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1、World EnergyOutlook 2022The IEA examines the full spectrum of energy issues including oil,gas and coal supply and demand,renewable energy technologies,electricity markets,energy efficiency,access to energy,demand side management and much more.Through its work,the IEA advocates policies that will enh
2、ance the reliability,affordability and sustainability of energy in its 31 member countries,11 association countries and beyond.Please note that this publication is subject to specific restrictions that limit its use and distribution.The terms and conditions are available online at www.iea.org/t&c/Th
3、is publication and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory,to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory,city or area.Source:IEA.International Energy Agency Website:www.iea.orgIEA member countri
4、es:Australia Austria Belgium CanadaCzech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland ItalyJapanKorea Lithuania Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Spain Sweden Switzerland Republic of TrkiyeUnited Kingdom United StatesThe Europe
5、an Commission also participates in the work of the IEAIEA association countries:INTERNATIONAL ENERGYAGENCYArgentinaBrazilChinaEgyptIndiaIndonesiaMoroccoSingaporeSouth AfricaThailandUkraineIEA.CC BY 4.0.Foreword 3 ForewordToday,theworldisinthemidstofthefirsttrulyglobalenergycrisis,withimpactsthatwill
6、befeltforyearstocome.RussiasunprovokedinvasionofUkraineinFebruaryhashadfarreachingimpactsontheglobalenergysystem,disruptingsupplyanddemandpatternsandfracturinglongstandingtradingrelationships.Thecrisisisaffectingallcountries,butattheInternationalEnergyAgency(IEA),weareparticularlyconcernedabouttheef
7、fectitishavingonthepeoplewhocanleastaffordit.OneofthestrikingfindingsinthisyearsWorldEnergyOutlook(WEO)isthatthecombinationoftheCovidpandemicandthecurrentenergycrisismeansthat70millionpeoplewhorecentlygainedaccesstoelectricitywilllikelylosetheabilitytoaffordthataccessand100millionpeoplemaynolongerbe
8、abletocookwithcleanfuels,returningtounhealthyandunsafemeansofcooking.Thatisaglobaltragedy.Anditisnotonlyanenergycrisiswithwhichwearedealing:manycountriesalsofaceafoodsecuritycrisisandincreasinglyvisibleimpactsofclimatechange.Astheworldfacesthisunprecedentedenergyshockandtheotheroverlappingcrises,wen
9、eedtobeclearonhowwegothereandwhereweneedtogo.TheanalysisinthisOutlookisparticularlyimportanttoshedlightonthesequestionsandtodispelsomeofthemistakenandmisleadingideasthathavearisenaboutthisenergycrisis.Forexample,thereisamistakenideathatthisissomehowacleanenergycrisis.Thatissimplynottrue.Theworldisst
10、rugglingwithtoolittlecleanenergy,nottoomuch.Fastercleanenergy transitions would have helped to moderate the impact of this crisis,and theyrepresentthebestwayoutofit.Whenpeoplemisleadinglyblameclimateandcleanenergyfortodayscrisis,whattheyaredoingwhethertheymeantoornotisshiftingattentionawayfromtherea
11、lcause:RussiasinvasionofUkraine.Anothermistakenideaisthattodayscrisisisahugesetbackforeffortstotackleclimatechange.TheanalysisinthisOutlookshowsthat,infact,thiscanbeahistoricturningpointtowardsacleanerandmoresecureenergysystemthankstotheunprecedentedresponsefromgovernmentsaroundtheworld,includingthe
12、InflationReductionActintheUnitedStates,the Fit for 55 package and REPowerEU in the European Union,Japans GreenTransformation(GX)programme,Koreas aim to increase the share of nuclear andrenewablesinitsenergymix,andambitiouscleanenergytargetsinChinaandIndia.Atthesametime,Iamworriedthattodaysmajorgloba
13、lenergyandclimatechallengesincreasetheriskofgeopoliticalfracturesandnewinternationaldividinglinesespeciallybetweenadvancedeconomiesandmanyemerginganddevelopingeconomies.Unityandsolidarityneedtobethehallmarksofourresponsetotodayscrisis.ThatisthecaseforEuropeduringwhatpromisetobetoughwintersnotonlythi
14、syearbutalsonext.Anditistrueglobally.ThisWEOunderscoresthatsuccessfulenergytransitionsmustbefairandinclusive,offeringahelpinghandtothoseinneedandensuringthebenefitsofthenewenergyeconomyaresharedwidely.Evenascountriesstruggletomanagethebrutalshocksfromthecrisis,theIEA.CC BY 4.0.4 International Energy
15、 Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 lastthingweshoulddoisturninwardsandawayfromsupportingeachother.Instead,weneedtoworktogethertobuildtrust.TheIEAiscommittedtocontinuingtoplayacentralroleinthisbyhelpinggovernmentstodefinetheactionsthatareneededtoenabletheworldtoconfrontoursharedenergyandclimatechallen
16、gestogether.Inthis,weareguidedbytheIEAsworldclassenergymodellingandanalysisunderpinnedbyunparalleleddatathatisexemplifiedbytheWorldEnergyOutlook.Forthis,IwouldliketowarmlythanktheexcellentIEAteamthathasworkedskilfullyandtirelesslyundertheoutstandingleadershipofmycolleaguesLauraCozziandTimGouldto pro
17、duce another essential and timely Outlook that I hope will help decisionmakersgloballytonavigatethecurrentcrisisandmovetheworldtowardsamoresecureandsustainablefuture.DrFatihBirolExecutiveDirectorInternationalEnergyAgencyIEA.CC BY 4.0.Acknowledgements 5AcknowledgementsThisstudywaspreparedbytheWorldEn
18、ergyOutlook(WEO)teamintheDirectorateofSustainability,TechnologyandOutlooks(STO)incooperationwithotherdirectoratesandofficesoftheInternationalEnergyAgency(IEA).ThestudywasdesignedanddirectedbyLauraCozzi,ChiefEnergyModellerandHeadofDivisionforEnergyDemandOutlook,andTimGould,ChiefEnergyEconomistandHead
19、ofDivisionforEnergySupplyandInvestmentOutlooks.ThemodellingandanalyticalteamsforthisWEO2022wereledbyStphanieBouckaert(demand),JonathanCoppel(investment and finance),ChristopheMcGlade(supply),ThomasSpencer(climate and environment),BrentWanner(power)and DanielWetzel(sustainabletransitions).Keycontribu
20、tionsfromacrosstheWEOteamwerefrom:OskarasAlauskas(transport),LucilaArboleyaSarazola(investment and finance),YasmineArsalane(leadoneconomicoutlook,power),BlandineBarreau(recoveryplan),SimonBennett(colead on hydrogen,energy technologies),CharlneBisch(datamanagement),JustinaBodlkov(employment),OliviaCh
21、en(employment),YunyouChen(power),DanielCrow(leadonbehaviour,airpollution),DavideDAmbrosio(leadondatascience,power),AmritaDasgupta(criticalminerals),TanguyDeBienassis(investmentandfinance),TomsdeOliveiraBredariol(leadoncoal,methane),MichaelDrtil(powerandelectricity networks),DarlainEdeme(Africa),Musa
22、Erdogan(fossil fuel subsidies,datamanagement),EricFabozzi(power and electricity networks),VctorGarcaTapia(datascience,buildings),PabloGonzlez(investmentandfinance),TimothyGoodson(leadonbuildings),EmmaGordon(investmentand finance),JrmeHilaire(leadonoilandgassupply modelling),PaulHugues(lead on indust
23、ry),JacobHyppoliteII(energy access),BrunoIdini(transport),GeorgeKamiya(energy technologies,digitalisation),HyejiKim(transport),TaeYoonKim(leadonenergysecurityandcriticalminerals),MartinKueppers(industry),TobiasLechtenbohmer(industry),LauraMaiolo(oil and gas supply),OrlaMcAlinden(behaviour),YannickMo
24、nschauer(affordability),ToruMuta(leadonfossilfuel subsidies),PaweOlejarnik(supply modelling),DianaPerezSanchez(industry),ApostolosPetropoulos(leadontransport),MariachiaraPolisena(power),RyszardPospiech(leadoncoalsupplymodelling,datamanagement),ArthurRog(buildings),MaxSchoenfisch(power),RebeccaSchulz
25、(oil and gas supply),LeonieStaas(buildings,behaviour),GianlucaTonolo(leadonenergyaccess),WonjikYang(datavisualisation)andPeterZeniewski(lead on gas).Other contributions were from NiccolHurst andCarloStarace.MarinaDosSantosandEleniTsoukalaprovidedessentialsupport.EdmundHoskercarriededitorialresponsib
26、ility.DebraJustuswasthecopyeditor.Colleagues from the Energy Technology Policy(ETP)Division led by Head of DivisionTimurGlcoleadonmodellingandanalysis,withoverallguidancefromAraceli Fernandez Pales and Uwe Remme.Peter Levi,Tiffany Vass,Alexandre Gouy,Leonardo Collina and Faidon Papadimoulis contribu
27、ted to the analysis on industry.IEA.CC BY 4.0.6 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022JacobTeter,LeonardoPaoli,ElizabethConnellyandEktaBibracontributedtotheanalysisontransport.ChiaraDelmastroandMartinHusekcontributedtotheanalysisonbuildings.StavroulaEvangelopoulou,FrancescoPavan,Amali
28、aPizarroandAmarBhardwajcontributedto the analysis on hydrogen.Praveen Bains contributed to the analysis on biofuels.MathildeHuismanscontributedtodatascience.OtherkeycontributorsfromacrosstheIEAwere:AliAlSaffar,HeymiBahar,ChiaraDAdamo,CarlosFernndezAlvarez,DavidFischer,InhoiHeo,JinsunLim,LucaLoRe,Reb
29、eccaMcKimm,JeremyMoorhouse,KristinePetrosyan,GabrielSaiveandTalyaVatman.Valuable comments and feedback were provided by other senior management andnumerousothercolleagueswithintheIEA.Inparticular,MaryWarlick,KeisukeSadamori,NickJohnstone,AmosBromhead,TorilBosoni,JoelCouse,PaoloFrankl,BrianMotherway,
30、Aad Van Bohemen,Rebecca Gaghen,An Fengquan,Sara Moarif,Hiro Sakaguchi andJacobMessing.ThanksgototheIEAsCommunicationsandDigitalOfficefortheirhelpinproducingthereportandwebsitematerials,particularlytoJadMouawad,FabienBarau,CurtisBrainard,AdrienChorlet,JonCuster,ClaireDehouck,AstridDumond,TanyaDyhin,M
31、erveErdem,Grace Gordon,Barbara Moure,Jethro Mullen,Isabelle NonainSemelin,Julie Puech,ClaraVallois,GregoryViscusiandThereseWalsh.IvoLetraandBenMcCullochprovidedessentialsupporttotheproductionprocess.IEAsOfficeoftheLegalCounsel,OfficeofManagementandAdministrationandEnergyDataCentreprovidedassistancet
32、hroughoutthepreparationofthereport.Valuableinputtotheanalysiswasprovidedby:DavidWilkinson(independentconsultant).Valuableinputtothemodellingonairpollutionandassociatedhealthimpactswasprovidedby Peter Rafaj,Gregor Kiesewetter,Wolfgang Schpp,Chris Heyes,Pallav Purohit,LauraWarnecke,AdrianaGomezSanabri
33、aandZbigniewKlimont(InternationalInstituteforAppliedSystemsAnalysis).Valuableinputtothemodellingandanalysisofgreenhousegasemissions from land use and bioenergy production was provided by Nicklas Forsell,AndreyLessaDerciAugustynczik,PekkaLauri,MykolaGusti,ZuelcladyAraujoGutierrezandPetrHavlk(Internat
34、ionalInstituteforAppliedSystemsAnalysis).Theworkcouldnothavebeenachievedwithoutthesupportandcooperationprovidedbymany government bodies,organisations and companies worldwide,notably:Enel;Eni;EuropeanUnion(GlobalPublicGoodsandChallengesProgramme);HitachiEnergy;Iberdrola;JupiterIntelligence;Ministryof
35、Economy,TradeandIndustry,Japan;MinistryofEconomicAffairsandClimatePolicy,theNetherlands;TheResearchInstituteofInnovativeTechnologyfortheEarth,Japan;Shell;SwissFederalOfficeofEnergy;andToshiba.TheIEACleanEnergyTransitionsProgramme(CETP),particularlythroughthecontributionsoftheAgenceFranaisedeDveloppe
36、ment,Italy,Japan,theNetherlands,SwedenandtheUnitedKingdomsupportedthisanalysis.ThanksalsogototheIEAEnergyBusinessCouncil,IEACoalIndustryAdvisoryBoard,IEAEnergyEfficiencyIndustryAdvisoryBoardandtheIEARenewableIndustryAdvisoryBoard.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Acknowledgements 7PeerreviewersManyseniorgovernmentoffic
37、ialsandinternationalexpertsprovidedinputandreviewedpreliminarydraftsofthereport.Theircommentsandsuggestionswereofgreatvalue.Theyinclude:KeigoAkimotoResearchInstituteofInnovativeTechnologyfortheEarth,JapanVenkatachalamAnbumozhiEconomicResearchInstituteforASEANandEastAsia(ERIA)DougArentNationalRenewab
38、leEnergyLaboratory(NREL),UnitedStatesNeilAtkinsonIndependentconsultantAndreyAugustynszikInternationalInstituteforAppliedSystemsAnalysis(IIASA)PeterBachDanishEnergyAgencyShanBaoguoStateGridEnergyResearchInstitute,ChinaManuelBaritaudEuropeanInvestmentBankPaulBaruyaWorldCoalAssociationTomBastinUKDepart
39、mentforBusiness,EnergyandIndustrialStrategy(BEIS)HarmeetBawaHitachiEnergyLeeBeckCleanAirTaskForceChristianBessonIndependentconsultantSamaBilbaoyLeonWorldNuclearAssociationJorgeBlazquezBPJasonBordoffColumbiaUniversity,UnitedStatesMickBuffierGlencoreNickButlerKingsCollegeLondonBenCahillCenterforStrate
40、gicandInternationalStudies(CSIS),UnitedStatesDianeCameronNuclearEnergyAgencyKimballChenGlobalLPGPartnershipDrewClarkeAustralianEnergyMarketOperatorRebeccaCollyerEuropeanClimateFoundationRussellConklinUSDepartmentofEnergyAnneSophieCorbeauColumbiaUniversityIanCronshawIndependentconsultantHelenCurrieCo
41、nocoPhillipsFrancoisDassaEDFRalfDickelOxfordInstituteforEnergyStudies,UnitedKingdomGilesDicksonWindEuropeZuzanaDobrotkovaWorldBankLynetteDrayUniversityCollegeLondonCodyFinkeBrimstoneEnergyNikkiFisherThungelaIEA.CC BY 4.0.8 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 JustinFloodDeltaElectri
42、cityNicklasForsellIIASADavidFritschUSEnergyInformationAdministrationHiroyukiFukuiToyotaMikeFulwoodNexantDavidG.HawkinsNaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil(NRDC)DolfGielenInternationalRenewableEnergyAgency(IRENA)AndriiGritsevskyiInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)MichaelHackethalMinistryforEconomicAffair
43、sandIndustry,GermanyYuyaHasegawaMinistryofEconomy,TradeandIndustry,JapanSaraHastingsSimonUniversityofCalgaryColinHendersonCleanCoalCentreJamesHendersonOxfordInstituteforEnergyStudies,UnitedKingdomMasazumiHironoTokyoGasTakashiHongoMitsuiGlobalStrategicStudiesInstitute,JapanJanHeinJesseJOSCOEnergyFina
44、nceandStrategyConsultancySohbetKarbuzMediterraneanObservatoryforEnergyRafaelKaweckiSiemensEnergyMichaelKellyWorldLPGAssociationNobuyukiKikuchiMinistryofForeignAffairs,JapanKenKoyamaInstituteofEnergyEconomics,JapanJimKraneBakerInstituteforPublicPolicyAtsuhitoKurozumiKyotoUniversityofForeignStudies,Ja
45、panSarahLadislawRockyMountainInstituteFranciscoLaveronIberdrolaJoyceLeeGlobalWindEnergyCouncilLeeLevkowitzBHPLiJiangtaoStateGridEnergyResearchInstitute,ChinaLiuXiaoliEnergyResearchInstitute,NationalDevelopmentandReformCommission,ChinaPierreLaurentLucilleEngieMalteMeinshausenUniversityofMelbourne,Aus
46、traliaAntonioMerinoGarciaRepsolMichelleMichotFossBakerInstituteforPublicPolicyCristobalMillerDepartmentofNaturalResources,CanadaVincentMinierSchneiderElectricTatianaMitrovaSIPACenteronGlobalEnergyPolicySimoneMoriENELPeterMorrisMineralsCouncilofAustraliaSteveNadelAmericanCouncilforanEnergyEfficientEc
47、onomy,UnitedStatesIEA.CC BY 4.0.Acknowledgements 9 JanPetterNoreNoradAndiNoviantoCoordinatingMinistryforEconomicAffairs,IndonesiaStefanNowakTechnologyCollaborationProgrammeonPhotovoltaicPowerThomasNowakEuropeanHeatPumpAssociationKentaroOePermanentDelegationofJapantotheOECDPakYongdukKoreaEnergyEconom
48、icsInstituteIgnacioPerezArriagaComillasPontificalUniversitysInstituteforResearchinTechnology,SpainStephaniePfeiferInstitutionalInvestorsGrouponClimateChangeCdricPhilibertFrenchInstituteofInternationalRelations,CentreforEnergy&ClimateElbietaPiskorzMinistryofClimateandEnvironment,PolandVickiPollardDGf
49、orClimateAction,EuropeanCommissionAndrewPurvisWorldSteelJasonRandallDepartmentofNaturalResources,CanadaSethRobertsSaudiAramcoTonyRookeGlasgowFinancialAllianceforNetZeroAprilRossExxonMobilYaminaSahebOpenEXP,IPCCauthorJuanBautistaSnchezPeuelaLejarragaPermanentRepresentationofSpaintotheEuropeanUnionHan
50、sWilhelmSchifferWorldEnergyCouncilSandroSchmidtPolarGeologyFederalInstituteforGeosciencesandNaturalResources,GermanyRobertSchwiersChevronAdnanShihabEldinIndependentexpertJesseScottDeutschesInstitutfrWirtschaftsforschung(GermanInstituteforEconomicResearch)SimonaSerafiniENIMariaSiciliaEnagsPaulSimonsY
51、aleUniversityJimSkeaImperialCollegeLondon,IPCCCoChairWorkingGroupIIIAshleySteelFoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNationsJonathanSternOxfordInstituteforEnergyStudies,UnitedKingdomWimThomasIndependentconsultantNikosTsafosGeneralSecretariatofthePrimeMinisteroftheHellenicRepublicJamesTurnureUSEne
52、rgyInformationAdministrationFridtjofFossumUnanderAkerHorizonsNoVanHulstInternationalPartnershipforHydrogenandFuelCellsintheEconomyDavidVictorUniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego,UnitedStatesIEA.CC BY 4.0.10 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 AndrewWalkerCheniereEnergyPeterWoodShellChri
53、stianZinglersenEuropeanUnionAgencyfortheCooperationofEnergyRegulatorsTheworkreflectstheviewsoftheInternationalEnergyAgencySecretariat,butdoesnotnecessarilyreflectthoseofindividualIEAmembercountriesorofanyparticularfunder,supporterorcollaborator.NoneoftheIEAoranyfunder,supporterorcollaboratorthatcont
54、ributed to this work makes any representation or warranty,express or implied,inrespectoftheworkscontents(includingitscompletenessoraccuracy)andshallnotberesponsibleforanyuseof,orrelianceon,thework.Thisdocumentandanymapincludedhereinarewithoutprejudicetothestatusoforsovereigntyoveranyterritory,tothed
55、elimitationofinternationalfrontiersandboundariesandtothenameofanyterritory,cityorarea.Commentsandquestionsarewelcomeandshouldbeaddressedto:LauraCozziandTimGouldDirectorateofSustainability,TechnologyandOutlooksInternationalEnergyAgency9,ruedelaFdration75739ParisCedex15FranceEmail:weoiea.orgMoreinform
56、ationabouttheWorldEnergyOutlookisavailableatwww.iea.org/weo.IEA.CC BY 4.0.TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTSIEA.CC BY 4.0.PART A:OVERVIEW AND CONTEXT Overview and key findingsSetting the scenePART B:ROADMAP TO NET ZERO EMISSIONSAn updated roadmap to Net Zero Emissions by 2050PART C:KEY ENERGY TRENDS
57、 Energy security in energy transitionsOutlook for energy demandOutlook for electricityOutlook for liquid fuelsOutlook for gaseous fuelsOutlook for solid fuels29837325365409ANNEXES429IEA.CC BY 4.0.14 World Energy Outlook 2022 Foreword3Acknowledgements5Executivesummary19PartA:Overviewandcon
58、text27Overviewandkeyfindings291.1 Introduction321.2 Causesofthecrisisandimmediateconsequences331.2.1Causesofthecrisis331.2.2Immediateconsequences361.3 Outlookforenergymarketsandsecurity421.3.1Trendsandvulnerabilitiesacrosstheenergymix441.3.2Isamessytransitionunavoidable?581.4 Outlookforenergytransit
59、ions631.4.1Selectedcountryandregionaltrends661.4.2Keepingthedoorto1.5Copen72Settingthescene832.1 Introduction862.2 Backgroundtotheglobalenergycrisis872.2.1Initialsignsofstrain872.2.2RussiasinvasionofUkraine882.2.3Economicconsequences922.3 Wheredowegofromhere?972.3.1Investmentandtraderesponses972.3.2
60、Policyresponses1022.3.3WorldEnergyOutlook2022scenarios1052.4 Inputstothescenarios1072.4.1Economicandpopulationassumptions1072.4.2Energy,mineralandcarbonprices1102.4.3Technologycosts115PartB:Roadtonetzeroemissions119AnupdatedroadmaptoNetZeroEmissionsby2050121Introduction124123IEA.CC BY 4.0.Table of C
61、ontents 15 NetZeroEmissionsScenario1253.1Emissionsandtemperaturetrends1253.2Energytrends1283.3Fuelsupply1333.4Electricitygeneration1363.5Industry1413.6Transport1463.7Buildings150Keythemes1553.8Avoidinggrowthinenergydemand1553.9Whatarethepublicandprivateinvestmentsneededto2030?1633.10Canwerampuplowem
62、issionstechnologiesfastenough?1663.11Energyemployment:anopportunityandabottleneckintheNZEScenario175PartC:Keyenergytrends179Energysecurityinenergytransitions181Introduction184Tenessentialsforsecureenergytransitions1864.1Synchronisescalinguparangeofcleanenergytechnologieswithscalingbackoffossilfuels1
63、864.2Tacklethedemandsideandprioritiseenergyefficiency1914.3Reversetheslideintoenergypovertyandgivepoorcommunitiesaliftintothenewenergyeconomy1954.4Collaboratetobringdownthecostofcapitalinemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies2004.5Managetheretirementandreuseofexistinginfrastructurecarefully,someofitwi
64、llbeessentialforasecurejourneytonetzeroemissions2044.6Tacklethespecificrisksfacingproducereconomies2094.7Investinflexibilityanewwatchwordforelectricitysecurity2144.8Ensurediverseandresilientcleanenergysupplychains2174.9Fostertheclimateresilienceofenergyinfrastructure2234.10Providestrategicdirectiona
65、ndaddressmarketfailures,butdonotdismantlemarkets228Conclusion2324IEA.CC BY 4.0.16 World Energy Outlook 2022 Outlookforenergydemand233Introduction236Scenarios2365.1Overview2365.2Energydemand2415.3Emissions2495.4Airpollution2555.5Investment257Keythemes2595.6Energyaccess2595.7Efficientcoolingforawarmin
66、gworld2665.8Bringingforwardthepeakinoiluseforroadtransport272Outlookforelectricity277Introduction280Scenarios2816.1Overview2816.2Electricitydemand2836.3Electricitysupply2906.4COemissionsfromelectricitygeneration3036.5Investment305Keythemes3076.6Powersystemflexibilityiskeytoelectricitysecurity3076.7E
67、lectricitynetworksarethebackboneofcleanpowersystems3126.8Criticalmineralsunderpinfuturecleanelectricitysystems318Outlookforliquidfuels325Introduction328Scenarios3297.1Overview3297.2Oildemandbyregionandsector3317.3Oilsupply3367.4Oiltrade3417.5Oilinvestment3427.6Liquidbiofuels3437.7Lowemissionshydroge
68、nbasedliquidfuels345567IEA.CC BY 4.0.Table of Contents 17 Keythemes3477.8Oiluseinplastics3477.9Arenewconventionaloilprojectsananswertotodaysenergycrisis?3527.10Refining:immediateandlongertermchallenges357Outlookforgaseousfuels365Introduction368Scenarios3698.1Overview3698.2Gasdemand3728.3Gassupply377
69、8.4Gastrade3818.5Investment383Keythemes3868.6OutlookfornaturalgasintheEuropeanUnionafterRussiasinvasionofUkraine3868.7Scalinguphydrogen3958.8IsnaturalgasstillatransitionfuelinemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomiesinAsia?402Outlookforsolidfuels409Introduction411Scenarios4129.1Overview4129.2Coaldemand41
70、49.3Coalsupply4189.4Coaltrade4219.5Coalinvestment4229.6Solidbioenergy423Annexes429AnnexA.Tablesforscenarioprojections431AnnexB.Designofthescenarios463AnnexC.Definitions485AnnexD.References505AnnexE.InputstotheGlobalEnergyandClimateModel51789IEA.CC BY 4.0.Executive Summary 19 ExecutiveSummaryRussiasi
71、nvasionofUkrainehassparkedaglobalenergycrisisTheworldisinthemidstofitsfirstglobalenergycrisisashockofunprecedentedbreadthandcomplexity.PressuresinmarketspredatedRussiasinvasionofUkraine,butRussiasactionshaveturnedarapideconomicrecoveryfromthepandemicwhichstrainedallmannerofglobalsupplychains,includi
72、ngenergyintofullblownenergyturmoil.Russiahasbeenbyfartheworldslargestexporteroffossilfuels,butitscurtailmentsofnaturalgassupplytoEuropeandEuropeansanctionsonimportsofoilandcoalfromRussiaareseveringoneofthemainarteriesofglobalenergytrade.Allfuelsareaffected,butgasmarketsaretheepicentreasRussiaseeksle
73、veragebyexposingconsumerstohigherenergybillsandsupplyshortages.Pricesforspotpurchasesofnaturalgashavereachedlevelsneverseenbefore,regularlyexceedingtheequivalentofUSD250forabarrelofoil.Coalpriceshavealsohitrecordlevels,whileoilrosewellaboveUSD100perbarrelinmid2022beforefallingback.Highgasandcoalpric
74、esaccountfor90%oftheupwardpressureonelectricitycostsaroundtheworld.TooffsetshortfallsinRussiangassupply,Europeissettoimportanextra50billioncubicmetres(bcm)ofliquefiednaturalgas(LNG)in2022comparedwiththepreviousyear.ThishasbeeneasedbylowerdemandfromChina,wheregasusewasheldbackbylockdownsandsubduedeco
75、nomicgrowth,buthigherEuropeanLNGdemandhasdivertedgasawayfromotherimportersinAsia.Thecrisishasstokedinflationarypressuresandcreatedaloomingriskofrecession,aswellasahugeUSD2trillionwindfallforfossilfuelproducersabovetheir2021netincome.Higherenergypricesarealsoincreasingfoodinsecurityinmanydevelopingec
76、onomies,withtheheaviestburdenfallingonpoorerhouseholdswherealargershareofincomeisspentonenergyandfood.Some75millionpeoplewhorecentlygainedaccesstoelectricityarelikelytolosetheabilitytopayforit,meaningthatforthefirsttimesincewestartedtrackingit,thetotalnumberofpeopleworldwidewithoutelectricityaccessh
77、asstartedtorise.Andalmost100millionpeoplemaybepushedbackintorelianceonfirewoodforcookinginsteadofcleaner,healthiersolutions.Facedwithenergyshortfallsandhighprices,governmentshavesofarcommittedwelloverUSD500billion,mainlyinadvancedeconomies,toshieldconsumersfromtheimmediateimpacts.Theyhaverushedtotry
78、andsecurealternativefuelsuppliesandensureadequategasstorage.Othershorttermactionshaveincludedincreasingoilandcoalfiredelectricitygeneration,extendingthelifetimesofsomenuclearpowerplants,andacceleratingtheflowofnewrenewablesprojects.Demandsidemeasureshavegenerallyreceivedlessattention,butgreatereffic
79、iencyisanessentialpartoftheshortandlongertermresponse.Isthecrisisaboost,orasetback,forenergytransitions?Withenergymarketsremainingextremelyvulnerable,todaysenergyshockisareminderofthefragilityandunsustainabilityofourcurrentenergysystem.Akeyquestionforpolicymakers,and for this Outlook,is whether the
80、crisis will be a setback for clean energytransitionsorwillcatalysefasteraction.ClimatepoliciesandnetzerocommitmentswereIEA.CC BY 4.0.20 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 blamedinsomequartersforcontributingtotherunupinenergyprices,butthereisscantevidenceforthis.Inthemostaffectedre
81、gions,highersharesofrenewableswerecorrelatedwithlowerelectricityprices,andmoreefficienthomesandelectrifiedheathaveprovidedanimportantbufferforsomebutfarfromenoughconsumers.Timesofcrisisputthespotlightongovernments,andonhowtheyreact.Alongsideshorttermmeasures,manygovernmentsarenowtakinglongertermstep
82、s:someseekingtoincreaseordiversifyoilandgassupply;manylookingtoacceleratestructuralchange.ThethreescenariosexploredinthisWorldEnergyOutlook(WEO)aredifferentiatedprimarilybytheassumptionsmadeongovernmentpolicies.TheStatedPoliciesScenario(STEPS)showsthetrajectoryimpliedbytodayspolicysettings.TheAnnoun
83、cedPledgesScenario(APS)assumesthatallaspirationaltargetsannouncedbygovernmentsaremetontimeandinfull,includingtheirlongtermnetzeroandenergyaccessgoals.TheNetZeroEmissionsby2050(NZE)Scenariomapsoutawaytoachievea1.5Cstabilisationintheriseinglobalaveragetemperatures,alongsideuniversalaccesstomodernenerg
84、yby2030.PolicyresponsesarefasttrackingtheemergenceofacleanenergyeconomyNewpoliciesinmajorenergymarketshelppropelannualcleanenergyinvestmenttomorethanUSD2trillionby2030intheSTEPS,ariseofmorethan50%fromtoday.Cleanenergybecomes a huge opportunity for growth and jobs,and amajor arena for internationalec
85、onomiccompetition.By2030,thanksinlargeparttotheUSInflationReductionAct,annualsolar and wind capacity additions in the United States grow twoandahalftimes overtodayslevels,whileelectriccarsalesareseventimeslarger.NewtargetscontinuetospurthemassivebuildoutofcleanenergyinChina,meaningthatitscoalandoilc
86、onsumptionbothpeakbeforetheendofthisdecade.FasterdeploymentofrenewablesandefficiencyimprovementsintheEuropeanUnionbringdownEUnaturalgasandoildemandby20%thisdecade,andcoaldemandby50%,apushgivenadditionalurgencybytheneedtofindnewsources of economic and industrial advantage beyond Russian gas.Japans Gr
87、eenTransformation(GX)programmeprovidesamajorfundingboostfortechnologiesincludingnuclear,lowemissionshydrogenandammonia,whileKoreaisalsolookingtoincreasetheshareofnuclearandrenewablesinitsenergymix.Indiamakesfurtherprogresstowardsitsdomesticrenewablecapacitytargetof500gigawatts(GW)in2030,andrenewable
88、smeetnearlytwothirdsofthecountrysrapidlyrisingdemandforelectricity.Asmarketsrebalance,renewables,supportedbynuclearpower,seesustainedgains;theupside for coal from todays crisis is temporary.The increase in renewable electricitygenerationissufficientlyfasttooutpacegrowthintotalelectricitygeneration,d
89、rivingdownthecontributionoffossilfuelsforpower.Thecrisisbrieflypushesuputilisationratesforexistingcoalfiredassets,butdoesnotbringhigherinvestmentinnewones.Strengthenedpolicies,a subdued economic outlook and high nearterm prices combine to moderateoverallenergydemandgrowth.IncreasescomeprimarilyfromI
90、ndia,SoutheastAsia,AfricaandtheMiddleEast.However,theriseinChinasenergyuse,whichhasbeensuchanimportantdriverforglobalenergytrendsoverthepasttwodecades,slowsandthenhaltsaltogetherbefore2030asChinashiftstoamoreservicesorientatedeconomy.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Executive Summary 21 Internationalenergytradeundergo
91、esaprofoundreorientationinthe2020sascountriesadjusttotheruptureofRussiaEuropeflows,whichisassumedtobepermanent.NotallRussianflowsdisplacedfromEuropefindanewhomeinothermarkets,bringingdownRussianproductionandglobalsupply.Crudeoilandproductmarkets,especiallydiesel,faceaturbulentperiodasEUbansonRussian
92、importskickin.Naturalgastakeslongertoadjust.The upcoming northern hemisphere winter promises to be a perilous moment for gasmarketsandatestingtimeforEUsolidarityandthewinterof202324couldbeeventougher.MajornewadditionstoLNGsupplymainlyfromNorthAmerica,QatarandAfrica arrive only around the mid2020s.Co
93、mpetition for available cargoes is fierce in themeantimeasChineseimportdemandpicksupagain.TodaysstrongerpolicysettingsbringafossilfuelpeakintoviewForthefirsttime,aWEOscenariobasedonprevailingpolicysettingshasglobaldemandforeachofthefossilfuelsexhibitingapeakorplateau.IntheSTEPS,coalusefallsbackwithi
94、nthenextfewyears,naturalgasdemandreachesaplateaubytheendofthedecade,andrisingsalesofelectricvehicles(EVs)meanthatoildemandlevelsoffinthemid2030sbeforeebbingslightlytomidcentury.Totaldemandforfossilfuelsdeclinessteadilyfromthemid2020sbyaround2exajoulesperyearonaverageto2050,anannualreductionroughlyeq
95、uivalenttothelifetimeoutputofalargeoilfield.GlobalfossilfuelusehasrisenalongsideGDPsincethestartoftheIndustrialRevolutioninthe18thcentury:puttingthisriseintoreversewhilecontinuingtoexpandtheglobaleconomywillbeapivotalmomentinenergyhistory.Theshareoffossilfuelsintheglobalenergymixhasbeenstubbornlyhig
96、h,ataround80%,fordecades.By2030intheSTEPS,thissharefallsbelow75%,andtojustabove60%by2050.AhighpointforglobalenergyrelatedCO2emissionsisreachedintheSTEPSin2025,at37billiontonnes(Gt)peryear,andtheyfallbackto32Gtby2050.Thiswouldbeassociatedwithariseofaround2.5Cinglobalaveragetemperaturesby2100.Thisisab
97、etteroutcomethanprojectedafewyearsago:renewedpolicymomentumandtechnologygainsmadesince2015haveshavedaround1Coffthelongtermtemperaturerise.However,areductionofonly13%inannualCO2emissionsto2050intheSTEPSisfarfromenoughtoavoidsevereimpactsfromachangingclimate.Fullachievementofallclimatepledgeswouldmove
98、theworldtowardssaferground,butthereisstillalargegapbetweentodaysambitionsanda1.5Cstabilisation.IntheAPS,aneartermpeakinannualemissionsisfollowedbyafasterdeclineto12Gtby2050.ThisisabiggerreductionthanintheWEO2021APS,reflectingtheadditionalpledgesthathavebeenmadeoverthepastyear,notablybyIndiaandIndone
99、sia.Ifimplementedontimeandinfull,these additional national commitments as well as sectoral commitments for specificindustriesandcompanytargets(consideredforthefirsttimeinthisyearsAPS)keepthetemperatureriseintheAPSin2100ataround1.7C.However,itiseasiertomakepledgesthantoimplementthemand,eveniftheyarea
100、chieved,thereisstillconsiderablyfurthertogotoalignwiththeNZEScenario,whichachievesthe1.5Coutcomebyreducingannualemissionsto23Gtby2030andtonetzeroby2050.IEA.CC BY 4.0.22 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 Ledbycleanelectricity,somesectorsarepoisedforafastertransformationTheworldisi
101、nacriticaldecadefordeliveringamoresecure,sustainableandaffordableenergysystemthepotentialforfasterprogressisenormousifstrongactionistakenimmediately.Investmentsincleanelectricityandelectrification,alongwithexpandedandmodernisedgrids,offerclearandcosteffectiveopportunitiestocutemissionsmorerapidlywhi
102、lebringingelectricitycostsdownfromtheircurrenthighs.TodaysgrowthratesfordeploymentofsolarPV,wind,EVsandbatteries,ifmaintained,wouldleadtoamuchfastertransformationthanprojectedintheSTEPS,althoughthiswouldrequiresupportivepoliciesnotjustintheleadingmarketsforthesetechnologiesbutacrosstheworld.By2030,i
103、fcountriesdeliverontheirclimatepledges,everysecondcarsoldintheEuropeanUnion,ChinaandtheUnitedStatesiselectric.Supplychainsforsomekeytechnologiesincludingbatteries,solarPVandelectrolysersareexpandingatratesthatsupporthigherglobalambition.IfallannouncedmanufacturingexpansionplansforsolarPVseethelighto
104、fday,manufacturingcapacitywouldexceedthedeploymentlevelsintheAPSin2030byaround75%andapproachthelevelsrequiredintheNZEScenario.Inthecaseofelectrolysersforhydrogenproduction,thepotentialexcesscapacityofallannouncedprojectsrelativetoAPSdeploymentin2030isaround50%.IntheEVsector,theexpansionofbatterymanu
105、facturingcapacityreflectstheshiftunderwayintheautomotiveindustry,whichattimeshasmovedfasterthangovernmentsinsettingtargetsforelectrifiedmobility.Thesecleanenergysupplychainsareahugesourceofemploymentgrowth,with clean energy jobs already exceeding those in fossil fuels worldwide andprojectedtogrowfro
106、maround33milliontodaytoalmost55millionin2030intheAPS.EfficiencyandcleanfuelsgetacompetitiveboostTodayshighenergypricesunderscorethebenefitsofgreaterenergyefficiencyandarepromptingbehaviouralandtechnologychangesinsomecountriestoreduceenergyuse.Efficiencymeasurescanhavedramaticeffectstodayslightbulbsa
107、reatleastfourtimesmoreefficientthanthoseonsaletwodecadesagobutmuchmoreremainstobedone.Demandforcoolingneedstobeaparticularlyfocusforpolicymakers,asitmakesthesecondlargestcontributiontotheoverallriseinglobalelectricitydemandoverthecomingdecades(afterEVs).Manyairconditionersusedtodayaresubjectonlytowe
108、akefficiencystandardsandonefifthofelectricitydemandforcoolinginemerginganddevelopingeconomiesisnotcoveredbyanystandardsatall.IntheSTEPS,coolingdemandinemerginganddevelopingeconomiesrisesby2800terawatthoursto2050,whichistheequivalentofaddinganotherEuropeanUniontotodaysglobalelectricitydemand.Thisgrow
109、thisreducedbyhalfintheAPSbecauseoftighterefficiencystandardsandbetterbuildingdesignandinsulationandbyhalfagainintheNZEScenario.Concernsaboutfuelprices,energysecurityandemissionsbolsteredbystrongerpolicysupportarebrighteningtheprospectsformanylowemissionsfuels.Investmentinlowemissionsgasesissettorise
110、sharplyinthecomingyears.IntheAPS,globallowemissionshydrogenproductionrisesfromverylowlevelstodaytoreachover30milliontonnes(Mt)IEA.CC BY 4.0.Executive Summary 23 peryearin2030,equivalenttoover100bcmofnaturalgas(althoughnotalllowemissionshydrogenwouldreplacenaturalgas).Muchofthisisproducedclosetothepo
111、intofuse,butthereisgrowingmomentumbehindinternationaltradeinhydrogenandhydrogenbasedfuels.Projectsrepresentingapotential12Mtofexportcapacityareinvariousstagesofplanning,although these are more numerous and more advanced than correspondingprojectstounderpinimportinfrastructureanddemand.Carboncapture,
112、utilisationandstorageprojectsarealsoadvancingmorerapidlythanbefore,spurredbygreaterpolicysupporttoaidindustrialdecarbonisation,toproduceloworloweremissionsfuels,andtoallowfordirectaircaptureprojectsthatremovecarbonfromtheatmosphere.ButrapidtransitionsultimatelydependoninvestmentAhugeincreaseinenergy
113、investmentisessentialtoreducetherisksoffuturepricespikesandvolatility,andtogetontrackfornetzeroemissionsby2050.FromUSD1.3trilliontoday,cleanenergyinvestmentrisesaboveUSD2trillionby2030intheSTEPS,butitwouldhavetobeaboveUSD4trillionbythesamedateintheNZEScenario,highlightingtheneedtoattractnewinvestors
114、totheenergysector.Governmentsshouldtaketheleadandprovidestrongstrategicdirection,buttheinvestmentsrequiredarefarbeyondthereachesofpublicfinance.Itisvitaltoharnessthevastresourcesofmarketsandincentiviseprivateactorstoplaytheirpart.Today,foreveryUSD1spentgloballyonfossilfuels,USD1.5isspentoncleanenerg
115、ytechnologies.By2030,intheNZEScenario,everyUSD1spentonfossilfuelsisoutmatchedbyUSD5oncleanenergysupplyandanotherUSD4onefficiencyandenduses.Shortfallsincleanenergyinvestmentarelargestinemerginganddevelopingeconomies,aworryingsignalgiventheirrapidprojectedgrowthindemandforenergyservices.IfChinaisexclu
116、ded,thentheamountbeinginvestedincleanenergyeachyearinemerginganddevelopingeconomieshasremainedflatsincetheParisAgreementwasconcludedin2015.ThecostofcapitalforasolarPVplantin2021inkeyemergingeconomieswasbetweentwoandthreetimeshigherthaninadvancedeconomiesandChina.Todaysrisingborrowingcostscouldexacer
117、batethefinancingchallengesfacingsuchprojects,despitetheirfavourableunderlyingcosts.Arenewedinternationaleffortisneededtostepupclimatefinanceandtackle the various economywide or projectspecific risks that deter investors.There isimmensevalueinbroadnationaltransitionstrategiessuchastheJustEnergyTransi
118、tionPartnershipswithIndonesia,SouthAfricaandothercountries,thatintegrateinternationalsupportandambitiousnationalpolicyactionswhilealsoprovidingsafeguardsforenergysecurityandthesocialconsequencesofchange.Thespeedatwhichinvestorsreacttobroadandcredibletransitionframeworksdependsinpracticeonahostofmore
119、granularissues.Supplychainsarefragile,andinfrastructureandskilledlabourarenotalwaysavailable.Permittingprovisionsanddeadlinesareoftencomplexandtimeconsuming.Clearproceduresforprojectapproval,supportedbyadequateadministrativecapacity,arevitaltoacceleratetheflowofviable,investableprojectsbothforcleane
120、nergysupplyaswellasforefficiencyandelectrification.Ouranalysisfindsthatpermittingandconstructionofasingleoverheadelectricitytransmissionlinecantakeupto13years,withsomeofthelongestleadtimesinadvancedeconomies.DevelopingnewIEA.CC BY 4.0.24 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 deposits
121、ofcriticalmineralshashistoricallytakenover16yearsonaverage,with12yearsspentliningupallaspectsofpermittingandfinancingand45yearsforconstruction.Whatiftransitionsdontpickup?If clean energy investment does not accelerate as in the NZE Scenario then higherinvestmentinoilandgaswouldbeneededtoavoidfurther
122、fuelpricevolatility,butthiswouldalsomeanputtingthe1.5Cgoalinjeopardy.IntheSTEPS,anaverageofalmostUSD650billionperyearisspentonupstreamoilandnaturalgasinvestmentto2030,ariseofmorethan50%comparedwithrecentyears.Thisinvestmentcomeswithrisks,bothcommercialandenvironmental,andcannotbetakenforgranted.Desp
123、itehugewindfallsthisyear,someMiddleEastproducersaretheonlypartoftheupstreamindustryinvestingmoretodaythanpriortotheCovid19pandemic.Amidconcernsaboutcostinflation,capitaldisciplineratherthanproductiongrowthhasbecomethedefaultsettingfortheUSshaleindustry,meaningthatsomeofthewindhasgonefromthesailsofth
124、emainsourceofrecentglobaloilandgasgrowth.ImmediateshortfallsinfossilfuelproductionfromRussiawillneedtobereplacedbyproductionelsewhereeveninaworldworkingtowardsnetzeroemissionsby2050.Themostsuitableneartermsubstitutesareprojectswithshortleadtimesthatbringoilandgastomarketquickly,aswellascapturingsome
125、ofthe260bcmofgasthatiswastedeachyearthroughflaringandmethaneleakstotheatmosphere.Butlastingsolutionstotodayscrisislieinreducingfossilfueldemand.Manyfinancialorganisationshavesetgoalsandplanstoscaledowninvestmentinfossilfuels.Muchmoreemphasisisneededongoalsandplansforscalingupinvestmentincleanenergyt
126、ransitions,andonwhatgovernmentscandotoincentivisethis.RussialosesoutinthereshufflingofinternationaltradeRussiasinvasionofUkraineispromptingawholesalereorientationofglobalenergytrade,leavingRussiawithamuchdiminishedposition.AllRussiastradetieswithEuropebasedonfossilfuelshadultimatelybeenundercutinour
127、previousscenariosbyEuropesnetzeroambitions,butRussiasabilitytodeliveratrelativelylowcostmeantthatitlostgroundonlygradually.Nowtherupturehascomewithaspeedthatfewimaginedpossible.InthisOutlook,more Russian resources are drawn eastwards to Asian markets,but Russia isunsuccessfulinfindingmarketsforallof
128、theflowsthatpreviouslywenttoEurope.In2025,Russias oil production is 2million barrels a day lower than in the WEO2021 and gasproductionisdownby200bcm.Longertermprospectsareweakenedbyuncertaintiesoverdemand,aswellasrestrictedaccesstointernationalcapitalandtechnologiestodevelopmorechallengingfieldsandL
129、NGprojects.Russianfossilfuelexportsneverreturninanyofourscenariostothelevelsseenin2021,anditsshareofinternationallytradedoilandgasfallsbyhalfby2030intheSTEPS.RussiasreorientationtoAsianmarketsisparticularlychallenginginthecaseofnaturalgas,asthemarketopportunityforlargescaleadditionaldeliveriestoChin
130、aislimited.RussiaistargetingnewpipelinelinkstoChina,notablythelargecapacityPowerofSiberia2pipelineIEA.CC BY 4.0.Executive Summary 25 throughMongolia.However,ourdemandprojectionsforChinaraiseconsiderabledoubtsabouttheviabilityofanotherlargescalegaslinkwithRussia,oncetheexistingPowerofSiberialineramps
131、uptofullcapacity.IntheSTEPS,Chinasgasdemandgrowthslowsto2%peryearbetween2021and2030,comparedwithanaveragegrowthrateof12%peryearsince2010,reflectingapolicypreferenceforrenewablesandelectrificationovergasuseforpowerandheat.ChineseimportershavebeenactivelycontractingfornewlongtermLNGsupplies,andChinaal
132、readyhasadequatecontractedsupplytomeetprojecteddemandintheSTEPSuntilwellintothe2030s.Werethe2010sthe“goldenageofgas”?OneoftheeffectsofRussiasactionsisthattheeraofrapidgrowthinnaturalgasdemanddrawstoaclose.IntheSTEPS,thescenariothatseesthehighestgasconsumption,globaldemandrisesbylessthan5%between2021
133、and2030andthenremainsflatataround4400bcmthroughto2050.Theoutlookforgasisdampenedbyhigherneartermprices;morerapiddeploymentofheatpumpsandotherefficiencymeasures;higherrenewablesdeploymentandafasteruptakeofotherflexibilityoptionsinthepowersector;and,insomecases,relianceoncoalforslightlylonger.TheInfla
134、tionReductionActcutsprojectedUSnaturalgasdemandin2030intheSTEPSbymorethan40bcmcomparedwithlastyearsprojections,freeing up gas for export.Stronger climate policies accelerate Europesstructuralshiftawayfromgas.Newsupplybringspricesdownbythemid2020s,andLNGbecomesevenmoreimportanttooverallgassecurity.Bu
135、tmomentumbehindnaturalgasgrowthindevelopingeconomieshasslowed,notablyinSouthandSoutheastAsia,puttingadentinthecredentialsofgasasatransitionfuel.Mostofthedownwardrevisiontogasdemandto2030inthisyearsSTEPSisduetoafasterswitchtocleanenergy,althougharoundonequarterisbecausegaslosesouttocoalandoil.Afocuso
136、naffordable,securetransitionsbasedonresilientsupplychainsAnewenergysecurityparadigmisneededtomaintainreliabilityandaffordabilitywhilereducingemissions.ThisOutlookincludestenprinciplesthatcanhelpguidepolicymakersthroughtheperiodwhendecliningfossilfuelandexpandingcleanenergysystemscoexist.Duringenergy
137、transitions,bothsystemsarerequiredtofunctionwellinordertodelivertheenergyservicesneededbyconsumers,evenastheirrespectivecontributionschangeovertime.Maintainingelectricitysecurityintomorrowspowersystemscallsfornewtools,moreflexibleapproachesandmechanismstoensureadequatecapacities.Powergeneratorswilln
138、eedtobemoreresponsive,consumerswillneedtobemoreconnectedandadaptable,andgridinfrastructurewillneedtobestrengthenedanddigitalised.Inclusive,peoplecentredapproachesareessentialtoallowvulnerablecommunitiestomanagetheupfrontcostsofcleaner technologies and ensure that the benefits of transitions are felt
139、 widely acrosssocieties.Evenastransitionsreducefossilfueluse,therearepartsofthefossilfuelsystemthatremaincriticaltoenergysecurity,suchasgasfiredpowerforpeakelectricityneeds,orrefineriestosupplyresidualusersoftransportfuels.Unplannedorprematureretirementofthisinfrastructurecouldhavenegativeconsequenc
140、esforenergysecurity.IEA.CC BY 4.0.26 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 Astheworldmovesonfromtodaysenergycrisis,itneedstoavoidnewvulnerabilitiesarisingfromhighandvolatilecriticalmineralpricesorhighlyconcentratedcleanenergysupplychains.Ifnotadequatelyaddressed,theseissuescoulddelay
141、energytransitionsormakethemmorecostly.Demandforcriticalmineralsforcleanenergytechnologiesissettorisesharply,morethandoublingfromtodayslevelby2030intheAPS.Copperseesthelargestincreaseintermsofabsolutevolumes,butothercriticalmineralsexperiencemuchfasterratesofdemandgrowth,notablysiliconandsilverforsol
142、arPV,rareearthelementsforwind turbine motors and lithium for batteries.Continued technology innovation andrecyclingarevitaloptionstoeasestrainsoncriticalmineralsmarkets.HighrelianceonindividualcountriessuchasChinaforcriticalmineralsuppliesandformanycleantechnologysupplychainsisariskfortransitions,bu
143、tsotooarediversificationoptionsthatcloseoffthebenefitsoftrade.TheenergycrisispromisestobeahistoricturningpointtowardsacleanerandmoresecureenergysystemEnergymarketsandpolicieshavechangedasaresultofRussiasinvasionofUkraine,notjustforthetimebeing,butfordecadestocome.Theenvironmentalcaseforcleanenergyne
144、edednoreinforcement,buttheeconomicargumentsinfavourofcostcompetitiveandaffordablecleantechnologiesarenowstrongerandsotooistheenergysecuritycase.Thisalignmentofeconomic,climateandsecurityprioritieshasalreadystartedtomovethedialtowardsabetteroutcomefortheworldspeopleandfortheplanet.Muchmoreremainstobe
145、done,andastheseeffortsgathermomentum,itisessentialtobringeveryoneonboard,especiallyatatimewhengeopoliticalfracturesonenergyandclimateareallthemorevisible.Thismeansredoublingeffortstoensurethatabroadcoalitionofcountrieshasastakeinthenewenergyeconomy.Thejourneytoamoresecureandsustainableenergysystemma
146、ynotbeasmoothone.Buttodayscrisismakesitcrystalclearwhyweneedtopressahead.IEA.CC BY 4.0.PART A OVERVIEW AND CONTEXT OVERVIEW AND CONTEXT PartAoftheWorldEnergyOutlookprovidesthestartingpointforthisyearsenergyprojectionsandgivesanoverviewofsomeofthekeyfindings.Chapter1exploresthecausesoftodaysglobalene
147、rgycrisisand the consequences.Itprovides projections forenergymarketsandenergysecuritythroughthreescenariosandexamines what those outlooks imply for energyrelatedemissions and achievement of the worlds sustainabledevelopmentgoals.Chapter2examinesthevariousforcesthatareimpactingtheenergysectortodayan
148、dthepolicyresponses,andassessestheimplicationsforourOutlookin2022.Italsodetailsthebasisofeachofthethreemainscenariosandhowandwhytheydiffer.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 29 Chapter1Overview and key findings Global energy crisis:causes and implications Theglobalenergycrisissparkedb
149、yRussiasinvasionofUkraineishavingfarreachingimplicationsforhouseholds,businessesandentireeconomies,promptingshorttermresponsesfromgovernmentsaswellasadeeperdebateaboutthewaystoreducetheriskoffuturedisruptionsandpromoteenergysecurity.Thisisaglobalcrisis,butEuropeisthemaintheatreinwhichitisplayingout,
150、andnaturalgasiscentrestageespeciallyduringthecomingnorthernhemispherewinter.High energy prices are causing a huge transfer of wealth from consumers toproducers,backtothelevelsseenin2014foroil,butentirelyunprecedentedfornaturalgas.Highfuelpricesaccountfor90%oftheriseintheaveragecostsofelectricitygene
151、rationworldwide,naturalgasaloneformorethan50%.Thecostsofrenewablesandcarbondioxidehaveplayedonlyamarginalrole,underscoringthatthisisacrisiswhereenergytransitionsarethesolution,ratherthantheproblem.Priceandeconomicpressuresmeanthatthenumberofpeoplewithoutaccesstomodernenergyisrisingforthefirsttimeina
152、decade.Around75millionpeoplewhorecentlygainedaccesstoelectricityarelikelytolosetheabilitytopayforit,and100millionpeoplemayreverttotheuseoftraditionalbiomassforcooking.Thereremainhugeuncertaintiesoverhowthisenergycrisiswillevolveandforhowlongfossilfuelpriceswillremainelevated,andtherisksoffurtherener
153、gydisruptionandgeopoliticalfragmentationarehigh.Inallourscenarios,pricepressuresandadimneartermoutlookfortheglobaleconomyfeedthroughintolowerenergydemandthaninlastyearsOutlook.Thecrisisprovidesashorttermboosttodemandforoilandcoalasconsumersscrambleforalternativestohighpricedgas.Butthelastinggainsfro
154、mthecrisisaccrueto lowemissions sources,mainly renewables,but also nuclear in some cases,alongsidefasterprogresswithefficiencyandelectrification,e.g.electricvehicles.IntheStatedPoliciesScenario(STEPS),globalenergydemandgrowthofaround1%peryearto2030ismetinaggregatealmostentirelybyrenewables.Emergingm
155、arketanddevelopingeconomies,suchasIndia,seeincreasesacrossabroaderrangeoffuelsandtechnologies,whiletheonlysourcestoshowgrowthinadvancedeconomiesto2030arelowemissions.Thecostadvantagesofmaturecleanenergytechnologiesandtheprospectsfornewones,suchaslowemissionshydrogen,areboostedbytheInflationReduction
156、ActintheUnitedStates,Europesincreasedpushforcleanenergy,andothermajornewpolicies.Theresultistoturbochargetheemergingglobalcleanenergyeconomy.TheSTEPSinthisOutlookisthefirstWorldEnergyOutlook(WEO)scenariobasedonprevailingpolicysettingsthatseesadefinitivepeakinglobaldemandforfossilfuels.S U M M A R Y
157、IEA.CC BY 4.0.30 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 Coaldemandpeaksinthenextfewyears,naturalgasdemandreachesaplateaubytheendofthedecade,andoildemandreachesahighpointinthemid2030sbeforefallingslightly.From80%todayalevelthathasbeenconstantfordecadestheshareoffossilfuelsintheglobalen
158、ergymixfallstolessthan75%by2030andtojustabove60%bymidcentury.IntheAnnouncedPledgesScenario(APS),thedrivetomeetclimatepledgesinfullsendsdemandforallthefossilfuelsintodeclineby2030.WiththelossofitslargestexportmarketinEurope,Russiafacestheprospectofamuchdiminishedroleininternationalenergyaffairs.2021p
159、rovestobeahighwatermarkforRussianexportflows.Itsshareofinternationallytradedgas,whichstoodat30%in2021,fallsto15%by2030intheSTEPSandto10%intheAPS.ImportersinChinahavebeenactivelycontractingforliquefiednaturalgas,andthereisnoroominChinasprojectedgasbalanceforanotherlargescalepipelinefromRussia.Energyr
160、elatedCO2emissionsreboundedto36.6Gtin2021,thelargesteverannualriseinemissions.IntheSTEPS,theyreachaplateauaround37Gtbeforefallingslowlyto32Gtin2050,atrajectorythatwouldleadtoa2.5Criseinglobalaveragetemperatures by 2100.This is around 1C lower than implied by the baselinetrajectorypriortotheParisAgre
161、ement,indicatingtheprogressthathasbeenmadesincethen.Butmuchmoreneedstobedone.IntheAPS,emissionspeakinthemid2020s and fall to 12Gt in 2050,resulting in a projected global mediantemperaturerisein2100of1.7C.IntheNetZeroEmissionsby2050(NZE)Scenario,CO2emissionsfallto23Gtin2030andtozeroin2050,atrajectory
162、consistentwithlimitingthetemperatureincreasetolessthan1.5Cin2100.Plannedincreasesinglobalcleanenergymanufacturingcapacityprovidealeadingindicatorofthepotentialforrapidincreasesindeployment.Inthecaseofheatpumps,currentandplannedmanufacturingcapacityisbelowthedeploymentlevelsprojectedintheAPS.Butannou
163、ncedglobalmanufacturingcapacityforelectrolysersandsolarPVmodulesin2030issufficientnotonlytoreachAPSdeploymentlevelsbuttogobeyondthem.Onepointcommontoeachscenarioistherisingshareofelectricityinglobalfinalenergyconsumption.From20%today,thisincreasesineachscenario,reachingmorethan50%bymidcenturyintheNZ
164、EScenario.Thisisassociatedwithahugeoverallincreaseinglobalelectricitydemandwiththebulkofthisgrowthcomingfromemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomiesandtheneedforconstantvigilancefrompolicymakerstoarangeofriskstoelectricitysecurity,inparticulartheeverincreasingneedforflexibleoperationofpowersystems.Thewo
165、rldhasnotbeeninvestingenoughinenergyinrecentyears,afactthatlefttheenergysystemmuchmorevulnerabletothesortofshocksseenin2022.Asmoothandsecureenergytransitionwillrequireamajoruptickincleanenergyinvestmentflows.GettingontrackfortheNZEScenariowillrequireatriplinginspendingoncleanenergyandinfrastructuret
166、o2030,alongsideashifttowardsmuchhigherinvestmentinemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies.-0.8Dec 20Oct 20Feb 21Apr 21Jun 21Aug 21Oct 21Dec 21Apr 22Jun 22Aug 22Feb 22Gas importersGas exporters202220062008200 4002 0001 600Asian spot LNGEU imported coalGerman powerNorth Sea BrentEur
167、ope natural gas(TTF)OtherEurasiaAfricaMiddle EastEuropeOtherCentral andSouth AmericaAsia Pacific202120302040Emissions2050Median temperature rise in 210001234CNet Zero5336 Gt CO212.332Index(1 September 2020=100)Trillion USD-0.400.40.8Pre-ParisAgreementAPSNZESTEPSHuge transfers fromconsumers to produc
168、ers:Oil has been expensive before,but there is no precedent for the import bills for natural gas in 2022.Policy and technology changes since the Paris Agreement in 2015 have reduced the projected temperature rise,but theres still a long way to go to cap global warming at 1.5 C.Emissions have tocome
169、downA shock to the systemRussias invasion of Ukraine has led to a period of extraordinary turbulence in energy markets,especially for natural gas.32 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 1.1 IntroductionEachenergycrisishasechoesofthepast,andtheacutestrainsonmarketstodayaredrawingcomp
170、arisonwiththemostsevereenergydisruptionsinmodernenergyhistory,mostnotablytheoilshocksofthe1970s.Then,asnow,therewerestronggeopoliticaldriversfortheriseinprices,whichledtohighinflationandeconomicdamage.Then,asnow,thecrisesbroughttothesurfacesomeunderlyingfragilitiesanddependenciesintheenergysystem.Th
171、en,asnow,highpricescreatedstrongeconomicincentivestoact,andthoseincentiveswerereinforcedbyconsiderationsofeconomicandenergysecurity.Buttodaysglobalenergycrisisissignificantlybroaderandmorecomplexthanthosethatcamebefore.Theshocksinthe1970swereaboutoil,andthetaskfacingpolicymakerswasrelativelyclear(if
172、notnecessarilysimpletoimplement):reducedependenceonoil,especiallyoilimports.Bycontrast,theenergycrisistodayhasmultipledimensions:naturalgas,butalsooil,coal,electricity,foodsecurityandclimate.Therefore,thesolutionsaresimilarlyallencompassing.Ultimatelywhatisrequiredisnotjusttodiversifyawayfromasingle
173、energycommodity,but to change the nature of the energy system itself,and to do so whilemaintainingtheaffordable,secureprovisionofenergyservices.ThisOutlookexploreshowthischangemightplayout,andwhatpitfallsandopportunitiesmaybeencounteredalongtheway.Eachscenarioisbasedonadifferentvisionofhowpolicymake
174、rsmightrespondtotodayscrisis.IntheStatedPoliciesScenario(STEPS),weexplorehowtheenergysystemevolvesifweretaincurrentpolicysettings.Theseincludethelatestpolicymeasuresadoptedbygovernmentsaroundtheworld,suchastheInflationReductionActintheUnitedStates,butdonotassumethataspirationaloreconomywidetargetsar
175、emetunlesstheyarebackedupwithdetailonhowtheyaretobeachieved.IntheAnnouncedPledgesScenario(APS),governmentsgetthebenefitofthedoubt.Inthisscenario,theirtargetsareachievedontimeandinfull,whethertheyrelatetoclimatechange,energysystemsornationalpledgesinotherareassuchasenergyaccess.Trendsinthisscenariore
176、vealtheextentoftheworldscollectiveambition,asitstandstoday,totackleclimate change and meet other sustainable development goals.Only in the Net ZeroEmissionsby2050(NZE)Scenario,doweworkbackfromspecificgoalsthemainoneinthiscasebeingtocapglobalwarmingto1.5Candshowhowtheycanbeachieved.Eachscenariomeetsc
177、urrentenergysecurityandclimatechallengesindifferentwaysandtodifferent extents,but the starting point for todays decision makers is fundamentallydifferentfromthatfacingtheircounterpartsinthe1970s.Theclimateandenvironmentalchallengesaremuchmoreacute,duetoahalfcenturyofrisingemissions.Butthecleantechno
178、logy choices available today are also much more mature and cost competitive,providing options for much more efficient energy use,cleaner energy production andgeneration,andnewkindsofstorage.Asaresult,manyofthecomponentpartsofanewtypeofenergysystemareclearlyvisible.Thequestionishoweffectivelyandquick
179、lytheycanbedeployedalongsidetraditionaltechnologies,andtheninplaceofthem.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 33 11.2 Causesofthecrisisandimmediateconsequences1.2.1 CausesofthecrisisTheworldisfacingaglobalenergycrisisofunprecedenteddepthandcomplexity.Thisishavingfarreachingimplicationsf
180、ormanyhouseholds,businessesandentireeconomies,promptingarangeofshorttermresponsesfromgovernmentsaswellasadeeperdebateaboutthewaystoavoidsuchdisruptionsinthefuture.PressuresonmarketspredatedtheRussianFederations(hereinafterRussia)invasionofUkraine,butitsactionshavetippedwhatwasastrongrecoveryfromthep
181、andemicstrongenoughtostrainweakenedsupplychainsandproductioncapacityintofullblownturmoilinenergymarkets,causingseveredamagetotheglobaleconomy.Thisisaglobalcrisis,butEuropeisthemaintheatreinwhichitisplayingout,andnaturalgasiscentrestage.Russiaisseekingtogainpoliticalleveragebywithholdinggassuppliesan
182、dexposingconsumerstohigherenergybillsandsupplyshortagesoverthewinterheatingseason.AsofSeptember2022,RussiasgasdeliveriestotheEuropeanUnionaredownby80%comparedtowheretheyhavebeeninrecentyears.ThishasnaturallycreatedsignificantpressureonEuropeanandglobalgasbalances.Duetodemandforheating,Europeangasdem
183、andisroughlytwiceashighduringthewintermonthsasduringthesummer,andismetbyacombinationofdomesticproduction(whichhasbeenindecline),importsbypipelineandliquefiednaturalgas(LNG),andwithdrawalsfromstorage(Figure1.1).Figure 1.1 European Union and United Kingdom winter natural gas supply and options to comp
184、ensate for a cut in Russian pipeline gas IEA.CCBY4.0.Russian pipeline imports met 20%of gas demand in the European Union in winter 2021-22;managing without this gas requires alternative imports,use of storage and lower demand IEA.CC BY 4.0.34 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 EUg
185、asstoragefacilitiesweremorethan90%fullinearlyOctober2022,aconsiderableachievementgiventhecutstoRussiansupplyoverthecourseoftheyear.IncombinationwithlowerdemandandcontinuedstronginflowsfromnonRussiansources,thisopensanarrowbutpotentiallysafepathwayforEuropethroughthenorthernhemispherewintermonths,alb
186、eitathighlyelevatedprices,onconditionthattheweatherdoesnotturntoocold.However,thebalancesfor20232024lookmorechallenging.TherearemanystrandstotheenergyrelationshipbetweenRussiaandEurope.Russiahasactedtoseverthegasrelationship.TheEuropeanUnionhashaltedcoalimportsfromRussia,meaningthatcoaldeliveriesfro
187、mEuropeslargestexternalsupplierfelltozeroasofAugust2022.Forthemoment,Russianoilproductionandexportsremainclosetoprewarlevels,despite some countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom imposingimmediaterestrictionsonoiltrade.Somereorientationoftradeflowshasalreadytakenplace,withlowerflow
188、sofoilfromRussiatotheEuropeanUnionandNorthAmericaoffsetbyhigherexportstoothermarkets,notablyIndia,ChinaandTrkiye.Butthemajorchangeslieahead:Russiaexported2.6millionbarrelsperday(mb/d)ofoiltotheEuropeanUnioninSeptember2022,andmostoftheseexportswillcometoanendwhenanEUbanonseabornecrudeoilimportsfromRu
189、ssiaentersintoforceinDecember2022andonabanonoilproductsfromRussia(whicharemainlymiddledistillates)takeseffectinFebruary2023.TheproximatecauseofthecrisiswasRussiasinvasionofUkraine,butpressureonmarketswasvisiblebeforeFebruary2022.Themainreasonwasthespeedoftheeconomicreboundfromthepandemicinducedslump
190、 in2020;thisstretched allmannerof supplychains,includingthoseinfuelsupply.Therewerealsoweatherrelatedfactors,ahigherincidenceofoutagestosupplyoftenrelatedtomaintenancepostponedfrom2020asaresultofthepandemicandwhattheIEAwascalling“artificialtightness”inmarkets.Innaturalgasmarkets,thisstemmedinlargepa
191、rtfromGazpromssluggishnessinrefillingitsEuropeangasstorageinthethirdquarterof2021,whichinretrospecthastobeseeninthecontextofRussiasinvasionofUkrainesomemonthslaterandthepressuresubsequentlyappliedtoEuropebycuttingoffgassupplies.The key underlying imbalance,which had been some years in the making,rel
192、ates toinvestment(Figure1.2).ThishasbeenarecurrentthemeinIEAanalysisintheWorldEnergyOutlookandWorldEnergyInvestmentseries.ForfiveyearsaftertheconclusionoftheParisAgreement,theamountofinvestmentgoingintoenergytransitionsremainedflatataroundUSD1trillionperyear.Sincecleanenergytechnologycostscontinuedt
193、odeclineduringthisperiod,thiswasenoughtogenerateyearonyearincreasesindeployment.Butitremainedfarshortoftheamountsneededtosupportathoroughgoingtransformationoftheenergysystem.Onlyinthelasttwoyears,2021and2022,didcleanenergyspendingseeanotableuptick.Theothersideoftheinvestmentcoinisspendingonfossilfue
194、ls.Thisdroppedrapidlyafterthefalloftheoilpricein201415,reflectinglowerrevenuesandinvestorfrustrationatthepoorreturnsthatoilandgascompaniesweregenerating.Intheabsenceofamuchneededaccelerationtoenergytransitionstocurbfossilfueldemand,thedeclinesinoilandgasIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findi
195、ngs 35 1investmentinthesecondhalfofthe2010spresentedarisktomarketbalancesinthe2020s.IntheWEO2016ExecutiveSummary,forexample,wesaidthat“ifnewprojectapprovalsremainlowforathirdyearinarowin2017,thenitbecomesincreasinglyunlikelythatdemand(asprojectedinourthenNewPoliciesScenario)andsupplycanbematchedinth
196、eearly2020swithoutthestartofanewboom/bustcyclefortheindustry”.Naturalgasmarketsalsofacedthe“riskofahardlanding”(IEA,2016).Figure 1.2 Historical energy investment and GDP trends IEA.CCBY4.0.Energy investment was subdued from 2015 to 2020;fossil fuel investment dropped after the 2014-2015 oil price fa
197、ll and clean energy spending did not start to pick up until recently Acceleration in new approvals failed to materialise,however,at least in part becauseuncertaintyoverlongtermdemandledtheindustrytoshyawayfromlargecapitalintensiveprojects.Eventoday,despitehigherpricesandhugewindfallproductsfortheoil
198、andgasindustryin2022,upstreamspendingistheonlysignificantsegmentoftheinvestmentpicturethatremainsbelowpreCovidlevels.TheotherunderlyingissuethathascontributedtothecrisisisEuropescontinuedhighlevelofrelianceonRussianenergy.In2021,oneoutoffiveunitsofprimaryenergyconsumedintheEuropeanUnioncamefromRussi
199、a.ThisrelianceonRussiahadlongbeenidentifiedasastrategic weakness,especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014,and someinfrastructurewasbuilttodiversifysourcesofimports,butRussianflowsremainedhigh.Inthecaseofnaturalgas,RussiasshareofEuropeangasdemandactuallyrosefrom30%onaveragein200510toreach40%
200、in201520.Climatepoliciesandnetzeroemissionscommitmentswereblamedinsomequartersforcontributingtotherunupinprices,butitisdifficulttoarguethattheyplayedarole.Morerapiddeploymentofcleanenergysourcesandtechnologiesinpracticewouldhavehelpedtoprotectconsumersandmitigatesomeoftheupwardpressureonfuelprices.I
201、twouldalso0.5%1.0%1.5%2.0%20021CleanenergyFossilfuelsEnergyinvestmentGDPInvestmentasashareofGDP20%10%0%10%20%20021AnnualchangeinGDPandinvestmentIEA.CC BY 4.0.36 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 havemitigatedthepostpandemicreboundinenergyrelatedcarbondioxide
202、(CO2)emissionswhichreached36.6gigatonnes(Gt)in2021.Theannualincreaseof1.9Gtwasthelargestinhistory,offsettingthepreviousyearspandemicinduceddecline.Moreover,thereisscantevidencetosupportthenotionthatnetzeroemissionspledgeshavestifledtraditionalinvestmentsinsupply,asthesepledgesarenotyetcorrelatedwith
203、changesinfossilfuelspending.Mostnetzeroemissionspledgesarerecent,andmanyhaveyettobetranslatedintospecificplansandpolicymeasures.Ouranalysisoffossilfuelinvestmentincountrieswithnetzeroemissionspledges(68countriesplustheEuropeanUnion)showsthattheyareatasimilarleveltowheretheywerein2016,andthatchangesi
204、ninvestmentlevelsinthosecountriesinrecentyearsarenotnoticeablydifferentfromthosethathavetakenplaceincountrieswithoutnetzeroemissionspledges(Figure1.3).Figure 1.3 Fossil fuel investment in countries with and without net zero emissions pledges,2015-22 IEA.CCBY4.0.There are,as yet,few signs that net ze
205、ro emissions pledges are correlated with lower global spending on fossil fuels Notes:NZE=netzeroemissions.Investmentisbasedoncountrieswhereinvestmentoccursratherthanwhereitoriginates.StatusofNZEpledgesasof2022.1.2.2 ImmediateconsequencesThemostvisibleconsequenceofthecrisiswasanexplosioninenergyprice
206、s.WhileoilpricesaboveUSD100/barrelhavebeenseenbefore,thereisnoprecedentforthepricelevelsseenin2022fornaturalgas,withpricesatEuropesTitleTransferFacility(TTF)hubregularlyexceedingUSD50permillionBritishthermalunits(MBtu),theequivalentofmorethanUSD200/barrel.High fuel prices were the main reason for up
207、ward pressure on global2004006008005200022WithNZEpledgesinlawWithNZEpledgesinpolicydocumentsWithoutaNZEpledgeBillionUSD(2021)IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 37 1electricityprices,inourestimationaccountingfor90%oftheriseintheaveragecostsofelectricity
208、generationworldwide(naturalgasaloneformorethan50%).Thecostsofcapitalrecoveryaddedonlyabout5%tothepricepressures,astheelectricitysectorcontinuestoshifttowardsrelativelycapitalintensivetechnologieslikesolarPVandwind.Theremaining5%increaseincostswasduetohighercostsformaintenanceandthoserelatedtoCO2pric
209、esinseveralmarkets.Figure 1.4 Year-on-year increase in average power generation costs by selected country and region,2022 IEA.CCBY4.0.Increases in power generation costs were driven by higher fuel prices and have been particularly sharp in gas-importing countries and regions Thehighcostofnaturalgasf
210、iredpowertypicallythemarginalsourceofgenerationwasthemainfactorbehindahugeriseinEUwholesaleelectricityprices,withtrendsalsoabettedbyhighercoal,oilandCO2prices,reducedavailabilityofnuclearpowerandapooryearforhydropower.WholesaleelectricitypricesintheEuropeanUniontripledinthefirsthalfof2022,wellabovet
211、he40%increaseintheunderlyingaveragecostsofgeneration(Figure1.4).This divergence,which produced huge excess revenues for some market participants,sparked a vigorous debate over the EU electricity market design and whether gas andelectricitypricesshouldsomehowbedelinked.Therippleeffectsofhighernatural
212、gaspricesinEuropewerefeltaroundtheworld.OneofthemostimmediateconsequencesofRussiascurtailmentofgasdeliverieswasasharpincreaseinEuropeandemandforLNGimports:inthefirsteightmonthsof2022,netLNGimportsinEuroperosebytwothirds(by45billioncubicmetresbcm)comparedwiththesameperiodayearearlier.ItfellmainlyonAs
213、iatobalancethemarket;AsianLNGdemandhasfallenyearonyearin2022forthefirsttimesince2015.Relativelyweakdemandinthe10%20%30%40%50%MexicoChinaJapanKoreaIndiaEuropeanUnionIEA.CC BY 4.0.38 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 PeoplesRepublicofChina(hereinafterChina),duetoslowereconomicgrowt
214、handCovidrelatedlockdowns,hasbeenafactorineasingmarketbalances(thesameistrueforoil),althoughthisraisesquestionsaboutwhatliesaheadwhendemandinChinastartstopickup.Elsewhere,highpricesandshortfallsinsupplyhaveledtosignificanthardshipfordevelopingcountriesthatrelyonLNG.Figure 1.5 Value of natural gas tr
215、ade,2005-2022 IEA.CCBY4.0.There is no precedent for the huge increase in payments for traded gas in 2022 Oneeffectofthecurrenthighenergypricesisahugetransferofwealthfromconsumerstoproducers.Thesumsinvolvedarelargebutnotentirelyunprecedentedforoil,beingsimilartotheamountspaidduringtheearly2010s,andpr
216、iortothedeclineintheoilpriceinlate2014.Buttheyareextraordinaryfornaturalgas(Figure1.5).Naturalgasistypicallythejuniorpartnerintermsofrevenueforhydrocarbonexporters,withthevalueofinternationaltradeingasaveragingaround20%ofthetotalvalueoftradedoilandgasbetween2010and2021.Thispercentageisnowsettoincrea
217、seto40%in2022.Theenergycrisisisfuellinginflationarypressures,increasingfoodinsecurityandsqueezinghouseholdbudgets,especiallyinpoorhouseholdswherearelativelyhighpercentageofincomeisspentonenergyandfood.TheeffectsofhighernaturalgasandelectricitypriceshavebeenfeltacutelyacrossmuchofEurope.Elsewhereinth
218、eworld,theconsequenceshavevariedaccordingtothetypeofeconomy,buttheyareclearlynegativeinoverallterms:theInternationalMonetaryFundcutitsexpectationsofglobalgrowthfor2022from4.9%inOctober2021to3.2%initsOctoberupdate(IMF,2022a).Overall,lowincomecountriesareparticularly exposed to higher food prices,to w
219、hich higher energy and fertiliser costscontribute(Figure1.6).Thecrisishasalsobeenafurthersetbackforeffortstoimproveenergyaccess(Box1.1).0.80.400.40.82005201020152020MiddleEastEurasiaAfricaCentralandSouthAmericaAsiaPacificEuropeOtherTrillionUSD(2021)Importingregions2022ExportingregionsIEA.CC BY 4.0.C
220、hapter 1|Overview and key findings 39 1Figure 1.6 Contributions of energy and food to inflation in selected countries,2022 IEA.CCBY4.0.Energy is behind many of the inflationary impacts of the crisis in Europe,but higher food prices to which energy contributes are the main driver in many low income c
221、ountries Source:IEAanalysisbasedonIMF(2022b).Box 1.1 Getting energy access back on track Duetothecombinationofthepandemicandthecurrentenergycrisis,theIEAestimatesthat75millionpeoplethatrecentlygainedaccesstoelectricityarelikelytolosetheabilitytopayforit,andthat100millionpeoplethathavegainedaccesstoc
222、ookingwithcleanfuelsmayforgoitoncostgrounds,returninginsteadtotheuseoftraditionalbiomass.Gettingtheworldontrackforuniversalaccesstoelectricityandcleancookingwillrequirededicatedadditionaleffortfromawiderangeofnationalandinternationalactors.Onlyhalfofthe113countrieswithoutuniversalaccesstoelectricity
223、havetargetstoincreaseaccess,andfewerthanhalfofthoseaimtoreachuniversalaccessby2030.Anevensmaller number,e.g.Cte dIvoire,Kenya,Senegal,Rwanda and Myanmar,havecomprehensivenationalelectrificationstrategiesinplace.TheachievementofnationaltargetsasmodelledintheAPSisthereforenotenoughtoachievefullunivers
224、alaccesstoelectricityby2030(theaimofSustainableDevelopmentGoal7).TheNZEScenario,bycontrast,buildsinachievementofthe2030target(Figure1.7).ThegapbetweentheSustainableDevelopmentGoal7(SDG7)targetandcurrentpolicyambitionsisevenwiderinthecaseofcleancookingfuels.Some128countriescurrentlylackuniversalacces
225、stocleancooking,butonly39ofthemhavecleancookingtargets,andfewerthanhalfofthesearetargetinguniversalaccessby2030.ChinaandIndonesiaIEA.CC BY 4.0.40 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 areclosetobeingontracktoachievetheirtargetsbutinmanyothercountriesthereisaneedtoraisethecurrentlevel
226、ofambitionandtoimproveimplementation.Aswithaccesstoelectricity,universalaccesstocleancookingby2030isbuiltintotheNZEScenario.Figure 1.7 Number of people without access to electricity and clean cooking by scenario,2021 and 2030 IEA.CCBY4.0.Well-formulated national strategies and international support
227、are vital to regain momentum on improving energy access after Covid-19 and todays high energy prices Notes:SubSaharanAfricaexcludesSouthAfrica.STEPS=StatedPoliciesScenario;APS=AnnouncedPledgesScenario;NZE=NetZeroEmissionsby2050Scenario.Shorttermpolicyresponsestothecrisishavebeenfocusedonaffordabilit
228、yandsecurityofsupply,withmitigatingmeasuresthatcanbeimplementedquicklyatapremium,evenwhentheyareexpensiveorcomeatthecostoftemporarilyhigheremissions.Oneresponsehasbeentoseektoprotectconsumersfromsomeoralloftheincreaseinprices,withmassiveinterventionsinparticulartoshieldvulnerableconsumers.SinceSepte
229、mber2021,theIEAhastrackedaroundUSD550billioningovernmentinterventions,mostlyinEurope,toshieldconsumersfromtheworsteffectsofthepricespikes,withalargeamountofadditionalsupportalsounderconsiderationinseveralcountries.Therehavebeenmeasurestoallowforhighercoalfiredgeneration,toextendthelifetimeofsomenucl
230、earpowerplantsandtoaccelerate the flow of new renewable projects.Demandside measures have generallyreceivedlessattention,buttherehavebeeninitiativestoencourageandincentivisecutsinenergyuse:attheEuropeanUnionlevel,theseincludeavoluntary15%reductioninnaturalgasdemandaswellasamandatoryreductiontargetof
231、5%ofelectricityuseinpeakhours(demand which is typically met by gasfired generation).There have also been variousinterventionstocaptherevenuespaidforcheapersourcesofgeneration,whichwould2004006008000STEPS2030APS2030NZESubSaharanAfricaDevelopingAsiaRestofworldWithoutaccesstoelectricityMilli
232、onpeople5000250020212030STEPS2030APS2030NZEMillionpeopleWithoutaccesstocleancookingIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 41 1otherwise be making huge gains because of the pricesetting role of gasfired plants,alongsidetemporaryadditionaltaxesontheprofitsofoilandgascompanies,wit
233、htheproceedsusedtohelpeasethepressureonhouseholdandcompanyenergybills.Alongsidetheseshorttermmeasures,somegovernmentshavetakenstepsthatwillplayoutoverthelongerterm.Someoftheseseektoincreaseoilandgassupply,viaannouncementsof new incentives or licensing rounds,1 or through support for new infrastructu
234、re,inparticularnewLNGterminalsinEuropetofacilitatethesupplyofnonRussiangas.Butmostofthenewpolicyinitiativesaimtoacceleratethestructuraltransformationoftheenergysector.TheEuropeanUnionisraisingitsrenewablesand energyefficiencytargetsandputtingsignificantresourcesbehindachievingthem.TheadoptionoftheIn
235、flationReductionActintheUnitedStatesgivesaboosttoanarrayofcleanenergytechnologiesthroughtheprovisionofUSD370billionforenergysecurityandclimatechangeinvestments,withthepotentialtomobilisefarlargersumsfromtheprivatesector.TheJapanesegovernmentisseeking to restart and build more nuclear plants and expa
236、nd other lowemissionstechnologieswithitsGreenTransformation(GX)plan.Chinacontinuestobreakrecordsforinvestmentsinrenewablesandtoaddhugenumbersofelectricvehicles(EVs)toitsstockeachyear.Indiahastakenakeysteptowardsestablishingacarbonmarketandboostingtheenergyefficiencyofbuildingsandappliances.Thererema
237、inhugeuncertaintiesoverhowthisenergycrisiswillevolve.ThebiggestconcernisthewarinUkrainehowitwillprogress,whenandhowitmightend.Othersrelatetothepossibilityoffurtherescalationinprices,theseverityofthe202223winter,theextenttowhichRussianexportflowscanberedirectedtoothermarkets,andthewaythathighpricesin
238、fluenceconsumerbehaviourorsocialattitudestowardscleanenergytransitions.Butthecurrentenergyshockhasalreadyhadaseismiceffect,providingavividreminderifonewasneededoftheimportanceofenergysecurityanddiversity.Insodoing,ithashighlightedthefragilityandunsustainabilityofmanyaspectsofourcurrentenergysysteman
239、dthewiderrisksthatthisposesforoureconomiesandwellbeing.Andithasplayedoutagainstabackdropofincreasinglyvisiblevulnerabilitiesandimpactsfromachangingclimate.Timesofcrisisputthespotlightongovernments,andthescenariosthatweincludeintheWorldEnergyOutlookaredifferentiatedprimarilybyhowpolicymakersrespond.1
240、Thetypicalleadtimesforupstreamprojectsareconsiderable.Ouranalysisshowsthatforconventionalupstreamprojectsthathavestartedproductionsince2010,ittookonaveragearoundsixyearsfromtheawardofanexplorationlicencetodiscovery;nineyearsfromdiscoverytoprojectapproval;andjustoverfouryearsfromapprovaltofirstproduc
241、tion.IEA.CC BY 4.0.42 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 1.3 OutlookforenergymarketsandsecurityTodayshighenergypricesandgloomyeconomicoutlookleadtolowerenergydemandgrowthintheSTEPSandAPS,bothintheneartermandoutto2030,thanintheWEO2021(IEA,2021a).Faced with market uncertainty and hi
242、gh prices,consumers are forgoingpurchasesandindustryisscalingbackproduction.Despiteastrongeconomicreboundfromthepandemicin2021,theassumedrateofaverageannualGDPgrowthfortherestofthedecadehasbeenreviseddownslightlyto3.3%(seeChapter2).EnergydemandrisesmoreslowlyinboththeSTEPSandAPSasaresult,andthemixtu
243、reoffuelsusedtomeetthisdemandgrowthchangessubstantiallyfrompreviousprojections(Figure1.8).Figure 1.8 Difference in total energy supply in the WEO-2022 STEPS relative to the WEO-2021 STEPS IEA.CCBY4.0.Gas demand is markedly lower than in last years STEPS while low-emissions sources led by renewables
244、see even greater growth.The upside for coal proves short-lived.Notes:EJ=exajoule.PositivenumbersindicatetotalenergysupplyishigherintheSTEPSinthisOutlookthanintheWEO2021STEPS.Thetrendsto2030intheSTEPSareconsistentwithaworldthatisgrapplingwithahostofneartermvulnerabilities,concernedaboutthehighcostofi
245、mportedfuelsbutalsoaboutclimatechange,andawareoftheopportunitiesaffordedbycosteffectivecleanenergytechnologies.Naturalgaspricesremainatveryhighlevelsbyhistoricalstandardsuntilthemiddle of the decade,causing gas to lose ground as new natural gas power plantconstructionsslows,withcountriesoptingforoth
246、ersourcestomaintainsystemadequacyandflexibilitywhileacceleratingrenewables.Tradeflowsundergoaprofoundreorientationasimportingregionstendtoprioritisedomesticresourceswherepossibleinanattempttoensurereliablesuppliesofenergyandlimitexposuretovolatileinternationalmarkets,andastheimplicationsofEuropesshi
247、ftawayfromRussianimportsreverberatearoundthesystem.Overall,energysecurityconcernsreinforcetheriseoflowemissionssourcesand20224202520262027202820292030OilNaturalgasCoalRenewablesNuclearEJIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 43 1efficiency:energydemandgrowthofalmost1
248、%ayearto2030islargelymetbyrenewables.Forthefirsttime,theSTEPSinthisOutlookshowsanoticeablepeakinoverallfossilfuelconsumptionwithinthisdecade(Box1.2).However,whileshowingdistinctsignsofchange,thetrendsintheSTEPSdonotyetamounttoaparadigmshift.Box 1.2 Era of fossil fuel growth may soon be over TheState
249、dPoliciesScenariointhisOutlookisthefirstWEOscenariobasedonprevailingpolicysettingsthatseesglobaldemandforeachofthefossilfuelsexhibitapeakorplateau.Coaldemandpeakswithinthenextfewyears,naturalgasdemandreachesaplateaubytheendofthedecade,andoildemandreachesahighpointinthemid2030sbeforefalling.Theresult
250、isthattotaldemandforfossilfuelsdeclinessteadilyfromthemid2020sbyaround2exajoules(EJ)(equivalentto1millionbarrelsofoilequivalentperdaymboe/d)everyyearonaverageto2050(Figure1.9).Figure 1.9 Fossil fuel demand in the STEPS,1990-2050 IEA.CCBY4.0.Total fossil fuel use sees a definitive peak for the first
251、time in this years STEPS.The share of fossil fuels in the energy mix falls to around 60%in 2050,a clear break from past trends Note:EJ=exajoule;TES=totalenergysupply.ChangesinfossilfuelusehavebroadlyfollowedchangesinGDPfordecades,andglobalfossilfueldemandhasremainedataround80%oftotaldemandfordecades
252、.The2022STEPSprojectionsarenowputtingtheworldonapathtowardsasignificantbreakwiththesetrendswithinafewyears.By2030,fossilfuelsaccountforlessthanthreequartersoftotalenergysupply,andby2050theirsharefallstojustabove60%.Thesetrendsareemblematic of a shift in the energy landscape since the Paris Agreement
253、.In theWEO2015,forexample,thescenarioequivalenttotheSTEPS(thencalledtheNewPoliciesScenario)sawasteadyriseindemandforeachofthefossilfuelsto2040,andtotalfossilfuelusein2040wasprojectedtobenearly20%largerthanin2040inthis20%40%60%80%100%050002020203020402050OilCoalNaturalgasEJShare
254、offossilfuels inTES(rightaxis)IEA.CC BY 4.0.44 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 yearsSTEPSprojections(IEA,2015).Thebiggestsinglechangesincethenhasbeeninthepower sector:the STEPS in this Outlook sees a much higher level of renewablesdeploymentto2030andbeyondthanitspredecessorscen
255、ariodidin2015,andthiscomesattheexpenseofcoalandnaturalgas.TheAPSbuildsonthesetrends,butassumesthatgovernments,companiesandcitizenstakefurthermeasurestoensurethattheresponsetothesetrendsisconsistentwithlongtermclimategoals.ThesehavecollectivelybecomemoreambitioussincetheWEO2021asaresultofnewpledgesan
256、dtargetsannouncedsincethen,notablyinIndiaandIndonesia.IntheAPS,globalenergydemandissettoincreaseby0.2%peryearto2030,comparedwith0.8%peryearintheSTEPS,reflectingmoreactivemeasuresintheAPStocurbdemandthroughenergyefficiencygains.Thereisalsoamuchmoredramaticshiftinfavouroflowemissionssourcesofenergy.Th
257、eNZEScenariomapsoutacompleteandevenmorerapidtransformationwhichisconsistentwithapathtonetzeroCO2emissionsfromenergyandindustrialprocessesby2050.TherateatwhichtheenergyefficiencyofdifferenteconomiesimprovesisacrucialvariableinourOutlook.Between2017and2020,energyintensityhasimprovedonaverageby1.3%pery
258、earconsiderablylowerthanthe2.1%seenbetween2011and2016andtherateofimprovementfurtherslowedto0.5%in2021.IntheSTEPS,energyintensityimprovesby2.4%peryearfrom2021to2030;asaresult,around44EJ(10%oftotalfinalconsumption)isavoidedby2030.However,thisstillleavesagreatdealofuntappedpotential:intheAPS,energyinte
259、nsityimprovesby3%peryear,andevenmorerapidlyintheNZEScenario.1.3.1 TrendsandvulnerabilitiesacrosstheenergymixElectricityTherearemanyuncertaintiesinourOutlook,butonepointwhichiscommontoallthescenariosistherisingshareofelectricityinglobalfinalenergyconsumption.From20%today,thisincreasesto22%by2030inthe
260、STEPS,and28%in2050.IntheAPS,thesharerisesto24%in2030and39%in2050.IntheNZEScenario,thesharerisesfurtherto28%by2030and52%by2050.Thisisassociatedwithahugeoverallincreaseinglobalelectricitydemandoverthecomingdecadesbymidcentury,electricitydemandis75%higherthantodayinthe STEPS,120%higher in APS and 150%i
261、n the NZE Scenario.Clean electricity andelectrificationareabsolutelycentraltotheshifttoanetzeroemissionssystem.Thebulkofthegrowthcomesfromemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies,whereelectricitymeetsabroadrangeofresidential,commercialandindustrialneeds.Growingpopulations,higherincomesandrisingtemperatu
262、resleadtorapidlyincreasingdemandforspacecooling,whichisoneofthebiggestcontributorstoelectricitydemandgrowth;anextra2800terawatthours(TWh)globallyforspacecoolingto2050inemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomiesintheSTEPSistheequivalentofaddinganotherEuropeanUniontocurrentglobalelectricitydemand.Comparingt
263、hisdemandforspacecoolingacrosstheIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 45 1scenariosprovidesausefulillustrationofthevalueofstringentefficiencypolicies:intheAPS,efficiencygainscutthegrowthincoolingdemandbyalmosthalf;evenmorestringentstandardsforairconditionersintheNZEScenario,togetherwith
264、betterinsulationinhomes,cutthisbyhalfagain.Asmodernlivesandeconomiesbecomeincreasinglyreliantonelectricity,sothereliabilityand affordability of electricity supply take centre stage in any discussion about energysecurity,anddecarbonisationofelectricitysupplybecomescentralinplanningfornetzeroemissions
265、goals.Around65%ofthecoalusedgloballyin2021and40%ofthenaturalgaswereforpowergeneration.Coaluseforelectricitygenerationisrisinginmanycountries,atleasttemporarily,inresponsetotheenergycrisis.Thesharesofcoalandnaturalgasinpowergenerationaresettodecreaseto2030ineachscenario,buttovaryingdegrees(Figure1.10
266、).Theglobalaveragecarbonintensityofelectricitygenerationiscurrently460grammesofcarbondioxideperkilowatthour(gCO2/kWh),heavilyinfluencedbytheamountofcoalinthemix.Bymidcentury,unabatedcoalfallsto12%oftotalgenerationintheSTEPS,downfrom 36%today,helping to reduce the carbon intensity of electricity gene
267、ration to160gCO2/kWh.Thispointisreached20yearsearlierintheNZEScenario,whichseescarbonintensitydipbelowzeroby2050asnegativeemissionsinthepowersectoroffsetresidualemissionsinindustryandtransport.Changingdemandpatternsandrisingsharesofsolarphotovoltaics(PV)andwindintheelectricitymixputapremiumonpowersy
268、stemflexibilityasacornerstoneofelectricitysecurity.Flexibilityneeds(measuredastheamounttherestofthesystemneedstoadjustonanhourlybasistoaccommodatedemandpatternsandthevariabilityofwindandsolaroutput)increaseinallscenarios;theydoubleintheAPSby2030,forexample,andthennearlydoubleagainby2050.Therearefour
269、mainsourcesofflexibilityinpowersystems:generation plants,grids,demandside response and energy storage.For the moment,thermalpowerplantsperformmostoftheadjustmentstomatchenergydemandandsupply,butasotherformsofflexibilitydevelopandexpand,coalandthengasfiredplantsseetheirroleasasourceofflexibilityprogr
270、essivelydiminishandeventuallydisappear.Removingexistingsourcesofflexibilitybeforeothersarescaleduprepresentsamajorrisktoelectricitysecurity.Adequateinvestmenttoexpandandmodernisegridinfrastructureisacaseinpoint.OurprojectionsintheSTEPSseeannualinvestmentofUSD770billionininfrastructureandstorageto205
271、0asgridsincreaseinlengthbyabout90%overtheperiod.Investmentingridsandstorageis30%higheronaverageintheAPS,atclosetoUSD1trillionperyear.However,thereareobstaclesthatneedtobeaddressed.Inpractice,thepermittingandconstructionofasinglehighpoweroverheadline(400kilovolts)cantakeasmuchas13years,dependingonthe
272、jurisdictionandlengthoftheline,withsomeofthelongestleadtimesfoundinadvancedeconomies.Transmissionbottlenecksarealreadycreatingnumerousinefficienciesandrisks.Forexample,authoritiesinVietNamannouncedinearly2022thattheywouldnotconnectanynewsolarPVorwindprojecttothegridfortherestoftheyear,whileinMongoli
273、a12%oftheelectricitygeneratedin2021couldnotbetransportedtoendusers.IEA.CC BY 4.0.46 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 Figure 1.10 Global energy supply and demand by sector,scenario and fuel IEA.CCBY4.0.Energy efficiency,electrification and expansion of low-emissions supply are th
274、e hallmarks of rapid transitions to 2030 06007202021STEPSAPSNZECoalOilNaturalgasTraditionaluseofbiomassNuclearModernbioenergyTotalenergysupply(EJ)20305003002021STEPSAPSNZE2021STEPSAPSNZE2021STEPSAPSNZE2021STEPSAPSNZEOtherrenewablesElectricityOtherElectricityandheat(EJ)2030Indus
275、try(EJ)Transport(EJ)Buildings(EJ)203020302030IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 47 1CleanenergysupplyandcriticalmineralsCleanenergy,includingbothlowemissionselectricityandfuels,isthebiggrowthstoryofthisOutlook.Theextentofthatgrowthstillrestsinthehandsofpolicymakers,evenwhereasinthecas
276、eofwindandsolartheyenjoylargecostadvantagesoverothertechnologies.Buttherearesignsthattheenergycrisisisgalvanisingincreasedpolicysupport,withtheInflationReductionActintheUnitedStatesbeingaparticularlystrikingexample.Lowemissionssourcesnowaccountforaround40%ofelectricitygeneration,with30%comingfromren
277、ewablesandanother10%fromnuclear.DeploymentofsolarPVandwindpoweracceleratesinallscenarios,settingnewrecordseveryyearto2030:bymidcenturytheircombinedshareofthesetwotechnologiesintheelectricitymixreaches45%intheSTEPSand60%intheAPS.Withintenyears,ifcountriesaretakingthenecessaryactiontodeliverontheircli
278、matepledges,theworldwillbedeployingaround210gigawatts(GW)ofwindcapacityeachyearand370GWofsolar.Thebalanceofdeploymentvariesbyregionandcountry.IntheUnitedStatesandIndia,forexample,solarPVbecomestheleadingtechnology.Bycontrast,theEuropeanUnionmovestowardsanelectricitysystemdominatedbyonshoreandoffshor
279、ewind,withbothsourcescombinedaccountingformorethan40%oftotalgenerationin2050intheSTEPSandover50%intheAPSandNZEScenario.The huge rise in the share of solar PV and wind in total generation in all scenariosfundamentallyreshapesthepowersystemandsignificantlyincreasesthedemandforpowersystemflexibilitytom
280、aintainelectricitysecurity.Thisputsapremiumondispatchablelowemissionstechnologies,suchashydropower,bioenergyandgeothermal.Italsoencouragesnewapproachessuchasthecofiringofammoniaincoalplantsandlowemissionshydrogeninnaturalgasplants,aswellassomeretrofitsofexistingpowerplantswithcarboncapture,utilisati
281、onandstorage(CCUS).RegionswithhighsharesofsolarPVrelativetowindtendtoseehigherrelativelevelsofbatterydeploymentthanregionsinwhichwindpredominates,suchasChinaortheEuropeanUnion,becausetheshortdurationstoragethatbatteriesprovideiswellsuitedtosmoothoutthedailycycleofsolarPVbasedelectricitygeneration.Re
282、gionswherewindistheleadingpowergenerationtechnologytendtorelyonawiderrangeofsourcesofflexibility.Investmentinnuclearpowerisalsocomingbackintofavourinsomecountries.Therehavebeen announcements of lifetime extensions for existing reactors,often as part of theresponsetothecurrentcrisis,aswellasannouncem
283、entsofnewconstruction,forexampleinJapanandFrance.Worldwide,thelargestnewbuildnuclearprogrammeisinChinaasitworkstowardsitsgoalofcarbonneutralityby2060.Thereisgrowinginterestinthepotentialfor small modular reactors to contribute to emissions reductions and power systemreliability.Theshareofnuclearinth
284、egenerationmixremainsbroadlywhereitistodayaround10%inallscenarios.Criticalmineralsareafundamentalpartoftheenergyandelectricitysecuritylandscape.Demandforcriticalmineralsforcleanenergytechnologiesissettorisetwotofourfoldby2030(dependingonthescenario)asaresultoftheexpandingdeploymentofrenewables,IEA.C
285、C BY 4.0.48 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 EVs,batterystorageandelectricitynetworks(Figure1.11).Copperuseseesthelargestincreaseintermsofabsolutevolumes,withcurrentdemandofaround6milliontonnes(Mt)peryearincreasingto11Mtby2030intheAPSand16MtintheNZEScenario,butothercriticalminer
286、alsexperiencefasterratesofdemandgrowth,notablysilverandsiliconforsolarPV,rareearthelementsforwindturbinemotorsandlithiumforbatteries.Boththeextractionandprocessingofcriticalmineralsarehighlyconcentratedgeographically:unlesstheneedforstrongerresilienceanddiversityinsupplychainsisaddressed,thereisaris
287、kthattheincreasinguseandimportanceofcriticalmineralscouldbecomeabottleneckforcleanenergydeployment.Figure 1.11 Mineral requirements for clean energy technologies by scenario,2021 and 2030 IEA.CCBY4.0.Mineral requirements for clean energy technologies quadruple to 2030 in the NZE Scenario,with partic
288、ularly high growth for materials for electric vehicles Notes:Mt=milliontonnes;EVs=electricvehicles.Includesmostofthemineralsusedinvariouscleanenergytechnologies,butdoesnotincludesteelandaluminium.SeeIEA(2021b)forafulllistofmineralsassessed.Recyclingisanimportantandforthemomentunderutilisedoptiontore
289、ducecriticalminerals demand:95%of solar panel components by mass are recyclable,and thepercentageforwindturbinesissimilar.IntheNZEScenario,annualcapacityretirementsforsolarPVrisefrom3GWin2030to400GWin2050,andforwindturbinesfrom16GWto240GWoverthesameperiod.Furtherpolicyeffortsareneededtoboostrecyclin
290、gandensurethatthesolarpanelsandwindturbinesreachingtheendoftheirlifedonotendupinlandfills.OtheruntappedopportunitiesforreuseandrecyclingincludespentEVbatteries,whichcanretainlargeamountsofunusedenergythatnolongermeetthestandardsforuseinavehicle;spentEVbatteriestypicallymaintainabout80%oftheirtotalus
291、ablecapacity.1STEPSAPSNZEHydrogenElectricityEVsandNuclearWindSolarPVBytechnologyMt2030storageandotherrenewables1STEPSAPSNZEMtOtherCobaltManganeseLithiumGraphiteNickelCopper2030BymineralIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 49 1Whilenotincreasingatthescaleoflowemissi
292、onselectricity,theprospectsforlowemissionsfuelsarebrightening,withbiogasesandlowemissionshydrogeninparticulargettingaboostfromthecurrentenergycrisis.IntheAPS,globallowemissionshydrogenproductionrisesfromverylowlevelstodaytoreach30milliontonnesofhydrogen(MtH2)peryearin2030.Thisisequivalentto100bcmofn
293、aturalgas(althoughnotalllowemissionshydrogenwouldreplacenaturalgasuse).Moreambitiousproductiontargetsarealsobeingsetinmanycountries for biogases and biomethane.Efforts to promote the use of hydrogen areconcentratedinEuropeandtheUnitedStates,butothercountriesarealsoactiveinthisfield:Japan,forexample,
294、aimsfora20%rateofcofiringimportedammoniaatitscoalfiredpowerplantsby2030,andthiswillrequire0.5MtH2peryear.Liquidfuelsarederivinglessbenefitfromcurrentmarketconditions:disruptiontofoodsupplychainsandhighfertiliserpricesmeanliquidbiofuelcostshaverisensharply.Toavoidconflictsbetweenfoodproductionandaffo
295、rdability,thereisageneralshiftinplanningforenergytransitionsawayfromconventionalbioenergysourcestowardsadvancedbiofuels,andaparticularfocusontwoinputs:sustainablewastestreamsthatdonotrequirespecificlanduseanddedicatedshortrotationwoodycropsgrownoncropland,pasturelandandmarginallandsthatarenotsuitedt
296、ofoodcrops.IntheNZEScenario,thereisnoincreaseincroplanduseforbioenergyandnobioenergycropsaregrownonexistingforestedland.Liquidbiofuelsincreasefrom2.2millionbarrelsofoilequivalentperday(mboe/d)in2021to3.4mboe/dintheSTEPS,5.5mboe/dintheAPSand5.7mboe/dintheNZEScenarioin2030.Aviationandshippingarethelar
297、gestcontributorstotheriseinliquidbiofueldemandintheAPSandNZEScenarioasroadtransportisincreasinglyelectrified.NaturalgasTheeraofrapidgrowthinnaturalgasseemstobedrawingtoaclose.IntheSTEPS,demandrisesbylessthan5%between2021and2030andthenremainsflatataround4400bcmthroughto2050.Thisisabout750bcmlowerin20
298、50thaninthecorrespondingscenariointheWEO2021(Figure1.12).Higherneartermprices,morerapidelectrificationofheatdemand,fasteruptakeofotherflexibilityoptionsinthepowersectorandinsomecasesrelianceoncoalforslightlylongeralldampentheoutlookforgas.Newpolicyinitiativesalsoplayanimportantpart:forexample,thesup
299、portprovidedforavarietyofcleanenergytechnologiesbytheUSInflationReductionActisakeyreasonwhynaturalgasdemandintheUnitedStatesisaround250bcmlowerbymidcentury,comparedwiththeSTEPSintheWEO2021.RussiasinvasionofUkraineanditscutsingassupplytotheEuropeanUnionalsoaccelerateEuropesstructuralshiftawayfromnatu
300、ralgas.InboththeSTEPSandAPS,naturalgaspricesinimportingcountriesinEuropeandAsiaremainhighoverthenextfewyearsasEuropesdrivetoreducerelianceonRussianimportskeepsglobalgasmarketstightduringarelativelybarrenperiodforlargenewgasexportprojects.Arebalancingcomeslaterinthe2020swhenslowerdemandgrowthcoincide
301、swithnewsupplyprojectscomingonline.Butthiscrisishasundercutmomentumbehindnaturalgas expansion in some large potential markets in south and southeast Asia and put aIEA.CC BY 4.0.50 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2022 significantdentintheideaofgasasatransitionfuel.Globally,aroundoneq
302、uarterofthedownwardrevisiontogasdemandto2030inthisyearsSTEPSisduetolessswitchingfromcoalandoiltonaturalgas,butmostofitreflectsacceleratedswitchingfromnaturalgastocleanenergy.IntheNZEScenario,naturalgasdemandfallsfurtherandfasterthanintheSTEPSandAPS,decliningto3300bcmin2030and1200bcmin2050.Around1900
303、bcmequivalent of lowemissions gases hydrogen,biogases and synthetic methane areconsumedgloballyintheNZEScenarioin2050.Figure 1.12 Drivers of change in natural gas demand in the WEO-2022 STEPS relative to the WEO-2021 STEPS IEA.CCBY4.0.Natural gas demand in this years STEPS is around 750 bcm lower in
304、 2050 than in the WEO-2021,driven mainly by switching from natural gas to renewables Note:bcm=billioncubicmetres.Inallourscenarios,theEuropeanUnioncompensatesforthelossofRussianimportswithanacceleratedtransitionawayfromnaturalgasthroughasurgeinrenewablecapacityadditionsandapushtoretrofitbuildingsand
305、installheatpumps,alongsideanincreasedneartermcallonnonRussiansupply,notablyviaLNG.AdditionalannualcleanenergyinvestmentofsomeUSD65billionto2030intheAPSismorethanoffsetovertimebylowernaturalgasimportcosts.MeanwhiletherearenoeasydiversificationoptionsfortheRussiangastraditionallyexportedtoEurope.Thebr
306、oadergassecuritylandscapeisdefinedbythreekeyquestions.Firstconcernstheroleofgasintheelectricitymarket.Gasaccountedfor23%ofglobalelectricitygenerationin2021andthissharedeclinesinallscenarios,albeitnotasprecipitouslyasthatofcoal.Butdeclinesin the volume of gas consumed for power generation do not impl
307、y a commensuratereductioninthevalueofgastoelectricitysecurity:naturalgasfiredcapacityremainsacriticalsourceofpowersystemflexibilityinmanymarkets,especiallytocoverforseasonal800600400200203020402050bcmMoregastorenewablesswitchingLesscoalandoiltogasswitchingAvoideddemandIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overvie
308、w and key findings 51 1variationsindemand.Europesgasstoragecontinuestoplayavitalrole:theshareofgasstoredtototalgasdemandin2030intheAPSissimilartothesharein2021.Secondconcernsthelevelofinvestment.Gasinfrastructureinvestmentsarecapitalintensiveand typically pay back over decades;they are therefore vul
309、nerable to uncertaintiesconcerninglongtermdemand.ThishasalreadybeenastumblingblockforgasdiversificationeffortsinEurope:mostpotentialsuppliersarelookingforlongtermcommitments,whichEuropeanbuyersareunwillingtoprovidebecausestrongneartermneedsareunlikelytobesustainedintothe2030s.Andasimilardilemmamayco
310、metoAsia.ThecommercialcasefornewLNGinvestmentsintheAPSisundercutbyfallingimportdemandinemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomiesinAsiainthe2040sandbeyond.Shorteningeconomiclifetimestotenyearswouldreducetheriskofnewcapacityadditionsturningintostrandedassets,butitwouldalsoincreasethebreakevengaspriceneeded
311、tofullyrecoupinvestmentcostsbyaround20%onaverage.Ashifttolowemissionshydrogenandhydrogenbasedfuelscouldprovideapartialanswertothisdilemma,butisunlikelytoofferacompletesolution.Thethirdquestionconcernsflexibilityofdelivery.Around50%ofcurrentglobalLNGtrade,250bcm,isflexibleinthesenseofhavingitsenddest
312、inationdeterminedcargobycargobyprice competition at a late stage:the rest is governed by fixed pointtopoint deliveryarrangements.Thecurrentenergycrisishasillustratedthisflexibilitywell,withhighpricesinEuropeincentivisingamajorinfluxofcargoestomeetthecontinentsshortfallingas,albeitattheexpenseofgasim
313、porterselsewhere,notablyamongdevelopingcountriesinAsia.However,whileflexibilityonthesupplysideislikelytobeunderpinnedbyafurtherriseinLNGexportsfromtheUnitedStates(facilitatedbythereductionsindomesticdemandarisingfromtheInflationReductionAct),thereareopenquestionsaboutflexibilityonthedemandside.Thepo
314、wersectoristypicallyanimportantproviderofflexibility,asutilitiesoftenhavetheabilitytoswitchtootherfuelsifgasbecomestoocostly.Butthephaseoutofcoalwillreducethisflexibility:asaresult,gasdemandinEuropeinparticularislikelytobecomelessresponsivetoprice,anddemandsideflexibilityislikelytobecomeconcentrated
315、inothermarkets,notablyinChina.OilOildemandpeaksineachscenariointhisOutlook.IntheSTEPS,demandreachesahighpointinthemid2030sat103mb/dandthendeclinesverygentlyto2050.GlobalgasolinedemandpeaksintheneartermandfallsasEVsdeploy.Demandinadvancedeconomiesdeclinesby3mb/dto2030,mainlybecauseofreductionsinroadt
316、ransport,butthisismorethanoffsetbyincreasesinemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomieswheredemandrisesby8mb/dthisdecade.Globally,themainsectorsseeinganincreaseintheuseofoilareaviationandshipping,petrochemicals(whereoilisusedasfeedstock),andheavytrucks,whereoilisusedasafuelandnotdisplacedbytheriseofEVsint
317、hesamewayasinotherroadtransportmodes.Thesesectorsseeariseindemandofaround16mb/dbetween2021and2050,butfrom the mid2030s growth in these sectors is more than offset by declining oil useelsewhere,especiallyinpassengercars,buildingsandpowergeneration.IEA.CC BY 4.0.52 International Energy Agency|World En
318、ergy Outlook 2022 ThereisnoshortageofoilresourcesworldwidetocoverthislevelofdemandintheSTEPSto2050;akeyuncertaintyforoilsecurityrelatestotheadequacyofinvestment.TheimpactoftheCovid19pandemicandthelowlevelofinvestmentinrecentyearsmeantherearerelatively few new resources under development and a dwindl
319、ing stock of discoveredresourcesinthenonOPECworldavailabletobedeveloped.Newoilresourcesdiscoveredin2021wereattheirlowestlevelsincethe1930s.Moreover,thereareconcernsinsomequarters in several nonOPEC countries about the commercial wisdom and socialacceptabilityofembarkingonsignificanthighupstreamcapit
320、alexpenditure.TheSTEPSseesneartermincreasesinoutputintheUnitedStates,GuyanaandBrazil,amongothers,butrelianceonmajorresourceholdersintheMiddleEastgrowssteadily:theshareofOPECcountriesinglobaloilproductionrisesfrom35%in2021to36%in2030and43%in2050,implyinganincreasingdegreeofmarketpowerforthatgroupofpr
321、oducers.Persistentunderproductioninrecentyearsamongthisgroup,relativetothetargetedlevels,maybeaharbingeroftherisksthatlieahead.TheoutlookforoilisverydifferentintheAPS,wherestrongerpolicyactionleadsglobaloildemandtopeakinthemid2020sbeforedroppingto93mb/din2030(similartothelevelofdemandin2019).Oildema
322、ndinadvancedeconomiesfallsby7.5mb/dbetween2021and2030andincreasesby4mb/dinemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies.ItisdifferentagainintheNZEScenario,whereglobaloildemandneverrecoverstoits2019levelandfallsbynearly20mb/dbetween2021and2030,ledbyasharpdeclineinoiluseinpassengercars(Figure1.13).Figure 1.13
323、Energy use in transport by scenario,2000-2050 IEA.CCBY4.0.Transport has long been the bedrock of oil demand,but its role weakens in the APS and NZE Scenario as electricity displaces very large volumes of oil Note:mboe/d=millionbarrelsofoilequivalentperday.0702000200402050Oilpro
324、ductsElectricityBiofuelsHydrogenHydrogenbasedfuelsNaturalgasSTEPSmboe/d2020203020402050APS2020203020402050NZEIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 53 1ThesetwoscenarioseasetherisksonthesupplysidethatariseintheSTEPS,but,despitetodaysscrambleforoilproducts,theyimplyseverelongtermpressuresf
325、orrefiners.IntheAPS,morethanhalfofcurrentrefiningcapacityfacestheriskoflowerutilisationorclosureby2050,andtherearefewcapacityadditionsafterprojectscurrentlyunderconstructioncome online.Those refiners that survive,invest to reduce emissions from refiningoperations,notablyvialowemissionshydrogen,CCUSa
326、ndefficiencyimprovements.Theyalsoviewintegrationwithpetrochemicaloperationsasamajorstrategicpriority,giventhattheuseofoilasapetrochemicalfeedstockisthemostdurableelementofdemand.Itwastheonlyuseofoilthatincreasedin2020amidthedisruptionoftheCovid19pandemic,anddemandremainsrelativelyrobusteveninveryrap
327、idtransitions:intheNZEScenario,oiluseforpassengercarsfallsby98%betweentodayand2050,butoiluseforpetrochemicalsfallsbyonly10%,despitepoliciestobanorreducesingleuseplastics,improverecyclingratesandpromotealternativefeedstocks.Thisisnottosaythatthesepolicieshavenoeffects:globalaveragerecyclingratesforpl
328、asticsincreasefromthecurrentlevelof17%to27%in2050intheSTEPS,50%intheAPS,and54%intheNZEScenario.2Manyrefinersarenowconsideringexpansionintoplasticsrecyclingasanotherwaytosecurenewrevenuestreams,alongsideareassuchasliquidbiofuelsandlowemissionshydrogen.CoalCoalconsumptionisprojectedtofallinallscenario
329、s,decliningby10%to2030intheSTEPS,by20%intheAPSoverthesameperiod,andby45%intheNZEScenario.Inthenearterm,coaldemandincreasesastheenergycrisisleadstosomeswitchingawayfromnaturalgasbecauseofconcernsabouthighpricesandavailability.Asaresult,coaldemandintheSTEPSishigherin2030thaninthesamescenariointheWEO20
330、21.Thisincreaseindemand,however,isrelativelyshortlived:intheSTEPS,coaldemandislowerin2030thanitistoday(althoughnotaslowasprojectedintheSTEPSintheWEO2021).Byandlarge,thecurrentcrisispushesuputilisationratesforexistingcoalfiredassets,butdoesnotbringhigherinvestmentinnewones.Thisamountofadditionalcapac
331、ity,however,doesprolongtheperioduntilglobalcoalfiredcapacitypeaks(2025intheSTEPS).Inadditiontoincreaseddemandinthepowersector,coalseesariseindemandinindustryinemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies,whereitalreadyaccountsfor35%ofenergyusedbyindustry.Thesetrendsinpowerandindustrykeepcoaldemandaroundtoda
332、yselevated levels to the mid2020s,but structural decline sets in thereafter.Overall coalconsumptionshowsamoresustainedriseonlyinafewfastgrowingcountriesandregions,notablyIndiaandSoutheastAsia.InIndia,coaldemandintheSTEPSdoesnotpeakuntiltheearly2030s,whenthedeploymentofrenewablesinthepowersectorspeed
333、sup;intheAPS,thispeakoccursinthelate2020s,andthesubsequentdeclineincoaldemandisconsiderablysteeper.2Globally,17%ofplasticwasteiscollectedforrecyclingtodayalthoughtherearelargedifferencesbetweenregions:forexample,25%iscollectedforrecyclinginEuropeandlessthan10%intheUnitedStates.Recyclingratesforplasticsaremuchlowerthanrecyclingratesforsteel(80%),aluminium(80%)andpaper(60%).IEA.CC BY 4.0.54 Internat