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1、BlackRock Investment Institute FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S., CANADA, HONG KONG, SINGAPORE AND AUSTRALIA. FOR INSTITUTIONAL, PROFESSIONAL, QUALIFIED INVESTORS AND QUALIFIED CLIENTS IN OTHER PERMITTED COUNTRIES. A new investment order 2021 global outlook BIIM1220U/M-1437265-1/16 2 Contents 2 We
2、 have entered a new investment order. The Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated profound shifts in how economies and societies operate. We see transformations across sustainability, inequality, geopolitics and macro policy. This is reflected in our 2021 investment themes: The new nominal, Globalization
3、rewiredand Turbocharged transformations. The new investment order is still evolving, and investors will need to adapt. Yet the features are becoming clear, and we believe this calls for a fundamental rethink of portfolio allocations starting now. Philipp Hildebrand Vice Chairman BlackRock First word
4、s Summary Introduction Macro landscape Themes The new nominal Globalization rewired Turbocharged transformations 2-4 2 3 4 5-7 5 6 7 2021 global outlook Summary Jean Boivin Head BlackRock Investment Institute Elga Bartsch Head of Macro Research BlackRock Investment Institute Mike Pyle Global Chief I
5、nvestment Strategist BlackRock Investment Institute Scott Thiel Chief Fixed Income Strategist BlackRock Investment Institute Forum focus Bottom-up Geopolitics Emerging world Asset allocation Strategic Directional Tactical The traditional business cycle playbook does not apply to the pandemic. We see
6、 the shock as more akin to that of a large-scale natural disaster followed by swift economic restart. Early in the crisis, we assessed that the ultimate cumulative economic losses what matters most for financial markets would likely prove to be a fraction of those seen in the wake of the global fina
7、ncial crisis (GFC). This view was conditional on robust policy support to tide households and businesses through the income shock. The early results of Covid-19 vaccine trials give us greater confidence in this framework. They suggest the economic restart can re-accelerate significantly in 2021 as p
8、ent-up demand is unleashed. We believe markets will likely be quick to price in a full economic restart given the improved visibility on the outlook. The U.S. and Europe face challenges in the very near term: A resurgence of virus cases may result in outright economic contraction. Risks of policy fa
9、tigue are rising, especially in the U.S., and ongoing policy support is vital to limit any permanent economic scarring. Yet positive vaccine news is a game changer in that we now know we are building a bridge to somewhere, providing clarity for policymakers, companies and markets about getting to a
10、post-Covid stage. As a result, we favor looking through any near-term market volatility. We increase our overall pro-risk stance by upgrading equities on a tactical basis, and take a sectoral approach. We like tech and healthcare due to the pandemics transformative shifts. We balance this with a pre
11、ference for prime potential beneficiaries of the economic restart, such as emerging market (EM) equities and U.S. small caps. We overweight Asia ex-Japan equities and Asia fixed income on the regions effective virus response, and favor assets exposed to Chinese growth. The policy revolution has big
12、implications for our strategic views as we see a more muted response of nominal yields to a higher inflation regime. Central banks appear committed to limit any rises in nominal yields even as inflation picks up. Investors will need a new playbook to navigate this. We underweight government bonds an
13、d maintain a higher strategic allocation to equities than in typical periods of rising inflation. Sustainability is a key component of our views as we see a tectonic shift to sustainable assets playing out over decades. Contrary to past consensus, we expect this shift to help enhance returns. Privat
14、e market exposures are one way to pursue portfolio resilience with a sustainable lens. FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S., CANADA, HONG KONG, SINGAPORE AND AUSTRALIA. FOR INSTITUTIONAL, PROFESSIONAL, QUALIFIED INVESTORS AND QUALIFIED CLIENTS IN OTHER PERMITTED COUNTRIES. 8-10 8 9 10 11-15 11-12 13
15、14-15 BIIM1220U/M-1437265-2/16 3 3 The new nominal A new investment order We held our virtual 2021 Investment Outlook Forum at a critical juncture: in the midst of an intensifying pandemic and right after a historic U.S. election. Our debates focused on transformations taking place across four dimen
16、sions: First, Covid-19 has put a spotlight on underappreciated environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors such as employee safety, while support for combating climate change has swelled amid extreme weather events. Second, rising income, wealth and racial inequalities are fueling dissatisfac
17、tion with the status quo, and could drive tax increases for the wealthy and higher minimum wages as well as threats to central bank independence. Third, Covid has accelerated geopolitical trends such as a bipolar U.S.-China world order and a rewiring of global supply chains. We dont see this as degl
18、obalization it is more about the world adapting to this new order. Lastly, the unprecedented cooperation between fiscal and monetary authorities has upended the policy landscape. We see no political appetite for fiscal austerity, even as debt ratios hit historic highs globally. The politics of inequ
19、ality will likely keep deficit spending high. New central bank policy frameworks are likely to keep interest rates low even in the face of rising inflation. And we are already seeing signs of a risk that central banks become more politicized in the new investment order. This comes as we expect risin
20、g production costs amid a focus on supply chain resilience and greater pricing power of large companies in this environment. Taken together, we believe markets underappreciate inflation risks and that the coming higher inflation regime will be very different from the reflation debates of the last ex
21、pansion. This has significant implications for strategic asset allocations. Key components include a rethink of the role of nominal developed market (DM) government bonds, given the implications of the policy revolution: a drop in real yields. That implies unusually in a more inflationary environmen
22、t a favorable backdrop for equities as discount rates are contained by policy. It also means a preference for inflation-protected bonds. We acknowledge these are big calls with much uncertainty and we will be tracking them closely in the years ahead. 2021 global outlook Introduction We see stronger
23、growth and lower real yields ahead as the vaccine-led restart accelerates and central banks limit the rise of nominal yields even as inflation expectations climb. Inflation will have different implications to the past. Strategic implication: We underweight government bonds and see equities supported
24、 by falling real rates. Tactical implication: Our low rate outlook keeps us pro- risk. We like U.S. equities and prefer high yield for income. Globalization rewired Covid-19 has accelerated geopolitical transformations such as a bipolar U.S.-China world order and a remaking of global supply chains p
25、lacing greater weight on resilience and less on efficiency. Strategic implication: We favor deliberate country diversification and above-benchmark China exposures. Tactical implication: We like EM equities, especially Asia ex-Japan, and are underweight Europe and Japan. Turbocharged transformations
26、The pandemic has added fuel to pre-existing structural trends such as an increased focus on sustainability, rising inequality within and across nations, and the dominance of e-commerce at the expense of traditional retail. Strategic implication: We prefer sustainable assets amid a growing societal p
27、reference for sustainability. Tactical implication: We take a barbell approach, favoring tech and healthcare as well as selected cyclical exposures. FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S., CANADA, HONG KONG, SINGAPORE AND AUSTRALIA. FOR INSTITUTIONAL, PROFESSIONAL, QUALIFIED INVESTORS AND QUALIFIED CLI
28、ENTS IN OTHER PERMITTED COUNTRIES. BIIM1220U/M-1437265-3/16 4 4 2021 global outlookMacro landscape FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S., CANADA, HONG KONG, SINGAPORE AND AUSTRALIA. FOR INSTITUTIONAL, PROFESSIONAL, QUALIFIED INVESTORS AND QUALIFIED CLIENTS IN OTHER PERMITTED COUNTRIES. Macro landscape
29、 A less severe shortfall Restart and reset The timing of effective and widely available Covid-19 vaccines will be a key driver of the restart particularly in the face of increased risks to U.S. fiscal stimulus needed to sustain households and businesses through the virus shock. Encouraging news on t
30、he vaccine front strengthens our base case of a full restart by late 2021. The vaccine game changer is knowing we are building a bridge to somewhere. It provides more clarity for governments, companies and households about the shape of a post Covid-19 economy. This anchor should help limit any econo
31、mic scarring and justify deploying further policy support. All this should make it easier for risk assets to absorb any near-term disappointments but also to quickly price in the accelerated restart, in our view. The restart faces challenges in the near term as rising hospitalizations and fatalities
32、 trigger renewed lockdowns. See our Covid tracker for pandemic and activity trends. The euro area economy may now contract in the fourth quarter, with the U.S. close behind. This setback would not materially increase the ultimate GDP shortfall from pre-virus levels, in our view. Consensus growth est
33、imates suggest the shortfall what ultimately matters for financial markets is now on track to be a fraction of the post-GFC one and smaller than what had been expected in July. See the chart. Traditional business cycle analysis doesnt apply in the wake of the Covid shock, in our view. We see it as a
34、kin to a natural disaster, which is typically followed by rapid economic restart with little permanent economic damage, and expect it to speed up structural changes. This is very different from the 2008 crisis, which was followed by a “lost decade” of deleveraging and declining trend growth. This vi
35、ew underpins the upgrade to our overall pro-risk stance, reflected in a new tactical overweight in equities. It includes overweights in selected cyclical exposures such as U.S. small caps, and EM and Asia ex- Japan equities. We also underweight investment grade credit to fund a tilt toward more cycl
36、ical exposures such as high yield and Asia fixed income. Sources: BlackRock Investment Institute, with data from Reuters News, November 2020. Notes: The green line shows the cumulative economic loss, or the difference between estimated U.S. nominal GDP at the time and where it would have been had it
37、 grown at its pre-GFC trend level (3.4% a year) from end-2007 onwards. The solid orange line shows the latest estimates of the cumulative economic loss from the Covid-19 shock, measured from a starting point of end- 2019 and assuming pre-crisis trend growth of 3.35% (a 20-year pre-Covid average). GD
38、P estimates reflect the median from a Reuters poll of economists published on Sept. 25, 2020. Poll data are only available for 16 quarters. We assume a return to trend growth after this time (orange dotted line). The yellow line shows the cumulative loss estimates as of July 2020. For illustrative p
39、urposes only. There is no guarantee that any forecasts made will come to pass. The hypothetical scenario is subject to significant limitations as the pandemic is evolving and we are still trying to understand the potential for more extensive activity shutdowns. The vaccine game changer is knowing we
40、 are building a bridge to somewhere. It provides more clarity for households, companies and governments on getting to a post Covid-19 economy. U.S. GDP shortfall after the GFC vs. estimated loss from the Covid shock -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 04823640 Loss as a % of pre-shock GDP Quarters foll
41、owing the shock nn Consensus estimate range (latest) nn Consensus estimate (latest) nn Consensus estimate (July) nn Cumulative loss after the GFC BIIM1220U/M-1437265-4/16 5 5 0.5 1.5 2.5 201520202025 Expected inflation (%) nn Market implied U.S. inflation nn Market implied euro area inflation nn BII
42、estimate - U.S. nn BII estimate - euro area 2021 global outlookThemes FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S., CANADA, HONG KONG, SINGAPORE AND AUSTRALIA. FOR INSTITUTIONAL, PROFESSIONAL, QUALIFIED INVESTORS AND QUALIFIED CLIENTS IN OTHER PERMITTED COUNTRIES. Theme 1 Underappreciated inflation risks The
43、 new nominal The “new nominal” is not simply about our expectation for a higher inflation regime in the next five years. It means stronger growth in the near term, and eventually higher inflation - without the typical rise in nominal bond yields. As a result, we see very different market implication
44、s than in the past. Previous episodes of rising inflation were costly for investors, leading to higher interest rates that pressured valuations across asset classes via rising discount rates. Yet the policy revolution means any rise in inflation from todays levels will be better for risk assets than
45、 in past episodes, in our view. Central banks have signaled they will be more willing to let economies run hot with above- target inflation by changing their policy frameworks to make up for prior inflation undershoots. At the same time, the fiscal-monetary policy revolution a necessary response to
46、the Covid-19 shock risks greater political constraints on central banks ability to lean against inflation. We see central banks likely curbing nominal yield rises to prevent an unwanted tightening of financial conditions. We see other reasons for higher inflation, as detailed in Preparing for a high
47、er inflation regime. Production costs look set to rise on the rewiring of global supply chains, while we see scope for companies to exert their pricing power to protect profit margins. Corporate cost cutting may mitigate inflationary pressures in the near term. But even the moderately higher inflati
48、on in our base case around 2.5-3% annually would surprise markets after a decade of undershoots. See the Under- appreciated inflation risks chart. DM government bonds in portfolios are challenged; with yields near effective lower bounds and central banks limiting yield rises even as growth picks up,
49、 we believe they will be less effective as portfolio diversifiers. Real yields look to be headed lower one reason why we favor inflation-linked securities on a strategic basis. Importantly, we believe The new nominal of constrained nominal bond yields will support risk assets. As a result, we are tactically more pro-risk and maintain a higher strategic allocation to equities than we would if higher inflation were to have its historical impact on nominal yields. ForwardForward- -looking estimates may