability of data within and between those economic sectors.87The proposed G20 CEREWG should work with the ISO and Interna-tional Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) in order to develop a univer-sally agreed definition of CE and establish k

949、ey circularity indicators for products and processes based on that definition. CE standards also need to be developed and harmonized through the ISO and other international and national standards bodies in order to cover areas such as perfor-mance measurement, reporting and accounting.88 The ISO est

950、ablished TC323 in 2019 as a technical committee to take forward the standardi-zation proposals related to CE.Monitoring frameworks to measure progress in the circular transi-tion should also be established. In addition to “hard” indicators about resource productivity, material footprints, waste gene

951、ration or recy-cling rates, progress could also be measured using indicators at an inter-national level.89Establish synergy with decarbonization As mentioned above, increased clarity is needed over the links between CE activities and climate change. One of the key areas for cooperation within the G2

952、0 lies in exploring strategies for the decarbonization of global industry through CE, taking account of both supply-side and demand-side per-spectives. Key supply-side technologies include energy efficiency (espe-cially at the system level), electrification, carbon capture and chemical feedstock. Cr

953、ucial demand-side approaches include material-efficient 87 Hans-Christian Eberl and Martin Charter (eds), Products and Circular Economy, cit.88 Yong Geng, Joseph Sarkis and Raimund Bleischwitz, “How to Globalize the Cir-cular Economy”, in Nature, No. 565 (2019), p. 153-155, https:/doi.org/10.1038/d4

954、1586-019-00017-z.89 Luc Alaerts et al., “Towards a More Direct Policy Feedback in Circular Economy Monitoring via a Societal Needs Perspective”, in Resources, Conservation and Recycling, Vol. 149 (October 2019), p. 363-371, https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2019.06.004.144Martin Charter and Ichin C

955、hengdesign (ecodesign); reductions in material waste; the substitution of low-carbon for high-carbon materials; and other CE interventions such as improving product longevity, reusability, refurbishment, remanufac-turing and recyclability.90 This approach applies well, for example, to the mining, en

956、ergy and transportation sectors, in which electrification, the growth of EVs (electric vehicles) and the development of various bat-tery and other storage technologies provide numerous opportunities for undertaking CE initiatives.Prioritize key impact sectors Each country and economy have differ-ent

957、 opportunities and challenges related to CE and “closing loops”. The G20 should particularly focus on resource-intensive and high-impact sectors such as agriculture, water and food production; construction; textiles, clothing and fashion; ICT; e-waste; and critical raw materials.Accelerate innovatio

958、n and technology deployment through CE pilots Technological acceleration is already creating a fundamental shift in the manufacturing landscape as a result of significant advances in sensing, digitization, computation, storage, networking and software.91 The dig-ital transformation of the production

959、 system and the enabling technolo-gies of so-called “industry 4.0” (the fourth industrial revolution) already offer solutions to make more sustainable and circular productions possi-ble and efficient in areas such as wireless predictive maintenance, oper-ational efficiency and advanced manufacturing

960、.Strategic, well-designed CE policies can accelerate innovation and provide incentives for technology deployment. The G20 should promote CE pilot projects and accelerator networks. Such coordinated commit-ments would signal to both business and investment communities that future CE pathways will dep

961、end on international coordination and open-ness to trade in CE goods and services. They would also strengthen the position of international financial institutions seeking to enhance the synergies in their investment plans between the CE and wider sustaina-90 Jeffrey Rissman et al., “Technologies and

962、 Policies to Decarbonize Global Industry: Review and Assessment of Mitigation Drivers Through 2070”, in Applied Energy, Vol. 266 (15 may 2020), p. 114848, https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2020.114848.91 Thomas L. Friedman, Thank You for Being Late. An Optimists Guide to Thriving in the Age of Accel

963、erations, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016.1455. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular Economyble-development programmes.92Provide economic instruments and incentives to mainstream CE The G20 should evaluate how existing economic instruments could incentiv-ize the mainst

964、reaming of CE at a global level.The OECDs “Policy Guidance on Resource Efficiency” identifies a set of instruments to guide national systems towards the circularity of eco-nomic processes. These economic instruments include: taxes on virgin materials or products, or waste disposal and incineration;

965、“deposit refund” schemes; taxation based on recycled-product content; public support for the creation of industrial symbiosis (IS) pro-cesses; and certification and labelling rules to strengthen the image of the product and the company, making traceability of the production process more verifiable.9

966、3In particular, it is important to deploy a variety of economic instru-ments and policy tools in the international trade and agreement arena, such as taxation on carbon emissions (carbon tax), on landfill dis-posal (landfill tax) and on pollution in general (pollution tax) in order to encourage the

967、transition to less-impactful technologies, promoting reuse, recovery and recycling.94Promote CE governance in developing countries Developing countries are becoming increasingly important centres for the production of goods and will be the future centres of consumption in the global economy. An incr

968、easing share of the global “consuming class” now lives in emerging and developing countries, with a vast concentration in India and China. 92 Felix Preston, Johanna Lehne and Laura Wellesley, “An Inclusive Circular Econ-omy: Priorities for Developing Countries”, cit.93 OECD, Policy Guidance on Resou

969、rce Efficiency, Paris, OECD, 2016, https:/dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264257344-en.94 UN Environment Inquiry and Italian Ministry of Environment, Financing the Future. Report of the Italian National Dialogue on Sustainable Finance, December 2016, https:/unepinquiry.org/?p=2531.146Martin Charter and Ichin

970、 ChengCooperative approaches will be needed to develop common rules and standards for the governance of global CE value chains.Discussions are happening on the ways in which international gov-ernance frameworks, such as the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wast

971、es and their Disposal (the “Basel Convention”), could be strengthened in order to manage the sig-nificant environmental and health impacts associated with global flows in e-waste.95 Particular attention should be paid to the ways in which CE governance rules can be applied in developing countries.Ac

972、hieve the SDGs through CE actions Progressing CE is essential for achieving individual and interdependent SDGs (see Appendix C). CE practices are of particular relevance to solving the global waste crisis, which disproportionately affects the populations of low- and middle-in-come countries where at

973、 least 2 billion people still do not have access to solid-waste collection. Looking forward, the G20 should integrate CE into the achievement of the SDGs and the pursuit of new models for sus-tainable, green and resilient growth.95 Felix Preston, Johanna Lehne and Laura Wellesley, “An Inclusive Circ

974、ular Econ-omy: Priorities for Developing Countries”, cit.1475. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular EconomyAppendix A | Three “Rs” to 12 “Rs”12 “RsDefinition of each RInitial stage (in use by many companies today)ReduceAction to reduce the use of resources in the beginningReuseA

975、 product, component or material can be used again without requiring any reprocessing or treatmentRecycle/ReclaimingThe action of processing a used product, component or material for use in a future product, component or materialAccelerating stage (in use by advanced companies today)RepairReturning a

976、 faulty or broken product, component or material back to a usable stateRefurbish/ReconditionAesthetic improvement of a product, component or material, which might involve making it look like new, with limited functionality improvementsRepurpose (including upcycle and downcycle)- Using a product, its

977、 components or materials in a role that they were not originally designed to perform- Downcycling: process of converting waste into new materials, components or products of lesser quality and reduced functionality compared with its original intended purpose- Upcycling: process of converting otherwis

978、e waste into new materials, components or products of better quality, improved functionality and/or a higher environmental valueRe-design/ Eco-designSignificant changes in existing products, processes or organizational structures, redesigning them towardsecodesign or green designRe-manufacturingRetu

979、rning a used product to at least its original performance with a warranty that is equivalent to or better than that of the original manufactured productAdvanced stage (rare best practice today)R&DInvestment in new materials, processes, technologies and general innovationReverse-supply chain/Reverse

980、logistics- Reverse logistics: the process of reclaiming products and materials from the end user- Reverse supply-chain management: the process to managing reverse logistics and the remanufacturing of products and materials for new products. In some cases, reverse supply chain involves different supp

981、liers and crosses different industriesRe-skilled peopleRetraining employees, designers, engineers, managers, policymakers, stakeholders and shareholders in order for them to understand the CE approachReinvention of the industrial system into a green industrial systemUsing CE principles to reinvent t

982、he industrial process and ways of treating materials and resources towards a green industrial revolution in order to achieve an ecological civilizationSource: Ichin Cheng, “Why Asia Matters: Circular Economy in Japan, China and Taiwan”, cit.148Martin Charter and Ichin ChengAppendix B | Some other CE

983、 initiatives and activities by G20 membersG20 memberTopicsActivitiesEUGlobal CE outreachSee aboveEUPlastics, textiles, construction and materials- Identify possible actions by the G20 to reduce the environmental and social impact of the production, use and disposal of plastics, textiles and construc

984、tion materials through a circular approach addressing, inter alia, product design and consumption- Lead efforts at the international level to reach a global agreement on plastics in line with the objectives of the European Plastics StrategyCanadaCE tech and Zero Plastic Waste international cooperati

985、onHost World Circular Economy Forum 2021CE policy initiatives are underway at all levels of government, including the Canada-Wide Action Plan on Zero Plastic WasteGermanyResource EfficientGerman Resource Efficient Programme II: Programme for the sustainable use and conservation of natural resourcesF

986、ranceRoadmapRoadmap for the CE 50 measures for a 100% CEItalyGreen public procurement (GPP)Plastics/BioplasticsTowards a CE model for ItalyThe public sector, with its large demand for goods and services, can, through processes of green public procurement, play a pivotal role in promoting resource ef

987、ficiency, innovation and the green economy and can do so in collaboration with the private sectorJapanInternational cooperation on resource-efficiency improvement in the Asia-Pacific and Africa regionsPromote activities under the “Regional 3R Forum in Asia and the Pacific and the “African Clean Citi

988、es Platform (ACCP), in collaboration with related international organizations and countries, providing good practice on sound waste management, the 3 “Rs and CE policy and technologiesUKSustainable ProductionShare information and best practice on resource efficiency and waste prevention at an intern

989、ational level with G20 partners. This includes ecodesign of products; improved consumer information; and increasing usage of secondary materials, including industrial by-productsUSADeveloping and incentivizing markets for secondary materialsFood loss and wasteAt a minimum, this work would cover appr

990、oaches to ensure that the supply of material is abundant, clean and reliable, as well as strengthening the demand for processed secondary materials domestically and internationallyAdvance cooperation on measuring and reducing food loss and waste.China- China revised its Circular Economy Promotion La

991、w in 2018- 10 zero-waste city demonstration projects established in 2019Source: European Commission, A New Circular Economy Action Plan, cit.; G20 Resource Efficiency Dialogue, Roadmap for the G20 Resource Efficiency Dialogue, cit.; authors own research; and Canada Government website: Circular Econo

992、my, cit.1495. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular EconomyAppendix C | Circular economy in the 2030 Agenda Framework: contributions and gapsDirect positive contributions through circular economyGaps in addressing social dimensions in the circular economyRequirements to enable ci

993、rcular economy transitionSDG 1 (No poverty)XSDG 2 (Zero hunger)XSDG 3 (Good health & wellbeing)XSDG 4 (Quality education)XSDG 5 (Gender equality)XSDG 6 (Clean water and sanitation)XSDG 7 (Affordable and clean energy)XSDG 8 (Decent work and economic growth)XSDG 9 (Industry, innovation and infrastruct

994、ure)XSDG 10 (Reduced inequalities)XSDG 11 (Sustainable cities and communities)XSDG 12 (Sustainable consumption and production)XSDG 13 (Climate change)XSDG 14 (Life below water)XSDG 15 (Life on land)XSDG 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions)XSDG 17 (Partnerships for the goals)XSource: Patrick S

995、chrder, “Promoting a Just Transition to an Inclusive Circular Economy”, in Chatham House Research Papers, April 2020, p. 9, https:/www.chathamhouse.org/node/41013.referencesLuc Alaerts et al., “Towards a More Direct Policy Feedback in Circu-lar Economy Monitoring via a Societal Needs Perspective”, i

996、n Resources, Conservation and Recycling, Vol. 149 (October 2019), p. 363-371, https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2019.06.004British Standards Institution (BSI), Framework for Implementing the Principles of the Circular Economy in Organizations. Guide, London, BSI, May 2017150Martin Charter and Ichin

997、 ChengMartin Charter (ed.), Designing for the Circular Economy, London/New York, Routledge, 2018Ichin Cheng, “Why Asia Matters: Circular Economy in Japan, China and Taiwan”, in Martin Charter (ed.), Designing for the Circular Economy, London/New York, Routledge, 2018Circular Economy Network (CEN) an

998、d ENEA, Report on Circular Econ-omy in Italy 2019. 10 Proposals and Research Summary, April 2019, https:/circulareconomy.europa.eu/platform/en/node/2298De Groene Zaak, Governments Going Circular. A Global Scan, Dutch Sus-tainability Business Association, February 2015, http:/ Eberl and Martin Charte

999、r (eds), Products and Circular Economy. Policy Recommendations Derived from Research & Inno-vation Projects, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2020, https:/doi.org/10.2777/15587Paul Ekins et al., Resource Efficiency: Potential and Economic Implications, Paris, UN Environment Pro

1000、gramme (UNEP), March 2017, http:/ MacArthur Foundation, Completing the Picture. How the Cir-cular Economy Tackles Climate Change, 26 September 2019, https:/www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/publications/completing-the-picture-climate-changeEllen MacArthur Foundation & ARUP, Urban Buildings System Sum

1001、mary, March 2019, https:/www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/assets/downloads/Buildings_All_Mar19.pdfEllen MacArthur Foundation, Deutsche Post Foundation and McKinsey Center for Business and Environment, Growth Within: A Circular Economy Vision for a Competitive Europe, June 2015, https:/www.ellenmacar

1002、thurfoundation.org/publications/growth-within-a-cir-cular-economy-vision-for-a-competitive-europeEuropean Commission, 2017 List of Critical Raw Materials for the EU (COM/2017/490), 13 September 2017, https:/eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0490European Commission, Leading the

1003、 Way to a Global Circular Economy: 1515. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular EconomyState of Play and Outlook (SWD/2020/100), 11 March 2020, https:/ec.europa.eu/environment/circular-economy/pdf/leading_way_global_circular_economy.pdfEuropean Commission, A New Circular Economy A

1004、ction Plan (Ares/2019/7907872), 23 December 2019, https:/eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=pi_com:Ares(2019)7907872European Commission, A New Circular Economy Action Plan. For a Cleaner and More Competitive Europe (COM/2020/98), 11 March 2020, https:/eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/

1005、?uri=CELEX:52020DC0098European Environmental Citizens Organisation for Standardisation (ECOS), M/543 Series of Horizontal Standards on Material Effi-ciency Soon to Be Finalised, 20 January 2020, https:/ecostandard.org/?p=2744Ludwig O. Federigan, “An Extended Producer Responsibility Policy for PH”, i

1006、n The Manila Times, 19 July 2018, https:/ Figueres and Tom Rivett-Carnac, “Our Approach to Covid-19 Can Also Help Tackle Climate Change”, in New Scientist, No. 3276 (4 April 2020), https:/ Forster, “Starbucks Wont Fill Your Reusable Cup Anymore Over Coronavirus Fears”, in Forbes, 4 March 2020, https

1007、:/ L. Friedman, Thank You for Being Late. An Optimists Guide to Thriving in the Age of Accelerations, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016G20 Resource Efficiency Dialogue, Roadmap for the G20 Resource Effi-ciency Dialogue, Tokyo, 9-10 October 2019, https:/g20re.org/pdf/Roadmap_for_the_G20_Resou

1008、rce_Efficiency_Dialogue.pdfYong Geng, Joseph Sarkis and Raimund Bleischwitz, “How to Globalize the Circular Economy”, in Nature, No. 565 (2019), p. 153-155, https:/doi.org/10.1038/d41586-019-00017-z152Martin Charter and Ichin ChengPeter S. Goodman, “A Global Outbreak Is Fueling the Backlash to Glo-b

1009、alization”, in The New York Times, 5 March 2020, https:/ Gokkon, “Indonesia leans on businesses to do more about plastic waste”, in Mongabay, 12 November 2018, https:/ Growth Knowledge Platform (GGKP), “Can International Trade Increase Resource Efficiency?”, in GGKP Webinars, 8 December 2015, https:

1010、/www.greengrowthknowledge.org/node/141517Roger Harrabin, “EU Brings in Right to Repair Rules for Appliances”, in BBC News, 1 October 2019, https:/www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-49884827International Resource Panel (IRP), Resource Efficiency for Sustain-able Development: Key Messages for the Group of 20

1011、, Paris, UN Environment Programme (UNEP), 2018, http:/ Ministry for the Environment and Ministry of Economic Develop-ment, Towards a Model of Circular Economy for Italy. Overview and Strategic Framework, November 2017, http:/consultazione-econo-miacircolare.minambiente.it/node/21H. Itoh, “The Recent

1012、 Trend of E-waste Recycling and Rare Metal Recov-ery in Japan”, in WIT Transactions on Ecology and the Environment, Vol 180 (2014), https:/doi.org/10.2495/WM140011Julian Kirchherr, Denise Reike and Marko Hekkert, “Conceptualizing the Circular Economy: An Analysis of 114 Definitions”, in Resources, C

1013、onservation and Recycling, Vol. 127 (December 2017), p. 221-232, https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2017.09.005Ewa Krukowska and Nikos Chrysoloras , “Europe Signals Pandemic Made Green Agenda Top Security Priority”, in Bloomberg, 16 April 2020, https:/ Lacy and Jakob Rutqvist, Waste to Wealth. The C

1014、ircular Economy Advantage, Basingstoke/New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015Andrew McCarthy, Rob Dellink and Ruben Bibas, “The Macroeconomics of the Circular Economy Transition. A Critical Review of Modelling 1535. The G20: Accelerating the Transition to a Global Circular EconomyApproaches”, in OECD En

1015、vironment Working Papers, No. 130 (16 April 2018), https:/doi.org/10.1787/19970900Kelly McCarthy, “Single-Use Plastic Gloves Seem Like a Good Idea During Coronavirus, But Heres the Problem”, in ABC News, 7 April 2020, https:/abcn.ws/2JJWBmgNabil Nasr et al., Redefining Value. The Manufacturing Revol

1016、ution. Reman-ufacturing, Refurbishment, Repair and Direct Reuse in the Circular Economy, Paris, UNEP International Resource Panel, 2018, https:/www.resourcepanel.org/node/712OECD, Extended Producer Responsibility. Updated Guidance for Effi-cient Waste Management, Paris, OECD , 2016, https:/doi.org/1

1017、0.1787/9789264256385-enOECD, Policy Guidance on Resource Efficiency, Paris, OECD, 2016, https:/dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264257344-enFelix Preston, Johanna Lehne and Laura Wellesley, “An Inclusive Circular Economy: Priorities for Developing Countries”, in Chatham House Research Papers, May 2019, https:

1018、/www.chathamhouse.org/node/39058Kenneth Rapoza, “Kudlow: Pay the Moving Costs of American Compa-nies Leaving China”, in Forbes, 10 April 2020, https:/ Rissman et al., “Technologies and Policies to Decarbonize Global Industry: Review and Assessment of Mitigation Drivers Through 2070”, in Applied Ener

1019、gy, Vol. 266 (15 may 2020), p. 114848, https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2020.114848Patrick Schrder, “Promoting a Just Transition to an Inclusive Circular Economy”, in Chatham House Research Papers, April 2020, https:/www.chathamhouse.org/node/41013Frdric Simon, “Circular Economy Erected As Number O

1020、ne Priority of European Green Deal”, in Euractiv, 13 November 2019, https:/ Trust, Design for Production. Seminar Notes, Leamington Spa, 1989154Martin Charter and Ichin ChengUN Environment Inquiry and Italian Ministry of Environment, Financ-ing the Future. Report of the Italian National Dialogue on

1021、Sustainable Finance, December 2016, https:/unepinquiry.org/?p=2531Venelina Varbova and Ruslan Zhechkov, Uptake of Industrial Symbiosis in European Regions. A Policy Learning Platform Event, Helsinki, 22-23 May 2019 follow up brief, https:/www.interregeurope.eu/industrialsymbiosis/conclusionsWBCSD, 3

1022、0 Leading Companies with a Combined Revenue of USD $1.3 Tril-lion Join Forces to Implement the Circular Economy, 23 January 2018, https:/www.wbcsd.org/Programs/Circular-Economy/Factor-10/News/launching-Factor10Anders Wijkman and Kristian Sknberg, The Circular Economy and Bene-fits for Society. Jobs

1023、and Climate Clear Winners in an Economy Based on Renewable Energy and Resource Efficiency. A Study Pertaining to Finland, France, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden, Club of Rome, 2015, https:/clubofrome.org/?p=11053Anders Wijkman and Kristian Sknberg, The Circular Economy and Bene-fits for Society.

1024、Jobs and Climate Clear Winners in an Economy Based on Renewable Energy and Resource Efficiency. A Study Pertaining to the Czech Republic and Poland, Club of Rome, 2015, https:/circu-lareconomy.europa.eu/platform/en/node/277Anders Wijkman and Kristian Sknberg, The Circular Economy and Benefits for So

1025、ciety. Jobs and Climate Clear Winners in an Economy Based on Renewable Energy and Resource Efficiency. A Study Per-taining to the Norwegian economy, Club of Rome, 2016, https:/www.avfallnorge.no/fagomraader-og-faggrupper/rapporter/the-circular-economy-and-benefits-for-societyShunta Yamaguchi, “Inter

1026、national Trade and the Transition to a More Resource Efficient and Circular Economy. A Concept Paper”, in OECD Trade and Environment Working Papers, No. 2018/03 (October 2018), https:/doi.org/10.1787/CountryUnited StatesStatement by US at the meeting of the WTO DSB25 February 2019European

1027、 Union, China, Canada, India, Norway, New Zealand Switzerland, Australia, South Korea, Iceland, Singapore, Mexico and Costa RicaProposals / Position statement1) The issue of 90 days:The Appellate Body must circulate its reports within 90 days of an appeal.2) Transitional rules for outgoing Appellate

1028、 Body members:A person who has ceased to be an Appellate Body member may not continue deciding appeals as if their term had been extended by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).3) The meaning of municipal law as an issue of fact:The Appellate Body may not make findings on issues of fact, including but

1029、 not limited to those relating to domestic law.4) Findings unnecessary for the resolution of the dispute:The Appellate Body may not give advisory opinions on issues that will not assist the DSB in making a recommendation to bring a WTO-in-consistent measure into compliance with WTO rules.5) The issu

1030、e of precedent:The Appellate Body may not assert that its reports serve as precedent or provide authoritative interpretations.6) Further:The Appellate Body may not change members substantive rights or obligations as set out in the text of the WTO agreements. “Rather than seeking to make revisions to

1031、 the text of the Dispute Settlement Under-standing to permit what is now prohibited, the United States believes it is necessary for Members to engage in a deeper discussion of the concerns raised, to consider why the Appellate Body has felt free to depart from what WTO Members agreed to, and to disc

1032、uss how best to ensure that the system adheres to WTO rules as written.”1) The issue of 90 days:- Amend the 90-day rule in Article 17.5 by providing an enhanced con-sultation and transparency obligation for the Appellate Body.- Possibility for the parties to agree to the exceeding of the 90-day rule

1033、.If there is no agreement of the parties on the exceeding of this time-frame there could be a mechanism pursuant to which the procedure or working arrangements for the particular appeal could be adapted to ensure the meeting of the 90-day timeframe (This could also include Appendix: Chapter 2, Table

1034、s 2-8Table 2 | WTO reform proposals on dispute settlement156Axel Berger and Clara Brandi10 December 2018 Further proposalby European Union, China, India and Montenegro11 December 2018the publication of the report in the language of the appeal only).- It should however be clear that those changes do

1035、not affect the exist-ing rules on the validity or the adoption of late reports.2) Transitional rules for outgoing Appellate Body members:It is proposed that a transitional rule for outgoing Appellate Body members is adopted by the WTO membership itself through an amendment of the Dispute Settlement

1036、Understanding (DSU). The DSU would provide that an outgoing Appellate Body member shall complete the disposition of a pending appeal in which a hearing has already taken place during that members term.3) The meaning of municipal law as an issue of fact:It is proposed to clarify, for greater certaint

1037、y, that issues of law cov-ered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel, in the meaning of Article 17.6 of the DSU, while they include the legal characterization of the measures at issue under the WTO rules, and the panels objective assessment according to Article 11 of t

1038、he DSU, they do not include the meaning itself of the municipal measures.4) Findings unnecessary for the resolution of the dispute:It is proposed to amend Article 17.12 of the DSU to provide that the Appellate Body shall address each of the issues raised on appeal by the parties to the dispute to th

1039、e extent this is necessary for the reso-lution of the dispute.5) The issue of precedent:It is proposed that annual meetings are held between the Appel-late Body and WTO members (in the DSB) at which members could express their views in a manner unrelated to the adoption of particu-lar reports (as la

1040、id down currently in Article 17.14 of the DSU). This would provide an additional “channel of communication” whereby concerns with regard to some Appellate Body approaches, systemic issues or trends in the jurisprudence could be voiced. Adequate trans-parency and ground rules for such meetings would

1041、need to be put in place, in order to avoid undue pressure on Appellate Body members.1) The issue of 90 days:- Increasing the number of Appellate Body members from 7 to 9. This would improve the efficiency and internal organization of the Appellate Body while also improving the geographical balance o

1042、n the Appellate Body after numerous accessions to the WTO since 1995.- Providing that membership of the Appellate Body is the exclusive occupation of Appellate Body members (currently, pursuant to the DSB decision WT/DSB/1, it is a part-time job). This would be accom-panied by appropriate changes in

1043、 the employment conditions. This would not preclude Appellate Body members from academic or scien-157Appendix Chapter 2Japan, Australia and Chile25 April 2019tific activities, consistent with the nature of their functions.- Expansion of the resources of the Appellate Body Secretariat, pro-viding adm

1044、inistrative and legal support to the Appellate Body.2) Independence of Appellate Body members:It is proposed to provide for one single but longer (68 years) term for Appellate Body members. The objective is to enhance the independ-ence of the Appellate Body and its members, which is needed in view o

1045、f the experience of recent years and also in view of the other amend-ments proposed in document WT/GC/W/752/Rev.2.3) Transitional rules for outgoing Appellate Body members:In order to ensure an orderly transition between the outgoing and new Appellate Body members, the outgoing Appellate Body member

1046、s should continue discharging their duties until their places have been filled but not longer than for a period of two years following the expiry of the term of office.4) The meaning of municipal law as an issue of fact: /5) Findings unnecessary for the resolution of the dispute: /6) The issue of pr

1047、ecedent: /7) Further: The launch of the Appellate Body selection process:It is clarified that the selection process to replace outgoing Appellate Body members shall be automatically launched no later than X e.g. 6 months before the expiry of their term of office.1) The issue of 90 days:- Members con

1048、firm that the prompt settlement of disputes is essen-tial to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of the proper balance between the rights and obligations of members, as stated in Article 3.3 of the DSU.- Members confirm that the Appellate Body shall strictly observe the 90-day d

1049、eadlines for appellate review.- Members also recognize the difficulty in some cases in particular, those involving complicated measures and/or legal claims and con-firm that the members involved would need to resolve the resulting procedural consequences in such cases.2) Transitional rules for outgo

1050、ing Appellate Body members: /3) The meaning of municipal law as an issue of fact:Members confirm that the Appellate Body shall not review panels fact-finding, such as the meaning of municipal law, as an issue of law.158Axel Berger and Clara Brandi4) Findings unnecessary for the resolution of the dis

1051、pute:- Members confirm that when the Appellate Body addresses the issues raised by the parties to the dispute per paragraph 12 of Article 17 of the DSU, the scope of the appellate review shall be limited to issues of law covered in a panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel in s

1052、trict compliance with paragraph 6 of Article 17 of the DSU.- Members affirm that they should refrain from filing appeals to the Appellate Body beyond the remit of the Appellate Body.5) The issue of precedent:- Members confirm that an interpretation by the Appellate Body of any WTO provision does not

1053、 constitute a precedent for posterior interpretations.- Members confirm that panels may adopt an interpretation of a WTO provision that is different from the one developed by the Appellate Body.- Members reaffirm the important role of the dispute-settlement sys-tem in providing security and predicta

1054、bility, as stated in paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the DSU.6) Further: Rights and obligations of members and dialogue between the DSB and AB:- Members confirm that recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements, in accorda

1055、nce with paragraph 2 of Article 3 and paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the DSU.- Members also confirm that panels and the Appellate Body should refrain from making a finding or recommendation on any of the issues of law and legal interpretation of relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement to the extent t

1056、hat the finding or recommendation adds to or diminishes the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.- Members confirm that panels and the Appellate Body shall interpret, in accordance with paragraph 6(ii) of Article 17 of the Anti-dumping Agreement, any provision of that Agreement

1057、that admits of more than one permissible interpretation, so as not to add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.- In order to ensure the implementation of the decision afterwards, the DSB, in consultation with the Appellate Body, will establish a reg-ular dialo

1058、gue channel between the DSB and the Appellate Body.Members affirm that they will also consider how to ensure the imple-mentation of the outcomes of the regular dialogue between the DSB and the Appellate Body.159Appendix Chapter 2Thailand25 April 20191) The issue of 90 days:- Article 17.5 of the DSU

1059、provides that “in no case shall Appellate Body proceedings exceed 90 days”. Thus, Article 17.5 requires that appel-late review shall be completed strictly within 90 days.- In this regard, members exhort the Appellate Body to observe this rule strictly and, to the extent possible, where necessary, to

1060、 expedite appellate proceedings in order to meet the DSU-mandated timeframe. The Appellate Body shall generally strive to complete appeals in the order in which they were initiated.- It is recognized that there may be cases of unusual complexity, or periods of numerous appeals, in which the 90-day d

1061、eadline may excessively constrain the Appellate Bodys ability to produce a report of the quality that the parties deserve.- In cases in which the Appellate Body considers that it would be diffi-cult to meet the 90-day deadline, the Appellate Body should immedi-ately communicate with the parties to t

1062、he dispute and consult on how the proceedings could be expedited. These may include, depending on the circumstances of each case, limiting the length of parties submis-sions, limiting the scope of issues on appeal raised by the parties and circulating the Appellate Body report before translation of

1063、the report has been completed. These consultations shall be without prejudice to the role of the Appellate Body as an objective and impartial adjudi-cator of the dispute. The result of the consultations shall be notified to the DSB.- In situations in which the Appellate Body consults with parties to

1064、 a dispute regarding the 90-day deadline, the parties shall make good-faith efforts to facilitate the appeal process. In doing so, the parties shall take into account the interests of the parties to other pending or upcoming appeals.- Regardless of whether or not the Appellate Body issues the report

1065、 within the deadline, the Appellate Body report shall be deemed to be properly issued and shall be adopted by the DSB in accordance with the rules contained in Article 17.14 of the DSU.2) Transitional rules for outgoing Appellate Body members:- Appellate Body members are appointed by the DSB, pursua

1066、nt to Arti-cles 17.1 and 17.2 of the DSU. A practical concern arises when an out-going Appellate Body members mandate ends while that member is performing his or her duties in an ongoing appeal. The importance of this situation lies in addressing this concern in a manner that ensures that the Appell

1067、ate Body can discharge its duties properly in a timely manner, including by circulating its report in any given dispute with as little delay as possible.- An Appellate Body member whose term expires during an appeal to which he/she has been assigned shall complete his/her work only upon approval by

1068、the DSB. At the request of the Chairperson of the Appellate Body, the DSB shall grant the approval automatically in appeals in which the oral hearing takes place at least 30 days before the completion of the term of the outgoing Appellate Body member.160Axel Berger and Clara Brandi- The Appellate Bo

1069、dy is requested to remove the current Rule 15 from the Working Procedures for appellate review.3) The meaning of municipal law as an issue of fact:- Article 17.6 of the DSU clearly limits the scope of the Appellate Bodys review to “issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations

1070、developed by the panel”.- Under public international law, the meaning of municipal law is nor-mally considered to be a question of fact. The DSU does not address this issue. Hence, issues sometimes arise when a panels findings are viewed as involving “mixed” questions of fact and law.- In these circ

1071、umstances, panels are encouraged to characterize their findings as factual or as legal, as appropriate, bearing in mind that the meaning of municipal law of a member is not a question of law. Where issues concerning the proper meaning of municipal law arise on appeal, the Appellate Body should affor

1072、d due consideration to the panels characterization.4) Findings unnecessary for the resolution of the dispute:- Under Article 17.12 of the DSU, the Appellate Body is required to “address each of the issues raised” in the appeal. In addition, Article 3.7 of the DSU provides that the aim of the dispute

1073、-settlement mech-anism is to secure a positive solution of the dispute. In addressing each of the issues raised on appeal, the Appellate Body shall consider carefully, in the light of the findings of the panel and its own judge-ment, the extent to which findings on each issue raised are necessary to

1074、 secure a positive solution to the dispute. The Appellate Body shall also consider carefully the precise nature of the findings to be made on each issue raised, in the light of Article 3.7.- The Appellate Body shall explore this issue with the parties upon initiation of appeal proceedings and during

1075、 the oral hearing, with a view to avoiding findings that are not necessary to achieve the over-riding purpose of securing a positive resolution to a dispute. It is rec-ognized, however, that the parties may disagree on what findings are necessary to achieve this purpose and that the decision finally

1076、 lies with the Appellate Body as the objective and impartial adjudicator of the dispute.- In its reports, the Appellate Body shall explicitly indicate why it con-sidered that issuing particular findings requested by the parties was necessary for the resolution of the appeal before it, and why it con

1077、-sidered that making other findings requested by the parties was not necessary for the resolution of the appeal.5) The issue of precedent:- Under Article 3.2 of the DSU, the role of panels and the Appellate Body is to preserve the rights and obligations of members under the covered agreements and to

1078、 clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Panels and the Appellate Body, in their 161Appendix Chapter 2Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay25 April 2019 reports, cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligati

1079、ons of WTO members under the covered agreements.- Similarly, the findings of panels and the Appellate Body are not authoritative interpretations of general applications of the covered agreements. Under Article IX: 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement, the exclusive authority to adopt such interpretations is

1080、 granted to the Ministerial Conference and the General Council. In these circum-stances, adopted panel and Appellate Body reports, as such, do not have any binding effect on panels or the Appellate Body in subsequent disputes.- It is, nevertheless, recognized that it is useful for parties in panel a

1081、nd Appellate Body proceedings to refer to prior panel and Appellate Body reports in developing their arguments. In considering these arguments, panels (in making their assessment under Article 11 of the DSU) and the Appellate Body should carefully consider the extent to which prior reports are relev

1082、ant to the issues before them. Panels and the Appellate Body should explain in their reports the extent to which they considered the prior reports to be relevant to the dispute at hand.6) Further: Dialogue between members and the adjudicative bodies of the WTO:Desiring to ensure the effective and sm

1083、ooth functioning of the WTO dispute-settlement system in a manner that duly preserves the rights and obligations of members under the covered agreements, members recognize the value of having regular dialogue between members and the adjudicative bodies of the WTO. To this end, the DSB shall hold ann

1084、ual meetings with members of the Appellate Body. The meetings, the function of which is recognized as not affecting the legitimacy of an Appellate Body report, shall be open to all members and any mem-bers of the Appellate Body. All Appellate Body members should, to the extent possible, be present a

1085、t the meetings. Furthermore, the meet-ings shall be without prejudice to the right of members to express their views on an Appellate Body report as provided under Article 17.14 of the DSU, and shall be conducted in a manner that ensures the integrity and impartiality of the appellate review.1) The i

1086、ssue of 90 days:- The deadlines established under Article 17.5 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) are binding and accord no discretion to the Appellate Body to issue reports outside the 90-day deadline set out therein.- At the request of the parti

1087、es to a dispute, the DSB may decide to deem a report issued beyond the 90-day deadline set out in Article 17.5 to be an Appellate Body report circulated pursuant to Article 17.5 of the DSU.162Axel Berger and Clara Brandi2) Transitional rules for outgoing Appellate Body members:Only the Ministerial C

1088、onference or the DSB may authorize a person who ceases to be a member of the Appellate Body to complete the disposition of any appeal to which that person was assigned while a member of the Appellate Body.3) The meaning of municipal law as an issue of fact:Descriptions or factual findings contained

1089、in the factual section of a panel report, issued to the parties pursuant to Article 15.1 of the DSU and possibly modified after the interim review stage, are not suscep-tible to appellate review.4) Findings unnecessary for the resolution of the dispute:- Findings by a panel and the Appellate Body ar

1090、e restricted to those necessary to assist the DSB, in the context of a specific dispute, in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements, including recommendations pursuant to Articles 19.1 and 26 of the DSU.- Article 3.2 of the DSU is not meant to encou

1091、rage panels or the Appel-late Body to clarify existing provisions of the covered agreements outside the context of resolving a particular dispute, nor to provide opinions beyond the findings that are necessary to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings in the context of

1092、 a particular dispute.- To address an issue pursuant to Article 17.12, the Appellate Body may consider and dispose of the issue to the extent necessary to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings pro-vided for in the covered agreements. Such action does not necessarily r

1093、equire addressing the merits of particular claims (e.g. by reasons of judicial economy).5) The issue of precedent:- Pursuant to Article IX of the WTO Agreement, the Ministerial Con-ference and the General Council have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the WTO Agreement and the Mult

1094、ilateral Trade Agreements.- In deciding to adopt panel or Appellate Body reports, the DSB does not intend that such adoption constitute a general and prospective endorsement, by the WTO membership, of any interpretations of provisions of the covered agreements contained in the reports. Such interpre

1095、tations, therefore, do not become definitive interpretations of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements by virtue of the adoption of panel or Appellate Body reports by the DSB.- Panels and the Appellate Body are thus not legally bound by the rea-soning and findings of previous panel and Ap

1096、pellate Body reports.- In recognition that such reports create legitimate expectations among WTO members, they should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute especially if adjudicators find the rea-soning in such reports sufficiently persuasive to rely on it in conduct-163Append

1097、ix Chapter 2African Group26 June 2019ing their own assessment of the matter in a dispute.6) Further: Filling of vacancies on the Appellate Body:- WTO members sitting on the DSB have a collective duty to ensure that vacancies in the Appellate Body shall be filled as they arise, as provided for in Art

1098、icle 17.2 of the DSU.- To assist members in discharging that duty, the selection procedure to fill a vacancy that will arise as a result of the expiry of the man-date of an Appellate Body member shall be launched by the Chair of the DSB 180 days before the expiry of that members mandate. If a vacanc

1099、y arises before the regular expiry of an Appellate Body mem-bers mandate or as a result of any other situation, the Chair of the DSB shall immediately launch the selection procedure with a view to filling that vacancy as soon as possible.1) The issue of 90 days:- The duration of ninety (90) days for

1100、 the examination of cases sub-mitted to the Appellate Body and the presentation of reports should be maintained. However, in exceptional circumstances, the Appellate Body may exceed the ninety (90) day time limit but not more than one hundred and twenty (120) days for the examination of cases referr

1101、ed to the Appellate Body, and for the submission of expected reports. Days not worked (weekends and public holidays) should not be counted. This provision will amend paragraph 5 of Article 17 of the DSU.- The volume of documentation of parties submissions should not exceed thirty (30) pages.2) Trans

1102、itional rules for outgoing Appellate Body members:- The Appellate Body selection process shall be launched automati-cally no later than three (3) months before expiry of the term of office.- Rule 15 should be maintained to allow outgoing Appellate Body members to discharge their duties until the pos

1103、ition has been filled but not longer than a period of two (2) years following the expiry of the term of office.3) The meaning of municipal law as an issue of fact: /4) Findings unnecessary for the resolution of the dispute:Findings unnecessary and unrelated to the resolution of a dispute may affect

1104、the rights and obligations of members. The AB should limit itself to the issues raised by the parties to the dispute. Under no cir-cumstances should it pronounce on issues not raised by any parties to the dispute.5) The issue of precedent: /164Axel Berger and Clara BrandiTaiwan8 April 20196) Further

1105、: Term of office for AB and number of members:- The maximum term of office of members of the WTO Appellate Body shall be seven (7) years, non-renewable. This provision will amend paragraph 2 of Article 17 of the DSU.- Increase the number of the Appellate Body members from seven (7) to nine (9) membe

1106、rs. In the composition of the Appellate Body, factors such as regional balance, gender representivity and multilingualism may be considered. This provision will amend paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the DSU.1) The issue of 90 days:Members re-confirm that the timeframes set out in Article 17.5 of the DS

1107、U are mandatory. These timeframes reflect members strong desire for the prompt settlement of disputes, as also indicated in Articles 3.3 and 21.1 of the DSU. Reading these timeframe provisions together with Article 17.6 of the DSU should also give the effect that the appel-late review be limited to

1108、issues of law which are necessary for the resolution of the dispute. Nevertheless, in consideration of practical needs, members agree that these timeframes could be extended on the agreement of the disputing parties.2) Transitional rules for outgoing Appellate Body members:Members re-confirm that th

1109、e rules as set out in Article 17.2 of the DSU, relating to the term of office and the procedure for appointment and reappointment of Appellate Body members, should be strictly fol-lowed. A case in which a person who ceases to be an Appellate Body member continues his or her disposition of an appeal

1110、can only be allowed by the DSB, or should be based on transitional rules agreed by the whole WTO membership.3) Findings unnecessary for the resolution of the dispute:Members clarify that Articles 3.3, 3.4, 17.5 and 17.12, being read together, should mean that the Appellate Body should review issues

1111、of law being raised to the extent that it achieves a prompt and satis-factory settlement of the dispute.4) The meaning of municipal law as an issue of fact:Members re-confirm that under Article 17.6 of the DSU, the appellate review should be limited to issues of law. For greater certainty, the “issu

1112、es of law” here do not include the panel findings with regard to the meaning of the municipal measures of a member. Members agree that the Appellate Body should refuse to review any appeals raised under Article 11 of the DSU on the panels factual findings unless the appellant establishes a prima fac

1113、ie case that the panel committed an egregious error that calls into question the good faith of that panel.165Appendix Chapter 2Honduras1 February 2019See also: WT/GC/W/7585) The issue of precedent:Members confirm that, under the DSU, panel and Appellate Body reports do not have binding precedential

1114、values. Findings of a panel and the Appellate Body should be based on the covered agreements and the evidence presented in each individual dispute. Neverthe-less, for the purpose of providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system as noted in Article 3.2 of the DSU, and to pr

1115、otect members legitimate legal expectations, the reasoning and interpretations made in prior disputes by panels and the Appellate Body may be taken into account by an adjudicator, after proper and independent deliberation, in addressing relevant issues.6) Further: Interaction mechanism:For the purpo

1116、se of facilitating communications between the Appel-late Body and the WTO members, the Secretariat should periodically publish a report to highlight and summarize the views and concerns expressed by members under Article 17.14 of the DSU on Appellate Body reports in particular, those relating to iss

1117、ues covered in these guidelines or other issues of systemic significance (e.g. exceeding the 90-day deadline). The Appellate Body shall endeavour to respond to those views and concerns by adapting its practices accordingly, and to indicate which steps it has taken to that effect in its annual report

1118、 or, if it deems proper, in a dedicated document, which may be published at a higher frequency.1) The issue of 90 days:- Members need to decide what time period they want to allocate to an appeal after the conclusion of the panel process.Members may explore how to streamline the appellate process. T

1119、he right of appeal extends the period of the dispute-settlement process, and hence needs to be limited and subject to certain conditions.- Better cooperation between disputing parties and the Appellate Body, and incorporating more stringent adherence to conditions of appeal, may reduce unnecessary d

1120、elays.- Members may have to decide on the nature of the time period allo-cated to an appeal, whether such a deadline is mandatory and the con-sequences of its non-respect.2) Transitional rules for outgoing Appellate Body members: /3) The meaning of municipal law as an issue of fact: /4) Findings unn

1121、ecessary for the resolution of the dispute: /5) The issue of precedent:- Members could agree that a dispute-settlement report forms prece-dent only by unanimous consent.166Axel Berger and Clara BrandiBolivia, Cuba, Ecua-dor, India, Malawi, Oman, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe22 July 2019

1122、David Walker4th Report on convergence15 October 2019- “Rule of reiteration”. If a certain WTO rule is interpreted the same way a number of times by the Appellate Body, it could automatically be considered to have set a precedent for how that rule should be interpreted.- Another iteration of this con

1123、cept would allow members to adopt via unanimous consensus an interpretation of a WTO rule if it had been interpreted in the same way across multiple cases.- Or allow the Appellate Body to be instructed to endorse a certain interpretation of a rule made in a previous report, if there is unanim-ity am

1124、ong Appellate Body members on that interpretation.- A functioning, independent and effective dispute-settlement sys-tem is indispensable for preserving the rights and obligations of all WTO members and for ensuring that the rules are enforced in a fair and even-handed manner. Without such a system t

1125、here would be no incentive to negotiate new rules or to undertake reforms. Therefore, resolution of the Appellate Body (AB) impasse needs to precede other reforms.- As per Articles 17.1 and 17.2 of the DSU, all WTO members have a collective duty to ensure the maintenance of a standing Appellate Body

1126、 comprising seven members. It would be disingenuous to use the pretext of the Appellate Bodys alleged digression from the clear man-date of the DSU to justify wilful non-compliance with the same by the membership.- Attempts at addressing the crisis in the dispute-settlement sys-tem must preserve its

1127、 essential features namely, an independent, two-tier dispute-settlement system automaticity in the launch of proceedings and decision-making by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) by negative consensus, where provided. Developing members concerns about affordability and equitable access to the use of

1128、the dis-pute-settlement system are also very important.1) The issue of 90 days:- Consistent with Article 17.5 of the DSU, the Appellate Body is obli-gated to issue its report no later than 90 days from the date on which a party to the dispute notifies its intention to appeal.- In cases of unusual co

1129、mplexity or periods of numerous appeals, the parties may agree with the Appellate Body to extend the timeframe for issuance of the Appellate Body report beyond 90 days. Any such agreement will be notified to the DSB by the parties and the Chair of the Appellate Body.2) Transitional rules for outgoin

1130、g Appellate Body members:- Only WTO members may appoint members of the Appellate Body.- The Dispute Settlement Body (the “DSB”) has the explicit authority, and responsibility, to determine membership of the Appellate Body, and is obligated to fill vacancies as they arise.- To assist members in disch

1131、arging this responsibility, the selection 167Appendix Chapter 2process to replace outgoing Appellate Body members shall be auto-matically launched 180 days before the expiry of their term in office. Such selection processes shall follow past practice.- If a vacancy arises before the regular expiry o

1132、f an Appellate Body members mandate, or as a result of any other situation, the Chair of the DSB shall immediately launch the selection process with a view to filling that vacancy as soon as possible.- Appellate Body members nearing the end of their terms may be assigned to a new division up until 6

1133、0 days before the expiry of their term.- An Appellate Body member so assigned may complete an appeal process in which the oral hearing has been held prior to the normal expiry of their term.3) The meaning of municipal law as an issue of fact:- The “meaning of municipal law” is to be treated as a mat

1134、ter of fact, and therefore is not subject to appeal.- The DSU does not permit the Appellate Body to engage in a “de novo” review or to “complete the analysis” of the facts of a dispute.- Consistent with Article 17.6 of the DSU, it is incumbent upon mem-bers engaged in appellate proceedings to refrai

1135、n from advancing extensive and unnecessary arguments in an attempt to have factual findings overturned on appeal, under DSU Article 11, in a de facto “de novo review”.4) Findings unnecessary for the resolution of the dispute:- Issues that have not been raised by either party may not be ruled or deci

1136、ded upon by the Appellate Body.- Consistent with Article 3.4 of the DSU, the Appellate Body shall address issues raised by parties in accordance with DSU Article 17.6 only to the extent necessary to assist the DSB in making the recom-mendations or in giving the ruling provided for in the covered agr

1137、ee-ments in order to resolve the dispute.5) The issue of precedent:- Precedent is not created through WTO dispute-settlement proceedings.- Consistency and predictability in the interpretation of rights and obligations under the covered agreements is of significant value to members.- Panels and the A

1138、ppellate Body should take previous panel/Appellate Body reports into account to the extent that they find them relevant in the dispute that they have before them.6) Further: “Overreach”:- As provided in Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU, findings and recom-mendations of panels and the Appellate Body,

1139、 and recommendations and rulings of the DSB, cannot add to or diminish the rights and obli-gations provided in the covered agreements.168Axel Berger and Clara BrandiCountryUnited States15 February 2019See also:WT/GC/W/757/Rev.1Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Malawi, Oman, South Africa, - Panels and t

1140、he Appellate Body shall interpret provisions of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 in accordance with Article 17.6(ii) of that agreement.7) Further: Dialogue between the DSB and AB:- The DSB, in consultation with the AB, will establish a

1141、mechanism for regular dialogue between WTO members and the AB whereby mem-bers can express their views on issues, including in relation to imple-mentation of this decision, in a manner unrelated to the adoption of particular reports.- Such a mechanism will be in the form of an informal meeting, at l

1142、east once a year, hosted by the Chair of the DSB.To safeguard the independence and impartiality of the AB, clear ground rules will be provided to ensure that at no point should there be any discussion of ongoing disputes or any member of the AB.Proposals / Position Statement1) To facilitate the full

1143、 implementation of future WTO agreements and to ensure that the maximum benefits of trade accrue to those members with the greatest difficulty integrating into the multilateral trading system, the following categories of members will not avail themselves of special and differential treatment (SDT) i

1144、n current and future WTO negotiations:- a WTO member that is a Member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or a WTO member that has begun the accession process to the OECD;- a WTO member that is a member of the Group of 20 (G20);- a WTO member that is classified as a

1145、“high income” country by the World Bank; or- a WTO member that accounts for no less than 0.5 percent of global merchandise trade (imports and exports).2) Nothing in this decision precludes reaching agreement that in sec-tor-specific negotiations other members are also ineligible for special and diff

1146、erential treatment.1) Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) is a treaty-embedded and non-negotiable right for all developing members. The available data indicates that the gap in the standards of living between devel-oping and developed countries has not narrowed to any significant Table 3 | WTO

1147、reform proposals on development / Special and Differential Treatment (SDT)169Appendix Chapter 2Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe22 July 2019See also:WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2extent since the establishment of the WTO. This necessitates the preservation and strengthening of the SDT provisions in both cur-rent and

1148、future WTO agreements, with priority to outstanding Least Developed Country (LDC) issues.2) The multilateral trading system must give policy space for devel-oping members to fulfil their development goals, including industri-alization. Developing members continue to confront many formidable challeng

1149、es, which underscores the continued relevance of SDT pro-visions in their favour. The long-awaited outstanding “development” issues from the Doha Round continue to be paramount, and include:- Implementation issues aimed at rebalancing the imbalanced rules from the Uruguay Round such as in the areas

1150、of agriculture, TRIMS (Trade Related Investment Measures), TRIPS (Trade Related Intellec-tual Property Rights), Subsidies Agreement, etc.- Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) strengthening and mak-ing effective and operational the SDT provisions in WTO agreements, in accordance with paragraph 4

1151、4 of the Doha Declaration.- Cotton the imbalances in Agriculture Domestic Support due to Aggregate Measures of Support (AMS) beyond de minimis, leading to subsidized exports by some, show up clearly in the area of cotton, where cotton prices have been depressed. This has impacted nega-tively on rura

1152、l livelihoods and employment across many developing countries including the C4 members. The “cotton four” (C4) coun-tries are Burkina Faso, Benin, Chad and Mali.- Public Stockholding (PSH) a permanent solution must be agreed upon and adopted. The General Council Decision of 27 November 2014 (WT/L/93

1153、9) says that “If a permanent solution for the issue of PSH is not agreed and adopted by the 11th Ministerial Conference, the mech-anism shall continue to be in place until a permanent solution is agreed and adopted”.- Special Safeguard Mechanism Ministers in Nairobi (WT/MIN(15)/43) mandated Members

1154、to “pursue negotiations on an SSM for developing country members in dedicated sessions of the Commit-tee on Agriculture in Special Session”.- Agriculture Domestic Supports to rectify the imbalances in the existing rules due to some members having AMS entitlements whilst others do not. High per-farme

1155、r subsidies by OECD countries, with huge flexibility, continue to have serious implications on food insecu-rity and rural poverty in developing countries.3) In addition to the issues mentioned above, work should also con-tinue on the following issues emphasizing the development compo-nents and in ac

1156、cordance with existing mandates:- Fisheries subsidies in accordance with the Doha, Hong Kong and MC11 Ministerial Declarations. All of these emphasize the importance of SDT in the outcome of these negotiations because of the “impor-tance of this sector to development priorities, poverty reduction, a

1157、nd livelihood and food security concerns”. SDG 14.6 also reinforces SDT.Axel Berger and Clara Brandi170Norway, Canada, Hong Kong, China, Iceland, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore and Switzerland21 September 2018- Discussions under the 1998 E-Commerce Work Programme in the relevant WTO bodies.4) Anothe

1158、r issue that must be addressed in any reform process relates to the alleged theft of traditional knowledge that is held, preserved and developed by traditional communities/indigenous peoples. The rules of the multilateral trading system must also support developing countries in building their techno

1159、logical capacities, and their access to affordable medicines and medical technologies.5) The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) articulate impor-tant development challenges still confronting developing countries, including overcoming poverty and hunger. WTO rules must be sup-portive, rather than a

1160、 constraint on these efforts.1) The contribution of trade to sustainable development is at the heart of the multilateral trading system. SDT is an important tool for enabling development and greater participation in the multilateral trading system. It forms part of the context of negotiations across

1161、 the range of policy areas in which the WTO is engaged.2) Aiming at consensus on a negotiated set of criteria for when a devel-oping member should have access to SDT is neither realistic nor neces-sarily useful. The question should rather be how SDT could be designed to address the development chall

1162、enges that members are facing. It is the negotiated result that matters, not the categorization of members. However, the special treatment of LDCs should be maintained.3) The tools already exist for a creative and effective approach to flex-ibilities that responds to the development needs of members

1163、. Such an approach would enable fuller participation and, at the same time, contribute to an appropriate balance of rights and obligations among WTO members.4) Development concerns have been addressed in many ways in the past. This should inspire us to explore how the development dimen-sion, includi

1164、ng SDT, can best be pursued in a pragmatic and creative manner in current and future negotiations. SDT enables developing members, and especially the LDCs, to secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development. What is important is the contr

1165、ibution in terms of bind-ing commitments that each member is able to make within each area of current and future negotiations. Implementing our shared commit-ment to SDT in a more flexible and effective way can help to make the most of these contributions, facilitating the greater integration of dev

1166、eloping members into international trade and the multilateral trading system.171Appendix Chapter 2China13 May 2019See also:WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2European UnionCommission Con-cept Paper; not WTO communication18 September 20181) Issue and problem:Development issue is at the centre of WTO work. The WTO agre

1167、e-ments have set forth special and differential treatment (SDT) provi-sions for developing members. However, most of these provisions are best-endeavour clauses in nature, and their implementation leaves much to be desired. Furthermore, some members are challenging the entitlement of developing memb

1168、ers to SDT, disregarding the systemic gaps between developing and developed members. They even request that some developing members assume the same obligations as those of developed members.2) Objective and task:Development remains an important theme of the times. It is crucial for the WTO to safegu

1169、ard the rights of developing members to SDT and to make SDT provisions more precise, effective and operational. This will be conducive to reducing the development deficit in trade rules and contributing to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations 2030 Agenda.3) Acti

1170、on and proposal:China, together with some other WTO members, has submitted a joint proposal (WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2) on SDT, and calls for continued pres-ervation of the rights of developing members to SDT. China further proposes the following:- Enhance the implementation and monitoring of existing SDT p

1171、rovi-sions particularly, the implementation of duty-free and quota-free treatment and the preferential treatment to services and service sup-pliers of the LDCs.- Provide more targeted and concrete technical assistance to ensure the integration of developing members into the multilateral trading syst

1172、em and global value chains.- Advance the negotiations on SDT provisions in accordance with the Doha Ministerial Declaration.- Accord adequate and effective SDT treatment to developing mem-bers in future negotiations on trade and investment rules.- Encourage developing members to actively assume obli

1173、gations com-mensurate with their level of development and economic capability.1) Graduation:Members should be actively encouraged to “graduate” and opt out of SDT, whether horizontally or by agreement. In the interim, members should be encouraged to clarify in which areas they actually use exist-ing

1174、 flexibilities, and to present roadmaps detailing when they would expect to be able to assume all the obligations stemming from the WTO agreement. This could form an integral part of a members Trade Policy Review (TPR) process.172Axel Berger and Clara Brandi2) Special and Differential Treatment (SDT

1175、) in future agreements:While acknowledging the need for particularly flexible treatment of LDCs, flexibilities available to other members should move away from open-ended block exemptions towards a needs-driven and evi-dence-based approach that will ensure that SDT will be as targeted as possible. V

1176、arious approaches can be used, which should satisfy the following principles:- The agreement in question will eventually be universally imple-mented, so that the core rights and obligations will apply to everyone and any exceptions will be time-bound.- Inbuilt flexibility in the form of additional c

1177、ommitments going beyond a core set of provisions should cater for differences among members.- The flexibilities available in any agreement should be proportional to the number of members participating and the ambition of the agreement.There are a number of tools that can be used to implement these p

1178、ro-posals for example, differentiation, graduation mechanisms, grace periods and assistance linked to implementation.3) Additional SDT in existing agreements:Though existing SDT provisions in current agreements should not be contested, when members request additional SDT this should be done only on

1179、the basis of a case-by-case analysis, on the basis of:- a clear identification of the development objective that is being affected by the rule in question;- an economic analysis of the impact of the rule and of the expected benefits of its relaxation;- an analysis of the impact of the requested flex

1180、ibility on other WTO members; and- a specification of the time period for which flexibility is requested and of its scope of application (one member, a group of members or all developing-country members).Depending on the outcome of this analysis, various approaches can be used to consider additional

1181、 flexibilities.Table 4 | WTO reform proposals per issue and country: Transparency and notificationsProposals / Position Statement1) The Working Group on Notification Obligations and Procedures (Working Group) shall meet before x date to develop recommenda-tions on improving member compliance with no

1182、tification obligations under the agreements and understandings listed . The Working Group will also consult with the WTO Secretariat as appropriate, including the WTO Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation (ITTC) to assess the contribution of WTO trade-related technical assistance to impro

1183、ving notification compliance, as well as the Cen-CountryArgentina, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan and United States27 June 2019173Appendix Chapter 2tral Registry of Notifications. The Working Group will report to the Council for Trade in Goods on its findin

1184、gs before x date, and provide updates at each subsequent meeting.2) Instruct the Working Group to work with the Secretariat to update the Technical Cooperation Handbook on Notification Requirements for each of the agreements and understandings listed and present it to the Council for Trade in Goods

1185、for its x date meeting.3) Instruct the Trade Policy Review Body to ensure that beginning in 20XX all trade-policy reviews include a specific, standardized focus on the members compliance with its notification obligations under the agreements and understandings listed .4) A member that fails to provi

1186、de a required notification within the deadline referenced in the relevant agreement or understanding listed is encouraged to submit to the relevant committee by six months after the relevant deadline and every six months thereafter an explanation for the delay, the anticipated timeframe for its noti

1187、-fication and any elements of a partial notification that a member can produce to limit any delay in transparency.5) If a member fails to provide a required notification within the deadline referenced in the relevant agreement or understanding listed , the member may request the Secretariat to provi

1188、de assis-tance in researching the matter and, in full consultation with the rel-evant member, and only with the approval of that member, provide a notification on its behalf.6) A developing-country member encountering difficulties in fulfill-ing its notification obligations is encouraged:- to reques

1189、t assistance and support for capacity building from the Sec-retariat, either in the form of WTO trade-related technical assistance or as ad hoc assistance for a particular notification; and- to submit to the relevant committee and to the Working Group by six months after the deadline provided under

1190、the relevant agreement or understanding listed and every six months thereafter information on those notifications that it has not submitted due to a lack of capacity, including information on the assistance and support for capacity build-ing that the member requires in order to submit required notif

1191、ications.7) With respect to the notification referred to as DS:1 in the Commit-tee on Agricultures Notification Requirements and Formats (G/AG/2), the deadline for the purposes of paragraphs 5 and 7(b) of this decision shall be two years following the notification deadline required under G/AG/2. Thi

1192、s paragraph shall cease to operate once an update of G/AG/2 has been adopted. An update of G/AG/2 is encouraged within two years of this decision.8) Encourage members, at any time, to bring to the attention of the rel-174Axel Berger and Clara Brandievant committee information that they consider has

1193、not been notified by another member in accordance with the agreements and under-standings listed .9) Beginning in 20XX, if a member fails to submit a required notification:- except as provided in subparagraphs (b) and (c), by one year from the deadline provided under the relevant agreement or unders

1194、tand-ing listed ;- by three years from the deadline required under the Committee on Agricultures Notification Requirements and Formats (G/AG/2) with respect to the notification referred to as DS:1; or- by one year of this decision being adopted with respect to an out-standing one-time notification,

1195、or required update, containing the most current information;the following administrative measures shall apply to that member:i. the member shall be designated as a member with notification delay;ii. representatives of the member will be called upon in WTO formal meetings after all other members have

1196、 taken the floor, and before any observers;iii. when the member with notification delay takes the floor in the General Council it will be identified as such;iv. the Secretariat shall report annually to the Council for Trade in Goods on the status of the members notifications; andv. representatives o

1197、f the member cannot be nominated to preside over WTO bodies.10) If after one year of the administrative measures in paragraph 9, above, being applied, the member has failed to submit the relevant notification, the following administrative measures shall also be applied to the member, in addition to

1198、the measures in paragraph 9the member shall be subject to specific reporting at the General Coun-cil meetings;questions posed by the member to another member during a trade policy review need not be answered; andthe member shall be assessed a charge by the Secretariat at the rate of x5 per cent of i

1199、ts normal assessed contribution to the WTO budget, to be effective in the following biennial budget cycle, that may be used for the purpose of providing members with technical assistance to fulfil notification obligations, including through the ITTC.11) The commencement of the administrative measure

1200、s identified in paragraphs 9 and 10, above, shall be deferred a year, respectively, for a developing-country member that has submitted information on the assistance and support for capacity building that the member requires, as set out in paragraph 6, above, if the member still fails to provide the

1201、required notification.12) When the administrative measures identified in paragraphs 9 and 175Appendix Chapter 2Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Malawi, Oman, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe22 July 2019See also: JOB/GC/21810, above, are applied to any member, the Director-General will notify

1202、 the ministers of those members responsible for the WTO of the admin-istrative measures being applied with respect to those members.13) Once any such member comes into compliance with its notifica-tion requirements, the administrative measures will cease to apply.1) Developing countries face challen

1203、ges in complying with all their notification obligations due to human-resource and institution-al-capacity constraints. Any non-compliance is not wilful. Treaty obligations must be performed in good faith. Yet despite the best of intentions, the ability to fulfil all notification obligations inevita

1204、bly depends on capacities that are commensurate with a members level of development and the resources available. In the light of these difficulties, we do not agree to additional transparency obligations. Any work in this area must be in the provision of capacity building to developing countries. De

1205、veloped members should also lead by exam-ple in submitting comprehensive, timely and accurate notifications.2) Some members have found innovative ways to undermine their WTO commitments, or not implement the spirit of those commit-ments. If the discussion on transparency goes beyond addressing capac

1206、ity issues, the first step must be to tackle the undermining of WTO commitments through:- regular notification of entry-related measures affecting existing Mode 4 commitments of members;- Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement developed countries have a legal obligation in the area of technology transf

1207、er towards LDCs, more transparency would be supportive of LDCs efforts to build a viable technological base;- the disclosure of origin of traditional knowledge and genetic resources in patent applications; and- transparency in tariffs non-ad valorem tariffs should be notified in ad valorem terms or

1208、converted to ad valorem tariffs.3) Transparency must also permeate the entire functioning of the WTO, including:- Taking note of the resource constraints of small delegations and thus rationalizing meetings at the WTO so that there are no overlaps. In areas in which there are active negotiations for

1209、 outcomes, these meetings should as far as possible take place in formal mode. They should always be open, inclusive and transparent, and take seriously the resource constraints of developing countries.- Ministerial Conferences (MCs) and the processes preceding them in Geneva. The basic principles a

1210、nd procedures for this member-driven organization need to be agreed upon. For instance, all meetings in the MC, which is the body for decision-making, should be open to all 176Axel Berger and Clara BrandiChina13 May 2019members without restricting the decision-making process to smaller Green Rooms.1

1211、) Issue and problem:At present, members overall fulfilment of notification obligations still falls short of the requirements under various WTO agreements. Due to their limited capacity and other constraints, some members could not submit the notifications on time. Meanwhile, the quality of counter-n

1212、otifications submitted by some members still needs further improvement.2) Objective and task:It is imperative to enhance the transparency of members trade poli-cies. Greater transparency will help to create an open, stable, predict-able, equitable and transparent international trading environment, a

1213、nd raise members confidence in the multilateral trading system.3) Action and proposal:- Developed members should lead by example in submitting compre-hensive, timely and accurate notifications.- Members should improve the quality of their counter-notifications.- Members should increase exchange of t

1214、heir experiences on notifications.- The WTO Secretariat needs to update the Technical Cooperation Handbook on Notifications as soon as possible, and intensify training in this regard.- Developing members should also endeavour to improve their compli-ance with notification obligations. Technical assi

1215、stance and capacity building should be provided to developing members in particular, LDCs if they are unable to fulfil notification obligations on time.Table 5 | WTO reform proposals on council and committee working proceduresProposals / Position Statement1) Meeting arrangements:- All documents to b

1216、e considered at a formal meeting of a WTO body including convening notices, which shall indicate the items proposed for the agenda shall be made available to members at least 15 cal-endar days before the meeting. This shall not apply to proposed and annotated agendas, which may be circulated closer

1217、to the meeting, or room documents, which may be circulated at any time. The Secretar-iat shall remind members of the closing dates for proposing items for the agendas.- Convening notices indicating the items proposed for the agenda shall CountryAlbania, Australia, European Union, Hong Kong, Iceland,

1218、 South Korea, Mol-dova, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Panama, Qatar, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, 177Appendix Chapter 2Turkey and Ukraine 21 October 2019indicate which trade concerns are raised for the first time and which have been previously raised, as well as how many times.

1219、Convening notices shall be unrestricted1 and made publicly available on the WTO website.- The minutes of a meeting of a WTO body shall normally be circulated within three weeks after the meeting and not later than 30 calendar days before the next regularly scheduled meeting of that body.- At the end

1220、 of the calendar year, the Secretariat shall circulate an indicative schedule of meetings for the coming year for each WTO body.- To the extent that the meeting arrangements set out in paragraphs 1 to 4 are in contradiction with rules set by individual councils and committees, the present decision s

1221、hall prevail. This includes where committees apply, mutatis mutandis, the Rules of Procedure for Meet-ings of the General Council.2) Consideration of trade concerns in WTO bodies:- Members requesting the inclusion of a trade concern in the agenda of a formal meeting for the first time should inform

1222、the respondent member(s) concerned and the Secretariat at least 20 calendar days prior to the meeting. They should provide the respondent member(s) with a substantive description of the concern so as to enable them to prepare a substantive reply. Respondent members shall endeavour to address the sub

1223、stance of the concerns raised at the first meeting in which the concern is included in the agenda.- Members raising a trade concern are encouraged to submit writ-ten questions or concerns to the respondent member(s). If a member receives written questions on a trade concern, that member should respo

1224、nd in writing within 30 calendar days of circulation of the writ-ten questions. Written questions and written replies on trade con-cerns shall be unrestricted, unless the member raising or responding to the trade concern requests otherwise.- The Secretariat will establish and manage a database on tr

1225、ade con-cerns in which all WTO documents pertaining to trade concerns are recorded, including written questions and replies, relevant minutes of meetings and relevant notifications. The database will contain a search facility to make all documents related to a particular trade concern easily accessi

1226、ble.- If concerns over the same measure are raised in different WTO bod-ies, the Chairperson assisted by the Secretariat shall, when the agenda item is taken up, give an overview of the relevant discussions that took place in other WTO bodies. This overview shall include informa-tion on which bodies

1227、 have addressed trade concerns over the same measure and how often, as well as a factual summary of substance.- The members raising and responding to a trade concern are encour-aged to consult with each other between formal meetings. As far as practicable and appropriate, they should report about th

1228、e outcome of their consultations at the next formal meeting if the trade concern is maintained on the agenda.178Axel Berger and Clara Brandi- When a trade concern is repeatedly raised at a WTO body, members taking the floor under the agenda item are encouraged, in order to make the best use of time

1229、and to the extent possible, to refer back to their previous statements which are on record.3) Informal resolution of trade concerns:- If a trade concern has remained on the agenda for three or more consecutive meetings without resolution, the member raising or responding to a trade concern may reque

1230、st the Chairperson to invite them to participate, on a voluntary basis, in an informal meeting with the objective of finding a way forward. The Secretariat shall participate, unless one of the members raising or responding to a trade concern disagrees. The member raising or responding to a trade con

1231、cern and the Chairperson may request the Secretariat to provide technical input. The Chairperson may invite other inter-ested members to the informal meeting if the members raising and responding to a trade concern so agree.- Members are encouraged to ensure the participation of capi-tal-based exper

1232、ts at the informal meeting as necessary and may request the Secretariat to facilitate their participation, including by means such as videoconferencing. If the members raising and responding to a trade concern agree, technical experts from organ-izations that have observer status in the body concern

1233、ed may par-ticipate at the technical meeting and may provide technical input upon request.- The Chairperson shall orally report about the outcome of the infor-mal meeting at the next formal meeting, unless the member rais-ing or responding to a trade concern disagree. The oral report shall include a

1234、 factual summary of views expressed and any way forward agreed by the members concerned.4) Assistance and review:- A developing-country member encountering difficulties in responding to a trade concern or in implementing these proce-dural guidelines is encouraged to request assistance from the WTO S

1235、ecretariat.- In the light of the experience gained from the operation of the pro-cedural guidelines, the General Council will, at an appropriate time, review and, if necessary, modify them.5) Scope and entry into force:- The procedural guidelines shall apply to the bodies set up pursuant to, and ref

1236、erred to by, Article IV of the Marrakesh Agreement Estab-lishing the World Trade Organization, with the exception of the Min-isterial Conference and the General Council including when it con-venes and acts as the Dispute Settlement Body and the Trade Policy Review Body. They shall also apply to the

1237、Committee of Participants on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products, which was established pursuant to the provisions of the Ministerial 179Appendix Chapter 2Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products3 and the Implementation of the Ministerial Declaration on Trade in

1238、Informa-tion Technology Products.- The present decision shall enter into force three months after the date of its adoption.Table 6 | WTO reform proposals on digital tradeProposals / Position Statement1) Infrastructure for electronic trade: /2) Open trading environment/trade facilitation:- Cross-bord

1239、er electronic information transfer should not be restricted if it is for business purposes (unless the restrictions are for “legitimate public policy objective(s)” and are not a “disguised restriction on trade”.- Government data, when publicly available, should be presented in a usable form.3) Elect

1240、ronic payments, contracts and paperless trading:- Electronic signatures should be legally accepted. Parties should be allowed to negotiate the best authentication methods for their trans-action, and should not be prevented from defending the legality of their transaction before the relevant authorit

1241、ies.- Members may require certain authentication standards for specific types of transactions.4) Customs duties:No customs duties should be imposed on electronic transmissions.5) Domestic regulations:Parties should “avoid unnecessary regulatory burden” and “facil-itate input by interested persons in

1242、 the development of its legal framework”.6) Intellectual property and source code:“No party shall require the transfer of, or access to, source code of software owned by a person of another Party” except in cases of legal investigations or enforcement action.7) Privacy and consumer protection:- Memb

1243、ers should enact regulations for protection of personal infor-mation, Information regarding access to redress and how businesses comply with regulations should be publicly available.- “Any restrictions on cross-border flows of personal information should be necessary and proportionate to the risks p

1244、resented”.CountryUnited StatesINF/ECOM/23180Axel Berger and Clara BrandiEuropean UnionINF/ECOM/228) Online security:- Members should build their capacity to respond to cybersecurity threats and “strengthen existing collaboration mechanisms”.- “Risk-based approaches” should be implemented for cyberse

1245、curity threat responses.9) Data localization:- “No Party shall require a covered person to use or locate computing facilities in that Partys territory as a condition for conducting busi-ness in that territory”.- No requirements regarding the locations of financial-services com-puting facilities.10)

1246、Developing countries and LDCs interests: /11) Inclusion (MSMEs and women):Interactive computer services should be promoted for e-commerce growth, and are important for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Open government data is especially important for SMEs.12) Digital products:Digital produc

1247、ts shall not be given less-favourable treatment (not applicable in cases of subsidies such as government-supported loans or insurance).13) Past agreements/frameworks: /1) Infrastructure for electronic trade:Open internet access should be maintained in members territories.2) Open trading environment/

1248、trade facilitation: /3) Electronic payments, contracts and paperless trading:- Electronic contracts should not be denied legality solely because they are in electronic form. Parties may negotiate the best authentica-tion methods for their transaction, and should not be prevented from proving the leg

1249、ality of their authentication to the relevant authorities.- Members may require specific certification standards for different types of transactions, provided standards are “objective, transpar-ent, and nondiscriminatory”.4) Customs duties: /5) Domestic regulations: /6) Intellectual property and sou

1250、rce code:Members shall not require the transfer of, or access to, the source code 181Appendix Chapter 2CanadaINF/ECOM/29, INF/ECOM/30of software owned by a natural or juridical person of other Members. The above is “without prejudice to” cases of violation of competition law, intellectual-property-r

1251、ights protection, and national-security interests.7) Privacy and consumer protection:- Measures should be taken to ensure that consumers have the oppor-tunity for redress and that traders are providing true information.- Consumers should be protected against unsolicited commercial electronic message

1252、s by requiring consent of the recipient and the opportunity to opt out. Suppliers should be obligated to disclose “on whose behalf unsolicited electronic messages are sent”.- “Members recognize the protection of personal data and privacy is a fundamental right” and that relevant safeguards should be

1253、 applied.8) Online security: /9) Data localization:Members should not require data to be processed at computing facil-ities in their territories. No requirement of data localization. No pro-hibition on storing or processing data in other members territories.10) Developing countries and LDCs interest

1254、s: /11) Inclusion (MSMEs and women): /12) Digital products: /13) Past agreements/frameworks: /1) Infrastructure for electronic trade:Consumers should be able to “access and use services and applica-tions” of their choice, “subject to reasonable network management”.2) Open trading environment/trade f

1255、acilitation: /3) Electronic payments, contracts and paperless trading:- Electronic signatures should not be denied legal validity. Parties should not be prevented from negotiating the best authentication meth-ods for their transaction, and should not be prevented from defending the legality of their

1256、 transaction before the relevant authorities.- Parties may require specific certification or performance standards for certain types of transactions.4) Customs duties:- No imposition of custom duties for electronically transmitted digital products.182Axel Berger and Clara BrandiJapanINF/ECOM/20- Mem

1257、bers may have internal fees on digital products.5) Domestic regulations: /6) Intellectual property and source code: /7) Privacy and consumer protection: /8) Online security: /9) Data localization: /10) Developing countries and LDCs interests: /11) Inclusion (MSMEs and women): /12) Digital products:

1258、/13) Past agreements/frameworks /1) Infrastructure for electronic trade:Consumers should have the ability to access information and services on the internet “subject to reasonable network management”.2) Open trading environment/trade facilitation:- Open cross-border electronic transfer of informatio

1259、n when it is for business purposes between members (exception: members may apply restrictions when needed for “a legitimate public policy objective”).- Members should increase public access to government data; any gov-ernment data that is made public should be available in a usable form.3) Electroni

1260、c payments, contracts and paperless trading:- Electronic signatures should be legally accepted unless domestic regulations specify otherwise.- Parties should be allowed to negotiate the best authentication meth-ods for their transaction, and should not be prevented from proving the legality of their

1261、 authentication methods to relevant authorities.- Electronic trade-administration documents should be made publicly available and legally acceptable.4) Customs duties:No customs duties should be imposed on electronic transmissions between members.5) Domestic regulations:- Members regulations should

1262、be “transparent, objective, reasona-ble” and designed “to meet legitimate public policy objectives”.183Appendix Chapter 2- Measures should be made publicly available in a timely fashion.6) Intellectual property and source code:- “No member shall require the transfer of, or access to, source code of

1263、software owned by a person of another Member”.- Members can require source-code modification for compliance “with laws and regulations which are not inconsistent with this Agreement” (exceptions to no disclosure of source code: patent or court requirements).- Members should not require manufacturers

1264、 or suppliers to disclose information or access to any technology or cryptography used in a product (except in cases of government-controlled networks and law-enforcement matters).7) Privacy and consumer protection:- Members should take consumer-protection measures against “fraudulent and deceptive

1265、commercial activities”.- Members should create their own frameworks specifying priva-cy-protection measures. Information regarding how to seek redress and how to comply with legal regulations should be published.- Members should cooperate amongst themselves to ensure that pri-vacy-protection framewo

1266、rks are compatible In the case of unsolicited commercial electronic messages, consumers must give consent to receive them or be given a way to opt out.8) Online security:Members should build their capacity to respond to cybersecurity threats and collaborate with other members.9) Data localization:“N

1267、o member shall require a person of Members to use or locate com-puting facilities in that Members territory as a condition for conduct-ing business in that territory” except in cases in which “legitimate public policy objective(s)” are being met.10) Developing countries and LDCs interests: /11) Incl

1268、usion (MSMEs and women): /12) Digital products:No discrimination in treatment of digital products (not applicable in cases of broadcasting).13) Past agreements/frameworks:Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 should apply to dispute settlement.184Axel Berger and Clara BrandiNew ZealandINF/ECOM/21Ukra

1269、ineINF/ECOM/281) Infrastructure for electronic trade: /2) Open trading environment/trade facilitation: /3) Electronic payments, contracts and paperless trading: /4) Customs duties: /5) Domestic regulations: /6) Intellectual property and source code: /7) Privacy and consumer protection:- Members shou

1270、ld enact consumer-protection laws to avoid harm from “misleading and deceptive conduct” (including misrepresenta-tions and false claims, false advertising, failure to or no intention to deliver products, unauthorized charging of consumers financial or telephone accounts).- Members national consumer-

1271、protection agencies should increase cooperation.8) Online security: /9) Data localization: /10) Developing countries and LDCs interests: /11) Inclusion (MSMEs and women): /12) Digital products: /13) Past agreements/frameworks: /1) Infrastructure for electronic trade:Customers should have the ability

1272、 to access information and services on the internet “subject to reasonable network management”.2) Open trading environment/trade facilitation:Government data that is publicly available should be searchable and usable.3) Electronic payments, contracts and paperless trading:- Electronic signatures sho

1273、uld not be denied legal validity.- Parties should not be prevented from determining the best authen-tication methods for their contract, or from defending the legality of their transaction before the relevant authorities.- Members may require certain authentication standards for specific 185Appendix

1274、 Chapter 2types of transaction.- Electronic trade-administration documents should be made publicly available and be legally accepted.4) Customs duties:No customs duties should be imposed on electronic transmissions (yet members may impose internal fees).5) Domestic regulations:Members should “avoid

1275、unnecessary regulatory burden on electronic transactions” and “facilitate input by interested persons in the devel-opment of its legal framework”.6) Intellectual property and source code:No requirements for access to source code as a condition for trade (except in the cases of achieving “a legitimat

1276、e public policy objective”, enforcement of intellectual-property rights, security concerns or court requirements).7) Privacy and consumer protection:- Members should enact consumer-protection laws and increase international cooperation between relevant national authorities.- Members should create fr

1277、ameworks for personal data protection. Members should develop compatible mechanisms that allow for increased cooperation between jurisdictions.- Measures should be taken to allow consumers to opt out or give prior consent before receiving unsolicited commercial electronic messages.8) Online security

1278、:Members should build their capacity to respond to cybersecurity threats and increase existing international cooperation.9) Data localization:No requirements for the location of computing facilities in a members territory (unless they are undertaken “to achieve a legitimate public policy objective”)

1279、.10) Developing countries and LDCs interests:Future texts should include “appropriate and effective special and dif-ferential treatment for developing country members and least devel-oped country members”.11) Inclusion (MSMEs and women):Increasing public availability to government data is important

1280、for SMEs12) Digital products:No discrimination in treatment of digital products.186Axel Berger and Clara BrandiBrazilINF/ECOM/2713) Past agreements/frameworks:WCO cross-border Ecommerce Framework of Standards should serve as a basis.1) Infrastructure for electronic trade:Free and open internet for “

1281、all legitimate commercial and develop-ment purposes”.2) Open trading environment/trade facilitation:- Avoid “barriers that constitute a disguised restriction on digital trade”.- Competition should not be prevented by online platforms.- Online platforms should not give “arbitrary or unjustifiable” ad

1282、van-tages to their own products. International cooperation for measuring digital-trade flows.3) Electronic payments, contracts, and paperless trading:- Electronic contracts, signatures and authentications should not be denied legality.- Parties involved in an electronic contract should be allowed to

1283、 “mutually determine the appropriate electronic methods for their transaction”.- Members can enact specific “objective, transparent, and nondiscrim-inatory” standards for authentication.- Administrative documents should be available electronically to the public.- No prior authorization principle.- I

1284、nternational cooperation to promote paperless trading.4) Customs duties:Members should not have to pay customs duties for electronic trans-missions. Members should not be prevented from having taxes or fees if they are “imposed in a manner consistent with this Agreement and on a non-discriminatory b

1285、asis”.5) Domestic regulations:- Clear frameworks to facilitate e-commerce development. Members may adopt exceptions to allowing cross-border electronic-informa-tion transfer provided that such exceptions “achieve a legitimate pub-lic policy objective” and are not “arbitrary or unjustifiable”.- Membe

1286、rs will not be prevented from enacting measures for “pro-tecting public morals or public order”, safety, security, privacy, war or emergency purposes.6) Intellectual property and source code: /7) Privacy and consumer protection:187Appendix Chapter 2ChinaINF/ECOM/19, INF/ECOM/32- Consumers should not

1287、 be sent marketing communications without consent.- Social-media platforms and digital apps should “inform consumers of the use of their personal information”.- Measures should be taken to prevent fraudulent commercial activi-ties and give redress to consumers.- Data privacy requires international c

1288、ooperation. Members should form frameworks for personal data protection, and publish informa-tion about them.8) Online security:International cooperation needed on matters of cybersecurity.Members should build cybersecurity response capacities.9) Data localization: /10) Developing countries and LDCs

1289、 interests: /11) Inclusion (MSMEs and women):It is important for MSMEs to increase their digital-trade participation.12) Digital products: /13) Past agreements/frameworks: /1) Infrastructure for electronic trade: /2) Open trading environment/trade facilitation:- Emphasis on transparency in e-commerc

1290、e laws and regulations.- Members should undertake “joint study and cooperative training” to promote information exchange.3) Electronic payments, contracts and paperless trading:- Electronic payments, trade-administration documents, invoices, contracts and signatures should be legally treated in the

1291、same way as their paper counterparts.- Trade-administration documents should be made publicly available in electronic form.4) Customs duties:The customs-duties moratorium for electronic transmissions should continue.5) Domestic regulations:- Agreement should take “full consideration of Members right

1292、 to regulate”.- Differing “industry development conditions, historical and cultural 188Axel Berger and Clara Branditraditions, legal systems”, and e-commerce development paths must be understood and respected.6) Intellectual property and source code: /7) Privacy and consumer protection:- Personal in

1293、formation of e-commerce users should be protected by members using the measures that they deem necessary.- No unsolicited electronic commercial messages to non-consenting consumers.- Members should “publish information on the personal information protections they provide”, including how individuals

1294、may pursue redress and businesses can comply with requirements.- Online consumers should be protected similarly to other consumers.- Judicial procedures should be maintained to solve disputes between consumers and e-commerce providers.- Members should increase cooperation between national consum-er-

1295、protection agencies.8) Online security:- Consumers using electronic commerce should be given protection like that of other consumers.- Members should increase cooperation and share best practices regarding cybersecurity.9) Data localization:The negotiations should not include the issues of data flow

1296、 or data storage or treatment of digital products at this time, due to differing views of members.10) Developing countries and LDCs interests:- Negotiation objectives to assist developing and LDC members to “integrate into global value chains, bridge the digital divide” and help to make trade more i

1297、nclusive.- An Electronic Commerce for Development programme should be created under the WTO framework to assist LDCs and developing members.11) Inclusion (MSMEs and women): /12) Digital products:The negotiations should not include the issues of data flow or data storage or treatment of digital produ

1298、cts at this time, due to differing views of members.13) Past agreements/frameworks:- “This negotiation should be complementary to the electronic com-merce discussion in relevant subsidiary bodies of the WTO”, and these bodies “should be informed of negotiation progress”.189Appendix Chapter 2TaiwanIN

1299、F/ECOM/24Hong KongINF/ECOM/26- The connection between current and past agreements should be clarified.1) Infrastructure for electronic trade:“The internet should remain free and open for all legitimate com-mercial and development purposes”.2) Open trading environment/trade facilitation: /3) Electron

1300、ic payments, contracts and paperless trading: /4) Customs duties: /5) Domestic regulations:Members may establish exceptions to the agreement of not restricting cross-border electronic-information transfer if it is not “arbitrary or unjustified discrimination” or if it is “necessary to achieve a legi

1301、timate public policy objective”. “A party may maintain a measure inconsist-ent with this agreement provided that such a measure is listed in its Schedule in the Annex of this Agreement”.6) Intellectual property and source code: /7) Privacy and consumer protection: /8) Online security: /9) Data local

1302、ization: /10) Developing countries and LDCs interests: /11) Inclusion (MSMEs and women): /12) Digital products: /13) Past agreements/frameworks: /1) Infrastructure for electronic trade: /2) Open trading environment/trade facilitation:Members should “open up government data and facilitate public acce

1303、ss”, using machine-readable formats and updating information in a timely manner.3) Electronic payments, contracts and paperless trading:190Axel Berger and Clara Brandi- Electronic signatures should be given legal validity.- Encourage electronic authentication. Parties shall be able to “mutu-ally det

1304、ermine the appropriate authentication methods” for their transaction and be allowed to defend it before judicial authorities.- Members may require their own specific authentication standards.- Electronic trade-administration documents should be legally accepted.4) Customs duties:No customs duties sh

1305、all be imposed on electronic transmissions; however, countries are free to impose their own internal fees if those are “consistent with the rules of the WTO”.5) Domestic regulations:Members should establish a legal framework for electronic transactions.6) Intellectual property and source code: /7) P

1306、rivacy and consumer protection:- Members should establish consumer-protection laws to protect against “fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices”.- National consumer-protection agencies should cooperate at the international level.- Members should create legal frameworks to protect users personal

1307、 information.- Redress and compliance information for individuals and businesses should be published.- Regarding unsolicited commercial electronic messages: consumers should be given the option of opting out of messages, or consumer consent must be required before sending messages.8) Online security

1308、: /9) Data localization: /10) Developing countries and LDCs interests: /11) Inclusion (MSMEs and women): /12) Digital products: /13) Past agreements/frameworks:Members legal frameworks should be “consistent with the principles of the UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Mode

1309、l Law on Electronic Commerce 1996 or the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts”.191Appendix Chapter 2South KoreaINF/ECOM/311) Infrastructure for electronic trade: /2) Open trading environment/trade facilitation:Parties should ensure consistency,

1310、 transparency and efficiency in their customs procedures, and be open about providing information regarding their procedures.3) Electronic payments, contracts and paperless trading:- Electronic signatures should not be denied legal validity.- Parties should not be prevented from negotiating the best

1311、 authenti-cation methods for their transaction, or from defending their transac-tion before the relevant authorities.- Members may require their own specific authentication standards for certain types of transaction.- Trade-administration documents should be made electronically available and legally

1312、 equivalent to the paper versions.4) Customs duties:- No customs duties should be placed on electronic transmissions “including content transmitted electronically”.- Customs administration should be “predictable, consistent, trans-parent, and efficient”.5) Domestic regulations:- Parties may enact me

1313、asures that impede the cross-border transfer of information if they are implemented to “achieve a legitimate public policy objective”.- Parties may implement any measure deemed necessary for its secu-rity interests.6) Intellectual property and source code:- Parties should not require access to, or t

1314、ransfer of, source code or software as a condition of selling the software in their territory.- Parties should allow users of other parties “access to and use of interactive computer services on fair terms”.7) Privacy and consumer protection:- Parties should create measures for consumer protection t

1315、hat are “equivalent to those provided for consumers engaged in other forms of transaction”.- An Online Dispute Resolution scheme should be established by each party.- National consumer-protection agencies should cooperate at the international level.- Parties “should publish information on the person

1316、al information protections that they provide”, including how individuals can get redress and business-compliance guidelines.- Parties should establish regulations on unsolicited commercial elec-tronic messages.192Axel Berger and Clara BrandiSingaporeINF/ECOM/258) Online security:- Parties should inc

1317、rease capabilities of bodies in charge of computer security.- Parties should collaborate to identify the “dissemination of mali-cious code that affects electronic networks”.9) Data localization:Parties shall not “require a covered person to use or locate computing facilities in that Partys territory

1318、 as a condition for conducting busi-ness in that territory”, unless such measures are needed for “legiti-mate public policy objectives”.10) Developing countries and LDCs interests: /11) Inclusion (MSMEs and women): /12) Digital products: /13) Past agreements/frameworks: /1) Infrastructure for electr

1319、onic trade: /2) Open trading environment/trade facilitation:- “Members shall allow the cross-border transfer of information by electronic means” for business purposes.- Measures that do not allow cross-border electronic-information transfer may be enacted if they are for a “legitimate policy objecti

1320、ve”.3) Electronic payments, contracts and paperless trading:- Trade-administration documents should be legally accepted in elec-tronic form except in cases with a “legal requirement to the contrary”.- International cooperation “to enhance acceptance of electronic ver-sions” is needed.- Electronic si

1321、gnatures should be legally accepted. Parties may decide on the best authentication methods for their transactions; however, members may call for specific authentication standards for certain transaction types.- Members should allow parties to bring the case of their transaction and authentication “b

1322、efore judicial or administrative authorities”.- E-invoicing systems and electronic transferable records should be recognized and encouraged.4) Customs duties:- No customs duties shall be placed on electronic transmissions between members.- Members can place internal fees or charges on electronic con

1323、tent if such measures are “consistent with WTO agreements”.Appendix Chapter 21935) Domestic regulations:- Regulatory measures should not be burdensome.- Members should “facilitate input by interested persons in the devel-opment of its legal framework”.6) Intellectual property and source code:- Acces

1324、s to source code should not be required “as a condition for the import, distribution, sale or use of such software”; however, this does not apply to “software used for critical infrastructure”.- Members may call for modification of source code “to comply with laws or regulations that are not inconsi

1325、stent with this Agreement”.7) Privacy and consumer protection:- Measures should be adopted to ensure that consumers can opt out of receiving spam messages, and that their consent must be obtained. “Members shall provide recourse” against non-complying suppliers.- Members should provide legal framewo

1326、rks for protecting the per-sonal information of e-commerce users.- Information regarding redress and compliance for individuals and businesses shall be published.- Members should recognize the differing legal frameworks of other members regarding personal-information protection.8) Online security:-

1327、Members should provide consumer protection through laws against “fraudulent and deceptive commercial activities”.- International cooperation between national consumer-protection agencies is crucial.9) Data localization:“Members shall not require the use or location of computing facili-ties in their

1328、territory as a condition for conducting business in that territory”, except in the case of meeting “a legitimate public policy objective”.10) Developing countries and LDCs interests: /11) Inclusion (MSMEs and women): /12) Digital products: /13) Past agreements/frameworks:Members legal frameworks sho

1329、uld be “consistent with the principles of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996 or the United Nations Convention of the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, 2005”.Source: Katya Garcia-Israel and Julien Grollier, Electronic Commerce Joint Statement: Issues in the

1330、Negotiations Phase, Geneva, CUTS International, October 2019, http:/bit.ly/2XJgsYk.194Axel Berger and Clara BrandiCountryArgentina, Australia, the United States and Uruguay11 July 2019See also: TN/RL/GEN/203Proposals / Position Statement1) Baseline subsidy notification and additional information:As

1331、a first step, and consistent with Article 25.3 of the SCM Agreement the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and Sub-sidy Committee practice, all members would establish a baseline for a subsidy cap by submitting an up-to-date fisheries-subsidies notifica-tion (i.e. covering the most r

1332、ecent two years). Critically, the value of any subsidies given must be provided if available even if only a reasonable estimate. Government agencies expenditures for fisheries manage-ment and enforcement would not be included in members caps.2) Member-specific subsidy caps/default cap:Taking into co

1333、nsideration this information, members would establish individual member limits (or “caps”) on such subsidies that would be reflected in a schedule to the agreement. In order to take into account the specific circumstances of members, a three-tier approach that is representative of members respective

1334、 contributions to global marine-capture production could be pursued, based on the following parameters:- In order to determine the tier into which a member falls for the purposes of subsequently negotiating and establishing subsidy com-mitments, tiered commitment levels would be based on a three-yea

1335、r average of UN Food and Agriculture Organization FAO marine-cap-ture production for the most recent representative period for which data are available, 20152017.Tier 1: Members that account for 0.7 percent or more of global marine-capture production would be required to negotiate with other members

1336、, on a request-offer basis, individual “subsidy caps” in monetary terms to be reflected in a schedule to the agreement. How-ever, Tier 1 members that have historically low or no subsidies may wish to accept the “Default Subsidy Cap” value of 50 million US dollars annually. Members in Tier 1 that opt

1337、 for the Default Cap would not be required to reduce their subsidy programmes over time.Tier 2: Members that account for more than 0.05 percent of global marine-capture production (but less than 0.7 percent, per above) would also have the option to negotiate a cap based on the recent subsidy informa

1338、tion provided, or to accept the same “Default Subsidy Cap” value of 50 million US dolllars annually.Tier 3: Members that account for less than 0.05 percent of global marine-capture production would not be required to schedule a cap.3) Reduction commitments:In order to ensure a fair and balanced outc

1339、ome that fulfils the minis-terial mandate, any member in Tier 1 that does not choose the Default Cap would also be required to reduce its subsidy cap over a negoti-ated period of time at a rate commensurate with its overall level of Table 7 | WTO reform proposals on fisheries subsidies195Appendix Ch

1340、apter 2subsidization, meaning that those members with the largest subsidy caps would also be expected to undertake the largest subsidy cuts. In addition, members are encouraged to prioritize reductions in any harmful subsidies over time, while retaining flexibility to maintain subsidies that encoura

1341、ge sustainability of the fisheries sector. Dur-ing the request-offer negotiations, consideration would be given to the nature of a members fisheries-subsidy programmes, and to sit-uations in which a member has historically notified relatively small fisheries-subsidy programmes. Additional considerat

1342、ion should be given to incentivizing Tier 2 members that voluntarily reduce their cap (e.g. with priority technical assistance).4) Transparency:Tier 1 and 2 members would need to maintain up-to-date fisher-ies-subsidy notifications in order to continue to benefit from their cap. Tier 3 members would

1343、 also need to maintain up-to-date fisheries subsidy notifications in order to maintain their exempt status.5) Review mechanism:The agreement would include a review mechanism, so that members caps (and tier levels) can be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised, over time. For example, members would mo

1344、nitor marine-capture pro-duction data to identify any changes in individual members global shares of marine-capture production that would shift a member from one tier to another. In addition, members could agree on a procedure for members in Tier 1 or Tier 2 seeking adjustments to their cap on the b

1345、asis of changed circumstances to notify such adjustments to the Committee for positive consideration, and which could be finalized and adopted within a short period of time (for example, 60 days) if no objection is raised. Finally, five years after entry into force of the agreement, members would al

1346、so undertake a review of the overall operation of the cap-based approach as part of a built-in review of the new fisheries disciplines as a whole, and negotiate any further reduc-tions or adjustments as necessary. Subsequent reviews would occur every five years.6) To implement the approach outlined

1347、above, the Rules Negotiating Group (RNG) would establish a clear process and associated time-frame for negotiating subsidy caps in order to include these caps in a schedule as part of the final agreement:Spring 2019: For the purpose of RNG negotiations, members notify existing fisheries-subsidy prog

1348、rammes consistent with Article 25.3 of the SCM Agreement (notwithstanding the SCM Agreement notifica-tion deadline of 30 June).Summer 2019: Members falling in Tier 1 and Tier 2, should they opt to do so, engage in request-offer negotiations regarding subsidy cap and reduction commitments, as appropr

1349、iate. Members in Tier 1 and Tier 2 wishing to use the Default Cap would notify their intent to do so to the WTO Secretariat.196Axel Berger and Clara BrandiArgentina, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Uruguay7 October 2019China3 June 2019Autumn 2019: Members negotiate and finalize subsidy

1350、 cap and reduc-tion schedules.- A prohibition on subsidies to vessels that are not flying the flag of the subsidizing WTO member could have far-reaching beneficial impacts. The majority of companies employing Flags Of Convenience (FOCs) are located in countries that collectively also have the larges

1351、t distant-water fleets fishing across the globe; removing subsidies to the estimated 15 percent of fishing vessels flying an FOC or listed as “flag unknown” would remove artificial distortions and potentially harmful incentives currently affecting the fishing economy.- Banning subsidies to vessels n

1352、ot flying the subsidizing WTO mem-bers flag would also place responsibility for fishing activity firmly back in the jurisdiction of the subsidizing member, and enable WTO members to contribute to the enforcement, legal and prosecutorial tools available to counter illegal fishing activity.- A prohibi

1353、tion on subsidies to vessels not flying the subsidizing WTO members flag would complement other prohibitions particularly, the proposal to prohibit subsidies contingent upon fishing in areas beyond national jurisdiction (RD/TN/RL/91/Rev.1).1) Members positions regarding subsidies that may contribute

1354、 to overcapacity and overfishing are still far apart. Compared with other approaches, a cap-based approach could be a relatively practical way forward because it accommodates the constraints as well as flexibili-ties of the disciplines and strikes a balance between the need for sus-tainable fisherie

1355、s and the need for policy space for sustainable social and economic development.2) Considering the multi-faceted role that fisheries play in environ-ment, trade, food security, livelihood and poverty reduction, and the diversity and differences of members fisheries situations, reasonable policy spac

1356、e should be provided for in making any prohibitive disci-plines. As such, a cap-based approach that responds to the diversified fisheries situations is needed.3) Elements for the cap-based approach:- Base for capping: For the purpose of this approach, all fisheries subsidies and certain fisheries-su

1357、pport measures are to be included in the base for capping, including non-specific fuel subsidies for the fisheries sector and fisheries service and management programmes, without prejudice as to whether or not such programmes constitute subsidies under the SCM Agreement.- Three approaches for cappin

1358、g and reduction: Considering the diversity and differences of members fisheries situations, members may choose one of the following approaches to achieve capping and reduction for their fisheries subsidies:i. a subsidy cap equal to X percent of the amount of the average base 197Appendix Chapter 2Ind

1359、ia5 March 2020for capping provided by a member during the base period; orii. a subsidy cap equal to Y percent of the average landed value of a members total wild marine capture during the base period; oriii. a subsidy cap equal to Z percent of the amount of global average base for capping per fisher

1360、man multiplied by the number of fishermen of a member during the base period.Capping and reduction commitments are to be expressed in aggregate monetary terms and be incorporated into members WTO schedules, to be phased within an implementation period.- Compliance with capping and reduction commitme

1361、nts: A mem-ber shall be considered to be in compliance with its capping and reduction commitments in any year upon entry into force of this instrument, in which its total fisheries subsidies, including non-spe-cific fuel subsidies for the fisheries sector, do not exceed the corre-sponding commitment

1362、 level specified in that members schedule.- “Green Box” measures: In order to encourage members to design their fisheries-subsidies policies in line with Sustainable Develop-ment Goals, the following four categories of programme shall not be subject to members capping and reduction commitments in an

1363、y year upon entry into force of this instrument, without prejudice as to whether or not such programmes constitute subsidies under the SCM Agreement:i. government service and management programmes;ii. programmes to protect fisheries resources or rebuild stocks;iii. programmes to reduce fishing effor

1364、ts or fishing capacity; andiv. programs that are reputably presumed not to contribute to overca-pacity or overfishing.- Review mechanism: Members shall notify all relevant informa-tion pertaining to their base for capping and approach for capping. Members shall notify all information pertaining to t

1365、heir Green Box measures.4) Transparency:Members shall notify all relevant information pertaining to their base for capping and approach for capping. Members shall notify all infor-mation pertaining to their Green Box measures.5) Special and Differential Treatment (SDT):Appropriate and effective spec

1366、ial and differential treatment shall be accorded to developing-country members and least-developed-coun-try members. Least-developed-country members shall be exempted from capping and reductions.1) Unreported and unregulated fishing:- The prohibition under Article Z in respect of unreported and unre

1367、gulated fishing shall not apply to subsidies granted/maintained by developing countries, including Least Developed Countries (LDCs), 198Axel Berger and Clara Brandifor fishing and fishing-related activities at sea by vessels other than large-scale industrial fishing vessels within their territorial

1368、sea.- The prohibition under Article Z in respect of unreported and unreg-ulated fishing shall not apply to subsidies granted/maintained by developing countries, including LDCs, for fishing and fishing-related activities at sea by vessels other than large-scale industrial fishing vessels in their Exc

1369、lusive Economic Zone EEZ and the area of compe-tence of Regional Fisheries Management Organization/Arrangement RFMO/A for a period of seven years from the date of entry into force of this instrument.2) Overfished stocks:- The prohibition under Article Z in respect of overfished stocks shall not appl

1370、y to subsidies granted/maintained by developing coun-tries, including LDCs, for fishing and fishing-related activities at sea in their territorial sea.- In respect of fishing and fishing-related activities at sea within their EEZ, the developing countries, including LDCs, shall be entitled to a tran

1371、sition period of two years to withdraw or modify any subsidy for fish stocks that have been declared as overfished by the national authorities based on the best scientific evidence available to such members.3) Overfishing and overcapacity:- The prohibition under Article Z in respect of overfishing a

1372、nd over-capacity shall not apply to subsidies granted/maintained by LDCs for fishing and fishing-related activities at sea.- The prohibition under Article Z in respect of overfishing and over-capacity shall not apply to subsidies granted/maintained by develop-ing countries for fishing and fishing-re

1373、lated activities at sea within their territorial sea.- The prohibition under Article Z in respect of overfishing and over-capacity shall apply to subsidies granted/maintained by a developing country for fishing and fishing-related activities at sea in their Exclu-sive Economic Zone EEZ and the area

1374、of competence of Regional Fisheries Management Organization/Arrangement RFMO/A if all the following criteria are met:i. their Gross National Income (GNI) per capita crosses 5,000 US dol-lars (based on constant 2010) for three consecutive years;ii. their individual share exceeds 2 percent of the annu

1375、al global marine-capture fish production as per most recent published FAO data;iii. they engage in distant-water fishing;iv. the contribution from agriculture, forestry and fishing to their national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is less than 10 percent for three consecutive years.4) Technical assista

1376、nce and capacity building:The developed-country members, and the developing-country mem-199Appendix Chapter 2Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Malawi, Oman, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe22 July 2019Philippines21 October 2019bers declaring themselves in a position to do so, shall provide ta

1377、r-geted technical assistance and capacity-building assistance to devel-oping-country members and LDCs for the purpose of the implementa-tion of the disciplines.Fisheries Subsidies in accordance with the Doha, Hong Kong and MC11 Ministerial Declarations. All of these emphasize the importance of SDT i

1378、n the outcome of these negotiations because of the “impor-tance of this sector to development priorities, poverty reduction, and livelihood and food security concerns”. SDG 14.6 also reinforces SDT.1) In cases of subsidy programmes/measures involving disputed waters, the members in the dispute shall

1379、 refrain from invoking the provisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and the specific dispute-settlement provisions under this agreement.2) The members shall engage in bilateral consultations with a view to reaching an agreement between/among them. Once a settlement is reached, th

1380、e members of the dispute shall jointly notify the WTO.3) Notwithstanding the provisions of the above paragraphs 1 and 2, the complaining member may invoke the provisions of the DSU if no bilateral or plurilateral settlement is reached after a reasonable period of time has elapsed but in no case exce

1381、eding (x) months from the initiation of the bilateral or plurilateral consultations.Table 8 | WTO reform proposals on subsidies, state-owned enterprises and forced technology transferProposals / Position StatementIndustrial subsidies:1) The current list of prohibited subsidies provided for in Articl

1382、e 3.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) is insufficient to tackle market- and trade-distorting subsidization existing in certain jurisdictions. Therefore, new types of uncondition-ally prohibited subsidies need to be added to the ASCM. These are:a. unlimited guarantees

1383、;b. subsidies to an insolvent or ailing enterprise in the absence of a credible restructuring plan;c. subsidies to enterprises unable to obtain long-term financing or investment from independent commercial sources operating in sec-tors or industries in overcapacity; andCountryJoint Statement, Trilat

1384、eral Meeting: US, EU, Japan14 January 2020200Axel Berger and Clara Brandid. certain direct forgiveness of debt.2) Certain other types of subsidies have such a harmful effect as to justify a reversal of the burden of proof, so that the subsidizing mem-ber must demonstrate that there are no serious ne

1385、gative trade or capacity effects and that there is effective transparency about the subsidy in question. Subsidies having been discussed in this category include, but are not limited to: excessively large subsidies; subsidies that prop up uncompetitive firms and prevent their exit from the market; s

1386、ubsidies creating massive manufacturing capacity, with-out private commercial participation; and subsidies that lower input prices domestically in comparison to prices of the same goods when destined for export. If such subsidy is found to exist and the absence of serious negative effect cannot be d

1387、emonstrated, the subsidizing member must withdraw the subsidy in question immediately.3) The current rules of the ASCM identify in Article 6.3 instances of serious prejudice to the interests of another member. However, these instances do not refer to situations in which the subsidy in question disto

1388、rts capacity. An additional type of serious prejudice linked to capacity should be therefore added to Article 6.3 ASCM. Further, work will continue on a provision defining the threat of serious prejudice.4) The current rules of the ASCM do not provide for any incentive for WTO members to properly no

1389、tify their subsidies. Therefore, the state-of-play of subsidies notifications is dismal. Hence, a new strong incentive to notify subsidies properly should be added to Article 25 ASCM, rendering prohibited any non-notified subsidies that were counter-notified by another member, unless the subsidizing

1390、 member provides the required information in writing within set timeframes.5) The current rules of the ASCM are insufficiently prescriptive when it comes to the determination of the proper benchmark for subsidies consisting of the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government i

1391、n situations in which the domestic market of the subsidizing member is distorted. Therefore, the ASCM should be amended to describe the circumstances in which domestic prices can be rejected and how a proper benchmark can be established, includ-ing the use of prices outside the market of the subsidi

1392、zing member.6) The ministers observed that many subsidies are granted through state enterprises, and discussed the importance of ensuring that these subsidizing entities are captured by the term “public body”. The ministers agreed that the interpretation of “public body” by the WTO Appellate Body in

1393、 several reports undermines the effectiveness of WTO subsidy rules. To determine that an entity is a public body, it is not necessary to find that the entity “possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority”. The ministers agreed to con-tinue working on a definition of “public body” on

1394、 this basis.201Appendix Chapter 2European UnionCommission Con-cept Paper27 June 2019Technology transfer:- On forced technology transfers, the ministers reaffirmed that tech-nology transfer between firms in different countries is an important part of global trade and investment. Technology transfer t

1395、hat is fair, voluntary and based on market principles can be mutually bene-ficial for growth and development. They also reaffirmed that when one country engages in forced technology transfer, it deprives other countries of the opportunity to benefit from the fair, voluntary and market-based flow of

1396、technology and innovation. These unfair prac-tices are inconsistent with an international trading system based on market principles, and undermine growth and development.- The ministers discussed possible elements of core disciplines that aim to prevent forced technology-transfer practices of third

1397、coun-tries; the need to reach out to, and build consensus with, other WTO members on the need to address forced technology-transfer issues; and their commitment to effective means to stop harmful forced tech-nology-transfer policies and practices, including through export con-trols, investment revie

1398、w for national-security purposes, their respec-tive enforcement tools and the development of new rules.State-owned enterprises:1) Improve transparency and subsidy notifications:- The lack of comprehensive information on subsidies provided by members is one of the biggest shortcomings in the applicat

1399、ion of the current system. Although the SCM Agreement already requires mem-bers to notify their subsidies, the level of compliance is poor and has deteriorated in recent years to the extent that, as of end of March 2018, over half of the membership (90 members) had not made any notification. Yet, wi

1400、thout transparency in subsidies, members cannot review each others actions and face significant obstacles in seeking enforcement of the rules. This greatly weakens the value of the sub-stantive disciplines.- The rule-making in this area should focus on creating incentives for WTO members to fully co

1401、mply with their notification obligations. The EU has already identified ways to improve transparency and subsidy notifications for example, the creation of a general rebut-table presumption according to which if a subsidy is not notified or is counter-notified, it would be presumed to be a subsidy o

1402、r even be presumed to be a subsidy causing serious prejudice.2) Better capture of SOEs:- State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are, in a number of countries, an instrument through which the state decisively governs and influ-ences the economy often with market-distortive effects. However, the growth and in

1403、fluence of SOEs in recent years is not yet matched by equivalent disciplines to capture any market-distorting behaviour under the current rules.202Axel Berger and Clara BrandiChina13 May 2019- Subsidies granted to SOEs are already captured by the SCM Agree-ment, in the same way as any other subsidy

1404、granted by the state. With regard to instances in which SOEs themselves grant subsidies, the SCM Agreement captures them through the concept of a “public body”. However, this has been interpreted in a rather narrow manner, which allows a considerable number of SOEs to escape the application of the S

1405、CM Agreement. The EU therefore should propose a clarification of what constitutes a public body, on the basis of a case-by-case analysis to determine whether a state-owned or a state-controlled enterprise performs a government function or furthers a government policy, as well as how to assess whethe

1406、r a member exercises meaningful control over the enterprise in question.- In addition, the EU should propose rules capturing other market-dis-torting support provided by SOEs when used as vehicles to pursue government economic policies rather than focusing on their own eco-nomic performance includin

1407、g, inter alia, transparency with regard to the level and degree of state control in SOEs.3) Capture more effectively the most trade-distortive types of subsidies:- The SCM Agreement provides for two categories of prohibited sub-sidies namely, subsidies contingent upon export performance and subsidie

1408、s contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods. All other subsidies are actionable: they are permissible, unless the complaining country shows that the subsidy had an adverse effect on its trade interests. However, the latter is quite often a challenging exercise and therefore a number of

1409、 egregious types of subsidies that heavily distort international trade, such as those contributing to the overcapacity plaguing several sectors of the economy, cannot be cap-tured sufficiently under the current rules.- The rule-making in this area should aim at subjecting the most harmful types of s

1410、ubsidies that are in principle permissible under the current rules to stricter rules. This could be achieved, for example, by expanding the list of prohibited subsidies or by creating a rebuttable presumption of serious prejudice similar to the lapsed Article 6(1) of the SCM Agreement. Types of subs

1411、idies that could be subject to such stricter rules include, for example, unlimited guarantees, subsidies given to an insolvent or ailing enterprise with no credible restructur-ing plan or dual pricing.State-owned enterprises:1) Issue and problem:State-owned-enterprises (SOEs) engaged in commercial c

1412、ompetition are equal players in the market as are other types of enterprises. How-ever, some members have come to set differentiated rules on the basis of ownership of enterprises. For example, they indiscriminately label all SOEs as “public bodies” within the meaning of the Agreement on Subsidies a

1413、nd Countervailing Measures, set forth additional trans-203Appendix Chapter 2parency requirements and disciplines for SOEs, and discriminate against SOEs in foreign-investment security reviews. Such practices are detrimental to creating an institutional framework for fair com-petition and, if left un

1414、checked, would give rise to more discriminatory rules in the future.2) Objective and task:It is imperative to respect the diversity of development models among members and promote fair competition in the fields of trade and investment. Such efforts would strengthen the inclusiveness of the multilate

1415、ral trading system.3) Action and proposal:Actions shall be taken in the WTO to uphold the principle of fair com-petition, so as to ensure that enterprises of different ownerships operate in an environment of fair competition. China proposes the following:- During discussions on subsidy disciplines,

1416、no special or discrimi-natory disciplines should be instituted on SOEs in the name of WTO reform.- Foreign-investment security reviews shall be conducted in an impartial manner and follow such principles as transparency and due process. Non-discriminatory treatment shall be given to like invest-ment

1417、 by enterprises with different ownership structures.Printed in June 2021with technology print on demandat the press centre Nuova Cultura Romep.le Aldo Moro n. 5, 00185 Romewww.nuovacultura.itfor orders: ordininuovacultura.itInt_9788833653334_17x24bn_MP03GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AT A TURNING POINTTHE ROLE O

1418、F THE G20This book collects contributions from international leading experts on how the Italian Presidency of the G20 in 2021 could advance a renewed global governance agenda. The Covid-19 pandemic has impacted every nation in the world, highlighting how globally interconnected we are. To mitigate t

1419、he health, social and economic effects of the Covid-19 crisis, the world needs effective global responses. However, multilateral cooperation has been facing dramatic headwinds before and after the Covid-19 pandemic. The G20 could play a key role in revitalizing multilateral cooperation, by pushing f

1420、or new ways and means to deal with global challenges. In this context, the authors explore four key areas which would require fresh global coordination: global trade, digitalization, demographic patterns and circular economy.GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AT A TURNING POINT edited by Ettore Greco, Fabrizio Botti

1421、 and Nicola Bilotta edited byEttore Greco, Fabrizio Botti and Nicola Bilotta9788833653334_204_MP_4SEGUICI SUI SOCIAL NETWORK18.00EUROIAI Research Studies5IAI Research Studies1. Andrea Dess, Ettore Greco (edited by), The Search for Stability in Libya. OSCEs Role between Internal Obstacles and Externa

1422、l Challenges, 20182. Lorenzo Kamel, Asli Selin Okyay (edited by), Realizing Youth Potential in the Mediterranean. Unlocking Opportunities, Overcoming Challenges, 20183. Lorenzo Kamel (edited by), Youth and Africa, 20204. Nicola Bilotta and Fabrizio Botti (edited by), Development Finance in Challengi

1423、ng Times, 20215. Ettore Greco, Fabrizio Botti and Nicola Bilotta (edited by), Global Governance at a Turning Point The Role of the G20, 2021IAI Research Studies are monographs written by one or more authors (IAI or external experts) on key global issues, mainly linked to international politics and i

1424、nternational relations. The aim is to promote greater and more up to date knowledge of emerging issues and trends and help prompt public debate.IAI is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli. IAI seeks to promote awareness of international

1425、politics and to contribute to the advancement of European integration and multilateral cooperation. Its focus embraces topics of strategic relevance such as European integration, security and defence, international economics and global governance, energy, climate and Italian foreign policy; as well as the dynamics of cooperation and conflict in key geographical regions such as the Mediterranean and Middle East, Asia, Eurasia, Africa and the Americas.ISSN 2611-867X ISBN 978-88-3365-333-4