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1、 2 Chinas Climate Transition:Outlook 2023 27 November 2023 Authors Lauri Myllyvirta,Qi Qin,Chengcheng Qiu,Xinyi Shen This report was published by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air(CREA)with the support of the Heinrich Bll Foundations(Heinrich-Bll-Sti?ung )global head office in Berlin,G
2、ermany.Contributors Xunpeng Shi,Muyi Yang,Shurui Wang Editor Kathryn Miller,Hannah Ekberg Translator Xiaoying You Designer Wendi Wu Photo by Li Yang on Unsplash Project coordinator Ella Soesanto,Xinyi Shen Acknowledgements CREA gratefully acknowledges the support,feedback,and insight received from D
3、r.Paul Kohlenberg and Jrg Haas.The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be attributed to any of the aforementioned.i About CREA The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air(CREA)is an independent research organisation focused on revealing the trends,causes,and he
4、alth impacts,as well as the solutions,to air pollution.CREA uses scientific data,research and evidence to support the efforts of governments,companies and campaigning organisations worldwide in their efforts to move towards clean energy and clean air.We believe that effective research and communicat
5、ion are the key to successful policies,investment decisions and advocacy efforts.CREA was founded in 2019 in Helsinki,Finland and has staff in several European and Asian countries.About the Heinrich Bll Foundation The Heinrich Bll Foundation(Heinrich-Bll-Sti?ung )is a public funded institute in Germ
6、any for green visions and projects with an international network encompassing partner projects in approximately 60 countries.The Foundations primary task is political awareness building in Germany and abroad to promote democratic will,socio-political commitment and international understanding.It is
7、guided by the basic political values of ecology,democracy,solidarity,and nonviolence.The Foundation currently has offices in more than 30 countries around the world.Disclaimer This publication is produced by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air(hereina?er referred to as CREA)headquartered
8、 in Finland,in accordance with the local laws and regulations.CREA is a global research organisation focused on promoting clean energy and studying solutions to air pollution.CREA is politically independent.The designations employed and the presentation of the material on maps contained in this repo
9、rt do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever concerning the legal status of any country,territory,city or area or of its authorities,or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.The content and expression of views and opinions expressed in this publication are based on t
10、hose of the authors of the independent scientific analysis and study during the time of research,and they do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position,or represent the views or opinions,of CREA,or its members and/or funders.CREA does not guarantee the timeliness,accuracy and completene
11、ss of the information contained in this publication.This publication is ONLY for the purposes of information sharing,environmental protection and public interests.Therefore,this publication should not be used as the reference of any investment or other decision-making process.CREA assumes no respons
12、ibility or liability for any errors or omissions in the content of this publication.This report is originally written in English and translated into Chinese subsequently.In case of a discrepancy,the English version prevails.ii Contents Executive summary 1 1 Introduction 4 2 Understanding Chinas gree
13、nhouse gas emissions 8 2.1 The meteoric rise of emissions 8 2.2 Chinas emissions in an international context 11 3 Pathways to carbon neutrality for China and the world 15 3.1 Overview 15 3.2 Global pathways 17 3.2.1 Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System(NGFS)17 3.2.
14、2 Climate Action Tracker(CAT)19 3.2.3 International Energy Agency(IEA)19 3.3 Pathways for China 20 3.3.1 Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development(ICCSD)23 3.3.2 School of Environment and Natural Resources,Renmin University(SENR-RMU)23 3.3.3 Institute of Atmospheric Environment,China A
15、cademy of Environmental Planning (CAEP-IAE)and Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute(EPPEI)24 3.3.4 North China Electric Power University(NCEPU)and Peking University(PKU)25 3.3.5 Energy Foundation China(EFC)and Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland(CGS-UMD)25 4 M
16、easuring and benchmarking Chinas progress 27 4.1 Total CO2 emissions 27 4.1.1 Trends compared to benchmarks 29 4.1.2 Policies in place 29 4.1.3 Data disclosure 35 4.2 Non-CO2 greenhouse gases 36 4.2.1 Policies in place 36 4.2.2 Data disclosure 38 4.3 Total energy supply and demand 39 4.3.1 Trends co
17、mpared to benchmarks 39 4.3.2 Policies in place:Action for green and low-carbon energy transition 45 4.3.3 Data disclosure 49 4.4 Electricity generation and capacity 50 4.4.1 Trends compared to benchmarks 51 4.4.2 Focus on:Chinas Coal Power Surge 55 4.4.3 Policies in place 57 4.4.4 Data disclosure 6
18、7 4.5 Industry 68 4.5.1 Trends compared to benchmarks 69 4.5.2 Policies in place:Peaking carbon dioxide emissions in industry 74 4.5.3 Focus:Iron and steel 80 4.5.4 Data disclosure 84 4.6 Buildings 85 4.6.1 Trends compared to benchmarks 86 4.6.2 Policies in place:Peaking carbon dioxide emissions in
19、the residential sector 88 4.6.3 Data disclosure 90 4.7 Transport 90 4.7.1 Trends compared to benchmarks 92 4.7.2 Policies in place:Actions for promoting green and low-carbon transportation 95 4.7.3 Data disclosure 98 4.8 Provincial actions 98 4.8.1 Policies in place:Chinas climate transition require
20、s collective efforts on provincial level 98 4.8.2 Recent adjustments to targets 104 5 Expert survey and interviews 106 5.1 Total emission of carbon dioxide 108 5.2 Consumption of primary energy and coal 109 5.3 The power sector 112 5.4 The industrial sectors 113 5.5 The transportation sector 115 5.6
21、 New dynamics 116 6 Conclusions 119 Appendix:Historical data sources 122 Abbreviations 124 List of figures Figure 1|Chinas reported greenhouse gas emissions in 2014,the most recent year for which official data are available.8 Figure 2|Chinas CO2 emissions from energy and cement,2000 September 2023.1
22、0 Figure 3|Chinas fossil CO2 emissions by sector (19952021).10 Figure 4|Chinas fossil CO2 emissions by sector;with emissions from power generation allocated to consuming sectors.11 Figure 5|Chinas CO2 emissions per capita.12 Figure 6|Comparison of Chinas CO2 emissions per capita in relation to globa
23、l and EU27 emissions.13 Figure 7|Comparison of Chinas CO2 emissions per unit of Gross domestic product(GDP)in relation to other regions.13 Figure 8|CO2 emission trajectories of fast-growing economies.14 Figure 9|Emission,concentration,and warming pathways in China.19 Figure 10|Total primary energy c
24、onsumption in China in 2050 by pathway.22 Figure 11|Installed power generation capacity in China in 2050 by pathway.22 Figure 12|Annual change in CO2 emissions compared to energy transition pathways.29 Figure 13|Indicative emissions pathways for China.30 Figure 14|Annual change in Chinas total energ
25、y consumption compared to energy transition pathways.39 Figure 15|Annual change in Chinas coal consumption compared to energy transition pathways.40 Figure 16|Annual change in Chinas oil consumption compared to energy transition pathways.41 Figure 17|Annual change in Chinas gas consumption compared
26、to energy transition pathways.41 Figure 18|Annual change in Chinas non-fossil energy production compared to energy transition pathways.42 Figure 19|Annual increase in the electrification ratio compared to energy transition pathways.43 Figure 20|Energy consumption growth by sector and fuel,from 2017
27、to 2021,and a decomposition of growth in industry by subsector.44 Figure 21|Annual change in CO2 emissions from electricity compared to energy transition pathways.51 Figure 22|Annual change in CO2 intensity of electricity generation compared to energy transition pathways.52 Figure 23|Annual added no
28、n-fossil power generation compared to energy transition pathways,with wind,solar,nuclear and hydropower capacity added each year converted to annual electricity output using average capacity factors for each technology.53 Figure 24|Annually added thermal power capacity compared to energy transition
29、pathways 54 Figure 25|Coal power pipeline in China;changes in project status,half-yearly.57 Figure 26|Chinas clean energy bases envisioned in the central and provincial Five-Year Plans.60 Figure 27|Chinas New Power System Roadmap,from Blue Book on the Development of the New Power System.62 Figure 28
30、|Annual change in total energy consumption in industry compared to energy transition pathways.69 Figure 29|Annual change in coal consumption in industry sector compared to energy transition pathways.70 Figure 30|Annual increase in the electrification ratio in industry compared to energy transition p
31、athways.71 Figure 31|Annual increase in electricity consumption in industry compared to energy transition pathways.71 Figure 32|Annual change in coal consumption in iron and steel compared to energy transition pathways.72 Figure 33|Annual change in electricity consumption in iron and steel compared
32、to energy transition pathways.72 Figure 34|Annual change in the electrification ratio in iron and steel compared to energy transition pathways.73 Figure 35|Annual change in the electrification ratio in chemicals compared to energy transition pathways.73 Figure 36|Chinas steel production share and EA
33、F-steel output target by 2025 82 Figure 37|Newly proposed iron and steelmaking capacity announced through capacity replacement on a half-yearly basis,20172023 H1.84 Figure 38|New iron and steelmaking capacity additions by their estimated commision year.84 Figure 39|Annual change in coal consumption
34、in buildings compared to energy transition pathways.86 Figure 40|Annual change in gas consumption in buildings compared to energy transition pathways.87 Figure 41|Annual increase in the electrification ratio in buildings compared to energy transition pathways.87 Figure 42|Annual change in oil consum
35、ption in transport compared to energy transition pathways.92 Figure 43|Annual change in the electrification ratio in transport compared to energy transition pathways.93 Figure 44|Annual change in electricity consumption in transport compared to energy transition pathways.93 Figure 45|Vehicle product
36、ion;12-month moving sum.95 Figure 46|Comparison of provincial targets on non-fossil energy consumption proportion by 2025.99 Figure 47|Comparison of provincial targets on non-fossil energy consumption proportion by 2030.100 Figure 48|Comparison of provincial targets for projected increase of non-fos
37、sil energy consumption proportion by 2025 with baseline numbers in 2020.101 Figure 49|Newly installed power capacity of different energy sources for the leading provinces between January and August 2023.103 Figure 50|Comparison of provincial targets on reduction in energy consumption by 2025 (compar
38、ed to levels in 2020).104 Figure 51|Comparison of provincial targets on reduction in CO2 emission by 2025(compared to levels in 2020).104 Figure 52|Comparison of provincial targets on reduction in CO2 emission by 2030(compared to levels in 2005).104 Figure 53|Expert fields of expertise(persons)107 F
39、igure 54|Expert industries(persons)107 Figure 55|Status of affiliated institutes(persons)107 Figure 56|The peak year of Chinas carbon emissions 108 Figure 57|Carbon emission peak 109 Figure 58|Year of peak primary energy consumption in China.1 10 Figure 59|Has Chinas coal consumption peaked?111 Figu
40、re 60|Number of responses for different Years of coal consumption peaking 1 12 Figure 61|Peak year of carbon emissions in Chinas power sector 11 3 Figure 62|Peak year of carbon emissions in Chinas steel industry 114 Figure 63|The peak year of carbon dioxide emissions in Chinas cement industry 115 Fi
41、gure 64|Peak years of carbon dioxide emissions in Chinas transportation sector 116 List of tables Table 1|Overview of the global scenarios included.17 Table 2|Overview of the included scenarios by Chinese researchers.20 Table 3|CO2 emissions under the ICCSD 1.5C,1.5C target-oriented and 2C pathways(
42、He et al.,2022).28 Table 4|Selected policies relating to non-CO2 greenhouse gases.38 Table 5|Selected policies relating to total energy consumption and supply.47 Table 6|Annual capacity additions of non-fossil power generation technologies and capacity fitted with CCS(He et al.,2021).51 Table 7|Sele
43、cted policies relating to the electricity sector.66 Table 8|Selected policies relating to industry.74 Table 9|Selected policies relating to the buildings sector.89 Table 10|Selected policies relating to transportation.95 Table 11|Total length of the railway lines and urban rail transit in use from 2
44、005 to 2025 (1,000km).98 Table 12|Survey results on Chinas carbon emission peaking year 108 Table 13|Survey results on the peak year for Chinas total primary energy consumption 109 Table 14|Survey results on the year of peak coal consumption in China 110 Table 15|Survey results on the peak year of c
45、arbon emissions in Chinas power sector 112 Table 16|Survey results on the peak year of carbon emissions in Chinas steel industry 113 Table 17|Survey results on the peak year of carbon emissions in Chinas cement industry 115 Table 18|Survey results on the peak year of carbon dioxide emissions in Chin
46、as transportation sector 116 Table 19|Survey results on the impact of Chinas post-pandemic economic situation on the energy transition process 117 Table 20|Survey results on views or recommendations regarding Chinas dual carbon strategy and goals 117 Table 21|Historical data sources 122 Executive su
47、mmary Chinas success in meeting and exceeding its current climate targets is possibly the single most important factor in the global fight against climate change.Currently,progress on clean energy deployment is undermined by continued coal capacity expansion and a rapid growth of energy consumption.
48、To successfully achieve a peaking and rapid decline of emissions,China will need increased efforts on energy efficiency,a successful transformation of the economic growth model,or even higher investments into clean energy.China,the worlds largest greenhouse gas emitter and the main source of emissio
49、ns growth in the past two decades,holds a crucial role in global climate efforts.To enable global emissions to peak fast enough,China needs to not only meet but exceed its current emissions commitments.In this series of annual reports,we break down Chinas progress to benchmarks for different sectors
50、 and variables that can be compared to available data from China.Each one is based on a suite of climate transition scenarios from Chinese and international institutions.In this second annual edition of the outlook report in November 2023,we reassess Chinas progress towards the countrys climate comm
51、itments and towards emissions pathways aligned with the Paris Agreement goals.Below we have highlighted our key findings.Emissions rebound Chinas carbon dioxide(CO 2 )emissions rebounded forcefully in 2023.The emissions increase was not reflective of a structural trend but rather caused by two extra
52、ordinary factors:a collapse in hydropower generation caused by the historically low rains that drove up coal-fired power generation.The re-opening of the economy a?er almost three years of zero-COVID-19 policies caused a rebound,particularly in oil consumption.In addition,energy and materials demand
53、 for manufacturing clean energy and clean transportation technologies offset much of the fall in demand from the real estate sector.1 Clean energy surge The most important development of 2023 is that Chinas deployment of clean energy generation has reached the scale projected in 1.5-degree scenarios
54、,a remarkable achievement that was predicted in our Outlook last year.Maintaining annual additions of clean electricity production capacity at the 2023 level or increasing them further will enable China to peak and decline its CO 2 emissions in the coming years.Production and sales of electric vehic
55、les are also growing in line with 1.5-degree scenarios.Electrification of energy use in the industrial and building sectors is similarly on track.Electrification will enable emissions reductions.Progress in reforming the growth model Chinas clampdown on financial risks and speculation in the real es
56、tate sector has put an end to growth in steel and cement output,which were the key drivers of Chinas emissions growth for most of the past two decades.This is another area where trends in the country have aligned with climate transition scenarios.Clean technology manufacturing boom Chinas clean tech
57、nology(cleantech)manufacturing sector is undergoing rapid expansion to deliver not just an increase in demand in China but also anticipated exponential growth in demand from the rest of the world.This has meant an unprecedented boom in investment,making cleantech a major economic driver,absorbing an
58、 estimated 10%of all investment in 2023 and the underlying reason for the net growth in investment.Experts grew more optimistic To gauge the views and expectations of practitioners in the field,Outlook 2023 surveyed an expanded pool of 89 experts representing diverse specialisations in the field of
59、climate and energy.The experts in this years survey are more optimistic than those interviewed last year,with 21%of experts believing Chinas CO 2 will peak before 2025,up from 15%in 2022s survey.The percentage of experts expecting Chinas CO 2 emissions to rise more than 15%above their 2020 before pe
60、aking fell from 69%to 56%.Energy consumption growth and investments in coal-based capacity remain off track Overall,however,China isnt yet on track to start reducing emissions at the rates required in climate transition pathways.The growth rate of total energy consumption is much faster than in the
61、transition pathways,with consumption in industry,buildings and transportation all running ahead.Economic policies during the zero-COVID-19 period increased activity in the energy intensive parts of the economy,undermining reductions in energy intensity.To tackle this issue,China will need increased
62、efforts on energy efficiency,a successful transformation of the economic growth model,or even higher investments into clean energy than projected in the transition scenarios.Investments in coal-based power capacity have accelerated.Since the start of 2022,Chinese 2 authorities have granted permits t
63、o 152 gigawatts(GW)and started construction on 92 GW of new coal power capacity.Even if we assume existing coal capacity will be retired at an accelerated pace,Chinas coal-fired power capacity is still on track to increase 23%by 2030 from existing levels.It is entirely possible for emissions to fall
64、 while capacity increases,but the buildup of new coal power plants makes emissions peaking economically and politically more challenging to implement.Investments in coal-based industrial capacity,particularly iron and steel capacity,have continued.With demand declining,the steel and building materia
65、ls sectors are expected to have peaked their emissions.To pave the way for carbon neutrality,policies restricting new carbon-intensive capacity and incentives for low-carbon technology are needed.As a result,China is badly off track to two commitments it has made under the Paris Agreement:strictly c
66、ontrolling new coal power projects during the 2021 to 2025 period,and reducing energy intensity(energy consumption per unit of GDP)by 13.5%from 2020 to 2025.The progress on reducing CO 2 emissions intensity is also off track,but the expected surge in clean electricity generation in the next two year
67、s is highly likely to enable China to meet the target.Halting progress on policies In terms of policymaking,the 2023 focus was on enabling policies,a?er the policy framework was completed last year.This includes the monitoring,reporting and verification of emissions,development of market-based instr
68、uments supporting emission reductions,as well as power market reform.Steps were taken to promote green electricity trading and use the emissions trading system to promote emission reductions through certified emissions reductions(CCER).Coal power capacity payment mechanism was established,incentiviz
69、ing an increase in coal power capacity and deferment of retirements.Policies promoting the deployment of solar and wind power proved highly effective,as did industrial policies stimulating new capacity in the solar,battery,electric vehicle and other cleantech industries.Emissions monitoring and repo
70、rting obligations were strengthened for industrial sectors,encouraged in part by the European Union(EU)carbon tariffs on carbon-intensive imports,which create an incentive for improved emissions data.There was unclear or no progress on several other areas:no timeline was specified for controlling to
71、tal emissions or for the expansion of the carbon market.For power market reform,regulatory work continued but no new milestones were specified beyond the long-held aim of creating a unified national market by 2030.While China has recently unveiled its national methane emission reduction action plan
72、and has declared intentions to“seek to establish a monitoring,reporting and verification(MRV)system for methane”,the action plan stops short of setting quantifiable targets for methane emission reduction.Progress in other areas of non-CO 2 greenhouse gas emissions remains stalled.There has been no a
73、dvancement in improving the MRV for the broader spectrum of non-CO 2 emissions,nor in the public reporting of energy use and emissions at a granular level.3 1 Introduction In 2023,clean energy and clean transportation technologies became a major economic driver in China.Capital expenditure on manufa
74、cturing and supply chains for solar power,batteries and electric vehicles drove growth in overall investment.Investment in clean power generation and high-speed rail reported some of the highest growth rates among all investment categories.The clean energy and clean technology expansion has supporte
75、d aggregate demand and industrial activity despite the weakness in real estate,contributing to the economic recovery a?er COVID-19 controls were li?ed in late 2022.The expansion has also contributed to increases in energy consumption and carbon dioxide(CO 2 )emissions during the year,but this part o
76、f the emissions increase will pay back manifold in the coming years both as a reduction in Chinas own emissions and as reductions in those countries where China exports clean energy equipment,such as solar panels,batteries and electric vehicles.Chinas clean energy technology exports have surged,enab
77、ling the energy transition in the rest of the world but also causing increasing concerns about excessive reliance on China.This year has also seen a rebound in oil and electricity consumption a?er the removal of COVID-19 controls,along with historically weak rains and hydropower generation,which mea
78、nt that the clean energy expansion didnt result in an immediate fall in emissions.Chinas greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions rebounded to the record levels of 2021 in the first eight months of 2023,a?er falling in 2022.However,there are strong reasons to believe that the latest jump in emissions will be te
79、mporary because the impressive additions of clean energy and an inevitable recovery in hydropower generation will push emissions down in late 2023 and in 2024.Extreme weather events were observed in 2023.The dry winter in Northern China contributed to sandstorms that were also felt in Beijing and ot
80、her large cities in the north.Torrential rains in August heavily affected rice farming,raising concerns once again about the impact of climate change on Chinas food security.Chinas nationwide temperature record was broken in July,as a part of another historic heatwave.Without global warming,the 2023
81、 heatwave would have been a once-in-250-years event,but global warming means that an equally severe heatwave is now expected to occur every five years 1 .Swiss Re,the worlds largest reinsurer,assesses that China is among the countries most affected by the economic and physical impacts of climate cha
82、nge,ranking far above regions such as the European Union(EU)and North America 2 .At the same time,as the worlds largest greenhouse gas emitter,Chinas own energy and climate policies have a major bearing on the severity of the climate impacts the country will face.The countrys emissions have more tha
83、n quadrupled over the course of the past two decades,making 2 Swiss Re Institute.(2021).The economics of climate change.https:/ pertise-publication-economics-of-climate-change.html#chapter-Physical-risks .Scientific publication.1 World Weather Attribution.(July 2023).https:/www.worldweatherattributi
84、on.org/extreme-heat-in-north-america-europe-and-china-in-july-2023-made -much-more-likely-by-climate-change/.Scientific blog.4 China the primary driver of global emissions growth over the period.Emissions growth in 20002008 was predominantly due to an export-driven industrial and investment boom.A?e
85、r 2009,emissions growth was mainly driven by real estate,infrastructure and industrial expansion.Chinas high emissions relative to gross domestic product(GDP)are due to both a coal-heavy energy structure and an economic structure relying heavily on construction and energy-intensive industry.Now,mass
86、ive clean energy expansion and the prospect of an economic transformation away from heavy industry-driven growth open up the possibility of reversing the factors behind Chinas high emissions.Chinas motivations to act on climate China has a strong self-interest in climate action,due to pressing envir
87、onmental challenges at home as well as the impacts of climate change on food security,water resources,the regional security environment,and other key aspects of national security.Climate action aligns with Chinas long-term economic and industrial goals,including the ambition to become a technologica
88、l and market leader in core technologies of the 21st century.China has also been able to use climate action and diplomacy to meet its global agenda.China wants to be seen as a steady partner and a crucial contributor to solving global environmental issues.Climate policy and diplomacy have allowed Ch
89、ina to pursue many foreign policy goals shaping international rules,portraying China as a responsible stakeholder and provider of important public goods,building a multipolar world,and increasing Chinas influence and presence in developing and emerging markets.The impacts of climate change on China
90、include weakened food security,increased risk of intense flooding,and increased risk of other extreme weather events such as cyclones.Chinas coastline includes low-lying,very densely populated areas such as the megacities of the Yangtze River Delta and Tianjin,implying that the costs of sea level ri
91、se are massive.The rise in average annual temperatures,or extended periods of extreme heat,also facilitates the spread of vector-borne infectious diseases such as malaria and dengue.According to the China Meteorological Administration,the incidence of torrential rains and extreme heat waves has alre
92、ady increased in China,as has the strength of typhoons landing on the coast 3 .Agriculture is affected among other sectors through increased droughts,floods and heatwaves.Warming has already increased the likelihood of crop failures.Heatwaves in key agricultural regions risk becoming so hot that day
93、time work in the fields becomes physiologically impossible 4 .Food security is a key priority for China,therefore impacts on agriculture are a particularly important reason for the countrys decision-makers to pay attention to climate change.According to public surveys,the Chinese are among the natio
94、ns the most concerned about climate change.In the fi?h edition of the European Investment Bank Climate Survey,91%of respondents said that climate change has an impact on their everyday lives,a higher percentage than in the EU(80%)or the United States(67%)5 .5 European Investment Bank(EIB).(2022).EIB
95、 Climate Survey.4 Kang,S.,Eltahir,E.A.B.North China Plain threatened by deadly heatwaves due to climate change and irrigation.Nat Commun 9,2894(2018).https:/doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-05252-y .Scientific publication.3 China Meteorological Administration.(2021).Blue Book on Climate Change in China 20
96、21.http:/ .Official document.5 However,there is also strong opposition to climate action and reduction in fossil fuel use in China,including from provinces and state-owned enterprises with a high reliance on coal and coal-related industries.State-owned enterprises in the coal power and steel sectors
97、 continue to invest in coal-based capacity.These sectors are Chinas two largest emitters of CO 2 ,and there is no sign of investment in coal-based capacity being scaled back.A complete shi?of new investments into clean capacity is needed to put China on track to peak CO 2 emissions and avoid a glut
98、of unneeded power and industrial capacity.Yet,even against this bleak backdrop,it is nonetheless noteworthy that China has demonstrated its determination to tackle climate change by announcing a CO 2 emissions peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060(“dual carbon goals”)6 ,as well as a ser
99、ies of policies to support these goals.Chinas policies and commitments Chinese President Xi Jinping reaffirmed Chinas determination to realise the 2030/2060 goals in July 2023,stating the commitment is steadfast.He also called for an acceleration of the green and low-carbon transformation of Chinas
100、development model and accelerating the construction of a new electricity system 7 .A?er announcing the targets in 2020,the Communist Party and the government has put in place a policy framework for carbon peak and carbon neutrality,known as 1+N.“1”refers to the long-term approach to combating climat
101、e change,which is well-documented in The Working Guidance for Carbon Dioxide Peaking and Carbon Neutrality in Full and Faithful Implementation of the New Development Philosophy ,issued on 24 October 2021 8 .China aims to gradually increase the share of non-fossil energy consumption to around 20%by 2
102、025,around 25%by 2030,and more than 80%by 2060.“N”refers to solutions to achieve peak carbon emissions by 2030,starting with the Action Plan for Carbon Dioxide Peaking Before 2030 ,issued on 26 October 2021 9 .China officially added the dual carbon goals to its nationally determined contributions(ND
103、Cs)targets on 28 October 2021 10 ,just before COP26 in Glasgow in 2021.Since then,“N”,a series of climate-related policy documents,has been successively issued as specific implementation plans for key areas such as energy,industry,construction and transport,and for key sectors such as coal,electrici
104、ty,iron and steel and cement,coupled with supporting measures in terms of science and technology,carbon sinks,finance and taxation,and financial incentives.10 NDC Registry China(2021)China first NDC(Updated submission)https:/unfccc.int/NDCREG .Official document.9 State Council.(2021).Action Plan for
105、 Carbon Dioxide Peaking.https:/ Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,State Council.(2021).Working Guidance for Carbon Dioxide Peaking and Carbon Neutrality in Full and Faithful Implementation of the New Development Philosophy.https:/ .Policy.7 Xinhua News.(July 2023).Xi Jinping emphasis
106、ed at the National Conference on Ecological and Environmental Protection.https:/ .News report.6 UN News.(2020).Enhance solidarity to fight COVID-19,Chinese President urges,also pledges carbon neutrality by 2060.https:/news.un.org/en/story/2020/09/1073052 .News article.https:/www.eib.org/en/surveys/c
107、limate-survey/5th-climate-survey/index.htm.Research report.6 At the two-year anniversary of the announcement of the dual carbon goals,on 22 September 2022,Chinas top planner National Development and Reform Commission(NDRC),stated that China has established its“1+N”climate policy framework,including
108、sectoral and regional plans 11 .The Commission pointed out that China has made stable progress in its climate actions and is undertaking to:Promote renewable energy development.Chinas total renewable power installation reached over 1100 GW and China has become the worlds leader in renewable power in
109、stallations.Promote industrial restructuring and restrict projects with high energy consumption and high pollution.Compared to 2012,Chinas energy intensity(total energy consumption per unit of GDP)dropped by 26.4%in 2021,and carbon intensity(total carbon emissions per unit of GDP)dropped by 34.4%.Pr
110、omote the transition of construction and transportation sectors.In 2021,Chinas newly built green buildings reached 2 billion square metres.The retained number of new energy vehicles in China accounted for half of the worlds total.Are these efforts enough for China to achieve its carbon goals?In this
111、 report,we reviewed literature published by international organisations and national researchers and identified indicators and benchmarks from China.We compiled the historical data for the indicators and future development projections to assess Chinas progress.We also conducted an expert survey to e
112、valuate their confidence in Chinas emissions outlook.Chapter 2 presents an overview of the sources,history and drivers of Chinas greenhouse gas emissions.Chapter 3 introduces the different transition pathways consistent with the Paris Agreement goals to limit global warming,which we will use as benc
113、hmarks for Chinas progress.Chapter 4 compares Chinas progress in different aspects of the climate transition,using indicators and benchmarks developed from the transition pathways.Chapter 5 presents findings from an expert survey that gauges the views and expectations of well-informed and influentia
114、l individuals in the energy and climate sectors to understand how they interpret current policies and trends,and how they expect Chinas emissions to develop over this decade.Our findings and conclusions are given in Chapter 6.11 Peoples Daily(22 Sep.2022)NDRC:The countrys work on the two carbon targ
115、ets achieved a good start in the past two years.http:/ .News article.7 2 Understanding Chinas greenhouse gas emissions 2.1 The meteoric rise of emissions China is the worlds largest greenhouse gas emitter,and the second-largest historical emitter,a?er the United States.In 2021,it produced 27%of glob
116、al greenhouse gas emissions 12 ,with around 18%of the worlds population and GDP.Chinas share of global emissions rose to this level from less than 10%in 1990.China was responsible for 73%of the increase in global CO 2 emissions from 2010 to 2022 and as of the end of 2022,was the only major emitter t
117、o increase emissions a?er the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic,due to a rapid and carbon-heavy recovery from the initial lockdowns 13 .The countrys high emissions relative to GDP are due to both a coal-heavy energy structure and an energy-intensive economic structure that relies heavily on constru
118、ction and smokestack industries.As a result,Chinas emissions are dominated by energy and industrial processes,in particular the production of steel,cement,and other construction materials.Figure 1|Chinas reported greenhouse gas emissions in 2014,the most recent year for which official data are avail
119、able 13 Energy Institute.2023 Statistical Review of World Energy.(2023).https:/www.energyinst.org/statistical-review .Research report.12 Alfredo Rivera,Shweta Movalia,Hannah Pitt,and Kate Larsen.Rhodium Group.(Dec,2022).https:/ note.8 China has committed to CO 2 emissions and clean energy targets si
120、nce the Copenhagen climate summit in December 2009.Actions to achieve the targets have made the country the world leader in deploying renewable energy and nuclear power,but have not been sufficient to peak CO 2 emissions from fossil energy consumption.China committed to peaking CO 2 emissions“around
121、 2030”,in the ObamaXi climate declaration in 2014.In 2020,President Xi Jinping pledged that China would target carbon neutrality before 2060 and peak CO 2 emissions“before 2030”14 .The increase in Chinas emissions in the 2000s was driven by its rapid industrial and economic growth a?er the export an
122、d investment boom started by World Trade Organization(WTO)accession.This boom came to a head with the global financial crisis,and in 2008,leadership responded with an unprecedentedly large infrastructure stimulus programme that drove even faster emissions increases in 20092012.Spending was predomina
123、ntly directed at the most energy-intensive parts of the economy:construction and heavy industry,particularly steel,cement,and other construction-materials industries.When the effect of the stimulus programme started to wear out in 2013,coal,steel and cement consumption began to fall.This fall was co
124、mpounded by the“war on corruption”launched by President Xi Jinping,curbing local government permits and enthusiasm for construction projects.The leaderships initial response to the slowdown of the industrial economy was to brand the changes as a part of an“economic new normal”in which household cons
125、umption,services,and high-value-added industries would become the key drivers of growth.This was also the time when Presidents Xi and Obama announced the“climate deal”between the two countries,including Chinas CO 2 peaking commitment and paving the way for the Paris Agreement,while the air pollution
126、 crisis dominated domestic headlines,creating a unique window of opportunity to limit coal consumption at least in the more prosperous coastal areas.However,falling demand and prices for key commodities and heavy industry products led to major financial distress in state-owned enterprises towards th
127、e end of 2015.A new wave of stimulus was launched in late 2015.This stimulus-driven growth continued in the following years and intensified as the government sought to offset the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic with supply-side stimulus measures.As a result,Chinas emissions surged in late 2
128、020 and early 2021,due to economic recovery policies aimed at stimulating construction and industrial output,including export industries.In 2020,the Global Carbon Project attributes two thirds of the increase in Chinas emissions to an increase in emissions embedded in trade 15 .COVID-19-related stim
129、ulus policies in the rest of the world boosted demand for Chinas exports,while the countrys own policies boosted production while doing little to create domestic demand.The surge in industrial output reversed in mid-2021,due to economic policies aimed at tamping down real estate speculation and low-
130、value construction projects,strict COVID-19 control policies,and clean 15 Friedlingstein,P.et al.(2022):Global Carbon Budget 2022.Earth System Science Data ,14,48114900,2022,https:/doi.org/10.5194/essd-14-4811-2022 .14 UN Affairs.(2021).China headed towards carbon neutrality by 2060;President Xi Jin
131、ping vows to halt new coal plants abroad https:/news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100642 .News announcement.9 energy expansion.A record heatwave and drought caused emissions to increase again in late 2022 and in 2023,as hydropower generation plummeted and was substituted by coal in the short term.In add
132、ition,oil consumption rebounded a?er the removal of zero-COVID-19 policies.Figure 2|Chinas CO 2 emissions from energy and cement,2000 September 2023 Figure 3|Chinas fossil CO 2 emissions by sector (19952021)10 Chinas CO 2 emissions are heavily dominated by power generation and heavy industry sectors
133、,with iron and steel,non-metallic minerals(cement and glass)and chemicals being the largest industrial emitters.Notably,the entire transport and household sectors rank below these industries in total emissions(Figure 3).When emissions from power generation are allocated to the sectors consuming the
134、power(Figure 4),the non-ferrous metals industry(e.g.aluminium,copper and nickel)stands out as a major emitter due to the sectors high electricity demand.Figure 4|Chinas fossil CO 2 emissions by sector;with emissions from power generation allocated to consuming sectors Satellite-based estimates sugge
135、st that Chinas methane emissions were increasing by approximately 1.5%per year from 20102017,with increases across all emitting sectors(coal,oil and gas,rice and livestock farming as well as landfills and wastewater)16 .However,emission inventories based on activity data(e.g.coal production)suggest
136、that emissions growth is likely to have slowed down or halted from 20122018 when coal production growth was slow or negative.There is significant uncertainty about emissions levels and trends.17 2.2 Chinas emissions in an international context Chinas per capita emissions from fossil fuel use within
137、the countrys borders overtook the world average around 2005 and those of the EU in 2013.17 Liu,G.et al.(2021)Recent slowdown of anthropogenic methane emissions in China driven by stabilized coal production https:/pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/acs.estlett.1c00463.Research article.16 Zhang,Y.et al.(202
138、2).Observed changes in Chinas methane emissions linked to policy drivers https:/www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2202742119 .Research article.11 When emissions are allocated based on where goods are consumed,rather than based on where they are produced,Chinas emissions are approximately 10%lower.In oth
139、er words,Chinas large export industry does contribute to its high emissions,but less than is generally perceived.Chinas consumption-based emissions per capita were equal with the EU in 2020.Chinas consumption-based emissions are high relative to the level of GDP because of the energy-intensive struc
140、ture of the economy.The most energy-intensive commodities steel,cement and non-ferrous metals are predominantly produced for the domestic market.Furthermore,China is also a major importer of emissions-intensive commodities.Emissions embedded in trade peaked around the 2007 global financial crisis,an
141、d have been falling since then.In other words,net exports have not contributed to Chinas emissions growth since 2008.A major focus of Chinas climate targets has been reducing the CO 2 intensity of the economy,i.e.CO 2 emissions per unit of GDP.China has made rapid progress in this regard,but from a
142、very high starting point compared to the average of other non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)countries,let alone developed economies.In comparison to other emerging economies that have achieved rapid economic growth in the past few decades,China has followed a far more C
143、O 2 -intensive growth trajectory,due to the high share of coal in the energy mix and the highly energy intensive structure of the economy.The slowdown in CO 2 emission growth since 2013 has produced some convergence,but emissions per capita remain more than twice as high as those of most other emerg
144、ing countries at the same level of GDP per capita.Figure 5|Chinas CO 2 emissions per capita 12 Figure 6|Comparison of Chinas CO 2 emissions per capita in relation to global and EU27 emissions Figure 7|Comparison of Chinas CO 2 emissions per unit of Gross domestic product(GDP)in relation to other reg
145、ions 13 Figure 8|CO 2 emission trajectories of fast-growing economies 14 3 Pathways to carbon neutrality for China and the world 3.1 Overview Meeting the goal of the Paris Agreement to limit global warming well below 2C requires addressing the worlds energy systems,industry,agriculture and land use,
146、among other things.The most effective and cost-efficient ways to explore widespread systems change can be projected using a variety of models that incorporate information about the demand for goods and services,production technologies,and their costs,as well as available resources.Most importantly,t
147、he models provide consistent and physically and economically plausible pathways for meeting the needs of the global economy for energy,goods,services and commodities while respecting the goals of the Paris Agreement.To capture the range of pathways and solutions available for China and the world,we
148、have compiled a suite of climate transition scenarios consistent with the Paris Agreement prepared by the following research institutions:Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS);Climate Action Tracker(CAT);International Energy Agency(IEA);Institute of Climate C
149、hange and Sustainable Development(ICCSD)of Tsinghua University;School of Environment and Natural Resources;Renmin University(SENR-RMU);Institute of Atmospheric Environment;China Academy of Environmental Planning(CAEP-IAE)and Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute(EPPEI);North China Electr
150、ic Power University(NCEPU)and Peking University(PKU);and Energy Foundation China(EFC)and Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland(CGS-UMD).These climate transition scenarios can serve as frameworks to support policymakers in evaluating the impacts of different policy approaches
151、 on technology choices and their implications for energy and emissions trends.We have identified a set of indicators,such as installed clean energy capacity or transport oil consumption,that can be compared against historical data and used to measure progress in a much more granular and forward-look
152、ing fashion than a simple look at the annual change in emissions would permit.We have converted the scenario data into benchmarks for each indicator that allow us to assess whether that particular indicator is aligned with the climate transition scenarios.While different proposals and scenarios diff
153、er in certain details,there are also clear similarities.In all scenarios,the basic formula for decarbonising Chinas energy system is to replace much of the fossil fuel used in industry,transport and households with electricity,and to produce that electricity from clean energy sources.This,in turn,re
154、quires an enormous expansion of clean electricity production.The majority of this expansion is delivered by wind and solar.All scenarios project only a modest expansion in gas-fired capacity.Enhancement of forest carbon sequestration and other land carbon sinks is also important across scenarios.A k
155、ey underlying assumption for emissions scenarios is the assumed or projected rate of economic growth.All pathways included in this report assume an average growth rate of 5.05.5%between 2020 and 2030,making them directly comparable in this regard.This rate is slightly lower than the 67%15 growth tha
156、t China reported in 20152019,but faster than the average for 20202023,given the current World Bank projection for 2023 of 5.6%(and therefore the average for 2020-2023 would be 4.8%).18 Global pathways,in terms of IEA,NGFS and CAT have updated climate transition pathways adjusted for economic project
157、ions to the latest historical year of publication.Recently,however,Chinas growth forecasts have been revised down due to the sluggish post-reopening recovery.For example,the IMF projects 5.0%for 2023,4.2%for 2024,and less than 4.0%for 20272028,further lowering the average projected GDP growth rate.1
158、9 The scenarios differ in terms of their projections of total energy demand growth,and in the role of nuclear power,carbon capture and storage(CCS),biomass,fossil gas,and coal-fired power.The ICCSD sees a larger share for nuclear power than other scenarios,while the NCEPU and PKU include more therma
159、l power than other scenarios.Some of the pathways,such as those prepared by the CAT,the CAEP and the EPPEI,do not consider CCS a technologically mature and cost-effective solution to reduce CO 2 emissions.That viewpoint is in contrast to others,such as the ICCSD,NCEPU,and the SENR,who see CCS applie
160、d to fossil emissions as one of the routes to decarbonise the power sector,as well as carbon capture and storage applied to bioenergy as a way to achieve negative emissions and offset emissions from other sectors.The international scenarios from the IEA and underlying Intergovernmental Panel on Clim
161、ate Change(IPCC)work tend to assume that much of the economic potential for energy efficiency can be exploited,resulting in lower overall energy demand.Considering that China had accelerated coal power approvals between 2021 and 2022,the IEA increased the share of coal power generation to adapt to t
162、he new reality and projected that China will not fully quit coal power by 2050 as was projected in 2021s edition.The ICCSD scenarios factor in structural change in the economy and energy efficiency potential,resulting in low projections for total energy demand.The EFC&CGS-UMD scenarios based on six
163、different models produced results over a wide range,covering the results projected by the other scenarios.Among them,the AIM-China and MESSAGEixChina models weighted heavily on nuclear power as the dominating energy for Chinas power generation,followed by solar and wind,which are the dominating ener
164、gy in the other models.The SENR scenarios see a significant role for fossil gas outside the power sector in the next decade,with gas consumption continuing to grow at the same rate as in the past few years until 2030.The IPCC and IEA scenarios,in contrast,project a sharp slowdown in gas consumption
165、growth over the 2020s.However,within each scenario family,the scenarios targeting lower global temperature increases have slower growth or more rapid reduction in fossil gas use.Apart from the ICCSD,most scenarios published in China dont cover other greenhouse gases besides CO 2 ,or give them cursor
166、y treatment at most.It hasnt been specified whether the carbon neutrality target should be understood to cover all greenhouse gases or only CO 2 ,with official statements being made both ways.Because of the sparsity of data both on emissions and on the viability and costs of mitigation options,estim
167、ates of the emissions reduction potential vary widely.Its evident that a target covering all greenhouse gases would require deeper reductions in CO 2 emissions because it wont be plausible to reduce the emissions of the other gases to zero and there are no foreseeable 19 International Monetary Fund.
168、(Oct 2023).Peoples Republic of China:Country Data.https:/www.imf.org/en/Countries/CHN .Database.18 The World Bank.(Jun 2023).Priority Reforms Key for Sustaining Growth and Achieving Chinas long-term goals -World Bank Report.https:/www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/06/14/priority-reforms-k
169、ey-for-sustaining-growth-and -achieving-china-s-long-term-goals-world-bank-report .Research report.16 solutions to achieve negative emissions for the other gases whose concentrations in the atmosphere are far lower than those of CO 2 (see section 4.2 on non-CO 2 greenhouse gases).3.2 Global pathways
170、 Significant research and modelling is being conducted by international organisations and universities to develop pathways under different scenarios to achieve carbon net zero emissions.Work by NGFS,CAT,and IEA has been selected for this report.The NGFSs delayed action scenarios forecast rapid carbo
171、n reductions a?er 2030,which is similar to Chinas two-stage development(see section 3.3.1).Data from CAT and IEA are their projections for China.Table 1|Overview of the global scenarios included Institute Scenario Source IEA Announced Pledges(APS)World Energy Outlook 2022 https:/www.iea.org/reports/
172、world-energy-outlook-2022 NGFS Delayed transition https:/ Below 2C https:/ Net Zero 2050 https:/ 1.5 degrees https:/climateactiontracker.org/countries/china/;https:/climateactiontracker.org/publications/paris-aligned-benchmarks-power-sector/CAT 2 degrees https:/climateactiontracker.org/countries/chi
173、na/3.2.1 Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System(NGFS)The Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System(NGFS)is a group that contributes to the development of environment and climate risk management in the financial sector.Along with an acade
174、mic consortium from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research(PIK),International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis(IIASA),University of Maryland(UMD),Climate Analytics(CA),ETH Zrich(ETHZ),and the National Institute of Economic and Social Research(NIESR),the group has developed a set of
175、global transition pathways for analysing climate risks to the economy and financial system.The pathways are divided into economic sectors and geographic regions and have been generated with three well established integrated assessment models(IAMs),namely GCAM,MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM,and REMIND-MAgPIE.The
176、scenarios were included in the Sixth Assessment Report(AR6)of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC).The NGFS provides country-level data for six different transition scenarios based on the IPCC socioeconomic pathways and the latest International Monetary Fund(IMF)economic forecasts.The
177、 pathways differ in their level of ambition,resulting in different levels of global warming,and in how orderly the transition is.Delayed action scenarios see a slower start to reducing emissions in the 2020s and consequently require much more rapid emissions reductions a?er 2030.We use the delayed 1
178、7 transition scenario,compatible with the 2C temperature goal,but not with the 1.5C goal,as the benchmark for Chinas transition,as this pathway most closely resembles Chinas carbon neutrality plan.The scenario assumes that global emissions dont fall before 2030,and then requires very rapid reduction
179、s a?er 2030 to preserve a more than 50%chance of staying below 2C.The scenario is expected to result in approximately 1.6C warming by the end of the decade(90%confidence interval:1.2C to 2.4C).China has not made explicit commitments about the rate of emissions reductions in the decades following the
180、 peak,other than reaching carbon neutrality by 2060,but the goal of the Paris Agreement requires rapid,front-loaded reductions a?er 2030.The latest set of NGFS scenarios was published in September 2022,entailing updated scenarios adjusted for new GDP projections,new policy pledges and targets,and ne
181、w model versions on a number of techno-economic parameters 20 .Figure 9|Emission,concentration,and warming pathways in China 20 NGFS Climate Scenarios Database.(Sep 2022).Technical Documentation V3.1.https:/ .Database.18 3.2.2 Climate Action Tracker(CAT)Using the 1.5C scenario in the IPCC 2018 speci
182、al report,Global Warming of 1.5C 21 ,with the International Energy Agencys 2015 data as the base year,in 2020,the Climate Action Tracker published the report,Paris Agreement Compatible Sectoral Benchmarks 22 ,to define and analyse a series of benchmarks for 2030 and 2050 across four major sectors at
183、 the global level:power,transport,industry and buildings.Six countries and the EU were selected for further analysis:Brazil,China,India,Indonesia,South Africa,and the US.In September 2023,CAT published Clean electricity within a generation:Paris-aligned benchmarks for the power sector 23 ,in which i
184、t provides benchmarks compatible with 1.5C for the power sector both at the global level and for 16 selected countries.China and the other 15 countries were selected based on their share of global power generation,scale of power sector emissions,geopolitical importance,and geographic and economic di
185、versity.CAT provides benchmarks for the future shares of coal,fossil gas and renewables,and emission intensity in power generation.The benchmarks were derived by downscaling the latest global pathways assessed by the IPCC,and an in-depth literature review of national studies on power systems modelli
186、ng.3.2.3 International Energy Agency(IEA)The International Energy Agency(IEA)assessment has a focus on energy but also covers industry,transport,and building sectors.The power sector is the single largest source of energy-related CO 2 emissions.Decarbonising the energy system is important to achieve
187、 the goal of limiting the global annual average temperature increase to 1.5C.At the same time,decarbonising other sectors through electrification relies on electricity from carbon-free power generation sources.The IEA has published a collection of reports examining the technologies and policies need
188、ed for countries and regions to achieve net-zero emissions in energy systems.The IEAs flagship report World Energy Outlook (WEO)analyses what would be needed over the period up to 2030 to put the world on a path towards net-zero emissions by 2050 24 .We use the WEO Announced Pledges Scenario (APS)as
189、 the benchmark for China because the net zero scenario does not include disaggregated projections for China.APS assumes that all aspirational targets announced by governments are met on time and in full,and thus is in line with Chinas long-term carbon neutrality goal.Compared with WEO 2021,the proje
190、ction of a bigger emissions reduction is seen in the APS of WEO 2022,reflecting updated NDCs and announced net zero emissions pledges that have been made over the past year.24 IEA.(2021).World Energy Outlook.https:/www.iea.org/topics/world-energy-outlook .Research report.23 Climate Action Tracker.(2
191、023).Clean electricity within a generation:Paris-aligned benchmarks for the power sector.https:/climateactiontracker.org/documents/1159/CAT_2023-09-19_Briefing_ParisBenchmarks_PowerSector.pdf .Research report.22 Climate Action Tracker.(2020).Paris Agreement Compatible Sectoral Benchmarks.https:/clim
192、ateactiontracker.org/documents/753/CAT_2020-07-10_ParisAgreementBenchmarks_FullReport.pdf Analytical report.21 IPCC.(2018).Global Warming of 1.5C https:/www.ipcc.ch/sr15 .Special scientific report.19 3.3 Pathways for China Translating the international goal of limiting global warming to 1.5C to emis
193、sion targets and pathways for individual countries is a complex,and o?en contentious,challenge.Different countries and researchers emphasise countries current per capita emissions,level of economic development and per capita income,historical responsibility,and capacity to act,as the key determinant
194、s of how large a responsibility the different countries should be assigned.Given Chinas share of global emissions,almost one-quarter,and Chinas dominant role in the increase of global emissions,peaking emissions and reaching carbon neutrality are mathematical necessities if the global goals are to b
195、e met.A?er the announcement of the carbon neutrality target in September 2020,numerous Chinese research institutions have unveiled their proposals or pathways to meet the target.Weve compiled a representative selection of pathways to form the basis for this report,shown in Table 2.The first ones wer
196、e published soon a?er the initial announcement by Tsinghua professors He Jiankun and Zhang Xiliang and the team.Their work is believed to have informed the initial decision to set the carbon neutrality target,and the choice of the target year,while Chinas climate envoy Xie Zhenhua,who was influentia
197、l in convincing the leadership to adopt the target,acted as an advisor to the project.As such,these scenarios are the closest to an official plan that existed at the time of the announcement.No other Chinese research is as comprehensive as that of the ICCSD and it o?en tends to focus on one sector.M
198、ore recent work reflects changes in energy trends and the policy environment since the announcement.Table 2|Overview of the included scenarios by Chinese researchers Institute Scenario Source Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development(ICCSD)1.5 degrees Chinas Long-Term Low-Carbon Develo
199、pment Strategies and Pathways https:/www.efchina.org/Reports-en/report-lce g-20210711-en Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development(ICCSD)2 degrees Chinas Long-Term Low-Carbon Development Strategies and Pathways https:/www.efchina.org/Reports-en/report-lce g-20210711-en School of Enviro
200、nment and Natural Resources(SENR),Renmin University 1.5 degrees Wang K(2021)Research on Chinas carbon emissions pathway under the 1.5C target http:/ n.1673-1719.2020.228 School of Environment and Natural Resources(SENR),Renmin University 2 degrees Wang K(2021)Research on Chinas carbon emissions path
201、way under the 1.5C target http:/ n.1673-1719.2020.228 North China Electric Power University(NCEPU)and Peking University(PKU)Accelerated electrification with diverse power mix (shortened to “Accelerated”in the graphs)Pathways and Policy for Peaking CO 2 Emissions in Chinas Power Sector https:/ 7APZoA
202、 20 Institute Scenario Source North China Electric Power University(NCEPU)and Peking University(PKU)Continued electrification led by new energy (shortened to“New Energy”in the graphs)Pathways and Policy for Peaking CO 2 Emissions in Chinas Power Sector https:/ 7APZoA Institute of Atmospheric Environ
203、ment,China Academy of Environmental Planning (CAEP-IAE)and Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute(EPPEI)Baseline scenario:high electricity demand,energy mix trend as the 13th Five-Year Plan of China(FYP)Pathways of carbon emission peak in Chinas electric power industry http:/ 8/j.issn.100
204、1-6929.2021.11.24 Institute of Atmospheric Environment,China Academy of Environmental Planning (CAEP-IAE)and Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute(EPPEI)Low carbon scenario:high electricity demand,maximise RE,lower coal consumption Pathways of carbon emission peak in Chinas electric powe
205、r industry http:/ 8/j.issn.1001-6929.2021.11.24 Institute of Atmospheric Environment,China Academy of Environmental Planning (CAEP-IAE)and Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute(EPPEI)Strengthened scenario:low electricity demand,maximise RE,lower coal consumption Pathways of carbon emissi
206、on peak in Chinas electric power industry http:/ 8/j.issn.1001-6929.2021.11.24 Energy Foundation China (EFC)and Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland (CGS-UMD)Based on updated NDC Synthesis Report 2022 on Chinas Carbon Neutrality:Electrification in Chinas Carbon Neutrality P
207、athways https:/www.efchina.org/Reports-en/report-snp -20221104-en?set_language=en 21 Figure 10|Total primary energy consumption in China in 2050 by pathway Figure 11|Installed power generation capacity in China in 2050 by pathway 22 3.3.1 Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development(ICCSD
208、)Since the beginning of 2019,the Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development(ICCSD)of Tsinghua University has been cooperating with more than ten Chinese research institutes to undertake a research project,Chinas Long-Term Low-Carbon Development Strategies and Pathways ,with 18 sub-proje
209、cts.The results were delivered as a comprehensive report published in 2021 25 .The ICCSD study splits Chinas long-term low-carbon transition pathway into two stages.The first stage,from 2020 to 2035,will focus on implementing and strengthening the nationally determined contributions(NDCs)to the Pari
210、s Agreement of emission reduction in line with the social and economic development goals.The second stage,from 2035 to 2050,will achieve the goal of deep decarbonisation of energy and economy and building a strong modern socialist country while aligning emission reduction pathways with global warmin
211、g control targets of 2C and 1.5C by 2050.The report analysed emissions reduction pathways,technology support,cost,and prices driven by the long-term decarbonisation goal.The study was based on four scenarios,namely,policy scenario,reinforced policy scenario,2C scenario,and 1.5C scenario.We select 1.
212、5C scenario and 2C scenario data for this report which are in line with the Paris Agreement and global net zero goals.The 2C scenario is based on the goal of controlling global warming to within 2C with per capita CO 2 emissions not exceeding 1.5 tonnes by 2050(down from 8.4 tonnes in 2020).The 1.5C
213、 scenario is based on the goals of limiting the global annual average temperature rise to 1.5C and achieving net zero CO 2 emissions and deep reductions of other GHGs emissions by 2050.Both 1.5C and 2C scenarios are ideal scenarios requiring a rapid shi?in Chinas energy systems and economic developm
214、ent pattern to align with the near-term emission reduction rates.Considering practical,economic and political challenges in peaking emissions immediately,the ICCSD further introduces target-oriented(later peak)variants of the 1.5C and 2C scenarios 26 ,which assumes that CO 2 emissions only peak late
215、 in the decade to allow for the prioritisation of economic growth during this decade and a more gradual shi?in the pattern of economic growth(termed two-stage development).These pathways envision an enhanced version of Chinas current Paris agreement pledges(NDCs)until 2030,accelerating carbon reduct
216、ion and energy systems transition from 2030,and achieving net zero carbon emissions by 2050.3.3.2 School of Environment and Natural Resources,Renmin University (SENR-RMU)According to the deep emissions reduction requirements and technical characteristics of the 1.5C target,Wang Ke et al.at the Schoo
217、l of Environment and Natural Resources,Renmin University,modified the existing energy system model PECE-LIU2020 by adding hydrogen and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage(BECCS)energy modules.Using the upgraded model,the team studied Chinas long-term CO 2 emissions reduction requirements,secto
218、ral contributions,and key emission 26 He,J.et al.(2022).Towards carbon neutrality:A study on Chinas long-term low-carbon transition pathways and strategies.Environmental Science and Ecotechnology ,9,100134.https:/ article.25 ICCSD,(2021).Chinas Long-Term Low-Carbon Development Strategies and Pathway
219、s,Comprehensive Report.https:/ .Study report.23 reduction measures under 1.5C and 2C scenarios 27 .The concept of 1.5C and 2C scenarios align with the IPCC.But the pathways are set based on Chinas circumstances.Similar to the ICCSDs two-stage transition,under the 2C scenario,China will take enhanced
220、 emissions reduction measures based on the existing NDC target,strive to achieve peak carbon emissions as soon as possible,and strengthen policies to accelerate the decline of emissions to meet Chinas emissions reduction target by 2050.Under the 2C scenario,already matured and demonstration stage lo
221、w-carbon technologies,including electric vehicles,wind and solar,will be developed rapidly.Demonstration of carbon capture,utilisation and storage(CCUS)technology will be accelerated to prepare for deployment a?er 2030.Under the 1.5C scenario,to achieve a more stringent carbon reduction target,China
222、 will peak carbon emissions as soon as possible and also accelerate carbon reduction to the 1.5C targets by 2050.China needs to accelerate technology renovation and innovation,rapidly develop hydrogen and BECCS technologies,improve energy system efficiency and deep decarbonise steel,chemical enginee
223、ring,road cargo and power sectors.Both 1.5C and 2C scenarios require China to enhance carbon reduction and reach peak carbon before 2025.With reference to the 2005 milestone,73%and 75%carbon reduction by 2030 are needed for 2C and 1.5C scenarios,respectively.3.3.3 Institute of Atmospheric Environmen
224、t,China Academy of Environmental Planning(CAEP-IAE)and Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute(EPPEI)The Institute of Atmospheric Environment,China Academy of Environmental Planning,and China Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute jointly established a projection model and influ
225、encing parameters/factors to study the pathway for Chinas power sector to peak carbon emissions under different scenarios.The influencing parameters include economic and social development,electricity demand,power source structure and standard coal consumption rate for power generation.Three scenari
226、os are laid out 28 ,as follows.Baseline scenario:The power structure will remain the same as during the 13th Five-Year Plan(FYP)period(20162020)to meet a high rate of power demand growth.Improvement in the thermal efficiency of coal-fired power plants stops and is frozen at the current level.Low car
227、bon scenario:To maintain a high rate of power generation growth,it is essential to maximise non-fossil fuel energy power generation within the limits set by the potential of different electricity generation sources,construction period,energy prices and other factors.The thermal efficiency of coal-fi
228、red power plants will fall at the same rate as during the 13th FYP period,resulting in a reduction in standard coal consumption of 2 g/kWh per year.Taking into account the more flexible operation of thermal power plants required to accommodate non-fossil energy sources,which tends to reduce the ther
229、mal efficiency of generation,it is assumed that coal consumption for power generation will fall by 28 Wang,L.et al.(2022).Pathway of carbon emission peak in Chinas electric power industry.Research of Environmental Sciences ,35,329338.doi:10.13198/j.issn.1001-6929.2021.11.24 .Research article.27 Wang
230、,K.et al.(2022).Research on Chinas carbon emissions pathway under the 1.5C target.http:/ .Research article.24 1 g/kWh annually and reach 286,280,and 275 g/kWh in 2025,2030,and 2035 respectively,down from 289 g/kWh in 2020.Strengthened scenario:The thermal efficiency improvements of coal-fired power
231、plants follow the low carbon scenario,and power generation from non-fossil fuels is maximised.In addition,measures are taken to reduce the growth rate of electricity demand.3.3.4 North China Electric Power University(NCEPU)and Peking University (PKU)Transition pathways developed by the North China E
232、lectric Power University and Peking University are based on the understanding that China will peak CO 2 emissions in 2030 and the power sector is the critical player in this mission.Combining the trends of various macroeconomic indicators,Professor Yuan and his team estimate that Chinas national ele
233、ctricity demand for the period of 2021 to 2035 will be driven by electrification in the power,industry,building and transport sectors 29 .To meet the electricity demand under different electrification processes,three pathways are set up to discuss the possible situations the low carbon power system
234、transformation may face and pathways for the power sector to peak carbon emissions.The carbon peak time under different scenarios is projected.We selected the“Accelerated electrification with diverse power mix”and“Continued electrification led by new energy”pathways for our report,shortened to“Accel
235、erated”and“New Energy”.NCEP and PKU recommend the“Accelerated”pathway as the most effective approach to peak emissions.Under the accelerated electrification scenario,targets of more than 50%of non-fossil fuel in the electricity mix and 1200GW wind and solar installations by 2030 are met.Coal power g
236、eneration will peak in 2025 at 5,200TWh,up from 4900 TWh in 2020.The role of coal power changes from the mainstay of power generation to a supporting source of generation for non-fossil energy.Under this scenario,carbon emissions from the power sector will peak around 2025.3.3.5 Energy Foundation Ch
237、ina(EFC)and Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland(CGS-UMD)Led by Energy Foundation China,and coordinated by the Center for Global Sustainability at the University of Maryland,United States,with contributions from 21 expert authors from nine research organisations,the multi-t
238、eam research conducted deep dives into decarbonizing the electricity sector to achieve Chinas carbon neutrality target.In the Synthesis Report 2022 on Chinas Carbon Neutrality:Electrification in Chinas Carbon Neutrality Pathways 30 ,the role of electrification and associated electricity system trans
239、formation in achieving Chinas 30/60 goals were identified,based on synthesised analyses on a number of national and global models,including China DREAM,China 30 Energy Foundation China.(Nov 2022).Synthesis Report 2022 on Chinas Carbon Neutrality:Electrification in Chinas Carbon Neutrality Pathways.h
240、ttps:/www.efchina.org/Reports-en/report-snp-20221104-en Research report.29 Yuan,J.et al.(2021)Pathways and policy for peaking CO 2 emissions in Chinas power sector.https:/ .Research article in Mandarin.25 TIMES,GCAM-China,MESSAGEix-China,AIM-China,PECE_LIU_2021,and PECE V2.0.Two scenarios,Updated Na
241、tionally Determined Contribution(NDC)To Carbon Neutrality and Original NDC to Carbon Neutrality were explored in this report.We use the average of the results from the seven models as our benchmark.Under the Updated Nationally Determined Contribution(NDC)to Carbon Neutrality scenario that we include
242、d in our report,net zero greenhouse gas emissions will be achieved by 2060,and Chinas emissions will peak before 2030 in line with the updated NDC submitted by China in October 2021.It differs from the original NDC scenario in that the original NDC scenario assumes Chinas CO 2 emissions do not peak
243、earlier than 2030.26 4 Measuring and benchmarking Chinas progress To base Chinas entire economy on carbon neutral emissions will require progress on numerous fronts:from clean electricity production to electrification,from moderating energy demand growth to shi?s in production processes,and transpor
244、t modes.The transition pathways allow us to translate the massive undertaking into more specific changes required in each key emitting sector.This section compares the development of Chinas emissions,energy mix,installed power generation capacity,electrification ratio and other essential indicators
245、to benchmarks derived from different transition pathways.The approach we take is to assess the annual change in each indicator against the required rate of change from 2020 to 2030 in different pathways.We assess whether the indicators are either already in line with the benchmarks or are making pro
246、gress so that the benchmarks are likely to be met.The assessment is designed so that we can repeat it annually and provide an update of progress.4.1 Total CO 2 emissions 2023 highlights The central government has released the Opinions on Advancing the Transition from Dual Control of Energy Consumpti
247、on to Dual Control of Carbon Emissions.The development of the Carbon Emission MRV(Monitoring,Reporting,and Verification)and Accounting System is fundamental to the implementation of Dual Control of Carbon Emissions.The Ecosystem Carbon Sink Enhancement Plan was launched to assess Chinas ecosystem ca
248、rbon storage baseline,identify potential for increased carbon sink,and establish an internationally-aligned carbon sink measurement system.Carbon trading is expected to expand beyond the power sector to include other industries and CCER is expected to be re-launched by the end of 2023.Strong support
249、 for low carbon and zero carbon technologies.To be consistent with the 1.5C degree target,even assuming very aggressive emissions reductions a?er 2030,Chinas CO 2 emissions should reach their peak by 2025.Considering practical,economic,and political challenges in peaking emissions immediately,the IC
250、CSD further introduced “target-oriented”(later peak)variants of the 1.5C and 2C scenarios 31 ,which assumes that CO 2 emissions only peak late in the decade to allow for the prioritisation of economic growth during this decade and a more gradual shi?in the pattern of economic growth(termed“two-stage
251、”development).These pathways envision an enhanced version of Chinas current Paris Agreement 31 He,J.et al.(2022).Towards carbon neutrality:A study on Chinas long-term low-carbon transition pathways and strategies.Environmental Science and Ecotechnology 9,100134.https:/ .Scientific article.27 pledges
252、(NDCs)until 2030,accelerating the carbon reduction and energy systems transition from 2030,and achieving net zero carbon emissions by 2050.These later peak pathways are less ambitious over the next decade than the 1.5C and 2C scenarios.For example,the ICCSD 1.5C target-oriented scenario sees CO 2 em
253、issions peak at 10.4 billion tonnes by 2025,up from 10.2 billion tonnes in 2020,and stay at the same level until 2030,dropping sharply to 1.7 billion tonnes by 2050,almost converging to the 1.5C pathway in the following decades,but with higher cumulative total emissions(Table 3).For the“ideal”1.5C a
254、nd 2C scenarios,CO 2 emissions should peak in 2020 at 10.2 billion tonnes and fall to 7.4 and 1.5 billion tonnes and 9.4 and 2.9 billion tonnes,respectively,by 2030 and 2050.With the help of CCUS and agroforestry carbon sinks,this would allow net zero CO 2 emissions to be achieved by 2050.Table 3|CO
255、 2 emissions under the ICCSD 1.5C,1.5C target-oriented and 2C pathways(He et al.,2022)2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 CO 2 emissions,billion tCO 2 1.5C 10.2 9.3 7.4 6 4.2 2.7 1.5 1.5C target oriented 10.2 10.4 10.4 7.7 5 3 1.7 2C scenario 10.2 10.1 9.4 8.1 6.4 4.3 2.9 Annual decline of CO 2 emiss
256、ions per unit of GDP,%1.5C 4.3 7.1 8.9 8.5 10.3 11.3 14.3 1.5C target oriented 4.3 4.1 4.1 8.2 9.3 10 10.4 2C scenario 4.3 5.5 6.1 7.2 8.4 10.7 10.1 Decline from 2005 level,%1.5C 50.6 65.8 78.5 86.2 92 95.6 98 1.5C target oriented 50.6 60.3 68.4 81.3 90 95 97.6 2C scenario 50.6 62.8 72.8 81.2 87.9 9
257、3.1 96 28 4.1.1 Trends compared to benchmarks Figure 12|Annual change in CO 2 emissions compared to energy transition pathways Chinas CO 2 emissions grew every year from 2016 to 2021,albeit at a much slower pace than CO 2 emissions up to 2013.The increase in CO 2 emissions reversed in the summer of
258、2021,resulting in a fall in CO 2 emissions in 2022,although there is still uncertainty about the magnitude of the fall.There was another upswing in emissions in 2023 due to a drop in hydropower generation due to droughts and a rebound in emissions following COVID-19.All transition pathways require e
259、missions to fall from 2020 to 2030,implying a peak well before 2030 and emissions reductions therea?er.In all transition pathways,emissions reductions need to accelerate significantly from the rates projected for 20202030 immediately a?er 2030 to meet their temperature targets.Our projected CO 2 emi
260、ssions growth rate for 2022 to 2023 is near-zero,making progress towards the annual reductions required in the Paris Agreement-aligned pathways.4.1.2 Policies in place The increase in CO 2 emissions is currently constrained by the CO 2 intensity and non-fossil energy targets for 2025 and 2030,the en
261、ergy intensity target for 2025 and the commitment to peak CO 2 emissions before 2030.The targets,however,leave room for a substantial increase in CO 2 emissions from 2020 to 2030,of up to 15%,assuming a 5%average GDP growth rate in 20212030.Emissions could increase even more by the late 2020s and th
262、en fall to meet the peaking target and the 2030 targets.There are no numerical targets in place for the rate of emissions reductions a?er the peak,leaving the trajectory of emissions from the peak to carbon neutrality sometime before 2060 wide 29 open.The absence of targets make it difficult to pred
263、ict Chinas cumulative emissions in the next decades and to measure whether the country is on track to achieve the carbon neutrality target.Figure 13|Indicative emissions pathways for China Data sources:CO 2 emissions until 2020 from BP Statistical Review of Worlds Energy;CREA analysis.Chinas current
264、 climate commitments allow a wide range of CO 2 emissions outcomes.The pathway labelled“minimum required by targets”shows the highest possible emissions pathway that China could follow while meeting the 2025 and 2030 CO 2 intensity targets and the commitment to peak emissions before 2030.A?er 2030,e
265、missions fall slowly and gradually,requiring very rapid reductions in the 2040s and 2050s.This does not violate Chinas commitments but results in large cumulative emissions and does little to demonstrate the commitment to the long-term goal over the next two decades.The“consistent effort”pathway sho
266、ws a path to the carbon neutrality target in which emissions plateau until 2025 and start falling therea?er,avoiding a large change in the amount of effort required in the following decades.The 1.5C pathway would be extremely challenging to achieve,but it is what China and other countries should str
267、ive towards based on the Paris Agreement.Chinas cumulative CO2 emissions in 2023-2060 under the 1.5 degree pathway would be 160 Gt,200 Gt in the“consistent”effort pathway and 270 Gt in the minimum required by targets pathway.The remaining carbon budget for a 50%chance of keeping global warming below
268、 1.5 degrees is estimated at 250 Gt as of January 2023.The budget for a 66%chance of limiting warming to 2 degrees 30 is an estimated 940 Gt.32 This means that under the“minimum required by targets”pathway Chinas emissions would use up the entire remaining 1.5-degree budget,and 29%of the 2-degree bu
269、dget.Under the 1.5-degree pathway,China would emit 64%of the remaining global 1.5 degree budget and 17%of the 2-degree budget.The 17%share could be seen as Chinas fair share as it corresponds to Chinas share of the world population.The 1.5-degree pathway for China shown in the figure includes CO2 co
270、ncentration overshoot and negative emissions,which is why Chinas share of the global emissions budget is implausibly large.Carbon Emissions Control In July 2023,the Central Committee for the Comprehensive Deepening of Reforms approved the Opinions on Advancing the Transition from Dual Control of Ene
271、rgy Consumption to Dual Control of Carbon Emissions 33 during its second meeting,although the content of this document has not been publicly disclosed.“Dual Control of Energy Consumption”manages total energy use and intensity.China has achieved progress in this regard,with a cumulative 26.4%decrease
272、 in energy consumption per unit of GDP from 2012 to 2021,although the energy intensity target for 2020 was missed.“Dual Control of Carbon Emissions”focuses on regulating both the total volume and intensity of carbon emissions.Both of these approaches place constraints on the use of fossil fuels.Howe
273、ver,its important to note that controlling total energy consumption extends beyond just fossil fuels.It also impacts the development of nuclear and renewable energy sources(exemptions for newly added renewable energy consumptions as of the end of 2022).Moreover,industries like petrochemicals have in
274、flexible energy demands,and overly restrictive measures during the“dual control of energy consumption”may not be reasonable or conducive to economic development.In contrast,“dual control of carbon emissions”considers both the quantity and intensity of carbon emissions,allowing for greater flexibilit
275、y in utilising renewable energy.To implement this approach,China needs to enhance the carbon emissions accounting capabilities,and allocate carbon emission targets to various administrative regions and key sectors.“Carbon emission dual control”empowers high-energy-consuming enterprises to effectivel
276、y manage emissions,fostering room for growth and transformation.This aligns with the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources,supporting both economic development and environmental sustainability.Carbon sinks Besides emissions control,China is also seeking to enhance its ecosystems c
277、arbon sink capacity.In 2023,the Chinese government launched the Ecosystem Carbon Sink Enhancement Plan 34 .This plan aims to assess Chinas ecosystem carbon storage baseline,identify potential for increased carbon sink during the 14th FYP period,and establish an internationally-aligned carbon sink me
278、asurement system.The plan also focuses on key actions,including enhancing forests and grassland carbon sinks,conserving and restoring marine and freshwater ecosystems,bolstering carbon sink capacity in urban 34 Ministry of National Resources of China.(2023).Ecosystem Carbon Sink Enhancement Plan.htt
279、ps:/ 33 CPC News.(2023)Constructing a New System for a Higher-Level Open Economy to Gradually Shi?from Energy Consumption Dual Control to Carbon Emission Dual Control http:/ 32 Lamboll,R.D.,Nicholls,Z.R.J.,Smith,C.J.et al.Assessing the size and uncertainty of remaining carbon budgets.Nat.Clim.Chang.
280、(2023).https:/doi.org/10.1038/s41558-023-01848-5 31 and agricultural areas,and rehabilitating degraded lands.Afforestation programmes have managed to continuously increase Chinas forest coverage since 2012.By 2022,the national forest cover rate reached 24%,with a forest stock volume of 19.5 billion
281、cubic metres 35 .With the context of a top-level goal set to reach a forest cover rate of 25%by 2030 36 ,the National Land Greening Planning Outline(2022-2030)stated that China should implement,among other things,afforestation and grass cultivation for 500 million mu(33.3 Mha)of land,control and tra
282、nsform 100 million mu(6.7 Mha)of desert,and increase the plantation coverage rate to 43%in urban areas and 32%in rural areas,during the period of the 14th FYP.The ecological carbon sink should have a significant increase by 2030 37 .Supporting tools such as Guidelines for Validation and Verification
283、 of Forestry Carbon Projects are also promulgated 38 .The 14th FYP stated that“ocean carbon sinks should be improved”,although no further detailed policy has been released.In 2023,the industry standard Ocean Carbon Sink Accounting Methods 39 was officially adopted,offering a solution for quantifying
284、 ocean carbon sinks.While there is no national-level policy,coastal regions have made local policies.For example,Zhejiang Province has released the Guidelines for Advancing Ocean Carbon Sink Capacity 40 ,aiming to create a model for ocean carbon sink development.Key goals to achieve by 2025 include
285、establishing a foundational research and monitoring system for ocean carbon sink,restoring 2,000 hectares of coastal wetlands,adding more than 200 hectares of mangroves,and rehabilitating 74 km of coastline.Hainan Province stated that it will finish an ocean sink baseline screening and launch five o
286、cean sink pilot programmes by 2024,according to the Hainan Province Pilot Work Plan for Carbon Sinks in Marine Ecosystems(2022-2024)41 .Shandong Province also included baseline screening for its coastal wetlands,ecological system restoration project,and several research programmes in the Shandong Pr
287、ovince Plan for Combating Climate Change during 14th FYP 42 .42 Shandong Provincial Leaders Group for Addressing Climate Change.(2022).Shandong Province Plan for Combating Climate Change during 14th FYP.http:/ .Policy.41 Hainan Provincial Ministry of Natural Resources and Planning.(2022).Hainan Prov
288、ince Pilot Work Plan for Carbon Sinks in Marine Ecosystems(2022-2024).http:/ .Policy.40 Development and Reform Commission of Zhejiang.(2023)Guidelines for Advancing Ocean Carbon Sink Capacity.https:/ 39 CCTV.(2023)Experts on Ocean Carbon Sink Accounting Methods.https:/ 38 National Forestry and Grass
289、land Administration of China.(2021).Guidelines for Validation and Verification of Forestry Carbon Projects.https:/ .National Standard.37 National Greening Commission.(2022).National Land Greening Planning Outline.(2022-2030).http:/ .Policy.36 Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,State C
290、ouncil.(2021).Working Guidance for Carbon Dioxide Peaking and Carbon Neutrality in Full and Faithful Implementation of the New Development Philosophy.https:/ .Policy.35 State Council of China.(2021)By 2025 Continuous Improvement in Urban and Rural Living Environments in Our Country,Village Greening
291、Coverage Rate Reaches 32.01%.https:/ News.32 Carbon emissions trading Since 2011,China has progressively launched carbon emissions trading pilot programmes in eight regions,including Beijing,Tianjin and Shanghai.In July 2021,the nationwide carbon emissions trading system began,covering the power sec
292、tor.The trading system differs from the“cap and trade”approach used in the EU in that its not designed to limit the total CO 2 emissions from the power sector but only to drive reductions in the emissions intensity of coal-and gas-fired power plants,mainly through improvements in thermal efficiency.
293、It does not,by design,encourage the replacement of fossil fuels with clean energy,or even the replacement of coal with gas.To play a significant role in power sector decarbonisation,the design of the scheme would therefore have to be revised significantly;this can however happen quite fast if the po
294、licymakers decide to do it.To ensure a stable power supply,the Carbon Emission Quota Scheme 43 grants exemptions to companies with significant quota shortfalls.This year,companies with a shortfall rate of 10%or more,and those temporarily unable to comply due to operational difficulties,can apply for
295、 the pre-allocation of a portion of the 2023 quotas to meet their compliance obligations.Its unclear if the policy will continue.The scope of carbon trading is meant to be expanded to cover other sectors besides power and,potentially,carbon sinks.The MEE has released a regulation defining the enterp
296、rises that are supposed to be included in carbon emissions trading 44 ,namely those with annual emissions exceeding 26,000 tonnes of CO 2 equivalent in the petrochemicals,chemicals,building materials,steel,non-ferrous metals,paper,and domestic civil aviation sectors.Another high-level policy documen
297、t,Opinions from Office of State Council on Establishing and Improving the Mechanism for Realising the Value of Ecological Products ,also emphasises improving carbon emission trading and calls for establishing carbon sink trading pilot programmes 45 .A?er more than six years of suspension,the nationa
298、l carbon credit programme(China Certified Emission Reduction,CCER)is about to relaunch by the end of 2023.In October 2023,the MEE released the Management Measures for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading(Trial)46 ,optimising the management approach for various aspects of voluntary greenhouse g
299、as emissions reduction,including methodologies,projects,emission reductions,accrediting and verification bodies,and trading entities.These measures serve as the foundational regulations to ensure the orderly operation of the CCER.CCER refers to the quantified verification of greenhouse gas emissions
300、 reductions from projects like renewable energy,forestry carbon sinks,and methane utilisation.These reductions can be used by regulated entities to offset their carbon emissions.46 Ministry of Ecology and Environment.(2023).Management Measures for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading(Trial).ht
301、tps:/ .Policy.45 Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,Office of State Council.(2021).Opinions on Establishing and Improving the Value Realisation Mechanism of Ecological Products.http:/ Ministry of Ecology and Environment of China.(2022).Notice on the Management of Corpora
302、te Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting in 2022.https:/ .Policy.43 Ministry of Ecology and Environment of China.(2023).Implementation Plan for the Total Allocation of Carbon Emission Trading Quotas for the Power Generation Industry in 2021 and 2022 Nationwide.https:/ 33 Carbon emissions monitoring,rep
303、orting,and verification and accounting system Regardless of the limited near-term impact on emissions,the introduction of the carbon trading scheme has heralded the creation of a regulatory framework and emissions monitoring,reporting,and verification(MRV)systems that make up the foundation of an ef
304、fective carbon trading system,and effective climate policy in general.The Notice on Carrying Out Greenhouse Gas Emission Reporting and Verification for Selected Key Industries for the Years 2023-2025 47 and the Guidelines for the Verification of Corporate Greenhouse Gas Emissions Report 48 are the m
305、ost recent guidelines for emission MRV,with many reporting guidelines that are also taking effect(accounting and reporting methods of these industries are released into three batches,by NDRC)49 ,50 ,51 .In the trading stage,Measures for the Administration of Carbon Emissions Trading is regulating th
306、e trading activity 52 .In April 2022,NDRC with other government departments jointly issued a plan 53 to create a standardised national and local carbon emissions accounting system.The National Bureau of Statistics was tasked with developing methods for this purpose.The plan also included annual carb
307、on emission calculations,improving industry and enterprise carbon accounting and enhancing greenhouse gas inventory mechanisms.The goal was to establish a unified and standardised carbon emissions accounting system by 2023.In November 2022,the State Administration for Market Regulation issued a plan
308、 54 to develop standards for carbon emissions monitoring,accounting and verification,essential for achieving carbon peak and neutrality.The plan aimed to establish the measurement system by 2025,covering major industries.In September 2023,MEE and NBS signed a framework agreement 55 to collaborate on
309、 carbon emissions accounting.This partnership aims to build a National Greenhouse Gas Emission Factor Database,strengthening Chinas foundational support for carbon accounting and enhancing transparency for compliance on carbon emissions.55 Ministry of Ecology and Environment.(2023)Ministry of Ecolog
310、y and Environment and National Bureau of Statistics Sign Cooperation Framework Agreement on Carbon Emission Statistical Accounting Work https:/ .News.54 State Administration for Market Regulation.(2022).Implementation Plan for Establishing and Improving the Carbon Peak and Carbon Neutrality Standard
311、 Measurement System.https:/ .Policy.53 National Development and Reform Commission.(2022).Implementation Plan for Accelerating the Establishment of a Unified and Standardised Carbon Emission Accounting System.https:/ .Policy.52 Ministry of Ecology and Environment of China.(2020).Measures for the Admi
312、nistration of Carbon Emissions Trading.https:/ .Policy.51 National Development and Reform Commission of China.(2015).Accounting and reporting methods of greenhouse gas emission for the 3rd batch-10 key industries.https:/ .Policy.50 National Development and Reform Commission of China.(2014).Accountin
313、g and reporting methods of greenhouse gas emission for the 2nd batch-4 key industries.https:/ .Policy.49 National Development and Reform Commission of China.(2013).Accounting and reporting methods of greenhouse gas emission for the 1st batch-10 key industries.http:/ .Policy.48 Ministry of Ecology an
314、d Environment.(2022)Guidelines for the Verification of Corporate Greenhouse Gas Emission Report.https:/ 47 Ministry of Ecology and Environment.(2023).The Notice on Carrying Out Greenhouse Gas Emission Reporting and Verification for Selected Key Industries for the Years 2023-2025.https:/ .Policy.34 L
315、ow carbon and zero carbon technologies The Ministry of Science and Technology,along with other departments,jointly released the 2022-2030 Implementation Plan for Technological Support for Carbon Peak and Carbon Neutrality 56 .Following this,several local governments including Shanghai,Jiangsu and He
316、bei have introduced their own plans to achieve dual carbon goals with technological backing.The significance of industrial and technology policy in Chinas carbon peak and carbon neutrality strategy is growing.The evidence of this is a wave of investment in manufacturing clean energy technologies,esp
317、ecially in solar,wind(details in 4.5.2)and electric vehicles(details in 4.7.2).The NDRC also clearly specified in the Implementation Plan for Further Enhancing the Market-Driven Green Technology Innovation System(2023-2025)57 that it intends to bolster financial and tax support for clean technologie
318、s.Currently,Chinas efforts in carbon neutrality technology focus on key areas such as clean and efficient coal utilisation,renewable energy technologies,low-carbon utilisation,and carbon capture and storage(CCUS).“Clean coal utilisation”includes technologies that make at most a marginal contribution
319、 to reducing emissions,such as unabated coal power plants using ultra-supercritical steam cycles,as well as ones that paradoxically have higher carbon emissions than the technologies they replace,especially coal-based synfuels and chemicals production(coal-to-chemicals industry).However,these techno
320、logies are o?en emphasised by officials as a showcase of emissions reduction achievements,as an alternative to limiting new coal projects.Technologies related to net zero carbon,such as CCUS,are currently in the industrial demonstration phase and are associated with relatively high costs.According t
321、o the China Annual Report on CCUS 2023 ,nearly 100 CCUS demonstration projects are operational or permitted.Among them,more than half have been constructed and put into construction,with a capacity to capture approximately 4 millions tons of CO 2 per year.The report suggests that it lays the foundat
322、ion for achieving large-scale applications in the near future.4.1.3 Data disclosure The government currently reports on the improvement in CO 2 intensity every year,which can be used to calculate the change in CO 2 emissions based on reported GDP growth.However,this is a rudimentary and non-transpar
323、ent way of reporting and doesnt include sinks or non-energy CO 2 emissions.Actual greenhouse gas emissions disclosure only takes place through Chinas national communications to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC),the most recent of which has data for 2014.Implementing d
324、ual control of carbon emissions(details in 4.1.2)hinges on building the necessary foundation capabilities,particularly in carbon emission data accounting.57 National Development and Reform Commission.(2022).Implementation Plan for Further Enhancing the Market-Driven Green Technology Innovation Syste
325、m(2023-2025).https:/ .Policy.56 Ministry of Science and Technology of China.(2022).Policy.2022-2023 Implementation Plan for Technological Support for Carbon Peak and Carbon Neutrality.https:/ .Policy.35 4.2 Non-CO 2 greenhouse gases 2023 highlights The Methane Emissions Control Action Plan was publi
326、shed,laying out Chinas approach to methane emission management and control.Besides rapid reductions in CO 2 emissions,the transition pathways consistent with the 1.5C target require more efforts to control other non-CO 2 greenhouse gases(NCGHGs).The total reductions in NCGHGs will reach 30%of the 20
327、14 emissions level(2,000 MtCO 2 -eq)in 2030 and 34%in 2050 in the 1.5C pathway.In the ICCSD 1.5C pathway,non-CO 2 emissions peak and fall below the 2020 level before 2025.Emissions stand at 2.38 GtCO 2 -eq in 2025 and fall to 1.2 GtCO 2 -eq in 2050.The ICCSDs 2C pathway projects that non-CO 2 GHG em
328、issions will peak in 2025 at 2.51 billion tCO 2 eq,with an average annual increase of 1.5%from 2020 to 2025,before falling to 1.76 GtCO 2 -eq in 2050,an annual rate of reductions of 1.4%.A?er CO 2 ,methane is the greenhouse gas that China emits the most in CO 2 -equivalent terms.In the ICCSD 2C path
329、way,methane emissions peak before 2025 at 1,220 MtCO 2 -eq and fall to 1,180 MtCO 2 -eq in 2030.Under the 1.5C scenario,methane emissions peak at the same level as the 2C pathway but around 2015 and then fall more rapidly to 790 MtCO 2 -eq by 2030.The ICCSD 1.5C pathway projects a peak in N 2 O emis
330、sions around 2020 at 580 million tCO 2 e,falling to 420 million tCO 2 e in 2030.F-gases emissions peak in 2030 at 730 MtCO 2 -eq and fall to 440 MtCO 2 -eq in 2050.The ICCSD 2C pathway sees N 2 O emissions reaching a peak around 2020,but at 650 million tCO 2 e and dropping to 570 million tCO 2 e in
331、2030,while F-gas emissions peak at the same level in the same year as the 1.5C pathway but drop to 510 million tCO 2 e in 2050.4.2.1 Policies in place China has long recognized the need to control non-CO 2 greenhouse gases,as shown by the inclusion of this area in the Action Plan for the 13th FYP ,p
332、ublished in 2016.However,more specific policies were not issued.In the 14th FYP,this was specified as“strengthen controlling of methane,HFCs and PFCs”.In the China National Implementation Progress Report on NDC(2022)58 China outlined its commitment to develop and execute an action plan for managing
333、non-CO 2 greenhouse gas emissions,and to improve monitoring and reporting techniques for these emissions.However,the action plan is yet to be published,and other policies have not included numerical targets.There is also no reporting on NCGHG emissions that would allow the assessment of emissions trends a?er 2014,the year covered by the latest official emissions inventory.Its currently not clear w