《国际原子能机构:在国家边境检测不受监管控制的核材料和其他放射性材料(2023)(英文版)(98页).pdf》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《国际原子能机构:在国家边境检测不受监管控制的核材料和其他放射性材料(2023)(英文版)(98页).pdf(98页珍藏版)》请在三个皮匠报告上搜索。
1、IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.44-TTechnical GuidanceDetection at State Borders ofNuclear and Other Radioactive Materialout of Regulatory ControlJointly sponsored byIAEA,ICPO-INTERPOL,UNICRI,UNOCT,UNODC,WCOINTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCYVIENNAThe objective of this publication is to provide guida
2、nce to States on planning,implementing and evaluating systems and measures to detect at State borders nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control,with special consideration of designated points of exit or entry and border areas.The guidance applies to all types of traffic flow i
3、nvolving people,goods and/or conveyances.This publication is intended to be used by national competent authorities and other organizations responsible for developing,designing,implementing and sustaining detection systems and measures at State borders,such as border protection authorities,customs au
4、thorities,national or local law enforcement agencies,regulatory bodies,national postal administrations and civil aviation authorities.IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.44-T Detection at State Borders of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory ControlIAEA NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIESNuclear
5、 security issues relating to the prevention and detection of,and response to,criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving,or directed at,nuclear material,other radioactive material,associated facilities or associated activities are addressed in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.These publicati
6、ons are consistent with,and complement,international nuclear security instruments,such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment,the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373 and
7、 1540,and the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.CATEGORIES IN THE IAEA NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIESPublications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series are issued in the following categories:Nuclear Security Fundamentals specify the objective of a States nuclear security regim
8、e and the essential elements of such a regime.They provide the basis for the Nuclear Security Recommendations.Nuclear Security Recommendations set out measures that States should take to achieve and maintain an effective national nuclear security regime consistent with the Nuclear Security Fundament
9、als.Implementing Guides provide guidance on the means by which States could implement the measures set out in the Nuclear Security Recommendations.As such,they focus on how to meet the recommendations relating to broad areas of nuclear security.Technical Guidance provides guidance on specific techni
10、cal subjects to supplement the guidance set out in the Implementing Guides.They focus on details of how to implement the necessary measures.DRAFTING AND REVIEWThe preparation and review of Nuclear Security Series publications involves the IAEA Secretariat,experts from Member States(who assist the Se
11、cretariat in drafting the publications)and the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee(NSGC),which reviews and approves draft publications.Where appropriate,open-ended technical meetings are also held during drafting to provide an opportunity for specialists from Member States and relevant international
12、 organizations to review and discuss the draft text.In addition,to ensure a high level of international review and consensus,the Secretariat submits the draft texts to all Member States for a period of 120 days for formal review.For each publication,the Secretariat prepares the following,which the N
13、SGC approves at successive stages in the preparation and review process:An outline and work plan describing the intended new or revised publication,its intended purpose,scope and content;A draft publication for submission to Member States for comment during the 120 day consultation period;A final dr
14、aft publication taking account of Member States comments.The process for drafting and reviewing publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series takes account of confidentiality considerations and recognizes that nuclear security is inseparably linked with general and specific national security conc
15、erns.An underlying consideration is that related IAEA safety standards and safeguards activities should be taken into account in the technical content of the publications.In particular,Nuclear Security Series publications addressing areas in which there are interfaces with safety known as interface
16、documents are reviewed at each of the stages set out above by relevant Safety Standards Committees as well as by the NSGC.DETECTION AT STATE BORDERS OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OUT OF REGULATORY CONTROLThe Agencys Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute
17、 of the IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters,New York;it entered into force on 29 July 1957.The Headquarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna.Its principal objective is“to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace,health and prosperity throughout the world.IAEA NUCLEA
18、R SECURITY SERIES No.44TDETECTION AT STATE BORDERS OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OUT OF REGULATORY CONTROLTECHNICAL GUIDANCE JOINTLY SPONSORED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION-INTERPOL,UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE RESE
19、ARCH INSTITUTE,UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM,UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME,WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATIONINTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY VIENNA,2023 IAEA,2023Printed by the IAEA in AustriaOctober 2023STI/PUB/1952COPYRIGHT NOTICEAll IAEA scientific and technical publications ar
20、e protected by the terms of the Universal Copyright Convention as adopted in 1952(Berne)and as revised in 1972(Paris).The copyright has since been extended by the World Intellectual Property Organization(Geneva)to include electronic and virtual intellectual property.Permission to use whole or parts
21、of texts contained in IAEA publications in printed or electronic form must be obtained and is usually subject to royalty agreements.Proposals for non-commercial reproductions and translations are welcomed and considered on a case-by-case basis.Enquiries should be addressed to the IAEA Publishing Sec
22、tion at:Marketing and Sales Unit,Publishing SectionInternational Atomic Energy AgencyVienna International CentrePO Box 1001400 Vienna,Austriafax:+43 1 26007 22529tel.:+43 1 2600 22417email:sales.publicationsiaea.org www.iaea.org/publicationsIAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication DataNames:Internati
23、onal Atomic Energy Agency.Title:Detection at state borders of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control/International Atomic Energy Agency.Description:Vienna:International Atomic Energy Agency,2023.|Series:IAEA nuclear security series,ISSN 18169317;no.44-T|Includes bibliograph
24、ical references.Identifiers:IAEAL 22-01561|ISBN 9789201186218(paperback:alk.paper)|ISBN 9789201187215(pdf)|ISBN 9789201188212(epub)Subjects:LCSH:Radioactive substances.|Radioactive substances Detection.|Radioactive substances Security measures.|Radioactive substances Safety measures.|Nuclear nonprol
25、iferation.Classification:UDC 341.67|STI/PUB/1952FOREWORD by Rafael Mariano Grossi Director GeneralThe IAEA Nuclear Security Series provides international consensus guidance on all aspects of nuclear security to support States as they work to fulfil their responsibility for nuclear security.The IAEA
26、establishes and maintains this guidance as part of its central role in providing nuclear security related international support and coordination.The IAEA Nuclear Security Series was launched in 2006 and is continuously updated by the IAEA in cooperation with experts from Member States.As Director Ge
27、neral,I am committed to ensuring that the IAEA maintains and improves upon this integrated,comprehensive and consistent set of up to date,user friendly and fit for purpose security guidance publications of high quality.The proper application of this guidance in the use of nuclear science and technol
28、ogy should offer a high level of nuclear security and provide the confidence necessary to allow for the ongoing use of nuclear technology for the benefit of all.Nuclear security is a national responsibility.The IAEA Nuclear Security Series complements international legal instruments on nuclear secur
29、ity and serves as a global reference to help parties meet their obligations.While the security guidance is not legally binding on Member States,it is widely applied.It has become an indispensable reference point and a common denominator for the vast majority of Member States that have adopted this g
30、uidance for use in national regulations to enhance nuclear security in nuclear power generation,research reactors and fuel cycle facilities as well as in nuclear applications in medicine,industry,agriculture and research.The guidance provided in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series is based on the pract
31、ical experience of its Member States and produced through international consensus.The involvement of the members of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and others is particularly important,and I am grateful to all those who contribute their knowledge and expertise to this endeavour.The IAEA also
32、 uses the guidance in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series when it assists Member States through its review missions and advisory services.This helps Member States in the application of this guidance and enables valuable experience and insight to be shared.Feedback from these missions and services,and l
33、essons identified from events and experience in the use and application of security guidance,are taken into account during their periodic revision.I believe the guidance provided in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series and its application make an invaluable contribution to ensuring a high level of nucle
34、ar security in the use of nuclear technology.I encourage all Member States to promote and apply this guidance,and to work with the IAEA to uphold its quality now and in the future.EDITORIAL NOTEThis publication does not address questions of responsibility,legal or otherwise,for acts or omissions on
35、the part of any person.Guidance issued in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series is not binding on States,but States may use the guidance to assist them in meeting their obligations under international legal instruments and in discharging their responsibility for nuclear security within the State.Guidance
36、 expressed as should statements is intended to present international good practices and to indicate an international consensus that it is necessary for States to take the measures recommended or equivalent alternative measures.Security related terms are to be understood as defined in the publication
37、 in which they appear,or in the higher level guidance that the publication supports.Otherwise,words are used with their commonly understood meanings.An appendix is considered to form an integral part of the publication.Material in an appendix has the same status as the body text.Annexes are used to
38、provide practical examples or additional information or explanation.Annexes are not integral parts of the main text.Although great care has been taken to maintain the accuracy of information contained in this publication,neither the IAEA nor its Member States assume any responsibility for consequenc
39、es which may arise from its use.The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any judgement by the publisher,the IAEA,as to the legal status of such countries or territories,of their authorities and institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries.The mention o
40、f names of specific companies or products(whether or not indicated as registered)does not imply any intention to infringe proprietary rights,nor should it be construed as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA.PREFACEThe IAEA Nuclear Security Series provides recommendations and gui
41、dance that States can use in establishing,implementing and maintaining their national nuclear security regimes.IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.15,Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control,provides recommendations to a State for the nuclear s
42、ecurity of nuclear or other radioactive material that has been reported as being out of regulatory control,as well as for material that is lost,missing or stolen but has not been reported as such,or has been otherwise discovered.IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.15 is jointly sponsored by the European
43、 Police Office(EUROPOL),the IAEA,the International Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO),the International Criminal Police Organization-INTERPOL(ICPO-INTERPOL),the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute(UNICRI),the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime(UNODC)and the World C
44、ustoms Organization(WCO).The present publication provides more detailed guidance on meeting the recommendations set out in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.15.It addresses nuclear security detection systems and measures at State borders,with special consideration of designated points of exit or entry
45、 and border areas.The present publication is jointly sponsored by the IAEA,the International Criminal Police Organization-INTERPOL(ICPO-INTERPOL),the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute(UNICRI),the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism(UNOCT),the United Nations Off
46、ice on Drugs and Crime(UNODC)and the World Customs Organization(WCO).CONTENTS1.INTRODUCTION.1Background(1.11.7).1Objective(1.8,1.9).2Scope(1.101.13).2Structure(1.14).32.NATIONAL DETECTION STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR SECURITY DETECTION ARCHITECTURE(2.1,2.2).4Legislative and regulatory framework(2.32.9).4Nat
47、ional detection strategy(2.102.13).6Policy and strategy attributes of a nuclear security detection architecture for State borders(2.14,2.15).73.PLANNING,IMPLEMENTING AND EVALUATING DETECTION SYSTEMS AND MEASURES AT STATE BORDERS(3.1).8Planning detection systems and measures at State borders(3.23.59)
48、8Implementing detection systems and measures at State borders(3.603.81).24Evaluating detection systems and measures at State borders(3.823.87).294.CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETECTION SYSTEMS AND MEASURES AT DESIGNATED POINTS OF EXIT OR ENTRY(4.14.3).31Inspection of large volumes of people,goods and conveya
49、nces(4.44.8).31Targeting criteria for screening (4.9,4.10).33Legitimate sources of radiation(4.114.13).33Additional documentation available for decision making(4.14).34On-site storage considerations(4.15).34Non-intrusive inspection equipment(4.16,4.17).34Upgrades,changes and damage(4.184.20).355.CON
50、SIDERATIONS FOR DETECTION SYSTEMS AND MEASURES IN BORDER AREAS(5.15.4).36Limited infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions(5.5,5.6)37Detection operations covering large areas(5.7,5.8).37Populated border areas(5.9).38Communication challenges(5.10).38Geography and terrain(5.115.14).38APPENDIX:
51、EQUIPMENT FOR RADIATION DETECTION AT STATE BORDERS 41REFERENCES.45ANNEX I:EXAMPLES OF CONTENT FOR THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND THE DESIGN 49ANNEX II:EXAMPLES OF CONTENT FOR STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 58ANNEX III:EXAMPLE OF AN EVALUATION PROCESS FOR ALARMS ON DECLARED SHIPMENTS 651.INTRODUCTIONBA
52、CKGROUND1.1.The threat posed by nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control is an important challenge that States face.The timely detection of this material can reduce the risk of its use in criminal or intentional unauthorized acts.1.2.IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.20,Objecti
53、ve and Essential Elements of a States Nuclear Security Regime 1,identifies the establishment of systems and measures to detect nuclear security events as an essential element of a States nuclear security regime.1.3.Paragraph 5.6 of IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.15,Nuclear Security Recommendations
54、on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control 2,states:“Using the national threat assessment,the competent authorities should establish nuclear security systems for detection by instruments of nuclear and other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control.The detectio
55、n systems should be based on a multilayered defence in depth approach and on the premise that such material could originate from both within or outside the State,and provide the necessary detection capability and capacity.”1.4.Paragraph 5.11 of Ref.2 recommends the following:“The State should contin
56、uously gather,store and analyse operational information with the goal of identifying any threat,suspicious activity or abnormality involving nuclear or other radioactive material that may indicate the intention to commit a criminal act,or an unauthorized act,with nuclear security implications”.1.5.I
57、AEA Nuclear Security Series No.21,Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control 3,provides guidance for the development of an effective nuclear security detection architecture derived from a comprehensive,integrated detect
58、ion strategy prepared by the State.Reference 3 states that“Effective border controls are critical in preventing and/or detecting the unauthorized transport of nuclear and other radioactive material.”11.6.This publication provides detailed guidance to supplement the guidance in Ref.3.States can use t
59、his guidance to design,implement and sustain effective nuclear security detection systems and measures at State borders that meet national nuclear security objectives and facilitate the efficient and effective movement of people,goods and conveyances.This publication also supplements the following I
60、mplementing Guides:IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.37-G,Developing a National Framework for Managing the Response to Nuclear Security Events 4;IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.24-G,Risk Informed Approach for Nuclear Security Measures for Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Contro
61、l 5;IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.31-G,Building Capacity for Nuclear Security 6.1.7.This publication also complements the following Technical Guidance:IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.34-T,Planning and Organizing Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out o
62、f Regulatory Control 7.OBJECTIVE1.8.The objective of this publication is to provide guidance to States on planning,implementing and evaluating systems and measures to detect at State borders nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.1.9.This publication is intended to be used
63、by national competent authorities and other organizations responsible for developing,designing,implementing and sustaining detection systems and measures at State borders,such as border protection authorities,customs authorities,national or local law enforcement agencies,regulatory bodies,national p
64、ostal administrations and civil aviation authorities.SCOPE1.10.This publication addresses nuclear security detection systems and measures at State borders,with special consideration of designated points of exit or entry(POEs)and border areas.This publication does not address nuclear security detecti
65、on systems and measures within a State.21.11.The guidance in this publication applies to the detection at State borders of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control for all types of traffic flow involving people,goods and/or conveyances,including the following:(a)All types of
66、persons,including pedestrians,passengers,ship or airline crews,airport or seaport employees,or residents of border areas;(b)All means of transport for people and cargo,including cars,vans,trains,buses,trucks,ships,boats,construction vehicles and conveyors;(c)All types of goods,including personal ite
67、ms,luggage,mail,containerized shipments and bulk shipments.1.12.This publication does not address response to a nuclear security event,guidance on which is provided in Ref.4.This publication therefore does not address response to nuclear or radiological emergencies involving nuclear or other radioac
68、tive material out of regulatory control at State borders,guidance on which is provided in Refs 814.1.13.While reference is made in this publication to the need for radiation safety measures at the point of detection,such measures are not addressed in detail.Subsequent handling of seized materials is
69、 also outside the scope of this publication.STRUCTURE1.14.Section 2 provides information on the national detection strategy.Section 3 provides guidance on planning,implementing and evaluating detection systems and measures at State borders.Sections 4 and 5 focus on considerations specific to detecti
70、on at designated POEs and in border areas,respectively.The Appendix provides descriptions of common types of detection equipment used at State borders.Annexes I and II present examples of content for the concept of operations,the design and standard operating procedures,and Annex III provides a deta
71、iled example of the process for evaluating alarms on declared shipments.32.NATIONAL DETECTION STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR SECURITY DETECTION ARCHITECTURE2.1.For the purpose of this publication,the term at a State border is taken to mean one of the following:(a)At a designated POE within the State.(b)At an
72、undesignated POE in a border area,that is,on the geographical line that separates a State from a neighbouring State,or in the area of the State lying along and close to this line.In the case of a border that crosses a lake or sea,the border area includes the area of water within the State between th
73、e border and the shore or coast,as well as the area of the State lying along and close to this shore or coast.2.2.A designated POE is an officially designated place on the land border between two States,seaport,international airport or other point where travellers,means of transport,and/or goods are
74、 inspected.Often,customs and immigration facilities are provided at these POEs.Border areas include all locations at or near State borders and undesignated POEs,which include any air,land or water crossing point between two States that is not officially designated for travellers and/or goods by the
75、State,such as green borders,seashores and local airports.The national detection strategy described in this publication guides the States detection activities at designated POEs and in border areas.LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK2.3.Paragraph 3.2 of Ref.2 states:“As part of an overall framework,
76、the State should establish and maintain effective executive,judicial,legislative and regulatory frameworks to govern the detection of and response to a criminal act,or an unauthorized act,with nuclear security implications involving any nuclear or other radioactive material that is out of regulatory
77、 control.Responsibilities should be clearly defined for implementing various elements of nuclear security and assigned to the relevant competent authorities”.42.4.Reference 2 also states(footnote omitted):“3.3.In establishing legislative and regulatory frameworks to govern nuclear security,the State
78、 should define the conduct which it considers to be a criminal act,or an unauthorized act,with nuclear security implications.“3.4.The State should establish criminal offences under domestic law which should include the wilful,unauthorized acquisition,possession,use,transfer or transport of nuclear o
79、r other radioactive material consistent with international treaties,conventions and legally binding United Nations Security Council resolutions.“3.5.The State should also establish as criminal offences a threat or attempt to commit an offence as described in paragraph 3.4.“3.6.The State should consi
80、der establishing as criminal offences,unlawful scams or hoaxes with nuclear security implications.”2.5.Moreover,para.4.60 of IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.29-G,Developing Regulations and Associated Administrative Measures for Nuclear Security 15,states:“The State should include in its legislative
81、and regulatory framework requirements for:A national strategy for the detection of criminal or intentional unauthorized acts with nuclear security implications involving nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control;Nuclear security systems and measures for the detection of nuclear
82、 and other radioactive material out of regulatory control;Agreements for international cooperation and assistance in relation to the detection of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.”2.6.Paragraph 4.61 of Ref.15 states:“The competent authorities with responsibilities for
83、 the detection of material out of regulatory control should be designated in primary legislation,such as nuclear law,national security legislation and legislation related to border protection and customs.The main competent authorities involved in the detection of material out of regulatory control i
84、nclude those with 5responsibilities to monitor and control the movements of goods and people.Competent authorities with responsibilities for the detection of material out of regulatory control may include the regulatory body,police and law enforcement agencies,customs authorities,border protection a
85、uthorities and intelligence agencies.”2.7.Furthermore,para.2.16 of Ref.3 states:“The legal framework should also provide the basis for the implementation of national import and export controls as well as customs and border operations for detection at designated and undesignated points of entry and/o
86、r exit(POEs),and at other strategic locations.”2.8.To facilitate inspections and detection,the competent authorities should have the appropriate authorization to stop,search and detain people and to seize goods and conveyances as part of their operations at the location where the inspections or dete
87、ction take place.2.9.Records of the calibration and maintenance of the equipment used in detection,and of the training of the front line officers1,should be maintained.All activities should be conducted in accordance with established standards and certification specifications and should be documente
88、d,as this information might be needed as supporting evidence in a prosecution.NATIONAL DETECTION STRATEGY2.10.Paragraph 3.14 of Ref.2 states:“The State,through its coordinating body or mechanism,should inter alia:Ensure the development of a comprehensive national detection strategy based on a multil
89、ayered defence in depth approach within available resources”.1 Front line officers are the responsible individuals from a designated government organization or institution who are first potentially in contact with nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control,either through inform
90、ation alerts or instrument alarms.62.11.Paragraph 2.8 of Ref.3 states:“The national detection strategy should determine the scope of,and priority assigned to the nuclear security detection architecture.It should articulate objectives for the detection systems and measures,and provide the basis for a
91、ssignment of functions,including cooperation and coordination between the competent authorities and allocation of resources.”2.12.The possible movement of nuclear and other radioactive material along transit routes into and out of the State should be considered in the national detection strategy.Whe
92、n performing a national threat assessment,as described in para.3.19 of Ref.2,competent authorities should work closely together and consider“The threat through and to the transboundary movement and transport of goods and movement of persons”.2.13.States should consider applying a graded approach by
93、prioritizing their designated POEs and border areas taking into account factors such as the level of risk,the location and size of the POE or area,the volume and type of traffic through it,the cost of detection systems and measures and the strategic importance of the area in order to implement more
94、effective detection systems and measures in higher priority locations.POLICY AND STRATEGY ATTRIBUTES OF A NUCLEAR SECURITY DETECTION ARCHITECTURE FOR STATE BORDERS2.14.As described in Ref.7,the first step of planning a nuclear security detection architecture involves the following:“2.8.Planners revi
95、ew the goals2 of the detection architecture and develop specific,measurable and actionable descriptions of activities that need to be completed to achieve these goals.“2.9.These descriptions,referred to as functional outcomes3,can be developed at different levels of specificity,and articulate specif
96、ic directions for the design of the detection architecture “2 In Ref.7 goals refer to high level statements that set the general direction.“3 In Ref.7 functional outcomes refer to specific descriptions of actions to be performed.”72.15.The goals and functional outcomes for the nuclear security detec
97、tion architecture at designated POEs and in border areas should be based on the policy and strategy attributes described in para.3.4 of Ref.7.The sustainability of the detection systems and measures,as well as the need for complementary measures to address the insider threat through mechanisms such
98、as trustworthiness programmes,should also be taken into account when planning and implementing detection systems and measures at State borders.3.PLANNING,IMPLEMENTING AND EVALUATING DETECTION SYSTEMS AND MEASURES AT STATE BORDERS3.1.Developing and sustaining systems and measures for the detection at
99、 State borders of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control involves three phases:planning,implementation and evaluation.The State should identify a lead organization or coordinating body that will be responsible for each of these phases.PLANNING DETECTION SYSTEMS AND MEASURES
100、 AT STATE BORDERS3.2.During the planning phase,the competent authority responsible for detection at State borders should draft and finalize the concept of operations and the design for the detection systems and measures.3.3.The concept of operations should define and describe the process by which in
101、formation and equipment are to be used to detect nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control and how the initial assessment is to be performed 8to determine whether an instrument alarm2 or information alert3 indicates the occurrence of an actual nuclear security event.An understa
102、nding of this process is needed to implement an effective design for nuclear security detection systems and measures that includes both equipment and operational aspects.43.4.The design is a document that describes in detail the resources that are needed,and where and when they are needed,to operate
103、 the detection systems and measures and hence implement the concept of operations.The design complements the concept of operations by identifying the physical location of detection instruments at designated POEs and in border areas,and by describing inspection locations,traffic flow and control mech
104、anisms,and the locations of border personnel and supporting communications infrastructure(e.g.cameras,central and local alarm stations,command centres).3.5.The concept of operations and the design should document the goals for the detection systems and measures at a specific site or area,should iden
105、tify the relevant competent authorities and should designate the organizational roles and responsibilities,taking into account such information as the location of the detection systems and measures,operational scenarios and constraints.The concept of operations and the design should also describe th
106、e characteristics of a detection system in a manner that integrates operations,staffing,infrastructure and maintenance plans.The concept of operations and the design should be agreed on by relevant competent authorities and other organizations that are affected by the detection systems and measures.
107、3.6.The concept of operations and the design are important inputs to defining the specifications for equipment procurement and developing and finalizing the standard operating procedures.The concept of operations addresses the overall process for detection(i.e.who does what,when and where),including
108、 a high 2 An instrument alarm is a signal from instruments that could indicate a nuclear security event requiring assessment.An instrument alarm may come from devices that are portable or deployed at fixed locations and operated to augment normal commerce protocols and/or in a law enforcement operat
109、ion 2.3 An information alert is time sensitive reporting that could indicate a nuclear security event requiring assessment and may come from a variety of sources,including operational information,medical surveillance,accounting and consigner/consignee discrepancies,border monitoring,etc.2.4 A concep
110、t of operations can be documented at the national level,describing multiple organizations activities;at the organizational level,describing the activities within a single organization nationwide;or at the site level,describing activities for a specific site or area.This publication focuses on a site
111、-or area-specific concept of operations.9level overview of the decision making that follows an alarm or alert.The design shows the physical deployment of equipment,identifies the information needed to support the concept of operations and provides instructions for traffic control,coordination of ope
112、rations and information sharing(i.e.how personnel should carry out their assigned tasks).More details on the types of information included in standard operating procedures and how to develop such procedures for a designated POE or border area are provided in paras 3.693.75 and in Annex II.3.7.When d
113、etermining the level of detail that each document should include,States should consider each documents purpose and intended audience.For planning,for example,the concept of operations and the design might describe the general approach to how information will be shared,and with whom,and where equipme
114、nt will be located.This information can help determine the number of staff needed and the type of equipment to be deployed.The standard operating procedures provide detailed instructions to the staff operating the equipment after its deployment on how information is to be shared among staff,which eq
115、uipment should be used and where it should be located.Relevant equipment manuals might provide more detailed information than the standard operating procedures on the use and maintenance of the deployed equipment.3.8.For example,the concept of operations might state that the safety of personnel shou
116、ld be considered when implementing detection systems and measures,while the standard operating procedures might dictate the use of personal radiation detectors by front line officers during all detection activities,and the equipment manual for the personal radiation detector normally provides specif
117、ic instructions regarding,for example,how to turn on and read the detector.As another example,the concept of operations might state that all inbound trucks should be monitored by a radiation portal monitor,the standard operating procedures might describe which front line officer operates the radiati
118、on portal monitor workstation to process the alarms,and the workstation manual might provide detailed steps on using the software.3.9.Examples of content for the concept of operations,for the design and for standard operating procedures are provided in Annexes I and II.States might find it useful to
119、 share experiences with other countries in order to understand good practices and common challenges related to their concepts of operations,design and standard operating procedures.3.10.The development of the concept of operations and the design should be an iterative process,as they are complementa
120、ry to each other.Detailed guidance on designating roles and responsibilities,drafting and finalizing the concept of 10operations and the design,and ensuring the sustainability of the system is provided in paras 3.113.59.Designating roles and responsibilities3.11.All competent authorities and other o
121、rganizations with nuclear security responsibilities related to State borders should be identified in the concept of operations and the design.These organizations include those responsible for deploying or installing,operating or maintaining radiation detection equipment;conducting border protection
122、and customs control;overseeing traffic control or the processing of people and cargo;operating a designated POE(e.g.an airport or port authority);providing technical expert support in the case of an instrument alarm or information alert;responding to a nuclear security event;transporting and storing
123、 detected material;and providing operational information such as intelligence.3.12.The roles and areas of responsibility assigned to each organization should be documented.One or more organizations may be designated as front line organizations responsible for operating the detection systems and meas
124、ures.Different organizations might carry out different types of inspection(i.e.of people,goods or conveyances)in different locations at the State borders(i.e.designated POEs or border areas),according to their specific areas of responsibility.National and local jurisdictions should be taken into acc
125、ount when identifying a front line organization and its roles and responsibilities.Some organizations with such responsibilities,such as luggage handling at airports or cargo handling at seaports,are not governmental agencies or regulatory bodies,but effective operations will rely on their cooperati
126、on and coordination with other agencies.3.13.When designating roles and responsibilities for competent authorities and other organizations,the State should consider and address potential complicating factors,such as when the owner of the equipment is not the same organization that operates or mainta
127、ins it,or when the authority responsible for assessing an alarm does not have jurisdiction in the area in which the detection equipment is located.3.14.In particular,organizational responsibilities and jurisdictions should be considered when determining equipment locations.For example,if the customs
128、 organization is responsible for responding to radiation detection alarms and the detection equipment is located in a part of an international airport in which the customs organization has no jurisdiction,the concept of operations can be complicated by the need for additional responding organization
129、s.In this situation,either the organizations should agree on a coordinated concept of 11operations or the detection equipment should be moved to a different location.A coordination agreement or memorandum of understanding can be used to clarify roles and responsibilities in cases where the concept o
130、f operations involves multiple organizations.3.15.The organizations responsible for approving the design at different levels(e.g.site,local,national)should be clearly identified.An approval process for the design should be established during the planning phase,because the design can affect licensing
131、 and construction activities and equipment deployment during the implementation phase.Drafting the concept of operations3.16.The concept of operations(see paras 3.33.10)describes the activities expected to occur during the operation of detection systems and measures,including the initial assessment
132、of alarms and alerts by front line officers.It might be informed by the specifications set out in the national detection strategy and the nuclear security detection architecture,as described in Ref.3.3.17.The concept of operations should describe the following:(a)The goals and functional outcomes of
133、 the detection process;(b)Any existing regulations,policies and constraints that might affect operations;(c)Activities and decision making processes for detection,including the initial assessment and interactions between organizations;(d)Assignment of responsibilities to competent authorities or oth
134、er organizations for each activity in the detection process;(e)Assignment of responsibilities for maintaining equipment and ensuring sustainability of the detection operations.3.18.The concept of operations should also address how nuclear security detection measures are to be integrated into routine
135、 operations so as not to negatively affect other roles performed by competent authorities at borders.Competent authorities and other organizations with responsibilities for securing State borders manage a variety of complex situations within the context of many different national security objectives
136、.A meeting with relevant representatives of all identified competent authorities and other organizations with responsibilities at a designated POE or in a border area should be held early in the development of the concept of operations to clarify and agree on respective roles and responsibilities.12
137、General considerations for drafting the concept of operations3.19.The routine transport of nuclear or other radioactive material across State borders should be taken into account during the planning and development of the concept of operations.Nuclear and other radioactive material is widely used in
138、 authorized facilities and activities,including in the nuclear fuel cycle,in medical and industrial applications,and in agriculture and scientific research,and can be transported across borders between the locations of such facilities and activities.Several common products that are regularly transpo
139、rted for trade,such as fertilizers,building materials and ceramics,also contain naturally occurring radioactive material(NORM)16,which is excluded or exempt from regulatory control.Detection instruments are likely to detect radiation from such material,and the concept of operations needs to allow fo
140、r the prompt investigation of these alarms to rapidly determine that they are innocent alarms5.Detection instruments that identify the radionuclides emitting the radiation are needed to identify the source(or sources)of radiation and to determine whether an alarm is innocent or not(see para.4.11).Id
141、entification of the radionuclides can also provide valuable information to competent authorities in cases where response measures are activated.3.20.The concept of operations should also describe how information alerts will be processed by the relevant competent authorities.An information alert migh
142、t provide information about nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control entering or leaving a State through either designated POEs or border areas 3.However,the validity of the information should be checked and procedures should be implemented to make sure sufficient information
143、is gathered when acting on an information alert.3.21.Protocols for sharing information should be taken into account in the development of the concept of operations,including sharing internally within a competent authority,between national agencies,between States,or with international organizations t
144、hrough established communication channels.For example,information exchange between States can be used to identify particular containers,conveyances and cargo that,or people who,might be carrying nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control and thus warrant a greater degree of insp
145、ection.5 An innocent alarm is an alarm found by subsequent assessment to have been caused by nuclear or other radioactive material under regulatory control or exempt or excluded from regulatory control 17.13Systematic approach to developing the concept of operations3.22.The concept of operations sho
146、uld describe the process that the front line officer should follow to determine whether an instrument alarm or information alert indicates the occurrence of a nuclear security event.The concept of operations should also describe the sequence of activities and decision points that should be worked th
147、rough to reach this determination.3.23.A systematic approach should be used for the detection of nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control and the declaration of a nuclear security event,and the approach should be described in the concept of operations.The approach could includ
148、e the following main stages:(a)Stage 1:Primary detection by instrument alarm and/or information alert.(b)Stage 2:Confirmation of the primary detection.(c)Stage 3:Confirmation of a radiation hazard.(d)Stage 4:Collection and analysis of information,including radionuclide identification.(e)Stage 5:Decl
149、aration of a nuclear security event and notification of the competent authorities,if indicated by the initial assessment.3.24.The radiation protection and safety of the front line officer,and of any other people affected,should be considered during all stages.3.25.The concept of operations might inc
150、lude text and flow charts to illustrate who does what and when.Figure 1 shows a flow chart of a generic process for detection(including the initial assessment),which could be tailored to specific designated POEs or border areas.Such a flow chart should clearly show each step of the decision making p
151、rocess.3.26.The five stages listed in para.3.23 can be adapted to integrate effectively with existing security processes at designated POEs or border areas,depending on the States particular considerations and constraints.The five stages are described in more detail in paras 3.273.35.14Stage 4Stage
152、2Alert and/or alarmConfirmedhazard?In accordance with,Declared shipmentInnocent alarm confirmed?FalseRecord and releaseYesNoNuclear security eventImplement safety measuresStage 1Stage 3Stage 5YesYesNoNoFIG.1.Generic concept of operations flow chart.Stage 1:Primary detection by instrument alarm and/o
153、r information alert3.27.The process for detecting nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control begins when an instrument alarm is triggered or a front line officer receives an information alert.Information alerts at a State border might originate from,for example,operational infor
154、mation obtained by front line officers,such as observations of suspicious behaviour by people crossing the border,the discovery of falsified or inaccurate documents,or data from complementary technologies(e.g.X ray scanning)showing inconsistencies between declared and actual items.Information alerts
155、 might also be received from other authorities within the State or from another State.An established procedure should be in place for receiving such information alerts and initiating a process for follow-up actions,depending on the type and credibility of the information(e.g.checks and controls at t
156、he border could be intensified).The subsequent stages of handling information alerts will be specific to each States security arrangements,and therefore paras 3.283.35 on Stages 25 primarily address the handling of instrument alarms.15Stage 2:Confirmation of the primary detection 3.28.At Stage 2,the
157、 front line officer should confirm the validity of the primary detection,particularly to establish whether an alarm is false.6 A false alarm could be caused,for example,by an equipment malfunction.The primary detection might be confirmed by more thoroughly screening with radiation detection equipmen
158、t the person,item or conveyance that triggered the alarm.3.29.After Stages 1 and 2,the front line officer should either release the entity that appeared to trigger the alarm(i.e.the person,item or conveyance)if the alarm is false,or investigate further(and proceed to Stage 3)if the alarm is confirme
159、d.Stage 3:Confirmation of a radiation hazard 3.30.At Stage 3,the front line officer should decide whether it is safe to proceed using the standard operating procedures developed according to national regulations.7 If the front line officer determines it is unsafe to proceed to the next stage because
160、 of an actual or potential radiation hazard,the appropriate response organizations should be notified and appropriate protective actions and other response actions should be implemented(e.g.establishing an inner cordoned area and evacuating that area),according to the requirements and guidance in Re
161、fs 811.Stage 4:Collection and analysis of information,including radionuclide identification3.31.At Stage 4,if the alarm is confirmed and it has been determined that there is no radiation hazard and it is safe to proceed,the front line officer(or expert support personnel,depending on the agreed conce
162、pt of operations)should gather and analyse the available information and conduct additional inspections,as necessary,to determine whether the alarm was an innocent alarm or an indication of a real nuclear security concern.Such inspections might vary considerably depending on the specific situation,a
163、nd might include,for example,verification with a radionuclide identification instrument,examination of documentation,or other analysis and confirmation of information.6 A false alarm is an alarm found by subsequent assessment not to have been caused by the presence of nuclear or radioactive material
164、 3.7 A gamma dose rate 100 Sv/h at 1 m from the object or at 1 m above the ground is an indication of a possible radiological emergency(hazard),although dose limits may differ among Member States according to national regulations 13.163.32.If the front line officer is presented with the documentatio
165、n,signage,placards and labels required for a declared legal shipment of nuclear material or radioactive material,the front line officer or expert support personnel should consider the process outlined in Annex III for verifying declared shipments of nuclear or radioactive material with the use of sp
166、ecialized detection equipment.Stage 5:Declaration of a nuclear security event and notification of the competent authorities,if indicated by the initial assessment3.33.Using the information gathered and analysed in Stage 4,at Stage 5 the front line officer should proceed as follows:(a)If the alarm is
167、 determined to be innocent,the front line officer should release the entity that caused the alarm and record the event.(b)If the alarm is determined not to be innocent,the front line officer should notify the relevant competent authorities to initiate response procedures for a nuclear security event
168、.(c)If the front line officer cannot determine the type of alarm,expert support should be obtained to assist with further information gathering and analysis.3.34.If the dose rate measured or material found during an additional inspection presents an imminent danger to health and safety,or a security
169、 threat,a safe perimeter should be defined,the material should be secured and the relevant competent authorities should be notified.The concept of operations and the relevant response plans should document the roles and responsibilities and the process for these actions and notifications as appropri
170、ate.3.35.Responsibilities for notification and for securing and placing material under regulatory control may be assigned to different organizations,or one organization may have multiple responsibilities.Actions to meet these responsibilities should be established in accordance with relevant respons
171、e plans and procedures for nuclear security events.Designing detection systems and measures at State borders3.36.The design goals for detection systems and measures for designated POEs and border areas should be such as to achieve the objectives of the national detection strategy.The design should r
172、eflect the concept of operations,and the physical location of and timeline for each detection stage(as described in para.3.23)should be clearly specified.For example,a design goal for an individual location might specify that the primary inspection will be conducted by front line officers 17using fi
173、xed detection instruments on all inbound traffic(i.e.people,goods and conveyances).As another example,a design goal might specify that,following an information alert,detection teams with mobile detection instruments will be deployed to patrol a specific area indicated by the alert.An initial survey
174、of the areas to be covered might be necessary to develop the design.3.37.The design should identify at least the following:(a)Traffic flow and control mechanisms;(b)Locations and nature of detection instruments;(c)Locations for inspections;(d)Checkpoints and patrol areas;(e)Data management and commu
175、nications equipment,including how this equipment will communicate with the national communications system and whether it will be located in a central alarm station,local alarm station and/or server room;(f)Other infrastructure,such as traffic control equipment,to support the detection systems and me
176、asures.3.38.The design should specify where people or conveyances that have been screened will be isolated while the initial assessment and any secondary inspection are conducted.Secondary inspections might include in addition to gamma spectrometry X ray scans or physical searches to check the conte
177、nts of containers,conveyances or items of cargo,or to look for contraband in the possession of a person.A temporary holding or storage location should be identified in the design for cases in which further inspections or analysis are needed to assess an alarm or alert,taking into account the relevan
178、t safety and security requirements.Temporary holding or storage locations can also serve as material seizure points.3.39.Paragraphs 3.403.48 provide more detail on the types of detection equipment and on the communications equipment and supporting infrastructure that could be included in the design.
179、Types of detection equipment3.40.Radiation detection equipment can be used to detect,locate,measure and identify nuclear and other radioactive material.Some detection equipment can also record and store measured data,download data to a computer,or transmit data to a centre of operations or to techni
180、cal expert support organizations.Some detection equipment is equipped with a global positioning system(GPS)and 18can be used for monitoring and mapping large areas.Radiation detectors can be portable,mobile or fixed.8 Advanced spectroscopic detectors can identify specific radionuclides from the radi
181、ation they emit,although these detectors are rarely used for primary detection at borders owing to their cost.Detection equipment selected for deployment should be based on technically sound and proven technology.3.41.The basic types of radiation detection equipment that can be used for detection pu
182、rposes at designated POEs and in border areas are listed below and described further in the Appendix:Personal radiation detectors;Handheld gamma and/or neutron survey meters;Handheld radionuclide identification devices;Backpack based radiation detection systems(with or without radionuclide identific
183、ation capability);Vehicle mounted radiation detection systems(with or without radionuclide identification capability);Fixed radiation portal monitors;Conveyor belt radiation monitors;Airborne radiation detection systems9;Maritime radiation detection systems.3.42.Each type of detection equipment has
184、advantages and limitations:each has a particular sensitivity range and provides optimal detection under particular conditions.The design of the overall detection system should take into account the operating conditions for which the different types of equipment are particularly suited.For example,fi
185、xed equipment is particularly suitable for monitoring controlled traffic,as the detection sensitivity depends on conditions such as the speed of the conveyance being scanned and its distance from the instrument.3.43.In practice,selecting equipment will involve balancing different considerations.For
186、example,fixed installations typically provide the most sensitive detection and can scan the largest volume of traffic,but at a higher purchase,installation and maintenance cost than portable or mobile equipment.Fixed 8 Equipment described as portable can typically be carried and used by a person(e.g
187、.a front line officer).Equipment described as mobile can readily be moved from place to place,typically by means of a vehicle or other equipment,but is then fixed for use at the chosen location.Equipment described as fixed cannot readily be moved.9 In this publication,airborne radiation detection sy
188、stems are systems that move through the air,such as aircraft mounted systems.19equipment with radionuclide spectrum identification capabilities is even more expensive to purchase and maintain,but it can reduce the staffing needs relating to the conduct of secondary inspections.In addition,other infr
189、astructure,such as protective barriers,might be needed to protect fixed detection equipment against damage,and traffic control measures might need to be installed.Mobile detection systems might have lower sensitivity but allow for greater operational flexibility in where,when and how they are deploy
190、ed.Portable equipment might have even lower sensitivity,but it can be less expensive to deploy and maintain and can offer the highest degree of operational flexibility.In addition to cost and detection sensitivity,consideration should be given to related factors,such as staffing needs and sustainabi
191、lity.3.44.Other factors to consider when determining which type of equipment to use and where to locate it include environmental conditions(e.g.temperature,wind speed and direction,dust levels,humidity,risks of flooding or lightning);estimates of traffic volumes and alarm rates;natural background ra
192、diation;the physical layout of the site;existing infrastructure(e.g.stable power supply,communications);possible interference from nearby inspection devices that emit radiation(e.g.non-intrusive gamma or X ray inspection devices);the physical space available for the secondary inspection and detentio
193、n of people,goods or conveyances;and the feasibility of protecting equipment against damage,theft and sabotage.Communications and supporting infrastructure3.45.In addition to setting out the types and locations of detection equipment to be used,the design should specify how information will be commu
194、nicated and presented to assist front line officers in making sound decisions during the detection process.For example,if information will need to be shared between detection equipment and local command centres,or between local offices and headquarters,the design should identify which communications
195、 system(puters,cameras,servers,software)and infrastructure(e.g.power supply,cabling)will be needed.The design should describe any regulatory or other requirements for storing,analysing and transmitting data generated by the radiation detection equipment,and how information will be collected,collated
196、,retained and removed.The design might also specify more detailed procedures.For example,data from a fixed portal monitor,such as the measured count rate,should be sent over a network to the front line officer along with a camera image of the conveyance passing through the monitor,or closed channel
197、communication devices should be available to patrol teams,with which they can send spectral data collected from a detection instrument over a wireless network to headquarters.203.46.For detection systems in which multiple sets of equipment report to one central alarm station,the design should specif
198、ically describe the method for networking and should address factors such as the bandwidth needed,the number of locations to be connected and the distances between them.3.47.The design should specify the infrastructure needed to support the detection instruments and their communications.For example,
199、the installation of fixed equipment may involve foundations,protective bollards,a stable power supply with backup,and a means to identify objects causing instrument alarms,such as cameras with a video link.A detection system needs power and communications connections,whether or not it includes radia
200、tion portal monitors.Handheld and mobile detection equipment might need a constant power supply for operation or for regular recharging,and information from such devices might need to be downloaded to computers,for which a suitable connection mechanism might be needed.3.48.The design should also spe
201、cify the infrastructure for receiving information alerts and for protecting and sharing information.This should include computer security and information security measures,as required by the State or as necessary to prevent compromise of sensitive information or of computer based systems performing
202、or supporting functions related to detection.For example,at some locations,information might be shared over dedicated communication channels,such as fibre optic cables or wireless networks.The relevant competent authority should evaluate the capabilities of potential adversaries and determine the ex
203、tent to which detection and communications equipment needs to be protected and whether specific measures,such as the use of virtual private networks or encryption of communications,should be required.Finalizing the concept of operations and the design3.49.The concept of operations and the design sho
204、uld be formal documents10 that are developed and approved by all appropriate competent authorities and other organizations with responsibilities related to detection.The participants in the development of the concept of operations and the design should include decision makers with the authority to c
205、ommit their organizations to roles and responsibilities,including financial obligations,and operational staff who can ensure that the concept of operations and the design are operationally viable.10 They might be combined into one document that meets the objectives of both.213.50.Before the concept
206、of operations and the design are finalized,a site survey should be conducted at each planned operational location.A site survey is an activity by which a designated POE or border area is reviewed to confirm local conditions,validate plans and identify possible locations for radiation detection equip
207、ment,data processing and communications systems,and infrastructure.3.51.The goal of the site survey is to collect information on and to document the following:the physical layout of the areas in which equipment is to be deployed;the standard vehicle,cargo and pedestrian traffic patterns for entry to
208、 and exit from the area;routes through the area for import,export,transit and transhipment;existing infrastructure,including communications systems and power supplies;information flow among competent authorities and other organizations with responsibilities related to detection(e.g.customs authority
209、,border protection authority,port authority,site operator,site security);and local regulations and governing procedures.3.52.A site survey for the installation of fixed detection equipment should be conducted by a survey team.The survey team should include the following individuals:(a)Technical expe
210、rts capable of developing designs for civil engineering works,electrical systems and communications networks.(b)Engineers who can determine construction specifications and initiate construction planning.(c)Representatives of the organizations with responsibilities related to detection to facilitate
211、discussion on issues such as how to respond to alarms at the site or in the patrolled area and how this process will influence decisions on the location of detection equipment.(d)Radiation detection experts who can perform a background radiation survey.The results of the radiation survey will inform
212、 the specifications for the design and the operation of the detection system.3.53.The proposed concept of operations and the proposed design should ideally be tested with different scenarios to simulate the decision making process under different conditions(e.g.during a power failure,in extremely cr
213、owded conditions,during quiet shifts with few staff on duty,when secondary inspection areas are located far from the patrol area).This can help validate assumptions and identify gaps in the concept of operations and the design.3.54.The formal meetings to revise and approve the concept of operations
214、and the design could be facilitated by the competent authority with the lead responsibility 22for detection at the designated POE or in the border area.Decisions taken in such meetings should be approved by all parties and documented.Sustainability planning3.55.In accordance with para.3.12(d)of Ref.
215、1,the competent authorities assigned responsibilities for nuclear security should be provided with“sufficient human,financial and technical resources to carry out the organizations nuclear security responsibilities on a continuing basis using a risk informed approach”.National regulations,such as le
216、gal requirements for detection at State borders,can provide for continuing resource allocations for activities associated with the long term sustainability of detection systems and measures.3.56.During the planning process,States should document their plans for the long term sustainability of the de
217、tection systems and measures,including resources for the equipments life cycle and development of human resources,in order to ensure that the systems and measures remain effective over time.States should conduct periodic risk and threat assessments as a basis for determining whether the detection sy
218、stems and measures remain appropriate and for identifying and implementing changes to the detection system when necessary.3.57.Regular training schedules should be developed for the personnel who operate detection systems and measures,with attention given to the development of training materials and
219、 to the certification of the trainers.3.58.The State should establish(a)a means by which detection equipment will continue to be maintained and repaired in the long term,including establishing responsibility for the equipment itself and for financing repair services,tools and spare parts,and(b)a pla
220、n for the training of maintenance and repair personnel.The relevant competent authorities should work with vendors,contractors and suppliers where necessary to understand and plan for equipment life cycle costs.3.59.The sustainability plan should establish a method for assessing the performance of t
221、he detection system,including the performance of the equipment and of the staff.It should also include resources for a life cycle plan to address equipment ageing,obsolescence and eventual upgrade or replacement.Recurring costs,such as staffing and training costs,should be incorporated into the annu
222、al resources of the relevant competent authorities.23IMPLEMENTING DETECTION SYSTEMS AND MEASURES AT STATE BORDERS3.60.The implementation phase includes the selection and procurement of equipment,its deployment and acceptance testing,and the training of personnel.The standard operating procedures sho
223、uld be drafted during this phase,indicating how the detection systems and measures will be operated at the designated POE and/or in the border area.Equipment selection and procurement3.61.Equipment specifications should be established as a basis for the selection and procurement of equipment.The cho
224、ice of equipment should take account of the concept of operations and the design,national policy and guidance(e.g.the national threat assessment,national detection strategy,nuclear security detection architecture,established equipment performance requirements or regulations),and factors identified d
225、uring sustainability planning.Selection and procurement of radiation detection instruments3.62.Radiation detection instruments should meet specifications designed to ensure performance consistent with established international and/or national standards.3.63.Procurement decisions frequently involve f
226、inding a balance between functionality and cost.Procurement considerations relating to the functionality of the equipment(including associated computer hardware and software)include the following:(a)Ability to support the concept of operations and the design;(b)Ability to detect and measure radiatio
227、n levels associated with materials of concern for nuclear security;(c)Ability to identify such materials;(d)Reliability(ability to consistently perform adequately)under expected environmental conditions at the detection location;(e)Compatibility with existing equipment;(f)Ability to meet specificati
228、ons for the display,storage and retention of data;(g)Ease and reliability of calibration;(h)Certification as qualified equipment for the intended purpose;(i)Training needs for operators;(j)General ease of use.243.64.Procurement considerations relating to cost include the following:(a)The initial pur
229、chase cost of the equipment itself;(b)The cost of deployment,including installation of communications systems and other infrastructure(e.g.systems for traffic control);(c)The cost of maintenance,repair and spare parts beyond those provided under warranty(which might depend on whether these parts are
230、 available locally);(d)The cost of ensuring the long term availability of spare parts;(e)The cost of installing and maintaining supporting infrastructure;(f)Staffing costs associated with operating and maintaining the equipment.3.65.During selection and procurement,States might take into account any
231、 radiation detection equipment that already exists for other uses(e.g.safety,emergency preparedness and response)and that could also provide functions for nuclear security detection without compromising its primary purpose.Communications systems3.66.A radiation detection system typically includes a
232、communications system to share alarm and alert information with operators,technical expert support,responders and others with relevant responsibilities.The elements of the communications system might also include methods to exchange information between competent authorities and to recover data after
233、 an unplanned shutdown or failure.3.67.Verbal communication(e.g.by radio or telephone)is the most basic communications system.Alternatives include collecting and recording data digitally at a centralized location(e.g.at a central alarm station or national response centre)and sending data,or otherwis
234、e providing access to data,to whomever needs it(and is authorized to receive it).Hardware and software for communications,whether procured from vendors or suppliers or developed internally,should be carefully planned and resourced.Compatibility of data formats with existing and planned systems shoul
235、d be considered and,if necessary,used as a selection criterion.Some resource considerations include computer maintenance and the need for regular equipment updates.Security features of hardware and software should be specified in procurement contracts in accordance with the system design specificati
236、ons.25Equipment deployment3.68.Deployment of the selected equipment might involve civil engineering works as well as the receipt,acceptance,installation and configuration of the detection systems.Quality assurance measures should be applied to ensure that systems as deployed meet the performance spe
237、cifications.Depending on the nature and scope of the deployment activities,specialized support might be needed to assist with developing and executing contracts,establishing power and communications connections,and ensuring the availability of office space and areas for the conduct of inspections.De
238、velopment of standard operating procedures3.69.Standard operating procedures are detailed written documents that describe how competent authorities or other organizations should implement the systems and measures defined in the concept of operations and the design to ensure effective detection.For e
239、xample,the standard operating procedures should set out in detail how front line officers determine whether an instrument alarm or information alert indicates a nuclear security event.Good standard operating procedures can help ensure that detection activities are conducted accurately,consistently,e
240、fficiently and effectively.An example of content for a standard operating procedure is provided in Annex II.3.70.The standard operating procedures should be drafted after the concept of operations and the design have been finalized.The competent authority with the lead responsibility for detection a
241、t a designated POE or in a border area should have the primary responsibility for drafting the standard operating procedures in cooperation with any other organization that will use them.This competent authority should also be responsible for reviewing standard operating procedures after the impleme
242、ntation phase and updating them when needed(e.g.following changes to the site configuration).Standard operating procedures should be developed and maintained under formal version control procedures.3.71.The number of standard operating procedures needed for the activities specified in the concept of
243、 operations will depend on such factors as the number of organizations involved in operating the detection systems,the types of standard operating procedure that these organizations already have in place,and whether relevant existing operating procedures can be modified to include detection related
244、operating procedures.The standard operating procedures should reflect the complexity of the system(including the hardware and software involved),but they should provide clear and simple instructions for the intended users.It might 26be helpful to include schematic overviews(e.g.flow charts)that refe
245、r to other more detailed documents and to use existing formats that will be familiar to users.Standard operating procedures might address detection based on information alerts as well as instrument alarms,if appropriate,taking account of the type of designated POE or border area,the different operat
246、ing steps and organizations involved in the detection systems and measures,and the different staff who might have roles in detection.3.72.The standard operating procedures should be written in clear language tailored to the target audience;should avoid ambiguity;and should specify alternative course
247、s of action only when absolutely necessary.They should maintain an appropriate balance between the need for detailed instructions and the need for the procedures to be of a manageable length.Standard operating procedures should also address the daily responsibilities of the operating staff at differ
248、ent levels of the hierarchical structure of the implementing authority.3.73.Safety and radiation protection measures based on State regulations(general and specific to the types of activity)should be detailed in the standard operating procedures.Radiation protection measures should be consistent wit
249、h relevant IAEA safety standards such as IAEA Safety Standards Series No.GSR Part 3,Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources:International Basic Safety Standards 18.The standard operating procedures should include an up to date list of contacts(e.g.technical expert support,maintenance pe
250、rsonnel,response team)to enable the front line officer to request support as needed,clearly indicating whom to contact and under what circumstances.3.74.The standard operating procedures should list the locations of fixed detection equipment and describe the deployment of other equipment.They should
251、 contain clear instructions for the front line officer on how to recognize the type of alarm and what actions to take for each type,how and when to use instruments in the assessment of the alarm(including uploading and reporting data),and how and when to perform any necessary routine maintenance suc
252、h as battery checks.They should(a)provide examples of alarm information displays and instructions for operating software and(b)describe actions necessary to control traffic and its speed and to move people,goods and conveyances to the secondary inspection area if they trigger an alarm.They might als
253、o include detailed techniques for searching people,goods and conveyances,as well as guidance on establishing isolation areas and on notifying competent authorities of a nuclear security event.3.75.The standard operating procedures should specify the roles,responsibilities and actions of staff if an
254、information alert is received and provide instructions 27for processing the alert and for notifying competent authorities and other organizations,as appropriate.The standard operating procedures should include an action plan or checklist to help in confirming whether the subject of an alert is likel
255、y to be carrying nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control.The standard operating procedures should indicate which of the actions specified in the case of an instrument alarm are applicable in the case of an information alert.Staffing for detection systems and measures3.76.Suff
256、icient staff,in number and expertise,are needed to operate,maintain and support detection systems and measures.Staffing decisions affecting front line officers and other key personnel at State borders should take into account the fact that locations with a large number of instrument alarms might nee
257、d extra staffing to conduct secondary inspections and that it might be challenging to allocate many functions and priorities to a limited number of staff members.3.77.Before and during the deployment period,competent authorities should identify staffing needs for operation,maintenance and technical
258、expert support for detection systems and measures,and suitable staff should be employed or contractors engaged to meet these needs.Considerations in determining staffing needs should include,at a minimum,the number of personnel needed to perform specific tasks identified in the concept of operations
259、 and in the standard operating procedures;the qualifications,knowledge and experience necessary to fulfil the various roles and responsibilities;financial and other resource limitations;and the need to provide training and awareness programmes and conduct exercises to improve staff effectiveness and
260、 sustainability.3.78.Other considerations in staff planning should include normal staff turnover and the need for continuity of knowledge,skills and abilities,as well as the need to adapt to changes in technology or procedures.Radiation detection should be part of the basic training curriculum for f
261、ront line officers.Human resource development3.79.Human resource development during this phase should identify the staff members that need to be trained as well as their training needs to ensure the effective operation,maintenance and sustainability of detection systems and measures.283.80.Types of
262、training should be tailored to the roles and responsibilities of different staff members involved in detection and their different backgrounds.Front line officers should be trained in,at a minimum,the basics of radiation and radiation protection,awareness of nuclear security threats,the safe and eff
263、ective use and maintenance of detection equipment,and relevant standard operating procedures.General awareness training for the staff of competent authorities and other relevant organizations could help to develop awareness of and support for detection activities.Training for maintenance staff or co
264、ntractors will need to cover at least routine maintenance,repair and calibration of equipment.Technical expert support personnel should also be trained,as appropriate to their role,in supporting the detection systems and measures.In addition to training for new staff,periodic refresher training shou
265、ld be provided for existing staff.3.81.After the detection systems and measures become operational,the relevant competent authority should consider organizing scenario based operational exercises,such as drills,tabletop exercises and field exercises,to support training and to assist in evaluating th
266、e detection systems and measures.EVALUATING DETECTION SYSTEMS AND MEASURES AT STATE BORDERS3.82.The performance of the detection systems and measures should be evaluated before they become operational and,thereafter,on a periodic basis.During the evaluation phase,the detection systems and measures s
267、hould be tested to ensure their effectiveness and consistency with the concept of operations,the design and the standard operating procedures.The maintenance and training programmes should also be in place during this phase to support the operation of the detection systems and measures and human res
268、ource needs.A programme of exercises can be designed and conducted to evaluate the detection systems and measures.System testing and evaluation3.83.The State should specify the competent authority responsible for the testing and evaluation of the detection systems and measures.To ensure that they op
269、erate as planned,the detection systems and measures should be reviewed and subjected to operational and performance testing on a defined periodic basis.The concept of operations and the design should be used to develop the testing specifications and metrics that provide a documented basis for the ev
270、aluation of the detection systems and measures.The standard operating procedures should be used to evaluate the detection systems and measures and the operators to ensure that 29the operators have the necessary training and skills.It should also be assessed whether the standard operating procedures
271、correctly reflect the detection systems and measures as deployed and whether they are adequate and are being followed.3.84.Acceptance testing of detection equipment is normally conducted as part of the procurement process during the implementation phase.Equipment should not be formally accepted from
272、 the manufacturer or installer until it has passed acceptance tests to confirm that it meets the functional specifications for the detection system.During the evaluation phase,the same acceptance tests can be conducted again to confirm that the equipment remains functional.Regular equipment checks(i
273、.e.operational testing)using check sources should be performed to confirm that the systems continue to respond as designed.Computer security measures for the communications and detection equipment,as well as protocols and procedures should also be evaluated.3.85.Other types of evaluation,such as sce
274、nario based tabletop exercises or field exercises,can be conducted to test specific components or measures or the entire detection system.Tabletop exercises can help evaluate whether the concept of operations functions adequately under different circumstances when different organizations are involve
275、d.Field exercises can help evaluate the deployed detection systems and the planned operations.Exercises can be designed to focus on specific situations,depending on the evaluation goals,and may be scheduled or unannounced.For example,an unannounced exercise simulating a smuggling attempt can provide
276、 valuable insights into the normal workings at a designated POE.Careful planning to ensure the safety of all participants is particularly important for unannounced exercises.More detailed information on planning and conducting exercises can be found in Ref.19.Validation and revision of standard oper
277、ating procedures3.86.Changes to the detection systems and measures that affect the concept of operations and/or the design can be made during the implementation phase.Since the standard operating procedures should be based on the detection systems and measures as deployed,they should be modified if
278、necessary and finalized after the systems and measures have been deployed,tested and exercised.3.87.The concept of operations,the design and the standard operating procedures should be reviewed,and revised if necessary,if major modifications are made at the designated POE or in the border area,if ch
279、anges are made to the detection systems and measures,if the threat environment changes,or if an exercise or real incident shows that the current arrangements are inadequate.Training programmes 30should be updated whenever the concept of operations,the design or the standard operating procedures have
280、 been modified.4.CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETECTION SYSTEMS AND MEASURES AT DESIGNATED POINTS OF EXIT OR ENTRY4.1.Conditions at designated POEs are different from those in border areas.Some differences in approach to planning,implementing and evaluating detection systems and measures are therefore needed.
281、This section addresses some considerations that are specific to designated POEs.4.2.Designated POEs are key points in the flow of people,goods and conveyances between States.In designing detection systems and measures for designated POEs,a likely priority is to avoid undue cost and inconvenience to
282、legitimate business and travel.Careful planning can lead to systems and measures that are effective for nuclear security detection while minimizing negative impacts on the legitimate movement of people,goods and conveyances.4.3.Measures should be in place to control and monitor the movement of peopl
283、e,goods and conveyances across the border at a designated POE,but the nature and extent of those controls will depend on the particular situation.Nuclear security detection systems and measures should be designed to integrate well with the existing border protection systems and should be consistent
284、with those of State organizations involved in countering other types of trafficking.INSPECTION OF LARGE VOLUMES OF PEOPLE,GOODS AND CONVEYANCES4.4.Some designated POEs experience very large volumes of traffic.If a States national detection strategy includes the radiation monitoring of all people,goo
285、ds and conveyances crossing the border at designated POEs,without unacceptably impeding the legitimate movement of people,goods and conveyances,fixed radiation portal monitors or mobile systems with large volume detectors are often the only realistic options for large volumes of traffic.Suitable con
286、trols,such as barriers,traffic signals,speed bumps,railings or turnstiles,can be used 31to regulate the flow and speed of people and conveyances and can help to keep the general traffic moving,allowing only one person or conveyance at a time to pass by or through detection equipment and thereby sati
287、sfying specific speed and distance specifications for effective detection.Competent authorities should determine how alarms will be communicated to operating staff at the designated POE and whether people being monitored should be informed of the presence of the detection equipment.4.5.The detection
288、 systems should allow front line officers to identify the person or conveyance that triggered an alarm and separate them from the rest of the traffic flow.For high traffic flows,technologies such as video cameras,optical character recognition or radiofrequency identification devices can help to meet
289、 this goal.The information from the detection instruments and the radionuclide identification devices can be integrated into a communications system that displays the combined information to front line officers,enabling them to locate the person or conveyance triggering the alarm.If this type of sys
290、tem is needed,the specifications including the locations of front line officers workstations should be identified in the design.4.6.If the system depends on the visual identification of a person or conveyance,the primary inspection relies on the constant involvement of the front line officers.4.7.Th
291、e system design should specify whether audio or visual alarms,or both,are to be used during the primary inspection.At some locations,the audio or visual indicators of the detection equipment can be turned off,and alarms only announced remotely to front line officers through a workstation,remote alar
292、m panel or mobile phone.4.8.Although primary detection at designated POEs is commonly in the form of instrument alarms from radiation portal monitors or the personal radiation detectors of front line officers,detection can also be triggered by information alerts based on observations of suspicious a
293、ctivity by front line officers.The concept of operations should specify how the validity of an alarm or alert is to be confirmed,taking account of the potential effects on day-to-day operations of the POE and on traffic flow and control measures.For example,if the front line officer seeks to confirm
294、 the validity of alarms at the location of the primary detection by redirecting people or conveyances back through a radiation portal monitor or by conducting additional secondary inspections using handheld equipment,other traffic will be impeded,which could result in long queues.32TARGETING CRITERI
295、A FOR SCREENING 4.9.It might not be feasible to screen all traffic through a designated POE owing to resource constraints such as staffing and time available to respond to alarms or for other logistical reasons.In such cases,criteria should be developed and applied to select the people,goods and con
296、veyances that will be monitored.These targeting criteria should be described in the concept of operations,and site specific procedures should be included in the standard operating procedures.4.10.The targeting criteria should be risk informed and include consideration of factors such as the threat,t
297、he fraction of traffic that can reasonably be screened,and any supplementary information available about specific people,goods or conveyances.If targeting criteria are based on easily determined factors such as the destination or origin of cargo,an element of randomness should also be included to pr
298、event adversaries from exploiting these criteria and avoiding detection.LEGITIMATE SOURCES OF RADIATION4.11.The concept of operations and the design should address the fact that the radiation detection instruments will produce innocent alarms(i.e.a real increase in radiation level is detected but is
299、 not due to inadvertent movement or trafficking of radioactive material).Innocent alarms typically occur at designated POEs as a result of shipments containing NORM,authorized shipments of radioactive material,and individuals who have recently undergone medical procedures involving radiopharmaceutic
300、als.The expected overall rate of alarms should be estimated,and the necessary equipment,space and staffing should be provided to allow for the expected number of alarms to be adjudicated.4.12.The detection systems and measures at designated POEs should allow the front line officers to confirm whethe
301、r the source of detected radiation is legitimate and whether declared shipments of radioactive material are in compliance with established regulations and with the material declared(e.g.to confirm that no additional material is being trafficked within a legal shipment).Front line officers should be
302、familiar with transport requirements for nuclear and other radioactive material 20.4.13.Verifying whether a shipment declared to include radioactive material contains only the declared radionuclides and activity is a specialized task needing expertise and equipment that might not normally be present
303、 at a designated POE;it might involve isolation of the cargo while waiting for technical expert support.33States might therefore consider limiting the number of designated POEs through which such declared shipments can be imported or exported.A technique for confirming the contents of a declared shi
304、pment is described in Annex III.ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION AVAILABLE FOR DECISION MAKING4.14.A wide variety of supporting documentation is typically available to front line officers at designated POEs to assist with the assessment of alarms and the associated decision making process.Examples include s
305、hipping manifests,customs declarations and personal travel documents.The design should specify when and how the competent authority undertaking detection activities should have access to this information.Any detection event should be considered in the context of the relevant supporting documentation
306、,taking account of the specific characteristics of the designated POE.For example,if a front line officer receives an instrument alarm from a cargo container,the shipping documents(including packing lists,bills of lading and invoices)should be available to the front line officer to consider whether
307、NORM might be present,whether additional inspection is needed and whether the documentation contains any irregularities or inconsistencies.ON-SITE STORAGE CONSIDERATIONS4.15.Areas for additional inspections and for isolation and temporary storage of seized radioactive material should be identified i
308、n the planning phase and documented in the design.These areas should be selected taking into account the need to maintain safety and nuclear security without unduly impeding the flow of people and goods.Some designated POEs might be subject to regulations or other restrictions that prevent the stora
309、ge of nuclear or radioactive material on the site.In such cases,the availability of a storage location might need to be addressed in the concept of operations or in the design.NON-INTRUSIVE INSPECTION EQUIPMENT4.16.If radioactive material or nuclear material is sufficiently shielded,it can pass thro
310、ugh a radiation portal monitor without triggering an instrument alarm.The competent authority responsible for detection should consider screening cargo at designated POEs using non-intrusive inspection systems to detect shielding 34materials.Non-intrusive inspection equipment includes metal detector
311、s and mobile or fixed X ray,gamma and backscatter imaging systems.4.17.Non-intrusive inspection equipment can affect the performance of nearby radiation detectors such as radiation portal monitors,causing alarms or other interference.If such equipment is used at a designated POE that also uses radia
312、tion portal monitors,the non-intrusive inspection equipment and the monitors should be placed as far apart as possible.If close placement is unavoidable,a configuration should be chosen that minimizes the impact of background or interference radiation from the non-intrusive inspection equipment on t
313、he radiation portal monitor.Additional shielding(e.g.on an X ray machine)or the addition of a collimator to a radiation portal monitor can also reduce interference.Alternatively,procedures or software can be used to introduce alternate operating times of the X ray machines and the radiation detector
314、s,to ensure that the detectors do not operate while X rays are being generated.UPGRADES,CHANGES AND DAMAGE4.18.Changes to the layout or operation of designated POEs might affect the detection systems.For example,the routes that people,goods and conveyances follow through the POE may be changed.If th
315、is can be foreseen during the planning phase,the design features in fixed detection equipment should be considered to facilitate the later relocation of the equipment,such as the use of overhead wiring rather than underground trenches,of above ground foundations that can be relocated,or of systems b
316、ased on a mobile design.If not planned for,the relocation of fixed detection equipment can be expensive.It may therefore be preferable to delay the installation of fixed detection equipment until after the completion of planned site modifications or renovations.4.19.The process for holding a person
317、or company responsible for damaging equipment should be formalized and documented.The repair and replacement of detection equipment can be expensive,and mechanisms to assign liability to individuals who damage equipment should be implemented prior to operating the system.4.20.Mobile detection system
318、s can be used when a fixed detection system is temporarily unavailable or when the traffic exceeds the capacity of a fixed detection system.Such systems can also be used for secondary inspections,or as a means of primary detection when there is no fixed detection equipment in 35place.For example,mob
319、ile detection systems can be used to monitor movements of cargo at seaports.5.CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETECTION SYSTEMS AND MEASURES IN BORDER AREAS5.1.Nuclear security detection systems and measures in border areas should be integrated into the existing border security arrangements.Border areas normally
320、 include the State border and adjacent territory(excluding designated POEs).Compared with detection systems and measures for designated POEs,the detection systems and measures in border areas need to cover larger and more varied geographical areas without established checkpoints.5.2.Border areas are
321、 often defined in national legislation to delineate areas where special border security measures are in place.One competent authority is typically assigned overall responsibility for border protection and law enforcement in the border area,but additional competent authorities may also have specific
322、functions.Roles and responsibilities should therefore be clearly established and documented in the concept of operations.5.3.The concept of operations and the design should describe planned ongoing operations in the border area,using an integrated approach to operations,intelligence and instrument d
323、eployment to detect nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.Because any violation in a border area is a cause for concern and could indicate the possibility of other violations,front line officers patrolling such an area should be prepared to apply established systems and me
324、asures for detecting nuclear or other radioactive material whenever they intercept anybody or anything crossing the border.To do this,they might have access to detection equipment at known locations in the field(e.g.at regional patrol posts)or they might carry such equipment with them,either routine
325、ly during regular patrols or only in response to an information alert.5.4.Information gathering in border areas can be based on instrument measurements as well as the inspection of people,goods,conveyances and documents located in the border area.A clear procedure for confirming this information,inc
326、luding communication with technical expert support,if necessary,should be established and documented in the standard operating procedures.For example,if a person is found crossing the border without correct personal 36documentation,more information might be needed about the person,and the front line
327、 officer should be able to communicate with a shift supervisor or other personnel from the local border unit to obtain more information about the person.LIMITED INFRASTRUCTURE AND HARSH ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS5.5.Any detection equipment deployed to a border area should be suitable for use in the en
328、vironmental conditions of the border area.Some border areas have limited infrastructure to support detection systems and measures.For example,patrol posts might not have the regular power supply and climate control needed to support certain types of detection equipment.For border areas without an ac
329、cessible and reliable power supply to recharge batteries,one of the available options is to use personal radiation detectors that operate with disposable batteries.Border areas might also have few roads and very limited communications infrastructure.In the case of an instrument alarm,for example fro
330、m a personal radiation detector,further inspection may need to take place at a local or regional post where additional detection equipment is located,or mobile or portable equipment may need to be moved to where the primary detection occurred.5.6.Detection equipment used in border areas should be su
331、fficiently durable to remain reliable during normal patrol activities under conditions such as extreme weather and difficult terrain,and should be sufficiently tolerant of temperature fluctuations and other potentially challenging environmental factors.For example,detection systems for use in mariti
332、me environments should be waterproof and corrosion resistant.Equipment selection should also take into account the ability of border units to maintain the equipment in a field setting,considering such factors as long term robustness,battery life under local environmental conditions,and ease of maint
333、enance and repair without specialized tools.DETECTION OPERATIONS COVERING LARGE AREAS5.7.In some border areas,very large areas of land or water need to be patrolled with limited detection resources.In such cases,the concept of operations and the design should describe how supporting equipment and expertise will be mobilized to support the investigation of an instrument alarm or information alert,t