1、A World Bank Group Flagship ReportGlobal Economic Prospects JANUARY 2023Global Economic Prospects JANUARY 2023 Global Economic Prospects 2023 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street NW,Washington,DC 20433 Telephone:202-473-1000;Internet:www.worldbank.org So

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12、ington,DC 20433,USA;e-mail:pubrightsworldbank.org.ISBN(paper):978-1-4648-1906-3 ISBN(electronic):978-1-4648-1950-6 DOI:10.1586/978-1-4648-1906-3 Cover design:Bill Pragluski(Critical Stages)Library of Congress Control Number:2022923405.The cutoff date for the data used in the report was December 19,2

13、022.v Summary of Contents Acknowledgments.xiii Foreword.xv Executive Summary.xvii Abbreviations.xix Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Statistical Appendix.161 Selected Topics.168 The Global Outlook.1 Box 1.1 Regional perspectives:Outlook and risks.16 Box 1.2 Recent developments and outlook for

14、 low-income countries.22 Regional Outlooks.51 East Asia and Pacific.53 Europe and Central Asia.59 Latin America and the Caribbean.67 Middle East and North Africa.75 South Asia.83 Sub-Saharan Africa.89 Investment Growth after the Pandemic.101 Small States:Overlapping Crises,Multiple Challenges.129 vi

15、i Contents Chapter 1 Global Outlook.1 Summary.3 Global context.8 Global trade.8 Commodity markets.8 Global inflation.11 Financial developments.11 Major economies:Recent developments and outlook.12 Advanced economies.13 China.14 Emerging market and developing economies.14 Recent developments.14 Outlo

16、ok.15 Global outlook and risks.27 Global outlook.27 Risks to the outlook.28 Policy challenges.35 Key global challenges.35 Challenges in emerging market and developing economies.37 References.45 Acknowledgments.xiii Foreword.xv Executive Summary.xvii Abbreviations.xix Regional Outlooks.51 East Asia a

17、nd Pacific .53 Recent developments.53 Outlook.54 Risks.55 Europe and Central Asia.59 Recent developments.59 Outlook.61 Risks.63 Chapter 2 viii Latin America and the Caribbean.67 Recent developments.67 Outlook.68 Risks.70 Middle East and North Africa .75 Recent developments.75 Outlook.76 Risks.78 Sou

18、th Asia.83 Recent developments.83 Outlook.85 Risks.86 Sub-Saharan Africa.89 Recent developments.89 Outlook.91 Risks.93 References.97 Chapter 2 Investment Growth after the Pandemic.101 Introduction.103 Evolution of investment growth.105 Macroeconomic backdrop.106 Empirical analysis of investment grow

19、th.109 Investment prospects.110 Implications of weak investment growth.110 Policies to promote investment growth.113 Fiscal policy.114 Structural policy.115 Conclusion.117 Annex 3.1 Determinants of investment growth:Empirical framework.119 Annex 3.2 Investment growth and reforms.121 References.122 C

20、hapter 3 Small States:Overlapping Crises,Multiple Challenges.129 Introduction.131 Characteristics of small states.133 Economic impact of overlapping crises.138 Chapter 4 ix Chapter 4 The COVID-19 pandemic.138 Russias invasion of Ukraine,inflation,and global monetary policy tightening.140 Prospects f

21、or recovery.141 Risks.142 External financing shocks.142 Inflation.144 Global downturn.144 Climate change and natural disasters.144 Policy priorities.145 Domestic policies.145 Policy support from the global community.151 References.156 Statistical Appendix.161 Data and Forecast Conventions.167 Select

22、ed Topics.168 1.1 Global prospects.5 1.2 Global risks and policy challenges.7 1.3 Global trade.9 1.4 Commodity markets.10 1.5 Global inflation and financial developments.12 1.6 Major economies:Recent developments and outlook.13 1.7 Recent developments in emerging market and developing economies.15 B

23、1.1.1 Regional outlooks.17 B1.1.2 Regional risks.19 1.8 Outlook in emerging market and developing economies.21 B1.2.1 LICs:Recent developments.23 B1.2.2 LICs:Outlook and risks.25 1.9 Per capita income growth.28 1.10 Global outlook.29 1.11 Risks to the outlook.30 1.12 Alternative downside scenarios.3

24、3 1.13 Global policy challenges.36 Figures Boxes 1.1 Regional perspectives:Outlook and risks.16 1.2 Recent developments and outlook for low-income countries.22 x 1.14 Monetary policy challenges in emerging market and developing economies.38 1.15 Fiscal policy challenges in emerging market and develo

25、ping economies.39 1.16 Structural policy challenges in emerging market and developing economies.41 2.1.1 China:Recent developments.54 2.1.2 EAP excluding China:Recent developments.55 2.1.3 EAP:Outlook.56 2.1.4 EAP:Risks.57 2.2.1 ECA:Recent developments.60 2.2.2 ECA:Outlook.61 2.2.3 ECA:Risks.63 2.3.

26、1 LAC:Recent developments.68 2.3.2 LAC:Outlook.69 2.3.3 LAC:Risks.71 2.4.1 MNA:Recent developments.76 2.4.2 MNA:Outlook.77 2.4.3 MNA:Risks.78 2.5.1 SAR:Recent developments.84 2.5.2 SAR:Outlook.85 2.5.3 SAR:Risks.87 2.6.1 SSA:Recent developments.90 2.6.2 SSA:Outlook .91 2.6.3 SSA:Risks.93 3.1 Investm

27、ent growth.104 3.2 Private and public investment growth.106 3.3 Investment around global recessions.106 3.4 Terms of trade and investment growth.107 3.5 Credit growth,debt,and investment growth.108 3.6 Estimated contribution of explanatory variables to predicted investment growth.109 3.7 Investment

28、growth outlook.110 3.8 Investment compared to trend.111 3.9 Slowdown in growth of investment and trade.111 3.10 Growth of investment,productivity,and potential output.112 3.11 Infrastructure spending needs related to the Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs).113 3.12 Investment growth around reform sp

29、urts and setbacks in EMDEs.115 4.1 Growth and income in small states.132 Figures xi Tables 1.1 Real GDP.4 B1.2.1 Low-income country forecasts.26 1.2 Emerging market and developing economies.44 2.1.1 East Asia and Pacific forecast summary.58 2.1.2 East Asia and Pacific country forecasts.58 2.2.1 Euro

30、pe and Central Asia forecast summary.65 2.2.2 Europe and Central Asia country forecasts.66 2.3.1 Latin America and the Caribbean forecast summary.72 2.3.2 Latin America and the Caribbean country forecasts.73 2.4.1 Middle East and North Africa forecast summary.80 2.4.2 Middle East and North Africa ec

31、onomy forecasts.81 2.5.1 South Asia forecast summary.88 2.5.2 South Asia country forecasts.88 2.6.1 Sub-Saharan Africa forecast summary.95 2.6.2 Sub-Saharan Africa country forecasts.96 3.1 Investment sample.118 A3.1.1 Correlates of investment growth.120 A3.1.2 Correlates of investment growth robustn

32、ess.121 A3.2.1 Investment growth around investment climate reform spurts and setbacks.122 4.1 EMDE small states,by type.154 4.2 Real GDP for EMDE small states.155 Figures 4.2 Features of small states.134 4.3 Output and trade characteristics of small states.135 4.4 Fiscal positions of small states.13

33、6 4.5 External financing of small states.137 4.6 Growth in small states during the past two decades.138 4.7 The COVID-19 pandemic in small states.139 4.8 Economic effects of the war in Ukraine.140 4.9 Prospects for recovery.141 4.10 External financing risks.143 4.11 Climate change and natural disast

34、ers.145 4.12 Policies to reduce vulnerability to global price shocks.149 xiii Global and regional surveillance work was led by Carlos Arteta.The report was prepared by a team that included John Baffes,Jongrim Ha,Samuel Hill,Osamu Inami,Sergiy Kasyanenko,Philip Kenworthy,Jeetendra Khadan,Patrick Kirb

35、y,Peter Nagle,Nikita Perevalov,Franz Ulrich Ruch,Kersten Stamm,Ekaterine Vashakmadze,Dana Vorisek,Collette Mari Wheeler,and Takefumi Yamazaki.Research assistance was provided by Jiayue Fan,Arika Kayastha,Maria Hazel Macadangdang,Mohamad Nassar,Muneeb Ahmad Naseem,Vasiliki Papagianni,Lorz Qehaja,Juan

36、 Felipe Serrano,Shijie Shi,Kaltrina Temaj,Yujia Yao,and Juncheng Zhou.Modeling and data work were provided by Rajesh Kumar Danda and Shijie Shi.Online products were produced by Graeme Littler.Joe Rebello managed communications and media outreach with a team that included Nandita Roy and Paul Blake a

37、nd extensive support from the World Banks media and digital communications teams.Graeme Littler provided editorial support,with contributions from Adriana Maximiliano and Janice Tuten.The print publication was produced by Adriana Maximiliano,in collaboration with Andrew Berghauser,Cindy Fisher,Maria

38、 Hazel Maca-dangdang,and Jewel McFadden.Regional projections and write-ups were produced in coordination with country teams,country directors,and the offices of the regional chief economists.Many reviewers provided extensive advice and comments.The analysis also benefited from com-ments and suggesti

39、ons by staff members from World Bank Group country teams and other World Bank Group Vice Presidencies as well as Executive Directors in their discussion of the report on December 19,2022.However,both forecasts and analysis are those of the World Bank Group staff and should not be attributed to Execu

40、tive Directors or their national authorities.Acknowledgments This World Bank Group Flagship Report is a product of the Prospects Group in the Equitable Growth,Finance and Institutions(EFI)Vice Presidency.The project was managed by M.Ayhan Kose and Franziska Ohnsorge,under the general guidance of Ind

41、ermit Gill and Pablo Saavedra.xv The crisis facing development is intensifying.Our latest forecasts indicate a sharp,long-lasting slowdown,with global growth declining to 1.7 percent in 2023 from 3.0 percent expected just six months ago.The deterioration is broad-based:in virtually all regions of th

42、e world,per-capita income growth will be slower than it was during the decade before COVID-19.The setback to global prosperity will likely persist:By the end of 2024,GDP levels in emerging-market and developing economies(EMDEs)will be about 6 percent below the level expected on the eve of the pandem

43、ic.Median income levels,moreover,are being eroded significantlyby inflation,currency depreciation and under-investment in people and the private sector.The latest Global Economic Prospects report highlights why the outlook is particularly devas-tating for many of the poorest economies,where poverty

44、reduction has already ground to a halt.Total debt among EMDEs is at a 50-year high,and Russias invasion of Ukraine has added major new costs.This leaves no room for fiscal support at a time when people are still suffering from COVID-related setbacks in health,education and nutrition.Over the next tw

45、o years,per-capita income growth in EMDEs is expected to average only 2.8 percenta full percentage point less than the 2010-2019 average.Between 2020 and 2024,per-capita income growth in EMDEs other than China is projected to be roughly the same as per-capita income growth in advanced economies,mean

46、ing income convergence is now effectively stalled.In fragile and conflict-affected areas,average per-capita incomes are expected to decline by 2024.In small states,an important focus of this edition of Global Economic Prospects,the output decline during the pandemic was about seven times the average

47、 decline in other EMDEs partly because of prolonged disruptions to tourism.Recoveries are expected to be weak,with large and persistent reductions in the level of output.Restoring progress will be especially difficult where poverty rates are highest.In Sub-Saharan Africa,which is home for 60 percent

48、 of the worlds poor,per-capita income growth is expected to average just 1.2 percent over the next two yearsa rate that could cause poverty rates to rise,not fall.This report also takes a detailed look at the shortfall in the new investment needed to overcome the reversals hitting development.Gross

49、investment in EMDEs is projected to grow by just 3.5 percent on average from 2022 through 2024.Thats less than half the average rate in the previous two decades and less than the rate needed to maintain capital stocks.Amid sharply rising global interest rates,the large fiscal demand on global capita

50、l by the governments of advanced economies points to a channeling of critical resources away from EMDEs.Today,roughly one in five EMDEs is effectively locked out of global debt markets,up from one in 15 in 2019.The ongoing shortfall in investment in EMDEs casts a cloud over all development and clima

51、te objectives.Sluggish investment weakens the rate of growth of potential output,reducing the ca-pacity of economies to increase median incomes,promote shared prosperity and repay debts.Slow capital accumulation obstructs advances in technology and productivity,impeding overall economic growth.It al

52、so hinders the ability of countries to tackle climate change and achieve the full array of development needs such as access to electricity,clean water and sufficient hours in school to achieve foundational learning skills.With the global economy under pressure,five critical steps must be taken.Boost

53、ing median incomes and shared prosperity in EMDEs will require:More investment to create jobs and increase output,allowing growth in consumption.This report underscores the urgent need for EMDEs to design policies that attract and incentivize new investment.This will require a comprehensive Foreword

54、 xvi strategy featuring fiscal,structural and regulatory measures to boost public and private investment,in ways that meet the needs of individual coun-tries.Fiscal and monetary policies that support stable,market-based currencies and productive investment are particularly critical to promote growth

55、,higher median income,and poverty reduction.Improvements in the business-enabling environ-ment.In about 60 EMDEs for which data is available,investment growth was about 7 percentage points higher on average in years when investment-climate reforms were imple-mented.In low-income countries that rely

56、on public-private partnerships for infrastructure investment,it is critical to establish a robust regulatory framework.Corruption and restric-tions on foreign direct investment are key factors limiting the quantity and quality of cross-border investment.Reducing business start-up costs and strengthe

57、ning property rights can also help enable business growth.Greater debt transparency and sustainability,espe-cially for the rising share of poor countries at high risk of debt distress.A faster,more decisive debt reconciliation and restructuring process will be vital to avoid the damage associated wi

58、th delays and incremental steps.Integrating climate and development in ways that increase energy access and speed up the transition to lower-carbon energy.These objec-tives need to be complemented by increased investment in climate adaptation.Meeting the challenge of increasing global public goods w

59、ill require better mobilization of public-private part-nerships,sustained international cooperation,and large new concessional funding and grants by the global community.Stronger cooperation to increase cross-border trade.Greater efforts are needed to diversify products and markets,gain access to tr

60、ade finance and strengthen trade facilitation through arrangements such as customs agreements.Governments should reduce arbitrary barriers to both imports and exports alike.Protectionist measures including the latest wave of export bans on food and fertilizers should be shunned.Thus,even in a time o

61、f scarce resources,there is much that policy makers can do to encourage the right investments to materialize.One global starting point is to veer away from the wasteful subsidies that prevail and redirect the savings to more productive uses including private sector investment,targeted time-bound sub

62、sidies,and impactful climate investments.Even though the world is now in a very tight spot,there should be no room for defeatism.The latest Global Economic Prospects report makes it clear that there are significant reforms that could be undertaken now to strengthen the rule of law,improve the outloo

63、k and build stronger economies with more robust private sectors and better opportunities for people around the world.David Malpass President World Bank Group xvii Executive Summary Global growth is projected to decelerate sharply this year,to its third weakest pace in nearly three decades,overshadow

64、ed only by the 2009 and 2020 global recessions.This reflects synchronous policy tightening aimed at containing very high inflation,worsening financial conditions,and continued disruptions from the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine.Investment growth in emerging market and developing economies(E

65、MDEs)is expected to remain below its average rate of the past two decades.Further adverse shocks could push the global economy into yet another recession.Small states are especially vulnerable to such shocks because of their reliance on external trade and financing,limited economic diversification,e

66、levated debt,and susceptibility to natural disasters.Urgent global action is needed to mitigate the risks of global recession and debt distress in EMDEs.Given limited policy space,it is critical that national policy makers ensure that any fiscal support is focused on vulnerable groups,that inflation

67、 expectations remain well anchored,and that financial systems continue to be resilient.Policies are also needed to support a major increase in EMDE investment,including new financing from the international community and from the repurposing of existing spending,such as inefficient agricultural and f

68、uel subsidies.Global outlook.Global growth is expected to decelerate sharply to 1.7 percent in 2023the third weakest pace of growth in nearly three decades,overshadowed only by the global reces-sions caused by the pandemic and the global financial crisis.This is 1.3 percentage points below previous

69、forecasts,reflecting synchronous policy tightening aimed at containing very high inflation,worsening financial conditions,and continued disruptions from Russias invasion of Ukraine.The United States,the euro area,and China are all undergoing a period of pronounced weakness,and the resulting spillove

70、rs are exacerbating other headwinds faced by emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs).The combination of slow growth,tightening financial conditions,and heavy indebtedness is likely to weaken investment and trigger corporate defaults.Further negative shockssuch as higher infla-tion,even tight

71、er policy,financial stress,deeper weakness in major economies,or rising geo-political tensionscould push the global econ-omy into recession.In the near term,urgent global efforts are needed to mitigate the risks of global recession and debt distress in EMDEs.Given limited policy space,it is critical

72、 that national policy makers ensure that any fiscal support is focused on vulnerable groups,that inflation expectations remain well anchored,and that financial systems continue to be resilient.Policies are also needed to support a major increase in EMDE investment,which can help reverse the slowdown

73、 in long-term growth exacer-bated by the overlapping shocks of the pandemic,the invasion of Ukraine,and the rapid tightening of global monetary policy.This will require new financing from the international community and from the repurposing of existing spending,such as inefficient agricultural and f

74、uel subsidies.Regional prospects.The forecast for growth in 2023 and 2024 combined has been downgraded for every EMDE region.Monetary policy tightening,and restrictive global financial con-ditions are slowing growth,especially in LAC,SAR and SSA.Persistently elevated energy prices are expected to da

75、mpen outlooks for energy-importers in all regions,while falling metals prices will weigh on terms of trade in LAC and SSA.The projected slowdown in advanced econ-omy import demand is expected to especially impact EAP and ECA.Added to the pandemic-recession and incomplete recovery,the outlook implies

76、 feeble per capita income growth in LAC,MNA and SSA in the half decade to 2024.Risks to the baseline forecasts are skewed to the downside in all regions.They include the possi-bility of financial stress and greater spillovers from major advanced economy weakness(espe-cially in EAP,ECA,LAC and SSA),c

77、ommodity price shocks(especially in ECA,EAP and SAR),conflict(particularly in ECA,MNA,and SSA),xviii and natural disasters(with elevated risk in sub-regions in EAP,LAC and SAR).This edition of Global Economic Prospects also includes analytical pieces on prospects for in-vestment after the pandemic a

78、nd the multiple challenges faced by small states.Investment growth after the pandemic.Invest-ment growth in EMDEs is expected to remain below its average rate of the past two decades through the medium term.This subdued outlook follows a geographically widespread investment growth slowdown in the de

79、cade before the COVID-19 pandemic.During the past two decades,investment growth was associated with strong real output growth,robust real credit growth,terms of trade improvements,growth in capital inflows,and investment environment reform spurts.All of these factors have seen a declining trend sinc

80、e the 2007-09 global financial crisis.Weak investment growth is a concern because it dampens potential growth,is associated with weak trade,and makes achieving develop-ment and climate-related goals more difficult.Policies to boost investment growth need to be tailored to country circumstances but i

81、nclude comprehensive fiscal and structural reforms,in-cluding repurposing of expenditure on inefficient subsidies.Given EMDEs limited fiscal space,the international community will need to signifi-cantly scale up international cooperation and official financing and grants as well as help leverage pri

82、vate sector financing for sufficient investment to materialize.Small States:Overlapping crises,multiple challenges.Small states economies were hit par-ticularly hard by COVID-19,largely due to pro-longed disruptions to global tourism.Now facing spillovers from Russias invasion of Ukraine and the glo

83、bal monetary tightening cycle,small states are expected to have weak recoveries with large and possibly permanent losses to the level of output.Small states are diverse in their economic features,but they share attributes that make them especially vulnerable to shocks,including depend-ence on import

84、s of essential goods,highly concentrated economies,elevated levels of debt,reliance on external financing,and susceptibility to natural disasters and climate change.Policy makers in small states can improve long-term growth prospects by building fiscal space,fostering effective economic diversificat

85、ion,and improving resilience to climate change.There is a need for intensified international cooperation to support small states in addressing their challenges.The global community can assist small states in these efforts by maintaining the flow of official assistance,helping restore and preserve de

86、bt sustainability,facilitating trade,and supporting climate change adaptation.xix Abbreviations ACLED AE CA CE CPI EAP ECA ECB EE EMBI EMDE EU FAO FCS FDI FSIN FY G7 G20 GCC GDP GEP GFC GMM GNAFC GNFS ICRG IEA ILO IMF IPC IPCC LAC LIC MNA/MENA OAD OECD OLS OPEC OPEC+PMI Armed Conflict Location&Event

87、 Data Project advanced economy Central Asia Central Europe and Baltic Countries consumer price index East Asia and Pacific Europe and Central Asia European Central Bank Eastern Europe emerging markets bond index emerging market and developing economy European Union Food and Agriculture Organization

88、fragile and conflict-affected situations foreign direct investment Food Security Information Network fiscal year Group of Seven:Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,the United Kingdom,and the United States Group of Twenty:Argentina,Australia,Brazil,Canada,China,France,Germany,India,Indonesia,Italy,Japa

89、n,Republic of Korea,Mexico,Russia,Saudi Arabia,South Africa,Trkiye,the United Kingdom,the United States,and the European Union Gulf Cooperation Council gross domestic product Global Economic Prospects Global Financial Crisis generalized method of moments Global Network Against Food Crises goods and

90、nonfactor services International Country Risk Guide International Energy Agency International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Latin America and the Caribbean low-income country Middle East and Nor

91、th Africa official development assistance Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ordinary least squares Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC and Azerbaijan,Bahrain,Brunei Darussalam,Kazakhstan,Malaysia,Mexico,Oman,the Russian Federation,South Sudan,and Sudan Purchas

92、ing Managers Index xx PPP PPPs RHS SAR SCC SDG SOE SSA TFP UN UNCTAD VAR WAEMU WDI WFP WTO purchasing power parity public-private partnerships right-hand scale South Asia South Caucasus Sustainable Development Goal state-owned enterprise Sub-Saharan Africa total factor productivity United Nations Un

93、ited Nations Conference on Trade and Development vector autoregression West African Economic and Monetary Union World Development Indicators World Food Programme World Trade Organization Abbreviations(continued)CHAPTER 1GLOBAL OUTLOOKCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JANUARY 2023 3 Global growth i

94、s expected to decelerate sharply to 1.7 percent in 2023the third weakest pace of growth in nearly three decades,overshadowed only by the global recessions caused by the pandemic and the global financial crisis.This is 1.3 percentage points below previous forecasts,reflecting synchronous policy tight

95、ening aimed at containing very high inflation,worsening financial conditions,and continued disruptions from the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine.The United States,the euro area,and China are all undergoing a period of pronounced weakness,and the resulting spillovers are exacerbating other hea

96、dwinds faced by emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs).The combination of slow growth,tightening financial conditions,and heavy indebtedness is likely to weaken investment and trigger corporate defaults.Further negative shockssuch as higher inflation,even tighter policy,financial stress,dee

97、per weakness in major economies,or rising geopolitical tensionscould push the global economy into recession.In the near term,urgent global efforts are needed to mitigate the risks of global recession and debt distress in EMDEs.Given limited policy space,it is critical that national policy makers ens

98、ure that any fiscal support is focused on vulnerable groups,that inflation expectations remain well anchored,and that financial systems continue to be resilient.Policies are also needed to support a major increase in EMDE investment,which can help reverse the slowdown in long-term growth exacerbated

99、 by the overlapping shocks of the pandemic,the invasion of Ukraine,and the rapid tightening of global monetary policy.This will require new financing from the international community and from the repurposing of existing spending,such as inefficient agricultural and fuel subsidies.Summary Global grow

100、th has slowed to the extent that the global economy is perilously close to falling into recessiondefined as a contraction in annual global per capita incomeonly three years after emerging from the pandemic-induced recession of 2020.Very high inflation has triggered unexpectedly rapid and synchronous

101、 monetary policy tightening around the world to contain it,including across major advanced economies(figure 1.1.A).Although this tightening has been necessary for price stability,it has contributed to a significant worsening of global financial con-ditions,which is exerting a substantial drag on act

102、ivity.This drag is set to deepen given the lags between changes in monetary policy and its economic impacts,and the fact that real rates are expected to continue to increase.Asset prices have been in broad,synchronous decline,investment growth has weakened substantially,and housing markets in many c

103、oun-tries are worsening rapidly.Shockwaves continue to emanate from the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine,especially in energy and other commodity markets.Against this backdrop,confidence has fallen precipitously.The worlds three major engines of growththe United States,the euro area,and China

104、are undergoing a period of pronounced weakness,with adverse spillovers for emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs),many of which are already struggling with weakening domestic conditions.Global inflation has been pushed higher by demand pressures,including those from the lagged effects of ea

105、rlier policy support,and supply shocks,including disruptions to both global supply chains and the availability of key commodities.In some countries,inflation has also been spurred by large currency depreciations relative to the U.S.dollar,as well as tight labor market conditions.Inflation remains hi

106、gh worldwide and well above central bank targets in almost all inflation-targeting economies.Although inflation is likely to gradually moderate over the course of the year,there are signs that underlying inflation pressures could be becoming more persistent.In response,central banks around the world

107、 have been tightening policy faster than previously expected.Monetary policy tightening in advanced economies,a strong U.S.dollar,geopolitical tensions,and high inflation have dampened risk appetite and led to widespread capital outflows and slowing bond issuance across EMDEs.Financial conditions ha

108、ve particularly worsened Note:This chapter was prepared by Carlos Arteta,Samuel Hill,Jeetendra Khadan,Patrick Kirby,Nikita Perevalov,and Collette Wheeler,with contributions from Jongrim Ha,Osamu Inami,Sergiy Kasyanenko,Phil Kenworthy,Peter Nagle,and Ekaterine Vashakmadze.CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PR

109、OSPECTS|JANUARY 2023 4 2020 2021 2022e 2023f 2024f 2022e 2023f 2024f World-3.2 5.9 2.9 1.7 2.7 0.0-1.3-0.3 Advanced economies-4.3 5.3 2.5 0.5 1.6 -0.1-1.7-0.3 United States-2.8 5.9 1.9 0.5 1.6 -0.6-1.9-0.4 Euro area-6.1 5.3 3.3 0.0 1.6 0.8-1.9-0.3 Japan-4.3 2.2 1.2 1.0 0.7 -0.5-0.3 0.1 Emerging mark

110、et and developing economies -1.5 6.7 3.4 3.4 4.1 0.0-0.8-0.3 East Asia and Pacific 1.2 7.2 3.2 4.3 4.9 -1.2-0.9-0.2 China 2.2 8.1 2.7 4.3 5.0 -1.6-0.9-0.1 Indonesia-2.1 3.7 5.2 4.8 4.9 0.1-0.5-0.4 Thailand-6.2 1.5 3.4 3.6 3.7 0.5-0.7-0.2 Europe and Central Asia-1.7 6.7 0.2 0.1 2.8 3.2-1.4-0.5 Russia

111、n Federation-2.7 4.8-3.5-3.3 1.6 5.4-1.3-0.6 Trkiye 1.9 11.4 4.7 2.7 4.0 2.4-0.5 0.0 Poland-2.0 6.8 4.4 0.7 2.2 0.5-2.9-1.5 Latin America and the Caribbean-6.2 6.8 3.6 1.3 2.4 1.1-0.6 0.0 Brazil-3.3 5.0 3.0 0.8 2.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 Mexico-8.0 4.7 2.6 0.9 2.3 0.9-1.0 0.3 Argentina-9.9 10.4 5.2 2.0 2.0 0.7

112、-0.5-0.5 Middle East and North Africa-3.6 3.7 5.7 3.5 2.7 0.4-0.1-0.5 Saudi Arabia-4.1 3.2 8.3 3.7 2.3 1.3-0.1-0.7 Iran,Islamic Rep.2 1.9 4.7 2.9 2.2 1.9 -0.8-0.5-0.4 Egypt,Arab Rep.3 3.6 3.3 6.6 4.5 4.8 0.5-0.3-0.2 South Asia-4.5 7.9 6.1 5.5 5.8 -0.7-0.3-0.7 India 2-6.6 8.7 6.9 6.6 6.1 -0.6-0.5-0.4

113、 Pakistan 3 -0.9 5.7 6.0 2.0 3.2 1.7-2.0-1.0 Bangladesh 3 3.4 6.9 7.2 5.2 6.2 0.8-1.5-0.7 Sub-Saharan Africa-2.0 4.3 3.4 3.6 3.9 -0.3-0.2-0.1 Nigeria -1.8 3.6 3.1 2.9 2.9 -0.3-0.3-0.3 South Africa-6.3 4.9 1.9 1.4 1.8 -0.2-0.1 0.0 Angola-5.8 0.8 3.1 2.8 2.9 0.0-0.5-0.3 Memorandum items:Real GDP1 High

114、-income countries-4.3 5.3 2.7 0.6 1.6 0.0-1.6-0.4 Middle-income countries-1.2 6.9 3.2 3.4 4.3 -0.1-0.8-0.2 Low-income countries 1.6 3.9 4.0 5.1 5.6 0.0-0.1 0.0 EMDEs excl.China-3.9 5.7 3.8 2.7 3.6 1.1-0.7-0.4 Commodity-exporting EMDEs-3.7 4.9 2.8 1.9 2.8 1.6-0.7-0.4 Commodity-importing EMDEs-0.4 7.6

115、 3.6 4.1 4.8 -0.8-0.8-0.2 Commodity-importing EMDEs excl.China-4.2 6.8 5.0 3.8 4.5 0.4-0.7-0.4 EM7-0.4 7.4 3.0 3.5 4.5 -0.3-0.8-0.2 World(PPP weights)4-2.8 6.1 3.1 2.2 3.2 0.0-1.2-0.3 World trade volume 5-8.2 10.6 4.0 1.6 3.4 0.0-2.7-0.4 Commodity prices 6 Level differences from June 2022 projection

116、s Energy price index 52.7 95.4 151.7 130.5 118.3 7.1 4.4 7.2 Oil price(US$per barrel)42.3 70.4 100.0 88.0 80.0 0.0-4.0 0.0 Non-energy commodity price index 84.4 112.0 123.7 113.7 113.0 -8.4-7.6-4.6 Source:World Bank.Note:e=estimate;f=forecast.World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new

117、information.Consequently,projections presented here may differ from those contained in other World Bank documents,even if basic assessments of countries prospects do not differ at any given date.For the definition of EMDEs,developing countries,commodity exporters,and commodity importers,please refer

118、 to table 1.2.EM7 includes Brazil,China,India,Indonesia,Mexico,the Russian Federation,and Trkiye.The World Bank is currently not publishing economic output,income,or growth data for Turkmenistan and Repblica Bolivariana de Venezuela owning to lack of reliable data of adequate quality.Turkmenistan an

119、d Repblica Bolivariana de Venezuela are excluded from cross-country macroeconomic aggregates.1.Headline aggregate growth rates are calculated using GDP weights at average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.The aggregate growth rates may differ from the previously published numbers that were ca

120、lculated using GDP weights at average 2010 prices and market exchange rates.2.GDP growth rates are on a fiscal year basis.Aggregates that include these countries are calculated using data compiled on a calendar year basis.The column labeled 2022 refers to FY2022/23.3.GDP growth rates are on a fiscal

121、 year basis.Aggregates that include these countries are calculated using data compiled on a calendar year basis.Pakistans growth rates are based on GDP at factor cost.The column labeled 2022 refers to FY2021/22.4.World growth rates are calculated using average 2010-19 purchasing power parity(PPP)wei

122、ghts,which attribute a greater share of global GDP to emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs)than market exchange rates.5.World trade volume of goods and nonfactor services.6.Energy price index is in nominal U.S.dollars(2010=100)and it includes coal(Australia),crude oil(Brent),and natural ga

123、s(Europe,Japan,and the United States).Oil price refers to the Brent crude oil benchmark.The non-energy index is in nominal U.S.dollars(2010=100)and it is the weighted average of 39 commodity prices(7 metals,5 fertilizers,and 27 agricultural commodities).For additional details,please see https:/www.w

124、orldbank.org/commodities.Percentage point differences from June 2022 projections TABLE 1.1 Real GDP1(Percent change from previous year unless indicated otherwise)CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JANUARY 2023 5 for less creditworthy EMDEs,especially if they are also energy importers(figure 1.1.B).

125、Fiscal space has narrowed considerably,and concerns over debt sustainability in many countries have risen as global financial conditions have made it more difficult to service debt loads that have accumulated rapidly in recent years,particularly during the pandemic.Nonetheless,many governments have

126、announced new support measures to shield households and firms from the effects of sharply rising prices,slowing the pace of fiscal consolidation as pandemic-related stimulus is withdrawn.Most commodity prices have eased,to varying degrees,largely due to the slowdown in global growth and concerns abo

127、ut the possibility of a global recession.By historical standards,however,they remain elevated,prolonging challenges associated with energy and food insecurity.Crude oil prices have steadily declined from their mid-2022 peak;meanwhile,natural gas prices in Europe soared to an all-time high in August

128、but have since fallen back toward pre-invasion levels.Non-energy prices,particularly metal prices,have declined alongside weak demand.While food prices have eased from earlier peaks,food price inflation remains very high in some EMDEs.Against this backdrop,global growth is forecast to slow to 1.7 pe

129、rcent in 2023(figure 1.1.C).This pace of growth would be the third weakest in nearly three decades,overshadowed only by the global recessions caused by the pandemic in 2020 and the global financial crisis in 2009.This forecast is 1.3 percentage points lower than in June,largely reflecting more aggre

130、ssive monetary policy tightening,deteriorating financial conditions,and declining confidence.Growth projections have been downgraded for almost all advanced economies and about two-thirds of EMDEs in 2023,and for about half of all countries in 2024(figure 1.1.D).Global trade is also expected to slow

131、 sharply alongside global growth,despite support from a continued recovery in services trade.Downgrades to growth project-ions mean that global activity is now expected to fall even further below its pre-pandemic trend over the forecast horizon,with EMDEs accounting for FIGURE 1.1 Global prospects H

132、igh global inflation has prompted rapid,synchronous monetary tightening.This has contributed to worsening financial conditions,particularly for less creditworthy emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs).Global growth in 2023 is expected to be the third weakest in nearly three decades,overshad

133、owed only by global recessions.Most country forecasts have been downgraded.The recovery from the pandemic recession is far from complete,especially in EMDEs,and the per-capita income outlook is particularly subdued for poverty-stricken countries.Sources:BIS(database);Bloomberg;Haver Analytics;Moodys

134、;JP Morgan;World Bank.Note:EMBI=Emerging Markets Bond Index;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies.Unless otherwise indicated,aggregate growth rates are calculated using real U.S.dollar GDP weights at average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.Shaded areas indicate forecasts.A.Short-te

135、rm policy rate weighted by nominal GDP in current U.S.dollars.“t”is the month before the U.S.policy rate increases.Cycle ends when the G7-weighted policy rate peaks.Judgement used to define“double-peak”cycles.March 2022 cycle extended using market-implied interest rate expectations from January 2023

136、 onward,observed on December 16,2022.B.Change in EMBI spreads since January 2022,using Moodys sovereign foreign currency ratings.Sample includes 11 EMDE energy exporters and 35 EMDE energy importers.Strong credit defined as ratings from Aaa to Baa3.Weak credit defined as ratings from Caa to Ca.Sampl

137、e excludes Belarus,the Russian Federation,and Ukraine.Last observation is December 13,2022.C.Sample includes up to 37 advanced economies and 144 EMDEs.D.Figure shows share of countries with forecast downgrades since the June 2022 Global Economic Prospects.E.Figure shows deviation between current for

138、ecasts and January 2020 Global Economic Prospects.January 2020 baseline extended into 2023 and 2024 using projected growth for 2022.F.“Low poverty headcount”are EMDEs with poverty headcount in the 25th percentile,and“high poverty headcount”are those in the 75th percentile.Bars show average per capit

139、a GDP growth over 2023-24 for 39 EMDEs.Whiskers show minimum-maximum range.Sample excludes Belarus and the Russian Federation.Poverty data are the poverty headcount ratio at$2.15 a day(2017 PPP).A.G7 policy rates B.EMDE sovereign spread changes in 2022,by credit rating and energy exporter status C.G

140、lobal growth D.Share of countries with downgrades in growth forecasts E.Deviation of output from pre-pandemic trends F.EMDE per capita GDP growth,by bottom and top quartile poverty headcount ratio 05101520ExporterImporterExporterImporterStrong creditWeak creditPercentage points0250500750tt+7t+14t+21

141、t+28Mar-22Dec-72May-79Jun-99Jun-04Dec-15Basis points0246810Low povertyheadcountHigh povertyheadcountPercent-8-6-4-202002220232024Advanced economiesEMDEsEMDEs excl.ChinaPercent-75-55-35--4-202464020022004200620082000222024Percent025507

142、52023202420232024WorldAdvancedeconomiesEMDEsPercent of countriesCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JANUARY 2023 6 surpass 2019 levels until at least 2024 in about one-third of EMDEs.Per capita income growth is expected to be slowest where poverty is highest(figure 1.1.F).In Sub-Saharan A

143、fricawhich ac-counts for about 60 percent of the worlds poorgrowth in per capita income over 2023-24 is fore-cast to average only 1.2 percent,far less than the pace that would be needed over the remainder of the decade to reach a 3 percent poverty rate by 2030.Soaring inflation reflects a combinatio

144、n of supply and demand factors,including large price increases for food and energy products priced in U.S.dollars.Inflation has risen particularly rapidly in poorer countries,partially due to the greater share of food in consumer spending.Relative to previous projections,global inflation is assumed

145、to remain higher for longer.After peaking at 7.6 percent in 2022,global headline CPI inflation is expected to remain elevated at 5.2 percent in 2023 before easing to 3.2 percent in 2024,above its 2015-19 average of 2.3 percent.Risks to the growth outlook are tilted to the downside.In light of high i

146、nflation and repeated negative supply shocks,there is substantial uncertainty about the impact of central bank policy in terms of both magnitude and timing.As a result,the risk of policy missteps is elevated.Global inflation may be pushed higher by renewed supply disruptions,including to key commodi

147、ties,and elevated core inflation may persist.To bring inflation under control,central banks may need to hike policy rates more than is currently expected.Financial stress among sovereigns,banks,and nonbank financial institutions may result from the combination of additional monetary tightening,softe

148、r growth,and falling confidence in an environment of elevated debt.Given already-weak global growth,a combination of sharper monetary policy tightening and financial stress could result in a more pronounced slowdown or even a global recession this year(figures 1.2.A and 1.2.B).Weaker-than-expected a

149、ctivity in China amid pandemic-related disruptions and stress in the real estate sector,rising geopolitical tensions and trade fragmentation,and climate change could also result in markedly slower growth.The weak global outlook and the heightened downside risks highlight the challenges facing most o

150、f the shortfall from trend(figure 1.1.E).This suggests that the negative shocks of the past three yearsnamely the pandemic,the invasion of Ukraine,and the rapid increase in inflation and associated tightening of monetary policy worldwideare having a lasting impact on economic prospects.In advanced e

151、conomies,conditions have deterio-rated sharply,owing to declining confidence alongside high inflation and rapid monetary policy tightening.In the United States,one of the most aggressive monetary policy tightening cycles in recent history is expected to slow growth sharply.The euro area is also cont

152、ending with severe energy supply disruptions and price hikes associated with the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine.In all,growth in advanced economies is forecast to slow from 2.5 percent in 2022 to 0.5 percent in 2023.In EMDEs,growth prospects have worsened materially,with the forecast for 20

153、23 downgraded 0.8 percentage point to a subdued 3.4 percent.The downward revision results in large part from weaker external demand and tighter financing conditions.EMDE growth is anticipated to remain essentially unchanged in 2023 relative to last year,as a pickup in China offsets a decline in othe

154、r EMDEs.Excluding China,EMDE growth is forecast to decelerate from 3.8 percent in 2022 to 2.7 percent in 2023 as significantly weaker external demand is compounded by high inflation,tighter financial conditions,and other domestic headwinds.The deviation between EMDE investment and its pre-pandemic t

155、rend is expected to remain substantial.EMDE invest-ment growth is envisaged to remain below its 2000-21 average pace,dampened significantly by weakening activity,heightened uncertainty,and rising borrowing costs.Low-income countries(LICs)are expected to grow 5.1 percent in 2023,with forecasts downgr

156、aded in about 65 percent of countries.Cost-of-living increases and a deteri-oration in the external environment are weighing heavily on activity in many LICs and com-pounding weakness in LICs with fragile and conflict affected situations(FCS).As a result of the sharp slowdown in global growth,per ca

157、pita income is not expected to CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JANUARY 2023 7 policy makers around the world.Urgent action is needed to attenuate the risk of global recession stemming,in part,from the fastest and most synchronized monetary tightening in decades.As they focus on reducing record-h

158、igh inflation,central banks in advanced economies and EMDEs need to take into account the possibility that cross-border spillovers from other monetary authorities actions may tighten financial con-ditions more than expected.Discussions among central banks can help mitigate risks associated with fina

159、ncial stability and avoid an excessive global economic slowdown in the pursuit of inflation objectives.The international community needs to intensify its support to large numbers of displaced people and others affected by conflict or food insecurity,particularly in LICs(figure 1.2.C).In responding t

160、o food and energy shocks,governments need to avoid imposing export restrictions and instead attenuate the impact on the poor through support measures targeted at low-income groups.The international community also needs to reduce the risk of debt crises in EMDEs,including by supporting timely debt re

161、structuring.Given the rising human and economic costs of more frequent climate-related disasters,particularly in small states,speedy action to foster the energy transition is critical for mitigating climate change.Global efforts need to be complemented by decisive policy action at the national level

162、.While monetary policy cycles are peaking in some EMDEs,further tightening may be needed in others to rein in inflation.Financial stability risks stoked by global and domestic policy tightening can be mitigated by strengthening macro-prudential regulation and promptly addressing financial vulnerabil

163、ities such as rising nonperforming loans.Preemptively alleviating currency mismatches in EMDE corporate and financial sectors with proper financial policy can also reduce crisis risks.EMDE policy makers can take steps to bolster foreign exchange buffers as appropriate,which can be utilized in episod

164、es of excessive volatility.Deployed appropriately,foreign exchange interventions can help stem temporary exchange rate pressures.FIGURE 1.2 Global risks and policy challenges Risks are tilted to the downside.Central banks may need to tighten more than expected to bring inflation under control.Given

165、already-weak global growth,this could result in a sharper slowdown or even a global recession this year.A rising number of people are affected by food insecurity,especially in low-income countries.Fiscal challenges in emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs)have become more acute,as exemplifi

166、ed by a precipitous drop in bond issuance.The long-term effects of the adverse shocks of the past three years have led to substantial losses,particularly for EMDE investment and output,which could grow larger if downside scenarios materialize.Sources:Bloomberg;Consensus Economics;Dealogic;FSIN and G

167、NAFC(2022);GNAFC(2022);Guenette,Kose,and Sugawara(2022);Haver Analytics;Oxford Economics;World Bank.Note:AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies;LICs=low-income countries;Fragile LICs=LICs with fragile and conflict affected situations.Unless indicated,aggregate growth r

168、ates calculated using real U.S.dollar GDP weights at average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.Data are estimates for 2022 and forecasts for 2023-24.A.B.Scenarios use Oxford Economics Global Economic Model.B.Growth aggregates computed by Oxford Economics using 2015 market exchange rates and p

169、rices.C.Bars show the number of people in food crisis as classified by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification(IPC/CH)Phase 3,that is,in acute food insecurity crisis or worse.Data for 2022 are estimates adapted from GNAFC(2022).D.Bars indicate the change in public and private bond issuance

170、 during the ten months after the start of the event compared to the same period one year prior.The starting dates are August 2008 for Global financial crisis,June 2013 for Taper tantrum,March 2020 for COVID-19,and February 2022 for 2022.E.Deviation between current forecasts and those of the January

171、2020 Global Economic Prospects report.For 2024,the January 2020 baseline is extended using projected growth for 2022.F.Figure shows expected losses over 2020-24 relative to pre-pandemic trend as a percentage of 2019 GDP.Pre-pandemic trend based on January 2020 baseline extended using 2022 projection

172、s.A.Global interest rates and inflation under different scenarios B.Global growth under different scenarios C.Food insecurity in LICs D.Change in bond issuance in EMDEs E.Deviation of investment from pre-pandemic trends in 2024 F.Cumulative output losses,2020-24 -300-250-200-150-100-500Globalfinanci

173、alcrisisTapertantrumCOVID-192022US$,billions04080Fragile LICsOther LICsMillions of people-8-6-4-20AdvancedeconomiesEMDEsPercent02462023202420232024Short-term interestratesInflationBaselineSharp downturnGlobal recessionPercent-40-30-20-100WorldAdvancedeconomiesEMDEsBaselineSharp downturnGl

174、obal recessionPercent of 2019 GDP-20242023202420232024WorldAEsEMDEsBaselineSharp downturnGlobal recessionPercentCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JANUARY 2023 8 Tighter financing conditions,weaker growth,and elevated debt levels create significant fiscal challenges for EMDEs,exemplified

175、 by the recent precipitous fall in bond issuance(figure 1.2.D).Timely and carefully calibrated fiscal consoli-dation needs to be guided by credible medium-term frameworks,with a focus on reducing wasteful spending,such as inefficient agricultural and fuel subsidies,and ensuring that support for the

176、poor and most vulnerable is well-targeted.Although increasing tax rates may be a challenge in the near term given weak growth prospects,revenues can nonetheless be bolstered by broadening the tax base through removing exemptions,progressively expanding coverage of under-taxed activities,and strength

177、ening col-lection and administration mechanisms.The long-term scarring effects of the overlapping adverse shocks of the past three years have led to large cumulative losses,especially with respect to EMDE output and investment(figure 1.2.E).These losses would be even larger in a sharper global downt

178、urn or recession(figure 1.2.F).To offset these losses and bolster green,resilient,and inclusive growth,EMDEs will need to make substantial investments in all forms of capitalhuman,physical,social,and natural.Given limited fiscal space,these investments will require private-sector involvement and new

179、 concessional financing from the international community.This can be complemented by structural reforms that improve the investment climate and reallocate public expenditures toward growth-enhancing investment.Such efforts will need to be accompanied by measures to strengthen social protection syste

180、ms,foster gender equality,promote investments in human capital,and facilitate more resilient food systems.Global context Weakening global demand is weighing on global trade.Most commodity prices have eased,to varying degrees,although they are expected to remain well above their average of the past f

181、ive years.High inflation is expected to persist for longer than previously expected.Monetary tightening and risk aversion have led to widespread currency depreci-ations and steep capital outflows from EMDEs.Global trade Global trade growth decelerated in the second half of 2022,in tandem with deteri

182、orating activity in major economies.Weakening trade mirrored the slowdown in global industrial production,as demand shifted toward its pre-pandemic com-position and away from goods.Despite this moderation,goods trade surpassed pre-pandemic levels last year;meanwhile,services trade contin-ued to reco

183、ver,supported by the gradual shift in demand toward services.Tourism flows rebounded as many countries eased travel restrictions but remained well below pre-pandemic levels and uneven across regions(WTO 2022).Although global supply chain pressures are still above pre-pandemic levels,they have eased

184、since mid-2022,as reflected in lower transportation costs and normalization of inventories(figures 1.3.A and 1.3.B).Weakening demand for goods is expected to reduce these pressures further in 2023.After softening to 4 percent in 2022,global trade growth is expected to decelerate further to 1.6 perce

185、nt in 2023,largely reflecting weakening global demand(figure 1.3.C).Trade is envisaged to be particularly subdued in EMDEs with strong trade linkages to major economies where demand is expected to slow sharply.In all,the current post-recession rebound in global trade is on course to be among the wea

186、kest on record(figure 1.3.D).Travel and tourism are expected to pick up further but will be constrained by slower global activity and high input costs.Goods trade is expected to moderate owing to subdued demand and a gradual shift in consumption toward services.Weaker-than-expected global demand and

187、 renewed supply chain bottlenecks pose downside risks to the global trade outlook.In addition,an intensification in trade protectionism,fragmen-tation of trade networks,and security concerns about supply chains could increase trade costs and slow trade growth(Ges and Bekkers 2022;Rubnov and Sebti 20

188、21).Commodity markets Most commodity prices have eased since June,to varying degrees,due to slowing global growth(figure 1.4.A;World Bank 2022a).Oil prices CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JANUARY 2023 9 declined from their mid-2022 peak amid demand concerns;for the year as a whole,the price of B

189、rent crude oil averaged$100/bbl.European natural gas prices surged to an all-time high in August but have since fallen back toward pre-invasion levels as inventories filled and mild weather reduced demand for natural gas for heating.Coal prices reached a record high in the third quarter before start

190、ing to soften in the fourth.Meanwhile,metal prices fell in the second half of 2022 owing to slowing demand,particularly from China(figure 1.4.B;Baumeister,Verduzco-Bustos,and Ohnsorge 2022).Agricultural prices remain high but have also declined,particularly for wheat and vegetable oils,reflecting hi

191、gher-than-expected crop yields,as well as a resumption of some exports from Ukraine.Concerns about food availability due to the invasion of Ukraine prompted many countries to impose export bans and other trade restrictions(figure 1.4.C).The extent of these restrictions,in both absolute numbers and a

192、s a share of caloric intake,have been comparable with those during the 2008 food price spike.However,because recent restrictions have been applied to a broad set of commodities,they have not affected global markets as much as those imposed in 2008(which were applied mostly to rice and wheat and were

193、 also accompanied by large purchases from major importers).Currency depreciations in many countries have resulted in higher commodity prices in local currency terms compared to the price in U.S.dollars.For instance,from February to November 2022,the price of Brent crude oil in U.S.dollars fell nearl

194、y 5 percent,but rose by 7 percent in domestic currency terms,on average,in advanced economies(excluding the United States)and by 5 percent in oil-importing EMDEs.As a result,commodity-driven inflationary pressures in many countries may be more persistent than indicated by recent declines in global c

195、ommodity prices.Going forward,energy prices are expected to ease in 2023 but remain higher than previously forecast,primarily reflecting an upward revision to coal prices.Crude oil prices are projected to moderate to an average of$88/bbl in 2023,$4/bbl below previous projections.The downward revisio

196、n is primarily due to slower global growth and the subsequent weakness in oil demand in 2023,particularly in Europe.Russian oil exports are expected to fall in 2023 due to additional EU sanctions that started in December 2022 for crude oil and will begin in February 2023 for oil products.The overall

197、 reduction in Russias exports is likely to be smaller than initially expected,however,as the G7 oil price cap will enable countries that import oil from Russia to continue FIGURE 1.3 Global trade Supply chain pressures continue to ease and are returning to historical averages amid rising inventories

198、 and falling shipping costs,while supplier delivery times are increasing at a slower pace.Global trade growth has been revised down substantially,in part reflecting deteriorating global demand.The recovery of global trade following the 2020 global recession is on course to be substantially weaker th

199、an the rebounds seen after previous global recessions.Sources:Federal Reserve Bank of New York;Haver Analytics;Kose,Sugawara,and Terrones(2020);World Bank.A.Figure shows the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index,as produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.The index is normalized such that zero

200、indicates the average value for the period January 1998-November 2022,while positive(negative)values represent how many standard deviations the index is above(below)the average value.Last observation is November 2022.B.Figure shows manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index(PMI)subcomponents.PMI data f

201、or delivery times are inverted by subtracting data from 100;therefore,increasing(decreasing)PMI data indicate faster(slower)delivery times.Last observation is November 2022.C.Trade is measured as the average of export and import volumes.June 2022 refers to forecasts presented in the June 2022 editio

202、n of the Global Economic Prospects report.D.Figure shows global trade recoveries after global recessions(1975,1982,1991,2009,and 2020).Global recession is defined as a contraction in global per capita GDP,as described in Kose,Sugawara,and Terrones(2020).A.Global supply chain pressures B.Manufacturin

203、g PMIs C.Global trade growth D.Global trade growth after global recessions 40455055606570Jan-19Apr-19Aug-19Nov-19Feb-20Jun-20Oct-20Feb-21May-21Oct-21Feb-22Jul-22Nov-22Suppliers delivery timesInventoriesIndex,50+=expansion048023January 2023June 20222000-19 averagePercent-2024620

204、00212022Standard deviation from average value8595105115125t-1tt+1t+2t+3120092020Index,100=t-1CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JANUARY 2023 10 to access EU and UK insurance services,provided they adhere to the price cap(IEA 2022a).Beyond Russia,oil supply will increase modest

205、ly,mainly from the United States,while OPEC+output will remain subject to their production agreement.For natural gas,annual average prices are forecast to moderate in 2023.Demand for natural gas is expected to decline in 2023 as households and industrial users reduce consumption,while rapid growth i

206、n renewable energy generation will help moderate demand for natural gas for electricity generation.Nonetheless,further price spikes are possible.Exports from Russia are envisaged to remain significantly lower than before the onset of the war in Ukraine.In addition,competition for liquefied natural g

207、as(LNG)will remain intense at the global level,as European countries continue to import large volumes of LNG to replace lower imports from Russia.Coal prices will ease from extremely elevated levels as production rises,especially in China and India.The main downside risk to the energy price forecast

208、 is weaker-than-expected global growth.Oil consumption could also be lower as a result of more persistent pandemic-related restrictions in China.Upside risks chiefly relate to supply factors.U.S.shale oil production could disappoint as producers focus on returning cash to shareholders rather than in

209、creasing production.Disruption to Russias exports could be larger than expected,while a cessation of the war in Ukraine could ease supply issues.Spare capacity among OPEC members is minimal,and OPEC+members continue to produce well below target,in part because of low levels of investment in new prod

210、uction in recent years(figure 1.4.D).In addition,strategic inventories have been drawn down,leaving limited buffers in the event of unexpected new shocks.For natural gas and,to a lesser extent,coal,a cold winter in Europe could cause natural gas inventories to fall to very low levels,requiring addit

211、ional refilling in 2023,and Europe could struggle to refill inventories ahead of the 2023 winter season.Agricultural prices are projected to decline 5 percent in 2023 after rising 13 percent in 2022,largely reflecting better global production prospects and easing input costs,particularly for fertili

212、zers.However,prices are expected to remain above pre-pandemic levels.Upward risks to food prices include the possibility that fertilizer prices will rise in response to higher natural gas prices and the closure of several fertilizer manufacturers in Europe,as well as the effects of a third consecuti

213、ve year of La Nia in 2022.Food insecurity remains a critical challenge in some EMDEs,reflecting the high number of food trade restrictions imposed last year,weather-related events,and the impact of the invasion of Ukraine and conflict elsewhere.As a result,about 220 million people are projected to f

214、ace severe food insecurity in 2022,a number which FIGURE 1.4 Commodity markets Most commodity prices have eased due to slowing global growth.Metals demand growth has seen a particularly marked slowdown.Concerns about food availability due to the invasion of Ukraine resulted in a number of countries

215、implementing food export restrictions in 2022.OPEC+announced a 2 mb/d reduction in their production target;however,the group is already producing below their official target.Sources:Bloomberg;IEA(2022a);Laborde and Mamun(2022);World Bank;World Bureau of Metal Statistics.Note:OPEC=Organization of the

216、 Petroleum Exporting Countries.A.Last observation is November 2022.B.Figure shows percent change in metal demand relative to same period in previous year.Last observation is September 2022.C.Bars show the peak of number of countries during each period implementing food export restrictions.D.Figure s

217、hows the difference in crude oil production compared to the target set by OPEC+countries for 2022 based on IEA(2022a).A.Commodity prices B.Metals demand growth C.Number of countries implementing food export restrictions D.OPEC+production shortfall -10-5051015Jan-20May-20Sep-20Jan-21May-21Sep-21Jan-2

218、2May-22Sep-22OECDChinaOther non-OECDWorldPercent010203040Food pricecrisis(2008)COVID-19(2020)Invasion ofUkraine(2022)Number of countries-4-3-2-10JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberAngolaNigeriaRussian Fed.Other OPEC+Mb/d204060800Jan-19Jul-19Feb-20Aug-20Mar-2

219、1Sep-21Apr-22Nov-22EnergyAgricultureMetalsIndex,100=January 2022CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JANUARY 2023 11 could rise further if upward risks to food prices materialize.Metal prices are expected to decline 15 percent in 2023 reflecting slowing global growth.Weakness in Chinas property marke

220、t will weigh on demand,though this may be tempered by infrastructure spending.Demand for metals from the renewable energy sectormade more competitive by high fossil fuel pricesis likely to remain strong in 2023.Metal prices may be higher than expected if elevated energy costs cause smelters to close

221、 and reduce production of refined metals.Conversely,weaker-than-expected growth,particularly in China,is a downside risk to prices.Global inflation Inflation rose throughout 2022 in almost all economies.Median global headline inflation exceeded 9 percent in the second half of the year,its highest le

222、vel since 1995.Inflation reached almost 10 percent in EMDEs,its highest level since 2008,and in advanced economies just over 9 percent,the highest since 1982.Inflation was above target in virtually all countries that have adopted inflation targeting.Soaring inflation in 2022 reflected a combination

223、of demand and supply factors(Ha,Kose,and Ohnsorge 2022;Shapiro 2022).On the demand side,the acceleration of growth during the initial rebound from the 2020 global recession,as well as the lagged effects of earlier macroeconomic support,contributed to persistent price pressures.Price increases were p

224、articularly large in sectors such as shipping and air travel,where compo-sitional shifts in demand encountered ongoing capacity constraints and supply chain disruptions(Kalemli-zcan et al.2022).On the supply side,shortages of key commodities,exacerbated by Russias invasion of Ukraine,contributed sub

225、stan-tially to higher energy and food prices.In some countries,tight conditions and mismatches in labor markets further added to rising wages and higher input and production costs.Finally,many countries experienced large currency depreciations that passed through into higher import,producer,and cons

226、umer prices.The higher share of food in consumer spending has caused inflation to accelerate more in low-income countries compared to other EMDEs.Inflation has risen across a broad range of goods and services(Ball,Leigh,and Mishra 2022).Global core inflation has risen markedly,reaching over 6 percen

227、t late last year,its highest level since 1992.As a result,short-term(one-year-ahead)inflation expectations have risen in most econ-omies(figure 1.5.A).In contrast,long-term(five-year-ahead)inflation expectations have been relatively more stable,edging up by only about 0.15 percentage point in both a

228、dvanced econ-omies and EMDEs since the onset of the pandemic.This stability may reflect the credibility of the commitment of most central banks to confront inflation,reinforced by recent policy tightening.Inflationary pressures started to abate toward the end of 2022,reflecting weakening demand and

229、easing commodity prices.The share of countries where inflation is accelerating is trending down(figure 1.5.B).In the face of substantial monetary tightening,slowing activity,easing supply chain disruptions,and moderating prices for many non-energy commodities,both core and headline inflation are exp

230、ected to decline over the forecast horizon.In many countries,however,high core inflation has been unexpectedly persistent,suggesting that global inflation will remain elevated for longer than previously envisaged.Financial developments Global financial conditions have tightened sharply,with risk app

231、etite dampened by slowing global growth,persistently elevated inflation,and faster-than-expected monetary tightening(figure 1.5.C).Long-term government bond yields in the United States and Germany increased at their fastest pace in nearly three decades in 2022,reaching their highest levels since 200

232、7 and 2011,respectively,in October.In the United Kingdom,a sharp deterioration in liquidity related to collateral calls on pension fund derivative posi-tions prompted central bank intervention in gilt markets for financial stability purposes.Equity markets worldwide saw substantial declinesby Decemb

233、er,the MSCI World equity index had CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JANUARY 2023 12 declined nearly 20 percent since the start of the year,with equity market indexes down more than 15 percent(in U.S.dollar terms)in about half of countries.As in past tightening episodes,tighter monetary policy in

234、advanced economies weighed on EMDE capital flows.China experienced sizable debt market outflows in 2022,while other EMDEs remained in a protracted period of generally weak debt and equity flows that started in 2021.The U.S.dollar also appreciated markedly in 2022,by about 14 percent on a GDP-weighte

235、d basis by October,before moderating somewhat later in the year.Most EMDE currencies depreciated against the U.S.dollar,but economies with fiscal deficits greater than 3 percent of GDP saw eight times more depreciation,on average,than other EMDEs(figure 1.5.D).Dollar strength has squeezed a wide ran

236、ge of borrowers with net dollar exposures and has contributed to inflation in countries with depreciating currencies.To forestall more acute capital outflows and currency depreciation pressures,many EMDE monetary authorities extended domestic tightening cycles or used foreign exchange reserves to le

237、an against currency pressures.Increasingly difficult market conditions led EMDE bond issuance in 2022 to fall to its lowest level in 10 years(figure 1.5.E).Investors increasingly shied away from the debt of the most vulnerable EMDEs,where financial crisis risks are mounting.Energy importers with wea

238、k credit ratings saw especially sharp increases in sovereign spreads,adding to the difficulty of financing large current account deficits(figure 1.5.F).Spreads on dollar-denominated debt exceed 10 percentage points in about one-in-five EMDEs,effectively locking them out of global debt markets.This i

239、s up from less than one-in-fifteen in 2019.Major economies:Recent developments and outlook Conditions in advanced economies have deteriorated sharply since mid-2022 amid high inflation,rapid monetary tightening,reduced fiscal support,and major energy disruptions in Europe.The monetary tightening cyc

240、le and continued energy supply pressures FIGURE 1.5 Global inflation and financial developments Global inflation surged in 2022.Short-term inflation expectations have risen in most countries;however,long-term expectations have been more stable.Global inflation has started to abate as fewer countries

241、 experience accelerating price increases.Amid faster-than-expected advanced-economy monetary policy tightening,the currencies of emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs)with large fiscal deficits have depreciated sharply.Bond issuance in EMDEs has also declined markedly,while sovereign borrow

242、ing spreads have risen particularly sharply in energy importers with weak credit ratings.Sources:BIS(database);Bloomberg;Consensus Economics;Dealogic;Haver Analytics;JP Morgan;Moodys;WEO(database);World Bank.Note:EAP=East Asia and Pacific,ECA=Europe and Central Asia,LAC=Latin America and the Caribbe

243、an,MNA=Middle East and North Africa,SAR=South Asia,SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa;EA=Euro area;EMBI=Emerging Markets Bond Index;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies.A.Median one-year-ahead(short-term)and five-year-ahead(long-term)CPI inflation expectations for up to 33 advanced economies and 50 EM

244、DEs,based on December 2022 surveys.Yellow diamonds indicate pre-pandemic levels based on January 2020 surveys.B.Last observation is November 2022.Median inflation for 32 advanced economies and 48 EMDEs.C.Policy rate expectations,starting on January 2023,derived from futures curves observed on Decemb

245、er 16,2022.D.Simple average of change in U.S.dollar exchange rates for 114 EMDEs with estimated fiscal deficits greater(less)than 3 percent of GDP in 2022.Last observation is December 16,2022.E.Sovereign and corporate bond issuance,January to November.Unbalanced sample of up to 76 EMDEs(9 EAP,16 ECA

246、,17 LAC,10 MNA,4 SAR,and 20 SSA).F.Change in EMBI spreads since January 2022,using Moodys sovereign foreign currency ratings.Sample includes 11 EMDE energy exporters and 35 EMDE energy importers.Strong credit defined as ratings from Aaa to Baa3.Weak credit defined as ratings from Caa to Ca.Sample ex

247、cludes Belarus,the Russian Federation,and Ukraine.Last observation is December 13,2022.A.Inflation expectations B.Share of economies with rising inflation C.U.S.and euro area interest rate expectations D.EMDE currency depreciation against the U.S.dollar in 2022 E.EMDE bond issuance,by region F.EMDE

248、sovereign spread changes in 2022,by credit rating and energy exporter status 05101520ExporterImporterExporterImporterStrong creditWeak creditPercentage points020406080100JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovGlobalAdvanced economiesEMDEsPercent of countries-20246Jan-22Jun-22Nov-22Apr-23Sep-23EA:Jan-2022E

249、A:Dec-2022U.S.:Jan-2022U.S.:Dec-2022Percent0246810EMDEs with largefiscal deficitsOther EMDEsPercent0200400600200002020212022EAPECALACMNASARSSAUS$,billions02468WorldAdvancedeconomiesEMDEsShort-termLong-termPre-pandemicPercentCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JANUARY

250、 2023 13 to compound the lagged effects of substantial interest rate increases in 2022 and further weigh on U.S.activity.Growth is projected to slow to 0.5 percent in 20231.9 percentage points below previous forecaststhe weakest performance outside official recessions since 1970.Inflation is expecte

251、d to moderate in 2023 as labor markets soften and wage pressures abate.In the euro area,activity in the first half of 2022 exceeded expectations,resulting in annual growth being revised up to 3.3 percent.In the second half are projected to slow growth further in 2023,especially in the euro area.In C

252、hina,activity weakened last year and remains vulnerable to a prolonged drag from the real estate sector and continued pandemic-related disruptions.Advanced economies Advanced economy growth slowed from 5.3 percent in 2021 to an estimated 2.5 percent in 2022the fourth fastest deceleration of the past

253、 five decades.Economic conditions deteriorated substantially in the second half of 2022 as high inflation eroded household purchasing power and dented confidence,while rapid monetary policy tightening weighed on demand.Housing prices and property-related activity have cooled.Gas supply to the euro a

254、rea was disrupted by Russias invasion of Ukraine,pushing up energy prices and inflation,hampering industrial production,and stoking uncertainty.Growth in advanced economies is projected to slow sharply in 2023,to 0.5 percent,as central banks continue to tighten monetary policy to contain inflationar

255、y pressures,labor markets soften,and energy market disruptions in Europe persist.Growth is expected to pick up modestly in 2024,as policy headwinds abate and energy markets stabilize.Persistent high inflation requiring an even more aggressive monetary policy response represents a major downside risk

256、,as do prolonged energy supply disruptions in Europe.In the United States,rising food and energy prices,together with a tight labor market,pushed inflation to multi-decade highs in 2022,before price pressures began easing toward the end of the year(figure 1.6.A).This has prompted the most rapid mone

257、tary policy tightening in more than 40 years(figure 1.6.B).Activity contracted in the first half of 2022,and domestic demand remained weak in the second half,with particular softness in residential investment.In all,growth for 2022 is estimated to have slowed to 1.9 percent as substantial fiscal con

258、solidationworth about 5 percent of GDPadded to monetary policy headwinds.Continued macroeconomic policy tightening to contain inflationary pressures this year is envisaged FIGURE 1.6 Major economies:Recent developments and outlook In the United States,inflation rose to multidecade highs,prompting th

259、e most rapid tightening of monetary policy in more than 40 years.In the euro area,energy prices soared as natural gas supplies were severely disrupted.Activity in China slowed due to pandemic-related restrictions and ongoing stress in the property sector.Sources:BIS(database);Bloomberg;Federal Reser

260、ve Economic Data;Haver Analytics;U.S.Bureau of Labor Statistics;World Bank.A.CPI refers to consumer price index.Bars show contributions to year-on-year headline CPI inflation.Line shows year-on-year headline CPI inflation.Last observation is November 2022.B.Bars represent the extent of the U.S.inter

261、est rate increase in the first 9 months of tightening cycle.Yellow diamonds represent the peak appreciation in the U.S.dollar nominal effective exchange rate in the first 9 months of tightening cycle.U.S.dollar depreciations during tightening cycles starting in 1994 and 2004 not shown.Horizontal axi

262、s represents the start of each tightening cycle since 1980.Last observation for nominal effective exchange rate is October 2022.C.Figure shows one-year-forward baseload electricity prices.Last observation is November 2022.D.Bars denote the year-to-date real growth of industrial production from Janua

263、ry to November and year-to-date nominal growth of retail sales and goods exports and imports from January to November.Last observation is November 2022.A.CPI inflation in the United States B.Rate hikes and U.S.dollar appreciation during U.S.monetary tightening episodes C.Euro area electricity prices

264、 D.Industrial production,retail sales,export,and import growth in China 05Aug-80Mar-83Mar-88Jan-94Jun-99Jun-04Dec-15Mar-22Interest rate increaseUS$appreciation(RHS)Percentage pointsPercent0200400600800Jan-19Apr-19Jul-19Oct-19Jan-20Apr-20Jul-20Oct-20Jan-21Apr-21Jul-21Oct-21Jan-22Apr-22Jul-

265、22Nov-22GermanyFranceItalyEUR/Mwh-IndustrialproductionRetailsalesExport ofgoodsImport ofgoods2021 YTD2022 YTDPercent-20Jan-19Apr-19Jul-19Oct-19Jan-20Apr-20Jul-20Oct-20Jan-21Apr-21Jul-21Oct-21Jan-22Apr-22Jul-22Nov-22 Core Non-coreHeadline CPI(RHS)Percentage pointsPercentCHAP

266、TER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JANUARY 2023 14 Growth is projected to pick up to 4.3 percent in 2023 as the lifting of pandemic restrictions releases pent-up consumer spending.This is 0.9 percentage point below previous forecasts,primarily due to longer-than-expected pandemic-related disruptions,we

267、aker external demand,and protracted weakness in the real estate sector.Continued disruptions from COVID-19,extreme weather events,and prolonged real estate sector stress are key downside risks.Emerging market and developing economies The outlook for EMDEs has deteriorated markedly due to tighter fin

268、ancial conditions and weaker external demand.High inflation,monetary policy tightening,and adverse effects from the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine are expected to weigh on EMDE activity.LICs are being particu-larly affected by high prices and shortages of food.Recent developments Activity i

269、n EMDEs decelerated sharply in 2022 as global financial conditions tightened,high inflation weighed on consumer spending,weakness in the worlds largest economies dampened external demand,and spillovers from the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine persisted.Growth nearly halved from 6.7 percent i

270、n 2021 to an estimated 3.4 percent in 2022the sharpest deceleration in EMDE growth outside of the 2009 and 2020 global recessions(figure 1.7.A).A steep fall in activity in the second half of the year contributed to downgrades in growth estimates for 2022 in many EMDEs and is set to be a drag on grow

271、th in 2023(figure 1.7.B).Inflation in many EMDEs has outpaced nominal wage growth.Price increases have dented real incomes,particularly for vulnerable households,and weighed on consumption(figure 1.7.C;Argente and Lee 2021;Ha,Kose,and Ohnsorge 2019a).Private investment has been feeble,reflecting hig

272、her borrowing costs,weakened confidence,and elevated uncertainty.Decelerating global demand has weighed on EMDE export growth,especially in economies with strong trade linkages with the United States,the euro area,and of the year,however,activity weakened sub-stantially as a result of soaring energy

273、 prices and supply uncertainty,compounded by rising borrowing costs.Inflation rose to record highs as Russias invasion of Ukraine led to natural gas supply cuts and surging energy priceswhich,despite some recent moderation,remain well above pre-invasion levels(figure 1.6.C).Broad-ranging fiscal meas

274、ures introduced by European governments,estimated at 1.2 percent of GDP in 2022 and up to almost 2 percent of GDP in 2023,aimed to cushion the impact of energy price increases on households and businesses(European Commission 2022).In 2023,euro area growth is forecast at zero percenta downward revisi

275、on of 1.9 percentage points,owing to ongoing energy supply disruptions and more monetary policy tightening than expected.Activity is expected to contract in the first half of 2023 before stabilizing later in the year.Inflation is envisaged to moderate as labor markets cool and energy prices decline.

276、In Japan,growth slowed in 2022 as high energy prices and supply bottlenecks eroded household purchasing power and dampened consumption.Deteriorating terms of trade and weakening global demand added to these headwinds.Growth is ex-pected to slow further to 1 percent in 2023,along-side a slowdown in o

277、ther advanced economies.China Economic activity in China deteriorated markedly in 2022(figure 1.6.D).COVID-19 related restrictions,unprecedented droughts,and ongoing property sector stress restrained consumption,production,and residential investment(World Bank 2022b).Property sales,housing starts,an

278、d new-home prices have continued to decline,and several property developers have defaulted on their debt obligations.Infrastructure-focused fiscal support,policy rate and reserve requirement ratio cuts,and regulatory easing measuresincluding cash subsidies and lower down payment requirementshave onl

279、y partially offset these headwinds.In all,growth is estimated to have slowed to 2.7 percent in 2022,1.6 percentage points below previous forecastsand,with the exception of 2020,the weakest pace of growth since the mid-1970s.CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JANUARY 2023 15 China.However,a rebound

280、in tourism led to stronger-than-expected growth in tourism-reliant economies,including many small states(figure 1.7.D).Growth estimates for 2022 in energy-exporting EMDEs were revised up,as the positive effects of high energy prices offset domestic demand weak-ness(figure 1.7.E).The improvement,howe

281、ver,was held back by supply constraints in some oil exporters,owing to a prolonged period of subdued investment(chapter 3).Activity among metal exporters was weaker than expected in 2022,reflecting softening external demand,especially from China,and the high cost of production,which tends to be ener

282、gy intensive(World Bank 2022a).Estimated growth last year in many agricultural exporters was revised down as a result of supply disruptions,high input costs,and unfavorable weather.In commodity importers,growth is estimated to have fallen from 7.6 percent in 2021 to 3.6 percent in 2022,partly reflec

283、ting the impact from high food and energy prices.Activity in LICs deteriorated over the course of the year as food insecurity and poverty worsened,with inflation in the median LIC doubling since early 2022.Cost-of-living increases and surging import bills have weighed on growth,particularly in LICs

284、without the policy space to shield vulnerable populations from rising food and fuel prices.Activity in LICs is also suffering from slowing external demand,debt distress,and ongoing conflict and fragility(figure 1.7.F).Outlook EMDE outlook Following last years sharp deceleration,growth in EMDEs is fo

285、recast to remain essentially unchanged at 3.4 percent in 2023.However,excluding Chinawhere growth is expected to partially recover after a weak 2022EMDE activity is forecast to again slow markedly this year,to 2.7 percent(figure 1.8.A).Spillovers from weaker growth in the euro area and the United St

286、ates are expected to dampen activity in EMDEs,especially those with tighter economic linkages to these major economies(ECA,LAC,SSA;box 1.1).FIGURE 1.7 Recent developments in emerging market and developing economies Growth in emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs)slowed significantly in 2022

287、,particularly in the second half of the year,owing to tighter global financial conditions and ongoing effects of the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine.The acceleration in inflation dampened private consumption,while weak external demand weighed on EMDE exports.Growth estimates for 2022 have be

288、en revised up for many energy exporters and tourism-reliant economies;in contrast,downgrades have been particularly prevalent in non-energy commodity exporters.In low-income countries,conflict and fragility have weighed on activity.Sources:Haver Analytics;Kose,Sugawara,and Terrones(2020);United Nati

289、ons World Tourism Organization;World Bank.Note:DRC=Democratic Republic of Congo;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies;LICs=low-income countries;Fragile LICs=LICs with fragile and conflict affected situations.Unless otherwise indicated,aggregate growth rates are calculated using real U.S.dol

290、lar GDP weights at average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.Forecast revisions are the change in 2022 growth forecasts between the June 2022 and January 2023 editions of Global Economic Prospects.Growth rates may differ than what is presented in table 1.1 due to sample size.A.Blue bar denote

291、s the average EMDE growth slowdown in non-global recession years since 1962.Red bars denote EMDE growth slowdowns that coincided with global recession years(1975,1982,2009,and 2020).Global recession is a contraction in global per capita GDP,as described in Kose,Sugawara,and Terrones(2020).Sample inc

292、ludes 101 EMDEs.B.Growth for period averages is calculated from quarterly growth rates,which are seasonally adjusted annual rates.Balanced sample includes 31 EMDEs.D.“Tourism-reliant”EMDEs are those in the top quartile of inbound tourism expenditures as a share of GDP(2015-19 average).Sample size in

293、cludes 35 tourism-reliant economies and 109 other EMDEs.E.Sample includes 90 EMDE commodity exporters.F.Sample includes 23 LICs,including 13 fragile LICs.A.Slowdown in EMDE growth B.EMDE growth in 2022 C.Contributions to EMDE growth D.Growth estimates in 2022,by degree of tourism reliance E.Revision

294、s to EMDE growth estimates in 2022,by commodity exporter group F.LICs growth estimates in 2022 -2024EMDEsEMDEs excl.China2022H12022H2Full-year growth estimatePercent-8-6-4-201965-2021average920202022Non-global recession yearsGlobal recession yearsCurrent slowdownPercentage points-1012-202

295、4Tourism-reliantEMDEsOther EMDEsGrowthRevision to growth estimates(RHS)PercentPercentage points0255075100CommodityexportersAgricultureexportersMetalexportersEnergyexportersUpgradedUnchangedDowngradedPercent of countries0246Fragile LICs,excl.Ethiopiaand DRCEthiopia andDRCOther LICsLICsPercent-4048122

296、0212022Private consumptionPrivate investmentExportsImportsGrowthPercentCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JANUARY 2023 16 BOX 1.1 Regional perspectives:Outlook and risks The forecast for growth in 2023 and 2024 combined has been downgraded for every emerging market and developing economy(EMDE)regio

297、n.Monetary policy tightening,and restrictive global financial conditions are slowing growth,especially in LAC,SAR,and SSA.Persistently elevated energy prices are expected to dampen outlooks for energy importers in all regions,while falling metals prices will weigh on terms of trade in LAC and SSA.Th

298、e projected slowdown in advanced economy import demand is expected to especially impact EAP and ECA.Added to the pandemic-induced recession and incomplete recovery,the outlook implies feeble per capita income growth in LAC,MNA,and SSA in the half decade to 2024.Risks to the baseline forecasts are sk

299、ewed to the downside in all regions.They include the possibility of financial stress and greater spillovers from major advanced economy weakness(especially in EAP,ECA,LAC,and SSA),commodity price shocks(especially in ECA,EAP,and SAR),conflict(particularly in ECA,MNA,and SSA),and natural disasters(wi

300、th elevated risk in subregions in EAP,LAC,and SAR).Introduction Emerging market and developing economy(EMDE)regions are contending with varied headwinds.Tese include spillovers from subdued conditions in major economies;the repercussions of the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine,including high

301、food and energy prices;tightening financial conditions;and continued fiscal consolidation.Tese factors are expected to hinder EMDE growth in 2023 and 2024,to varying degrees across the regions.Growth is expected to be weakest in ECA,where the effects of the war and a sharp slowdown in the euro area

302、are greatest,and in LAC,where commodity tailwinds are unwinding amid sharp policy tightening to contain inflation.MNA is projected to experience rapid slowing from a decade-high growth rate in 2022,driven by surging oil prices.Te outlook remains comparatively resilient in SAR,due to limited spillove

303、rs to India from a projected global slowdown,but growth is nonetheless expected to decelerate notably in 2023.Growth is set to gradually firm in EAP and SSA in 2023 and 2024,but from low starting points due to weakness in large regional economies.Te baseline projection of broadly lackluster growth l

304、eaves EMDE regions vulnerable to further negative shocks.Tese could take the form of balance of payments difficulties,debt crises,weaker external demand,food and energy price shocks,and climate-related natural disasters.Against this backdrop,this box considers two questions:What are the cross-region

305、al differences in the outlook for growth?What are the key risks to the outlook for each region?Outlook EMDE regions face numerous spillovers from the darkening global economic outlook,along with weakening domestic conditions.Te forecast for growth in 2023 and 2024 combined has been downgraded for ev

306、ery EMDE region since June(figure B1.1.1.A).Growth is projected to be weakest in ECA,with output virtually flat in 2023 for a second consecutive year,reflecting a deep contraction in Russia and weak growth elsewhere.Te outlook in LAC is also for anemic growth in 2023,as a recovery boosted by commodi

307、ty tailwinds unwinds,with only a limited rebound in 2024.After growth at a decade-high rate in 2022,driven by surging energy prices,MNAs economy is expected to decelerate rapidly toward its average 2010s growth rate.Weakness in China weighed on activity in EAP in 2022,though expansion was firmer in

308、the rest of the region.Some improvement in activity is forecast in 2023 and 2024,underpinned by a partial recovery in China,but growth overall is projected to remain slower than in the pre-pandemic decade.In SSA,a firming but still mediocre growth outlook suggests only limited progress with poverty

309、reduction.Tough set to decelerate,SAR is expected to remain the fastest growing EMDE region accross the forecast horizon,driven by India.Nonetheless,Pakistan faces mounting economic difficulties and Sri Lanka remains in crisis.In all regions,improvements in living standards over the half-decade to 2

310、024 are expected to be slower than from 2010-19(figure B1.1.1.B).In LAC and SSA,per capita incomes are expected to further diverge from those in advanced economies,rather than catching up.Restrictive global financial conditions and domestic monetary tightening are weighing on most regional outlooks

311、by discouraging investment and raising debt Note:This box was prepared by Phil Kenworthy CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JANUARY 2023 17 service costs,with the most pronounced effects in LAC,SAR,and SSA.Many EMDEs are also pursuing necessary fiscal adjustments,which nonetheless dampen near-term

312、growth prospects.Te sharpest tightening of monetary policy has taken place in LAC,where inflation-targeting central banks reacted to accelerating prices with steep rate hikes earlier than in other regions.Higher interest rates,in real as well as nominal terms,may help to limit currency depreciations

313、 and ensure macroeconomic stability in the medium-term,but are expected to dampen domestic demand in 2023 and 2024(figure B1.1.1.C).In SAR and SSA,fiscal and monetary policies have become less accommodative more recently,as authorities seek lower fiscal deficits and higher real interest rates to ste

314、m external financing pressures and bear down on rising inflation.In MNA,monetary policy has tightened in both net oil importers and exportersin the former,to curb soaring inflation and current account deficits;in the latter,in line with pegged exchange rates and in recognition of substantial price p

315、ressures on households.In ECA,nominal policy rates have risen to multidecade highs in many countries but have been outstripped by soaring prices;real rates have fallen sharply as a result.Many ECA authorities have also implemented emergency fiscal measures to support populations facing plummeting re

316、al incomes due to war-related energy supply disruptions.Monetary and fiscal policy has eased somewhat in China,where activity has been weak and inflation below target.Elsewhere in EAP,policy has started to tighten due to mounting inflation and price pressures,albeit with inflation still lower than i

317、n other regions.As growth in advanced economies slows sharply,EMDE export growth will weaken.Te projected contraction in the euro area is set to weigh on ECA and net oil importers in MNA.A subdued global growth outlook also implies limited demand growth for primary commodity exports,including from L

318、AC and SSA,though gradually firming import demand in China should provide some offset.Producers of manufactured goods in EAP and LAC are heavily exposed to the sharp BOX 1.1 Regional perspectives:Outlook and risks(continued)FIGURE B1.1.1 Regional outlooks Growth forecasts have been downgraded in all

319、 EMDE regions since June,reflecting external headwinds as well as weakening domestic conditions.In almost all regions,per capita income growth in 2020-24 is expected to be far below 2010-19 averages.Monetary policies have been tightened in many EMDEs to combat inflation and stave off external financ

320、ing pressures.Amid high inflation,real effective exchange rates have appreciated in most EMDE regions.Sources:BIS(database);Bloomberg;Consensus Economics;Haver Analytics;International Monetary Fund;United Nations Population Division;World Bank.Note:AEs=advanced economies;EAP=East Asia and Pacific,EC

321、A=Europe and Central Asia,LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean,MNA=Middle East and North Africa,SAR=South Asia,SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa;REER=real effective exchange rate.A.B.Aggregate growth rates are calculated using GDP weights at average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.A.June 2022 refers to

322、 forecasts presented in the June 2022 edition of the Global Economic Prospects report.Shaded areas indicate forecasts.C.Real interest rates are policy rates minus one-year-ahead inflation expectations.One-year-ahead expectations are calculated as a weighted average of Consensus Economics or Bloomber

323、g private forecasters median expectations for annual inflation in 2022 and 2023.Regional values are GDP-weighted averages of the three largest economies in each region,excluding economies where inflation is above 50 percent year-on-year(Argentina and Trkiye).The change in real interest rates is from

324、 the end of 2021 to November,2022.Change in real effective exchange rate is a GDP-weighted average of the change from December 31,2021,to December 16,2022.REERs are based on consumer price inflation.Sample contains 54 EMDEs(9 in EAP,12 in ECA,14 in LAC,7 in MNA,2 in SAR,and 10 in SSA).A.Output growt

325、h B.Average annual per capita GDP growth C.Changes in real policy interest rates and real effective exchange rates in 2022 -20-100102030-4-20246EAPECALACMNASARSSA2022 change in real rates2022 change in REER(RHS)PercentagepointsPercent01234567EAPECALACMNASARSSAAEs2020-24 average2010-19 averagePercent

326、02468202220232024202220232024202220232024202220232024202220232024202220232024EAPECALACMNASARSSAJune 2022Percent change from previous yearCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JANUARY 2023 18 deceleration projected for the United States.In SAR,in contrast,limited trade openness reduces direct vulnerabi

327、lity to trade spillovers.High inflation and substantial weakening of several advanced economy currencies have also contributed to appreciating real effective exchange rates in most EMDE regions,eroding competitiveness.In ECA,real appreciation reflects falls in the euro and sterling,the appreciation

328、of the Russian ruble,and broad-based double-digit domestic inflation.In LAC,high inflation has been paired with resilient domestic currencies,reflecting strong commodity exports and rising real interest rates.Energy producers in MNA and SSA have also seen large real appreciations due to export windf

329、alls(combined with fixed exchange rates,in many cases).EAP and SAR are the only regions where real effective exchange rates did not strengthen significantly in 2022,due to the weakening Chinese renminbi and sharp nominal currency depreciations in Pakistan and Sri Lanka,respectively.Diverging commodi

330、ty prices are another key factor driving regional prospects.Despite slowing global growth,energy prices are expected to remain elevated.In contrast,most metal prices fell appreciably in 2022 and are expected to decline by a further 15 percent(in U.S.dollar terms)in 2023(World Bank 2022a).Te only EMD

331、E region where growth is bolstered by the commodity price outlook is MNA,due to the preponderance of energy exporters.In LAC and SSA,while fossil fuel exporters are benefitting from high energy prices,exporters of industrial metals are suffering from worsening terms of trade that are expected to wea

332、ken investment and output growth.Te effects of commodity price movements are also mixed in ECA.Energy exporters are likely to continue seeing elevated export earnings,but sharply higher energy and food prices will suppress regionwide consumption.Most large economies in EAP and SAR depend on imported

333、 energy,with heavy use of coal and gas for which prices are expected to remain especially elevated.In some countries this implies a continued squeeze in consumer spending;in others,price controls and subsidies may initially shield households,but fiscal burdens and distortions associated with such policies will grow(World Bank 2022b).Risks Te baseline projection is subject to a range of downside ri