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1、WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONSOUTLOOK 20231.5C PATHWAYVOLUME 1ABOUT IRENAThe International Renewable Energy Agency(IRENA)serves as the principal platform for international co-operation,a centre of excellence,a repository of policy,technology,resource and financial knowledge,and a driver of action on the gr
2、ound to advance the transformation of the global energy system.A global intergovernmental organisation established in 2011,IRENA promotes the widespread adoption and sustainable use of all forms of renewable energy,including bioenergy,geothermal,hydropower,ocean,solar and wind energy,in the pursuit
3、of sustainable development,energy access,energy security,and low-carbon economic growth and prosperity.www.irena.org IRENA 2023Unless otherwise stated,material in this publication may be freely used,shared,copied,reproduced,printed and/or stored,provided that appropriate acknowledgement is given of
4、IRENA as the source and copyright holder.Material in this publication that is attributed to third parties may be subject to separate terms of use and restrictions,and appropriate permissions from these third parties may need to be secured before any use of such material.ISBN:978-92-9260-527-8CITATIO
5、N IRENA(2023),World Energy Transitions Outlook 2023:1.5C Pathway,Volume 1,International Renewable Energy Agency,Abu Dhabi.Available for download:www.irena.org/publications For further information or to provide feedback:publicationsirena.orgDISCLAIMERThis publication and the material herein are provi
6、ded“as is”.All reasonable precautions have been taken by IRENA to verify the reliability of the material in this publication.However,neither IRENA nor any of its officials,agents,data or other third-party content providers,provides a warranty of any kind,either expressed or implied,and they accept n
7、o responsibility or liability for any consequence of use of the publication or material herein.The information contained herein does not necessarily represent the views of all Members of IRENA.The mention of specific companies or certain projects or products does not imply that they are endorsed or
8、recommended by IRENA in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.The designations employed,and the presentation of material herein,do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of IRENA concerning the legal status of any region,country,territory,city or area or of its
9、 authorities,or concerning the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries.3WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONSOUTLOOK 2023ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThis report was developed under the guidance of Rabia Ferroukhi and Roland Roesch and was led by Ute Collier and Ricardo Gorini.The executive summary was led by Elizabeth Press.
10、The chapters were authored by Sean Collins,Jinlei Feng,Maria Vicente Garcia,Krisly Guerra,Diala Hawila,Melda Jabbour,Maisarah Abdul Kadir,Rodrigo Leme,Gayathri Prakash,Faran Rana,Nicholas Wagner and Mengzhu Xiao.Modelling co-ordination was provided by Rodrigo Leme and Chapter drafting by Mengzhu Xia
11、o.Significant contributions were provided by IRENA colleagues and consultants:Emanuele Bianco,Ines Jacob,Stuti Piya,Gandhi Pragada(ex-IRENA),Pablo Rimancus and Michael Taylor.Valuable input,support and comments were provided by IRENA colleagues,consultants and advisors:Abdullah Abou Ali,Arina Anisie
12、,Simon Benmarraze,Francisco Boshell,Yong Chen,Isaline Court,Jaidev Dhavle,Nazik Elhassan,Gerardo Escamilla,Isaac Elizondo Garcia,Dolf Gielen(ex-IRENA),Luis Janeiro,Karan Kochhar,Martina Lyons,Asami Miketa,Raul Miranda,Paula Nardone,Athir Nouicer,Juan Pablo Jimenez Navarro,Pablo Ralon,Michael Renner,
13、Daniel Russo,Danial Saleem,Lucio Scandizzo,Gondia Sokhna Seck,Aakarshan Vaid(ex-IRENA),Iris van der Lugt,Adrian Whiteman and Badariah Yosiyana.Editorial and communications support were provided by Francis Field,Stephanie Clarke,Nicole Bockstaller,Daria Gazzola and Manuela Stefanides.The report was c
14、opy-edited by Steven B.Kennedy and a technical review was provided by Paul Komor.The graphic design was provided by weeks.de Werbeagentur GmbH.IRENA is grateful for the generous support of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action.4WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023The re
15、cent Synthesis Report of the IPCC Sixth Assessment has delivered a sobering message-our collective ability to adhere to a 1.5C pathway hangs in the balance.This decade,our success in reducing greenhouse gas emissions will determine whether global temperature rise can be limited to 1.5C or even 2C.Th
16、e ramifications of each fraction of a degree cannot be overstated-particularly for the worlds most vulnerable populations,who are already suffering the destructive impacts of climate change.The ubiquity of climate-induced disasters-be they floods,droughts or fires-demonstrates the pressing need for
17、a course correction.Within the timeframe to 2030,we must simultaneously realise the goals of the sustainable development agenda and significantly reduce emissions.Energy plays an essential role in climate course correction and the realisation of sustainable development.IRENAs 1.5C pathway,set out in
18、 the World Energy Transitions Outlook,positions electrification and efficiency as key transition drivers,enabled by renewable energy,clean hydrogen and sustainable biomass.Increasingly,countries are positioning these technological avenues at the centre of their climate action,as well as their econom
19、ic,energy security and universal access strategies.This volume of the World Energy Transitions Outlook 2023 provides an overview of progress by tracking implementation and gaps across all energy sectors.It shows that most of the progress achieved to date has been in the power sector,where a virtuous
20、 circle of technology,policy and innovation has taken us a long way;but the scale and extent of implementation fall far short of what is required to stay on the 1.5C pathway.An equally concerning trend is the geographic concentration of these deployments,which remains limited to a few countries and
21、regions.This pattern,which has persisted for the past decade,has excluded almost half of the global population,and particularly those in countries with significant energy access needs.The business case for renewables is strong,but deeply entrenched barriers stemming from the systems and structures c
22、reated for the fossil-fuel era continue to hamper progress.The World Energy Transitions Outlook sets out a vision for overcoming these barriers.It envisages three pillars that would form the foundations for a way forward:first,building the necessary infrastructure and investing at scale in grids,and
23、 both land and sea routes,to accommodate new production locations,trade patterns and demand centres;second,advancing an evolved policy and regulatory architecture that can facilitate targeted investments;and finally,strategically realigning institutional capacities to help ensure that skills and cap
24、abilities match the energy system we aspire to create.FOREWORD5VOLUME 1Francesco La CameraDirector-General,IRENAThis also requires a realignment of the way in which international cooperation works.Multilateral financing institutions should prioritise building the infrastructure that would underpin t
25、he new energy system.This would coherently and simultaneously help deliver development and climate priorities,triggering virtuous economic and social dynamics.Importantly,this would enable private sector investment in countries and regions that currently face barriers such as high capital costs.The
26、bulk of this funding should be in the form of concessional loans,whilst for the most vulnerable such as least developed countries(LDCs)and small island developing states(SIDS),a share of grant funding is needed.Our collective promise was to secure a climate-safe existence for current and future gene
27、rations.We simply cannot continue with incremental changes;there is no time for a new energy system to evolve gradually over centuries,as was the case for the fossil fuel-based system.The energy transition must also become a strategic tool to foster a more equitable and inclusive world.The upcoming
28、28th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC(COP28)and the Global Stocktake must not only confirm our deviation from a 1.5C pathway but also provide a strategic blueprint to steer us back on track.It is my belief that the World Energy Transitions Outlook can offer critical input to shaping our colle
29、ctive action following this important climate action milestone.WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 20236WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023 Figures .08Tables.10Boxes.11Abbreviations.12Executive summary.14Introduction .26References.166 CHAPTER 1 THE 1.5C CLIMATE PATHWAY AND PROGRESS IN THE ENERGY TRANSI
30、TION Highlights.291.1 Transforming the global energy system.301.2 The 1.5C Scenario:Global perspectives.331.3 Implications for the 1.5C Scenario of revised NDCs and other pledges.421.4 The energy crisis and its implications for the energy transition.471.5 Conclusions.5101TABLE OF CONTENTSVOLUME 1 7V
31、OLUME 1|TABLE OF CONTENTS0203CHAPTER 2 SECTORAL TRANSFORMATION PATHWAYS AND SUPPORTING POLICIES Highlights.532.1 Introduction.562.2 Power sector.562.3 Emerging fuels:Clean hydrogen and its derivatives.762.4 Bioenergy supply and consumption.842.5 Industry sector.922.6 Buildings sector.1082.7 Transpor
32、t sector.1172.8 Conclusions.129CHAPTER 3 INVESTMENT NEEDS,FINANCING AND ENABLING POLICY FRAMEWORKS Highlights.1313.1 Introduction.1333.2 Investments to accelerate the energy transition.1333.3 Renewable energy investments and policies over the past year.1433.3 Role of public finance and policies for
33、a just and inclusive energy transition.1568WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023FIGURE S1 Key energy transition pillars and barriers.21 FIGURE 1.1 Power generation needs to more than triple by 2050 in the 1.5C Scenario.35FIGURE 1.2 Breakdown of total final energy consumption by energy carrier between
34、 2020 and 2050 under the 1.5C Scenario.36FIGURE 1.3 Total primary energy supply by energy carrier group,2020-2050 under the 1.5C Scenario.37FIGURE 1.4 Estimated trends in global CO2 emissions under the Planned Energy Scenario and 1.5C Scenario,2023-2050.39FIGURE 1.5 Carbon emissions abatement under
35、the 1.5C Scenario in 2050.40FIGURE 1.6 CO2 emission trajectories based on COP announcements and the 1.5C Scenario.43 FIGURE 2.1 Annual power capacity expansion,2002-2022.57FIGURE 2.2 Change in global weighted average levelised cost of electricity by technology,2020-2021.59FIGURE 2.3 Power generation
36、 mix and installed capacity by energy source:Planned Energy Scenario and 1.5C Scenario in 2020,2030 and 2050.63FIGURE 2.4 Total global power generation capacity expansion needed by 2030 and 2050 to realise the 1.5C Scenario.67FIGURE 2.5 Global clean hydrogen supply in 2020,2030 and 2050 in the 1.5C
37、Scenario.77FIGURE 2.6 Recommendations for G7 members.83FIGURE 2.7 Primary bioenergy supply by carrier in 2020,2030 and 2050 under the Planned Energy Scenario and 1.5C Scenario.84FIGURE 2.8 Bioenergy final energy consumption by sectors in 2020,2030 and 2050 under the 1.5C Scenario.86FIGURESVOLUME 1 9
38、VOLUME 1|LIST OF FIGURESFIGURE 2.9 A policy framework for sustainable bioenergy development.90FIGURE 2.10 Industry:Final consumption under the Planned Energy Scenario and the 1.5C Scenario in 2020,2030 and 2050,and corresponding emissions.93FIGURE 2.11 Temperature ranges and technologies for industr
39、y sectors.102FIGURE 2.12 Buildings:Final energy consumption under the Planned Energy Scenario and the 1.5C Scenario in 2020,2030 and 2050,and corresponding emissions.108FIGURE 2.13 Heat pump sales in 21 EU markets,2014-2022.112FIGURE 2.14 Transport:Final energy consumption under the Planned Energy S
40、cenario and the 1.5C Scenario in 2020,2030 and 2050,and corresponding emissions.118FIGURE 2.15 Measures to improve transport strategies.124 FIGURE 3.1 Global investment by technological avenue:Planned Energy Scenario and 1.5C Scenario,2023-2050 .134FIGURE 3.2 Global investment in energy transition t
41、echnologies,2015-2022.145FIGURE 3.3 Global annual financial commitments in renewable energy by technology,2013-2022.146FIGURE 3.4 Global annual renewable energy investments by application,2013-2022.148FIGURE 3.5 Investment in renewable energy by region of destination,2013-2022.149FIGURE 3.6 Global i
42、nvestment in renewable energy by financial instrument,2013-2020.151FIGURE 3.7 Renewable energy investment by region and type of investment (debt vs.equity),2013-2020.152FIGURE 3.8 Portion of DFI funding in the form of grants and low-cost debt,2013-2020.153FIGURE 3.9 Cumulative renewable energy inves
43、tment in Africa and globally,2000-2020.154FIGURE 3.10 Global shares of annual commitments in off-grid renewables by financial instrument,2013-2021.159FIGURE 3.11 Flow of public finance for a just and inclusive energy transition.16210WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023TABLE S1 Tracking progress of k
44、ey energy system components to achieve the 1.5C Scenario.16 TABLE 1.1 Key performance indicators for achieving the 1.5C Scenario compared with the Planned Energy Scenario in 2030 and 2050.34TABLE 1.2 Key measures to accelerate the energy transition.49TABLE 2.1 Key performance indicators for the powe
45、r sector:Planned Energy Scenario and 1.5C Scenario in 2030 and 2050.65TABLE 2.2 Key performance indicators for clean hydrogen and its derivatives:Planned Energy Scenario and 1.5C Scenario in 2030 and 2050.79TABLE 2.3 Key performance indicators for bioenergy supply and consumption:Planned Energy Scen
46、ario and 1.5C Scenario in 2030 and 2050.88TABLE 2.4 Key performance indicators for the industry sector:Planned Energy Scenario and 1.5C Scenario in 2030 and 2050.94TABLE 2.5 Key performance indicators for the buildings sector:Planned Energy Scenario and 1.5C Scenario in 2030 and 2050.111TABLE 2.6 Ke
47、y performance indicators for the transport sector:Planned Energy Scenario and 1.5C Scenario in 2030 and 2050.121 TABLE 3.1 Required annual investments under the Planned Energy Scenario and 1.5C Scenario,2023-2030.136TABLESVOLUME 1 11VOLUME 1|TABLE OF BOXESBOX 1.1 Key energy transition pillars.31BOX
48、1.2 IRENAs regional studies.41BOX 1.3 The Paris Agreement Global Stocktake.44 BOX 1.4 Insights from analysing the alignment between LTES and LT-LEDS.46 BOX 2.1 Flexibility and the importance of cross-border power exchange.69BOX 2.2 Enabling actions to speed up permitting protocols for offshore wind
49、projects.72BOX 2.3 Power sectors in the renewable energy era setting up organisational structures.75BOX 2.4 Recommendations for accelerating hydrogen deployment.82BOX 2.5 Accelerating the transition to a decarbonised steel sector:Key actions from the Breakthrough Agenda Report.98BOX 2.6 Emerging tec
50、hnologies for decarbonising heating in industry.102BOX 2.7 The circular economy and industrial decarbonisation.106BOX 2.8 Emerging technologies for heating buildings.112BOX 2.9 Emerging technologies for the e-mobility sector.123BOX 2.10 Avoid-shift-improve strategies for road transport.124 BOX 3.1 I
51、nvestments in renewable energy in Africa by region and source of financing.154BOX 3.2 Off-grid renewable energy investments in developing countries.159BOX 3.3 Short-term investment priorities(by 2030).163BOX 3.4 IRENA Investment Forums.165BOXES12WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023ASEAN Association
52、of Southeast Asian NationsBECCS bioenergy with carbon capture and storageBF blast furnaceBOF basic oxygen furnaceCAGR compound annual growth rateCCS carbon capture and storageCCU carbon capture and utilisationCCUS carbon capture,utilisation and storageCFOR Collaborative Framework for Offshore WindCN
53、Y Chinese yuanCOP Conference of the Parties CO2 carbon dioxideCSP concentrating solar powerDC direct currentDFI development finance institutioneCF e-cracking furnaceEEA European Economic AreaEJ exajouleEU European UnionEUR euro(currency)EV electric vehicleFiT feed-in tariff GBP British pound GCF Gre
54、en Climate FundGHG greenhouse gasGIZ German Agency for International CooperationGLAD Global Life Cycle Assessment Data AccessGOWA Global Offshore Wind AllianceGt gigatonneGW gigawattGWEC Global Wind Energy CouncilHVAC heating,ventilation and air conditioning IATA International Air Transport Associat
55、ionICAO International Civil Aviation OrganisationICE internal combustion engineIDDI Industrial Deep Decarbonisation InitiativeIEA International Energy AgencyILO International Labour OrganizationIMO International Maritime OrganisationIPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate ChangeIRENA International R
56、enewable Energy AgencyJETP Just Energy Transition PartnershipKPI key performance indicatorLCOE levelised cost of electricityLNG liquefied natural gasLTES long-term energy scenariosLT-LEDS long-term low greenhouse gas emission strategiesMEPS minimum energy performance standardsNDC Nationally Determin
57、ed ContributionNGO non-governmental organisationOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentPES Planned Energy ScenarioPJ petajoulePPA power purchase agreementPV photovoltaicPWh petawatt hoursRD&D research,development and demonstrationSDG Sustainable Development GoalSIDS small island
58、developing statesSOE state-owned enterpriseSOFI state-owned financial institutionTFEC total final energy consumptionTPES total primary energy supplyTW terawatt UAE United Arab EmiratesUK United KingdomUN United NationsUS United StatesUSD United States dollarVRE variable renewable energyWEF World Eco
59、nomic ForumZEV zero-emission vehicle ABBREVIATIONS13The World Energy Transitions Outlook outlines a vision for the transition of the energy landscape to reflect the goals of the Paris Agreement,presenting a pathway for limiting global temperature rise to 1.5C and bringing CO2 emissions to net zero b
60、y mid-century.The report builds on two of IRENAs key scenarios to capture global progress toward meeting the 1.5C climate goal:The 1.5C Scenario describes an energy transition pathway aligned with the 1.5C climate goal to limit global average temperature increase by the end of the present century to
61、 1.5C,relative to pre-industrial levels.It prioritises readily available technology solutions,which can be scaled up to meet the 1.5C goal.1.5C Scenario The Planned Energy Scenario is the primary reference case for this study,providing a perspective on energy system developments based on governments
62、 energy plans and other planned targets and policies in place at the time of analysis,with a focus on G20 countries.Planned Energy ScenarioVOLUME 1WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 202314WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023EXECUTIVE SUMMARY15VOLUME 1|EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe energy transition is off-track
63、.The aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ripple effects of the Ukraine crisis have further compounded the challenges facing the transition.The stakes could not be higher-every fraction of a degree in global temperature change can trigger significant and far-reaching consequences for natural s
64、ystems,human societies and economies.Limiting global warming to 1.5C requires cutting carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions by around 37 gigatonnes(Gt)from 2022 levels and achieving net-zero emissions in the energy sector by 2050.Despite some progress,significant gaps remain between the current deployment of
65、 energy transition technologies and the levels needed to achieve the goal of the Paris Agreement to limit global temperature rise to within 1.5C of pre-industrial levels by the end of this century.A 1.5C compatible pathway requires a wholescale transformation of the way societies consume and produce
66、 energy.Current pledges and plans fall well short of IRENAs 1.5C pathway and will result in an emissions gap of 16 Gt in 2050.Nationally Determined Contributions(NDCs),long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies(LT-LEDS)and net-zero targets,if fully implemented,could reduce CO2 emis
67、sions by 6%by 2030 and 56%by 2050,compared to 2022 levels.However,most climate pledges are yet to be translated into detailed national strategies and plans-implemented through policies and regulations-or supported with sufficient funding.According to IRENAs Planned Energy Scenario,the energy-related
68、 emissions gap is projected to reach 34 Gt by 2050,underscoring the urgent need for comprehensive action to accelerate the transition.Annual deployment of some 1 000 GW of renewable power is needed to stay on a 1.5C pathway.In 2022,some 300 GW of renewables were added globally,accounting for 83%of n
69、ew capacity compared to a 17%share combined for fossil fuel and nuclear additions.Both the volume and share of renewables need to grow substantially,which is both technically feasible and economically viable.Policies and investments are not consistently moving in the right direction.While there were
70、 record renewable power capacity additions in 2022,the year also saw the highest levels of fossil fuel subsidies ever,as many governments sought to cushion the blow of high energy prices for consumers and businesses.Global investments across all energy transition technologies reached a record high o
71、f USD 1.3 trillion in 2022,yet fossil fuel capital investments were almost twice those of renewable energy investments.With renewables and energy efficiency best placed to meet climate commitments-as well as energy security and energy affordability objectives governments need to redouble their effor
72、ts to ensure investments are on the right track.Every year,the gap between what is achieved and what is required continues to grow.IRENAs energy transition indicators(Table S1)show significant acceleration is needed across energy sectors and technologies,from deeper end-use electrification of transp
73、ort and heat,to direct renewable use,energy efficiency and infrastructure additions.Delays only add to the already considerable challenge of meeting IPCC-defined emission reduction levels in 2030 and 2050 for a 1.5C trajectory(IPCC,2022a).This lack of progress will also increase future investment ne
74、eds and the costs of worsening climate change effects.16WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023IndicatorsRecent years 2050Progress(off/on track)2030Share of renewables in electricity generationRenewable power capacity additionsAnnual solar PV additionsAnnual wind energy additionsInvestmentneeds for RE
75、generationELECTRIFICATION WITH RENEWABLES continuedShare of renewables infinal energy consumptionSolar thermalcollector areaModern useof bioenergy(direct use)Geothermal consumption(direct use)Renewables based district heat generationInvestmentneeds for renewablesend uses and district heatDIRECT RENE
76、WABLES IN END-USES AND DISTRICT HEATInvestment needs for power grids and flexibilityRENEWABLESENERGYEFFICIENCYELECTRIFICATIONHYDROGENCCS AND BECCS29%Investment needs for energy conservation and efciency1525USD billion/yr1780USD billion/yr295USD billion/yr0.04GtCO2 captured/yr0.002GtCO2 captured/yr3.
77、8GtCO2 captured/yr0.8GtCO2 captured/yr28%91%68%35%295 GW/yr975 GW/yr1 066 GW/yr191 GW/yr551 GW/yr615 GW/yr75 GW/yr329 GW/yr335 GW/yr1 380USDbillion/yr1 300USDbillion/yr486USD billion/yr210USD billion/yr290USD billion/yr13 USDbillion/yr17%82%585 million m2/yr3 882 million m2/yr21 EJ53 EJ46 EJ2.2 EJ13
78、 EJ1 552 million m2/yr1.7%/yr2.8%/yr3.3%/yr30 USD billion/yr170USD billion/yr1.1 USD billion/yr100 USD billion/yr107USD billion/yr6.4 USD billion/yr38 USD billion/yr0.9 EJ0.9 EJ4.3 EJ1.4 EJ2)4)1)1)5)6)7)9)10)11)12)13)16)18)17)27)19)20)21)28)29)30)23)24)25)15)14)3)3)3)230USD billion/yr22)26)31)8)274U
79、SD billion/yr605USDbillion/yr800USDbillion/yrTABLE S1 Tracking progress of key energy system components to achieve the 1.5C Scenario 17VOLUME 1|EXECUTIVE SUMMARYIndicatorsRecent years 2050Progress(off/on track)2030Notes:see next pageShare of renewables infinal energy consumptionSolar thermalcollecto
80、r areaModern useof bioenergy(direct use)Geothermal consumption(direct use)Renewables based district heat generationInvestmentneeds for renewablesend uses and district heatDIRECT RENEWABLES IN END-USES AND DISTRICT HEATInvestment needs for power grids and flexibilityShare of directelectricity in fina
81、l energy consumptionPassenger electric carson the roadInvestments needs for charging infrastructure of EVs and EV adoption supportInvestment needs for heat pumpsClean hydrogen productionElectrolyser capacityInvestment needs for clean hydrogen and derivatives infrastructureCCS/U-emissions abatedBECCS
82、 and others to abate total emissionsInvestment needs for carbon removal and infrastructureEnergy intensity improvement rateENERGYEFFICIENCYELECTRIFICATIONHYDROGENCCS AND BECCS29%Investment needs for energy conservation and efciency1525USD billion/yr1780USD billion/yr295USD billion/yr0.04GtCO2 captur
83、ed/yr0.002GtCO2 captured/yr3.8GtCO2 captured/yr0.8GtCO2 captured/yr1.7%/yr2.8%/yr3.3%/yr30 USD billion/yr170USD billion/yr1.1 USD billion/yr100 USD billion/yr107USD billion/yr6.4 USD billion/yr38 USD billion/yr0.9 EJ0.9 EJ4.3 EJ1.4 EJ51%22%10.5 million 360 million 2180 million 364USD billion/yr137 U
84、SD billion/yr523 Mt/yr125 Mt/yr0.7 Mt/yr5 722 GW0.5 GW1)1)16)18)17)27)19)20)21)28)29)30)23)24)25)15)14)3)3)3)230USD billion/yr22)26)31)64 USD billion/yr233 GW3.2 GtCO2 captured/yr274USD billion/yr1.4GtCO2 captured/yr237USD billion/yr(contd.)TABLE S1 Tracking progress of key energy system components
85、to achieve the 1.5C Scenario18WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023Table S1 notes:1 Average annual investments requirement to reach the 1.5C target during the period 2023-2030 and 2023-2050 are shown in the investments rows under 2030 and 2050,respectively.All investment figures for recent years are
86、in current USD;the particulars of recent years used for the indicators are:2 2020;3 net capacity additions for 2030 and 2050 are excluding replacement stock for end-of-life units;4 2022;5 2022;6 2022;7 2022;8 2022;9 2020;10 2021;11 2020-non-energy uses are not included;12 2020;13 2020;14 future inve
87、stments needed in renewables in end uses,district heating,biofuels and bio-based innovative fuels;15 2022;16 Recent years value is an average between 2010 and 2020;17 future investments in energy conservation and efficiency include those in bio-based plastics and organic materials,chemical and mecha
88、nical recycling and energy recovery;18 2021;192020;20 2022;21 2022;22 2022;23 2021;24 the share for green hydrogen is 40%in 2030;25the share for green hydrogen is 94%in 2050;26 2022;27 future investments needed in electrolysers,infrastructure,H2 stations,bunkering facilities and long-term storage;28
89、 2022;29 Includes CO2 capture in natural gas processing,hydrogen,other fuel supply,power and heat,industry,direct air capture of facilities in operation,2022;30 Current total capture corresponds to fuel supply,2022;31 2022.CCS/U=carbon capture and storage/use;BECCS=bioenergy,carbon capture and stora
90、ge;EV=electric vehicle;RE=renewable energy;yr=year;m2=square metre;EJ=exajoule;Gt=gigatonne.19VOLUME 1|EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe share of renewable energy in the global energy mix would increase from 16%in 2020 to 77%by 2050 in IRENAs 1.5C scenario.Total primary energy supply would remain stable due to i
91、ncreased energy efficiency and growth of renewables.Renewables would increase across all end-use sectors,while a high rate of electrification in sectors such as transport and buildings would require a twelve-fold increase in renewable electricity capacity by 2050,compared to 2020 levels.Globally,ann
92、ual renewable power capacity additions would need to reach an average of 1 066 GW per year from 2023 to 2050 under the 1.5C scenario.Electricity would become the main energy carrier,accounting for over 50%of total final energy consumption by 2050 in the 1.5C scenario.Renewable energy deployment,impr
93、ovements in energy efficiency and the electrification of end-use sectors would contribute to this shift.In addition,modern biomass and hydrogen would both play more significant roles,meeting 16%and 14%of total final energy consumption by 2050,respectively.By 2050,94%of hydrogen would be renewables-b
94、ased in the 1.5C scenario.Hydrogen would play a key role in the decarbonisation of end-uses and flexibility of the power system.The 1.5C Scenario envisages that total final energy consumption would decrease by 6%between 2020 and 2050,due to efficiency improvements,deployment of renewables,and change
95、s in behaviour and consumption patterns.An enduring investment gap A cumulative USD 150 trillion is required to realise the 1.5C target by 2050,averaging over USD 5 trillion in annual terms.Although global investment across all energy transition technologies reached a record high of USD 1.3 trillion
96、 in 2022,annual investment must more than quadruple to remain on the 1.5C pathway.Compared with the Planned Energy Scenario-under which a cumulative investment of USD 103 trillion is required an additional USD 47 trillion in cumulative investment is required by 2050 to remain on the 1.5C pathway.Aro
97、und USD 1 trillion of annual investments in fossil fuel-based technologies currently envisaged in the Planned Energy Scenario must therefore be redirected towards energy transition technologies and infrastructure.Renewable energy investment remains concentrated in a limited number of countries and f
98、ocused on only a few technologies.Investment in renewable energy(including both power and end-uses)reached USD0.5trillion in 2022(IRENA and CPI,2023);however,this is around one-third of the average investment needed each year in renewables under the 1.5C Scenario.Furthermore,85%of global renewable e
99、nergy investment benefitted less than 50%of the worlds population and Africa accounted for only 1%of additional capacity in 2022(IRENA,2023a;IRENA and CPI,2023).Investments in off-grid renewable energy solutions in 2021 amounted to USD 0.5 billion(IRENA and CPI,2023)far below the USD 15 billion need
100、ed annually to 2030.While many technology choices exist,most investments were in solar PV and wind power,with 95%channelled toward these technologies(IRENA and CPI,2023).Greater volumes of funding need to flow to other energy transition technologies such as biofuels,hydropower and geothermal energy,
101、as well as to sectors beyond power that have lower shares of renewables in total final energy consumption(e.g.heating and transport).20WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023Some 75%of global investment in renewables from 2013 to 2020 came from the private sector.However,private capital tends to flow t
102、o the technologies and countries with the least associated risks,be they real or perceived.In 2020,83%of commitments in solar PV came from private finance,whereas geothermal and hydropower relied primarily on public finance-only 32%and 3%of investments in these technologies,respectively,came from pr
103、ivate investors in 2020(IRENA and CPI,2023).Stronger public sector intervention is required to channel investments towards countries and technologies in a more equitable way.Public finance and policy should crowd in private capital,but greater geographical and technological diversity of investment r
104、equires targeted and scaled-up public contributions.For many years,policy has focused on mobilising private capital.Public funding is urgently needed to invest in basic energy infrastructure in the developing world,as well as to drive deployment in less mature technologies(especially in end uses suc
105、h as heating and transport,or synthetic fuel production)and in areas where private investors seldom venture.Otherwise,the gap in investment between the Global North and the Global South could continue to widen.Overcoming barriers to the transitionPolicy makers need to strike the right balance betwee
106、n reactive measures and proactive energy transition strategies that promote a more resilient,inclusive and climate-safe system.Several of the root causes of current crises stem from the fossil fuel-based energy system,such as overdependence on a limited number of fuel exporters,inefficient and waste
107、ful energy production and consumption,and the lack of accounting for negative environmental and social impacts.An energy transition based on renewables can reduce or eliminate many of these.It is therefore the speed of the change that will determine the levels of energy security and economic and soc
108、ial resilience at the national level and offer new opportunities for improved human welfare globally.Accelerating progress worldwide requires a shift away from structures and systems built for the fossil fuel era.The energy transition can be a tool with which to proactively shape a more equal and in
109、clusive world.This means overcoming existing barriers across infrastructure,policy,workforces and institutions that hamper progress and impede inclusivity(Figure S2).More can be done in the short term.While the energy transition undoubtedly requires time,there is significant potential to implement m
110、any of the available technology options today.Upward trends in the deployment of these solutions demonstrate that the technical and economic case is sound.However,comprehensive policies are needed across all sectors to ramp up deployment,as well as to instigate the systemic and structural overhaul r
111、equired to realise climate and development objectives.EnablinginfrastructurePolicy andregulationsSkills andinstitutionalcapacityForward-looking planning,modernisation and expansion of supporting infrastructure both on land and sea to facilitate the development,storage,distribution,transmission and c
112、onsumption of renewables.Infrastructure should facilitate national,regional and global strategies for new supply-demand dynamics.Design policy and regulatory frameworks that facilitate deployment,integration and trade of renewables-based energy,improve socio-economic and environmentaloutcomes and pr
113、omote equity and inclusion.These need to enable the energy transition at various levels,from local to global,and reflect new supply-demand dynamics.Awareness-and capacity-building of institutions,communities and individuals to acquire requisite skills and knowledge to drive and sustain the energy tr
114、ansition.This includes co-ordination between educational institutions and industry.Strengthened institutions,social dialogue and collective bargaining will help bring about greater socio-economic benefits.BarriersSolutionsInsufcient infrastructure to connect renewable energy to markets,including ene
115、rgy storage and grid integration infrastructure.Lack of readiness of the distribution infrastructure for electricity,gases and fuels.Unpreparedness of end-use sector facilities to switch to renewables.Policy and regulatory frameworks that are still shaped around fossil fuels,ofering insufcient publi
116、c funding for energy transition support.Lack of integrated planning for energy production and consumption.Insufcient attention to the socio-economic dimension,including a lack of industrial policy for viable supply chains.Misalignments between fossil fuel job losses and renewable job gains(skills-re
117、lated,sectoral,spatial,temporal).Skills gaps due to inadequate education and training opportunities;uneven access for women,youth,minorities;and unmet reskilling and upskilling needs.Also lack of awareness of opportunities.Job quality issues,including wages,occupational health and safety,and overall
118、 workplace conditions.21VOLUME 1|EXECUTIVE SUMMARYFIGURE S1 Key energy transition barriers and solutions22WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023The Global Stocktake at the 2023 United Nations Climate Change Conference(COP28)must serve as a catalyst for scaling up action in the years to 2030 to impleme
119、nt existing energy transition options.Whilst planning must provide room for innovation and additional policy action,a significant scale up of existing solutions is paramount.For example,advancing efficiency and electrification based on renewables is a cost-effective avenue for the power sector,as we
120、ll as for transport and buildings.Clean hydrogen and its derivatives,and sustainable biomass solutions,also offer various solutions for end uses.The period following COP28 will be pivotal for efforts to curb climate change and achieve the sustainable development goals outlined in the 2030 Agenda.The
121、 energy transition is crucial for delivering on economic,social and environmental priorities.It is imperative for governments,financial institutions and the private sector to urgently re-evaluate their aspirations,strategies and implementation plans to realign the energy transition with its intended
122、 trajectory.Developing structures for a renewables-based energy systemA profound and systemic transformation of the global energy system must be achieved within 30 years.This condensed timeframe necessitates a strategic shift that expands beyond the focus on decarbonisation of energy supply and ener
123、gy consumption,toward designing an energy system that not only reduces carbon emissions but also supports a resilient and inclusive global economy.As a result,planning needs to extend beyond borders and the narrow confines of fuels to focus on the requirements of the new energy system and the econom
124、ies it will sustain.Focusing on the enablers of a renewables-dominated system can help address the structural barriers that hinder progress in the energy transition.Pursuing fuel and sectoral mitigation measures is necessary,but is insufficient to transition to an energy system fit for the dominance
125、 of renewables.From energy production and transportation to processing coal,oil and gas,the global infrastructure dedicated to energy will need to change.This will have impacts on power generation,industrial production and manufacturing,as well as on rail,pipelines,shipyards and other means of suppl
126、ying fossil fuels.Enhancing the focus on systems design will help accelerate the development of a new energy infrastructure and sustain its implementation.A profound and systemic transformation of the global energy system must occur within 30 years 23VOLUME 1|EXECUTIVE SUMMARYGovernments can proacti
127、vely shape a renewables-based energy system,overcome the flaws and inefficiencies of current structures,and more effectively influence outcomes.The simultaneous,proactive shaping of physical,policy and institutional structures will be essential to realising development and climate objectives,and ach
128、ieving a more resilient and equitable world.These underpinnings should form the pillars of a structure that supports the energy transition:Physical infrastructure upgrades,modernisation and expansion will increase resilience and build flexibility for a diversified and interconnected energy system.Tr
129、ansmission and distribution will need to accommodate both the highly localised,decentralised nature of many renewable fuels,as well as different trade routes.Planning for interconnectors to enable electricity trade,and shipping routes for hydrogen and derivatives,must consider vastly different globa
130、l dynamics and proactively link countries to promote the diversification and resilience of energy systems.Storage solutions will need to be widespread and designed with geo-economic impacts in mind.Public acceptance is also critical for any large-scale undertaking and can be secured through project
131、transparency and opportunities for communities to voice their perspectives.Policy and regulatory enablers must systematically prioritise the acceleration of the energy transition and a reduction in the role of fossil fuels.Today,the underlying policy and regulatory systems remain shaped around fossi
132、l fuels.While it is inevitable that fossil fuels will remain in the energy mix for some time,their share must dramatically decrease as we approach mid-century.Policy frameworks and markets should therefore focus on accelerating the transition and provide the essential underpinnings for a resilient a
133、nd inclusive system.A well-skilled workforce is a lynchpin of a successful energy transition.Work by IRENA and the International Labour Organization(ILO)has shown that the renewable energy sector employed some 12.7 million people worldwide in 2022,growing from about 7.3 million in 2012.Energy transi
134、tion modelling indicates that tens of millions of additional jobs will likely be created in the coming decades as investments grow and installed capacities expand.A broad range of occupational profiles will be needed.Filling these jobs will require concerted action in education and skills building,a
135、nd governments have a critical role in co-ordinating efforts to align the offerings of the education sector with projected industry needs-whether in the form of vocational training or university courses.To attract talent to the sector,it is crucial that jobs are decent,and that women,youth and minor
136、ities have equal access to job training,hiring networks and career opportunities.24WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023The way forward:Prioritising bold and transformative actionsAchieving the necessary course-correction in the energy transition will require bold,transformative measures that reflect
137、 the urgency of the present situation.A considerable scale-up of renewables needs to go hand-in-hand with investments in enabling infrastructure.Comprehensive policies are needed not only to facilitate deployment but also to ensure the transition has broad socio-economic benefits.Net-zero commitment
138、s must be embedded in legislation and translated into implementation plans that are adequately resourced.Without this crucial step,climate announcements remain aspirational,and the necessary progress out of reach.The current energy system is deeply woven into socio-economic structures that have evol
139、ved over centuries.This means significant structural change must occur in a condensed timeframe of less than three decades to successfully deliver on the goals of the Paris Agreement.Every investment and planning decision concerning energy infrastructure today should consider the structure and geogr
140、aphy of the low-carbon economy of the future.Energy infrastructure is long-lived,so investment in fixed infrastructure should consider the long term.Electrification of end uses will reshape demand.Renewable power will require existing infrastructure to be modernised,with grid reinforcement and expan
141、sion on both land and sea.Green hydrogen production will also occur in locations other than todays oil and gas fields.The technical challenges and economic costs of redesigning infrastructure should be accounted for,and the environmental and social aspects adequately addressed from the outset.A just
142、 and inclusive energy transition will help to overcome deep disparities that affect the quality of life of hundreds of millions of people.Energy transition policies must be aligned with broader systemic changes that aim to safeguard human well-being,advance equity among countries and communities,and
143、 bring the global economy in line with climate,broader environmental and resource constraints.Supporting developing countries to accelerate the energy transition could improve energy security while preventing the global decarbonisation divide from widening.A diverse energy market would reduce supply
144、 chain risks,improve energy security and ensure local value creation for commodity producers.Access to technology,training,capacity building and affordable finance will be vital to unlock the full potential of countries contributions to the global energy transition,especially for those rich in renew
145、ables and related resources.Human welfare and security must remain at the heart of the energy transition.Systemic changes beyond the energy sector will be needed to overcome pervasive problems related to human welfare and security,as well as deeply embedded inequalities;a renewables-based energy tra
146、nsition can help alleviate some of the conditions that underly these issues.The more the energy transition can help solve these broad challenges,the more its popular acceptance and legitimacy will rise,provided also that community needs and interests are well represented and integrated into transiti
147、on planning.25VOLUME 1|EXECUTIVE SUMMARYRewriting international co-operationThe dynamism of energy sectors and geopolitical developments necessitates greater scrutiny of international co-operation modalities,instruments and approaches to ensure their relevance,impact and agility.To achieve a success
148、ful energy transition,international co-operation needs to be enhanced and redesigned.The centrality of energy to the global development and climate agenda is undisputed,and international co-operation in energy has increased exponentially in recent years.This co-operation plays a decisive role in det
149、ermining the outcomes of the energy transition and is a critical avenue for achieving greater resilience,inclusion and equality.The expanding variety of actors engaged in the energy transition requires an assessment of roles to leverage respective strengths and efficiently allocate limited public re
150、sources.The imperatives of development and climate action,coupled with changing energy supply and demand dynamics,require coherence and alignment around priority actions.For instance,investment in systems for cross-border and global trade of energy commodities will require international co-operation
151、 on an unprecedented scale.It is,therefore,essential to reconsider the roles and responsibilities of national and regional entities,international organisations,and international financial institutions and multilateral development banks to ensure their optimal contribution to the energy transition.Ac
152、hieving the energy transition will require collective efforts to channel funds to the Global South.In 2020,multilateral and bilateral development finance institutions(DFIs)provided less than 3%of total renewable energy investments.Going forward,they need to direct more funds,at better terms,towards
153、large-scale energy transition projects.Moreover,financing from DFIs was provided mainly through debt financing at market rates(requiring repayment with interest rates charged at market value)while grants and concessional loans amounted to just 1%of total renewable energy finance(IRENA and CPI,2023).
154、These institutions are uniquely placed to support large-scale and cross-border projects that can make a notable difference in accelerating the global energy transition.26WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023The year since the publication of the 2022 edition of the World Energy Transitions Outlook has
155、 been a challenging one for decision makers.With the world still reeling from the economic effects of the pandemic,the consequences of events in Ukraine escalated what has become one of the worst energy crises in decades.At the same time,the scale of the global climate emergency has become ever more
156、 obvious.Unprecedented heat waves in Europe,widespread flooding in Pakistan and the worst drought on record in the Horn of Africa are just a few of the recent extreme weather events that have been linked to climate change.The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC),in a synthesis report publ
157、ished in March 2023,stressed the need for rapid and far-reaching transitions across all sectors and systems(IPCC,2023).As the International Renewable Energy Agency(IRENA)has urged in previous editions of the World Energy Transitions Outlook,a set of complementary transitions-in renewables-based elec
158、trification,energy efficiency,and direct uses of renewables in transport,industry and buildings-offer a pathway to the IPCCs 1.5C climate target based on technologies and measures that are,for the most part,already available.The past year has demonstrated the clear benefits of this renewables-based
159、pathway in strengthening energy security,reducing the negative effects of fossil fuel price volatility,and making energy more affordable.Renewables have become increasingly competitive relative to fossil fuels in many cases,offering the potential to hold down energy costs while allowing countries to
160、 reduce their dependence on imports.The impacts of the global energy-related challenges countries have faced over the past year-such as rising energy prices,inflation,higher capital costs and energy insecurity-would have been less severe if countries had invested earlier in transition technologies a
161、nd associated infrastructure in the power and heat sectors.Further delays will compound these challenges.Nonetheless,it is not too late to change course.Several energy transition indicators show that despite the crisis,there is resilience in the various components of the energy transition,with some
162、even picking up speed.Overall,however,the energy transition is not on track;each year the gap grows between what is being done and what is required.Too many decision makers have been addressing the energy crisis in ways that are incompatible with the longer-term need for profound transformation,not
163、only of the energy sector but of the economy and society as well.The slow pace of progress now will increase investment needs in the future,both to produce the energy we need and to cope with worsening climate change effects.The simultaneous,proactive reshaping of physical,policy and institutional s
164、tructures will be essential to the realisation of a more resilient,productive and equitable world.This first volume of the World Energy Transitions Outlook 2023 proposes a 1.5C-compatible pathway to 2050,while documenting the progress achieved to date in the deployment of investment and energy trans
165、ition solutions.It presents ways to deal with the short-term energy crisis while remaining on the energy transition path;contains new analysis and information;provides perspectives on the latest developments and progress in energy scenarios and investments;and offers new views on enabling finance an
166、d frameworks.The second volume of the outlook,to be published later in 2023,will examine the socio-economic impacts of the energy transition.INTRODUCTION27This volume comprises three chapters:Chapter 1 presents transition pathways to 2030 and 2050 under the Planned Energy Scenario and the 1.5C Scena
167、rio,examining the required technological choices and emission mitigation measures to achieve the 1.5C Paris climate goal.In addition to the global perspective,the chapter presents transition pathways at the G20 level,and emphasises the G20s role in reducing emissions and accelerating the deployment
168、of low-carbon technologies.Along with the latest information on the Nationally Determined Contributions from the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference(COP27),the emissions gap to the 1.5C target is discussed.Additionally,it includes an examination of responses to the current energy crisis an
169、d their implications for the energy transitions.The chapter concludes with recommendations for policy actions to respond to the present energy crisis and longer-term climate goals.Chapter 2 provides sector-and technology-specific details of the transition to 2030 and 2050.The analysis shows that a r
170、ange of technologies and strategies must be deployed.Renewables must play a dominant role in all end-use sectors,notably electricity,green hydrogen and synthetic fuels produced from renewable power.Bioenergy and biomass feedstocks must also play a growing role,especially in industry and transport.In
171、stitutional and regulatory frameworks and policies to propel the energy transition are examined for the power sector,supplies of emerging fuels and end-use sectors.Chapter 3 identifies the investments required by 2030 and 2050 under the 1.5C Scenario,comparing them with current levels.After explorin
172、g how governments can balance short-and long-term energy transition investment needs,the chapter examines the pressing need to accelerate investment in infrastructure.Recent trends in energy-transition investment are analysed by technology,region and source of funding.To achieve both an overall scal
173、e-up of deployment and a truly global energy transition,public finance(both national and international),co-ordinated regulation,and policy support will play crucial roles in the deployment of renewable energy,especially in regions and countries that have not been able to attract private capital.Unde
174、rstanding the socio-economic consequences of the transition pathways(at different levels of ambition)is a fundamental aspect of proper planning and policy making.Policy makers need to know how their choices will affect peoples well-being and overall welfare,just as they need to be aware of the poten
175、tial gaps and hurdles that could affect progress.For the energy transition to yield its full benefits,countries will require a comprehensive policy framework that not only transforms energy systems,but also protects people,livelihoods and jobs.The climate policy baskets that underlie IRENAs macroeco
176、nometric model,the results of which will be presented in the forthcoming second volume of the World Energy Transitions Outlook 2023,contain a range of measures(e.g.investments in public infrastructure,increased social spending,and cross-sectoral carbon pricing and subsidies)to support a just and inc
177、lusive transition,in addition to policies that deploy,integrate and promote energy transition technologies.Chapter 1Chapter 2Chapter 3VOLUME 1|INTRODUCTIONWORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023CHAPTER 01THE 1.5C CLIMATE PATHWAY AND PROGRESS TOWARDS THE ENERGY TRANSITION WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK
178、 20230129VOLUME 1|CHAPTER 01 Despite the progress achieved to date,the deployment of energy transition technologies falls far short of the levels required to achieve the 1.5C Paris climate goal.A 1.5C-compatible pathway requires a complete transformation of how societies consume and produce energy.T
179、o secure the outcomes of this scenario,the world will need to reach net-zero emissions in the energy sector by 2050,requiring reductions in annual energy-related carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions of about 37 gigatonnes(Gt)compared with estimated levels in 2022-which are expected to represent an all-time
180、high.By 2050,global energy consumption will need to drop by 6%from 2020 levels through substantial improvements in energy efficiency,while the share of renewables in the global energy mix will have to rise to 77%by 2050,up from 16%in 2020.All end-use sectors will have to use more renewables,and the
181、requisite scale of electrification in the transport and buildings sectors will require a twelve-fold increase in renewable electricity capacity by 2050,compared to 2020 levels.Member countries made commendable commitments at the 27th United Nations Climate Change Conference(COP27)in Egypt-including
182、Nationally Determined Contributions(NDCs),long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies(LT-LEDS)and net-zero targets.Yet,these will fail to achieve the 1.5C climate goal by 2050,leaving an emissions gap of about 16 Gt of CO2 in 2050.In addition,NDCs and other climate pledges must be t
183、ranslated into national strategies and plans.These,in turn,must set targets(e.g.for renewable energy)and be implemented through policies,regulations and other measures that cover all aspects of the energy sector in order to attract sufficient funding.A rapid acceleration of these efforts is needed t
184、o close the gap and achieve the climate goals articulated in the Paris Agreement.The energy crisis has led many governments to implement short-term measures to secure energy supplies and protect consumers,such as new investments in fossil fuel infrastructure(e.g.liquefied natural gas LNG terminals)a
185、nd subsidies for consumers.Governments need to ensure that short-term measures are aligned with the longer-term aims of the energy transition by redoubling their efforts to achieve energy efficiency and renewable energy deployment.The potential rewards should be persuasive;a 1.5C-compatible energy s
186、ystem holds the promise of long-term energy security and price stability.Energy efficiency,combined with renewables,can make countries less dependent on fossil fuel imports,diversify supply options,promote energy trade and co-operation,and help decouple economies from volatile international fossil f
187、uel price fluctuations.HIGHLIGHTS30WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 20231.1 Transforming the global energy systemA profound and systemic transformation of the global energy system must occur within the next 30 years if the world is to avoid devastating consequences from climate change and a steady er
188、osion of energy security.This condensed time frame necessitates a strategic shift that moves beyond the decarbonisation of supply towards an energy system that cuts carbon emissions while supporting a resilient and inclusive global economy.Planning must therefore transcend the borders of technology
189、to focus on the broader exigencies of the new energy system and the economies it will sustain.The simultaneous,proactive reshaping of physical,policy and institutional structures will be essential to the realisation of a more resilient,productive and equitable world.The pillars of the energy transit
190、ion required to deliver that world are(1)physical infrastructure,(2)policy and regulatory enablers and(3)skills and capacities(see Box 1.1).The current structures contain many barriers that hamper the transition.A diversified and interconnected energy system requires the modernisation and expansion
191、of infrastructure.Transmission and distribution systems will need to accommodate the highly localised,decentralised nature of many renewable sources,along with the various trade routes involved.With regard to the interconnectors required to trade electricity and shipping routes for hydrogen and deri
192、vatives,planning must consider a staggering array of global dynamics,proactively linking countries to promote diverse and resilient energy systems.Public acceptance,which is critical for any large-scale undertaking,can be secured through transparency in planning and implementation and by providing o
193、pportunities for communities to voice their perspectives.A rapid transformation of the energy system is needed by 2050 31PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE:forward-looking planning,modernisation and expansion of supporting infrastructure on land and sea to facilitate the development,storage,distribution and tr
194、ansmission,and consumption of renewables.Infrastructure should facilitate national,regional and global strategies for new supply-demand dynamics.POLICY AND REGULATORY ENABLERS:design of policy and regulatory frameworks that facilitate deployment,integration and trade of renewables-based energy,impro
195、ve socio-economic and environmental outcomes and promote equity and inclusion.These need to enable the energy transition at various levels,from local to global,and reflect new supply-demand dynamics.SKILLS AND CAPACITIES:awareness-and capacity-building institutions,communities and individuals to acq
196、uire the requisite skills,knowledge and expertise to drive and sustain the energy transition.Strengthened institutions,social dialogue and collective bargaining will help bring about greater socio-economic benefits.VOLUME 1|CHAPTER 01BOX 1.1 Key energy transition pillars321 The second volume of the
197、World Energy Transitions Outlook 2023,to be published later in the year,will further explore the socio-economic impacts of the energy transition and the role of international collaboration.WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023Today,although more policy initiatives and regulatory measures seek to prom
198、ote renewable sources and reduce greenhouse gas emissions(as shown in the subsequent chapters),the underlying policy and regulatory systems are still geared toward fossil fuels.Whilst it is inevitable that fossil fuels will remain in the energy mix for some time,their share must be dramatically redu
199、ced as the mid-century mark approaches.Policy frameworks and markets should therefore focus on accelerating the transition and establishing the underpinnings of a resilient and inclusive system.A skilled workforce is a linchpin of the energy transition.In a series of socio-economic studies conducted
200、 since 2016(IRENA,2016a,2020a,2021a,2022a),IRENA and the International Labour Organization have shown that the renewable energy sector employed some 12.7million people worldwide in 2022,up from 7.3million in 2012.Both the private and public sectors will require a broad range of occupational profiles
201、,including upskilled staff in the public sector(government,agencies and regulators)to undertake transition planning and craft appropriate regulations.To attract talent to the sector,jobs must offer decent wages and opportunities,with equal access for women,youth and minorities in search of training,
202、hiring networks and career opportunities.1International co-operation on energy will also need to be enhanced and redesigned.With the centrality of energy to the global development and climate agenda undisputed,international co-operation has increased in recent years,helping to steer the energy trans
203、ition.The speed at which energy sectors respond to geopolitical developments makes it imperative that co-operative modalities,instruments and approaches remain agile and relevant.For their own good,and for that of the developing world,the G20 countries that account for the bulk of global emissions-m
204、ust act in concert,raising their climate ambitions and fulfilling their pledges.For the developing world,collaboration is crucial if countries are to leapfrog systems already nearing obsolescence in the developed world and thereby avoid misplaced investments.Specific combinations of technologies in
205、certain country and institutional settings can drive energy transitions in end-use sectors.They can also change supply-side and transformational processes,depending on institutional conditions,resource availability and infrastructure.But a common factor across all countries is the need to electrify
206、heat and transport using renewable electricity,efficiency measures and the direct use of renewables(bioenergy,solar and hydrogen).This chapter presents possible energy system transition pathways under a 1.5C Scenario aligned with the IPCC special report on limiting global warming to no more than 1.5
207、C by 2050(IPCC,2022a).It examines the technological changes and mitigation measures required through 2030 and 2050.The chapter also explores the implications of the current energy crisis,proposing a set of measures governments can take to alleviate the crisis whilst helping to accelerate the energy
208、transition.This 2023 edition of the World Energy Transitions Outlook focuses closely on the transition pathways in the Group of Twenty(G20)countries and emphasises their role in reducing emissions and strengthening the deployment of low-carbon technologies.33VOLUME 1|CHAPTER 011.2 The 1.5C Scenario:
209、Global perspectivesAs in previous editions,IRENA uses six performance indicators to monitor progress towards the 1.5C pathway:Use of renewables to generate electricity:comprising two sub-indicators;1)the amount of electricity generated from renewables and 2)the share of renewables in the total elect
210、ricity generated.Direct uses of renewables:comprising two sub-indicators;1)the share of renewable energy in total final energy consumption and 2)the quantity of modern bioenergy used.Improvements in energy intensity.The electrification of end-use sectors.Production and supply of clean hydrogen and d
211、erivative fuels.The amount of carbon dioxide captured and removed by various methods.Table 1.1 details the 2020 standing of the six indicators,both globally and in the G20,compared with projections of their standing in 2030 and 2050 under the 1.5C Scenario and a reference scenario based on current p
212、lans.34TABLE 1.1 Key performance indicators for achieving the 1.5C Scenario compared with the Planned Energy Scenario in 2030 and 2050Recent years203020502020PES1.5C Scenario PES1.5C Scenario KPI.01RENEWABLES(POWER)Electricity generation (TWh/yr)Global 7 468 16 504 27 358 38 118 82 148 G206 237 14 2
213、69 22 397 31 071 60 547 Renewable energy share in electricity generation(%)Global 28%46%68%73%91%G2028%48%69%74%91%KPI.02RENEWABLES(DIRECT USES)Renewable energy share in TFEC(%)Global 18%23%35%33%82%G2016%22%36%35%82%Modern use of bioenergy(EJ)1Global 2130504164G201926363342KPI.03ENERGY INTENSITYEne
214、rgy intensity improvement rate(%)Global 1.7%1.8%3.3%2.0%2.8%G202.1%2.1%3.6%2.3%3.1%KPI.04ELECTRIFICATION IN END-USE SECTORS (DIRECT)Electrification rate in TFEC(%)Global 22%23%29%28%51%G2024%26%31%32%55%KPI.05CLEAN HYDROGEN AND DERIVATIVESProduction of clean hydrogen(Mt)Global 0.7 Mt/yr2212521523G20
215、0.5 Mt/yr229420373KPI.06CCS,BECCS AND OTHERSCO2 captured from CCS,BECCS and other removal measures(Gt)Global 0.04 GtCO2/yr30.12.20.57.0G200.03 GtCO2/yr30.12.10.44.9WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023Notes:The Planned Energy Scenario,the reference case for WETO 2023,is based on countries current pla
216、ns.1.Includes non-energy uses.2.Operational project capacity through October 2022(IEA Hydrogen Project Database).3.Operational project capacity through March 2023(IEA CCUS Database).BECCS=bioenergy with carbon capture and storage;CCS=carbon capture and storage;CO2=carbon dioxide;EJ=exajoule;G20=Grou
217、p of Twenty;Gt=gigatonne;KPI=key performance indicator;Mt=megatonne;PES=Planned Energy Scenario;TFEC=total final energy consumption;TWh/yr=terawatt hours per year.35VOLUME 1|CHAPTER 01Under the 1.5C Scenario,electricity generation would more than triple from 2020 to 2050,with 91%of the total electri
218、city supply coming from renewable sources,compared to 28%in 2020(see Figure 1.1).Coal-and oil-based power generation would experience a sharp decline over the decade before being phased out entirely by mid-century.By 2050,natural gas would provide 5%of total electricity needs,with the remaining 4%be
219、ing met by nuclear power plants.The transition features a synergy between increasingly affordable renewable power technologies and the wider adoption of electric technologies for end-use applications,especially in transport and heat.The electrification of transport,heat and other end uses implies th
220、at global renewable power generation capacity would need to expand by a factor of almost 12 by end-2050,compared to 2020 levels,in order to meet the 1.5C target.A detailed analysis can be found in Chapter 2.FIGURE 1.1 Power generation needs to more than triple by 2050 in the 1.5C Scenario Fossil fue
221、lsFossil fuelsRenewablesRenewablesNuclearNuclear62%62%10%10%5%5%4%4%28%28%91%91%27PWh90PWh20202050(1.5C Scenario)Gross electricity generation(PWh)Gross electricity generation(PWh)Note:PWh=petawatt hours.36WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023The scale-up would grow the share of renewable energy in to
222、tal final energy consumption(TFEC)from 18%in 2020 to 82%by 2050.The 1.5C Scenario envisages electricity becoming the main energy carrier,accounting for over 50%of TFEC(see Figure 1.2).Renewable energy deployment,improvements in energy efficiency and the electrification of end-use sectors contribute
223、to this shift.In addition,modern biomass and hydrogen are projected to play more significant roles,with 16%and 14%of TFEC by 2050,respectively.Notably,94%of hydrogen production is expected to come from renewables,indicating a growing reliance on clean energy sources(IRENA,2022b,2022c,2022d).The path
224、way also suggests that TFEC could fall 6%between 2020 and 2050,suggesting a potential trend towards decarbonisation and a more sustainable energy future.FIGURE 1.2 Breakdown of total final energy consumption by energy carrier between 2020 and 2050 under the 1.5C ScenarioNotes:The figures above inclu
225、de only energy consumption,excluding non-energy uses.For electricity use,28%in 2020 and 91%in 2050 are from renewable sources;for district heating,the shares are 7%and 84%,respectively;for hydrogen(direct use and e-fuels),the renewable energy share(i.e.green hydrogen)would reach 94%by 2050.Hydrogen(
226、direct use and e-fuels)accounts for total hydrogen consumption(green and blue)and other e-fuels(e-ammonia and e-methanol).Electricity(direct)includes the consumption of electricity that is provided by all sources of generation:renewable,nuclear and fossil fuel-based.Traditional uses of biomass refer
227、 to the residential TFEC of solid biofuels in non-OECD countries.Modern bioenergy uses include solid biomass,biogas and biomethane used in buildings and industry;and liquid biofuels used mainly in transport,but also in buildings,industry and other final consumption.Remaining fossil fuels in 2050 cor
228、respond to natural gas(mainly used in industry and transport,and to a lesser extent in buildings),oil(mainly in industry and transport,and to a lesser extent in buildings)and coal(corresponds to uses in industry-cement,chemicals,iron and steel).Others include district heat and other renewables consu
229、mption.EJ=exajoule;OECD=Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;TFEC=total final energy consumption.TFEC(%)20202050(1.5C Scenario)374 EJ Total final energy consumption353 EJ Total final energy consumption22%Electricity(direct)51%Electricity(direct)4%6%Traditional uses of biomass5%Mode
230、rnbiomassuses63%Fossil fuels16%Modern biomass uses14%Hydrogen(direct use and e-fuels)*7%OthersFossil fuels12%OthersRenewable sharein hydrogen94%91%Renewable share in electricity28%Renewable share in electricity37VOLUME 1|CHAPTER 01Total primary energy supply remains stable due to increased energy ef
231、ficiency and growth of renewables(see Figure 1.3).The share of renewable energy in primary energy supply would grow from 16%in 2020 to 77%in 2050.The energy mix would change drastically in the process,with a net gain of 61 percentage points of renewable energy share in total primary energy supply,dr
232、iven by a mix of end-use electrification,renewable fuels and direct uses.Achieving this level of renewable energy penetration is critical to meeting global climate goals and would require significant investment and policy support,as well as continued innovation.FIGURE 1.3 Total primary energy supply
233、 by energy carrier group,2020-2050 under the 1.5C Scenario202020502045204020352030TPES(EJ/year)6004002000RenewablesNuclearFossil fuelsWhere we need to be(1.5C Scenario)-63p.p.-63p.p.79%79%5%5%6%6%6%6%6%6%6%6%7%7%16%16%34%34%47%47%59%59%69%69%77%77%60%60%47%47%35%35%25%25%16%16%+61p.p.+61p.p.Notes:Gl
234、obal primary energy supply refers to the total amount of energy that is produced and consumed in various forms around the world.It includes all the energy sources that are used to produce electricity,power transportation,heat buildings and homes,and power industrial processes.Renewables include hydr
235、o,solar,wind,bioenergy,geothermal and ocean energy.EJ/yr=exajoules per year;TPES=total primary energy supply.Renewables would account for 77%of primary energy supply by 2050 in the 1.5C Scenario38WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023The energy transition should aim to deliver improved energy intensit
236、y across the economy through a range of energy efficiency technologies,complemented by structural and behavioural changes.Energy intensity improvements are associated with a combination of deployments of renewable and efficient technologies in end-use sectors,along with extensive electrification.Pow
237、er demand would need to grow three-fold by 2050 through extensive electrification of end-use sectors-37%supplied by solar and 36%by wind.By 2030 the installed capacity of renewable power would need to expand almost four times to set the world on track for the transition.Specifically,the share of var
238、iable renewable energy(VRE)in the generation mix would need to increase from the current 9%to 46%by 2030,requiring additional flexibility in the operation of the energy system for economic and security reasons.Bioenergy for modern uses in various forms(i.e.solid biomass,biogas,biomethane and liquid
239、biofuels)would supply 22%of total primary energy by 2050-2.5 times present levels.In the transport sector,sustainable biofuels would meet 13%of TFEC by 2050.From its negligible levels in 2020,the production of clean hydrogen,both for direct use as well as use of derivative fuels,should ramp up to 52
240、3 Mt by 2050.Hydrogen and its related compounds ammonia,methanol and kerosene would account for 14%of final energy use by 2050.Early investment in the green hydrogen supply chain(electrolysis,fuel cells,transport pipelines,storage caverns,etc.)is vital to the uptake of hydrogen applications in end-u
241、se sectors and to carbon reduction goals.This is especially the case for hard-to-decarbonise sectors like air,marine and heavy-duty transport,as well as some primary industrial processes.By 2030 IRENA expects that 50 Mt of green hydrogen would be required,which would need to scale up ten-fold by 205
242、0.With only 0.04 Gt of carbon captured in 2020,removal and storage measures-from carbon capture and storage(CCS)to bioenergy with carbon capture and storage(BECCS)and other methods should be scaled up to remove 7 Gt by 2050.Although ambitious expansions of renewables and efficiency measures account
243、for most emission reductions,remaining carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions from fossil fuels-primarily in industrial processes and some transport would require CCS technologies together with CO2 removal measures.A total of 109 Gt of CO2 would require removal between 2023 and 2050.CCS from bioenergy will be
244、 important in power,heat and cogeneration plants,as well as in some industrial applications.Meanwhile,fossil fuel-based carbon capture and utilisation(CCU)and CCS are vital processes for removing emissions in cement,iron,steel and chemicals production.Captured carbon needs to reach 2.2 Gt by 2030 fr
245、om current negligible levels,with the main focus being industrial processes.Much improved energy efficiency,structural and behavioural changes are all needed under the 1.5C Scenario39VOLUME 1|CHAPTER 01FIGURE 1.4 Estimated trends in global CO2 emissions under the Planned Energy Scenario and 1.5C Sce
246、nario,2520151050-52023 202520302035204020452050RemovalsNet annual energy-and process-related CO2 emissions(GtCO2/year)-12.7 GtCO2-12.7 GtCO2-9.8 GtCO2-9.8 GtCO2-1.3 GtCO2-1.3 GtCO2-2.5 GtCO2-2.5 GtCO2-7.9 GtCO2-7.9 GtCO2Planned Energy Scenario34 GtCO21.5C Scenario-0.2 GtCO2Reductions
247、in sectors in 2050 from PES to 1.5C ScenarioBuildingsTransportOtherPower and heat plants2050IndustryBuildingsTransportOtherPower and heat plantsIndustryNotes:GtCO2=gigatonne of carbon dioxide;PES=Planned Energy Scenario.In the Planned Energy Scenario,the reference case of this study,annual emissions
248、 would decline only slightly to 34 GtCO2 in 2050(see Figure 1.4).By contrast,to meet Paris Agreement commitments,IRENAs 1.5C Scenario plots a steep and continuous drop to net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050.The Scenario depends on a steep reduction in global CO2 emissions through 2030,followed by a conti
249、nued downward trajectory,reaching net zero by 2050.To accomplish this,substantial efforts beyond those already planned in sectors such as power,heat and industry would be needed,with negative emissions delivering the necessary additional carbon reductions.40WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023FIGURE
250、 1.5 Carbon dioxide emissions abatement under the 1.5C Scenario in 2050Abatements2050Renewables(power and direct uses)Energy conservationand efciencyElectrification in end use sectors(direct)BECCS and other carbon removal measuresHydrogen and its derivativesCCS/U in industry19%12%8%25%25%11%-34.2GtC
251、O2/yr-34.2GtCO2/yr100%1.5C Scenario Notes:BECCS=bioenergy with carbon capture and storage;CCS/U=carbon capture and storage/utilisation;GtCO2/yr=gigatonne of carbon dioxide per year.If all the above-mentioned technologies and measures were achieved,global CO2 emissions could be reduced dramatically,r
252、eaching negative emissions of 0.2 GtCO2/year by 2050(i.e.removing more CO2 than is produced).The largest declines would come from the use of renewables in power generation and for direct uses in heat and transport,combined with energy conservation and efficiency;together these would make up more tha
253、n half the cuts in global CO2 emissions,followed by a 19%contribution from the direct electrification of various end-use sectors and 12%from the use of hydrogen and its derivatives,including synthetic fuels and feedstocks(see Figure 1.5).As noted above,the remaining CO2 in the period to 2050 would n
254、eed to be captured and stored either through CCS/CCU,BECCS or other carbon removal measures such as direct air capture,soil carbon sequestration,enhanced mineralisation,ocean-based CO2 removal and afforestation or reforestation.IRENA also compiles several regional renewable energy and energy transit
255、ion outlooks.These studies provide deeper regional and country insights into the technologies,measures,policies and impacts associated with the transition.They also provide views on regional co-operation and joint actions(see Box 1.2).41VOLUME 1|CHAPTER 01BOX 1.2 IRENAs regional studiesIRENA has pro
256、duced several regional renewable energy and energy transition outlooks.These studies provide deeper regional and country insights into the technologies,measures,policies and impacts entailed by the transition.They also provide views on regional co-operation and joint actions.Renewable energy roadmap
257、 for Central America:Towards a regional energy transition(IRENA,2022l)is a technical assessment of the future energy landscape in Belize,Costa Rica,El Salvador,Guatemala,Honduras,Nicaragua and Panama.The report contributes to the debate around decarbonising the energy sector in Central America.Integ
258、rated regional planning is vital for the energy transition,in which energy and climate policies are linked to country commitments.With this proposition in mind,the roadmap evaluates how well the regions renewable and low-carbon technologies are integrated into its end-use and power sectors;a“flexibi
259、lity”analysis of the regional power system is included(IRENA,2022l).A key finding is that the energy transition should focus on the transport and power sectors.The energy system decarbonisation will cost an estimated USD1 930billion in total including investment in new installed power capacity and g
260、rids,operation and maintenance,fuel costs and end-use technology in the most ambitious scenario.An even more costly investment,of USD1 950billion,is seen in the event that current energy policies are implemented between 2018 and 2050.The future energy landscape of the Association of Southeast Asian
261、Nations(ASEAN)is assessed in Renewable energy outlook for ASEAN:Towards a regional energy transition(IRENA,2022m).The ASEAN countries Brunei Darussalam,Cambodia,Indonesia,the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic,Malaysia,Myanmar,Philippines,Singapore,Thailand and Viet Nam are undertaking an integrated re
262、gional plan for the transition,linking energy and climate policies with actual country commitments.Meanwhile,member countries are identifying a low-carbon energy pathway powered by renewable energy,increased efficiency,and related transition technologies and measures.As a growth driver of global ene
263、rgy demand over the next three decades,the ASEAN region will be an important partner in climate change efforts.The regions integrated regional approach will expand the total renewable energy capacity from 2 770GW to 3 400GW by 2050 under the 1.5C Scenario.The assessment shows that in the 1.5C Scenar
264、io,the total costs of energy supply can be reduced by as much as USD160billion,cumulatively,by 2050.Additionally,avoided externalities from the 1.5C Scenario range from USD508billion to USD1 580billion,cumulatively,to 2050.The outlook concludes that the 1.5C Scenario can be achieved at a lower cost
265、while energy emissions are reduced.IRENA is also working on regional outlooks for Africa,South America and Europe that analyse the entire energy system,providing empirical evidence on the macroeconomic impacts of the energy transition,including in the context of development and climate goals.422 As
266、of 16 October 2022,Eritrea had not ratified the Paris Agreement but had submitted an NDC.WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 20231.3 Implications for the 1.5C Scenario of revised NDCs and other pledges Global energy-related CO2 emissions grew by 0.9%,or 321 Mt,in 2022,to reach a new high of 36.8 Gt(IEA,
267、2023a).As noted above,IRENAs 1.5C Scenario plots a steep and continuous drop to net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050.Beyond energy-related emissions,those related to land use must decline and become negative in the approach to 2050 so that the overall burden on the remaining carbon budget is at least neut
268、ral.Although COP27 redoubled mitigation targets,more is required to bridge the gap to the 1.5C target.The emissions gap between the trajectory defined by the COP announcements and the 1.5C Scenario in 2050 remains at 16 Gt.Stronger NDCs,LT-LEDS(as defined in article 4.19 of the Paris Agreement)and n
269、et-zero targets,if fully implemented,could cut CO2 emissions by 6%by 2030 and 57%by 2050,compared with 2022 levels.However,most climate pledges have yet to be translated into detailed national strategies and plans,implemented through policies and regulations,or supported with sufficient funding.In t
270、heir NDCs,several countries identify an urgent need for the means to implement their emissions-reduction goals,which the current energy crisis may make even more difficult.Commitments from outside the NDC process,beyond 2030,are also emerging.By April 2023,130countries,126 regions and 246 cities had
271、 made net-zero commitments for 2050(Net Zero Tracker,2022).Private companies have also made pledges.Of the 2 000 largest publicly traded companies globally,almost 900 are said to be considering a net-zero target(Net Zero Tracker,2022).Many,however,have not yet backed their targets with operational p
272、lans and strategies,raising questions about what they will achieve(Energy Tracker Asia,2022).By May 2023,193 parties had ratified the Paris Agreement,while 194 had submitted NDCs.2 Of the 166parties that submitted new or updated NDCs,99(representing 81%of global GHG emissions)had enhanced their ambi
273、tions,revising their targets upwards.The remaining 67(together accounting for about 14%of global emissions)submitted NDCs with the same emission-reduction targets as in their first NDCs,lower targets,or targets that are not easily comparable with their initial NDCs(Climate Watch,2022).Despite the en
274、hancements,the new climate pledges do not significantly change the emissions projections of current pledges;a wide gap remains between the climate pledges announced in the run-up to COP28 and what is needed to reach the 1.5C target.Figure 1.6 shows the estimated future global CO2 emissions in gigato
275、nnes(Gt)based on 1)a trajectory that aligns with the announcements made up to COP27 and 2)the IRENA 1.5C Scenario.To be aligned with the IRENA 1.5C Scenario,CO2 emissions in 2030 would need to be about 23GtCO2,compared to 34 GtCO2 under the COP announcements trajectory.Net-zero commitments need to b
276、e translated into operational plans and strategies 43VOLUME 1|CHAPTER 01The COP announcements trajectory includes all NDCs,LT-LEDS and net-zero targets communicated by the parties as of October and November 2022,respectively.This trajectory is based on an“optimistic”climate analysis that assesses th
277、e highest ambition(i.e.lowest emission levels)of the full NDC implementation,including both conditional and unconditional contributions.Renewable energy is clearly vital to the energy transition,but targets for its deployment are not included in every NDC.As of mid-October 2022,183 parties had inclu
278、ded renewable energy components in their NDCs;of these,143 had a quantified target.Of the total targets,108 focus on power;and 31 focus on heating and cooling,transport or cooking.Only 12 parties had committed to a percentage of renewables in their overall energy mixes.Of the 108 parties with define
279、d targets for renewables in the power sector,47 presented them only in the form of additions mostly in the form of capacity(gigawatts,GW)and a few in terms of output(gigawatt hours,GWh).Of the 61 parties with targets defined as a share of the power mix,13 commit to achieving a renewable energy share
280、 lower than 24%,23 commit to a share between 25%and 59%,13 commit to shares between 60%and 89%,and 12 to shares between 90%to 100%(IRENA,2022e).FIGURE 1.6 CO2 emission trajectories based on COP announcements and the 1.5C ScenarioAnnual net energy-related emissions (GtCO2/year)20402045202520302022203
281、5205040 30 20 10 0-5IRENA 1.5C ScenarioCOP announcements Notes:COP announcements trajectory calculated based on data from:(Meinshausen et al.,2022).COP=Conference of the Parties(United Nations Climate Change Conference);GtCO2=gigatonne of carbon dioxide.44WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023BOX 1.3
282、The Paris Agreement Global Stocktake The Global Stocktake evaluates progress on the worlds efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions;adapt and build resilience to climate impacts;and align financial support with the scale and scope needed to tackle the climate crisis.Its outcomes will provide valua
283、ble information on the remaining gaps and opportunities to bridge them to reach the goals of the Paris Agreement.IRENAs WETO tracks the gaps between the Planned Energy Scenario and 1.5C Scenario targets for 2030 that could contribute to the discussion of global stocktake with detailed analysis on te
284、chnology avenues(section 1.2),policy(chapter 2)and investments(chapter 3).IRENA also works closely with countries to support the development and implementation of renewable energy policies and strategies.This includes providing technical assistance and capacity building to help countries to increase
285、 the share of renewable energy in their energy mix(section 1.4).This work can be useful for many international processes,including the global stocktake.IRENA roadmaps provide a framework for countries to set targets and develop policies for the deployment of specific renewable energy technologies.Fo
286、r example,IRENA has developed technology roadmaps for a range of renewable energy technologies,including wind power,solar photovoltaics,hydropower,and bioenergy.These roadmaps provide a comprehensive assessment of the current state of the technology,as well as its potential for growth and deployment
287、.The roadmaps also provide guidance on policy and regulatory frameworks that can support the deployment of the technology,as well as measures to address technical and institutional barriers.By providing these technology roadmaps,IRENA helps countries to develop effective policies and strategies for
288、the deployment of renewable energy technologies,which in turn can help to accelerate the energy transition and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.These roadmaps also provide valuable information for the global stocktake process,by highlighting the potential for different renewable energy technologies t
289、o contribute to the achievement of the Paris Agreement goals.Overall,IRENA aims to make a critical contribution to the global stocktake process through assessing progress towards the Paris Agreement goals and identifying opportunities for further action on renewable energy.45VOLUME 1|CHAPTER 01For r
290、enewable energy pledges or targets in NDCs to be realised,they need to be aligned with renewable energy targets set under each respective countrys institutional energy framework,such as those in national energy plans and laws.As of mid-October 2022,149 countries had targets for renewable power in th
291、eir national policies and plans but only 82 of these had comparable targets in NDCs.In most countries,renewable energy targets in NDCs do not align with those included in national energy plans(IRENA,2022e).By aligning renewable energy targets in NDCs with national energy plans,the targets become mor
292、e effective and credible.In so doing,they reinforce intended signals to investors,developers and other players across the supply chain,strengthening the renewable energy sector.In some cases,national targets would need to be established or updated.In other cases,they would need to be reflected in th
293、e next round of NDCs.In order to keep the world on track to achieve the energy transition under IRENAs 1.5C Scenario by 2050,the level of ambition of renewable energy power targets set in national plans and strategies for 2030 would need to almost double.In fact,non-ambitious targets may effectively
294、 act as a cap on renewables,hindering rather than promoting their deployment.The higher target is readily achievable,as current targets are below the market pace and lag recent deployment levels.Countries are currently aiming for average annual renewable power capacity additions of 262 GW by 2030 in
295、 their national targets.This is below the capacity installed in the past two years,which amounted to 294 GW and 264 GW in 2022 and 2021,respectively,even against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic and the related supply chain disruptions,the crisis in Ukraine and global inflation.Although many de
296、veloping countries have set ambitious renewable energy targets in their NDCs,most are conditional on external support from developed economies.For instance,in small island developing states(SIDS),more than half of the 11.5GW targeted capacity by 2030 remains conditional on the provision of internati
297、onal support in the form of financing,technical assistance,technology transfer,capacity building and other forms of support based on each countrys national context(Rana and Abou Ali,2022).Providing such support will allow developing countries to capitalise on their renewable energy resources to miti
298、gate and adapt to their climate-induced vulnerabilities while ensuring energy security and sustainable socio-economic growth.Renewable energy targets in NDCs and national energy plans need to be better aligned46WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK 2023BOX 1.4 Insights from analysing the alignment between
299、 LTES and LT-LEDSClimate and renewable energy commitments must be matched by implementation.Aligning pledges with national energy plans is a priority not only for NDCs but also for longer-term strategies.IRENAs(2023d)report,Long-term energy scenarios and low-emission development strategies:Stocktaki
300、ng and alignment,compares 24 official long-term energy scenario(LTES)documents and 36 long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies(LT-LEDS)covering 45 countries to gauge how well the two processes are aligned at the institutional and technical levels,and investigate areas for improve
301、ment.The report reviews the governance frameworks developed for LTES and LT-LEDS reports,including co-ordination,stakeholder consultations and type of publication.It also looks at scenario-supporting elements,from infrastructure to social factors and other constraints.The report finds that aligning
302、LTES and LT-LEDS processes leads to more robust mitigation plans;planning documents produced by multiple or interdisciplinary ministries lay out scenarios that cover more elements of the transition.LTES and LT-LEDS processes can also complement one another in various ways;LTES have 10-20%more quanti
303、tative representation of energy production,transmission and distribution,and storage than LT-LEDS,and LT-LEDS have approximately 10-15%more quantitative representation of socio-economic elements than LTES.Both LTES and LT-LEDS need to improve their representation of hydrogen and e-fuel infrastructur
304、e in scenarios;however,less than 50%of all scenarios have quantitative representation of those elements.This could risk overestimating the potential for application of those technologies,and possible misallocation of investments.At a minimum,it is recommended that climate change mitigation strategie
305、s be based on scenarios,as this leads to more scientifically robust co-ordination of planning with the resulting proposals.Thirty six out of the fifty three LT-LEDS published as of October 2022 have featured scenarios as their main tool to outline alternative pathways and targets,and to quantitively
306、 assess the short-and medium-term policies needed to reach their long-term goals.47VOLUME 1|CHAPTER 011.4 The energy crisis and its implications for the energy transitionOver the past few years,global events have complicated action on the energy transition and climate action.A global energy crisis b
307、rought about by rebounding demand following the COVID-19 pandemic,adverse weather and reduced fossil fuel supplies escalated in early 2022 owing to the fallout from the Ukraine crisis.The rapid rise in energy prices affected countries around the world,either directly or indirectly.Energy supplies ti
308、ghtened in Europe,particularly supplies of natural gas from Russia.The ensuing high prices affected households and businesses across Europe and spilled over to food production and other commodities,affecting vulnerable households and developing countries(UN,2022).Among the worlds most vulnerable reg
309、ions,Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a 6%rise in extreme poverty in 2022(IEA,2022a),with the energy crisis compounding economic pressures in the region.In response to the energy crisis,a number of governments announced measures to address supply shortages and mitigate price hikes.While some of the me
310、asures focused on demand reduction,faster renewable energy deployment and support for green hydrogen,others called for additional fossil fuel investments or other steps incompatible with the energy transition.The European Commission presented its REPowerEU plan in May 2022.Focusing on diversificatio
311、n,energy savings and accelerating clean energy,the plan seeks to make the European Union(EU)independent of Russian fossil fuels well before 2030.As part of the European Green Deal and the REPowerEU plan,the EU provisionally agreed in March 2023 to speed up its rollout of renewable energy with strong
312、er legislation.This action raised the EUs binding renewable target for 2030 to 42.5%,with the ambition to reach 45%(European Commission,2023).The EU is also promoting hydrogen infrastructure and plans to produce 10 Mt of green hydrogen,and to import another 10Mt by 2030.Spain,France and Portugal hav
313、e agreed to build an undersea pipeline to transport hydrogen from the Iberian Peninsula to France and the rest of Europe,strengthening the EUs energy independence(Sullivan,2022).Support is needed to help developing countries realise ambitious renewable energy targets48WORLD ENERGYTRANSITIONS OUTLOOK
314、 2023At the same time,since the onset of the Ukraine crisis in February 2022,investments of at least USD50 billion in new infrastructure for liquefied natural gas(LNG)have been announced,including floating and fixed terminals and new pipelines.Most of these investments in diversifying imports have b
315、een made in European countries-among them Finland,Germany,Greece,Italy,the Netherlands and Spain.The new LNG storage terminals will give the European Union at least 60 billion cubic metres of annual capacity(Aposporis,2022;Bloomberg,2022;Esau,2022;Habibic,2022;Jewkes,2022;Karres,2023;Kurmayer,2022;L
316、andini,2022;Reuters,2022a,2022b;Sharma,2022).In addition,the EU passed an act classifying natural gas as a“transitional”energy source for sustainable investment,with technical and emission standards set for corresponding projects.To help European households and businesses,several governments provide
317、d consumer subsidies to soften the rise in energy prices.As a result,estimated 2022 fossil fuel subsidies were the highest ever(IEA,2023b).For example,France provided subsidies to farmers to mitigate petrol price increases;in 2023 it announced a 15%cap on power and gas price increases for households
318、(Struna,2022).The UK government introduced the Energy Bills Support Scheme and the Energy Bills Support Scheme Alternative Fund,which provided a one-time GBP400 payment to households to help with bills over the winter of 2022-2023(Mawhood,Bolton and Stewart et al.,2022).The German government agreed
319、to a relief package worth up to EUR 200 billion to cushion the impact of expensive energy until 2024(Amelang and Wettengel,2022).Although many countries have kept renewable energy at the top of their investment lists,they risk ending up with stranded assets in their LNG contracts and infrastructure
320、both complicate the“phasing out”of natural gas.Governments will naturally prioritise short-term responses to the energy crisis,but they need to maintain their strategic direction at the same time.A comprehensive range of measures is needed to scale up deployment and help achieve long-term transition
321、 goals(see Table 1.2).Renewables and energy efficiency are consistent with climate commitments,and improve both energy security and energy affordability for all.Multilateral action is critical,yet each country and each region will need to tailor its own response to its current resources,infrastructu
322、re,access to finance and localised challenges(UN,2022).Renewables and energy efficiency can both help alleviate the energy crisis and achieve the energy transition ENABLING PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE Undertake integrated cross-sector infrastructure planning for the energy transition with ambitious targ
323、ets for expansion(e.g.power grids,electric vehicle EV charging infrastructure,heat networks,all linked up to optimise variable renewable electricity).Provide incentives for infrastructure investments where market barriers exist.Streamline permitting procedures for large-scale infrastructure without
324、compromising environmental and social impact assessments and ensure public acceptance is fostered.Set obligations or mandatory targets for new or renovated buildings(e.g.numbers of EV chargers,connection to heating and cooling networks).Provide more public finance for the development of the infrastr
325、ucture required (e.g.through direct ownership of assets such as transmission lines).POLICY AND REGULATIONPower sector Adopt a power system structure that is conducive to high shares of variable renewable energy,recognising their techno-economic characteristics.This could include dual procurement of
326、energy with long-term procurement through auctions and a short-term flexibility market.Streamline permitting procedures for renewable power projects without compromising environmental and social impact assessments.Ensure public acceptance is fostered.Better synchronise power grid expansion and other
327、 infrastructure developments with renewable power deployment to avoid bottlenecks.Design renewable energy procurement processes(e.g.auctions)to serve objectives beyond lowest price(e.g.development of local industry)and consider design elements to distribute the risks of supply chain disruptions amon
328、g stakeholders(e.g.indexation of components).Design policies for self-consumption in a progressive way that supports equitable access to deployed solutions and the distribution of socio-economic benefits.End-use sectors buildings,industry,transport Develop energy efficiency programmes and measures s
329、uch as fuel efficiency standards for transport,and minimum efficiency standards for industry and buildings.Promote behaviour changes through sufficiency measures.Adopt or improve building codes to promote renewable consumption in public,commercial and residential buildings.Promote behaviour change(e
330、.g.to shift transport demand to low-carbon modes or to adjust room temperatures).Mobilise public finance to procure low-carbon industrial products and materials.49VOLUME 1|CHAPTER 01TABLE 1.2 Key measures to accelerate the energy transition continued POLICY AND REGULATION(contd.)Cross-sector and cro
331、ss-cutting policies Introduce fiscal policy measures:obligations for reinvesting windfall profits of fossil fuel energy revenues in energy transition technologies,reduced subsidies for fossil fuels and raised/newly introduced CO2 prices when fossil fuel prices fall.Ensure the socio-economic benefits
332、 of such instruments are distributed fairly.Reform taxes and levies on heating fuels,VAT exemptions for renewables,etc.Increase public finance(domestic and international)and strategically plan,select and implement instruments to channel it including:(1)government spending such as grants,rebates and
333、subsidies;(2)debt including existing and new issuances,credit instruments,concessional/blended financing and guarantees;(3)equity and direct ownership of assets(such as transmission lines or land to build projects).Define risk in a more comprehensive way that goes beyond the narrow investor-centric definition of risk(e.g.of investment in energy assets not paying off)to include broader environmenta