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1、TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITIONACKNOWLEDGMENTSThe project was developed at the European Transport and Energy Research Centre of the Institute of Transportation Studies,University of California,Davis,and managed by Pierpaolo Cazzola.This report was
2、authored by Pierpaolo Cazzola,Leonardo Paoli,and Jacob Teter.All authors contributed to the development of the data processing methodology,building on earlier experiences,in particular with previous GFEI benchmarking reports.Leonardo Paoli led on updating the data and making them publicly available.
3、Sheila Watson(FIA Foundation)provided feedback on the draft report and John Pap(FIA Foundation)managed the editorial process.The authors would like to thank peer reviewers who provided essential feedback to improve the quality of the report.They include Elizabeth Connelly(IEA International Energy Ag
4、ency);Matteo Craglia(International Transport Forum);Francois Cuenot(United Nations Economic Commission for Europe);Eduardo Espitia Echeverria(World Bank);Lew Fulton(University of California,Davis);Mathilde Huismans(IEA);Alex Krner(United National Environment Programme);Aditya Ramji(University of Cal
5、ifornia,Davis),Mara Santos Alfageme(Instituto Superior Tcnico,Lisbon);Jules Sery(IEA);and Jacopo Tattini(Joint Research Center,European Commission).The project was funded by the FIA Foundation.Design by Diana Fauner and John Rigby.Photography by Alamy,Getty Images,iStock and Shutterstock.DOI:10.7922
6、/G2HM56SVDataset on Zenodo.DOI:10.5281/zenodo.10148349November 2023TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITIONTRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITIONExecutive Summary1 Introduction2 Key developments in light-duty ve
7、hicle markets 2.1 New sales of passenger cars and light commercial vehicles 2.2 Energy efficiency of new vehicles 2.2.1 Technical determinants of the energy efficiency of vehicles 2.2.2 Tailpipe carbon emissions of new light-duty vehicles 2.3 Vehicle sales by powertrain 2.4 Vehicle sales by segment
8、2.5 Vehicle size and weight3 Analysis of the vehicle market developments and implications for policy action 3.1 Impacts of the shift towards SUVs 3.1.1 Energy and CO2 emissions 3.1.2 Vehicle weight 3.1.3 Road safety 3.1.4 Equity 3.2 The role of EVs in the shift towards SUVs 3.3 Impacts of the EV tra
9、nsition 3.3.1 Energy and CO2 emissions 3.3.2 Vehicle weight 3.3.3 Road safety 3.3.4 Equity 3.4 Are SUVs and EVs increasing the risk of a global divide?3.5 Need for policy action to address existing challenges4 Policy options 4.1 Regulatory policy frameworks on energy,environment and safety 4.1.1 Env
10、ironmental regulations 4.1.2 Road safety regulations 4.1.3 Use of regulations in vehicle trade 4.1.4 Urban access restrictions 4.1.5 Targeted regulatory requirements for specific usage profiles 4.2 Regulatory changes to address vehicle weight increases and equity-related challenges 4.2.1 Regulations
11、 on vehicle footprint 4.2.2 Regulations on battery capacity 4.2.3 Other regulatory requirements applying specifically to batteries 4.2.4 Changes in existing environmental regulations 4.2.5 Changes in existing road safety regulations 4.2.6 Changes in targeted regulatory requirements for specific usag
12、e profilesCONTENTS2730339404040404 4.3 Vehicle taxation 4.3.1 Country-level taxation frameworks 4.3.2 Key examples of country-wide differentiated vehicle registration taxes 4.3.3 Vehicle taxation related to international trade 4.3.4 Local vehicl
13、e taxes and charges 4.4 Changes in vehicle taxes to address vehicle weight increases and equity-related challenges 4.4.1 Changes in country-level taxation frameworks 4.4.2 Changes in vehicle taxation related with international trade 4.4.3 Changes in local vehicle taxes and charges 4.5 Fuel taxation
14、and carbon prices 4.5.1 Road user charges to complement or progressively replace fuel taxation 4.6 Alternative energy infrastructure(EV chargers)4.7 Sustainable finance and development aid fundingAnnex:Methodological note A.1 Description of data sources A.1.1 Fuel economy in major car markets(2005-2
15、017)data,GFEI_0517 A.1.2 GFEI 2021 data,IEA_19 A.1.3 Automotive sales data from Marklines A.1.4 CO2 emissions from cars and vans,EEA,EEA A.2 Description of data processing steps A.2.1 Preparing Marklines sales data A.2.2 Preparing IEA specific energy consumption data A.2.3 Preparing EEA data A.2.4 M
16、atching of powertrain categories with Marklines categories A.2.5 Joining specific energy consumption,weight,and footprint data to sales data A.2.6 Improvements in ICE vehicle efficiency technologies A.2.7 Mismatch between vehicle factory shipments and registrations in China A.3 Applying new WLTC cor
17、rections A.3.1 Re-benchmarking NEDC to WLTC conversion factors A.4 Regional aggregationsAbbreviations and acronyms Units of measureReferencesEndnotes454545464748484950505555557575757575959595960621TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSIT
18、IONThe global average annual rate of energy intensity reductions in the period from 2020 to 2022 was 4.2%.If this rate of improvement could be sustained through 2030,it would bring LDVs very close to meeting the GFEI target of doubling the energy efficiency of new LDV sales by 2030 from a 2005 basel
19、ine.The rapid acceleration in energy efficiency seen in recent years is mainly due to the uptake of electric light-duty vehicles(EVs,which include both battery electric vehicles BEVs and plug-in hybrids PHEVs)(Figure ES2).Electric powertrains consume three to six times less energy than internal comb
20、ustion engine vehicles to cover a unit of distance and their sales share reached 15%in 2022200202020008200720062005Lge/100 km41.10.90.70.60.4kWh/km2022200202020008200720062005gCO2/km2902702502302101901
21、70150130110WorldOther CountriesJapanEuropeNorth AmericaChinaFIGURE ES1:Trends in the specific energy consumption of new light duty vehicles in major marketsNotes:Lge stands for litres of gasoline equivalent,and it is used to standardise fuel consumption according to their volumetric energy content,l
22、ike kWh/km.There are 9.3 kWh per Lge.Historical specific energy consumption values have been benchmarked according to new understanding of the ratio between NEDC and WLTP test cycle energy intensity and CO2 emissions performance.This revision has improved the real-world representativeness of the rep
23、orted specific energy consumption.Sources:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThis is the latest update of a benchmarking report looking at the specific fuel consumption of light-duty vehicles(LDVs).While reporting
24、 data starting in 2005,it focuses on changes that occurred between 2019 and 2022.Key developments include a 15%contraction of global LDV sales in 2020 as a consequence of the pandemic,and a limited recovery in sales through 2022.The sales-weighted specific energy consumption of LDVs decreased in all
25、 major car markets from 2019 to 2022,improving at an average yearly rate of 3.2%and reaching 6.9 Lge/100 km in 2022(0.64 kWh/km).This is a doubling of the average improvement rate observed between 2005 and 2019(1.6%)(Figure ES1).Direct CO2 emissions have declined even faster,at a rate of 2.1%per yea
26、r between 2005 and 2022,as electrification affects carbon emissions more than energy consumption.2022.The yearly rate of energy efficiency improvement between 2019 and 2022 was more pronounced(close to 6%)in markets where EV sales increased the most,namely China and Europe.In North America,lower upt
27、ake of EVs and a continued trend in sales of larger and heavier vehicles has resulted in a yearly improvement rate of 1.6%.In countries where EVs are not widely deployed,annual improvement rates are also close to 1.5%.The efficiency of new vehicles is also linked with the size,weight,and power of ne
28、w cars.A long-term shift towards Sport Utility Vehicles(SUVs),underpinning increases in larger,heavier,and more powerful vehicles,has continued in major automotive markets and across nearly all countries(Figure ES3).In 2022,sales of SUVs overtook sales of conventional cars at a global level,reaching
29、 51%of the total.Globally,the average vehicle weight of LDVs has also reached an all-time maximum,at 1530 kg.Average footprint has stagnated after 2019/2020 at about 4.2 m2.Increases took place in low-and medium-income countries,typically starting from a lower baseline.Limited declines occurred main
30、ly in China and Europe.100%75%50%25%0%Sales share2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022Battery ElectricPlug-in HybridHybridMild HybridICE PetrolICE DieselICE OtherFIGURE ES2:Global LDV sales shares by powertrainNote:ICE stands for internal combustio
31、n engine.Sources:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022100%75%50%25%0%Sales ShareLarge SUVSmall SUVSmall CarMedium CarLarge CarLCVUnclassifiedSh
32、are SUVFIGURE ES3:Global LDV sales by segmentSources:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.43TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITIONThe two main trends underpinning developments in the glo
33、bal car market a market shift towards SUVs and the transition toward EVs have far-reaching implications for the automotive industry,as well as on the environment and society.Shifts to larger and heavier vehicles led to increased oil consumption,direct CO2 emissions and vehicle weight,size and power.
34、Without the shift towards SUVs,energy use per km for combustion engine vehicles could have fallen at an average annual rate that is 30%higher than it did from 2010 to 2022.In the absence of the SUV shift,vehicle weight increases for these same vehicles could also have been more than halved.Impacts o
35、f the SUV shift on energy use and direct emissions of CO2 per km are being offset by increased electrification,thanks to markedly lower specific energy consumption versus combustion vehicles.Electric vehicles however tend to weigh more than combustion vehicles,and their rise has added to the weight
36、increases coming from the shift from small and medium cars to SUVs.Despite increases in disposable income of households worldwide,the SUV shift was instrumental for an increase in original equipment manufacturers(OEM)profitability that remained in place even after the contraction observed in the glo
37、bal LDV market.This,however,also resulted in relevant affordability and equity challenges within and across countries.Higher investment costs needed for EVs exacerbated these challenges,even if savings from lower energy and maintenance costs for EVs help to mitigate this effect on a total cost of ow
38、nership basis.Legacy OEMs have been slow to enter the EV market,especially in smaller segments,despite the risk of exposure to long-term losses of market shares to Chinese competitors.Reasons include the near-term focus on higher profitability,the cost of the batteries for BEVs and complex powertrai
39、ns for PHEVs,challenges in the development of new battery supply chains and large capital outlays for investment in new industrial facilities.Equity-related challenges and greater exposure of low-income households and businesses to the combined market transformation towards EVs and SUVs point toward
40、s the possibility of a growing global divide,not only within different income groups within countries,but also between major developed economies and other countries.POLICY OPTIONSManaging these developments requires a broad range of policy actions.The adoption and continued development of fundamenta
41、l pre-requisites:technical standards,increased low-carbon electricity availability,and removal of fossil fuel subsidies.A coherent policy framework is also needed beyond tailpipe emissions,taking a holistic approach to address impacts of LDV production and operations from a lifecycle perspective.Nov
42、el regulatory mechanisms can address issues related to increased vehicle size and weight.The introduction of a cap on vehicle footprint,in absolute terms and as a sales-weighted average,paired with net declines going forward,to limit and then reverse the SUV shift.Corporate-average regulatory requir
43、ements,similar to those in place for fuel economy or CO2 emissions,having battery capacity(kWh/vehicle)as the regulated parameter.These could be especially effective to complement the footprint regulations to reverse the SUV shift,addressing critical mineral issues from the demand side and equity is
44、sues specifically related with EVs through product diversification,while leaving room for innovation in battery chemistries and providing flexibility in compliance strategies for automakers.The use of vehicle footprint,rather than weight,is also suggested as the best choice as a modulating parameter
45、 in existing regulations on specific energy consumption or direct CO2 emissions,alongside tightened requirements for larger vehicles(including both ICEVs and EVs).This is because regulating based on footprint can incentivize lightweighting as an energy consumption reduction strategy,whereas weight-b
46、ased regulations fail to do this.This report proposes also to target more stringent environmental and safety regulations on highly utilized vehicles such as company cars,taxis,government fleets,and ride-and carsharing services.Measures requiring higher EV market shares and incentivizing electric vkm
47、 in these use cases can enhance efficiency in the use of minerals for EV batteries and may also generate positive spillovers in terms of equity.Adapting existing policy and regulatory instruments can also help address these issues.Vehicle taxation reforms including the integration of weight and pric
48、es as modulating parameters for vehicles taxes and charges,at the national and at the local levels can help steer vehicle markets away from SUVs and encourage EV adoption without reducing government budgets.Fossil fuel taxes and carbon pricing mechanisms offer important opportunities to provide econ
49、omic incentives for EVs.Incentives need to be targeted on more vulnerable households and businesses,facilitating a more equitable and inclusive transition.They can be financed from revenues from fossil fuel taxes and carbon pricing.Regulatory and fiscal measures supporting universal access to EV cha
50、rging infrastructure are needed to enable consumers to gain more confidence to undertake a larger share of their trips even with a shorter range,thereby also addressing weight-related challenges for EVs.Sustainable finance frameworks,important to help achieve a better alignment between the decisions
51、 taken by investors,corporations and other entities,can benefit from updates in their taxonomies regarding weight-related attributes of vehicles.Financial instruments designed to facilitate access to EVs for capital-constrained households and small businesses,as well as initiatives favouring access
52、to capital at lower cost,are crucial to help favouring an equitable transition,domestically and internationally.While it is also technically feasible to make progress by reforming trade rules and tariffs applied to critical minerals,EV battery,and vehicles,progress on this depends upon the effective
53、ness of the dialogue and negotiations taking place at the intergovernmental level.Possible improvements to trade-related policies on vehicles include differentiated tariffs based on powertrain,battery size,energy efficiency,GHG emissions,vehicle weight and footprint.They are feasible as long as the
54、differentiation aligns with rules of origin,environment-and national security-related exceptions foreseen by the World Trade Organization(WTO).65TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITION1 INTRODUCTIONThis report is the latest update and sixth instalment of
55、the Global Fuel Economy Initiatives biannual benchmarking report on light-duty vehicle sales,extending the analysis from 2019 through 2022.Previous reports tracked the technical,market,and policy drivers of fuel economy and CO2 emissions performance of new light-duty vehicles(LDVs)at a country,regio
56、nal,and global level(Cuenot and Fulton,2011,Cuenot and Krner,2013,IEA,2019a,and IEA,2021a).These reports,together with other GFEI analyses(Cuenot,2017),have documented the rising market shares of Sport Utility Vehicles(SUVs),and more generally,of larger and heavier vehicles,and analysed the impact o
57、f these trends on energy efficiency and CO2 emissions in major LDV markets.This report tracks this continuing trend,highlighting key implications,including reduced energy and resource efficiency,increased vehicle production costs and reduced affordability for vehicle owners exacerbating inequalities
58、 within and among countries as well as heightened injury and mortality risks to pedestrians,cyclists,and car drivers alike.Examining vehicle sales trends in low-and medium-income countries,this work also extends themes developed in the UC Davis report commissioned by the FIA Foundation for the ZEV T
59、ransition Council,“Facilitating a Transition to Zero-Emission Vehicles in the Global South”(Cazzola and Santos Alfageme,2023).Chapter 2 illustrates that the tendency towards larger market shares for vehicles in larger heavier vehicle segments is persistent and widespread.The same analysis also shows
60、 a rapid increase in vehicle electrification,with strong EV adoption in China,Europe,Korea,Japan and North America,1 resulting in substantial energy intensity and GHG emission reductions.Chapter 3 analyses key determinants of the observed market developments,with a specific focus on the shift toward
61、s SUVs and the increase in EV shares.It examines the broader impacts of these dynamics,focusing on vehicle size,weight,and price increases,and considers aspects related with energy,emissions of CO2 and local air pollutants,road safety,demand for minerals resources,and equity.The following analysis,i
62、n Chapter 4,reviews policies already developed by governments to address the impacts of recent market developments,identifies best practices,and recommends changes and new regulatory instruments that are best suited to address the challenges discussed in Chapter 3,placing a greater emphasis on solut
63、ions that help bridge the risk of a global divide.The methodological approach of this update differs from previous GFEI benchmarking reports.Rather than relying on a database with detailed model-level and in some cases trim-level data and including an extensive list of vehicle technical parameters(e
64、.g.,weight,footprint,engine capacity,number of doors,presence of efficiency technologies such as continuously variable transmissions,turbochargers,etc.),this data update relies on lower resolution data(still at the model level)from Marklines.The Methodological Annex outlines the methods used to ensu
65、re as close as possible consistency with previous reports,and to verify the accuracy and validity of this assessment.2.1 NEW SALES OF PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT COMMERCIAL VEHICLESWorldwide,the sales of light-duty vehicles(LDVs)including passenger cars and light commercial vehicles2 steadily increased
66、 through 2017,and then slowed down through 2019(Figure 1).Long term-trends were disrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020,which resulted in a rapid drop of sales across all regions:globally,15%fewer LDVs were sold in 2020 than in 2019.Following 2020,sales rebounded,but are still around 10%lower tha
67、n they were before the pandemic.2 KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN LIGHT DUTY VEHICLE MARKETS2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 202250403020100ChinaJapan and KoreaBrazil,Mexico,MalaysiaNorth AmericaIndiaMiddle EastEuropeOther CountriesIndonesia,Thailan
68、d,Vietnam,South Africamillion unitsFIGURE 1:Global LDV sales by region 2005-2022Note:LDV sales included in this analysis and in this graph are those for the countries listed in annex Table A6.Europe includes all member countries of the European Economic Area(EEA)plus Switzerland and the United Kingd
69、om.North America includes the United States and Canada but excludes Mexico,included in the same group as Brazil and Malaysia,as they have similar characteristics with respect to GDP per capita,while still having a comparable population density,the presence of an automotive manufacturing capacity and
70、 not being a net importer of oil and petroleum products.Total sales for this set of countries are equivalent to roughly 85%of the total vehicle sales accounted by OICA including commercial vehicles(OICA,2023),meaning that they represent the vast majority of light duty vehicle sales globally.Sources:
71、this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.87TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITIONThe rebound in sales has been slowed down by a stretched supply chain especially due to a shortage of microch
72、ips that has struggled to keep up with swings in demand(JP Morgan,2023;Brinley,2023,Straughan,2023;Burkacky et al.,2021;Burkacky et al.,2022).Shifts in the market structure,as discussed below,accompanied by changes in vehicle prices as larger vehicles are above those of smaller ones,discussed in Cha
73、pter 3,are also influencing consumer choices regarding the acquisition of a new vehicle,including through postponement of purchases(GfK,2023;Shmuel,2022;Romei,2022)or an increased consideration of second-hand options,where they are available(Roch Baranowski et al.,2023;Manheim,2023).The Chinese LDV
74、market has undergone a very rapid rise since the beginning of the century.China became the worlds largest LDV market in 2009 and from 2020 through 2022,with annual sales of 21 million vehicles,it has become by far and away the worlds largest automotive market,accounting for 29%of global LDV sales in
75、 2022.All the same,Chinas sales peaked in 2017 and have since been slowly declining.Several factors,often limiting growth in car ownership,help explain why the stabilization of car sales occurred when the number of cars per capita in China is still well below the levels observed in economies with hi
76、gher per capita income.These reasons include,in addition to recent supply-chain challenges:the early phase of a transition from a growth market where most vehicles were sold to first-time owners to a mature“replacement”market;significant investments in public transport,including urban and intercity
77、rail services(Xinhua,2020;IEA,2019b;and Ou et al.,2022);the frequent use of policies managing access to personal vehicles in cities,also in light of the transition to vehicle electrification(Feiqi et al.,2020;Liu et al.,2022;Jin et al.,2023;and He et al.,2018);and a pro-active deployment of digitall
78、y-enabled shared mobility services(Yin et al.,2022).3 The 2020 pandemic also had a much smaller impact in the Chinese market than in all other markets,with sales only declining around 5%year on year.Sales in China have subsequently remained fairly constant.Sales in mature markets such as North Ameri
79、ca,Korea,Japan and Europe4 remained mostly stagnant through 2019.With sales increasing in China by nearly seven-fold in 2020,relative to 2005(and despite the decrease in sales from 2017 onwards)and with other countries,such as India,Indonesia,and Brazil,the combined share of these mature markets out
80、 of the global market has declined from over 70%in 2005 to under 50%in 2022.LDV sales in North America declined 14%in 2020 from their 2019 level,and have dropped a further 5%since then,to 13.9 million vehicles in 2022.Global supply chain constraints and rapid inflation,with the prices of new cars an
81、d trucks rising even higher than other consumer goods(Bureau of Labor Statistics,2023),justify this reduction.5 In Japan,sales of LDVs declined by more than 10%since the pandemic and remained roughly constant thereafter.In Korea the pandemic did not lead to any reduction in sales,but there has been
82、a small decline since 2020.In 2022,Korea and Japan accounted for 8%of global LDV sales,the same share they accounted for pre-pandemic.The European market has been slower than others to recover from the impacts of the pandemic due to regional shortages of vehicle components that were aggravated by Ru
83、ssias invasion of Ukraine(VDA,2022).This has led Europes share of the global market to decline from 21%in 2019 to 18%in 2022.Vehicle sales in emerging markets such as India,Indonesia,and Brazil grew substantially between 2005 and 2010,but their growth has slowed down since.In 2022,these markets acco
84、unted for 22%of global sales.The pandemic and the ensuing economic difficulties have also taken a toll on car sales in these countries,with a decline of 20%in 2020.Sales have since regained 7%,but they are still below pre-pandemic levels.Among these markets,the Indian market has been particularly dy
85、namic,as it declined by a staggering 30%in 2020 but has since regained all the losses and sales volumes in 2022 exceeding pre-pandemic levels.2.2 ENERGY EFFICIENCY OF NEW VEHICLESThe specific energy consumption of new vehicles has decreased since the beginning of this benchmarking exercise.The globa
86、l sales-weighted average fuel consumption for LDVs sold in 2022 was 6.9 Lge/100km(0.64 kWh/km)6,nearly 30%less energy than the value in 2005.In 2020,GFEI partners reaffirmed their target to double the energy efficiency of new LDV sales by 2030 from a 2005 baseline.If it can be sustained through 2030
87、,the global average annual rate of energy intensity reduction in the period from 2020 to 2022(4.2%)would bring LDVs very close to meeting the GFEI target.Worldwide,the pace of annual reduction in energy consumption per km declined over the 2010s,but marked improvements can be seen from 2019 onwards,
88、as sales shares of electric vehicles have begun to ramp up substantially(Figure 2).The rapid acceleration in energy efficiency improvements seen in recent years is mainly due to the uptake of EVs,which include both BEVs and PHEVs,reflecting the fact that electric powertrains consume three to six tim
89、es less energy to cover a unit of distance in comparison with powertrains reliant on internal combustion engines(ICEs)and their sales share reached 15%in 2022.The yearly rate of energy efficiency improvement between 2019 and 2022 was more pronounced in markets where EV sales increased the most,namel
90、y China(5.9%)and Europe(5.8%).In North America,lower uptake of EVs and a continued trend in sales of larger and heavier vehicles has resulted in a yearly improvement rate of 1.6%.In countries where EVs are not widely deployed,annual improvement rates are close to 1.5%.Fuel prices and income levels r
91、emain key determinants of vehicle energy use per km,leading to systemic differences across national and regional markets,as already identified in earlier analyses(IEA,2019a,IEA,2021a)and shown in Figure 3.The Figure shows specific energy consumption plotted against gasoline prices and GDP per capita
92、,both corrected based on purchasing power parities.Results show that higher fuel prices(and taxes)7 tend to be paired with lower energy consumption per km and also that specific energy consumption is higher in countries with lower levels of fuel taxation,across different levels of average income.8 2
93、005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 20224WorldOther CountriesJapanEuropeNorth AmericaChinaLge/100kmFIGURE 2:Trends in the specific energy consumption of new vehicles in major car marketsNotes:Data from 2005 to 2017 is based on Fuel Economy i
94、n Major Car Markets 2005-2017(IEA,2019a),while from 2019 onwards data follows the new methodology outlined in the annex.The year 2018 is shown as the average in values between 2017 and 2019.Sources:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines da
95、ta.109TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITIONARGENTINABRAZILCHILECHINAEGYPTMALAYSIAPHILIPPINESRUSSIAFRANCEGERMANYITALYJAPANKOREAUNITED KINGDOMINDIATURKEYAUSTRALIACANADAUSAARGENTINABRAZILCHILECHINAEGYPTMALAYSIAPHILIPPINESRUSSIAFRANCEGERMANYITALYJAPANKOREAU
96、NITED KINGDOMINDIATURKEYAUSTRALIACANADAUSA00709.08.58.07.57.06.56.05.55.09.08.58.07.57.06.56.05.55.00.0 0.51.01.52.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5Fuel Consumption(lge/100km)Fuel Consumption(lge/100km)Gasoline Price(2022 USD PPP)GDP PPP per capita(thousand 2017 constant USD)Low-medium income
97、,low-medium fuel taxationHigh income,high fuel taxationLow-medium income,high fuel taxationHigh income,low-medium fuel taxationFIGURE 3:Evolution of specific energy consumption and gasoline price(left)and GDP per capita(right),using purchasing power parities,2019-2022Notes:Arrows show the change fro
98、m 2019 to 2022.Sources:Specific energy consumption from this data assessment(see the Annex for sources and methods)Gasoline prices from the IEA energy prices database(IEA,2023a)GDP per capita PPP and PPP conversions are from the World Bank Open Data(World Bank,2023).To enable global comparisons acro
99、ss countries and major markets,fuel consumption and CO2 emissions data are converted from regional or national test cycles to a single globally harmonized test cycle,the Worldwide harmonized Light-duty Test Cycle(WLTC).In earlier reports(from 2016 to 2021),conversion factors were taken from powertra
100、in-specific(i.e.gasoline and diesel ICE)zero intercept regressions developed by the ICCT(Khlwein et al.,2014).10 This approach is revised here,using regressions based on actual type approval data providing CO2 emissions based on both the NEDC and WLTC test cycles,as reported by the European Environm
101、ental Agency(EEA)for light-duty vehicles registered across Europe between 2019 and 2022.11 This led to a revision of the gap between NEDC and WLTC,meaning that it is now larger than it had been initially assessed in 2014,in line with other literature(Pavlovic et al,2018,JRC,2023).Table 1 highlights
102、the main differences in the assessment of specific fuel consumption due to this update.These results,based on EEA data and compared with those of the 2014 assessment(Khlwein et al.,2014),indicate that the earlier NEDC to WLTC conversion factors were lower by a factor of 1.05 for gasoline-and 1.20 fo
103、r diesel-powered LDVs,in comparison with updated values.As inter-cycle conversion factors for test cycles used in different regions(e.g.,between CAFE and JC08 and NEDC)assessed in 2014 remain accurate,the factors summarized in Table 1 have been used to rebase results assessed in earlier editions of
104、this work,while maintaining inter-cycle conversion factors unchanged.It is also worth highlighting that a gap remains between the WLTC factors and real-world fuel consumption,as has been established by a number of recent assessments(Tietge at al.,2017;Craglia and Cullen,2019;IEA,2019a;Dornoff et al.
105、,2020;Komnos et al.,2022).REVISED BENCHMARKING OF NEDC TO WLTC CONVERSIONBOX 1:PowertrainNEDC to WLTC ratio ICCT 2014NEDC to WLTC ratio update EEA data 2019-22Ratio between 2014 and updated factorGasoline1.1281.185*1.05Diesel1.0291.235*1.20TABLE 1:Regression results for gasoline and diesel conversio
106、n between NEDC and WTLC*The values reported here are for the ratio between NEDC and WLTC emissions performance(g CO2/km)for passenger cars.These ratios were determined also separately for passenger vehicles and light commercial vehicles for all basic powertrain-fuel combinations in the EEA dataset(g
107、asoline,diesel,natural gas,LPG,gasoline-electric,diesel-electric,e85).Since direct CO2 emissions for battery-electric and fuel-cell electric vehicles are 0 g CO2/km,ratios for specific energy consumption are unaffected for these powertrains.Full regression results are provided in the Appendix.173213
108、72882465258050843636429222000Time(seconds)Speed(km/h)NEDCWLTPThe trends in the specific energy consumption of new vehicles shown in Figure 2 can be analysed looking at three phases.The first spans the years between 2005 and 2017,the s
109、econd runs from 2017 to 2020 and the third(also having important implications for Figure 3)follows the year 2020.Figure 4 summarizes key developments characterizing each of these phases,considering the development of key driving factors and their evolution over the years.Between 2005 and 2017,averag
110、e fuel consumption declined at a yearly rate of 1.8%,with most improvements having occurred in the earlier part of this period.These improvements were driven by regulations in major car markets aiming to reduce fuel consumption and CO2 emissions,setting the pace of technology deployment in a way tha
111、t also influenced other markets.Carmakers largely delivered these improvements through improved internal combustion engine(ICE)and vehicle technologies.These included turbochargers and improved transmissions,engine downsizing,material substitution and light-weighting technologies,an increased use of
112、 diesel powertrains(especially in Europe,India and Korea)and hybrid powertrains(IEA,2019a).Between 2017 and 2020,improvements in rated specific energy intensity have mostly stagnated at a global level,with average specific energy consumption hovering 7.5 Lge/100 km(0.7 kWh/km).This period of stagnat
113、ing improvements can be largely explained by two counteracting drivers.On the one hand,new vehicles became larger,heavier,and more powerful,with a shift in market segments(the SUV share increased from 38%to 46%)driving fuel consumption upward.On the other hand,the beginning of growing market shares
114、of electric vehicles(EVs),substantially lowering sales-weighted average fuel consumption and tailpipe emissions.Electric vehicle sales increased from 1.5%in 2017 to 4%in 2020,on the back of supportive government policies and market-and technology-driven cost declines(IEA,2018;2019b;2020).1211TRENDS
115、IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITION0%-5%-10%5%10%2005-2017SEC%SUV%EV%HVICE SECFootprintWeight0%-5%-10%5%10%2017-20200%-5%-10%5%10%%FIGURE 4:Changes in LDV specific fuel consumption and its principal driversNotes:SEC stands for specific energy cons
116、umption,calculated as the compound annual rate of increase/decrease.ICE SEC stands for the specific energy consumption of ICE vehicles,calculated as compound annual rate of change.Footprint stands for the average vehicle footprint,calculated as compound annual rate of change.Weight stands for the av
117、erage vehicle mass,calculated as compound annual rate of change.%EV refers to the change in the market share of electric vehicles over the period.%HV refers to the change in the market share of hybrid vehicles over the period.%SUV refers to the change in the market share of SUVs over the period.Gree
118、n indicates a contribution that decreases specific energy consumption.Red indicates a contribution that increases specific energy consumption.Sources:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.Between 2020 and 2022,the global average of t
119、he specific energy consumption of new vehicle sales decreased 8%.This equates roughly to a 4.2%year-on-year decrease,double what has been observed in any year previously over the entire GFEI database period that started in 2005(as covered by this series of benchmarking reports).This suggests that,st
120、arting in 2020,trends in specific energy consumption have entered a new period,heavily influenced by the rise of EV market shares across all major LDV markets.Indeed,China saw EV sales share start to grow very rapidly in 2019.Europe followed in 2020.Since 2022,a remarkable growth is starting to occu
121、r also in North America.With EV sales accounting for 15%of the global market in 2022,and limited changes in the energy use per km of new ICEVs,the impact of EVs on the specific energy consumption of light-duty vehicles is now significant,even at the global scale.The surge in EV market shares that oc
122、curred after 2020 is paired with stronger changes in the patterns show in Figure 3,since markets with high increases in EV sales shares are those characterized by the most relevant drops in the specific fuel consumption of new vehicles.The cases of European countries and China are particularly visib
123、le,as they have undergone the fastest change.In China,the change was so pronounced that it now fits well within the cluster of developed countries with high fuel prices,while still having a relatively low level for fuel taxation.2.2.1 TECHNICAL DETERMINANTS OF THE ENERGY EFFICIENCY OF VEHICLESThe sp
124、ecific energy consumption of vehicles depends primarily on two physical characteristics:it is proportional to the weight and size of the vehicle,and it is inversely proportional to the efficiency of the powertrain.Figure 5 shows results relative to vehicles sold in 2022 in the European market and re
125、flects differences taking place across both weight and powertrains.Weight-related trends by powertrain show that heavier vehicles(which are generally also larger,and tend to be Sport Utility Vehicles,or SUVs)require more motive energy per unit distance.For example,a large SUV(such as a Ford F150)pow
126、ered by a gasoline engine consumes around 11 Lge/100 km(1 kWh/km),while a medium car(such as a VW Golf)consumes 6.4 Lge/100km(0.6 kWh/km).Conversely,powertrains that more efficiently convert input energy into motion consume less energy to drive the same distance.Differences in specific energy consum
127、ption across powertrains reflect differences in the capacity of different powertrains to convert energy into motion(IEA,2021a).Gasoline-powered ICEs convert roughly 20%-25%of the energy available in the fuel into motion.Diesel powertrains are generally more energy efficient than gasoline ICEs with s
128、imilar performance,requiring roughly 15%to 20%less energy than gasoline ICEs to perform the same service,despite a weight penalty.Hybrid vehicles convert around 35%of the fuels energy into motion,cutting liquid fuel requirements by roughly 20%vs.ICE powertrains,thanks to the use of electric propulsi
129、on in driving phases where the ICE is particularly inefficient,which more than offsets higher energy demand(to recharge the batteries)in driving conditions with better ICE energy efficiency.Battery electric vehicles(BEVs)convert around 75%of the energy they receive into motion.Plug-in hybrids combin
130、e the benefits of BEVs and hybrids in a way that depends on the extent to which they are driven in charge-depleting mode(in which case their energy efficiency performance is close to a BEVs)or in charge-sustaining mode(in which case they behave in a way that is similar to a conventional hybrid vehic
131、le).Hybrids,plug-in hybrids,and battery electric vehicles also recover,with limited losses,the kinetic energy of vehicles during braking,with larger energy efficiency advantages vs.ICEs for heavier vehicles.Further variability depends on driving speeds and the use of auxiliaries(e.g.,air conditionin
132、g).9 8000022002400WEIGHT(KG)1086420Specific energy comsumption(Lge/100km)2600Battery ElectricPlug-in HybridHybridICE-DieselICE-PetrolFIGURE 5:Specific energy consumption plotted against vehicle mass,by powertrain,for top selling light-duty vehicles in EuropeSource:based on 2021
133、 European registration data from EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b.Specific energy consumption for PHEVs was calcuated using a utility factor derived from the all-electric range reported in the EEA database using a function reflective of real-world usage(Fraunhofer ISI,2021),specific energy consumption of electri
134、city for driving phased in all-electric mode and specific fuel consumption for other driving phases.1413TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITION2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 202229027025023021019017015
135、0130110WorldOther CountriesJapanEuropeNorth AmericaChinagC02/kmFIGURE 6:Trends in the tailpipe CO2 emissions of new vehicles in major car marketsSources:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.2.2.2 TAILPIPE CO2 EMISSIONS OF NEW LIGHT
136、DUTY VEHICLESThe tailpipe carbon dioxide emissions from new sales have evolved in a very similar way to the specific energy consumption,as shown in Figure 6.The two quantities are proportional and closely related.For vehicles powered by fossil fuels,declines in tailpipe CO2 emissions are directly pr
137、oportional to the declines in specific energy consumption.The key difference in trends between the two parameters is driven by the presence of EVs,and in particular of BEVs:their specific energy consumption is around 70%lower than that of ICEs,while their CO2 emissions are 100%lower,as they emit no
138、CO2 tailpipe emissions.Until 2019,95%of all vehicles sold globally were powered by traditional internal combustion engine powertrains.A major driver for improvements in fuel economy through 2019 was the introduction,growth,and eventual decline of diesel powertrains in Europe and India.This means tha
139、t the electrification trend is stronger than the SUVs shift,when looking at this parameter.Therefore,unlike specific energy consumption,CO2 emissions have continuously declined at a global level.The decline was 1.6%,on average,per year,from 2005-2019,and 4.6%between 2019 and 2022 faster than the dec
140、line in specific energy consumption.Similarly,we observe that all markets where electrification has advanced CO2 emissions have declined faster than specific energy consumption.2.3 VEHICLE SALES BY POWERTRAINFigure 7 summarizes the dynamics the LDV market has evolved in terms of vehicle powertrains.
141、It considers both global developments(across the whole period analysed here)and specific cases,represented by selected years and targeted markets.Until 2019,95%of all vehicles sold globally were powered by traditional internal combustion engine powertrains.A major driver for improvements in fuel eco
142、nomy through 2019 was the introduction,growth and eventual decline of diesel powertrains in Europe and India.Diesel engines proved to be a good solution to reduce CO2 emissions,but improvements came at the expense of increased air pollutant emissions.12 The discovery of these increased emissions in
143、2015 has marked the beginning of the decline for this powertrain in both Europe and India.In 2022,diesel powertrains accounted for 23%of sales in Europe and 25%in India.As shown in Figure 5,hybrid vehicles offer energy savings relative to gasoline-fuelled vehicles.They also offer reduced air polluta
144、nt emissions relative to diesel-fuelled vehicles.This technology was pioneered in Japan,where hybrid vehicles account now for about one-quarter of sales.Worldwide,hybrid sales shares remained constant from 2013 to 2019,accounting for roughly 3%of all vehicles entering the market.Over this period,rel
145、atively low oil prices and limited availability of hybrid models have limited market penetration,mostly to Japan and Korea,where hybrid sales shares reached 20%and 6%of the total,respectively,in 2019.Since then,hybrid sales have further increased in Korea,reaching a 12%market share in 2022.From 2019
146、 onwards,hybrids have also made inroads in the European market,mostly driven by regulatory pressures to reduce fuel consumption and reflecting increased model availability.Hybrid sales increased in Europe from 4%in 2019 to 19%in 2022.Hybrids also grew in market relevance in North America,with sales
147、shares reaching 5%in 2022.Despite a growing trend,hybrid vehicles have small market share in China,reflecting a strong policy focus on BEVs.202220192010100%75%50%25%0%China202220192010100%75%50%25%0%North America202220192010100%75%50%25%0%EuropeBattery ElectricPlug-in HybridHybridMild HybridICE Petr
148、olICE DieselICE Other202220192010100%75%50%25%0%Japan100%75%50%25%0%Sales share2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022202220192010100%75%50%25%0%Other Countries202220192010100%75%50%25%0%KoreaFIGURE 7:LDV sales shares by powertrain:global and in sele
149、cted marketsNotes:ICE stands for internal combustion engine Other includes compressed natural gas(CNG)and liquefied petroleum gases(LPG)powered vehicles.Sources:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.1615TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE F
150、LEET 2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITIONPHEVs and BEVs,accounted for limited shares at the global level until 2016,at which point sales surpassed two million units(IEA,2017).By 2019,EVs reached 2%of global sales.Norway was an early adopter,with shares well above global average already
151、before 2019.By 2019,EV sales accounted for 56%of the market in Norway,more than ten times the 5%share of China and the 3.5%share for the European market as a whole(IEA,2020 and this assessment).EV sales shares increased sharply in 2020 in Europe,with OEMs selling more EVs to comply with the more str
152、ingent CO2 emission standards,as they integrated EV-specific incentives mechanisms.13 In that year Europe was the largest EV market.Its EV sales share tripled and reached 10%(IEA,2021b and this assessment).In 2021,the same trend occurred in China,where the EV sales share tripled over the previous ye
153、ar,reaching 15%(IEA,2022 and this assessment).EV sales accelerated significantly in 2022 also in North America and Korea,with EVs reaching 7%and 10%of the market,respectively.In other developing and emerging economies,EV sales shares are still below 2%.Despite this,EVs accounted for 14%of all new LD
154、V sales globally.Of these,two-thirds are pure battery electric vehicles while the rest are PHEVs(IEA,2023b and this assessment).2.4 VEHICLE SALES BY SEGMENTInternational regulations define passenger cars as power-driven vehicles with four or more wheels destined primarily for the carriage of people(
155、UN,2005,UN,2023).The passenger car market is divided into different segments,based on vehicle size and shape.Conventional cars typically include sedans,hatchbacks,or multipurpose vehicles.Larger forms of passenger cars,with higher ground clearance and height and that may have initially been designed
156、 to be able to drive off-road,include the so-called Sport Utility Vehicles(SUVs)and,in specific markets(mainly in North America)also pick-up trucks.For the purposes of this report,the passenger car market is divided into five categories:small,medium,and large conventional cars and small and large SU
157、Vs.Efforts were made to harmonize segment definitions across all vehicle markets.All else held equal,SUVs tend to have a higher specific energy consumption than cars,due to a larger cross-sectional area(which increases air drag)and larger weight(which increases the energy needed for acceleration,i.e
158、.to overcome inertia).Light commercial vehicles(LCVs)are primarily intended for the carriage of goods.They tend to be larger than cars and have more space for freight than for passengers,but they also share many of the technology characteristics(especially in terms of powertrains)of cars and,for thi
159、s reason,are often subject to similar regulatory requirements.Table 2 shows popular vehicles of these categories in each of the main car markets.All else held equal,SUVs tend to have a higher specific energy consumption than cars,due to a larger cross-sectional area(which increases air drag)and larg
160、er weight(which increases the energy needed for acceleration,i.e.to overcome inertia).Light commercial vehicles(LCVs)are primarily intended for the carriage of goods.They tend to be larger than cars and have more space for freight than for passengers,but they also share many of the technology charac
161、teristics(especially in terms of powertrains)of cars and,for this reason,are often subject to similar regulatory requirements.Table 2 shows popular vehicles of these categories in each of the main car markets.MarketSmall carMedium carLarge carSmall SUVLarge SUVLCVChinaWuling Hongguang MinievVW Lavid
162、aToyota CamryHaval H6Li L9Foton Xian-gling M1EuropeFiat 500VW GolfAudi A4WV T-RocBMW X5Renault TraficUnited StatesKia RioToyota CorollaTesla Model 3Chevrolet EquinoxFord F-150Ford TransitTABLE 2:Top selling vehicle models by segment in key marketsFigure 8 shows global LDV sales by market segment,cle
163、arly illustrating that the main development observed over the period covered by this analysis(2019-2022)has been an increase in the share of SUVs and a corresponding decrease in the sales of cars(especially small and medium cars).On the global scale,SUVs saw their market share rise from 22%in 2005 t
164、o roughly half of the LDV market(including cars,SUVs,and LCVs)in 2022.In addition to an increase across all major markets in the market share of SUV,Figure 8 which includes details for the main global automotive markets also shows significant differences in market segmentation across countries.20222
165、0192017100%75%50%25%0%China202220192017100%75%50%25%0%North America202220192017100%75%50%25%0%Europe202220192017100%75%50%25%0%Japan202220192017100%75%50%25%0%India202220192017100%75%50%25%0%Korea2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022100%75%50%25%0%
166、Sales ShareLarge SUVSmall SUVSmall CarMedium CarLarge CarLCVUnclassifiedShare SUVFIGURE 8:LDV sales by segment:global and in selected marketsSources:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.1817TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023-MA
167、NAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITION2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 20221.51.31.10.90.70.60.4Specific energy comsumption(Lge/100km)KWh/kmSmall CarMedium CarLarge CarSmall SUVLarge SUVFIGURE 9:Global specific energy consumption by
168、vehicle segmentSources:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.The North American vehicle market is also characterized by the highest share of Large SUVs,which include vehicles that are locally defined as“full sized SUVs”and“pickups,”a
169、nd are not common in other parts of the world.Shares are high in both Canada and the United States(79%and 75%in 2022,respectively).Australia(not represented in Figure 8)has also large SUV shares,with 76%.Large SUVs accounted for one quarter of all North American vehicle sales in 2022.Growth in these
170、 segments has remained strong,with the overall SUV market share increasing by 9 percentage points from 2019 to 2022.In China,SUVs accounted for 45%of the market in 2022,a share that increased by 4 percentage points from 2019.Nearly all SUVs sold fall in the small SUV category,as is the case in most
171、other global markets.Large cars also account for a significant share of the market(26%)in 2022,up by 3%since 2019.China has witnessed,over the past decades,not only a surge in vehicle demand,but also a fast transition from smaller vehicles to larger ones,as the disposable income of its citizens rose
172、.Europes share of SUVs is the lowest among the three largest global markets,accounting for 41%of all sales.However,SUV sales in Europe have also consistently grown since 2017.Conventional cars still account for the majority of vehicles sold,however the share of medium cars has been shrinking fast,wh
173、ile small SUV sales increased.The Korean market has shown similar recent trends in segmentation as Europe,with the exception of the relative shares of conventional cars;large cars have larger market shares in Korea,and shares of small and medium cars are smaller.Japan has similar market segmentation
174、 characteristics to Europe,but the share of small cars is even greater,and that of SUVs even smaller.Europe and Japan share a high reliance on oil imports.The significant resilience of small cars also points to a strong peculiarity of the Japanese market.14India also has high shares of small car sal
175、es,following a long-standing tradition of high fuel taxes and domestic manufacture of small vehicles.Recent market developments,however,show an erosion of market shares of small vehicles,in favour of large cars and small SUVs.Specific energy consumption varies significantly by vehicle segment:large
176、SUVs are the most energy intensive type of vehicle,while small cars are the most efficient(Figure 9).Small SUVs and large cars are roughly equivalent since the former tend to have higher weight and larger cross-sectional area,while the latter tend to have higher power ratings.When looking at trends,
177、it becomes clear that not all segments have improved at the same rate.In the period 2010 to 2019,small SUVs have undergone the fastest efficiency improvements,as this segment transitioned and evolved from a niche composed mostly of smaller 4x4 vehicles to the worlds most popular segment.The specific
178、 energy consumption of small SUVs improved by 3%per year,while all other segments improved at rates between 1%and 2.5%per year.In the period between 2019 and 2022,the strongest efficiency improvements have been observed in small cars,with specific energy consumption declining at a staggering 4.3%per
179、 year in the case of small cars,driven mostly by rapid adoption of electric cars,in particular in China.As explained in Section 2.3,electric powertrains significantly reduce energy consumption.However,their market penetration is not equally distributed across segments,nor across geographies.In China
180、,EVs accounted for three-quarters of small car sales in 2022(Figure 10),with the Hongguang mini EV,a sedan with a top speed of around 100 km/h that sold from around USD 6,500 to up to USD 15,000,being the top-selling model both in 2021 and 2022(van Vyk,2023).Chinese automakers have been competing in
181、tensely for market share in the small electric car segment,and have been willing to sustain tight margins;Wuling further cut the starting price of the Hongguang mini EV to around 4,300 USD in May 2023(Reuters,2023).EVs sold in other segments are often sold at far higher price points,either by establ
182、ished EV leaders such as BYD and Tesla or by new market entrants such as Nio,Li Auto,and XPeng,who have yet to post profits(Lepltre,2023).In Europe and the United States,the share of electric sales in the small car segment is far lower than in China(Figure 10).In Europe,large SUVs are the most heavi
183、ly electrified segment,with nearly half of all sales being electric,followed by the much larger segment in terms of sales volumes of small SUVs;with European automakers apparently seeking to replicate the possibility to lock-in higher margins by selling more SUVs even in the rapidly electrifying mar
184、ket.North America sees a different dynamic,where EVs are mostly found in small and large cars(with Tesla leading in the large car segment).Across all three markets,the medium car segment has relatively low levels of EV penetration.North AmericaChinaElectric VehiclesOther VehiclesEurope0%25%50%75%100
185、%0%25%50%75%100%Small SUVLarge SUVMedium CarSmall CarLarge CarLCV0%25%50%75%100%FIGURE 10:Electric vehicle sales share by vehicle segment in key automotive markets,2022Note:Electric vehicles include plug-in hybrid and battery electric vehicles.Source:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA
186、,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines 2019TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITION2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 20215.04.54.03.53.02.5Footprint(m2)2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 202000800Weight(kg)USACh
187、inaEuropeJapanIndiaWorldOther CountriesFIGURE 11:Footprint and weight trends across major LDV marketsSources:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.2.5 VEHICLE SIZE AND WEIGHTTwo major global trends are affecting the average vehicle s
188、ize(best represented by the attribute of footprint)15 and weight16 are the shift of market segments towards SUVs and electrification.Both weight and footprint have been on the rise since 2010(Figure 11),the year that also marks a change in pace in the transition across market segments globally(Figur
189、e 7).The shift from(especially small and medium)cars to SUVs has been a key driver of larger average footprint and greater weight.17 As shown in Table 3 and Figure 5,for ICEVs this shift is also associated with systematic differences in specific fuel consumption across segments,pointing to a key rol
190、e of the shift in market segmentation in limiting energy efficiency improvements for LDVs.Recent developments,however,following the year 2020,also suggest that the increasing trend for vehicle footprint has slowed down,and vehicle size even experienced a slight decline in 2022(Figure 12).Vehicle wei
191、ght,on the other hand,continued to increase.A major determinant of this development is the adoption of EVs.The reason is that EVs tend to have similar dimensions(and footprint)to ICEVs,but greater weight,largely due to the heavy battery that they carry(as further detailed in Chapter 3).WorldAverage
192、footprintAverage weightSpecific Energy ConsumptionMarket share changem2kgLge/100kmkWh/km-2022Small car3.510504.90.46-9%-3%Medium car4.0135060.56-3%-8%Large Car4.516606.50.60-3%-1%Small SUV4.115206.60.6119%10%Large SUV5.2214010.50.98-2%1%LCV4.416707.60.7118%11%TABLE 3:Average vehicle cha
193、racteristics by segment(left)and change in sales share by segment(right)Source:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.200162018 2020 2022013001200Weight(kg)200162018 2020 20224.504.254.003.753.50Footprint(m2)All vehicles,
194、excluding EVsAll vehiclesFIGURE 12:Global vehicle weight(left-hand side)and footprint(right-hand side)trends,including and excluding EVsSources:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.2221TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023-MANAGIN
195、G THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITION3 ANALYSIS OF THE VEHICLE MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY ACTIONThis Chapter focuses on the two major trends identified in Chapter 2:a shift in market segments towards SUVs and a recent rapid development of vehicle electrification.The analysis con
196、siders the impact of both these developments on energy use per km,direct CO2 emissions,road safety,and equity.Specific sections cover the implications that the EV transition had on the SUV shift,and makes the case that the combined shift to SUVs and the EV transition are leading to increased risks o
197、f a global divide.The last section lays out reasons that justify the policy interventions elaborated in Chapter 4.3.1 IMPACTS OF THE SHIFT TOWARDS SUVSThis section outlines impacts that the shift towards SUVs had on energy,direct CO2 emissions per km18 and vehicle weight,also considering related imp
198、lications for road safety and equity.3.1.1 ENERGY AND CO2 EMISSIONSFigure 13 shows historical evolutions in specific energy consumption for the main automotive markets globally,comparing developments in cases that include or exclude a shift in market segmentation,taking the year 2010 as the baseline
199、.The data indicate that energy use per km for ICE vehicles without the shift towards SUVs(and the subsequent increases in vehicle size,weight and power)could have improved at an average annual rate that is 30%higher than it actually did.19 The gap is larger in China(around 50%)and narrower in Europe
200、(around 20%),as the first focused on EVs while the other focused on improved technologies for ICEs(as discussed in Section 3.3.).Gaps in terms of direct emissions of CO2 are even larger,as CO2 emissions are almost directly proportional to fuel use for ICEVs,20 and EVs do not emit CO2 at the tailpipe
201、.Gaps are slightly narrower with lifecycle accounting of greenhouse gas emissions,as:Light-duty EVs have significantly lower lifecycle emissions,over their lifetime,with respect to ICEVs(Bieker,2021),but the lifecycle emission gap,especially in places with carbon-intensive grid mixes,is not as wide
202、as the energy efficiency differential.The variation of specific energy consumption for EVs across vehicle segments is small(as shown in Figure 5 for the case of Europe for 2022,and as also shown in IEA,2019a,with data from different geographies).3.1.2 VEHICLE WEIGHTFigure 14 illustrates trends in ve
203、hicle weight,globally and in the main markets,excluding the effect of the EV transition(discussed in Section 3.3.2),but including the impacts of the SUV shift.As SUVs are heavier than small and medium cars(Table 3),and as the main shifts in market segmentation consist of a decline in sales share of
204、small and medium cars and an increase in small SUV sales shares,the data in Figure 14 indicate North AmericaEuropeChinaWorld0.0%-1.0%-2.0%-3.0%-4.0%0.0%-1.0%-2.0%-3.0%-4.0%0.0%-1.0%-2.0%-3.0%-4.0%0.0%-1.0%-2.0%-3.0%-4.0%FIGURE 13:Global yearly rate of change in specific energy consumption,with a foc
205、us on the impact of the SUV shift,2010-2022Note:Observed rate is the yearly rate of improvement in SEC.Without EV,with SUV:is the rate of improvement that would have been achieved without EV(BEV and PHEV)sales.Without SUV,with EVs:is the rate that would have been achieved if LDV segment share had re
206、mained the same as it was in 2010.Without SUV,without EVs:is the rate that would have been achieved with the same LDV segment sales share as 2010 and without EV sales.Sources:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.that,in the absence
207、of the SUV shift,vehicle weight increases could have been more than halved relative to the increase that actually occurred(when excluding impacts of the EV transition)between 2010 and 2022.Region-specific results shown in Figure 14 indicate that net savings in weight(and related material demand)coul
208、d have been stronger,in percentage terms,in Europe and China than in the United States.They also indicate that weight increases have been more pronounced,over time,outside of the United States,even if average LDV weight in the North American market is still well above all others in absolute terms(by
209、 about 15-20%).1.4%1.2%1.0%0.8%0.6%0.4%0.2%0.0%-0.2%1.6&1.4%1.2%1.0%0.8%0.6%0.4%0.2%0.0%-0.2%1.4%1.2%1.0%0.8%0.6%0.4%0.2%0.0%-0.2%1.4%1.2%1.0%0.8%0.6%0.4%0.2%0.0%-0.2%All vehicles,excluding SUVsAll vehiclesICE vehiclesICE vehicles,excluding SUVsNorth AmericaEuropeChinaWorldFIGURE 14:Rate of change i
210、n vehicle weight,with a focus on the impact of the SUV shift,2010-2022Sources:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.All vehiclesICE vehiclesAll vehicles,excluding SUVsICE vehicles,excluding SUVs2423TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET
211、2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITION3.1.3 ROAD SAFETYThe shift to SUVs also had implications for road traffic injuries.Worldwide,road traffic injuries are the leading cause of death for children and young adults aged 5-29 years,and the cost of road traffic crashes is estimated at around
212、 3%of GDP across most countries(WHO,2022).Studies analysing the impact of increases in vehicle weight and size on motorist,passenger,and pedestrian safety show that collisions with larger,heavier vehicles are more likely to result in more severe injuries(including brain damage)or death,both to drive
213、rs of smaller vehicles and to cyclists and pedestrians(Ossiander at al.,2014;Van den Berghe,2021;Edwards and Leonard,2022,Nuyttens and Ben Messaoud,2023).Such studies primarily focus on the impacts of larger and heavier cars in North America(and especially in the United States where car crashes are
214、among the leading causes of death)and Europe.Recent analyses conducted in the United States find that large trucks,minivans and SUVs do not necessarily make the roads more dangerous,in aggregated terms,for drivers or passengers.However,risks are distributed unevenly.Increased injury and mortality ra
215、tes for occupants of smaller vehicles are generally offset by lower rates for occupants of larger vehicles(Ossiander et al.,2014).In addition to their greater weight and size,pickup and SUV designs diverge somewhat across key parameters that influence crash safety(for instance ride height)from cars.
216、In the United States,this design incompatibility has decreased following a 2009 voluntary commitment among automakers to standardize the height of energy-absorbing structures across all vehicles.Nevertheless,weight differences,together with some degree of continuing incompatibility,increase mortalit
217、y risks for drivers of cars in crashes between pick-ups or SUVs and cars by around 25%(Monfort and Nolan,2019).Evidence also shows that the severity of injuries and the risk of mortality is substantially higher for pedestrians that are hit by minivans,pickups,and SUVs,due to factors such as greater
218、impact force,higher front-end designs,and larger driver blind spots(Tyndall,2023,Nuyttens and Ben Messaoud,2023).In the United States,pedestrians hit by a pickup truck are roughly 70%more likely to die than those hit by a car,and those hit by an SUV are twice as likely(Tyndall,2023).If all light tru
219、cks(minivans,pickup trucks and SUVs)sold from 2000-2019 had been cars,pedestrian deaths in 2019 could have been reduced by 30%(Tyndall,2021).3.1.4 EQUITYThe analysis developed by the IEA and the ICCT in 2017(as summarized in Figure 15)shows that vehicle prices tend to be higher,across all main autom
220、otive markets,for small SUVs the segment that keeps experiencing significant increases in market shares than for small and medium cars the segments that,globally,experienced the most relevant contractions.Taking central estimates,for all regions,the gap between a medium car and a small SUV price is
221、on the order of 10%to 20%,and 25%to 60%between a small car and a small SUV,with the largest gap in developed economies with low fuel taxes(IEA,2019a).21 Similar gaps emerge from a recent comparison between small/medium cars and small SUVs for different European brands and models,which found that sma
222、ll SUVs carry a price premium of 8%to 30%with respect to comparable small and medium cars(Krajinska,2023).Figure 16 indicates also that ICE powertrain costs make up lower shares of the total vehicle price for small SUVs with respect to small and medium cars.This suggests that a shift in market segme
223、ntation towards SUVs,without major changes in powertrain technology,is not only likely to lead towards increases in turnover,but also towards larger profit margins,for manufacturers.Such a development is confirmed also by analyses pointing to larger margins available for larger,premium ICEVs(Sussams
224、 et al.,2018;Slowik et al.,2022).This is also consistent with reports showing increases in OEM profits,even with declining sales(Welch and Naughton,2023 and Hersh,2023).Combining these estimates with the decade-long tendency of a global shift towards SUVs shows clearly that the resulting impact led
225、to significant increases in OEM revenues with respect to a counterfactual without the shift.Drawbacks related to potential market growth higher than what has been observed are possible and are also consistent with the increases in average vehicle age in replacement markets like the EU and North Amer
226、ica(European Environment Agency,2023,for Europe and Parekh and Campau,2022,for the United States),22 even despite increases of average income levels,which provided households with a larger budget for vehicle purchases).The significant price gaps shown in Figure 15,combined with a continued expansion
227、 in SUV sales shares,are also consistent with the increased profitability registered by the automotive industry after 2020,taking place even with a decline in sales volumes(Stricker and Correa,2023),and notwithstanding a contextual effect due to increased inflation.This also resulted in relevant aff
228、ordability and equity challenges,within and across countries.Since 2019,average new car sales prices have risen faster than inflation in most regions.For example,the average price of new cars in the United States in early 2023 was 30%higher than in 2019(this compares prices of the same cars,and henc
229、e is not a result of the shift to SUVs)(Bureau of Labor Statistics,2023).New car buyers tend to be higher-income households(Krisher,2022)that can afford larger and more expensive vehicles.However,the choices made by this segment of the population affect the choices and affordability of car sales for
230、 the second-hand market(see,for instance,Krisher,2022).23 The lower-income segment of the population that relies on the second-hand market is also likely to be affected by the recent average price increase of vehicles,which was compounded by a shift towards SUVs.SegmentSmall CarMedium CarSmall SUVLa
231、rge CarLarge SUVVan/LCV00Price(thousand USD)Developed economies withcomparatively low fuel prices/taxesDeveloped economies withcomparatively high fuel prices/taxesEmerging economiesFIGURE 15:Evolution of vehicle prices,by segment and economic cluster,for the year 2017Source:adapted from I
232、EA,2019a,with revision of labels used for vehicle segments to match names used in this report.Small CarMedium CarSmall SUVLarge CarLarge SUVVan/LCVVehicle Price(thousand USD)PowertrainOther vehicle componentsPowertrain cost as percentage of vehicle pricePercentage of powertrain costin total vehicle
233、price8070605040302010040%35%30%25%20%15%10%5%0%FIGURE 16:Share of powertrain costs in internal combustion engine vehicle price for different vehicle segmentsSource:adapted from ITF,2020a,with revision of labels used for vehicle segments to match names used in this report.2625TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEH
234、ICLE FLEET 2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITIONThis effect is stronger in high-income countries,where there is a higher share of SUV sales.However,data shows that the move towards larger market segments is a global phenomenon.Data on vehicle prices by segment and global region,available
235、 from IEA,2019a(and shown in Figure 15)show a clear price gap between cars(especially small and medium cars)and small SUVs.As sales shares of small and medium cars shrink and shares of small SUVs rise,equity impacts are also likely to emerge.The dynamics of segment shifts in low-and medium-income co
236、untries are the combination of different factors that vary country by country:New car buyers in low-income countries tend to represent a small and very high-income segment of the population,therefore their high budget availability and preferences lead them to purchase increasingly large vehicles.In
237、such countries,lower income segments of the population do not have the financial ability to enter the new car market,therefore the demand for smaller,more affordable new cars is weak.In medium-income countries,where vehicle ownership is on the rise and demand growth is strong,small and medium cars a
238、re retaining market share as first-time new car buyers in these countries are more likely to be able to afford smaller vehicles.The rapid growth dynamics also mean that OEMs can retain sufficient profit margins.Both justify lower SUV market shares,in comparison with high-inciome countries.Equity imp
239、acts due to increases in new vehicle prices in developed countries may also impact second-hand vehicles sales in low-and medium-income countries,where second-hand vehicle purchases are a more common path to access motorization.Therefore,a higher average price of imports driven by an increased availa
240、bility of larger cars exports can lead to greater challenges in gaining access to motorized mobility in countries strongly reliant on second-hand vehicle imports.Due to greater constraints in the range of mobility choices,equity impacts due to vehicle price increases are also more relevant in countr
241、ies with limited affordable,accessible,and reliable alternatives to personal vehicles(such as public transport).3.2 THE ROLE OF EVS IN THE SHIFT TOWARDS SUVSFigure 17 provides additional insights across the main global markets compared to the information already shown in Figure 10.24 The figure illu
242、strates the evolution of market segmentation across all powertrains(left-hand bars)and for EVs(right-hand bars),between 2019 and 2022.The figure shows that EVs are not exempt from the shift towards SUVs:the market share of electric SUVs(especially small electric SUVs)has grown substantially between
243、2019 and 2022,in all markets.This marks an increase in product diversification,as EVs also gained overall market shares,moving beyond earlier market deployment strategies,more focused on large,premium car models.EV shares declined in the small car segment between 2019 and 2022,across all markets.Thi
244、s is primarily due to shifts in Europe and the United States(where this was further exacerbated,in 2023,by discontinuation of the only electric small car by a US OEM).As shown also in Figure 6,EVs in the small car segment maintained significant market shares in China.Globally,EVs also have limited m
245、arket share within the large SUV segment.This is consistent with sizable market shares of large SUVs limited to North America,where EVs also had to date lower market penetration,in comparison with China and Europe(despite recent increases).3.3 IMPACTS OF THE EV TRANSITIONSimilar to the case of the S
246、UV shift covered in Section 3.1,this section assesses impacts on the EV transition on energy and CO2 emissions,weight and material needs,road safety,and equity in different sub-sections.25 3.3.1 ENERGY AND CO2 EMISSIONSChapter 2 highlights the key role EVs have played in reducing the specific energy
247、 consumption of vehicles after 2020.Section 3.1.1 discusses impacts of the shift towards SUVs on energy efficiency and CO2 emission trends,excluding the effect of electrification,pointing out that the SUV shift led to significant reductions in the rate of improvement of energy efficiency compared to
248、 what could have materialized without this shift,and resulting in upward pressure on energy demand and CO2 emissions.This section analyses the specific effect of increased EV deployment on the gap in energy use per km(outlined in Section 3.1.1),considering the impacts on specific energy consumption
249、of the shift to SUVs in EVs.Like Figure 14,Figure 18 shows historical evolutions in specific energy consumption for the main automotive markets globally,comparing developments that actually occurred with a counterfactual that excludes the shift in market segmentation(on the top of the results alread
250、y included in Figure 14).20222019100%75%50%25%0%China20222000%75%50%25%0%USA20222000%75%50%25%0%Europe20222000%75%50%25%0%World20222019Large SUVSmall SUVSmall CarMedium CarLarge CarLCVUnclassifiedAll light duty vehiclesElectric vehiclesAll light duty vehiclesElectric
251、 vehiclesAll light duty vehiclesElectric vehiclesAll light duty vehiclesElectric vehiclesFIGURE 17:Powertrain shares globally and in major EV markets globally,with EVs singled out,2019 and 2022Sources:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines
252、 data.2827TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITIONAll vehicles,excluding SUVsAll vehiclesICE vehiclesICE vehicles,excluding SUVsNorth AmericaEuropeChina0.0%-1.0%-2.0%-3.0%-4.0%0.0%-1.0%-2.0%-3.0%-4.0%0.0%-1.0%-2.0%-3.0%-4.0%0.0%-1.0%-2.0%-3.0%-4.0%WorldFIG
253、URE 18:Global yearly rate of change in specific energy consumption,with a focus on the impact of the EV transition,2010-2022Sources:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on IEA,2019a;IEA,2021a;EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.Overall,results shown in Figure 18 point toward net increases i
254、n energy savings from EVs,across all markets.Without EVs,savings would have been 40%lower at the global level.The role of EVs is the result of two effects.On one hand,EVs have markedly lower specific energy consumption versus competing technologies(see also Figure 5,showing this clearly for the case
255、 of the European market).On the other hand,like all vehicles,specific energy consumption for EVs also increases with increasing vehicle weight(and therefore also with the segment shift towards SUVs),even though these increases are less pronounced than for other powertrains.Energy savings due to EVs
256、are stronger in recent years and in markets that saw a larger EV market penetration.In China and Europe,electrification had a very strong role in the decrease of average specific energy consumption of new vehicles.In the United States,impacts of the EV transition on trends of specific energy consump
257、tion are less pronounced,due to lower EV market shares as compared to China and Europe.From 2020 to 2022,electrification led to reductions in specific energy consumption that were roughly offset by the detrimental impact of SUVs.3.3.2 VEHICLE WEIGHTEVs are on average 13%heavier than equivalent ICEs.
258、The differential in weight for EVs comes primarily from the weight of the battery,which in turn depends on three factors:specific energy consumption,battery technology,and range.Despite lower impacts on EVs,due to the possibility to recover energy in regenerative braking,specific energy consumption
259、for EVs still varies across market segments.European data(Figure 5)show that small BEVs consume less energy,on average(14-15 Wh/km),than large all-electric SUVs(18-20 Wh/km).Small EVs also have lower vehicle weights than large EVs,as they need smaller batteries for the same range(Figure 19).Motor te
260、chnology can also contribute to weight savings,since higher efficiency motors(usually using rare-earth rich permanent magnets)can deliver better specific energy consumption.Battery technology(including chemistry and pack architecture)matters for vehicle weight because it determines the energy densit
261、y of the battery(Wh/kg).Better technologies deliver more energy per unit weight and tend to be used more frequently on larger vehicles,with longer ranges(Figure 19).High nickel content chemistries tend to have higher cell-level energy densities that range from 240 to 340 Wh/kg,while lithium iron pho
262、sphate(LFP)chemistries range between 150 and 190 Wh/kg(Hasselwander et al.,2023,Battery Design,2022,Frith et al.,2023).Pack technology is also very important,as there can be significant differences across chemistries,with LFP performing better than other chemistries,as also shown by BYD,with the bla
263、de battery(Frith et al.,2023).This opens up opportunities for its use on vehicles with larger batteries and longer ranges.The electric range of a vehicle is determined by battery capacity and weight(Figure 19),as well as by the vehicle aerodynamics and powertrain efficiency.All else being equal,rang
264、e is directly proportional to battery capacity,and thus also vehicle weight.Figure 19 shows that,on average,adding 100 km of range adds 330 kg to vehicle weight for a BEV(less additional weight is needed for smaller BEVs,given their lower energy intensity).EVs with ranges below 400 km have a weight
265、that is roughly similar to average ICE vehicles,while for longer range vehicles,weight rapidly increases.The relevance of range as a key determinant of battery size is also important considering PHEVs and BEVs independently,since PHEVs are meant to rely on all-electric ranges mainly for trips with s
266、horter distances and therefore have smaller battery packs(Figure 20)while they still rely on the HEV powertrain in charge-sustaining mode for longer distances.26 As such,they come with the advantage of lower requirements in terms of battery materials,with respect to BEVs,and the disadvantage of havi
267、ng a weight penalty due to the ICE.27 0300025002000300600900Weight(kg)Electric Range(km)Average ICEvehicle weight0300025002000300600900Weight(kg)Electric Range(km)Average ICEvehicle weightLarge SUVSmall SUVSmall CarMedium CarLarge CarNCABattery Chemistry:NMCLFPFIGURE 19:Weight
268、as a function of electric range for battery electric vehiclesSource:analysis based on data from EV Volumes(EV Volumes,2023).20000806040200Average Battery Capacity(KWh/vehicle)200202022WorldChinaNorth AmericaEuropeBEVPHEVFIGURE 20:Average battery capacity for PHEVs an
269、d BEVs globally and in the main LDV marketsSource:this assessment(details in the Annex)based on EV Volumes(EV Volumes,2023).3029TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITIONEV battery cathodes require high purity“critical materials”including lithium,cobalt,mang
270、anese,and nickel.Magnets that are in most EV motors(except for AC induction motors)require rare earth elements(mainly neodymium,and often also dysprosium,terbium,and praseodymium).A massive scale-up of critical material mining,processing,and EV cell production will be required over the coming decade
271、 to enable the rapid growth of EVs required to meet global climate targets(IEA,2023c).Scaling up to levels where supply can match demand growth will require closing gaps between global supply(based on expansion announcements)and EV battery demand,as well as ensuring that each step of the EV battery
272、supply chain mines,material processing,cathode and anode production and cell production ramps up to full capacity at speeds equivalent to or better than what has been achieved to date.The supply gap for lithium is particularly acute IEA assessed the gap between EV battery requirements in the Net Zer
273、o Scenario and announced production plans to 2030 to be just under 40%for lithium mining and processing(IEA,2023c).Rapid acceleration in EV demand,bolstered by ambitious EV deployment and industrial policies and targets,has already begun to guide investment for new facilities,as well as development
274、of innovative chemistries such as sodium-ion batteries for vehicle applications(Tapia-Ruiz et al.,2021).These are being explored by several Chinese battery makers,and are most viable in small EVs(as well as in electric two-wheelers due to lower energy density and lower cost).For a given battery chem
275、istry,mineral intensity scales linearly to battery capacity at the cell level.For example,0.1 kg of lithium are needed per each kWh of capacity for NCA and NMC 811 cell chemistries(the intensities are similar for LMO,at 0.106 kg/kWh,and for LFP,at 0.095 kg/kWh).Demand-side opportunities for right-si
276、zing batteries could also help to close the material supply gap,as well as decrease risks posed by regional concentration of lithium(and other metal)mining and processing.For instance,returning to average battery capacities of around 40 kWh/vehicle(the global average in 2017),rather than 60 kWh/vehi
277、cle(the average in 2022 as shown in Figure 20),would reduce lithium demand by around one-third.Other demand-side measures,such reducing reliance on car ownership,together with EV battery recycling,could further reduce exposure to critical mineral risks(Riofrancos et al.,2023).REDUCING CRITICAL MATER
278、IAL REQUIREMENTS FOR EV BATTERIES BY REDUCING BATTERY SIZESBOX 2:Figure 21 shows weight trends,globally and in the main light-duty vehicle markets,considering both the SUV shift and the EV transition,similar to Figure 18 for specific fuel consumption.The indications emerging from Figure 21 are consi
279、stent with the considerations outlined in Chapter 2 and above,since they indicate that the EV transition led to net increases in weight trends,adding to the effect of the shift from small and medium cars to SUVs.The effect is remarkable in the case of Europe,characterized by rapid growth both in EV
280、shares and by higher EV penetration in the SUV segments.China exhibits a lower weight increase due to its EV transition,reflecting the fact that the majority of EV sales are in the small segment(Figure 10).In the case of North America,impacts of the EV transition are larger when the SUV segment shif
281、t is not taken into consideration,since EVs have mostly penetrated in small and large car segments to date.3.3.3 ROAD SAFETYChapter 2 in particular Section 2.5 shows that vehicle electrification is having a significant effects on vehicle weight,contributing to the continuation of an upward trend,des
282、pite a flattening of the evolution of vehicle footprints.This contribution means that EVs are clearly not exempt from implications related to road safety.Available data on road safety point to a likelihood of passengers being killed in a collision with another vehicle that increases by 12%for every
283、500 kg difference between vehicles(Shaffer et al,2021).This is also what explains increased injury and mortality rates for occupants of smaller vehicles in crashes with larger vehicles,as flagged in Section 3.1.3 and as also reported in Nuyttens and Ben Messaoud (2023)for the case of Belgian roads.A
284、 2018 study by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety,focused on the United States,found that hybrid vehicles were subject to a 10%higher likelihood to injure a pedestrian than ICE equivalents(Highway Loss Data Institute,2018).Extrapolating this result on the basis of characteristics like faster
285、 acceleration and lower noise,Zipper(2023)claims that similar impacts could also end up being observable for EVs.Lower noise is effectively identified as a reasonable cause of higher frequency of crashes between EVs and pedestrians,in the case of Norway(Nuyttens and Ben Messaoud,2023).While acknowle
286、dging that most countries are still in an early phase of EV deployment,analyses that have reviewed available evidence from road safety analyses regarding EVs in Europe(including Norway)do not point towards indicators of negative impacts from vehicle electrification on road crashes with other vehicle
287、s(Nuyttens and Ben Messaoud,2023).A possible reason for this is the possibility that EVs are more frequently equipped with effective driver assistance features,capable of protecting both occupants of the vehicle and other road users.1.4%1.2%1.0%0.8%0.6%0.4%0.2%0.0%-0.2%1.4%1.2%1.0%0.8%0.6%0.4%0.2%0.
288、0%-0.2%1.4%1.2%1.0%0.8%0.6%0.4%0.2%0.0%-0.2%1.4%1.2%1.0%0.8%0.6%0.4%0.2%0.0%-0.2%All vehicles,excluding SUVsAll vehiclesICE vehiclesICE vehicles,excluding SUVsNorth AmericaEuropeChinaWorldFIGURE 21:Rate of change in vehicle weight,with a focus on the impact of the EV transition,2010-2022Source:this
289、assessment(details in the Annex)based on EEA,2023a;EEA,2023b and Marklines data.3231TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND THE EV TRANSITIONOverall,it is therefore important that a transition towards greater shares of EVs can effectively integrate strategies that limits t
290、heir impact on weight increases(Shaffer et al,2021),while still delivering the sizable energy security,energy diversification,and GHG emission mitigation benefits that EVs are capable of.3.3.4 EQUITYAvailable data on vehicle purchase prices such as those outlined in IEA,2019a and in following techno
291、-economic analyses,including Slowik,2022,for the United States28 point to a significant purchase price premium still characterizing sales of both PHEVs and BEVs.This premium is grounded in a combination of technical and economic factors,including:The cost of the batteries,for BEVs,which currently st
292、ill exceeds the cost of ICE powertrains,and major efforts(including the possibility to develop new joint ventures between battery manufacturers and automotive OEMs)needed to develop new supply chains.In the case of PHEVs,the cost of complex powertrains,which combine ICEs with systems meant to pair e
293、ngines with electric motors and batteries,anyway larger than on hybrids and ICEVs.Other cost components,related to research,development and above all investment in new industrial facilities,as these come with large capital outlays that need to be recovered over time.Especially for legacy OEMs,costs
294、potentially associated(as this varies on a case-by-case basis)with the need for early dismissal of existing industrial facilities,or part of them(e.g.,engine production lines),even if other capital costs are likely to be already amortized(contrary to the case of new market entrants focusing exclusiv
295、ely on electric vehicles).These factors,combined with a near-term focus on higher profitability,also explain the greater reluctance of legacy OEMs to enter the EV market,especially in smaller segments.This is the case despite exposure to long-term losses of market shares to Chinese competitors(alrea
296、dy selling EVs at affordable prices,and across several different segments)and prospects for shrinking relevance as automotive technology providers going forward.The economic benefits of EVs which consist of lower running costs and a decreased exposure to oil product market price are benefitting thos
297、e consumers and small businesses that can afford the higher upfront cost.These tend to be in very high-income segments of the population,meaning that lower income segments of the population are not able to reap the economic benefits of electrification.Therefore,vehicle electrification is not exempt
298、from equity challenges,at least until such a time when EVs no longer come with higher upfront costs.EV sales are concentrated in China and high-income countries,as higher upfront costs(especially in countries other than China)and lack of charging infrastructure make EV deployment slow in low-and mid
299、dle-income countries.The same equity issue that exists within individual economies as low-income groups are not yet able to reap the savings that come with more efficient electric vehicles also exists at the global level,across countries with different levels of income.3.4 ARE SUVS AND EVS INCREASIN
300、G THE RISK OF A GLOBAL DIVIDE?Equity-related challenges and greater exposure of low-income households and businesses to the combined market transformation towards EVs and SUVs point towards the possibility of a growing global divide,not only within different population groups within countries,but al
301、so between major developed economies and other countries.A number of global dynamics may exacerbate this potential trend:Increases in fossil energy prices,already accelerating the transition to EVs,as they tend to be paired with greater exposure to high energy prices on non-EV drivers.29 resulting i
302、n greater challenges to access EVs for households and businesses exposed to higher costs of borrowing,and often reliant on second-hand vehicle purchases.Faster depreciation of ICEVs,including SUVs(which are still likely to remain more expensive than conventional cars),with respect to EVs,30 resultin
303、g in greater challenges to access EVs for households and businesses exposed to higher costs of borrowing,and often reliant on second-hand vehicle purchases.Growing interest in batteries for stationary applications,as well as regulatory requirements related with materials circularity and a progressiv
304、e transition towards net-zero emissions,insofar as these policies exert upward pressure on the value of EV batteries and the materials they contain,as these could also slow down EV depreciation,with net advantages for people and businesses having easier access to capital at lower costs.31 The impact
305、s of dynamics affecting vehicle prices(via depreciation and/or structural determinants of battery costs)are not only limited to single countries or markets,but they also have transnational relevance,through international trade of new and second-hand vehicles.The latter is especially important for ma
306、ny low-and medium-income countries in Africa,Asia,the Middle East and Latin America,as they receive significant flows of used cars and vans(contributing to ensure a more affordable access to enhanced mobility options)32 from high-income countries(UNEP,2021).In the absence of strong efforts to accele
307、rate the shift to electric mobility in the Global South,at affordable costs,there is an increased risk of a growing divide between vehicle markets in the Global North more focused on new EV purchases and having greater capital availability to retain second-hand EVs,and other markets more exposed to
308、EV deployment and increased flows of cheap and unsafe ICE vehicles,including through second-hand vehicle trade.Rapid declines in new battery costs and/or energy prices(with greater environmental benefits if these declines are faster for renewable energies and/or other forms of low-carbon electricity
309、,in comparison with fossil fuels)could mitigate these effects.3.5 NEED FOR POLICY ACTION TO ADDRESS EXISTING CHALLENGESChapter 2 described key features of recent developments of the light duty vehicle market,providing a global overview that covers vehicle sales trends,powertrain technologies,market
310、segments,specific energy consumption,CO2 emissions,vehicle weight and footprint.Chapter 3 analysed further specific implications of two major trends identified in Chapter 2:a shift in market segments towards SUVs and a recent rapid development of vehicle electrification.The analysis developed in Cha
311、pter 3 considered key elements that underpinned an increase in market shares of SUVs.It looked at the impact of this development on energy consumption,CO2 emissions road safety and equity.It overlaid these considerations with transformations due to increased rates of electrification in the global LD
312、V market,pointing out cases where EVs could mitigate or exacerbate challenges arising from the SUV shift.Overall,this analysis flagged the following key issues,also summarized graphically in Table 4:While the shift towards SUVs in the LDV market could be important to support longer-term investments
313、for stakeholders in the automotive sector,especially in cases where the need to invest in electrification has not been properly anticipated(or it has been deliberately delayed)33,it is effectively reducing the offer of affordable vehicles on the market.The shift towards SUVs has therefore detrimenta
314、lly impacted equity,with stronger negative consequences on part of the society subject to greater barriers to access capital,both domestically and internationally.Due to its upward pressure in new vehicle prices,and despite increases in average income that took place over the years across different
315、geographies,this shift may also have contributed to a stagnation of the global market for new vehicles.The SUV shift has clear negative implications for energy efficiency improvements and CO2 emission mitigation,as it led to sizable reduction in energy efficiency improvement in comparison with a cou
316、nterfactual without this shift.The SUV shift is also clearly paired with increased vehicle weight and demand for materials,beyond what can become available from end-of-life management of vehicles,34 even in replacement markets.3433TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL VEHICLE FLEET 2023-MANAGING THE SUV SHIFT AND TH
317、E EV TRANSITION Increased market shares of SUVs are also paired with negative implications for road safety,including for the most vulnerable users,exacerbating equity impacts.The net benefits for energy efficiency improvements and CO2 emission mitigation from EVs.The EV transition will continue to r
318、equire increasing extraction and processing of materials for EV batteries.Over the coming decades,material demand will not only exceed supplies that may become available from vehicle and EV battery recycling,but growing sales of electric vehicles will require rapid expansion of material demand and p
319、rocessing(IEA,2023c).Electric SUVs are paired with higher energy use per km and larger battery packs,exacerbating these challenges.Existing evidence suggests that EV impacts on road safety are not yet clear.At the same time,key characteristics like greater weight and less noise are likely to require
320、 risk mitigation strategies to avoid negative impacts,especially but not only for vulnerable road users.High upfront costs of EVs also expose the EV transition to equity-related challenges,similar to the case of the SUV shift,since low-income households are subject to greater capital availability co
321、nstraints and higher costs of borrowing.This is relevant both domestically and internationally,with greater exposure for low-income countries.Contrary to the SUV shift,though,the EV transition enables access to much lower operational costs,and lower total cost of ownership,especially for highly util
322、ized vehicles.This has positive implications for equity,as long as hurdles in overcoming higher upfront costs are addressed by policy.Effectively addressing these key issues,while pursuing improvements across all indicators considered,requires continued policy focus on the transition towards vehicle
323、 electrification,paired with targeted policies to mitigate,and if possible,reverse,the size shift towards SUVs.This transition is achievable with the combination of forward-looking policy and alignment of industry strategy aligned with longer term viability.Challenges related to the demand of materi
324、als and minerals for battery supplies deserve specific attention,due to their wide-ranging implications for industrial development,trade,and geopolitics.These challenges are linked with stresses regarding the availability,pace of extraction and processing of battery materials(stronger with larger EV
325、 batteries)and the need for greater diversification of the battery value chain,also for reasons related with security of supply.35 Policy is crucial to de-risk transformative investment choices and direct them towards a product mix capable of mitigating the negative impacts on equity,environment and
326、 road safety highlighted in this chapter.A re-envisioning of industrial priorities is needed to steer capital toward investments that provide longer term prospects for market growth and value creation.Policy is also crucial to handle challenges related with tensions regarding material demand and sup
327、ply.In addition to scaling up supply and investing in alternative battery chemistries,demand-side measures can play an important role(Riofrancos et al.,2023).These are not limited to aspects related with the type of materials needed in EV batteries,but they also cover the effects associated with the
328、 evolution of vehicle and battery sizes.Importantly,policy measures aiming to manage the development of EV battery materials can also have positive implications for equity,especially if they are paired with other policies that enhance access to charging infrastructure.If not paired with investments
329、in the technology transition towards EVs by legacy OEMs,the EV transition also risks coming with a weakening of existing industrial clusters.Unless compensated by new market entrants,this can lead to overall deindustrialization.Due to impacts on jobs and their geographical location(ILO,2021),this ca
330、n also have destabilizing effects on social and economic resilience,especially for countries that currently have a strong stake in the automotive industry.36 Policies and strategic choices for industrial development should address these deindustrialization risks(or,in countries that do not have stro
331、ng automotive industry clusters,seize industrialization opportunities),while not losing focus on the need to maintain economic competitiveness.Challenges of making affordable vehicles available on national markets could become opportunities for countries that have retained higher sales shares in the
332、 smaller market segments,as they have the possibility to leverage production already existing for the domestic market,turning it towards exports.China is particularly well positioned to gain market shares through exports for its EVs,thanks to its already strong EV production capacity including small
333、er market segments and the pervasive role that it has acquired across all stages of the battery supply chain.37 Due to their domestic market structure,other major global manufacturers with stronger presence in the small vehicle segments can also benefit from policy action capable of rebalancing opportunities for value creation away from SUVs and vehicles with comparatively high energy demand and e