1、TechnologyPerspectives2023EnergyThe IEA examines the full spectrum of energy issues including oil,gas and coal supply and demand,renewable energy technologies,electricity markets,energy efficiency,access to energy,demand side management and much more.Through its work,the IEA advocates policies that

2、will enhance the reliability,affordability and sustainability of energy in its 31 member countries,11 association countries and beyond.This publication and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory,to the delimitation of international frontiers

3、and boundaries and to the name of any territory,city or area.Source:IEA.International Energy Agency Website:www.iea.orgIEA member countries:AustraliaAustriaBelgiumCanadaCzech RepublicDenmarkEstoniaFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceHungaryIrelandItalyJapanKoreaLithuaniaLuxembourgMexicoNetherlandsNew ZealandN

4、orwayPolandPortugalSlovak RepublicSpainSwedenSwitzerlandRepublic of TrkiyeUnited KingdomUnited StatesThe European Commission also participates in the work of the IEAIEA association countries:ArgentinaBrazilChinaEgyptIndiaIndonesiaMoroccoSingaporeSouth AfricaThailandUkraineINTERNATIONAL ENERGYAGENCYE

5、nergy Technology Perspectives 2023 Abstract PAGE|3 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Abstract The Covid-19 pandemic and Russias invasion of Ukraine have led to major disruptions to global energy and technology supply chains.Soaring prices for energy and materials,and shortages of critical minerals,semiconductors and o

6、ther components are posing potential roadblocks for the energy transition.Against this backdrop,the Energy Technology Perspectives 2023(ETP-2023)provides analysis on the risks and opportunities surrounding the development and scale-up of clean energy and technology supply chains in the years ahead,v

7、iewed through the lenses of energy security,resilience and sustainability.Building on the latest energy,commodity and technology data,as well as recent energy,climate and industrial policy announcements,ETP-2023 explores critical questions around clean energy and technology supply chains:Where are t

8、he key bottlenecks to sustainably scale up those supply chains at the pace needed?How might governments shape their industrial policy in response to new energy security concerns for clean energy transitions?Which clean technology areas are at greatest risk of failing to develop secure and resilient

9、supply chains?And what can governments do to mitigate such risks while meeting broader development goals?The Energy Technology Perspectives series is the IEAs flagship technology publication,which has been key source of insights on all matters relating to energy technology since 2006.ETP-2023 will b

10、e an indispensable guidebook for decision-makers in governments and industry seeking to tap into the opportunities offered by the emerging new energy economy,while navigating uncertainties and safeguarding energy security.Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Foreword PAGE|4 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Foreword Th

11、e global energy sector is in the midst of profound changes that are set to transform it in the coming decades from one based overwhelmingly on fossil fuels to one increasingly dominated by renewables and other clean energy technologies.A new global energy economy is emerging ever more clearly,with t

12、he rapid growth of solar,wind,electric vehicles and a range of other technologies such as electrolysers for hydrogen.This transition is in turn changing the industries that supply the materials and products underpinning the energy system,heralding the dawn of a new industrial age the age of clean en

13、ergy technology manufacturing.At the International Energy Agency(IEA),we are dedicated to improving the security,resilience and sustainability of the global energy system.Those interlinked priorities are at the heart of this edition of Energy Technology Perspectives 2023(ETP-2023),the latest in the

14、IEAs technology flagship series that began in 2006.As decision-makers seek to understand and adapt to the changes underway,ETP-2023 serves as the worlds first comprehensive global guidebook on the clean energy technology industries of today and tomorrow.It provides a detailed analysis of clean energ

15、y technology manufacturing and its supply chains around the world and how they are likely to evolve as the clean energy transition advances in the years ahead.Major economies around the world from Asia to Europe to North America are stepping up efforts to expand their clean energy technology manufac

16、turing with the overlapping aims of advancing net zero transitions,strengthening energy security and competing in the new energy economy.And the current global energy crisis has only accelerated these efforts.These trends have massive implications for governments,businesses,investors and citizens ar

17、ound the world.Every country needs to identify how it can benefit from the opportunities and navigate the challenges of this new energy economy.This report shows that the rapid growth of clean technology manufacturing is set to create new markets worth hundreds of billions of dollars as well as mill

18、ions of new jobs in the coming years,assuming countries make good on the energy and climate pledges they have announced.At the same time,the industrial strategies that countries develop to secure their places in this new energy economy will need to take into account the emerging challenges that thes

19、e changes bring.Today,we already see potentially risky levels of concentration in clean energy supply chains globally both in the manufacturing of the technologies and in the critical minerals on which they rely.Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Foreword PAGE|5 I EA.CC BY 4.0.These challenges are

20、what make ETP-2023 such a vital and timely contribution as policy makers are working to devise the industrial strategies to benefit their economies and project developers and investors are weighing key decisions on future manufacturing operations.Our analysis shows that the global project pipeline i

21、s very large enough to move the world much closer to reaching international energy and climate goals if it all comes to fruition.But the majority of those announced projects are not yet under construction or set to begin construction imminently.Governments have a role here in providing the supportiv

22、e policies and broader industrial strategies that can provide developers and investors with the visibility and confidence they need to go ahead.However,this report also shows issues of which governments need to be mindful,such as the importance of ensuring fair and open international trade in clean

23、energy technologies,which will be essential for achieving rapid and affordable energy transitions.ETP-2023 also makes clear that for most countries,it is not realistic to try to compete across all parts of clean energy technology supply chains.Countries will need to play to their strengths,whether t

24、hat comes in the form of mineral resources,low-cost clean energy supplies,a workforce with relevant skills,or synergies with existing industries.And since no country will be in a position to cover every part of the supply chain at once,international collaboration will be an essential element in indu

25、strial strategies.This can include strategic partnerships and foreign direct investment,for example.These are just some of the key issues on which ETP-2023 provides extremely valuable insights.Im confident decision-makers around the world will greatly appreciate these and the many others contained i

26、n these pages.And for this,I would like to thank the excellent team at the IEAs Energy Technology Policy Division,under the outstanding leadership of my colleague Timur Gl,for all the work that went into producing this report,which will serve as a reference for years to come.Dr.Fatih Birol Executive

27、 Director International Energy Agency Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Acknowledgements PAGE|6 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Acknowledgements This study was prepared by the Energy Technology Policy(ETP)Division of the Directorate of Sustainability,Technology and Outlooks(STO),with input from other divisions of

28、the International Energy Agency(IEA).The study was designed and directed by Timur Gl,Head of the Energy Technology Policy Division.The modelling and analytical teams of Energy Technology Perspectives 2023(ETP-2023)were coordinated by Araceli Fernandez(Head of the Technology Innovation Unit)and Uwe R

29、emme(Head of the Hydrogen and Alternative Fuels Unit).Peter Levi(industrial competitiveness)and Leonardo Paoli(investment needs)were responsible for the analysis of cross-cutting topics throughout the report.The principal authors and contributors from the ETP division were(in alphabetical order):Pra

30、veen Bains(synthetic hydrocarbon fuels),Jose Miguel Bermudez(hydrogen production including electrolysers),Amar Bhardwaj(electrolysers),Sara Budinis(direct air capture,technology manufacturing),Elizabeth Connelly(fuel cell trucks,technology manufacturing),Chiara Delmastro(heat pumps,technology manufa

31、cturing),Mathilde Fajardy(bioenergy with carbon capture,risk assessment),Stavroula Evangelopoulou(electricity infrastructure),Breanna Gasson(risk assessment),Alexandre Gouy(critical minerals,materials),Carl Greenfield(policy),Will Hall(sustainability,materials),Mathilde Huismans(wind,data management

32、),Megumi Kotani(policy),Jean-Baptiste Le Marois(status of clean technology supply chains,innovation),Rafael Martnez Gordn(heat pumps,wind),Shane McDonagh(fuel cell trucks),Rachael Moore(CO2 management infrastructure),Faidon Papadimoulis(trade,data management),Francesco Pavan(electrolysers,hydrogen i

33、nfrastructure),Amalia Pizarro Alonso(hydrogen infrastructure),Richard Simon(resilience,innovation),Jacob Teter(policy),Tiffany Vass(materials,policy)and Biqing Yang(China industrial policy).The IEAs Energy Modelling Office led by Chief Energy Modeller Laura Cozzi coordinated the employment analysis,

34、in particular Daniel Wetzel,Caleigh Andrews and Olivia Chen;and the analysis on electricity infrastructure,in particular Michael Drtil.Other key contributors from across the IEA were Julien Armijo,Piotr Bojek,Leonardo Collina,Shobhan Dhir,Conor Gask,Pablo Gonzalez,Ilkka Hannula,Energy Technology Per

35、spectives 2023 Acknowledgements PAGE|7 I EA.CC BY 4.0.George Kamiya,Samantha McCulloch,Yannick Monschauer,Takashi Nomura,Nasim Pour,Vida Rozite and Fabian Voswinkel.Valuable comments and feedback were provided by other senior management and numerous other colleagues within the IEA,in particular Keis

36、uke Sadamori,Laura Cozzi,Dan Dorner,Tim Gould,Brian Motherway,Paolo Frankl,Heymi Bahar,Simon Bennett,Thomas Spencer and Brent Wanner.Caroline Abettan,Liselott Fredriksson,Reka Koczka and Per-Anders Widell provided essential support throughout the process.Thanks also to the IEA Communications and Dig

37、ital Office for their help in producing the report,particularly to Jad Mouawad,Curtis Brainard,Jon Custer,Hortense De Roffignac,Tanya Dyhin,Merve Erdem,Grace Gordon,Barbara Moure,Jethro Mullen,Isabelle NonainSemelin,Julie Puech,Clara Vallois,Gregory Viscusi,Therese Walsh and Wonjik Yang.Trevor Morga

38、n provided writing support to the report and holds editorial responsibility.Erin Crum and Kristine Douaud were the copy-editors.The work could not have been achieved without the financial support provided by the Governments of Australia and Japan.Several senior government official and experts provid

39、ed essential input and feedback to improve the quality of the report.They include:Matt Antes Department of Energy,United States Florian Ausfelder DECHEMA Matthew Aylott Department for Business,Energy and Industrial Strategy,United Kingdom Harmeet Bawa Hitachi Energy Adam Baylin-Stern Carbon Engineer

40、ing Marlen Bertram International Aluminium Institute Fabrizio Bezzo Universit di Padova Souvik Bhattacharjya TERI,the Energy and Resources Institute,India Chris Bolesta Directorate-General for Energy,European Commission Javier Bonaplata ArcelorMittal Antoine Boubault Bureau de Recherches Gologiques

41、et Minires,France Keith Burnard Technology Collaboration Programme on Greenhouse Gas R&D Wang Can Tsinghua University Diego Carvajal European Copper Alliance Roland Chavasse International Lithium Association Xavier Chen Beijing Energy Club Jianhong Cheng China National Institute of Standardization E

42、nergy Technology Perspectives 2023 Acknowledgements PAGE|8 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Beatrice Coda CINEA,the European Climate,Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency,European Commission Russell Conklin Department of Energy,United States Jasmin Cooper Imperial College London James Craig Technology Colla

43、boration Programme on Greenhouse Gas R&D Colin Cunliff Department of Energy,United States Ilka von Dalwigk EIT InnoEnergy Ganesh Das Tata Power Charis Demoulias Aristotle University of Thessaloniki Alberto DiLullo Eni Tim Dixon Technology Collaboration Programme on Greenhouse Gas R&D Sayanta Dutta H

44、yzon Motors sa Ekdahl World Steel Association Sara Evangelisti Gas and Heat SpA Pharoah Le Feuvre Enagas Alan Finkel Government of Australia Fridtjof Fossum Unander Aker Horizons Hiroyuki Fukui Toyota Jan Fredrik Garvik Hydrogen Pro Sara Giarola Politecnico di Milano James Glynn Columbia University

45、Stefan Gossens Schaeffler AG Astha Gupta Independent consultant Emmanuel Hache IFP Energies nouvelles Martin Haigh Shell Chen Haisheng China Energy Storage Alliance Neville Hargreaves Velocys Clare Harris Shell Yuya Hasegawa Ministry of Economy,Trade and Industry,Japan Nikolaos Hatziargyriou Nationa

46、l Technical University of Athens Roland Hequet John Cockerill Vincent DHerbemont IFP Energies nouvelles Chris Heron Eurometaux Ludo van Hijfte Carbon Collectors Neil Hirst Imperial College London Geoff Holmes Carbon Engineering No van Hulst International Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in th

47、e Economy Marie Ishikawa Toyota Rishabh Jain Council on Energy,Environment and Water,India Ayaka Jones Department of Energy,United States Birte Holst Jrgensen Technical University of Denmark Robert Kennedy Smith Department of Energy,United States Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Acknowledgements

48、PAGE|9 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Balachander Krishnan Shirdi Sai Electricals Ltd Leif Christian Krger Thyssenkrupp Nucera Oji Kuno Toyota Oleksandr Laktionov Naftogaz Martin Lambert Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Francisco Lavern Iberdrola Xiao Lin Technology Collaboration Programme on Hybrid and Electric

49、 Vehicles Sebastian Ljungwaldh Northvolt Claude Lorea Global Cement and Concrete Association Patricia Loria Carbon Capture Inc.Giuseppe Lorubio Ariston Richard Lowes Regulatory Assistance Project Louis Marie Malbec IFP Energies nouvelles Foivos Marias CINEA,the European Climate,Infrastructure and En

50、vironment Executive Agency,European Commission Mercedes Maroto-Valer Heriot-Watt University Rick Mason Plug Power Marc Melaina Department of Energy,United States Dennis Mesina Department of Energy,United States Roberto Millini Eni Diane Millis Carbon Clean Vincent Minier Schneider Electric Mark Mist

51、ry Nickel Institute Daniel Monfort Bureau de Recherches Gologiques et Minires,France Victoria Monsma DNV Nirvasen Moonsamy Oil and Gas Climate Initiative Simone Mori Enel Hidenori Moriya Toyota Poul Georg Moses Topsoe Ramin Moslemian DNV Vivek Murthi Nikola Jane Nakano Center for Strategic and Inter

52、national Studies Hidetaka Nishi Ministry of Economy,Trade and Industry,Japan Motohiko Nishimura Kawasaki Heavy Industries Takashi Nomura Toyota Olga Noskova Topsoe Thomas Nowak European Heat Pump Association Koichi Numata Toyota Shaun Onorato United States National Renewable Energy Laboratory Stavro

53、s Papathanasiou National Technical University of Athens Claudia Pavarini Snam Inga Petersen Global Battery Alliance Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Acknowledgements PAGE|10 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Cdric Philibert IFRI,lInstitut franais des relations internationales Larry Pitts Plug Power Joana Portugal U

54、niversit Fdrale de Rio de Janeiro Andrew Purvis World Steel Association Aditya Ramji University of California,Davis Julia Reinaud Breakthrough Energy Stephan Renz Technology Collaboration Programme on Heat Pumping Technologies Mark Richards Rio Tinto Grgoire Rigout Air Liquide Pablo Riesgo Abeledo D

55、irectorate-General for Energy,European Commission Agustn Rodrguez Riccio Topsoe Antonio Ruiz Nikola Toshiyuki Sakamoto Institute of Energy Economics,Japan Gerhard Salge Hitachi Energy Mara Sicilia Salvadores Enagas Bari Sanli Permanent Delegation of Trkiye to the OECD Abhishek Saxena NITI Aayog,Nati

56、onal Institution for Transforming India Hannah Schindler Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action,Germany Olaf Schilgen Volkswagen Thore Sekkenes EIT InnoEnergy Cory Shumaker Hyzon Motors Jim Skea Imperial College London Guillaume de Smedt Air Liquide Robert Spicer BP Vivek Srinivasa

57、n Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation,Australia Martin Stuermer International Monetary Fund Bert Stuij Netherlands Enterprise Agency Peter Taylor University of Leeds Wim Thomas Independent consultant Dietmar Tourbier Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisati

58、on,Australia Lyle Trytten Independent consultant Yusuke Tsukahara Asahi Kasei Ins Tunga Energy Systems Catapult Cornelius Veith Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action,Germany Rahul Walawalkar India Energy Storage Alliance Michael Wang Argonne National Laboratory Amanda Wilson Natur

59、al Resources Canada Markus Wrke Swedish Energy Research Centre Akira Yabumoto J-Power Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Acknowledgements PAGE|11 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Makoto Yasui Chiyoda Nozomi Yokoo Toyota Shiho Yoshizawa Ministry of Economy,Trade and Industry,Japan Alan Zhao Cummins Energy Technology

60、Perspectives 2023 Table of contents PAGE|12 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Table of contents Executive summary.20 Introduction.26 Purpose of this report.26 Clean energy and technology supply chains.27 Scope and analytical approach.29 Report structure.34 References.35 Chapter 1.Energy supply chains in transition.36

61、Highlights.36 The clean energy transition.37 Implications of net zero for supply chains.50 References.75 Chapter 2.Mapping out clean energy supply chains.81 Highlights.81 Assessing vulnerabilities in supply chains.82 Geographic diversity and energy security.85 Resilience of supply chains.115 Supply

62、chain sustainability.128 References.135 Chapter 3.Mining and material production.142 Highlights.142 Material needs for net zero emissions.143 Mineral extraction.156 Materials production.169 References.199 Chapter 4.Technology manufacturing and installation.206 Highlights.206 Overview.207 Mass manufa

63、cturing of clean technologies and components.212 Installation of large-scale,site-tailored technologies.248 References.267 Chapter 5.Enabling infrastructure.276 Highlights.276 The role of enabling infrastructure.277 Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Table of contents PAGE|13 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Electri

64、city grids.279 Hydrogen transport and storage.300 CO2 management infrastructure.330 Focus on repurposing existing infrastructure.343 References.349 Chapter 6.Policy priorities to address supply chain risks.356 Highlights.356 Designing policies for supply chains.357 Prioritising policy action.364 Ref

65、erences.431 Annex.439 Glossary.439 Clean supply chain characteristics.444 Regional definitions.453 Acronyms and abbreviations.454 Units of measure.455 Currency conversions.456 References.457 List of figures Figure I.1 Steps and interdependencies of technology and energy supply chains.28 Figure I.2 K

66、ey elements for each step in selected clean energy and technology supply chains 31 Global mass-based resource flows into the energy system,2021.39 Global total primary energy supply in the NZE Scenario.41 Global energy flows in the NZE Scenario.43 Total primary energy supply,electrification rates an

67、d energy intensity in 2030 in the APS and NZE Scenario.44 Global cumulative energy sector CO2 emissions reductions by decarbonisation pillar and clean energy and technology supply chains studied in ETP-2023,2021-2050.45 Global deployment of selected clean energy technologies in the NZE Scenario.47 H

68、eat pumps and heating distribution system market price and installation time for a typical household by type of equipment,2021.48 Time frame for prototype to market introduction and early adoption for selected clean energy technologies in the past and the NZE Scenario.49 Global average raw material

69、requirements for selected energy technologies,2021.52 Global supply gap with the NZE Scenario and geographic concentration by stage and technology based on expansion announcements,2030.55 Global investment in selected clean energy supply chains needed to bring online enough capacity in 2030 in the N

70、ZE Scenario,by supply chain step.56 Cost of capital for bulk material production industries by country/regional grouping,2020.57 Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Table of contents PAGE|14 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Indicative levelised cost of production for selected bulk materials.59 Increase in the global

71、average prices of selected clean energy products from switching to low-emission bulk material production.60 Lead times for mining of selected minerals.61 Range of(top)and average(bottom)global lead times for selected clean energy technology supply chains.64 Global scaling-up of selected energy and o

72、ther supply chains by lead time in the past(solid)and the NZE Scenario(dashed).66 Typical operating lifetime of selected energy technologies.67 Global energy sector employment by technology.68 Energy employment by region and supply chain step,2019.69 Energy employment in selected sectors by region,2

73、019.70 Global energy sector employment by technology in the NZE Scenario.72 Global employment by skill level,2019.73 Interconnections between selected energy and technology supply chains.84 Regional shares of global fossil fuel and uranium production and resources,2021.85 Global reserves and extract

74、ion of selected resources by region,2021.86 Regional shares of global production of selected critical materials,2021.89 Estimated end-use shares of global consumption of selected bulk materials,2021.90 Regional shares in global production of bulk materials and intermediate commodities,2021.91 Region

75、al shares of manufacturing capacity for selected mass-manufactured clean energy technologies and components,2021.95 Regional shares in global installed operating capacity of selected large-scale site-tailored clean energy technologies,2021.101 Share of inter-regional trade in global production for s

76、elected minerals,materials and technologies,2021.105 Trade balance along supply chains in selected countries/regions,2021.106 Global trade flows of lithium-ion batteries and electric vehicles,2021.108 EV imports to Europe by country of production and manufacturer,2021.109 Global trade flows along th

77、e solar PV supply chain,2021.111 Global trade flows of wind energy components in USD,2021.112 Global inter-regional trade flows of heat pumps,2021.113 Heat pump manufacturing capacity by company headquarters and plant location,and installations by region/country,2021.115 International prices of sele

78、cted critical and bulk materials and energy.116 Energy intensity of extracting and producing selected critical and bulk materials,and of manufacturing selected energy technologies,2021.118 Average manufacturing cost breakdown of selected energy technologies and components by commodity,2019-2021.119

79、Average ammonia production costs by technology and component in selected regions/countries,2022.121 Return on assets of companies in selected upstream,bulk materials and manufacturing sectors.123 Global inventories as a share of annual consumption for selected bulk materials,minerals and fuels.124 S

80、emiconductor manufacturing capacity and market share revenue,2021.127 Supply chain step shares in total CO2 emissions from the production of solar PV,wind turbines,EVs and heat pumps,2021.129 Global average life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions intensity of selected energy technologies,2021.130 Energy

81、 Technology Perspectives 2023 Table of contents PAGE|15 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Global average primary energy and CO2 emissions intensity of mining and processing of selected critical and bulk materials,2021.131 Global mass-based resource flows into the energy system in the NZE Scenario,2050.144 Total global

82、 material demand by type in the NZE Scenario.147 Global critical material demand by end use in the NZE Scenario.149 Estimated global bulk material demand by end use in the NZE Scenario.150 Share of secondary production in the global supply of selected materials in the NZE Scenario.154 Change in glob

83、al demand for selected minerals in the NZE Scenario,2021-2030.157 Primary production of selected minerals by country/region in the NZE Scenario and based on currently anticipated supply.159 Anticipated investment in mining of critical minerals by region/country and that required to meet mineral dema

84、nd over 2022-2030 in the NZE Scenario.161 Shares of the leading regions in global mining of selected critical minerals in 2021 and 2030 based on currently anticipated investments.163 Global energy intensity and average grade of ore production for selected metals.166 Theoretical global energy consump

85、tion and CO2 emissions in mining of selected minerals for meeting NZE Scenario demand levels at current carbon intensity.167 Decomposition of change in global direct CO2 emissions from mining of selected minerals between 2021 and 2050 in the NZE Scenario.169 Production of selected critical materials

86、 by country/region in the NZE Scenario and based on currently anticipated supply.171 Anticipated investment in critical material production by region/country and that required to meet demand over 2022-2030 in the NZE Scenario.172 Shares of the leading regions in global processing of selected critica

87、l minerals in 2021 and 2030 based on currently anticipated investments.173 Emissions intensity of different lithium hydroxide production routes by fuel used and process temperature,2021.176 Production of bulk materials by country/region and type of technology in the NZE Scenario.179 Estimates of nea

88、r zero emission material production based on project announcements and the NZE Scenario in 2030.182 Shares of the leading regions in global production of selected bulk materials in 2021 and 2030 in the NZE Scenario.184 Current global manufacturing capacity,announced capacity additions,capacity short

89、fall in 2030 relative to the NZE Scenario,and lead times for selected mass-manufactured clean energy technologies and components.208 Current global capacity,announced capacity additions,capacity shortfall in 2030 relative to the NZE Scenario,and installation lead times for selected large-scale,site-

90、tailored clean energy technologies.209 Global employment in manufacturing and installing selected mass-manufactured clean energy technologies in the NZE Scenario,2019 and 2030.210 Announced global cumulative investment in mass manufacturing of selected clean energy technologies by region/country and

91、 that required to meet demand in 2030 in the NZE Scenario,2022-2030.214 Solar PV manufacturing capacity by country/region according to announced projects and in the NZE Scenario.216 Wind power manufacturing capacity by component and country/region according to announced projects and in the NZE Scena

92、rio.220 Financial indicators for non-Chinese wind turbine manufacturers.222 Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Table of contents PAGE|16 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Battery and component manufacturing capacity by country/region according to announced projects and in the NZE Scenario.225 Heavy-duty fuel cell tru

93、ck and mobile fuel cell manufacturing capacity by country/region according to announced projects and in the NZE Scenario.229 Heat pump manufacturing capacity by country/region according to announced projects and in the NZE Scenario.235 Global annual sales of heat pump technologies for buildings in t

94、he NZE Scenario.240 Electrolyser manufacturing capacity by country/region according to announced projects and in the NZE Scenario.242 Announced global cumulative investment in large-scale,site-tailored clean energy technologies by region/country and that required to meet demand in 2030 in the NZE Sc

95、enario,2022-2030.250 Capacity of hydrogen production from natural gas with CCS by country/region according to announced projects and in the NZE Scenario.252 Direct air capture capacity by country/region for use and storage according to announced projects and in the NZE Scenario.256 Capacity of bioen

96、ergy with CO2 captured for use and storage by country/region according to announced projects and in the NZE Scenario.259 Low-emission synthetic hydrocarbon fuel production capacity by country/region according to announced projects and in the NZE Scenario.262 Global historic deployment and investment

97、s in electricity and natural gas infrastructure.277 Key technology components of electricity grids.280 Global high-voltage direct current(HVDC)transmission lines by country/region and line type.281 Gross electricity grid additions in advanced and emerging economies in the NZE Scenario.284 Average an

98、nual transformer and stationary-battery capacity additions in the NZE Scenario.285 Average annual material needs for selected grid technologies in the NZE Scenario.287 Typical material composition of overhead lines and cables by weight,2021.288 Typical material composition of transformers and statio

99、nary batteries by weight and value,2021.289 Global trade flows of grain-oriented steel by weight,2020.293 Global trade flows of transformers above 10 MW in monetary terms,2020.294 Average lead times to build new electricity grid assets in Europe and the United States,2010-2021.296 Hydrogen pipeline

100、network configuration.301 Technological pathways for long-distance transport for the supply of hydrogen and ammonia by tanker.302 Global natural gas and hydrogen supplies in the NZE Scenario.304 Average annual global investment in hydrogen and natural gas infrastructure in the NZE Scenario.304 Globa

101、l hydrogen transmission pipeline length in the NZE Scenario.305 Global production of low-emission merchant hydrogen and interregional trade in the NZE Scenario.308 Interregional trade and infrastructure for shipping low-emission hydrogen in the NZE Scenario compared with historical LNG trade.309 Tan

102、ker capacity in energy and volume terms by energy carrier type in the NZE Scenario,2030.309 Global LNG trade and largest LNG and LH2 tanker sizes.312 International ammonia trade flows via shipping,2019.313 Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Table of contents PAGE|17 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Indicative leveli

103、sed cost of delivering hydrogen,by transport option and distance in the NZE Scenario,2030.315 Indicative levelised cost of delivering hydrogen,by shipping-option step and distance in the NZE Scenario,2030.316 Global underground geological storage capacity for hydrogen in the NZE Scenario and histori

104、cal growth in natural gas storage by region.318 Global liquefied gas tanker deliveries by country and type in the NZE Scenario.323 Lead times of selected natural gas infrastructure projects.326 Global energy consumption for hydrogen transportation in the NZE Scenario.328 Energy consumption and overa

105、ll efficiency of hydrogen transport and distance in the NZE Scenario,2030.329 CO2 flows through the CO2 management value chain.331 CO2 pipeline network.332 Criteria for CO2 source-sink matching.335 Indicative CO2 shipping and offshore pipeline transportation costs.338 Existing and planned annual glo

106、bal CO2 storage injection capacity,compared with projected NZE Scenario needs in 2030.339 Lead times for the CO2 storage component of selected CCUS projects with dedicated storage.341 Lead times of selected recent natural gas and CO2 pipeline projects.342 Figure 6.1 Risks threatening acceleration of

107、 the global clean energy transition.366 Figure 6.2 Annual energy sector investments by regional grouping in the NZE Scenario.370 Figure 6.3 Public energy R&D by region and corporate energy R&D by technology.373 Figure 6.4 Risks to the energy security of global clean energy supply chains.386 Figure 6

108、.5 Geographic concentration for key critical minerals,material production and manufacturing operations for clean energy technologies.388 Figure 6.6 Announced project throughput and deployment for key clean energy technologies in the APS and the NZE Scenario.389 Figure 6.7 Market size for key clean e

109、nergy technologies and net fossil fuel trade in the APS.391 Figure 6.8 Employment in clean energy technology manufacturing by region.393 Figure 6.9 Concentrations of the largest enterprises in global manufacturing capacity and material production,2021.395 Figure 6.10 Risk to resilience of global sel

110、ected clean energy and technology supply chains.404 Figure 6.11 Industry end-user prices for natural gas and electricity in selected countries.406 Figure 6.12 Indicative production costs for hydrogen and hydrogen-based commodities produced via electrolysis.408 Figure 6.13 Global cathode production f

111、or passenger light-duty BEVs by chemistry in the NZE Scenario.410 Figure 6.14 Risk of failing to reduce CO2 emissions in the most intensive steps of selected clean energy and technology supply chains.416 Figure 6.15 Number of companies committed to purchasing low-emission steel by end-use sector,and

112、 global market size for selected bulk materials in the NZE Scenario.419 List of boxes Box 2.1 Clean energy supply chains interdependencies.84 Box 2.2 The different steps of metal production.87 Box 2.3 Resilience and vulnerabilities in the ammonia supply chain.120 Box 2.4 Stockpiles of critical miner

113、als and energy security.123 Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Table of contents PAGE|18 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Box 2.5 The chip shortage is holding back the deployment of EVs.126 Box 2.6 Mining waste stored behind tailings dams.133 Box 3.1 Clarifying materials-related terminology.144 Box 3.2 Behavioural c

114、hange to reduce the supply chain challenge.152 Box 3.3 Increasing recyclability of clean energy technologies.155 Box 3.4 Plans for near zero emission material production.180 Box 4.1 Potential installation bottlenecks in the wind sector.211 Box 4.2 Carbon intensity of technology manufacturing.214 Box

115、 4.3 The heat pump market:Synergies between end uses and subsectors.240 Box 4.4 Strategies to decarbonise road transport:Potential role for low-emission synthetic hydrocarbon fuels.264 Box 5.1 Why do energy infrastructure projects take so long?.296 Box 5.2 Environmental impacts of liquefied gas ship

116、ping.330 Box 6.1 Case study:The solar PV supply chain in China.361 Box 6.2 Case study:Strategic partnerships in clean energy supply chains.363 Box 6.3 Case study:Policy responses to the semiconductor shortage.367 Box 6.4 Case study:Strategies for clean energy supply chains in the United States and E

117、urope.374 Box 6.5 Case study:Identifying strategic projects in the European Union.376 Box 6.6 Case study:A one-stop shop for EV charging support in the United States.378 Box 6.7 Case study:Enhancing transferable skills in Alberta.380 Box 6.8 Case study:Financing innovation in the European Union.383

118、Box 6.9 Case studies:Support for new mines and manufacturing plants.401 Box 6.10 Case study:EU right-to-repair rules.412 Box 6.11 Case study:Repurposing fossil energy infrastructure in the United Kingdom and United States.414 Box 6.12 Case study:Standards for concrete and asphalt in the United State

119、s.420 Box 6.13 Lifecycle-based low-carbon fuel standards.421 Box 6.14 Case study:Incentivising the circular economy of battery supply chains in the European Union.423 Box 6.15 Case study:Supporting sustainable battery value chains by 2030 and the battery passport.425 Box 6.16 Case study:The shifting

120、 focus of EU climate policy on supply chains.428 Box 6.17 Case study:Incentivising clean construction materials in the United States.430 List of tables Characteristics of secure,resilient and sustainable clean energy technology supply chains.83 Examples of digital technology use across clean energy

121、supply chains.125 Use of semiconductors in clean energy technologies.126 Environmental impact of mining for selected minerals.133 Leading minerals and materials for clean energy supply chains by type.145 Examples of government supply-side support for low-emission material production.185 Examples of

122、government demand-side policies for low-emission material production and private-and public-sector commitments.186 Top steel producers and leading existing or planned projects making progress towards near zero emission steel production.188 Top cement producers and leading existing or planned project

123、s making progress towards near zero emission cement production.192 Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Table of contents PAGE|19 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Top plastics producers and leading existing or planned projects making progress towards near zero emission plastics production.195 Top aluminium producers a

124、nd leading existing or planned projects making progress towards near zero emission aluminium production.197 Selected announced expansion projects for manufacturing solar PV supply chain components.217 Announced expansion projects of selected battery makers and automakers.226 Expansion plans of selec

125、ted heavy-duty fuel cell truck and fuel cell manufacturers.230 Announced heat pump manufacturer expansion projects by country and type of investment.237 Announced expansion plans of key electrolyser manufacturers.244 Planned capacity expansions of selected companies to produce hydrogen from natural

126、gas with CCS.252 Direct air capture expansion projects of selected companies.257 Announced BECC expansion projects of selected companies.260 Announced low-emission synthetic hydrocarbon fuel capacity by company.263 Table 5.1 Global grain-oriented steel manufacturing capacity by country and manufactu

127、rer,2020.292 Table 5.2 Characteristics of existing hydrogen pipelines and desired features of new ones.307 Table 5.3 Announced designs for liquefied hydrogen tankers expected to be commercial before 2030.311 Table 5.4 Characteristics of types of underground geological storage for hydrogen.317 Table

128、5.5 Selected companies commercialising or planning to commercialise compressors suitable for hydrogen transmission and storage.324 Table 5.6 CO2 pipeline deployment for CO2 capture in the NZE Scenario,2050.337 Table 5.7 Fossil fuel infrastructure with potential for repurposing for transporting or st

129、oring hydrogen and CO2.344 Table 5.8 Technical aspects of repurposing oil and gas pipelines for hydrogen and CO2 transport.345 Table 5.9 Existing and planned projects to repurpose natural gas pipelines to carry CO2.346 Table 6.1 Supply chain risk assessment framework.358 Table 6.2 Policy recommendat

130、ions for secure,resilient and sustainable supply chains.364 Table 6.3 Accreditation requirements for clean energy sector workers by technology in selected countries,2022.372 Table 6.4 Components of supply chain concentration.385 Table 6.5 Traceability standards,protocols and initiatives.426 Energy T

131、echnology Perspectives 2023 Executive summary PAGE|20 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Executive summary The energy world is in the early phase of a new industrial age the age of clean energy technology manufacturing.Industries that were in their infancy in the early 2000s,such as solar PV and wind,and the 2010s,such

132、 as EVs and batteries,have mushroomed into vast manufacturing operations today.The scale and significance of these and other key clean energy industries are set for further rapid growth.Countries around the world are stepping up efforts to expand clean energy technology manufacturing with the overla

133、pping aims of advancing net zero transitions,strengthening energy security and competing in the new global energy economy.The current global energy crisis is a pivotal moment for clean energy transitions worldwide,driving a wave of investment that is set to flow into a range of industries over the c

134、oming years.In this context,developing secure,resilient and sustainable supply chains for clean energy is vital.Every country needs to identify how it can benefit from the opportunities of the new energy economy,defining its industrial strategy according to its strengths and weaknesses.This 2023 edi

135、tion of Energy Technology Perspectives(ETP-2023)provides a comprehensive inventory of the current state of global clean energy supply chains,covering the areas of mining;production of materials like lithium,copper,nickel,steel,cement,aluminium and plastics;and the manufacturing and installation of k

136、ey technologies.The report maps out how these sectors may evolve in the coming decades as countries pursue their energy,climate and industrial goals.And it assesses the opportunities and the needs for building up secure,resilient and sustainable supply chains for clean energy technologies and examin

137、es the implications for policy makers.The new energy economy brings opportunities and risks Clean energy transitions offer major opportunities for growth and employment in new and expanding industries.There is a global market opportunity for key mass-manufactured clean energy technologies worth arou

138、nd USD 650 billion a year by 2030 more than three times todays level if countries worldwide fully implement their announced energy and climate pledges.Related clean energy manufacturing jobs would more than double from 6 million today to nearly 14 million by 2030,with over half of these jobs tied to

139、 electric vehicles,solar PV,wind and heat pumps.As clean energy transitions advance beyond 2030,this would lead to further rapid industrial and employment growth.But there are potentially risky levels of concentration in clean energy supply chains both for the manufacturing of technologies and the m

140、aterials on Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Executive summary PAGE|21 I EA.CC BY 4.0.which they rely.China currently dominates the manufacturing and trade of most clean energy technologies.Chinas investment in clean energy supply chains has been instrumental in bringing down costs worldwide for

141、key technologies,with multiple benefits for clean energy transitions.At the same time,the level of geographical concentration in global supply chains also creates potential challenges that governments need to address.For mass-manufactured technologies like wind,batteries,electrolysers,solar panels a

142、nd heat pumps,the three largest producer countries account for at least 70%of manufacturing capacity for each technology with China dominant in all of them.The geographical distribution of critical mineral extraction is closely linked to resource endowments,and much of it is very concentrated.For ex

143、ample,Democratic Republic of Congo alone produces 70%of the worlds cobalt,and just three countries account for more than 90%of global lithium production.Concentration at any point along a supply chain makes the entire supply chain vulnerable to incidents,be they related to an individual countrys pol

144、icy choices,natural disasters,technical failures or company decisions.The world is already seeing the risks of tight supply chains,which have pushed up clean energy technology prices in recent years,making countries clean energy transitions more difficult and costly.Increasing prices for cobalt,lith

145、ium and nickel led to the first ever rise in battery prices,which jumped by nearly 10%globally in 2022.The cost of wind turbines outside China has also been rising after years of decline,with the prices of inputs such as steel and copper about doubling between the first half of 2020 and the same per

146、iod in 2022.Similar trends can be seen in solar PV supply chains.Governments are racing to shape the future of clean energy technology manufacturing Countries are trying to increase the resilience and diversity of clean energy supply chains while also competing for the huge economic opportunities.Ma

147、jor economies are acting to combine their climate,energy security and industrial policies.The Inflation Reduction Act in the United States is a clear articulation of this,but there is also the Fit for 55 package and REPowerEU plan in the European Union,Japans Green Transformation programme,the Produ

148、ction Linked Incentive scheme in India that encourages manufacturing of solar PV and batteries,and China is working to meet and even exceed the goals of its latest Five-Year-Plan.There are big dividends for countries that get their clean energy industrial strategies right.Project developers and inve

149、stors are watching closely for the policies that can give them a competitive edge in different markets,and will respond to supportive policies.Only 25%of the announced manufacturing projects globally for solar PV are under construction or beginning construction Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Ex

150、ecutive summary PAGE|22 I EA.CC BY 4.0.imminently the number is around 35%for EV batteries and less than 10%for electrolysers.The share is highest in China,where 25%of total solar PV and 45%of battery manufacturing is already at such an advanced stage of implementation.In the United States and Europ

151、e,less than 20%of announced battery and electrolyser factories are under construction.The relatively short lead times of around 1-3 years on average to bring manufacturing facilities online mean that the project pipeline can expand rapidly in countries with an environment that is conducive to invest

152、ment.Manufacturing projects announced,but not firmly committed,in one country today could end up actually being developed elsewhere in response to shifts in policies and market developments.Greater efforts are needed to diversify and strengthen clean energy supply chains.China accounts for most of t

153、he current announced manufacturing capacity expansion plans to 2030 for solar PV components(around 85%for cells and modules,and 90%for wafers);for onshore wind components(around 85%for blades,and around 90%for nacelles and towers);and for EV battery components(98%for anode and 93%for cathode materia

154、l).Hydrogen electrolysers are the main exception,with around one-quarter of manufacturing capacity announcements for 2030 being in China and the European Union,respectively,and another 10%in the United States.Clean energy supply chains benefit from international trade International trade is vital fo

155、r rapid and affordable clean energy transitions,but countries need to increase diversity of suppliers.For solar PV,many components are traded today,in particular wafers and modules.The share of international trade in global demand is nearly 60%for solar PV modules,with around half of the solar modul

156、es manufactured in China being exported predominantly to Europe and the Asia Pacific region.The situation is similar for EVs,for which most of the trade in components flows from Asia into Europe,which imports around 25%of its EV batteries from China.Wind turbine components are heavy and bulky,but th

157、e international trade of towers,blades and nacelles is quite common.China is a major player in wind turbine component manufacturing,accounting for 60%of global capacity and half of total exports,most of which go to other Asian countries and Europe.In the United States,one of the largest wind power m

158、arkets,the domestic content of blades and hubs is lower than 25%.For heat pumps,the share of international trade in global manufacturing is below 10%,with most of it from China to Europe.The announced manufacturing pipeline to 2030 is very large for many clean energy technologies.If all announced pr

159、ojects to expand manufacturing capacities were to materialise and all countries implement their announced climate pledges,China alone would be able to supply the entire global market for solar PV Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Executive summary PAGE|23 I EA.CC BY 4.0.modules in 2030,one-third o

160、f the global market for electrolysers,and 90%of the worlds EV batteries.Announced projects in the European Union would be sufficient to supply all of the blocs domestic needs for electrolysers and EV batteries,but would continue to be highly dependent on imports for solar PV and wind,an area where i

161、t currently has a technological edge.The situation is somewhat similar in the United States,although further capacity additions are highly likely as a result of the Inflation Reduction Act.The current global pipeline of announced projects would exceed demand for some technologies(solar PV,batteries

162、and electrolysers)and fall significantly short for others(wind components,heat pumps and fuel cells).This highlights the importance of clear and credible deployment targets from governments to limit demand uncertainty and guide investment decisions.Critical minerals bring their own set of challenges

163、 The mining of critical minerals is the only step in clean energy technology supply chains that depends on resource endowment alone.The long lead times for new mines,which can be well over ten years from the start of project development to first production,increase the risk that critical minerals su

164、pply becomes a major bottleneck in clean technology manufacturing.Moreover,the high geographical concentration of todays production creates security of supply risks,making international collaboration and strategic partnerships crucial.Clear policy signals about future deployment are particularly imp

165、ortant to de-risk investments in this sector,as companies developing new mining capacity need to be confident that clean energy technologies further down the supply chain will be successfully scaled up in time.The majority of announced projects for the processing and refining of key critical mineral

166、s are set to be located in China.These midstream processes tend to be energy-intensive.China accounts for 80%of the announced additional production capacity to 2030 for copper and dominates announced refining capacity of key metals used in batteries(95%for cobalt,and around 60%for lithium and nickel

167、).Currently planned expansions of mineral processing capacity worldwide fall well short of the volumes that will be needed for rapid deployment of clean energy technologies.Polysilicon for solar PV supply chains is the only area in which a surplus of capacity by 2030 can currently be expected.Mitiga

168、ting risks in critical mineral supplies requires a new,more diversified network of diverse international producer-consumer relationships.These will be based not only on mineral resources,but also on the environmental,social and governance standards for their production and processing.These new partn

169、erships need to be balanced in ways that offer resource-rich producers,especially in developing economies,the opportunity to move beyond primary production.Stockpiling options can also provide safeguards against disruption,but Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Executive summary PAGE|24 I EA.CC BY

170、4.0.a comprehensive suite of policies in support of minerals security needs to include attention on the demand side,notably via recycling programmes and support for technology innovation.Countries clean energy industrial strategies need to reflect their strengths and weaknesses For most countries,it

171、 is not realistic to compete effectively across all parts of the relevant clean energy technology supply chains.They need not to do so.Competitive specialisms often arise from inherent geographic advantages,such as access to low-cost renewable energy or the presence of a mineral resource,which can l

172、ead to lower production costs for energy and material commodities.But they can also arise from other attributes,like a large domestic market,a high-skilled workforce or synergies and spillovers stemming from existing industries.Holistically assessing and nurturing these competitive advantages should

173、 form a central pillar of governments industrial strategies,designed in accordance with international rules and complemented by strategic partnerships.Energy costs will continue to be a major differentiator in the competitiveness of countries energy-intensive industry sectors.Industrial competitiven

174、ess today is closely linked to energy costs,especially natural gas and electricity,which vary greatly between regions.This remains the case in the clean energy transition.For example,production costs of hydrogen from renewable electricity could be much lower in China and the United States(USD 3-4/kg

175、)than in Japan and Western Europe(USD 5-7/kg)using the best resources in those countries today,translating into similar differences in production costs for derivative commodities,such as ammonia and steel.As countries make progress towards their climate pledges,with renewable electricity costs conti

176、nuing their decline and electrolyser costs falling rapidly,the cost difference between regions is likely to shrink somewhat,but competitiveness gaps will remain.Carefully considering where in the supply chain to specialise domestically,and where it might be better to establish strategic partnerships

177、 or make direct investments in third countries,should form key considerations of countries industrial strategies.New infrastructure will form the backbone of the new energy economy in all countries.This covers areas such as the transportation,transmission,distribution or storage of electricity,hydro

178、gen and CO2.Building clean energy infrastructure can take 10 years or more,typically involving large civil engineering projects that have to adhere to extensive local planning and environmental regulations.While construction is in most cases a relatively efficient process,taking 2-4 years on average

179、,planning and permitting can cause delays and create bottlenecks,with Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Executive summary PAGE|25 I EA.CC BY 4.0.the process taking 2-7 years,depending on the jurisdiction and type of infrastructure.Lead times for infrastructure projects are usually much longer than

180、 for the power plants and industrial facilities that connect to them.The story of the new energy economy is still being written supply chains are central to the narrative Industrial strategies for clean energy technology manufacturing require an all-of-government approach,closely coordinating climat

181、e and energy security imperatives with economic opportunities.This will mean identifying and fostering domestic competitive advantages;carrying out comprehensive risk assessments of supply chains;reducing permitting times,including for large infrastructure projects;mobilising investment and financin

182、g for key supply chain elements;developing workforce skills in anticipation of future needs;and accelerating innovation in early-stage technologies.Every country has a different starting point and different strengths,so every country will need to develop its own specific strategy.And no country can

183、go it alone.Even as countries build their domestic capabilities and strengthen their places in the new global energy economy,there remain huge gains to be had from international co-operation as part of efforts to build a resilient foundation for the industries of tomorrow.Energy Technology Perspecti

184、ves 2023 Introduction PAGE|26 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Introduction Purpose of this report The International Energy Agency(IEA)Energy Technology Perspectives(ETP)technology flagship series of reports has been providing critical insights into key technological aspects of the energy sector since 2006.Clean ener

185、gy technologies and innovation are vital to meet the policy goals of energy security,economic development and environmental sustainability.Cost-effective energy and environmental policy making must be based on a clear understanding of the potential for deploying these technologies.ETP seeks to help

186、achieve this goal by assessing the opportunities and challenges associated with existing,new and emerging energy technologies,and identifying how governments and other stakeholders can accelerate the global transition to a clean and sustainable energy system.The Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian Fed

187、erations(hereafter,“Russia”)invasion of Ukraine have critically disrupted global energy and technology supply chains,leading to soaring gas,oil and coal prices,as well as shortages of critical minerals,semiconductors and other materials and components needed to manufacture clean energy technologies.

188、The current global energy crisis poses a threat to near-term economic prospects and is threatening to slow the rollout of some clean energy technologies,but it also strengthens the economic case for accelerating the shift away from fossil fuels by massively raising investments in renewables,energy e

189、fficiency and other clean energy technologies.The recent spate of extreme weather events across the planet reminds us of the urgent need for radical action to rein in emissions of greenhouse gases.As the IEA has repeatedly stressed,the world does not need to choose between tackling the energy crisis

190、 and the climate crisis.The social and economic benefits of accelerating clean energy transitions are as huge as the costs of inaction.Secure,resilient and sustainable supply chains for manufacturing clean energy technologies and producing low-emission energy commodities are central to the global en

191、ergy transition.These supply chains depend largely on minerals and on an array of materials and components derived from them,rather than on fossil fuel supplies.As a result,energy security considerations will increasingly be about access to those resources and goods.Important lessons can be drawn fr

192、om established markets and technologies such as solar photovoltaics(PV)in shaping emerging markets for batteries,low-emission hydrogen and other technologies that are poised to play key roles in the clean energy transition.Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Introduction PAGE|27 I EA.CC BY 4.0.The p

193、rimary purpose of this edition of ETP is to help government and industry decision makers overcome hurdles in developing and expanding the clean energy technology1 supply chains the world needs to reach net zero emissions by mid-century.Through the lenses of energy security,resiliency and sustainabil

194、ity,ETP-2023 focuses throughout on the opportunities and risks involved in scaling up clean energy and technology supply chains in the years ahead.It sets out where key clean energy and technology supply chains stand today and assesses how quickly they need to expand for the world to be on track for

195、 net zero emissions,and it identifies vulnerabilities and risks in adapting them to a net zero world as well as emerging opportunities to establish the new global energy economy.It also examines how governments can design more effective policies and strategies to encourage greater supply chain secur

196、ity,resiliency and sustainability.ETP-2023 builds on the 2020 revamp of this series,aimed at improving its usefulness and relevance for policy makers and other stakeholders.It draws on and updates the IEAs ongoing analysis of critical minerals and recent detailed assessments of technology supply cha

197、ins for electric vehicle(EV)batteries and solar PV,as well as the IEAs extensive clean energy technology tracking and analytical activities.ETP analysis also benefits from IEA Technology Collaboration Programme expertise and research provided by experts around the world who support this work with te

198、chnology data and analytical insights.Clean energy and technology supply chains Energy and technology supply chains refer to the sequences of steps,or stages,required to deliver a technology or an energy service to the market.They include extracting natural resources(such as minerals),producing mate

199、rials and fuels,manufacturing components and assembling them into a technology or system,installing and operating that technology,and managing wastes generated during its operating lifetime and when it is being dismantled at the end of its lifespan.An energy technology comprises a combination of har

200、dware,techniques,skills,methods and processes used to produce energy and provide energy services,i.e.energy production,transformation,storage,transportation and use.In this report we distinguish between technology supply chains and energy supply chains,based on the final service delivered:1 Clean en

201、ergy technology comprises those technologies that result in minimal or zero emissions of carbon dioxide(CO2)and pollutants.For the purposes of this report,clean energy technology refers to low or near zero emissions technologies that do not involve the production or transformation of fossil fuels co

202、al,oil and natural gas unless they are accompanied by carbon capture,utilisation and storage(CCUS)and other anti-pollution measures.Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Introduction PAGE|28 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Technology supply chains refer to the different steps needed to install a technology,with inputs

203、 of materials,components and services involved at each stage.In the case of clean energy technologies,the main steps include the extraction of minerals;the processing of those minerals into usable materials;the manufacturing of components;their assembly into finished equipment;the installation of th

204、at equipment;its operation;and its decommissioning and reuse or recycling of certain components.These technologies include supply-side equipment,such as solar PV systems(ranging from household systems to large utility-scale plants)and electrolysers to produce hydrogen,as well as end-use equipment su

205、ch as EVs,heat pumps and hydrogen-powered fuel cell vehicles.Energy supply chains refer to the different steps needed to supply a fuel or final energy service to end users,usually involving trade of that energy commodity along and across technology supply chains.Steps include power generation or fue

206、l transformation,as well as their transportation,transmission,distribution and storage.Examples include the supply of renewable electricity(such as solar PV and wind power)and low-emission hydrogen and synthetic hydrocarbon fuels,such as synthetic kerosene.Technology supply chains and energy supply

207、chains are interrelated.Producing,generating,transporting and storing any form of energy requires technologies,which need to be manufactured and brought into service.In parallel,all the different steps along the technology supply chain consume energy and thus depend on energy supply chains.Figure I.

208、1 Steps and interdependencies of technology and energy supply chains IEA.CC BY 4.0.Energy and technology supply chains are interdependent,as one is unable to operate without the other.Recent trends in technology costs and energy prices illustrate the interlinkages between the two types of supply cha

209、ins.The prices of many minerals and metals that are essential for some leading clean energy technologies have soared in the last few years,due to a combination of rising demand,disrupted supply chains,Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Introduction PAGE|29 I EA.CC BY 4.0.concerns about future suppl

210、y and rising energy prices.For example,the price of lithium has nearly doubled since the beginning of 2022(see Chapter 2).Cathode materials such as lithium,nickel,cobalt and manganese,which are essential for making lithium-ion batteries,accounted for less than 5%of battery pack costs in the middle o

211、f the last decade when there were only a handful of battery gigafactories;that share has risen to over 20%today.Scope and analytical approach Risk assessment framework for supply chains Disruptions to clean energy technology supply chains could have a major impact on the worlds ability to achieve cl

212、imate and energy goals.Understanding the risk profile of each element of the supply chain is a key step in determining where to focus efforts to enhance security,resilience and sustainability,and in developing policies to address potential vulnerabilities.These profiles can look very different depen

213、ding on the country,region and technology and will change over time as new technologies and materials emerge and mature,and as markets develop.Making supply chains secure,resilient and sustainable can only be achieved through a comprehensive and co-ordinated approach.This means taking action to deve

214、lop supply chains that can meet the needs of a net zero pathway and that can absorb,accommodate and recover from short-term shocks and adjust to long-term changes in supply,including periodic material shortages,the effects of climate change and natural disasters,and other potential market disruption

215、s.The need to reduce the emissions intensity and environmental impact of clean energy technology supply chains themselves is particularly urgent.The IEA has developed a risk assessment framework that both government and businesses can use to capture the risks and vulnerabilities of supply chains.It

216、was first presented in Securing Clean Energy Technology Supply Chains,published in July 2022(IEA,2022a).For the purposes of ETP-2023,the analysis has been significantly expanded to provide a comprehensive risk-assessment framework for technology and energy supply chains based on the combined assessm

217、ent of likelihood and impact metrics relevant to four identified potential risks:insufficient scaleup pace,and supply insecurity,inflexibility and unsustainability.The framework is designed to be applied to current supply chain structures to assess how well they can adapt and respond in the short to

218、 medium term.This report uses it to provide a global perspective,but it can be applied at the national or regional level.Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Introduction PAGE|30 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Scenario analysis Analysis in this report is underpinned by global projections of clean energy technologies

219、 derived from the IEAs Global Energy and Climate(GEC)model(IEA,2022b),a detailed bottom-up modelling framework composed of several interlinked models covering energy supply and transformation,and energy use in the buildings,industry and transport sectors.The modelling framework includes 26 regions o

220、r countries covering the whole world(see Annex).The ETP-2023 projection period is 2021 to 2050.The most recent year of complete historical data is 2020,though preliminary data are available for some countries and sectors for parts of 2021 and have been used to adjust the projections.We employ two sc

221、enarios to describe possible energy technology pathways:The Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE)Scenario the central scenario in this report is a normative scenario that sets out a pathway to stabilise global average temperatures at 1.5C above pre-industrial levels.The NZE Scenario achieves global net ze

222、ro energy sector CO2 emissions by 2050 without relying on emissions reductions from outside the energy sector.In doing so,advanced economies reach net zero emissions before developing economies do.The NZE Scenario also meets the key energy-related UN Sustainable Development Goals,achieving universal

223、 access to energy by 2030 and securing major improvements in air quality.The Announced Pledges Scenario(APS)assumes that governments will meet,in full and on time,all the climate-related commitments they have announced,including longer-term net zero emissions targets and Nationally Determined Contri

224、butions(NDCs),as well as commitments in related areas such as energy access.It does so irrespective of whether these commitments are underpinned by specific policies to secure their implementation.Pledges made in international fora and initiatives on the part of businesses and other non-governmental

225、 organisations are also taken into account wherever they add to the ambition of governments.Neither scenario should be considered a prediction or forecast.Rather,they are intended to offer insights into the impacts and trade-offs of different technology choices and policy targets,and to provide a qu

226、antitative framework to support decision making in the energy sector and strategic guidance on technology choices for governments and other stakeholders.The focus of the analysis in ETP-2023 is on the technology requirements of the NZE Scenario;the APS is employed with a view to understanding geogra

227、phical concentration and regional needs.The scenarios and results are consistent with those presented in the 2022 World Energy Outlook(IEA,2022c).Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Introduction PAGE|31 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Selected energy and technology supply chains This report analyses six clean energy

228、 and technology supply chains in detail(Figure I.2).They were selected based on their critical importance to the clean energy transition described in the NZE Scenario.Together,they contribute around half of the cumulative emissions reductions to 2050 in that scenario.Three are clean energy supply ch

229、ains for low-emission electricity(including solar PV and wind with their respective technology supply chains);low-emission hydrogen(including technology supply chains for electrolysers and natural gas-based plants with carbon capture and storage CCS);and low-emission synthetic hydrocarbon fuels(incl

230、uding technology supply chains for direct air capture DAC and bioenergy with carbon capture BECC to provide CO2,connected to the low-emission hydrogen supply chain).The three others are clean technology supply chains for electric cars(including the battery supply chain);fuel cell trucks(including th

231、e fuel cell supply chain);and heat pumps for buildings.Figure I.2 Key elements for each step in selected clean energy and technology supply chains LOW-EMISSION ELECTRICITY LOW-EMISSION HYDROGEN Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Introduction PAGE|32 I EA.CC BY 4.0.LOW-EMISSION SYNTHETIC HYDROCARBON

232、 FUELS BATTERY ELECTRIC VEHICLES HEAT PUMPS Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Introduction PAGE|33 I EA.CC BY 4.0.FUEL CELL TRUCKS IEA.CC BY 4.0.Notes:BECC=bioenergy with carbon capture.DAC=direct air capture.FT=Fischer-Tropsch.ETP-2023 studies six selected clean energy and technology supply chain

233、s in detail.Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Introduction PAGE|34 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Report structure Chapter 1 reviews the current status of the global clean energy transition and outlines the extent of the changes required to clean energy and technology supply chain to put the world on the NZE Scen

234、arios net zero pathway,as well as some potential risks that could arise.Chapter 2 assesses in detail how the key clean energy and technology supply chains function today and their vulnerabilities as clean energy transitions advance,focusing on the link between geographic concentration and security,r

235、esilience to market shocks and environmental performance.Chapter 3 quantifies global mineral and material needs for the transition to net zero emissions and analyses the extent to which current expansion plans are compatible with that trajectory.It also discusses the policy and market factors drivin

236、g investments in key regions and the main corporate strategies in this step of the supply chain.Chapter 4 assess prospects for the supply of mass-manufactured and large-scale site-tailored clean energy technologies,focusing on the expansion of manufacturing and installation capacity based on current

237、 and announced construction activity.Like Chapter 3,Chapter 4 also discusses the policy and market factors driving investments in key regions and the main corporate strategies in this step of the supply chain.Chapter 5 analyses how and at what pace energy and CO2 infrastructure needs to be transform

238、ed to cost-effectively sustain the clean energy supply chains that will be needed for net zero emissions,focusing on electricity,hydrogen and CO2 transportation,transmission,distribution and storage.Chapters 6 sets out how policy makers can support the development and expansion of secure,resilient a

239、nd sustainable supply chains,the tools at their disposal and how best to use them,drawing on recent experience around the world.Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Introduction PAGE|35 I EA.CC BY 4.0.References IEA(International Energy Agency)(2022a),Securing Clean Energy Technology Supply Chains,ht

240、tps:/www.iea.org/reports/securing-clean-energy-technology-supply-chains IEA(2022b),Global Energy and Climate Model,https:/www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model IEA(2022c),World Energy Outlook,https:/www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2022 Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Chapt

241、er 1.Energy supply chains in transition PAGE|36 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1.Energy supply chains in transition Highlights Momentum for clean energy transitions is accelerating,driven by increasingly ambitious energy and climate policies,technological progress and renewed energy security concerns follow

242、ing Russias invasion of Ukraine.Clean energy investment reached USD 1.4 trillion in 2022,up 10%relative to 2021 and representing 70%of the growth in total energy sector investment.Despite this important progress,fossil fuels still account for 80%of the primary energy mix.Clean energy technology depl

243、oyment must accelerate rapidly to meet climate goals.In the Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE)Scenario,global production of electric cars increases six-fold by 2030;renewables account for over 60%of power generation(up from 30%today);and electricity demand increases by 25%,accounting for nearly 30%of t

244、otal final consumption(up from 20%today).If delivered in full,announced projects to expand clean technology manufacturing capacity would meet the needs for 2030 in the NZE Scenario for solar PV modules and approach that required for EV batteries,but would fall short in other areas,leaving gaps of 40

245、%for electrolysers and 60%for heat pumps.The transition to clean energy hinges on clean energy technology supply chains.USD 1.2 trillion of cumulative investment would be required to bring enough capacity online for the supply chains studied in ETP-2023 to be on track with the NZE Scenarios 2030 tar

246、gets.Announced investments cover around60%of this total.Given project lead times,most investments are required during 2023-2025,at an average of USD 270 billion per year during that period,which is nearly seven times the average rate of investment over 2016-2021.Critical materials like copper,lithiu

247、m,cobalt and nickel are changing the energy security paradigm.Manufacturing a typical-size electric car requires five times as much of these materials as a regular car.Anticipated supply expansion suggests that production could fall well short of NZE Scenario requirements for 2030,with deficits of u

248、p to 35%for lithium mining and 60%for nickel sulfate production.Lead times to establish new supply chains and expand existing ones can be long,requiring policy interventions today.Opening mines or deploying clean energy infrastructure can take more than a decade.Building a factory or ramping up oper

249、ations for mass-manufactured technologies requires only around 1-3 years.Clean energy sector jobs in the NZE Scenario soar from 33 to 70 million over 2021-2030,offsetting the loss of 8.5 million in fossil fuel-related sectors.Building a large,skilled workforce is key to meeting net zero targets,but

250、labour and skills shortages in expanding clean energy industries are already creating bottlenecks.Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Chapter 1.Energy supply chains in transition PAGE|37 I EA.CC BY 4.0.The clean energy transition Recent trends in energy technologies The move to clean energy is accel

251、erating The global clean energy transition is accelerating,driven by a combination of policy,technological change and economics.The need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions drastically and urgently in the face of ever more startling evidence of global climate change is now widely accepted,reflected i

252、n increasingly ambitious national goals.The global energy crisis following the Russian Federations(hereafter,“Russia”)invasion of Ukraine has bolstered energy security concerns about supply of conventional fuels such as oil and gas,providing further impetus to the need and policy support for clean e

253、nergy technologies.As of the end of November 2022,87 countries and the European Union had announced pledges to reduce emissions to net zero this century,covering over 85%of the worlds emissions and 85%of its gross domestic product.Notable announcements since 2021 include the Peoples Republic of Chin

254、as(hereafter,“China”)target of carbon neutrality by 2060(IEA,2021a),Indias net zero emissions by 2070 goal(Government of India,2022)and Indonesias net zero emissions by 2060 target(IEA,2022a).If all announcements and targets are met in full and on time,they will be enough to hold the rise in global

255、temperatures to around 1.7C in 2100(IEA,2022b;IEA,2022c).Over the last decade,the uptake of clean energy technologies and the supply of energy from non-fossil sources,notably renewables,has accelerated rapidly.In 2022,renewables accounted for 30%of global power generation,up from below 20%in 2010,wi

256、th notable increases in solar PV,wind,hydropower and bioenergy output(IEA,2022d).Electrification is accelerating across all end-use sectors.In transport,sales of electric cars exceeded 10 million in 2022,or 13%of the global car market,bringing their total number on the worlds roads to over 25 millio

257、n,up from practically zero in 2010(IEA,2022e).There were more than 1 000 gigawatts thermal(GWth)of heat pump capacity operating worldwide in 2021,up from around 500 GWth in 2010,with sales growing 13%relative to 2020.2 Investment in clean energy technology is increasing quickly and exceeded USD3 1.4

258、 trillion in 2022,accounting for nearly 70%of year-on-year growth in overall energy investment,and up from about USD 1 trillion in 2015(IEA,2022f).2 Heat pumps included in this analysis are electric,and are those used primarily for heating(space and/or water)in buildings and the ones for which heati

259、ng function is just as important as its cooling function,aiming to exclude to the extent possible air-air reversible heat pumps units bought primarily for space cooling.They include both centralised and decentralised units in buildings.3 All USD values in this report are expressed in real terms base

260、d 2021 prices.Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Chapter 1.Energy supply chains in transition PAGE|38 I EA.CC BY 4.0.In the case of electric cars,global spending by governments and consumers doubled to about USD 280 billion in 2021,about ten times more than in 2015.This increase took place despite

261、difficult market conditions and manufacturing constraints:the combined revenues of the worlds 25 largest car manufacturers stagnated between 2015 and 2021,before rebounding in 2022.Renewables,power grids and energy storage in 2022 accounted for more than 80%of the nearly USD 1 trillion of total powe

262、r sector investment,led by solar PV,up from 75%of the USD 800 billion invested in 2015,while the share of fossil fuel power fell from about 20%to 10%over the same period.Aggregate investment in oil,gas and coal supply amounted to just above USD 800 billion in 2022,down from over USD 1 trillion in 20

263、15.Capital spending by oil and gas companies4 on clean energy technologies has risen in recent years,expected to reach just over 5%of their total upstream investment in 2022,up from 0.5%in 2015.The world still relies heavily on fossil fuels Despite the rapid recent growth in clean energy technologie

264、s,the world still relies predominantly on fossil fuels for its energy supply(Figure 1.1).In fact,growth in clean energy supply since 2000 has been dwarfed by that of oil,gas and coal,especially in the emerging and developing economies.In those countries,the share of fossil fuels in total primary ene

265、rgy supply increased from 77%in 2000 to 80%in 2021,mainly due to a jump in coal,from 27%to 35%.In the advanced economies,the share dropped from 82%to 77%over the same period.As a result,the overall share of fossil energy in the global energy mix has remained almost constant at about 80%.Oil remains

266、the single largest source of primary energy,making up 29%of total energy supply in 2021(down from 37%in 2000),followed by coal at 26%(up from 23%)and natural gas at 23%(up from 21%).Bioenergy is still the single largest source of non-fossil energy,accounting for around 10%of total primary energy use

267、 in 2021,though over one-third is in the form of traditional biomass,often used in unsustainable and polluting ways.Nuclear power makes up 5%of supply,hydropower around 2%,and solar and wind together a mere 2%.While electrification has accelerated over the last two decades,fossil fuels still dominat

268、e energy end use,accounting for around 35%of total energy use in buildings and 95%in transport.4 Includes the majors BP,Chevron,ConocoPhillips,Eni,ExxonMobil,Shell and TotalEnergies,as well as ADNOC(Abu Dhabi National Oil Company),CNPC(China National Petroleum Corporation),CNOOC(China National Offsh

269、ore Oil Corporation),Equinor,Gazprom,Kuwait Petroleum Corporation,Lukoil,Petrobras,Repsol,Rosneft,Saudi Aramco,Sinopec and Sonatrach.Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Chapter 1.Energy supply chains in transition PAGE|39 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Global mass-based resource flows into the energy system,2021 IE

270、A.CC BY 4.0.Notes:Physical mass flows of fuels and materials in the energy system,in million tonnes.The“energy system”includes:devices that directly produce or consume energy(e.g.solar panels and motors);equipment and structures that house energy-consuming devices and in turn can passively have an i

271、mpact on energy consumption(e.g.building envelopes and car bodies);infrastructure that directly transports energy or CO2(e.g.electricity grids and CO2 pipelines);and infrastructure whose build-out could be directly affected by shifts in technology due to clean energy transitions(e.g.rail infrastruct

272、ure and roads).Industry material demand includes that from equipment but not the plant shell.Region of production refers to region of extraction for fuels and minerals,and production for bulk materials(steel,cement,aluminium).For critical minerals(copper,lithium,nickel,cobalt and neodymium),volumes

273、refer to the materials(metals)derived from them.A similar graph for the Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE)Scenario for 2050 is in Chapter 3.Sources:IEA analysis based on IEA data;USGS(2022).Despite the rapid recent growth in clean energy technologies and demand for metals critical to them,the world sti

274、ll relies primarily on coal,oil and gas to meet its energy needs.In addition to the direct use of energy,end-use sectors consume large amounts of energy embedded in materials,such as cement for infrastructure and buildings,steel for vehicles and manufacturing goods,and chemicals for fertilisers and

275、consumer goods.The production of these bulk materials today also relies mainly on fossil fuels,either for combustion or as feedstock.In 2021,coal made up around 75%of the energy used in global steel production and more than half of that used to make cement,while about 70%of chemicals production was

276、based on oil or natural gas.The demand for so-called“critical minerals”,5 from which 5 In this report,five main critical minerals are analysed:copper,lithium,cobalt,nickel and neodymium.They were selected based on their use in key clean energy technologies,potential constraints in their supply and r

277、isks relative to the geographical concentration of their production.Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Chapter 1.Energy supply chains in transition PAGE|40 I EA.CC BY 4.0.metals such as copper,nickel and cobalt are produced,has been increasing briskly in recent years,driven by the deployment of cle

278、an energy technologies such as batteries,yet their combined production by mass represents just 0.3%of that of coal today.The extraction and processing of critical minerals typically relies on fossil fuels at present.Much of the momentum for clean energy is recent and has thus yet to translate into m

279、ajor change in global energy supply(IEA,2022g).Most countries have been strengthening policy support for clean energy since the Paris Agreement in 2015,and even more so since 2020 as part of Covid-19 economic recovery packages.For example,the United States passed the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022,

280、authorising USD 370 billion in spending on energy and climate change(US Congress,2022).In the wake of Russias invasion of Ukraine,the European Union adopted the REPowerEU plan,which is expected to mobilise an additional EUR 210 billion in clean energy technology investment over five years and suppor

281、t the Fit for 55 package a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation and to put in place new initiatives with the aim of reducing EU emissions by at least 55%by 2030(EC,2022;European Council,2022).At the Global Clean Energy Action Forum co-organised by Mission Innovation and the Clean Ene

282、rgy Ministerial,16 countries collectively announced USD 94 billion in spending for clean technology demonstration projects by 2026,following IEA analysis of global needs for net zero(US Department of Energy,2022;IEA,2022h).Japan has established a roadmap to reach net zero by 2050 with support for de

283、veloping emerging technologies through the JPY 2 trillion Green Innovation Fund(Japan,METI,2021;NEDO,2021).Chinas 14th Five-Year Plan contains action plans for technology development aimed at achieving a peak in CO2 emissions by 2030(China,NEA,2022;China,NDRC,2021).India is increasing supply chain i

284、nvestments to boost domestic manufacturing in strategic industries including batteries(over USD 2 billion),cars(over USD 3 billion),solar PV(nearly USD 600 million)and steel(USD 800 million)through the Production Linked Incentive scheme over the 2022-2027 period(India,MCI,2021a and 2021b;India,MHI,2

285、022a and 2022b;India,MNRE,2022;India,Union Cabinet,2020).Clean energy technology needs for net zero Net zero calls for a deep transformation of the energy sector Achieving global net zero emissions of CO2 by 2050 requires curbing the growth in energy demand alongside a radical change in the energy m

286、ix,involving a wholesale shift to renewable and other clean energy sources and technologies(Figure 1.2).In the NZE Scenario,behavioural changes,improvements in energy efficiency,and switching to renewables enable a fall in total primary energy supply Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Chapter 1.Ene

287、rgy supply chains in transition PAGE|41 I EA.CC BY 4.0.by 10%between 2021 and 2030,despite the global economy growing by nearly a third.Total final consumption falls by 9%over the same period.The annual rate of energy intensity improvement nearly triples to more than 4%per year compared with the pre

288、vious decade.Between 2030 and 2050,global demand falls more slowly,by just 15%in total,as the scope for further energy conservation efforts and efficiency improvements diminishes,and growing population and economic activity continue to drive up underlying demand for energy services.Renewables led by

289、 solar PV and wind see the biggest increase in supply to 2050 in the NZE Scenario,complemented by significant increases in nuclear.Solar output jumps 23-fold and that of wind 13-fold,while nuclear power doubles between 2021 and 2050.By 2050,solar and wind together make up about 40%of total primary e

290、nergy supply and nuclear 12%.Total capacity additions of renewables quadruple from 300 GW in 2021 to nearly 1 200 GW in 2030,their share of total power generation reaching over 60%;additions slow to about 1 100 GW by 2050 as the need to replace existing fossil fuel-based capacity diminishes,with ren

291、ewables accounting for about 90%of generation by then.Unabated fossil fuels provided around 65%of total final consumption in 2021,excluding fossil fuel use for non-energy purposes such as chemical feedstock.In the NZE Scenario,this share falls to around 55%in 2030 and to 15%by 2050.In absolute terms

292、,the consumption of bioenergy in end-use sectors rises modestly over 2021-2050,but this masks a shift in its composition:the use of modern bioenergy rises sharply while its traditional use is phased out completely by 2030 as full access to modern energy is achieved in all countries.Global total prim

293、ary energy supply in the NZE Scenario IEA.CC BY 4.0.Renewables and nuclear displace most fossil fuel use in the NZE Scenario,with the share of fossil fuels plunging from almost 80%in 2021 to less than 20%in 2050.0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700200402050EJOthersourcesRenewablesNuclearNatural

294、gasOilCoalHistoricalScenarioEnergy Technology Perspectives 2023 Chapter 1.Energy supply chains in transition PAGE|42 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Electricity becomes the largest energy vector,with demand more than doubling between 2021 and 2050,by which time it meets more than half of total final consumption(Figu

295、re 1.3).Total electricity generation grows by 3.5%per year to 2050 to meet that demand.Hydrogen and hydrogen-based fuels emerge as significant end-use forms of energy,especially after 2030,being deployed mainly in heavy industry and long-distance transport;their share of total final consumption reac

296、hes nearly 10%in 2050.The share of bioenergy reaches around 15%in 2050.Carbon capture,utilisation and storage(CCUS)plays an increasingly important role:CO2 capture grows from around 0.04 Gt in 2021 to 1.2 Gt in 2030 and 6.2 Gt in 2050,with industry and fuel transformation sectors accounting for more

297、 than 40%,direct air capture(DAC)for around 5%,and power and heat generation for the rest by then.The transformation of the global energy system described in the NZE Scenario results in a rapid decline in energy sector CO2 emissions(energyrelated and from industrial processes),falling by about 30%by

298、 2030 and by 95%by 2050 relative to 2021.Residual emissions in 2050 from sectors where reducing them is technically difficult and costly,such as aviation,shipping,road freight and heavy industry,are entirely compensated by carbon removal from bioenergy with carbon capture and storage,which removes C

299、O2 from the atmosphere indirectly,and direct air capture with storage,resulting in overall net zero emissions.Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Chapter 1.Energy supply chains in transition PAGE|43 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Global energy flows in the NZE Scenario 2021 2050 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Notes:Some electricity

300、 is used to generate hydrogen from water electrolysis,while some hydrogen(and hydrogen-based fuels such as ammonia)is in turn used for power generation in 2050.Losses include fuel,heat and power distribution losses,as well as transformation process conversion losses and own use.Electricity becomes t

301、he largest energy vector in the NZE Scenario,with demand more than doubling between 2021 and 2050.Announced pledges fall short of net zero,but still require major shifts in the energy sector Despite strong progress,current pledges by governments and companies as reflected in the Announced Pledges Sc

302、enario(APS)are not enough to put the world on track to achieve net zero emissions by 2050.In 2050,energy-related CO2 Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Chapter 1.Energy supply chains in transition PAGE|44 I EA.CC BY 4.0.emissions in the APS amount to about 11 Gt CO2.Nevertheless,achieving those ple

303、dges will still require quick decarbonisation this decade.Emissions fall by about 15%over 2021-2030 in the APS(40%in the NZE Scenario),which calls for major shifts in the energy sector.In the APS,renewables overtake coal and account for over a fifth of total primary energy supply in 2030,while the s

304、hare of fossil fuels drops from 80%today to 70%(Figure 1.4).Electrification accelerates 25%of total final consumption in 2030 and the carbon intensity of power simultaneously drops by about 40%.Growth decorrelates from emissions,and the energy intensity of the global economy falls by a quarter over

305、2021-2030.Clean energy technologies are deployed quickly:in 2030,sales of electric cars exceed 40 million(up from 10 million today),320 GWth of heat pumps are installed(up from 100 GWth),and 30 Mt of low-emission hydrogen are produced(up from less than one).Total primary energy supply,electrificatio

306、n rates and energy intensity in 2030 in the APS and NZE Scenario IEA.CC BY 4.0.Note:TFC=total final consumption;PPP=purchasing power parity.NZE=Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario.APS=Announced Pledges Scenario.In the middle graph on electrification,carbon intensity labels(%)refer to the decrease in

307、 electricity carbon intensity in APS and NZE in 2030 relative to 2021.In the right-hand side graph on energy intensity,labels(%)refer to the decrease in energy intensity in APS and NZE in 2030 relative to 2021.While current pledges as reflected in the APS fall short of net zero pathways,they still r

308、equire major transformation of the energy sector.Massive deployment of clean energy technologies is needed The decarbonisation of the energy system envisioned in the NZE Scenario rests on eight main pillars:behavioural change and avoided demand,energy efficiency,hydrogen,electrification,bioenergy,wi

309、nd and solar,CCUS,and other fuel shifts 26%21%16%23%21%20%29%28%26%12%22%31%5%6%8%0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700APSNZE20212030EJCoalNatural gasOilRenewablesNuclearOther-24%-33%0123APSNZE20212030GJ per thousand USD(2021,PPP)Energy intensity-39%-64%02004006000%10%20%30%APSNZE20212030Electricity share o

310、f TFC(left)Carbon intensity(right)g CO2/kWhTotal primary energy supplyElectrificationEnergy intensityEnergy Technology Perspectives 2023 Chapter 1.Energy supply chains in transition PAGE|45 I EA.CC BY 4.0.(e.g.switching from coal and oil to natural gas,nuclear,hydropower,geothermal,concentrating sol

311、ar power and marine energy).Behavioural change and energy efficiency gains do not require fundamental changes to existing energy systems,but the other pillars,which account for over 70%of total cumulative emissions reductions over 2021-2050,require the massive deployment of new types of equipment an

312、d infrastructure.For the purpose of ETP-2023,we select key energy technologies and enabling infrastructure across the major decarbonisation pillars from the NZE Scenario to assess and illustrate the implications for supply chains of the clean energy transition(Figure 1.5).Taken together,they account

313、 for nearly 50%of total cumulative emissions reductions over 2021-50.Some selected energy and technology supply chains are specific to a particular pillar,such as electric cars and heat pumps for electrification,fuel cell trucks for hydrogen,or solar PV and wind.Some are more cross-cutting in nature

314、,such as low-emission hydrogen and low-emission synthetic hydrocarbon fuels.Global cumulative energy sector CO2 emissions reductions by decarbonisation pillar and clean energy and technology supply chains studied in ETP-2023,2021-2050 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Notes:“Other fuel shifts”include other renewables,n

315、uclear,and switching from coal and oil to natural gas.“Behaviour”includes energy service demand changes from user decisions(e.g.changing heating temperature),as well as avoided demand,which refers to energy service demand changes from technology developments(e.g.digitalisation).The technologies feat

316、ured in the right-hand side diagram are those selected for study in ETP-2023.Six clean energy and technology supply chains hold the potential to unlock around 50%of cumulative emissions reductions to 2050 in the NZE Scenario.The scale and speed of the required deployment of clean energy technologies

317、 needs to increase dramatically to meet the needs of the NZE Scenario(Figure 1.6).Global production of electric vehicles(EVs)(excluding two-and ElectrificationBehaviourEfficiencyHydrogenOther fuel shiftsCCUSDecarbonisation pillarsSupply chainsHeat pumpsLow-emission hydrogenLow-emission electricityLo

318、w-emission synthetic hydrocarbon fuelsElectric carsFuel cell trucksBioenergyTechnology supply chainsEnergy supply chainsSolar PV and wind31%17%16%10%10%5%4%7%0%20%40%60%80%100%2021-2050Emissions reductions(%)Other fuel shiftsHydrogenBehaviourCCUSBioenergyEfficiencyElectrificationSolar PV and windCum

319、ulative emissions reductionsEnergy Technology Perspectives 2023 Chapter 1.Energy supply chains in transition PAGE|46 I EA.CC BY 4.0.three-wheelers)increases 15-fold to 2050,while the deployment of renewables nearly quadruples.Low-emission synthetic hydrocarbon fuels(primarily jet kerosene),productio

320、n of which is minimal today as most technologies are still under development,reach 2.4 billion litres in 2030(more than the oil consumption of domestic aviation in Japan in 2021)and over 105 billion litres by 2050(equivalent to the total oil consumption of domestic and international aviation in the

321、United States and the European Union combined in 2021).Production of low-emission hydrogen from electrolysis or natural gas-based hydrogen with carbon capture and storage(CCS)jumps from around 0.5 Mt in 2021 to 450 Mt in 2050 equal in energy equivalent terms to about half of the worlds energy consum

322、ption in the transport sector in 2021.In many cases,available clean energy technologies on the market today are not yet competitive with existing fossil fuel-based ones,despite recent cost reductions.The former are generally more capital-intensive,i.e.the upfront cost of purchasing or installing the

323、m is higher per unit of capacity as they tend to involve more extensive and costly inputs,though their running and maintenance costs are typically lower.For some technologies,higher upfront costs are outweighed by savings during use,though this varies by region.In general,costs in real terms are exp

324、ected to continue to decline over time as deployment increases and with innovation.EVs are a case in point.The price gap between electric and internal combustion engine(ICE)cars has been shrinking,thanks mainly to major reductions in the cost of making batteries,helping to stimulate EV demand.Improv

325、ements in performance and recent fuel price hikes are also boosting their attractiveness.Yet electric cars remain more expensive and offer shorter driving ranges in most cases.For a medium-sized car,a battery EV typically costs around USD 10 000(or roughly 40%)more than a conventional alternative(be

326、fore taxes and subsidies).The price premium is generally smaller in China,averaging about 10%,due to smaller vehicle size and greater competition among carmakers,while it has been rising recently in Europe following large investments aimed at improving vehicle performance.Heat pumps a technology tha

327、t efficiently provides heating and cooling to buildings and industry also have an upfront price premium when compared with fossil fuel heating equipment,though heat pumps pay back over their lifetime in many regions today.The total cost of purchasing and installing a heat pump ranges from USD 1 500

328、to USD 10 000 for most homes,but varies substantially depending on the region and the type of unit installed(Figure 1.7).Installation can add substantially to total cost;especially if the energy distribution system needs to be upgraded to accommodate heat pumps(i.e.enlarging radiators or underfloor

329、exchangers),this can add cost.This matters substantially for more efficient ground-source heat pumps,where installation can take up to several weeks and Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Chapter 1.Energy supply chains in transition PAGE|47 I EA.CC BY 4.0.requires drilling and underground piping,ma

330、king their total cost much higher than other options.Installation time and costs could decline as heat pumps become more common,and offer greater opportunities than in manufacturing.The most expensive components in heat pumps(e.g.heat exchangers,compressors)have already been mass manufactured for a

331、long time,making further manufacturing cost reductions more limited than for other clean energy technologies.Global deployment of selected clean energy technologies in the NZE Scenario IEA.CC BY 4.0.Notes:HF=hydrocarbon fuels The scale and speed of deployment of clean energy technologies and their a

332、ssociated supply chains accelerate dramatically in the NZE Scenario.Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 Chapter 1.Energy supply chains in transition PAGE|48 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Heat pumps and heating distribution system market price and installation time for a typical household by type of equipment,2021

333、IEA.CC BY 4.0.Notes:HP=heat pumps.For ground-source heat pumps,the installation costs include drilling costs and underground pipes.HP installation cost includes labour and balance of plant.Distribution system costs include labour and materials.The uncertainty line refers to installation time.The market price of heat pumps significantly depends on installation costs,where the biggest potential for