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1、Securing System-in-Packages with PUF Technology-2-Track:ChipletsSecuring System-in-Packages with PUF TechnologyG.J.Schrijen,CTO-3-Based on Moores Law:fitting all functions on one dieIncreased valueArea size depends on technology node(technology scaling)Increased cost(e.g.expensive masks,R&D,)But we
2、are reaching the limits of Moores Law:Reticle size is limiting factor for die sizeCost increases drastically sub-28nm(process technology complexity)Analog&NVM do not scale longer time to marketTraditional Approach:Monolithic SoCMonolithic SoCCost and complexity push towards chip disaggregation-4-New
3、 Approach:Chip Disaggregation-or Heterogeneous Integration(HI)Drivers(Hyperscale)data centers,5G,HPC,AI/ML,Need high performance and low powerChallengesInterfaces and interface standardsSupply chain risksSecurity vulnerabilities at different levelsChipletInterposerSiPAdvantages of SiPKeep Moores Law
4、 alive!Shorter product development timeLower overall design costModularity and flexibilitySystem in Package(SiP)-5-Both may be physically or remotely attacked Traditional Security RisksMonolithic SoCSystem-in-PackageProtection needed against:fault injectioncontact-less probingside-channel analysis-6
5、-Extra Security Risks for SiPsMonolithic SoCChiplets from untrusted source can be:Malicious(e.g.HW Trojans)Vulnerable to attacksUnreliableCounterfeitsInjecting malicious circuits into chip is quite difficultTop-layer chip-to-chip interfaces are susceptible to man in the middle attacksOn-chip bussesF
6、oreign bodyTrusted chipletComponents put together in multiple locations trust in 3rdparties needed3rdparty can overproduce chiplets or steal IPSystem-in-Package-7-Traditional Security SolutionKeys injected from outsideRoTOTPSecure storage on chip Expensive Complex Not FeasibleHardware Root-of-Trust(
7、RoT)security subsystem with:Crypto engines(symmetric&asymmetric)True Random Number Generator(TRNG)Secure processor-8-Traditional Method:Key Injection01110101Physical Element FusesROMFlashEEPROMAnti-fuseHardware Security ModuleHigh CostLow Flexib
8、ilityLow Security-9-Challenges Towards Advanced Technology NodesBasic ComponentsNVMFuse,anti-fuse,flashgates,flip-flops,SRAM Scaling is challengingLess reliable key storageNo NVM available on chipNVM in larger nodeWhere to securely and reliably store keys?-10-0010001
9、0000000000000000110110001
10、00000000000100011PUF Device Fingerprints-11-SRAM PUF Keys from SiliconThe start-up values create a highly random and repeatable pattern
11、 that is unique to each chipSilicon FingerprintProcess VariationDeep sub-micron variations in the production process give every transistor slightly random electric properties13When the SRAM is powered on this randomness is expressed in the start-up values(0 or 1)of SRAM cellsSRAM Start-up Values2SRA
12、M PUF KeyThe silicon fingerprint is turned into a secret key that builds the foundation of a security subsystem4Device-unique,unclonable fingerprintLeverages entropy of mfg.processNo key material programmed-12-The activation code is non-sensitive and can be stored on-or off-chipHighly reliable:Avera
13、ge error rate 10-12SRAM PUF Key Creation&ReconstructionEnrollment:One-Time ProcessRKey Extractor(QuiddiKey IP)SRAM PUFHelperdata/Activation Code(AC)Key Reconstruction:in the FieldRKey Extractor(QuiddiKey IP)SRAM PUFSRAM PUF Key-13-Trust Validation Levels with PUFLevel 1Level 2Level 3PUF as identifie
14、rPUF+symmetric cryptoPUF in PKI systemChipletHardwarePUFSRAMQuiddiKeyChipletHardwarePUFSRAMQuiddiKeyAsymmetric CryptoChipletHardwarePUFSRAMlightweight solutionworks on any chiplettracking from earliest moment in productionStrong protection of private keyNo UID programming neededNo OTP needed for key
15、 storageSymmetric key only known within SiPNo UID programming needed No OTP needed for key storage No UID programming needed No OTP needed for key storage No keys at restCipher-14-Chipletsfor various functions have a minimum hardware security component comprising:QuiddiKey IP(QK)for secure key manag
16、ementA small region of SRAM memory for Chiplet identification and trackingA light-weight cipher for authentication and encryption purposesLevel 1&2 Security Example There is one Master Chiplet that:Contains the main processor Has a security subsystem with more powerful crypto capabilities,including
17、asymmetric cryptoVerifies authenticity of connected ChipletsSets up encrypted communication channels with the other Chiplets in the SiPChipletQKCipherMaster ChipletSecurity SubsystemCPUQKCrypto Accelerators-15-SRAM Fingerprint(FP)is read out and QuiddiKey(QK)Enrollment is triggered The produced Acti
18、vation Code(AC)and derived chiplet-unique key are sent to ChipIDServerServer turns FP into a unique identifier(UID)and stores ACA set of Random Keys is encrypted with the chiplet-unique key for later usage added to ChipletCertificateChiplet Enrollment Silicon ManufacturingSilicon Manufacturing/Wafer
19、 TestChipID ServerChiplet:3F4A119CD0Reference FP,ACChiplet:28453670EReference FP,ACQKCipherQKCipherSRAM Fingerprint(FP),AC,SRAM Fingerprint(FP),AC,-16-Master Chiplet verifies Chiplet fingerprint with Reference fingerprint in certificate(Level 1)Master Chiplet uses encrypted Random Key to verify Chip
20、let authenticity(Level 2)Chip/SiPProductionChipID ServerChiplet 3Chiplet 4Fingerprint CertificateChiplet 2(NVM)Chiplet 1(Master)FingerprintChiplet:3F4A119CD0Reference FP,ACAC-17-Master Chiplet uses an encrypted Random Key to setup its own secret Communication Key with the specific ChipletStoring AC
21、and wrapped ChipletCommunication Key in NVMChip/SiPProductionChiplet 3Chiplet 4Fingerprint CertificateChiplet 2(NVM)Chiplet 1(Master)3:AC,Chiplet:3F4A119CD0Reference FP,ACACChipID Server-18-1.Master Chipletsends AC and wrapped ChipletCommunication Key to every Chiplet2.QK on Chipletreconstructs PUF
22、key and unwraps the ChipletCommunication KeyLoading Chiplet Keys(in the field)Chiplet 3Chiplet 4Chiplet 2(NVM)Chiplet 1(Master)3:AC,4:AC,AC,AC,Further communications on the bus can now be encrypted and authenticated Note:no sensitive data in any non-volatile memory-19-PUFs allow for tracking in the
23、supply chain as early as from a die on a waferPUFs enable chipletswithout OTP to securely“store”cryptographic keysPUFs provide a more convenient,flexible,and secure way to provision(many)chipletsConclusionsWith System-in-Package new security threats arisePUF technology offers several advantages to protect SiPs-20-Have a look at our website:https:/www.intrinsic- in finding out more?Thank you!