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1、World EnergyOutlook 2023INTERNATIONAL ENERGYAGENCYIEA member countries:Australia Austria BelgiumCanadaCzech Republic DenmarkEstoniaFinland France Germany Greece HungaryIreland ItalyJapanKoreaLithuania Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand NorwayPoland Portugal Slovak Republic Spain Sweden Switze
2、rland Republic of Trkiye United Kingdom United StatesThe European Commission also participates in the work of the IEAIEA association countries:Argentina BrazilChinaEgyptIndiaIndonesiaKenyaMoroccoSenegalSingaporeSouth AfricaThailandUkraineThe IEA examines the full spectrum of energy issues including
3、oil,gas and coal supply and demand,renewable energy technologies,electricity markets,energy efficiency,access to energy,demand side management and much more.Through its work,the IEA advocates policies that will enhance the reliability,affordability and sustainability of energy in its 31 member count
4、ries,13 association countries and beyond.Please note that this publication is subject to specific restrictions that limit its use and distribution.The terms and conditions are available online at www.iea.org/termsThis publication and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or
5、sovereignty over any territory,to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory,city or area.Source:IEA.International Energy Agency Website:www.iea.orgIn memory of Robert Priddle(1938-2023)Executive Director of the International Energy Agency from 1994 t
6、o 2002.Foreword 5 Foreword Today,50 years on from the oil shock that led to the founding of the International Energy Agency(IEA),the world once again faces a moment of high geopolitical tensions and uncertainty for the energy sector.There are parallels between then and now,with oil supplies in focus
7、 amid a crisis in the Middle East but there are also key differences:the global energy system has changed considerably since the early 1970s and further changes are taking place rapidly before our eyes.One thing that hasnt changed since the 1970s is the IEAs commitment to its core mission of safegua
8、rding energy security.As we have demonstrated throughout the global energy crisis that erupted in February 2022,the IEA is ready to respond quickly and effectively to sudden disruptions in energy markets.At the same time,we continue to dedicate significant efforts to anticipating and addressing the
9、challenges that are evolving and emerging across the entire global energy system.This is an area where the data and analysis of the World Energy Outlook(WEO)are so valuable.With the insights of this new WEO in mind,I want to highlight some important differences between where the energy sector was 50
10、 years ago and where it is today.The 1973-74 crisis was all about oil,but todays pressures are coming from multiple areas.Alongside fragile oil markets,the world has seen an acute crisis in natural gas markets caused by Russias cuts to supply,which had strong knock-on effects on electricity.At the s
11、ame time,the world is dealing with an acute climate crisis,with increasingly visible effects of climate change caused by the use of fossil fuels,including the record-breaking heatwaves experienced around the world this year.A crisis with multiple dimensions requires solutions that are similarly all-
12、encompassing.Ultimately,what is required is not just to diversify away from a single energy commodity but to change the energy system itself,and to do so while maintaining the affordable and secure provision of energy services.The growing impacts of global warming make this all the more important,as
13、 an increasing amount of energy infrastructure that was built for a cooler,calmer climate is no longer reliable or resilient enough as temperatures rise and weather events become more extreme.In short,we have to transform the energy system both to stave off even more severe climate change and to cop
14、e with the climate change that is already with us.A second difference between the 1970s and today is that we already have the clean energy technologies for the job in hand.The 1973 oil shock was a major catalyst for change,driving a huge push to scale up energy efficiency and nuclear power.But it st
15、ill took many years to ramp them up while some other key technologies like wind and solar were still emerging.Today,solar,wind,efficiency and electric cars are all well established and readily available and their advantages are only being reinforced by turbulence among the traditional technologies.W
16、e have the lasting solutions to todays energy dilemmas at our disposal.IEA.CC B 4.0.6 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 The third difference is that clean energy transitions have real momentum at the moment.In the 1970s,many countries were going from a standing start as they scra
17、mbled to respond to the oil shock.As we show in this WEO,clean energy deployment is moving faster than many people realise.And it can and should go faster still for us to meet our shared energy and climate goals.In addition,we have international processes and accords in place today,such as the Paris
18、 Agreement,that provide an important framework for stronger action by governments.And one final difference is,unlike in 1973,we have the IEA.I firmly believe that the Agency has a crucial role to play by safeguarding against traditional energy security vulnerabilities,by anticipating new ones,and in
19、 the words of our most recent Ministerial mandates by“leading the global energy sectors fight against climate change”.The world is much better prepared than we were 50 years ago.We know what we need to do and where we need to go.At the same time,the challenges are much broader and more complex energ
20、y security and climate are interwoven,and claiming that we need to focus on just one or the other is a blinkered view.We can still learn from the response to the oil shock of 1973 and from the approach that led to the Paris Agreement of 2015:governments must work together to address our major common
21、 challenges because a patchwork of individual efforts will fall short.We need to co-ordinate and co-operate those in the lead and with greater resources need to help those further behind who have less.Each country must find its own path,but it still needs some signposts along the way.This WEO highli
22、ghts,once again,the choices that can move the energy system in a safer and more sustainable direction.I encourage decision makers around the world to take this reports findings into account in the lead-up to the COP28 climate change conference in Dubai later this year and beyond.I would like to comm
23、end my IEA colleagues who worked so hard on this WEO alongside many other key reports,activities and events for all their efforts,under the outstanding leadership of Laura Cozzi and Tim Gould.We have chosen to dedicate this edition to a longtime friend of the WEO and leading figure in the history of
24、 the IEA,our former Executive Director Mr Robert Priddle,who sadly passed away in September.After serving as Executive Director between 1994 and 2002,Mr Priddle continued to make a major contribution for many years as editor of the WEO.In this role,his deep understanding of energy and geopolitical m
25、atters,as well as his exceptional communication skills,raised our work to a new level.We will miss him greatly.Dr Fatih Birol Executive Director International Energy Agency IEA.CC BY 4.0.Acknowledgements 7 Acknowledgements This study was prepared by the World Energy Outlook(WEO)team in the Directora
26、te of Sustainability,Technology and Outlooks(STO)in co-operation with other directorates and offices of the International Energy Agency(IEA).The study was designed and directed by Laura Cozzi,Director,Sustainability,Technology and Outlooks,and Tim Gould,Chief Energy Economist.The modelling and analy
27、tical teams for the World Energy Outlook-2023 were led by Stphanie Bouckaert(demand),Christophe McGlade(lead on Chapter 4,supply),Thomas Spencer(climate and environment),Cecilia Tam(investment and finance),Brent Wanner(power)and Daniel Wetzel(sustainable transitions).Key contributions from across th
28、e WEO team were from:Oskaras Alauskas(transport),Caleigh Andrews(employment),Yasmine Arsalane(lead on Chapter 5,lead on economic outlook,power),Blandine Barreau(government spending),Simon Bennett(lead on hydrogen,energy technologies),Charlne Bisch(data management),Eric Buisson(critical minerals),Oli
29、via Chen(lead on buildings,equity),Yunyou Chen(power),Jonathan Coppel(economic outlook),Daniel Crow(lead on climate modelling,behaviour),Julie Dallard(power,flexibility),Davide DAmbrosio(lead on data science,power),Amrita Dasgupta(critical minerals),Tanguy De Bienassis(investment and finance),Toms D
30、e Oliveira Bredariol(lead on methane,coal),Nouhoun Diarra(access),Michael Drtil(power,electricity networks),Darlain Edeme(Africa),Musa Erdogan(fossil fuel subsidies,data management),Eric Fabozzi(power,electricity networks),Vctor Garca Tapia(buildings,data science),Emma Gordon(Africa),Alexandra Hegar
31、ty(methane),Jrme Hilaire(lead on oil and gas supply modelling),Paul Hugues(lead on industry),Bruno Idini(employment),Hyeji Kim(transport),Tae-Yoon Kim(lead on critical minerals,energy security),Martin Kueppers(industry,decomposition analysis),Yannick Monschauer(lead on affordability),Alessio Pastore
32、(power,electricity networks),Diana Perez Sanchez(industry,affordability),Apostolos Petropoulos(lead on transport),Ryszard Pospiech(lead on coal supply modelling,data management),Alana Rawlins Bilbao(investment and finance),Arthur Roge(agriculture,data science),Gabriel Saive(climate pledges),Max Scho
33、enfisch(power,electricity security),Siddharth Singh(lead on Chapter 5,lead on regional analysis),Leonie Staas(buildings,behaviour),Carlo Starace(Africa),Matthieu Suire(demand-side response),Jun Takashiro(lead on fossil fuel subsidies),Ryota Taniguchi(power),Gianluca Tonolo(lead on energy access),Ant
34、hony Vautrin(buildings,demand-side response),Peter Zeniewski(lead on Chapter 3,lead on gas,energy security).Other contributions were from:Abdullah Al-Abri,Emile Belin-Bourgogne,France dAgrain,David Fischer,Paul Grimal,Marco Iarocci,Yun Young Kim,Alice Latella,Carson Maconga,Ana Morgado,Rebecca Ruff
35、and Natalia Triunfo.Marina Dos Santos,Eleni Tsoukala and Reka Koczka provided essential support.Edmund Hosker carried editorial responsibility.Debra Justus was the copy-editor.IEA.CC BY 4.0.8 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 Colleagues from the Energy Technology Policy(ETP)Divis
36、ion led by Timur Gl,Chief Energy Technology Officer,co-led on modelling and analysis,with overall guidance from Araceli Fernandez Pales and Uwe Remme.Peter Levi,Tiffany Vass,Alexandre Gouy,Leonardo Collina,Richard Simon,Faidon Papadimoulis contributed to the analysis on industry.Elizabeth Connelly,J
37、acob Teter,Shane McDonagh,Mathilde Huismans contributed to the analysis on transport.Chiara Delmastro,Rafael Martnez-Gordn contributed to the analysis on buildings.Jos Miguel Bermdez Menndez,Stavroula Evangelopoulou,Francesco Pavan and Amalia Pizarro contributed to the analysis on hydrogen.Praveen B
38、ains contributed to the analysis on biofuels.Other key contributors from across the IEA were:Heymi Bahar,Carlos Fernndez Alvarez and Jeremy Moorhouse.Valuable comments and feedback were provided by other senior management and numerous other colleagues within the IEA.In particular,Mary Warlick,Dan Do
39、rner,Toril Bosoni,Joel Couse,Paolo Frankl,Dennis Hesseling,Brian Motherway and Hiroyasu Sakaguchi.Thanks go to the IEAs Communications and Digital Office for their help in producing the report and website materials,particularly to Jethro Mullen,Poeli Bojorquez,Curtis Brainard,Jon Custer,Hortense de
40、Roffignac,Astrid Dumond,Merve Erdil,Grace Gordon,Julia Horowitz,Oliver Joy,Isabelle Nonain-Semelin,Julie Puech,Robert Stone,Sam Tarling,Clara Vallois,Lucile Wall,Therese Walsh and Wonjik Yang.IEAs Office of the Legal Counsel,Office of Management and Administration and Energy Data Centre provided ass
41、istance throughout the preparation of the report.Valuable input to the analysis was provided by David Wilkinson(independent consultant).Support for the modelling of air pollution and associated health impacts was provided by Peter Rafaj,Gregor Kiesewetter,Laura Warnecke,Katrin Kaltenegger,Jessica Sl
42、ater,Chris Heyes,Wolfgang Schpp,Fabian Wagner and Zbigniew Klimont(International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis).Valuable input to the modelling and analysis of greenhouse gas emissions from land use,agriculture and bioenergy production was provided by Nicklas Forsell,Zuelclady Araujo Gutier
43、rez,Andrey Lessa-Derci-Augustynczik,Stefan Frank,Pekka Lauri,Mykola Gusti and Petr Havlk(International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis).Advice related to the modelling of global climate impacts was provided by Jared Lewis,Zebedee Nicholls(Climate Resource)and Malte Meinshausen(Climate Resourc
44、e and University of Melbourne).The work could not have been achieved without the support and co-operation provided by many government bodies,organisations and companies worldwide,notably:Enel;Eni;European Commission(Directorate General for Climate and Directorate General for Energy);Hitachi Energy;I
45、berdrola;Japan(Ministry of Economy,Trade and Industry,and Ministry of Foreign Affairs);The Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the Earth,Japan;and Swiss Federal Office of Energy.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Acknowledgements 9 The IEA Clean Energy Transitions Programme,the IEA flagship initiative to tra
46、nsform the worlds energy system to achieve a secure and sustainable future for all,supported this analysis.Thanks also go to the IEA Energy Business Council,the IEA Coal Industry Advisory Board,the IEA Energy Efficiency Industry Advisory Board,the IEA Renewable Industry Advisory Board and the IEA Fi
47、nance Industry Advisory Board.Peer reviewers Many senior government officials and international experts provided input and reviewed preliminary drafts of the report.Their comments and suggestions were of great value.They include:Keigo Akimoto Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the Earth
48、,Japan Doug Arent National Renewable Energy Laboratory,United States Papa Samba Ba Ministre du Ptrole et des Energies,Sngal Manuel Baritaud European Investment Bank Marco Baroni Enel Foundation Harmeet Bawa Hitachi Energy Christian Besson Independent consultant Jorge Blazquez BP Stefan Bouzarovski U
49、niversity of Manchester Mick Buffier Glencore Nick Butler Kings College London Rebecca Collyer European Climate Foundation Russell Conklin US Department of Energy Anne-Sophie Corbeau Columbia University Ian Cronshaw Independent consultant Franois Dassa EDF Jonathan Elkind Columbia University Jason F
50、arr Oxfam David Fritsch US Energy Information Administration Hiroyuki Fukui Toyota Mike Fulwood Nexant David G.Hawkins Natural Resources Defense Council Tim Goodson Independent consultant Francesca Gostinelli ENEL Yuya Hasegawa Ministry of Economy,Trade and Industry,Japan IEA.CC B 4.0.10 Internation
51、al Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 Sara Hastings-Simon University of Calgary Laury Haytayan Natural Resource Gouvernance Institute Masazumi Hirono Tokyo Gas Takashi Hongo Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute,Japan Jan-Hein Jesse JOSCO Energy Finance and Strategy Consultancy Sohbet Karbu
52、z Mediterranean Observatory for Energy Rafael Kawecki Siemens Energy Michael Kelly World LPG Association Msizi Khoza Absa Group Ken Koyama Institute of Energy Economics,Japan Atsuhito Kurozumi Kyoto University of Foreign Studies,Japan Joyce Lee Global Wind Energy Council Li Jiangtao State Grid Energ
53、y Research Institute,China Thomas-Olivier Lautier TotalEnergies Pierre-Laurent Lucille Engie Ritu Mathur NITI Aayog,Government of India Felix Chr.Matthes ko-Institut Institute for Applied Ecology,Germany Malte Meinshausen University of Melbourne,Australia Antonio Merino Garcia Repsol Tatiana Mitrova
54、 SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy Christopher Moghtader UK Department for Business,Energy and Industrial Strategy Isabel Murray Department of Natural Resources,Canada Steve Nadel American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy,United States Jan Petter Nore Norad Thomas Nowak European Heat Pump A
55、ssociation Pak Yongduk Korea Energy Economics Institute Demetrios Papathanasiou World Bank Ignacio Prez Arriaga Comillas Pontifical Universitys Institute for Research in Technology,Spain Andrea Pescatori International Monetary Fund Glen Peters CICERO Cdric Philibert French Institute of International
56、 Relations,Centre for Energy&Climate Vicki Pollard Directorate-General for Climate Action,European Commission Andrew Purvis World Steel Association IEA.CC B 4.0.Acknowledgements 11 Julia Reinaud Breakthrough Energy Oliver Reynolds Global Off-Grid Lighting Association Nick Robins Grantham Research In
57、stitute Jay Rutovitz University of Technology Sydney Yamina Saheb OpenEXP,IPCC author Ana Beln Snchez Institute for the Just Transition,Spain Hans-Wilhelm Schiffer World Energy Council Jesse Scott Deutsches Institut fr Wirtschaftsforschung (German Institute for Economic Research)Adnan Shihab-Eldin I
58、ndependent consultant Rebekah Shirley World Resources Institute Maria Sicilia Enags Paul Simons Yale University Gurdeep Singh National Thermal Power Corporation Limited Jim Skea Imperial College London,IPCC Co-Chair Working Group III Jonathan Stern Oxford Institute for Energy Studies,United Kingdom
59、Miguel Gil Tertre Directorate General for Energy,European Commission Wim Thomas Independent consultant Rahul Tongia Centre for Social and Economic Progess,India Nikos Tsafos General Secretariat of the Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic Adair Turner Energy Transitions Commission James Turnure US
60、 Energy Information Administration Fridtjof Fossum Unander Aker Horizons No Van Hulst International Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the Economy David Victor University of California,San Diego,United States Andrew Walker Cheniere Energy Charles Weymuller EDF Kelvin Wong DBS Bank Christian
61、Zinglersen European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators IEA.CC B 4.0.12 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 The work reflects the views of the International Energy Agency Secretariat,but does not necessarily reflect those of individual IEA member countries or of a
62、ny particular funder,supporter or collaborator.None of the IEA or any funder,supporter or collaborator that contributed to this work makes any representation or warranty,express or implied,in respect of the works contents(including its completeness or accuracy)and shall not be responsible for any us
63、e of,or reliance on,the work.This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory,to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory,city or area.Comments and questions are welcome and should be
64、 addressed to:Laura Cozzi and Tim Gould Directorate of Sustainability,Technology and Outlooks International Energy Agency 9,rue de la Fdration 75739 Paris Cedex 15 France E-mail:weoiea.org More information about the World Energy Outlook is available at www.iea.org/weo.IEA.CC B 4.0.Table of Contents
65、13 Table of Contents Foreword.5 Acknowledgements.7 Executive summary.17 Overview and key findings 23 Introduction.25 1.1 A peak by 2030 for each of the fossil fuels.26 1.1.1 Coal:Scaling up clean power hastens the decline.27 1.1.2 Oil:End of the“ICE age”turns prospects around.28 1.1.3 Natural gas:En
66、ergy crisis marks the end of the“Golden Age”.29 1.2 A slowdown in economic growth in China would have huge implications for energy markets.31 1.2.1 Chinas growth has defined the energy world in recent decades.31 1.2.2 Integrating a slowdown in Chinas economy into the STEPS.32 1.2.3 Sensitivities in
67、the Outlook.35 1.3 A boom of solar manufacturing could be a boon for the world.36 1.3.1 Solar module manufacturing and trade.37 1.3.2 Solar PV deployment could scale up faster to accelerate transitions 38 1.4 Pathway to a 1.5 C limit on global warming is very tough,but it remains open.42 1.4.1 Four
68、reasons for hope.42 1.4.2 Four areas requiring urgent attention.46 1.5 Capital flows are gaining pace,but not reaching the areas of greatest need 49 1.5.1 Fossil fuels.50 1.5.2 Clean energy.51 1.6 Transitions have to be affordable.52 1.6.1 Affordability for households.53 1.6.2 Affordability for indu
69、stry.55 1.6.3 Affordability for governments.57 1.7 Risks on the road to a more electrified future.59 1.7.1 Managing risks for rapid electrification.60 1.7.2 Critical minerals underpin electrification.62 1.8 A new,lower carbon pathway for emerging market and developing economies is taking shape.63 1
70、IEA.CC B 4.0.14 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 1.9 Geopolitical tensions undermine energy security and prospects for rapid,affordable transitions.68 1.9.1 Clean energy in a low-trust world.69 1.9.2 Fossil fuels in a low-trust world.71 1.9.3 Risks of new dividing lines.72 1.10
71、As the facts change,so do our projections.73 1.10.1 Solar PV and wind generation.75 1.10.2 Natural gas.77 Setting the scene 79 2.1 New context for the World Energy Outlook.81 2.1.1 New clean energy economy.84 2.1.2 Uneasy balance for oil,natural gas and coal markets.86 2.1.3 Key challenges for secur
72、e and just clean energy transitions.88 2.2 WEO scenarios.91 2.2.1 Policies.92 2.2.2 Economic and demographic assumptions.93 2.2.3 Energy,critical mineral and carbon prices.95 2.2.4 Technology costs.99 Pathways for the energy mix 101 3.1 Introduction.103 3.2 Overview.104 3.3 Total final energy consum
73、ption.107 3.3.1 Industry.108 3.3.2 Transport.113 3.3.3 Buildings.118 3.4 Electricity.123 3.5 Fuels.130 3.5.1 Oil.130 3.5.2 Natural gas.135 3.5.3 Coal.140 3.5.4 Modern bioenergy.145 3.6 Key clean energy technology trends.147 2 3 IEA.CC B 4.0.Table of Contents 15 Secure and people-centred energy trans
74、itions 155 4.1 Introduction.157 4.2 Environment and climate.158 4.2.1 Emissions trajectory and temperature outcomes.158 4.2.2 Methane abatement.161 4.2.3 Air quality.164 4.3 Secure energy transitions.166 4.3.1 Fuel security and trade.166 4.3.2 Electricity security.171 4.3.3 Clean energy supply chain
75、s and critical minerals.178 4.4 People-centred transitions.183 4.4.1 Energy access.183 4.4.2 Energy affordability.187 4.4.3 Energy employment.191 4.4.4 Behavioural change.193 4.5 Investment and finance needs.197 Regional insights 203 5.1 Introduction.205 5.2 United States.206 5.2.1 Key energy and em
76、issions trends.206 5.2.2 How much have the US Inflation Reduction Act and other recent policies changed the picture for clean energy transitions?.208 5.3 Latin America and the Caribbean.211 5.3.1 Key energy and emissions trends.211 5.3.2 What role for Latin America and the Caribbean in maintaining t
77、raditional oil and gas security through energy transitions?.213 5.3.3 Do critical minerals open new avenues for Latin America and the Caribbeans natural resources?.214 5.4 European Union.216 5.4.1 Key energy and emissions trends.216 5.4.2 Can the European Union deliver on its clean energy and critic
78、al materials targets?.218 5.4.3 What next for the natural gas balance in the European Union?.219 5.5 Africa.221 4 5 IEA.CC B 4.0.16 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 5.5.1 Key energy and emissions trends.221 5.5.2 Recharging progress towards universal energy access.223 5.5.3 What
79、 can be done to enhance energy investment in Africa?.224 5.6 Middle East.226 5.6.1 Key energy and emissions trends.226 5.6.2 Shifting fortunes for energy exports.228 5.6.3 How is the desalination sector changing in times of increasing water needs and the energy transition?.229 5.7 Eurasia.231 5.7.1
80、Key energy and emissions trends.231 5.7.2 Whats next for oil and gas exports from Eurasia?.233 5.8 China.236 5.8.1 Key energy and emissions trends.236 5.8.2 How soon will coal use peak in China?.238 5.9 India.241 5.9.1 Key energy and emissions trends.241 5.9.2 Impact of air conditioners on electrici
81、ty demand in India.243 5.9.3 Will domestic solar PV module manufacturing keep pace with solar capacity growth in India?.244 5.10 Japan and Korea.246 5.10.1 Key energy and emissions trends.246 5.10.2 Challenges and opportunities of nuclear and offshore wind.248 5.10.3 What role can hydrogen play in t
82、he energy mix and how can the governments deploy it?.249 5.11 Southeast Asia.251 5.11.1 Key energy and emissions trends.251 5.11.2 How can international finance accelerate clean energy transitions in Southeast Asia?.253 5.11.3 How can regional integration help integrate more renewables?.254 Annexes
83、Annex A.Tables for scenario projections.259 Annex B.Design of the scenarios.295 Annex C.Definitions.319 Annex D.References.339 Annex E.Inputs to the Global Energy and Climate Model.347 IEA.CC B 4.0.Executive Summary 17 Executive Summary The energy world remains fragile but has effective ways to impr
84、ove energy security and tackle emissions Some of the immediate pressures from the global energy crisis have eased,but energy markets,geopolitics,and the global economy are unsettled and the risk of further disruption is ever present.Fossil fuel prices are down from their 2022 peaks,but markets are t
85、ense and volatile.Continued fighting in Ukraine,more than a year after Russias invasion,is now accompanied by the risk of protracted conflict in the Middle East.The macro-economic mood is downbeat,with stubborn inflation,higher borrowing costs and elevated debt levels.Today,the global average surfac
86、e temperature is already around 1.2 C above pre-industrial levels,prompting heatwaves and other extreme weather events,and greenhouse gas emissions have not yet peaked.The energy sector is also the primary cause of the polluted air that more than 90%of the worlds population is forced to breathe,link
87、ed to more than 6 million premature deaths a year.Positive trends on improving access to electricity and clean cooking have slowed or even reversed in some countries.Against this complex backdrop,the emergence of a new clean energy economy,led by solar PV and electric vehicles(EVs),provides hope for
88、 the way forward.Investment in clean energy has risen by 40%since 2020.The push to bring down emissions is a key reason,but not the only one.The economic case for mature clean energy technologies is strong.Energy security is also an important factor,particularly in fuel-importing countries,as are in
89、dustrial strategies and the desire to create clean energy jobs.Not all clean technologies are thriving and some supply chains,notably for wind,are under pressure,but there are striking examples of an accelerating pace of change.In 2020,one in 25 cars sold was electric;in 2023,this is now one in 5.Mo
90、re than 500 gigawatts(GW)of renewables generation capacity are set to be added in 2023 a new record.More than USD 1 billion a day is being spent on solar deployment.Manufacturing capacity for key components of a clean energy system,including solar PV modules and EV batteries,is expanding fast.This m
91、omentum is why the IEA recently concluded,in its updated Net Zero Roadmap,that a pathway to limiting global warming to 1.5 C is very difficult but remains open.This new Outlook provides a strong evidence base to guide the choices that face energy decision makers in pursuit of transitions that are ra
92、pid,secure,affordable and inclusive.The analysis does not present a single view of the future but instead explores different scenarios that reflect current real-world conditions and starting points.The Stated Policies Scenario(STEPS)provides an outlook based on the latest policy settings,including e
93、nergy,climate and related industrial policies.The Announced Pledges Scenario(APS)assumes all national energy and climate targets made by governments are met in full and on time.Yet,much additional progress is still required to meet the objectives of the Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE)Scenario which
94、limits global warming to 1.5 C.Alongside our main scenarios,we explore some key uncertainties that could affect future trends,including structural changes in Chinas economy and the pace of global deployment of solar PV.IEA.CC B 4.0.18 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 We are on t
95、rack to see all fossil fuels peak before 2030 A legacy of the global energy crisis may be to usher in the beginning of the end of the fossil fuel era:the momentum behind clean energy transitions is now sufficient for global demand for coal,oil and natural gas to all reach a high point before 2030 in
96、 the STEPS.The share of coal,oil and natural gas in global energy supply stuck for decades around 80%starts to edge downwards and reaches 73%in the STEPS by 2030.This is an important shift.However,if demand for these fossil fuels remains at a high level,as has been the case for coal in recent years,
97、and as is the case in the STEPS projections for oil and gas,it is far from enough to reach global climate goals.Policies supporting clean energy are delivering as the projected pace of change picks up in key markets around the world.Thanks largely to the Inflation Reduction Act in the United States,
98、we now project that 50%of new US car registrations will be electric in 2030 in the STEPS.Two years ago,the corresponding figure in the WEO-2021 was 12%.In the European Union in 2030,heat pump installations in the STEPS reach two-thirds of the level needed in the NZE Scenario,compared with the one-th
99、ird projected two years ago.In China,projected additions of solar PV and offshore wind to 2030 are now three-times higher than they were in the WEO-2021.Prospects for nuclear power have also improved in leading markets,with support for lifetime extensions of existing nuclear reactors in countries in
100、cluding Japan,Korea and the United States,as well as for new builds in several more.Although demand for fossil fuels has been strong in recent years,there are signs of a change in direction.Alongside the deployment of low-emissions alternatives,the rate at which new assets that use fossil fuels are
101、being added to the energy system has slowed.Sales of cars and two/three-wheel vehicles with internal combustion engines are well below where they were before the Covid-19 pandemic.In the electricity sector,worldwide additions of coal-and natural gas-fired power plants have halved,at least,from earli
102、er peaks.Sales of residential gas boilers have been trending downwards and are now outnumbered by sales of heat pumps in many countries in Europe and in the United States.China has changed the energy world,but now China is changing China has an outsized role in shaping global energy trends;this infl
103、uence is evolving as its economy slows and its structure adjusts,and as clean energy use grows.Over the past ten years,China accounted for almost two-thirds of the rise in global oil use,nearly one-third of the increase in natural gas,and has been the dominant player in coal markets.But it is widely
104、 recognised,including by the countrys leadership,that Chinas economy is reaching an inflection point.After a very rapid building out of the countrys physical infrastructure,the scope for further additions is narrowing.The country already has a world-class high-speed rail network;and residential floo
105、rspace per capita is now equal to that of Japan,even though GDP per capita is much lower.This saturation points to lower future demand in many energy-intensive sectors like cement and steel.China is also a clean energy powerhouse,accounting for around half of wind and solar additions and well over h
106、alf of global EV sales in 2022.IEA.CC B 4.0.Executive Summary 19 Momentum behind Chinas economic growth is ebbing and there is greater downside potential for fossil fuel demand if it slows further.In our scenarios,Chinas GDP growth averages just under 4%per year to 2030.This results in its total ene
107、rgy demand peaking around the middle of this decade,with robust expansion of clean energy putting overall fossil fuel demand and emissions into decline.If Chinas near-term growth were to slow by another percentage point,this would reduce 2030 coal demand by an amount almost equal to the volume curre
108、ntly consumed by the whole of Europe.Oil import volumes would decline by 5%and LNG imports by more than 20%,with major implications for global balances.New dynamics for investment are taking shape The end of the growth era for fossil fuels does not mean an end to fossil fuel investment,but it underc
109、uts the rationale for any increase in spending.Until this year,meeting projected demand in the STEPS implied an increase in oil and gas investment over the course of this decade,but a stronger clean energy outlook and lower projected fossil fuel demand means this is no longer the case.However,invest
110、ment in oil and gas today is almost double the level required in the NZE Scenario in 2030,signalling a clear risk of protracted fossil fuel use that would put the 1.5 C goal out of reach.Simply cutting spending on oil and gas will not get the world on track for the NZE Scenario;the key to an orderly
111、 transition is to scale up investment in all aspects of a clean energy system.The development of a clean energy system and its effect on emissions can be reinforced by policies that ease the exit of inefficient,polluting assets,such as ageing coal plants,or that restrict the entry of new ones into t
112、he system.But the urgent challenge is to increase the pace of new clean energy projects,especially in many emerging and developing economies outside China,where investment in energy transitions needs to rise by more than five times by 2030 to reach the levels required in the NZE Scenario.A renewed e
113、ffort,including stronger international support,will be vital to tackle obstacles such as high costs of capital,limited fiscal space for government support and challenging business environments.Meeting development needs in a sustainable way is key to moving faster The global peaks in demand for each
114、of the three fossil fuels mask important differences across economies at different stages of development.The drivers for growth in demand for energy services in most emerging and developing economies remain very strong.Rates of urbanisation,built space per capita,and ownership of air conditioners an
115、d vehicles are far lower than in advanced economies.The global population is expected to grow by about 1.7 billion by 2050,almost all of which is added to urban areas in Asia and Africa.India is the worlds largest source of energy demand growth in the STEPS,ahead of Southeast Asia and Africa.Finding
116、 and financing low-emissions ways to meet rising energy demand in these economies is a vital determinant of the speed at which global fossil fuel use eventually falls.Clean electrification,improvements in efficiency and a switch to lower-and zero-carbon fuels are key levers available to emerging and
117、 developing economies to reach their national energy and climate targets.Getting on track to meet these targets,including net zero goals,has broad implications for future pathways.In India,it means every dollar of value added by IEA.CC B 4.0.20 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 I
118、ndias industry results in 30%less carbon dioxide(CO2)by 2030 than it does today,and each kilometre driven by a passenger car,on average,emits 25%less CO2.Some 60%of two-and three-wheelers sold in 2030 are electric,a share ten times higher than today.In Indonesia,the share of renewables in power gene
119、ration doubles by 2030 to more than 35%.In Brazil,biofuels meet 40%of road transport fuel demand by the end of the decade,up from 25%today.In sub-Saharan Africa,meeting diverse national energy and climate targets means that 85%of new power generation plants to 2030 are based on renewables.Significan
120、t progress is made towards universal access to modern energy,with some 670 million people gaining access to modern cooking fuels,and 500 million to electricity by 2030.Ample global manufacturing capacity offers considerable upside for solar PV Renewables are set to contribute 80%of new power capacit
121、y to 2030 in the STEPS,with solar PV alone accounting for more than half.However,this uses only a fraction of the worlds potential.Solar has become a major global industry and is set to transform electricity markets even in the STEPS.But there is significant scope for further growth given manufactur
122、ing plans and the technologys competitiveness.By the end of the decade,the world could have manufacturing capacity for more than 1 200 GW of panels per year.But in the STEPS,only 500 GW is deployed globally in 2030.Boosting deployment up from these levels raises some complex questions.It would requi
123、re measures notably expanding and strengthening grids and adding storage to integrate the additional solar PV into electricity systems and maximise its impact.Manufacturing capacity is also highly concentrated:China is already the largest producer and its expansion plans far outstrip those in other
124、countries.Trade,therefore,would continue to be vital to support worldwide deployment of solar.Using 70%of anticipated solar PV manufacturing capacity would bring deployment to the levels projected in the NZE Scenario;effectively integrated,this would further cut fossil fuel use first and foremost co
125、al.In a sensitivity case,we explore how the STEPS projections would change if the world added over 800 GW of new solar PV per year by 2030.The implications would be particularly strong for China,reducing coal-fired generation by a further 20%by 2030 compared with the STEPS.Without assuming any addit
126、ional retirements,the average annual capacity factor for coal-fired power plants would fall to around 30%in 2030,from over 50%today.The consequences would spread well beyond China:in this case,more than 70 GW of additional solar PV is deployed on average each year to 2030 across Latin America,Africa
127、,Southeast Asia and the Middle East.Even with modest curtailment,this reduces fossil fuel-fired generation in these regions by about one-quarter in 2030 compared with the STEPS.Solar PV alone cannot get the world on track to meet its climate goals,but more than any other clean technology it can ligh
128、t up the way.A wave of new LNG export projects is set to remodel gas markets Starting in 2025,an unprecedented surge in new LNG projects is set to tip the balance of markets and concerns about natural gas supply.In recent years,gas markets have been dominated by fears about security and price spikes
129、 after Russia cut supplies to Europe.Market balances remain precarious in the immediate future but that changes from the middle of the decade.Projects that have started construction or taken final investment IEA.CC B 4.0.Executive Summary 21 decision are set to add 250 billion cubic metres per year
130、of liquefaction capacity by 2030,equal to almost half of todays global LNG supply.Announced timelines suggest a particularly large increase between 2025 and 2027.More than half of the new projects are in the United States and Qatar.This additional LNG arrives at an uncertain moment for natural gas d
131、emand and creates major difficulties for Russias diversification strategy towards Asia.The strong increase in LNG production capacity eases prices and gas supply concerns,but comes to market at a time when global gas demand growth has slowed considerably since its“golden age”of the 2010s.Alongside g
132、as contracted on a longer-term basis to end-users,we estimate that more than one-third of the new gas will be looking to find buyers on the short-term market.However,mature markets notably in Europe are moving into stronger structural decline and emerging markets may lack the infrastructure to absor
133、b much larger volumes if gas demand in China slows.The glut of LNG means there are very limited opportunities for Russia to secure additional markets.Russias share of internationally traded gas,which stood at 30%in 2021,is halved by 2030 in the STEPS.Affordability and resilience are watchwords for t
134、he future A tense situation in the Middle East is a reminder of hazards in oil markets a year after Russia cut gas supplies to Europe.Vigilance on oil and gas security remains essential throughout clean energy transitions,and our projections highlight how the balance of trade and potential vulnerabi
135、lities shift over time.In the STEPS,the share of seaborne crude oil trade from the Middle East to Asia rises from some 40%of the total today to 50%by 2050.Asia is also the final destination for almost all of additional Middle East LNG supply.The global energy crisis was not a clean energy crisis,but
136、 it has focused attention on the importance of ensuring rapid,people-centred and orderly transitions.Three interlinked issues stand out:risks to affordability,electricity security and the resilience of clean energy supply chains.Sheltering consumers from volatile fuel prices in 2022 cost governments
137、 USD 900 billion in emergency support.The way to limit such expenditures in the future is to deploy cost-effective,clean technologies at scale,especially in poorer households,communities and countries that struggle to finance the upfront investments required.As the world moves towards a more electri
138、fied,renewables-based system,security of electricity supply is also paramount.Higher investment in robust and digitalised grids needs to be accompanied by a role for batteries and demand response measures for short-term flexibility and lower-emissions technologies for seasonal variations,including h
139、ydropower,nuclear,fossil fuels with carbon capture,utilisation and storage,bioenergy,hydrogen and ammonia.Diversification and innovation are the best strategies to manage supply chain dependencies for clean energy technologies and critical minerals.A range of strategies are in place to strengthen th
140、e resilience of clean energy supply chains and reduce todays high levels of concentration,but these will take time to bear fruit.Exploration and production investments are rising around the world for critical minerals like lithium,cobalt,nickel and rare earths,but the share of the top three producer
141、s in 2022 is either unchanged or has increased from 2019 levels.Our tracking of announced projects suggests concentration levels IEA.CC B 4.0.22 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 in 2030 are set to remain high,especially for refining and processing operations.Many midstream proje
142、cts are being developed in todays major producing regions,with China holding half of planned lithium chemical plants and Indonesia representing nearly 90%of planned nickel refining facilities.Alongside investments in diversified supply,policies encouraging innovation,mineral substitution and recycli
143、ng can moderate trends on the demand side and ease market pressures.They are vital components of critical minerals security.We need to go much further and faster,but a fragmented world will not rise to meet our climate and energy security challenges Proven policies and technologies are available to
144、align energy security and sustainability goals,speed up the pace of change this decade and keep the door to 1.5 C open.The STEPS sees a peak in energy-related CO2 emissions in the mid-2020s but emissions remain high enough to push up global average temperatures to around 2.4 C in 2100.This outcome h
145、as improved over successive editions of the Outlook but still points towards very widespread and severe impacts from climate change.The key actions required to bend the emissions curve downwards to 2030 are widely known and in most cases very cost effective.Tripling renewable energy capacity,doublin
146、g the pace of energy efficiency improvements to 4%per year,ramping up electrification and slashing methane emissions from fossil fuel operations together provide more than 80%of the emissions reductions needed by 2030 to put the energy sector on a pathway to limit warming to 1.5 C.In addition,innova
147、tive,large-scale financing mechanisms are required to support clean energy investments in emerging and developing economies,as are measures to ensure an orderly decline in the use of fossil fuels,including an end to new approvals of unabated coal-fired power plants.Every country needs to find its ow
148、n pathway,and it needs to be inclusive and equitable to secure public acceptance,but this package of global measures provides crucial ingredients for any successful outcome from the COP28 climate change conference in Dubai in December.No country is an energy island,and no country is insulated from t
149、he risks of climate change.The necessity of collaboration has never been higher.Especially in todays tense times,governments need to find ways to safeguard co-operation on energy and climate,including by embracing a rules-based system of international trade and spurring innovation and technology tra
150、nsfer.Without this,the chance to limit the rise in global temperatures to 1.5 C will disappear.The outlook for energy security will also look perilous if we lose the benefits of interconnected and well-functioning energy markets to ride out unexpected shocks.Fifty years on from the first oil shock,t
151、he world has lasting solutions to address energy insecurity that can also help tackle the climate crisis.The first oil shock 50 years ago brought two crucial policy responses firmly into play:energy efficiency and low-emissions power,led at the time by hydropower and nuclear.Todays energy decision m
152、akers are once again facing geopolitical tensions and the risk of energy shocks,but they have a much broader range of highly competitive clean technologies at their disposal,and an accumulated wealth of policy experience on how to accelerate their deployment.The crucial step is to put these readily
153、available solutions to work.IEA.CC B 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 23 Chapter 1 Overview and key findings Transitions are getting competitive Conflict and uncertainty provide an inauspicious backdrop to the new World EnergyOutlook.Following Russias invasion of Ukraine,instability in the Mi
154、ddle East couldlead to further disruption to energy markets and prices.This underscores once againthe frailties of the fossil fuel age,and the benefits for energy security as well as foremissions of shifting to a more sustainable energy system.Clean energy projects are facing headwinds in some marke
155、ts from cost inflation,supply chain bottlenecks and higher borrowing costs.But clean energy is the mostdynamic aspect of global energy investment.How fast it grows in the coming decadesin response to policy and market stimuli is key to explain the differences in trajectories and outcomes across our
156、three main scenarios.In all scenarios,the momentumbehind the clean energy economy is enough to produce a peak in demand for coal,oil and natural gas this decade,although the rates of post-peak decline vary widely.In the Stated Policies Scenario,average annual growth rate of 0.7%in total energydemand
157、 to 2030 is around half the rate of energy demand growth of the last decade.Demand continues to increase through to 2050.In the Announced Pledges Scenario,total energy demand flattens,thanks to improved efficiency and the inherentefficiency advantages of technologies powered by electricity such as e
158、lectricvehicles and heat pumps over fossil fuel-based alternatives.In the Net ZeroEmissions by 2050 Scenario,electrification and efficiency gains proceed even faster,leading to a decline in primary energy of 1.2%per year to 2030.Our analysis explores some key uncertainties,notably regarding the pace
159、 of Chinaseconomic growth and the possibilities for more rapid solar PV deployment opened by a massive planned expansion in manufacturing capacity(led by China).We highlightthe implications of a huge increase in the capacity to export liquefied natural gasstarting in the middle of this decade,led by
160、 the United States and Qatar.We examinehow any deterioration in geopolitical tensions would undermine both the prospectsfor energy security and for rapid,affordable transitions.Extreme volatility in energy markets during the global energy crisis has highlightedthe importance of affordable,reliable a
161、nd resilient supply,especially in price-sensitivedeveloping economies that see the largest increase in demand for energy services.Energy transitions rely on electrification and technologies like wind,solar PV andbatteries,and push electricity security and diversified supply for clean technologiesand
162、 critical minerals up the policy agenda.Emerging market and developingeconomies account for almost 80%of the global growth in electricity demand in the Stated Policies Scenario,and for over two-thirds in the other scenarios.S U M M A R YIEA.CC B 4.0.RussiaSolar PV is lightinga path forward forclean
163、energy transitionsSolar manufacturing growth is outpacing the rise of solar PV deployment,creating some risks of imbalances but huge opportunities for the world to accelerate energy transitions.Around 250 bcm of new liquefaction capacity is set to come online by 2030,of which the United States and Q
164、atar account for 60%.200 GW220 GW640 GW120 GW1 260 GW500 GWPower sectorCO2 emissions+65+120+140ManufacturingcapacitySTEPSadditionsA wave of new LNG export projects is set to overturn gas markets-1.6 Gtin the NZESolar Case12.3 GtSTEPS 2030Clean energyUnabated fossil fuelsAs Chinas demand g
165、rowth slows,clean energy pushesfossil fuels into declineAnnual change in energy consumption200020022885 bcm635 bcm400 bcm350 bcmTotal capacityCapacity additions-224EJ20232050Additional in the NZE Solar CaseChinaOther emerging marketand developing economiesAdvanced economiesAfricaAustralia
166、CanadaOtherQatarSoutheast AsiaUnited StatesChapter 1|Overview and key findings 25 1 Introduction Some of the tensions in energy markets receded in 2023 since the extreme volatility of the global energy crisis,but the situation remains fragile.The urgent task of transforming the energy system now tak
167、es place in a more challenging macroeconomic and geopolitical context.The frailties of the fossil fuel age and the hazards that it has created for the planet are plain to see,and opportunities in the emerging clean energy economy are growing fast.But many uncertainties remain about the resilience of
168、 energy supply chains old and new,about risks to the security and affordability of transitions,and about whether the process of change will be sufficiently rapid to avoid very severe impacts from a changing climate.Using the latest data for energy markets,policies and technologies,the World Energy O
169、utlook(WEO)provides insights on all these key issues.It does so by exploring scenarios that reflect different assumptions about the actions taken in the coming years to shape energy systems and reduce energy-related carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions.The projections in the Stated Policies Scenario(STEPS)g
170、ive a sense of the current direction of travel for the energy economy,based on the actual state of play in different sectors,countries and regions.The Announced Pledges Scenario(APS)shows how that future would be different if all countries were to hit their aspirational targets,including national an
171、d regional net zero emissions pledges,on time and in full.The updated Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE)Scenario illustrates what more is required to limit global warming to 1.5 degree Celsius(C).This overview chapter provides ten takeaways from the new analysis.Our projections show that for the first
172、time demand for each of the fossil fuels reach a peak in the STEPS before the end of this decade.We examine how uncertainties over the pace of economic growth in The Peoples Republic of China(hereinafter China)could affect the near-term outlook,as well as the implications of the extraordinary China-
173、led boom in manufacturing capacity for solar photovoltaic(PV)modules.We highlight areas of hope and areas for caution about the prospects of staying within the 1.5 C limit,and examine the crucial issue of capital flows for clean energy and fossil fuels.Against a background of macroeconomic uncertain
174、ty,we consider the affordability of the transition for households,industry and governments.As the world comes to rely more and more on electricity,we look at risks affecting technologies that have a key part to play in increasing electrification and decarbonising the power supply.We also ask whether
175、 the policy and technology choices facing emerging market and developing economies open the possibility of a new lower carbon pathway for development.In addition,we identify the ways in which geopolitical tensions could affect the Outlook,and look back to see how and why our projections have changed
176、 over time.The topics included in this chapter represent key themes of the World Energy Outlook 2023.Further information and background on the IEA Net Zero Roadmap is in Net Zero Roadmap:A Global Pathway to Keep the 1.5 C Goal in Reach published in September 2023.In addition,a range of supply and de
177、mand issues for the oil and gas industry and their relation to the Outlook are the focus of a forthcoming special report in November 2023.IEA.CC BY 4.0.26 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 1.1 A peak by 2030 for each of the fossil fuels In the WEO-2023,the Stated Policies Scenari
178、o(STEPS)sees lower demand projections for each of the fossil fuels than in the WEO-2022.This reflects current policy settings by governments worldwide,a slight downward revision in the economic outlook,and the continued ramifications of the 2022 global energy crisis.It also reflects longer term tren
179、ds:fossil fuel technologies have been losing market share to clean energy technologies across various sectors in recent years,and in many cases fossil fuel-powered technologies have already seen a peak in sales or additions.These shifts mean that each of the three fossil fuel categories are now proj
180、ected to reach a peak by 2030(Figure 1.1).This has never previously been seen in the STEPS.The changes in our projections highlight how the energy system is changing as low-emissions electricity and fuels meet an increasing share of the worlds rising energy needs,and as energy efficiency improvement
181、s help to moderate those needs.Total demand for fossil fuels declines from the mid-2020s by an average of 3 exajoules(EJ)per year to 2050 in the STEPS,and the peak in energy-related CO2 emissions in the STEPS is brought forward to the mid-2020s.Figure 1.1 Fossil fuel consumption by fuel in the STEPS
182、,2000-2050 IEA.CC BY 4.0.All fossil fuels peak before the end of this decade,with declines in advanced economies and China offsetting increasing demand elsewhere We highlight below some of the key drivers for these changes by fuel,but there are some important issues to bear in mind when considering
183、these trends.First,the projected declines in demand after the peaks are nowhere near steep enough to be consistent with the NZE Scenario getting on track for this scenario will require much faster clean energy deployment and much more determined policy action by governments(section 1.4).Second,the d
184、emand trends for the different fuels vary considerably among regions,with reduced 50%60%70%80%90%100%2000200402050Natural gasOilCoalIndex(peak value=100%)IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 27 1 demand in advanced economies partially offset by continued growth in many emergi
185、ng market and developing economies,particularly for natural gas.Third,while the trajectories in our scenarios reflect underlying structural changes,the demand outlook will not be linear in practice.There will inevitably be spikes,dips and plateaus along the way.For example,heatwaves and droughts cou
186、ld well cause temporary jumps in coal demand by pushing up electricity use at a time when hydropower output may be constrained.Even as demand for fossil fuels falls,energy security challenges will remain since the process of adjustment to changing demand patterns will not necessarily be easy or smoo
187、th.For example,the peaks in demand we see based on todays policies do not remove the need for investment in oil and gas supply,given how steep the natural declines from existing fields often are.At the same time,they underline the economic and financial risks of major new oil and gas projects,on top
188、 of their risks for climate change(section 1.5).1.1.1 Coal:Scaling up clean power hastens the decline After remaining consistently high over the past decade,global coal demand is now set to fall within the next few years in the STEPS(Figure 1.2).This projected trend reflects declines in recent years
189、 of capacity additions of both coal-fired power and coal-fired iron and steel production the two largest consumers of coal today which account for 65%and 16%respectively of overall coal consumption.Figure 1.2 Global coal demand by sector and annual average change by region in the STEPS,2000-2050 IEA
190、.CC BY 4.0.Peaks in coal capacity additions reached in the power,steel and cement sectors are laying the foundation for global coal demand to peak in the mid-2020s Note:Mtce=million tonnes of coal equivalent;AE=advanced economies;EMDE=emerging market and developing economies.1 0002 0003 0004 0005 00
191、06 0002000200402050PowerSteelCementOtherCoal demandMtceSteelPowerPeak year in coal capacity additionsCementAnnual average change-75-50-250 25 50 752010-2022-2030-AEChinaOther EMDEMtce202220302050IEA.CC BY 4.0.28 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 The share of coal-fired
192、 power in new worldwide capacity additions hit a high point in 2006 at 45%and has since fallen steadily to 11%in 2022.The size of annual coal capacity additions peaked in 2012 at over 100 gigawatts(GW)before dropping to 50 GW in 2022,with big investments in coal falling away rapidly,and solar PV and
193、 wind power increasingly dominating the expansion of electricity systems.The role of coal-fired power plants has started to shift towards providing flexibility and system services rather than bulk power.As a result,the average capacity factor of coal power plants was almost ten percentage points low
194、er over the past decade than during the decade before.Changes in iron and steel production have also contributed to the decline in coal demand.Capacity additions of coal-based steel production plants1 peaked in 2003 at over 130 million tonnes(Mt),driven in large part by Chinas rapid industrialisatio
195、n.Eleven years later,global coal demand for iron and steel production peaked at over 950 million tonnes of coal equivalent(Mtce)before starting to fall,despite a continuing steady increase in the production of iron and steel.The decline in the global coal intensity of steel production since 2015 is
196、the result of growth in the share of scrap-based production in electric arc furnaces,as well as alternatives to blast furnaces for iron production such as natural gas-based direct reduced iron.In advanced economies,coal demand peaked in 2007.In China the worlds largest coal consumer the impressive g
197、rowth of renewables and nuclear alongside macroeconomic shifts point to a decrease in coal use by the mid-2020s.Coal use continues to increase in other emerging market and developing economies as new power plants and industry capacity come online,but this growth is more than offset by projected decl
198、ines elsewhere.1.1.2 Oil:End of the“ICE age”turns prospects around In the past two decades,oil demand has surged by 18 million barrels per day(mb/d).Much of the increase has been driven by rising demand in road transport.The global car fleet expanded by more than 600 million cars over the last 20 ye
199、ars,and road freight activity has increased by almost 65%.Road transport now accounts for around 45%of global oil demand,which is far more than any other sector:the petrochemicals sector,second-largest in oil consumption,accounts for 15%of oil demand.The astounding rise in electric vehicle(EV)sales
200、is now having an impact on demand for oil in road transport.Sales of gasoline and diesel cars,two/three-wheelers and trucks peaked in 2017,2018 and 2019 respectively(Figure 1.3).In 2020,EVs accounted for 4%of global car sales.They are on track to reach 18%in 2023 with 14 million EV sales,mostly in C
201、hina and the advanced economies,and are set to continue to increase rapidly in the future.Sales of internal combustion engine(ICE)buses also peak by the mid-2020s in the STEPS,with the uptake of electric buses rising particularly quickly in emerging market and developing economies.By the end of this
202、 decade,road transport is no longer a source of oil demand growth.1 Includes blast furnaces-basic oxygen furnaces,smelting reduction-basic oxygen furnace,coal-based direct reduced iron-electric arc furnace,coal-based iron in induction or in open hearth furnaces.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and k
203、ey findings 29 1 Figure 1.3 Global oil demand by sector and annual average change by region in the STEPS,2000-2050 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Sales of gasoline and diesel passenger vehicles and trucks have already peaked,leading to a peak in oil demand before 2030 Note:mb/d=million barrels per day;AE=advanced ec
204、onomies;EMDE=emerging market and developing economies.Although oil demand for petrochemicals,aviation and shipping continues to increase through to 2050 in the STEPS,this is not enough to offset reductions in demand from road transport,as well as in the power and buildings sectors.As a result,oil de
205、mand peaks before 2030.The decline from the peak however is a slow one in the STEPS all the way through to 2050.The outlook for oil demand varies across regions.Oil demand in advanced economies peaked in 2005,and its decline becomes more pronounced in the coming decade.Chinas robust oil demand growt
206、h since 2010 weakens in the coming years and declines in the long run.In emerging market and developing economies(other than China),which see growing populations and car ownership,oil demand grows continuously to 2050.1.1.3 Natural gas:Energy crisis marks the end of the“Golden Age”The“Golden Age of
207、Gas”,a term coined by the IEA in 2011,is nearing an end.Global natural gas use has increased by an annual average of almost 2%since 2011,but growth slows in the STEPS to less than 0.4%per year from now until 2030.The power and buildings sectors todays biggest consumers of natural gas accounting for
208、39%and 21%respectively of total demand have already seen peaks in natural gas capacity additions for power plants and space heating boilers,and muted demand in these two sectors reduces natural gas use enough to cause it to peak by 2030(Figure 1.4).2040608000402050Passenger veh
209、iclesTrucksNon-road transportOthermb/dCarsTrucksPeak in ICE vehicle salesTwo/three-wheelersOil demand-0.75-0.50-0.2500.250.500.-20302030-2050AEChinaOther EMDEmb/dAnnual average changeIEA.CC BY 4.0.30 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 Figure 1.4 Global natural gas d
210、emand by sector and annual average change by region in the STEPS,2000-2050 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Additions of new gas power plants and gas boilers in buildings are slowing;gas demand peaks before 2030 in the STEPS,though gas use in industry continues to increase Note:bcm=billion cubic metres;AE=advanced eco
211、nomies;EMDE=emerging market and developing economies.The high point for natural gas power capacity additions was in 2002,when they exceeded 100 GW and made up around 65%of total annual capacity additions.Capacity additions fell to less than 30 GW in 2022.Despite this slowing in annual additions,the
212、global installed capacity of natural gas power continues to expand over time.Gas differs in this respect from coal,where installed capacity reduces in the future.Natural gas demand in the power sector nevertheless declines in the STEPS from today until 2050,with a particularly strong dip in the 2030
213、s when co-firing in gas-fired power plants begins to be deployed at scale.Sales of gas-fired boilers for space heating in buildings have also peaked.At their height,gas boilers accounted for around 40%of total sales of space heating equipment.The subsequent decline in sales over the last few years r
214、eflects the rapid rise of heat pumps,especially in advanced economies.Heat pump sales have a strong impact on gas demand in the buildings sector in the STEPS trajectory because space heating is by far the leading end-use in terms of natural gas demand today.In advanced economies,the rebound in natur
215、al gas demand seen in 2021 did not last long,and demand in 2022 was below pre-pandemic levels.This faltering in demand reflects a shift to renewables in electricity generation,the rise of heat pumps,and Europes accelerated move away from gas following the Russian Federation(hereinafter Russia)invasi
216、on of Ukraine.Demand continues to decline in the STEPS,and by 2030 this more than offsets continued demand growth in emerging market and developing economies.1 0002 0003 0004 0005 0006 0002000200402050PowerBuildingsIndustryOtherbcmPowerBoilers in buildingsPeak year in gas capacity additio
217、nsNatural gas demand-30-20-100 10 20 -20302030-2050AEChinaOther EMDEbcmAnnual average changeIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 31 1 1.2 A slowdown in economic growth in China would have huge implications for energy markets 1.2.1 Chinas growth has defined the energy worl
218、d in recent decades Chinas economic growth has been an epoch-making event over the last several decades.Since 1995,China accounted for two-thirds of the decline in the global population living in extreme poverty.Its GDP per capita increased more than seven-times in the same period,as its economy tra
219、nsformed into a globally integrated,innovative industrial powerhouse.Figure 1.5 Chinas share in the change of selected global economic and energy sector indicators,2012-2022 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chinas growth has transformed the global economy,energy sector and environment Note:GDP is measured at market ex
220、change rates.More recently,over the course of the last decade China was responsible for more than one-third of growth in global GDP(Figure 1.5).Chinas growth has done much to shape energy markets and the global environment:in the last decade,it accounted for more than 50%of global energy demand grow
221、th and 85%of the rise in energy sector CO2 emissions.But its economy is changing.Chinas leaders have long acknowledged that its current phase of massive and resource-intensive investment in urbanisation,infrastructure and factories must end.As far back as 2007,Chinas then Premier warned that the big
222、gest problem with Chinas economy is that growth is unstable,unbalanced,uncoordinated and unsustainable.This rebalancing could have substantial impacts on the outlook for Chinas energy sector,and given Chinas size,for the world too.20%40%60%80%100%GDPEnergydemandEnergy-related CORenewablescapacityIEA
223、.CC BY 4.0.32 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 1.2.2 Integrating a slowdown in Chinas economy into the STEPS The rebalancing of the Chinese economy still has a long way to go.Savings and investment levels remain very high,the debt-to-GDP ratio has continued to climb,and the cons
224、truction sector retains an outsized role in GDP(Figure 1.6).This model is pushing against inherent constraints.China already has a world-class infrastructure stock,and after growing almost 30%in the last decade its per capita residential floorspace is already equal to that of Japan,despite Chinas lo
225、wer level of GDP per capita.Chinas working age population peaked around 2015 and is projected to fall by more than 20%by 2050.With this will come a reduced need for investment,such as in new housing and infrastructure(Figure 1.7).Figure 1.6 Selected indicators of structural change in the Chinese eco
226、nomy,2010-2022 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Rebalancing of Chinas economy still has a long way to go with investment,debt-to-GDP ratio,and share of the construction sector in GDP remaining high Notes:GDP is expressed in market exchange rate terms.VA=value added.Allied sectors are basic chemicals and fertilisers,ba
227、sic metals,non-metallic minerals,pulp and paper,wood and wood products excluding furniture.Debt refers to total outstanding credit to the non-financial sector from all lending sectors,expressed as a percent of GDP.Sources:IEA analysis based on data from Oxford Economics(2023)and BIS(2023).Although t
228、he current property crisis in China has attracted much attention,it has not yet significantly impacted the energy sector(Box 1.1).Moreover,the property crisis is a symptom of the broad structural change facing the Chinese economy.How this economic transition plays out is one of the key uncertainties
229、 in this Outlook.In our scenarios,we have revised downwards the long-term projection of GDP growth in China to just under 4%per year for the period 2022 to 2030,and 2.3%per year for the period 2031 to 2050.This compares to more than 4.5%and more than 2.5%respectively in the World Energy Outlook-2022
230、 scenarios.As a result,the economy is around 5%smaller in 2030 than projected last 10%20%30%40%50%20102022Investment(share of GDP)70%140%210%280%350%20102022Debt(share of GDP)10%20%30%40%50%20102022Construction and allied sectors(share of industrial VA)IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findin
231、gs 33 1 year,and slightly less than 15%smaller in 2050.Despite these changes,China remains a critical driver of global growth,accounting for almost one-third of global GDP growth to 2030 in our scenarios.But slower growth results in Chinas total energy demand peaking around the middle of this decade
232、;with stable and then slowly declining demand,clean energy growth is sufficient to drive a decline in fossil fuel demand and hence emissions.Figure 1.7 Selected economic indicators and annual total energy demand growth in China in the STEPS,2010 2050 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Cement,steel and working age popula
233、tion each have peaked and are set to decline;as Chinas economy changes,energy demand growth will slow,peak and decline Source:Population projection from the Median Variant of the World Population Prospects(UNDESA,2022).Box 1.1 The property crisis is everywhere,except in the energy statistics Despite
234、 the importance of the unfolding property crisis,Chinas energy demand and its heavy industrial production appear only modestly affected.The total floorspace of new projects started per year fell around 50%from 2019 to 2022;but floorspace under construction,despite falling in 2022,is still 1%higher t
235、han in 2019(Figure 1.8).In other words,the property crisis has impacted new projects,not those already under construction.This explains why material and energy demand has been less impacted than indicators like new project starts or property developer share or bond prices.It also implies that if Chi
236、nas property sector settles into a lower level of activity,over time this will impact the stock of projects under construction and hence energy and material demand underlying construction projects.0.60.70.80.91.0200402050Economic indicators(peak=1)Working agepopulationSteel productionCeme
237、nt production-40 4 8 03020402050Energy demand growth(EJ)Clean energyUnabatedfossilfuelsIEA.CC BY 4.0.34 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 Figure 1.8 Selected property sector indicators,China,2011-2022 IEA.CC BY 4.0.So far,the property crisis has hit the flow of new pro
238、ject starts,but has had limited impact on the stock of projects under construction Source:IEA analysis based on data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China(NBSC,2023).There are several additional reasons,both structural and cyclical,which explain why energy demand has been resilient in the
239、face of the downturn in the property sector in China:Rapid electrification has driven strong electricity demand growth.Electricity generation accounted for more than 70%of the increase in energy demand since 2015 in China.“New economy”sectors have been growing strongly,including high-tech manufactur
240、ing in clean energy areas such as PV and EVs.While the average annual growth of fixed asset investment in property has shrunk by around 5%since January 2022,it has grown by about 15%for automobile manufacturing,for example.To take another example,revenue in the last year for listed solar PV manufact
241、urers and automobile manufacturers amounted to USD 166 billion and USD 135 billion respectively.China is massively increasing its domestic petrochemical production.Between 2019 and 2024,China is set to add as much petrochemical capacity as the combined capacity of all OECD countries in Europe and As
242、ia.Feedstock demand for petrochemical production has increased 50%since 2019 and is responsible for around 80%of growth in oil product demand in China over the 2019 to 2023 period.Droughts in 2021 and 2022 constrained hydro electricity production(and are continuing to do so in 2023).Without this fac
243、tor,Chinas total energy demand growth would have been less in 2022,and its CO2 emissions would have declined rather than risen marginally.20%40%60%80%100%120%20112022New floorspacestartedSalesUnder constructionCompletedIndex(2019=100%)Property indicators 2 4 6 8 10 1220112022Property indicatorsUnder
244、 constructionNew floorspace startedSalesBillion mCompletedIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 35 1 1.2.3 Sensitivities in the Outlook But outcomes other than those in the STEPS are possible.To explore possible implications,we have modelled a Low Case and a High Case.In the Low Case,Chi
245、nas GDP is around 7.5%lower in 2030 than in the STEPS,with a more rapid decline in infrastructure and property investment not fully offset by an increase in consumption and investment in other sectors.Cement production is around 14%lower than in the STEPS,for example.The Low Case assumes slower but
246、ultimately“higher quality”growth.2 The High Case assumes the reverse,with a delayed rebalancing temporarily increasing GDP growth while at the same time negatively impacting longer term economic sustainability.Figure 1.9 Key energy indicators for China in the Low Case versus the STEPS,2030 IEA.CC BY
247、 4.0.Slower but high quality growth in this decade would have large impacts on world energy markets and Chinas CO2 emissions In the Low Case,primary coal demand is around 7%lower than in the STEPS in 2030 due to lower levels of production in heavy industries,less electricity demand,and continued rob
248、ust expansion of low-emissions sources of electricity generation(Figure 1.9).Oil is less affected than coal,with primary demand around 0.75 mb/d lower than in the STEPS,but the decline in demand nevertheless represents the equivalent of about 5%in projected 2030 oil imports in the STEPS(or about 2%o
249、f the global market).Natural gas is also less affected than coal,with demand almost 30 billion cubic metres(bcm)lower in 2030 than in the STEPS,though still over 15%higher than in 2022.This reduction represents the equivalent of more than 2 Increasingly used in official discourse,the phrase“high qua
250、lity”growth is taken to mean economic growth based on domestic consumption,external demand and business investment in productive sectors,as opposed to continued growth based on high investment in property and infrastructure with low and diminishing productivity returns.-250-200-150-100-50Coal(Mtce)-
251、1.0-0.8-0.6-0.4-0.2Oil(mb/d)-30-24-18-12-6Natural gas(bcm)-1000-800-600-400-200Total CO(Mt)IEA.CC BY 4.0.36 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 20%of Chinas projected liquefied natural gas(LNG)imports in the STEPS in 2030.These various changes result in CO2 emissions that are more
252、than 0.8 gigatonnes(Gt)lower in 2030 than in the STEPS,and nearly 15%lower than in 2022.On the other hand,the High Case sees stronger coal demand and higher CO2 emissions.Emissions still peak before 2030,but in 2030 are about 0.8 Gt higher than in the STEPS,and 1.6 Gt higher than in the Low Case.As
253、in the Low Case,the impact across fuels is not symmetrical,with less of an upside for oil than for coal.In both the High Case and the Low Case,the weight of China in global energy markets means that the changes have significant global implications.This discussion highlights the importance of paying
254、close attention to Chinas macroeconomic evolution.The Low Case,predicated on lower but higher quality growth,would have substantial and probably deflationary impacts on global energy commodity and technology markets.At the same time,increased emphasis on export-oriented sectors,including clean energ
255、y technology sectors,in order to partially offset the decline of others such as property could have implications for already strained trade relations.On the other hand,a prolongation of the current infrastructure and property intensive model might provide a near-term boost to energy and commodity ma
256、rkets,but it would also increase CO2 emissions and could store economic problems for the future.1.3 A boom of solar manufacturing could be a boon for the world Solar manufacturing has experienced a remarkable expansion over the last decade,increasing ten-fold globally to meet increasing demand for c
257、lean energy.This trend is set to continue at an elevated pace,with investments in the pipeline set to raise global solar module manufacturing capacity from about 640 GW in 2022 to over 1 200 GW in the medium term(Figure 1.10).Paired with rapid expansion along the supply chain from the production of
258、polysilicon to wafers and solar cells solar PV is poised to accelerate clean energy transitions around the world.Solar PV has been one of the major successes of the past decade,with annual deployment of electricity generation capacity growing more than sevenfold.Manufacturing capacity expansion has
259、been even faster and the gap has driven down the utilisation rate of solar manufacturing from close to 60%to below 40%in 2022.This is well below the 70%level that would normally be considered healthy for a mature industry.In the STEPS,global solar PV deployment continues to expand from around 220 GW
260、 in 2022 to about 500 GW in 2030,but planned manufacturing expansion means that the utilisation rate of solar manufacturing remains below 40%through to 2030.The scope to make fuller use of solar manufacturing capacity represents an enormous opportunity to accelerate the deployment of solar PV around
261、 the world and accelerate energy transitions.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 37 1 Figure 1.10 Global solar module manufacturing and solar PV capacity additions in the STEPS,2010-2030 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Planned expansion of solar manufacturing outpaces solar PV capacity additions to 2030
262、;its low utilisation rate presents a huge opportunity to accelerate clean energy transitions 1.3.1 Solar module manufacturing and trade Solar manufacturing today is highly concentrated just five countries account for over 90%of global capacity.China is far and away the largest,with the capacity to p
263、roduce solar modules with an output of over 500 GW every year,equivalent to 80%of world manufacturing capacity.The other four are Viet Nam(5%of the global market),India(3%),Malaysia(3%)and Thailand(2%).The next five leading solar manufacturers the United States,Korea,Cambodia,Trkiye and Chinese Taip
264、ei each account for around 1%of the global total,as does the European Union.While fewer than 40 countries have capacity to produce solar modules,over 100 countries completed solar PV projects in 2022,which mostly relied on imported solar panels.China is the primary exporter of solar panels(IEA,2022a
265、).Its exports,and those of other exporters,facilitate the expansion of renewable energy in markets around the world.Southeast Asia is the second-largest exporter,with many of the panels it exports going to the United States and the European Union.As domestic manufacturing capacity in India has incre
266、ased in recent years,there is potential to reduce import dependence over the coming years.Today,the European Union and the United States are the largest importers of solar panels.New import tariffs have recently been put in place in the United States on solar modules that originate in China:these ar
267、e set to change the pattern of imports to the United States,and may have knock-on effects in other markets.10%20%30%40%50%60%200 400 600 8001 0001 20020030HistoricalPlannedSTEPS solar PVGWProduction capacityUtilisation rate(right axis)capacity additionsIEA.CC BY 4.0.38 International Energ
268、y Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 Figure 1.11 Planned solar module manufacturing capacity and solar PV capacity additions in the STEPS,2030 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Solar manufacturing is set to expand in more than a dozen countries:China remains the largest exporter,while the European Union and United States
269、 remain the main importers Plans for additional capacity suggest that solar manufacturing will remain highly concentrated,and that trade will continue to be important for many markets(Figure 1.11).China plans to add another 500 GW of solar module manufacturing capacity in the coming years,far outstr
270、ipping plans for new capacity in other countries.Expansion on this scale means that it is likely to maintain its 80%share of the global total and to remain the primary exporter of solar modules by some distance.India aims to continue expanding its production capacity to meet domestic needs and to ex
271、port solar modules:projects in the pipeline under the Production Linked Incentives scheme suggest that its manufacturing capacity could exceed 70 GW per year by 2027.Production capacity in Southeast Asia is set to outpace regional needs,allowing it to remain an important exporter.In the United State
272、s,planned solar module production capacity investments have been boosted by the Inflation Reduction Act,and are on course to increase sixfold in the medium term.However,without further investment,significant imports will still be needed to meet fast growing solar PV deployment in the STEPS in 2030.S
273、olar manufacturing in the European Union is set to double in the medium term,but here too deployment is increasing rapidly,and about 70%of deployment in 2030 will depend on imported solar modules unless further investments are made in manufacturing in the European Union.1.3.2 Solar PV deployment cou
274、ld scale up faster to accelerate transitions Planned increases in solar PV manufacturing capacity around the world have the potential to enable over 800 GW of new solar PV to be deployed in 2030,which is in line with the level of deployment reached in the NZE Scenario in 2030(Figure 1.12).This would
275、 raise the average 300 600 9001 200ChinaSoutheastAsiaIndiaPlanned solar module manufacturing2030 solar PV capacity additionsSolar module exportersGW 20 40 60 80UnitedStatesEuropeanUnionRest ofworldSolar module importersGWIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 39 1 utilisation rate for sol
276、ar module manufacturing to around 70%,which is roughly what might be expected in a mature industry.We have constructed the NZE Solar Case which looks at what would happen if all this potential solar capacity was tapped and compares the outcomes in 2030 with those in the STEPS.The rest of this sectio
277、n highlights this comparison.Figure 1.12 Global solar PV and battery storage capacity additions and power sector CO2 emissions,2022 and 2030 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Taking advantage of solar manufacturing capacity could lift solar PV deployment to over 800 GW by 2030,in line with the NZE Scenario,cutting powe
278、r sector emissions 30%by 2030 Note:GW=gigawatts;Gt=gigatonnes;NZE solar=NZE Solar Case.An important initial point is that rapid further deployment of solar PV in the NZE Solar Case would require measures to integrate the additional solar PV into electricity systems and maximise its impact.Scaling up
279、 battery storage would be crucial in most cases to improve the alignment of solar PV output with electricity demand patterns and system needs.In the NZE Solar Case,utility-scale battery deployment in 2030 is close to double the level in the STEPS.Measures to modernise and expand networks,facilitate
280、demand response and boost power system flexibility would also be necessary.Accelerating solar PV deployment to the levels in the NZE Scenario would reduce CO2 emissions in 2030 by displacing some unabated fossil fuels.Global CO2 emissions from the power sector would fall below 11 Gt in 2030,some 15%
281、lower than the level in the STEPS in 2030 and 30%below the level in 2022.Coal-fired electricity generation would be around 15%lower than in the STEPS in 2030:the decline in coal-fired generation would largely take place in emerging market and developing economies and would deliver the bulk of the em
282、issions reductions.Natural gas-fired electricity generation would also be reduced by 15%compared with the STEPS in 2030,with reductions in both advanced economies and emerging market and developing economies.200 400 600 8001 0002022STEPSNZE solarSolar PVBattery storageSolar PV and battery capacity a
283、dditionsGW20302030 3 6 9 12 152022STEPSNZE solarPower sector CO emissionsGt COIEA.CC BY 4.0.40 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 China could accelerate solar PV deployment to shift away from coal faster In the STEPS,solar PV capacity additions in China reach over 270 GW per year
284、before flattening.While this means a marked slowing of the rate of growth achieved in recent years,it still puts China five years ahead of schedule to reach 1 200 GW of solar PV and wind capacity,which is one of the targets for 2030 in its Nationally Determined Contribution.Nevertheless,there is sco
285、pe for China to accelerate its uptake of both distributed solar PV and large-scale projects.In the NZE Solar Case,Chinas annual solar PV capacity additions exceed 400 GW by 2030(Figure 1.13).To successfully integrate the additional solar PV and keep curtailment at manageable levels,battery storage a
286、nd network enhancements would be as important in China as everywhere else.Continued progress on power system reforms,including further moves towards a unified national power market,would help make the best use of the additional solar PV(IEA,2023a).Figure 1.13 Solar PV capacity additions and coal-fir
287、ed electricity generation in China in the STEPS and NZE Solar Case,2020-2035 IEA.CC BY 4.0.With targeted integration measures,China could deploy significantly more solar PV and put coal-fired power into a steeper decline Effectively integrated,higher solar PV deployment would accelerate the transiti
288、on away from coal-fired power in China.While coal-fired generation would still peak around 2025,it would decline more steeply afterwards.By 2030,the level of coal-fired generation in the NZE Solar Case would be 20%lower than in the STEPS and 35%lower than in 2022.Without assuming any additional reti
289、rements,the average annual capacity factor for coal-fired power plants would fall to about 30%in 2030,compared with about 40%in the STEPS and over 50%in 2022.As a result,power sector CO2 emissions would fall to about 4.2 Gt in 2030,a 30%reduction from the 2022 level.200 400 6002020202520302035Solar
290、PV capacity additionsGWSTEPSNZE solar case2 0004 0006 0002020202520302035TWhCoal-fired electricity generationIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 41 1 Emerging market and developing economies could also shift away from coal faster Spare solar PV manufacturing capacity could also facilit
291、ate faster uptake of low cost solar PV in emerging market and developing economies other than China.In the NZE Solar Case,more than 70 GW of additional solar PV is deployed each year to 2030 across Africa,Latin America and the Caribbean(LAC),Middle East and Southeast Asia.Even with modest amounts of
292、 curtailment,this would reduce both natural gas-fired and coal-fired power generation by about one-quarter in 2030 compared with the levels in the STEPS,cutting power sector CO2 emissions in 2030 by over 500 Mt,30%of the total.The Middle East would also have the opportunity to cut both coal and natu
293、ral gas use in power,while in LAC the additional solar PV would mostly reduce demand for natural gas-fired generation;in Africa and Southeast Asia,its biggest impact would be on coal-fired power(Figure 1.14).Figure 1.14 Additional solar PV capacity additions in the NZE Solar Case and related impacts
294、 in selected regions relative to the STEPS,2030 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Additional solar PV deployed in emerging market and developing economies could significantly reduce generation from coal and natural gas and cut CO2 emissions Note:EMDE=emerging market and developing economies.LAC=Latin America and the Ca
295、ribbean.Hydropower resources in LAC and Africa could facilitate the integration of more solar PV,while the Middle Easts reliance on natural gas would also help to provide system flexibility.Southeast Asia would face the most serious integration challenges,which could be eased by expanding interconne
296、ctions and cross-border trade(IEA,2019).In all emerging market and developing economies,access to finance and the reduced costs of capital would be essential to be able to take advantage of the opportunity to accelerate uptake of solar PV(IEA,2021a).-60%-40%-20%0%20%40%60%-30-20-100102030Southeast A
297、siaAfricaMiddle EastEMDE in LACAdditional solar PVcapacity per yearCoal-firedgenerationNatural gas-firedgenerationPower sector CO emissionsGWto 2030Impacts(right axis):IEA.CC BY 4.0.42 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 1.4 The pathway to a 1.5 C limit on global warming is very to
298、ugh,but it remains open Net Zero Roadmap:A Global Pathway to Keep the 1.5 C Goal in Reach,the IEA update to the landmark Net Zero by 2050 Roadmap,was published in September 2023(IEA,2023b).The updated Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE)Scenario is incorporated in full in this Outlook.It reached the conc
299、lusion that the pathway to net zero emissions by 2050 has narrowed since the first version published in 2021,but that it remains feasible.In this section,we highlight four reasons why this pathway remains open and look at four areas that require urgent attention if the promise of a 1.5 C limit on gl
300、obal warming is to be realised.1.4.1 Four reasons for hope Clean energy policies are stepping up Many countries and an increasing number of businesses are committed to reaching net zero emissions.As of September 2023,net zero emissions pledges cover more than 85%of global energy-related emissions an
301、d nearly 90%of global GDP.Ninety-three countries and the European Union have pledged to meet a net zero emissions target.Moreover,governments around the world,especially in advanced economies,have responded to the pandemic and the global energy crisis by putting forward new measures designed to prom
302、ote the uptake of renewables,electric cars,heat pumps,energy efficiency and other clean energy technologies.EV targets have driven a major transformation in the industrial strategies of car and truck manufacturers in recent years,together with fuel economy and CO2 emissions standards in the European
303、 Union and China,and more recently in the United States.Similarly,electric two/three-wheelers and buses have seen significant uptake in India and other emerging market and developing economies thanks to policy support,increasing economic competitiveness and limited infrastructure needs.The United St
304、ates,through the Inflation Reduction Act adopted in 2022,has provided unprecedented funding to support deployment and reduce costs for a range of low-emissions technologies,notably carbon capture,utilisation and storage(CCUS)and hydrogen.Successive five-year plans in China have progressively raised
305、ambitions for solar PV and driven down global costs.Offshore wind deployment in Europe has turned into a global industry.Clean energy deployment is accelerating fast Clean energy investment and deployment have increased rapidly in response to the market signals and financial incentives provided by g
306、overnments,with mass-manufactured technologies such as solar PV,wind turbines and EVs leading the way.Sales of residential heat pumps and stationary battery storage are also rising fast.Since the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015,almost 1 terawatt(TW)of solar PV capacity has been added to the globa
307、l system nearly equivalent to the total installed electricity capacity in the European Union.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 43 1 Around 40%of this deployment was in 2021 and 2022.Well over half of the electric cars on the road worldwide have been sold since 2021.As a result,solar
308、PV capacity additions are currently tracking ahead of the trajectory envisaged in the 2021 version of our NZE Scenario.We now estimate that global manufacturing capacities for solar PV and EV batteries would be sufficient to meet projected demand in 2030 in the updated NZE Scenario,if all announced
309、projects proceed.This progress reflects major cost reductions in recent years:the costs of key clean energy technologies solar PV,wind,heat pumps and batteries fell by close to 80%on a deployment weighted average basis between 2010 and 2022.Box 1.2 Clean energy deployment is starting to bend the emi
310、ssions curve Clean energy deployment is starting to bend the emissions curve,thanks largely to solar PV,wind power and EVs.These three technologies contribute the bulk of the emissions reductions in the WEO-2023 STEPS relative to a pre-Paris Baseline Scenario(Figure 1.15).Solar PV is projected to re
311、duce emissions by around 3 Gt in 2030,roughly equivalent to the emissions from all the cars on the road worldwide today.Wind power is projected to reduce emissions by around a further 2 Gt in 2030,and EVs by around 1 Gt more.This is far from enough to get on track for net zero emissions by 2050;inde
312、ed staying on a STEPS trajectory to 2030 would definitely close the door to the 1.5 C limit.But it is keeping the pathway open.Figure 1.15 Global energy sector CO2 emissions in the pre-Paris Baseline Scenario and the STEPS,2015-2030 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Solar PV,wind power and EVs reduce emissions by 6 Gt
313、in 2030 in the STEPS relative to the pre-Paris Baseline Scenario 3035404520152030Gt CO2022Pre-Paris BaselineSTEPS-2023Solar PVWindElectricvehiclesOtherIEA.CC BY 4.0.44 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 We have the tools to go much faster The key actions required to bend the emiss
314、ions curve much more sharply downwards by 2030 are mature,tried and tested,and in most cases very cost effective.More than 80%of the additional emissions reductions needed in 2030 in the NZE Scenario come from well-known sources:ramping up renewables,improving energy efficiency,increasing electrific
315、ation and cutting methane emissions.In the NZE Scenario,tripling the installed capacity of renewables and doubling the rate of energy intensity improvements are central to the transformation of the energy sector.Figure 1.16 Global renewables power capacity,primary energy intensity improvements,and e
316、nergy sector methane emissions in the NZE Scenario,2022 and 2030 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Renewables,energy efficiency and methane emissions reduction options are available today and crucial to reducing near-term emissions Tripling global installed capacity of renewables to 11 000 GW by 2030 provides the large
317、st emissions reductions to 2030 in the NZE Scenario.Current trends are encouraging;repeating the growth rate seen over the last decade would be sufficient,and current policy settings already put advanced economies and China on track to achieve 85%of their contribution to this global goal.The contrib
318、ution of solar PV has been revised upward from the 2021 version of the NZE Scenario,underpinned by a surge in global manufacturing capacity,but a range of low-emissions technologies is required to ensure balanced and secure decarbonisation of the power sector.Doubling the annual rate of energy inten
319、sity improvement by 2030 in the NZE Scenario not only reduces emissions but also boosts energy security and affordability,saving the energy equivalent of all worldwide oil use in road transport today.Priorities vary by country,but the 50 100 -75%4 0008 00012 00020222030RenewablesGWIntensi
320、ty improvementsMethane emissionsMtx 3 2%4%6%20222030 x 2IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 45 1 key improvements at the global level come from upgrading the technical efficiency of equipment such as electric motors and air conditioners,from efficiency gains brought about by electrific
321、ation and the switch away from solid biomass use in low income countries,and from using energy and materials more efficiently.Further electrification of end-uses is a priority.EVs and heat pumps are central to this.Sales of EVs are already increasing fast enough to achieve the NZE Scenario milestone
322、 of two-out-of-three cars sold in 2030 being electric,and announced production targets from car makers suggest that such an outcome is within reach.Heat pump sales rose 11%globally in 2022,but many markets,notably in the European Union,are already tracking ahead of the roughly 20%annual growth rate
323、needed to 2030 in the NZE Scenario.Achieving the rapid growth in renewables,efficiency and electrification envisaged in the NZE Scenario drives down demand for fossil fuels by more than 25%this decade.However,it is also vital to reduce emissions from the fossil fuels that continue to be used.Cutting
324、 methane emissions from fossil fuel supply by 75%by 2030 is one of the lowest cost opportunities to limit warming in the near term,and the technical solutions needed are tried and tested.Without action to reduce methane emissions from fossil fuel supply,global energy sector CO2 emissions would need
325、to reach net zero by around 2045 to meet the 1.5 C limit goal.The world is finding innovative answers There is noticeably less reliance on early-stage technologies to reach net zero emissions in the updated NZE Scenario than in our first roadmap report in 2021.At that time,technologies not available
326、 on the market,i.e.at prototype or demonstration phase,delivered nearly 50%of the emissions reductions needed in 2050 to reach net zero.Now that number is around 35%(Figure 1.17).Progress has been driven by both public and private efforts to further develop and commercialise new clean energy technol
327、ogies,spurred by supportive government policies and the growing market prize of the clean energy economy.Energy R&D spending by globally listed companies exceeded USD 130 billion in 2022,an increase of 25%from 2020,and clean energy venture capital flows remain strong,despite the more difficult macro
328、economic environment.Part of this shift is also due to increased confidence in direct electrification as a cost-effective approach.In the road transport sector,for example,cost reductions and standardisation for commercial lithium-ion batteries in particular have strengthened the business case for e
329、lectromobility over other options for all types of road transport.Overall,the decarbonisation of road transport in the 2023 NZE Scenario relies around ten percentage points less on technologies under development in 2050 than was the case in the 2021 version,in part because of a reduction in the shar
330、e of hydrogen fuel cell electric heavy-duty vehicles.IEA.CC BY 4.0.46 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2023 Figure 1.17 Comparison of CO2 emissions reductions in 2050 relative to base year by technology maturity in the 2021 and 2023 NZE Scenario IEA.CC BY 4.0.Emissions reductions by
331、2050 from technologies in demonstration or prototype stage have been reduced from almost half in the 2021 NZE Scenario to about 35%in 2023 NZE Scenario 1.4.2 Four areas requiring urgent attention Scale up clean energy investment in emerging market and developing economies Clean energy investment nee
332、ds to rise everywhere,but the steepest increases are needed in emerging market and developing economies other than China(Figure 1.18).From 2015 to 2022,advanced economies and China together accounted for over 95%of global electric car and heat pump sales and nearly 85%of combined wind and solar capa
333、city additions.There are some bright spots elsewhere,notably solar investment in India,but overall clean energy investment outside advanced economies and China has been stagnant in real terms since 2015.It would need to increase by more than six-times over the next ten years to get on track for the NZE Scenario.However,there are significant obstacles to such a scale-up,including tightening financi