《世界银行:2022年贫困与共享繁荣报告(英文版)(271页).pdf》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《世界银行:2022年贫困与共享繁荣报告(英文版)(271页).pdf(271页珍藏版)》请在三个皮匠报告上搜索。
1、CourseCorrectingCorrectingCorrectingCourseCorrectingCourseCorrecting 2022 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank1818 H Street NW,Washington,DC 20433Telephone:202-473-1000;Internet:www.worldbank.orgSome rights reserved1 2 3 4 25 24 23 22This work is a product of the staf
2、f of The World Bank with external contributions.The findings,interpre-tations,and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank,its Board of Executive Directors,or the governments they represent.The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy,completeness,o
3、r currency of the data included in this work and does not assume responsibility for any errors,omissions,or discrepancies in the information,or liability with respect to the use of or failure to use the information,methods,processes,or conclusions set forth.The boundaries,colors,denominations,and ot
4、her information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.Nothing herein shall constitute or be construed or considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of th
5、e priv-ileges and immunities of The World Bank,all of which are specifically reserved.Rights and PermissionsThis work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license(CC BY 3.0 IGO)http:/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo.Under the Creative Commons Attribution license,you are
6、 free to copy,distribute,transmit,and adapt this work,including for commercial purposes,under the following conditions:AttributionPlease cite the work as follows:World Bank.Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2022:Correcting Course.Washington,DC:World Bank.doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1893-6.License:Creative Co
7、mmons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGOTranslationsIf you create a translation of this work,please add the following disclaimer along with the attribution:This translation was not created by The World Bank and should not be considered an official World Bank translation.The World Bank shall not be liable for
8、 any content or error in this translation.AdaptationsIf you create an adaptation of this work,please add the following disclaimer along with the attribution:This is an adaptation of an original work by The World Bank.Views and opinions expressed in theadaptation are the sole responsibility of the au
9、thor or authors of the adaptation and are not endorsed byTheWorld Bank.Third-party contentThe World Bank does not necessarily own each component of the content contained within the work.The World Bank therefore does not warrant that the use of any third-party-owned indi-vidual component or part cont
10、ained in the work will not infringe on the rights of those third parties.The risk of claims resulting from such infringement rests solely with you.If you wish to re-use a component of the work,it is your responsibility to determine whether permission is needed for that re-use and to obtain permissio
11、n from the copyright owner.Examples of components can include,but are not limited to,tables,figures,or images.All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to World Bank Publications,The World Bank Group,1818 H Street NW,Washington,DC 20433,USA;e-mail:pubrightsworldbank.org.ISBN(paper):978-
12、1-4648-1893-6ISBN(electronic):978-1-4648-1894-3DOI:10.1596/978-1-4648-1893-6Cover design:Bill Pragluski,Critical Stages,LLCInterior design:Ricardo Echecopar,Beyond SACLibrary of Congress Control Number:2022947109.vContents Foreword xiii Acknowledgments xv About the Team xvii Main Messages xxi Abbrev
13、iations xxv Overview 1Introduction 1Part 1.Progress on poverty and shared prosperity 2Part 2.Fiscal policy for an inclusive recovery 9Notes 22References 23Part 1.Progress on Poverty and Shared Prosperity 271 Global Poverty:The Biggest Setback in Decades 29Summary 29Setting the scene:Poverty on the e
14、ve of the pandemic 30Poverty over the pandemic period:The nowcast 46Implications for reaching the 3 percent global poverty target by 2030 56Notes 58References 602 Shared Prosperity and Inequality:Uneven Losses and an Uneven Recovery 63Summary 63Introduction 64Shared prosperity and inequality,201419
15、66Shared prosperity and inequality during COVID-19 74Global inequality 83Notes 88References 88viPOVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 20223 Beyond the Monetary Impacts of the Pandemic:A Lasting Legacy 91Summary 91Introduction 92Multidimensional poverty on the eve of the pandemic 94Pandemic impacts from a mu
16、ltidimensional perspective 98Notes 108References 109Part 2.Fiscal Policy for an Inclusive Recovery 111Why focus on fiscal policy?114What is in part 2?114Note 116References 1164 Protecting Households with Fiscal Policy:Learning from COVID-19 117Summary 117The nature of the fiscal response to the COVI
17、D-19 crisis 118The impact of the fiscal response on household welfare 121Factors that influenced the impact of fiscal policy 137Conclusion 142Notes 142References 1445 Taxes,Transfers,and Subsidies:Improving Progressivity and Reducing the Cost to the Poor 151Summary 151Introduction 152The impact of t
18、axes and transfers on short-term poverty andinequality 155Taxation and distribution 162Transfers and distribution 171Economies of all income levels and capacities can achieve progressive fiscal policy 177Conclusion 180Notes 182References 1846 Fiscal Policy for Growth:Identifying High-Value FiscalPol
19、icies 187Summary 187Introduction 187viiContentsMeasuring the value of fiscal policies 188Using information on the value of policies to informpolicychoices 191High-value policies that support growth 195Constraints on investing in high-value policies 201Increasing the value of policies through increas
20、ed efficiency of spending 202Conclusion 204Notes 205References 2057 Putting It All Together:Better Fiscal Policy for Reducing Poverty and Increasing Shared Prosperity 211Summary 211Accelerating progress with better fiscal policy:Different options for different countries 211Spending for faster growth
21、 213Positioning fiscal policy to protect households against future crises 215Raising revenue 221Data and evidence for better fiscal decision-making 229Can better fiscal policy put progress back on track?The need for global action 231Notes 235References 235Boxes O.1 Introducing the new 2017 PPP-based
22、 poverty lines 3 O.2 Measuring poverty in India 5 O.3 Tools that help to prioritize fiscal policies 17 1.1 How the new international poverty lineswere derived 31 1.2 New data now available to measure poverty in India 35 1.3 Predicting changes in poverty with nowcasts 46 1.4 The impacts of rising glo
23、bal food and energy prices on poverty 54 2.1 Data coverage:A growing challenge for measuring shared prosperity,particularly for poorer countries 64 2.2 Inequality and top incomes 71 2.3 Experiences on the ground with sharedprosperity 73 2.4 High-frequency phone surveys 77 3.1 Poverty-adjusted life e
24、xpectancy:An index aggregating poverty and mortality 99 3.2 Lifecycle foundations for multidimensional comparisons interms of years of life 103 4.1 COVID-19 cash transfers in Togo 131 5.1 The CEQ framework:An integrated approach to fiscal incidence analysis 153 5.2 Different types of tax instruments
25、 163 5.3 Incidence curves,concentration shares,and fiscal progressivity 165 5.4 Chile:The distributional impact of commonly missing CEQ fiscal instruments 170 5.5 Uruguay:The impact of indirect taxes and direct transfers 178 5.6 Bolivia and Ethiopia:Fiscal system impact on poverty and inequality 179
26、 6.1 Calculating the value of a policy using the MVPF 190 6.2 The progressivity of spending on education and health 196viiiPOVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2022 7.1 Digitalization can improve the efficiency of fiscal administration,but not without challenges 227 7.2 Nudging tax compliance:How behaviora
27、l science tools can improve compliance at low financial and politicalcosts 228 7.3 Using evidence and data to expand COVID-19 social protection in South Africa 229Figures O.1 The COVID-19 pandemic triggered a historic shock to global poverty 2 O.2 Recent global inequality trends were reversed in 202
28、0 4 O.3 Poverty reduction resumed slowly in 2021but may stall in 2022 7 O.4 A widespread reduction in poverty acrosscountries in 2020,followed by anascent and uneven recovery 8 O.5 Progress in poverty reduction has been altered in lasting ways 9 O.6 The interplay of shocks,policy,and poverty affects
29、 workplace mobility 11 O.7 Fiscal policy reduced the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on poverty but less so in poorer economies 12 O.8 Delivering support on time and to those in most need was challenging 14 O.9 In poorer economies,poorer householdsare more likely to be left withless money after taxes
30、have been paidand transfers received 15 O.10 Poorer economies rely more on indirect taxes,which are less progressive 16 O.11 Poorer economies spend less on transfersthan on subsidies,which benefitthe poor less 16 1.1 Global extreme poverty has continued tofall but at a slower rate in recent years 30
31、 B1.1.1 Poverty lines expressed in constant 2017 US$32 1.2 The global extreme poor are concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa 36 1.3 From 1990 to 2019,poverty fell in all regions except the Middle East and North Africa 37 1.4 Poverty rates are higher among children in every region 39 1.5 The extreme poo
32、r were less connected online going into the pandemic 40 1.6 Global poverty at higher poverty lines continued to fall,slowly 41 1.7 At the higher poverty lines,the regional distribution of the global poor changes 42 1.8 The cost of basic needs increases as countries grow 43 1.9 Progress has been made
33、 in reducing the societal poverty rate in recent years 44 B1.3.1 Cross-checking poverty derived using various methods,change in poverty,201920 48 1.10 The COVID-19 pandemic was a historic shock to global poverty 50 1.11 Poverty increased across income groups in 2020 and displayed an uneven recovery
34、in 202122 51 1.12 Poverty reduction stalled at all poverty lines in 2022 53 1.13 Poorer households spend more on food 56 1.14 Progress in poverty reduction has been altered in lasting ways 57 2.1 From 2014 to 2019,the vast majority ofeconomies made substantial progress insharedprosperity 67 2.2 Sign
35、ificant differences occured in sharedprosperity across regions and country income groups 68 2.3 Median income growth and shared prosperity are highly correlated 70 2.4 Within-country inequality was as likely to fall as to increase before the pandemic,but reductions in inequality were likely to be la
36、rger than increases 72 2.5 The pandemic led to large income losses among the bottom 40 75 2.6 Employment and income losses arising from the pandemic were severe,with certain groupsbeing hit harder 78 2.7 The pandemic likely harmed the quality of jobs among those who continued to work 80 2.8 In selec
37、ted countries,the probability of income loss was greater for the bottom 40 than the top60,especially in urban areas 81 2.9 Projected changes in the Gini index showno clear pattern across countries with different income levels,with increasesand decreases equally likely 82ixContents 2.10 The decline i
38、n global inequality before the pandemic reflects the strong income growthof the global middle class,whereas those in the bottom and the middle lost the most during the pandemic 84 2.11 The pandemic caused the largest increase in global inequality since World War II,after a steady decline over the pa
39、st two decades 85 2.12 An increase in between-country inequality was mainly responsible for the reversal in global inequality 86 2.13 The increase in between country inequality was driven by larger countries with large income shocks 87 2.14 The bottom 40 suffered a larger shock from the pandemic and
40、 is recovering more slowly than the top 60 88 3.1 Widespread learning losses were reported,especially among low-income countries during the COVID-19 crisis 93 3.2 Meals skipped were highest at the start of the COVID-19 crisis and in lower-income countries 94 3.3 Almost 40 percent of the multidimensi
41、onally poor are not monetarily poor 97 B3.1.1 Lower-income economies have experienced larger reductions in poverty-adjusted lifeexpectancy 101 B3.1.2 Reduction in poverty-adjusted life expectancy was driven by learning loss in lower-income countries and by increased mortality in higher-income countr
42、ies 102 3.4 The pandemics impact on well-being through additional current and future poverty and excess mortality varies substantially across economies 107 4.1 COVID-19 elicited an unprecedented,but highly unequal,fiscal response 119 4.2 Health spending increased,but the shareofspending on education
43、 fell in many countries 119 4.3 Nearly all countries provided support to households and firms,but the type ofsupport varied by income group 120 4.4 Household and firm outcomes are strongly correlated in low-and middle-income countries 121 4.5 Fiscal support received by households and firms was lower
44、 in poorer economies 122 4.6 Support provided to households had significant impact 125 4.7 Households quickly employed coping strategies in response to lower labor incomes 127 4.8 Countries announced fiscal support quickly at the outset of pandemic 127 4.9 Fiscal support often arrived after needs em
45、erged 128 4.10 In 2022,the fiscal response to rising foodand energy prices was much smallerand focused on subsidies 130 4.11 Countries implemented more broad-based support than targeted support during COVID-19 131 4.12 A breakdown by country income group reveals it was challenging to direct support
46、to need 134 4.13 In simulations,fiscal policy reduced the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on poverty but less so in poorer economies 136 4.14 Fiscal policy reduced poverty more when more was spent 138 4.15 A higher credit rating was correlated with a larger fiscal response and increased externalborrow
47、ing 138 4.16 Support reached more households in formal economies and in countries with high prepandemic rates of social assistance 140 B5.1.1 CEQ framework:Fiscal policy impacts on household income through taxes and transfers 153 5.1 Taxes,transfers,and subsidies reduce inequality in all economies,b
48、utindifferent ways,from different starting positions,and to different degrees 157 5.2 Taxes,transfers,and subsidies increase short-term poverty in a majority of non-HICs 160 5.3 Taxes,transfers,and subsidies increase consumable income for the poorest households at all income levels except LICs 161xP
49、OVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2022 5.4 Developing economies rely on indirect taxes for a majority of revenues;as economies get richer,they collect more through direct taxes,the main source ofOECD revenues 162 5.5 Direct taxes collect a higher percentage of income from richer households,but indirect t
50、axes collect more relative to incomes from poorer households 164 B5.3.1 Progressive,neutral,and regressive incidence curves 166 B5.3.2 Inequality-reducing and inequality-increasing concentration shares 167 5.6 Poorer households buy more from informal vendors,reducing their effective indirect tax rat
51、es 168 5.7 Richer economies spend more on education,health,and social protection 171 5.8 Subsidies are expensive in many developing economies,often exceeding social protectionbudgets 173 5.9 Most transfers go to poorer households and provide strong income support;most subsidies go to richer househol
52、ds and provide little support to poorer ones 175 5.10 The indirect tax burden usually exceeds the benefit of direct transfers for the poor in all but HICs 177 B5.5.1 Net incidence of transfers and indirect taxes in Uruguay 178 B5.6.1 Net incidence of transfers and indirect taxes in Bolivia 179 B5.6.
53、2 Net incidence of transfers and indirect taxes in Ethiopia 180 6.1 Fiscal policy trade-offs 192 B6.2.1 Education and health concentration shares,by income category and decile 196 6.2 Average MVPF of policies in the United States,and of two policies targeted to children in low-and middle-income coun
54、tries 197 7.1 Some countries are facing the dual challenge of stimulating recovery and coping with limited access to external finance 213 7.2 Improving fiscal policy can help recoverthe losses of 2020,but it requires historic efforts and does not result in ending extreme poverty by 2030 233 7.3 Many
55、 countries cannot recover the losses of 2020 by 2030,despite historic fiscal efforts 234Map 1.1 In 2019,countries with the highest poverty rate at the US$2.15-a-day poverty line were mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa 37Tables B1.1.1 Derivation of global poverty lines,2011 PPPs versus 2017 PPPs 32 B1.3.1
56、Method used for nowcasting global poverty in 2020 47 B2.1.1 Data coverage summary,shared prosperity,circa 201419 65 2.1 Summary,shared prosperity and shared prosperity premium,78 economies 69 2.2 Within-country inequality tended to decrease but with variations across world regions,201419 73 3.1 Depr
57、ivations in education and infrastructure raise the multidimensional poverty measure above monetary poverty 96 3.2 Multidimensional poverty declined in recent years,along with monetary poverty 98 3.3 Declines across all dimensions of the multidimensional poverty measure are apparent even when restric
58、ting comparison to a consistent set of economies over time 98 3.4 Years lost to premature mortality exceed increase in years lived in poverty in about half of economies 105 3.5 Years lost to premature mortality and the increase in years of future poverty exceed the increase in years of current pover
59、ty in most economies 108xiContents 4.1 Cross-country correlations highlight the importance of access to external borrowing 139 5.1 Number of fiscal incidence studies,by region and income category 155 6.1 Cash transfers are higher value and better targeted than subsidies 195 7.1 Comparison of risk fi
60、nancing instruments 217 7.2 Progressive fiscal policy strategies areavailable to all countries 222xiiiForewordCOVID-19 marked the end of a phase of global progress in poverty reduction.During the three decades that preceded its arrival,more than 1 billion people escaped extreme poverty.The incomes o
61、f the poorest nations gained ground.By 2015,the global extreme-poverty rate had been cut by more than half.Since then,poverty reduction has slowed in tandem with subdued global economic growth.The economic upheavals brought on by COVID-19 and later the war in Ukraine produced an outright reversal in
62、 progress.It became clear that the global goal of ending extreme poverty by 2030 would not be achieved.Given current trends,574 million peoplenearly 7 percent of the worlds populationwill still be living on less than US$2.15 a day in 2030,with most in Africa.In 2020 alone,the number of people living
63、 below the extreme poverty line rose by over 70 million.That is the largest one-year increase since global poverty monitoring began in 1990.Looking at poverty more broadly,nearly half the worldover 3 billion peoplelives on less than US$6.85 per day,which is the average of the national poverty lines
64、of upper-middle-income countries.Using that measure,poverty persists well beyond Africa.The prevalence and persistence of poverty darken the outlook for billions of people living around the world.The data confirm that the income losses of the poorest 40 percent of worlds population were twice as hig
65、h as those of the richest 20 percent.Global median income declined by 4 percent in 2020the first decline since our measurements of median income began in 1990.This decline represents a major setback for the goal of shared prosperity.The poorest also suffered disproportionate setbacks in education an
66、d health,with massive learning losses and shortened lifespans.These setbacks,if left unaddressed by policy action,will have lasting consequences for peoples lifetime income prospects and for development more broadly.This latest Poverty and Shared Prosperity report offers the first comprehensive look
67、 at the global landscape of poverty in the aftermath of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine.It outlines the limits of current fiscal policies for poverty reduction in low-and lower-middle-income economies,and points to the importance of reviving economic growth.It also shows the potential of fiscal-poli
68、cy reforms to help reduce poverty and support broad-based growth and development.Strong fiscal policy measures made a notable difference in reducing COVID-19s impact on poverty.In fact,the average poverty rate in developing economies would have been 2.4 percentage points higher without a fiscal resp
69、onse.Yet government spending proved far more beneficial to poverty reduction in the wealthiest countries,which generally managed to fully offset COVID-19s impact on poverty through fiscal policy and other emergency support measures.Developing economies had fewer resources and therefore spent less an
70、d achieved xivPOVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2022less:upper-middle-income economies offset just 50 percent of the poverty impact,and low-and lower-middle-income economies offset barely a quarter of the impact.The rise in poverty in poorer countries reflects economies that are more informal,social pro
71、tection systems that are weaker,and financial systems that are less developed.Yet several developing economies achieved notable successes during COVID-19.Helped by digital cash transfers,India managed to provide food or cash support to a remarkable 85 percent of rural households and 69 percent of ur
72、ban households.South Africa initiated its biggest expansion of the social safety net in a generation,spending US$6 billion on poverty relief that benefited nearly 29 million people.And Brazil managed to reduce extreme poverty in 2020 despite an economic contraction,primarily using a family-based dig
73、ital cash-transfer system.In short,fiscal policyprudently used and considering the initial country conditions in terms of fiscal spacedoes offer opportunities for policy makers in developing economies to step up the fight against poverty and inequality.To realize the potential of fiscal measures,the
74、 report calls for action on three fronts:Choose targeted cash transfers instead of broad subsidies.Half of all spending on energy subsidies in low-and middle-income economies went to the richest 20 percent of the population,who also happen to consume more energy.Targeted cash transfers are a far mor
75、e effective mechanism for supporting poor and vulnerable groups:more than 60 percent of spending on cash transfers goes to the bottom 40 percent.Cash transfers also have a larger impact on income growth than subsidies.Prioritize public spending for long-term growth.COVID-19 has underlined how progre
76、ss achieved over decades can vanish suddenly.High-return investments in education,research and development,and infrastructure projects should be made now.Governments need to improve their preparation for the next crisis.They also should improve the efficiency of their spending.Better procurement pro
77、cesses and incentives for public sector managers can boost both the quality and efficiency of government spending.Mobilize tax revenues without hurting the poor.This can be done by introducing property taxes,broadening the base of personal and corporate income taxes,and reducing regressive tax exemp
78、tions.If indirect taxes need to be raised,their design should minimize economic distortions and negative distributional impacts,and they should be accompanied with targeted cash transfers protecting the incomes of the most vulnerable households.Restoring progress in poverty reduction is possible whe
79、n helped by strong and broad-based economic growthnot only in the poorest economies but in middle-income economies as well.The policy reforms outlined in this report can help in achieving the necessary course corrections,recognizing that it will likely require stronger global growth and focused poli
80、cy adjustments.David MalpassPresidentWorld Bank GroupxvThe preparation of this report was co-led by Jed Friedman and Ruth Hill.The core team included Jessica Adler,Pierre Bachas,Katy Bergstrom,Ben Brunckhorst,Benoit Decerf,Uche Ekhator-Mobayode,Yeon Soo Kim,Christoph Lakner,Daniel Gerszon Mahler,Mar
81、ta Schoch,Mahvish Shaukat,Mariano Sosa,Samuel Kofi Tetteh-Baah,Matthew Wai-Poi,and Nishant Yonzan.The extended team included,Evie Calcutt,Andres Castaneda,Mark Conlon,Leif Jensen,Jose Ernesto Lopez-Cordova,Arthur Galego Mendes,Rose Mungai,Minh Cong Nguyen,Stephen Michael Pennings,Tatiana Skalon,Vero
82、nica Montalva Talledo,Marika Verulashvili,Martha Viveros,and Kushan Sanuka Weerakoon,all of whom provided key inputs.Jessica Adler was project coordinator,and Anna Regina Rillo Bonfield,Karem Edwards,and Claudia Gutierrez provided general support to the team.The authors are especially appreciative o
83、f the Poverty and Inequality Data Team;the Data for Goals(D4G)Team,in particular Carolina Diaz-Bonilla,Minh Cong Nguyen,and Rose Mungai;and the regional statistical teams for their tireless work to ensure consistency and accuracy in global poverty monitoring and projections.The authors benefitted fr
84、om discussions with the staff of the International Comparison Program Global Office at the World Bank,particularly Maurice Nsabimana,Marko Olavi Rissanen,and Mizuki Yamanaka.This work was conducted under the general direction of Deon Filmer,Haishan Fu,and Carolina Snchez-Pramo,with additional input
85、from Benu Bidani,Luis Felipe Lopez-Calva,Berk Ozler,and Umar Serajuddin.The team is also grateful for the overall guidance received from Indermit Gill,Aart Kraay,and Carmen Reinhart.The report would not have been possible without the communications,editorial,and publishing teams.Elizabeth Howton,Anu
86、graha Palan,and Joe Rebello led the communications strategy and engagement,with support from Paul Blake,Paul Gallagher,Nicholas Nam,Inae Riveras,Shane Kimo Romig,Torie Smith,and Nina Vucenik.The report was edited by Gwenda Larsen,Catherine Lips,Sabra Ledent,Honora Mara,and Sara Proehl,and designed b
87、y Ricardo Echecopar and Bill Pragluski.Alberto Cairo and Divyanshi Wadhwa provided data visualization services.Mary Fisk,Amy Lynn Grossman,Patricia Katayama,and Yaneisy Martinez from the World Bank Groups Publishing Program managed the editing,design,typesetting,translation,and printing of the repor
88、t.The team gratefully acknowledges the advice from peer reviewers and external advisers.Peer reviewers for this report included Paloma Anos Casero,Dean Jolliffe,Ambar Narayan,Norbert Schady,and Celine Thevenot.External advisers included Stefan Dercon,Nathan Hendren,and Nora Lustig.Patrick Heuveline
89、also provided expert guidance.In addition,the team would like tothank the many World Bank colleagues who provided comments during the preparation of AcknowledgmentsxviPOVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2022this report.In particular,the team is grateful for comments from Alan Fuchs,Ugo Gentilini,Alvaro Go
90、nzalez,Chadi Bou Habib,Alaka Holla,Gabriela Inchauste,Maria Ana Lugo,Johan Mistiaen,Yuko Okamura,Pierella Paci,and Rinku Murgai.The team also benefited from many helpful discussions with teams across the World Bank Group,including the Office of the Chief Economist of the Human Development Global Pra
91、ctice.The report is a joint project of the Development Data and Development Research Groups in the Development Economics Vice Presidency,and the Poverty and Equity Global Practice in the Equitable Growth,Finance and Institutions Vice Presidency of the World Bank.Financing from the government of the
92、United Kingdom helped support analytical work through the Data and Evidence for Tackling Extreme Poverty Research Programme.xviiCo-Leads of the ReportJed Friedman is a lead economist in the Development Research Group(Poverty and Inequality Team)at the World Bank.His research interests include the me
93、asurement of well-being and poverty as well as the evaluation of health and social policies.His current work involves investigating the effectiveness of health financing reforms,assessing the nutritional and development gains from early life investment programs,and incorporating new approaches to su
94、rvey-based well-being measurement.Jeds previous work has appeared in the Journal of the European Economic Association,the Review of Economics and Statistics,the Journal of Development Economics,the Journal of Human Resources,The Lancet,and other outlets.Jed holds a BA in philosophy from Stanford Uni
95、versity and a PhD in economics from the University of Michigan.Ruth Hill is a lead economist in the Global Unit of the Poverty and Equity Global Practice at the World Bank.Previously,she worked in the Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia units on rural income diagnostics,poverty assessments,systematic
96、country diagnostics,and an urban safety net project.From 2019 to 2021,Ruth was on external service as the chief economist at the UKgovernments Centre for Disaster Protection.Before joining the World Bank in 2013,she was a senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute,whe
97、re she conducted impact evaluations on insurance,credit,and market interventions.Ruth has published in the Journal of Development Economics,World Bank Economic Review,Economic Development and Cultural Change,Experimental Economics,the American Journal of Agricultural Economics,and World Development.
98、She has a DPhil in economics from the University of Oxford.Core TeamJessica Adler is a senior operations officer in the World Banks Global Unit of the Poverty and Equity Global Practice.She supports the delivery of the Poverty and Equity work program,including strategyand program design,operational
99、advice,quality assurance,portfolio management,and results monitoring.Jessica also serves as the program manager for the Umbrella Facility for the Poverty and Equity trust fund.She holds a BA in international economics from George Washington University and an MPP from George Mason University.Pierre B
100、achas is an economist in the Development Research Group(Macroeconomics and Growth Team)at the World Bank.His research focuses on public finance in developing countries,About the TeamxviiiPOVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2022in particular,on optimal tax design and challenges to tax collection faced by l
101、ow-and middle-income countries as a result of tax evasion,informality,and differences in economic structure.Prior to joining the World Bank,Pierre was a postdoctoral researcher at Princeton University.He holds a PhD in economics from the University of California,Berkeley.Katy Bergstrom is an economi
102、st in the World Banks Development Research Group(Poverty and Inequality Team).Her research interests lie at the intersection of public and development economics,specifically in optimal taxation and redistribution in developing countries,the determinants of income inequality,and investment differenti
103、als among children.Katy holds a BS in economics and mathematics from the University of Canterbury,New Zealand,and a PhD in economics from Stanford University.Ben Brunckhorst is a consultant in the Global Unit of the Poverty and Equity Global Practice at the World Bank.His research interests include
104、climate change and poverty,disaster risk finance,and public infrastructure investment.Before joining the World Bank,he was a research assistant at the University of Oxford and the UK governments Centre for Disaster Protection.Ben holds bachelor degrees in engineering and economics from the Universit
105、y of Queensland,and an MSc in economics for development from the University of Oxford.Benoit Decerfis a research economist in the Development Research Group at the World Bank.He is an applied micro-theorist whose research interests include poverty measurement,welfare economics,and mechanism design.H
106、is current research on poverty measurement focuses on the design of poverty indicators aggregating different dimensions of deprivation,for example,combining subsistence and social participation,or combining poverty and mortality.Benoit holds an MS from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and a PhD fr
107、om the Universit Catholique de Louvain,both in Belgium.Uche Ekhator-Mobayode is a World Bank Young Professional in the Global Unit of the Poverty and Equity Global Practice.She was previously an assistant professor of economics at the University of Pittsburgh at Bradford.Her previous World Bank expe
108、rience includes one year with the pioneer cohort of the Forced Displacement Research Fellowship in 2018,and as a consultant on the Gender Dimensions of Forced Displacement project with the Global Gender Unit.Uche completed her PhD in economics at Northern Illinois University.Yeon Soo Kim is a senior
109、 economist in the Global Unit of the Poverty and Equity Global Practice,where she co-leads the global program on the distributional impact of the COVID-19 crisis.Shepreviously worked in the Europe and Central Asia and South Asia regions and was based in the Sri Lanka country office from 2018 to 2021
110、.Yeon Soo has led and contributed to reports on a wide range of topics,including poverty,inequality,fiscal incidence,informality,and spatial disparities.Before joining the World Bank,she was an associate research fellow at the Korea Development Institute,where she worked on labor and health issues.S
111、he holds a PhD in economics from the University of Maryland,College Park.Christoph Lakneris a senior economist in the Development Data Group at the World Bank.His research interests include inequality,poverty,and labor markets in developing countries.In particular,he has been working on global inequ
112、ality,the relationship between inequality of opportunity and growth,the implications of regional price differences for inequality,and the xixAbout the teAmincome composition of top incomes.He is also involved in the World Banks global poverty monitoring.Christoph leads the Poverty and Inequality Dat
113、a Team,which publishes the Poverty and Inequality Platform,the home of the World Banks global poverty numbers.He holds a BA in economics,an MPhil,and a DPhil from the University of Oxford.Daniel Gerszon Mahleris an economist in the Development Data Group,where he is part of the Sustainable Developme
114、nt Statistics Team and the team behind the Poverty and Inequality Platform.Prior to joining the World Bank,he was a visiting fellow at Harvard Universitys Department of Government and worked for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.He holds a PhD in economics from the University of Copenhagen.Dani
115、el conducts research related to the measurement of poverty,inequality,and well-being.Marta Schoch is a consultant in the Development Data Group at the World Bank,contributing to the groups work on global poverty and inequality measurement.Her research interests are in political economy,inequality,an
116、d poverty,with a focus on the formation of political preferences and its link with inequality.Since she joined the World Bank in 2020,she worked on the Poverty and Shared Prosperity Report 2020 and contributed to the Nigeria Poverty Assessment 2022.Previously,she worked for the University of Sussex,
117、the Migrating out of Poverty Research consortium,and the Imperial College London.Marta holds a PhD in economics from the University of Sussex.Mahvish Shaukat is an economist in the World Banks Development Research Group(Macroeconomics and Growth Team).Her research studies issues in governance,politi
118、cal economy,and public finance,with the goal of understanding how institutions and incentives shape state efficacy and citizen welfare.Mahvish holds a PhD in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.Mariano Sosa is a consultant for the Global Unit of the Poverty and Equity Global Pra
119、ctice at the World Bank.His research interests include public finance and fiscal policy.His areas of expertise are fiscal incidence analysis,social policy,and the redistributive impact of fiscal policy in developing countries.Before joining the World Bank,Mariano was a research fellow for the Resear
120、ch Department of the Inter-American Development Bank.He holds an MPA in international development from Harvard Kennedy School.Samuel Kofi Tetteh-Baah is a consultant in the Development Data Group at the World Bank,Washington,DC.He generally works on the empirical analysis of poverty and inequality.H
121、e has primarily been assessing the impact of purchasing power parity data on global poverty estimates.He holds a PhD in development economics from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology,Zrich,Switzerland.Matthew Wai-Poi is a lead economist in the World Banks Poverty and Equity Global Practice,whe
122、re he supports the regional work program in East Asia and Pacific on understanding and addressing poverty and inequality,as well as on topics such as the middle class,top incomes,female labor force participation,and the distributional impacts of climate change.He is also global lead for the Distribu
123、tional Impacts of Fiscal and Social Policies.Previously,also at the World Bank,he worked on poverty and inequality issues in the Middle East and North Africa,including the role of gender and displacement,and was based in Jakarta for eight years.He was co-editor of xxPOVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 202
124、2the recent flagship report on Targeting in Social Assistance and has published in the Journal of Political Economy and American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings,among others.Matthew has a PhD in economics from Columbia University and degrees in law and business.He worked in management co
125、nsulting before joining the World Bank.Nishant Yonzan is a consultant for the Development Data Group(Poverty and Inequality Data Team)at the World Bank,contributing to the groups global agenda on measuring poverty and inequality.His research interests include the measurement and the causes and conse
126、quences of economic poverty and inequality.Some of his work has highlighted the role of institutions in shaping economic distributions and civil conflict,the impact of COVID-19 on poverty and inequality,the effect of cash transfers on fertility,and the differences in top incomes captured in survey a
127、nd tax data.Nishant holds a PhD in economics from the Graduate Center of the City University of New York.xxiThe World Banks latest Poverty and Shared Prosperity report provides the first comprehensive look at global poverty in the aftermath of an extraordinary series of shocks to the global economy.
128、The COVID-19 pandemic dealt the biggest setback to global poverty in decades.The pandemic increased the global extreme poverty rate to an estimated 9.3 percent in 2020up from 8.4 percent in 2019.That indicates that more than 70 million people were pushed into extreme poverty by the end of 2020,incre
129、asing the global total to over 700 million.2020 marked a historic turning pointan era of global income convergence gave way to global divergence.The worlds poorest people bore the steepest costs of the pandemic.Incomes in the poorest countries fell much more than incomes in rich countries.As a resul
130、t,the income losses of the worlds poorest were twice as high as the worlds richest,and global inequality rose for the first time in decades.The poorest also suffered disproportionately in many other areas that directly affect their well-being.For example,they faced large setbacks in health and educa
131、tion,with devastating consequences,including premature mortality and pronounced learning losses.These setbacks,if left unaddressed by policy action,will have lasting consequences for peoples lifetime income prospects.The economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic has been uneven.The richest econom
132、ies have recovered from the pandemic at a much faster pace than low-and middle-income economies.Rising food and energy pricesfueled by climate shocks and conflict among the worlds biggest food producershave hindered a swift recovery.By the end of 2022,as many as 685 million people could still be liv
133、ing in extreme poverty.This would make 2022 the second-worst year for poverty reduction in the past two decades(after 2020).These setbacks occurred when the speed of progress toward poverty reduction was already slowing.In the five years leading up to the pandemic,poverty reduction had slowed to 0.6
134、 percentage point per year.Before 2020,the world was already significantly off course on the global goal of ending extreme poverty by 2030.This report projects that 7 percent of the worlds populationroughly 574 million peoplewill still struggle in extreme poverty in 2030.That is far short of the glo
135、bal goal of 3 percent in 2030.Further,the report shows that in 2019 nearly half of the worlds population(47 percent)lives in poverty when this is measured as living on less than US$6.85 a day.Main MessagesxxiiPOVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2022These setbacks call for a major course correction.Despite
136、 difficult global and domestic circumstances,policy makers must redouble their efforts to grow their economies in the coming yearswhile paying careful attention to who benefits from that growth.The need for growth that boosts the incomes of the poorest could not be greater than it is today.Resilient
137、 recovery will depend on a wide range of policies.This report focuses on fiscal policya key area at the center of pandemic and postpandemic responses.Fiscal policy concerns how governments raise revenue and spend public resources.This report offers new analysis on how fiscal policy was used during t
138、he first year of the pandemic.It also sheds light on the impact of taxes,transfers,and subsidies on poverty and inequality in 94 countries before 2020,providing important new insights into the impacts of fiscal policynot only during crises but also during normal conditions.Fiscal policy made a notic
139、eable difference in reducing the pandemics impact on poverty.Without it,the average poverty rate in developing economies,assessed at national poverty lines,would have been 2.4 percentage points higher than it was.Yet fiscal policy was much less protective in poorer economies than in richer ones.Most
140、 high-income economies fully offset the pandemics impacts on poverty through the use of fiscal policy,and upper-middle-income economies offset one-half of the impact.However,low-and lower-middle-income economies offset only one-quarter of the impact.The differences in effectiveness reflected more li
141、mited access to finance,weaker delivery systems,and higher levels of informality,which made protecting jobs much more challenging.In general,low-and middle-income economies tend to be less successful than high-income ones in ensuring that the combination of taxes,transfers,and subsidies benefit the
142、poor.Taxes finance spending on core services and investments,and transfers and subsidies can offset their impact on household incomes.But in two-thirds of low-and middle-income economies,the income of poor households falls by the time taxes have been paid and trans fers and subsidies have been recei
143、ved.This divergence is due in part to the larger share of the informal sector in those economies.As a consequence,taxes are predominantly collected indirectlythrough sales and excise taxesand income transfers are often too low to compensate.Given these structural challenges,this report identifies th
144、ree key priority actions for fiscal policy in the coming years,as countries work to correct course:1.Reorient spending away from subsidies toward support targeted to poor and vulnerable groups.Subsidies are often poorly targeted.For example,one-half of all spending on energy subsidies in low-and mid
145、dle-income economies goes to the richest 20 percent of the population,who consume more energy.In contrast,programs like targeted cash transfers are far more likely to reach poor and vulnerable groups.More than 60 percent of spending on cash transfers goes to the bottom 40 percent.Cash transfers also
146、 tend to have a larger impact on income growth than subsidies.2.Increase public investment that sup ports long-run development.Some of the highest-value public spendingsuch as investments in the human capital of young people or investments in infrastructure and research and developmentcan have a ben
147、eficial impact on growth,inequality,or poverty decades later.Amid crises,it is difficult to protect such xxiiimAin messAgesinvestments,but it is essential to do so.The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that hard-won progress achieved over decades can suddenly vanish.Designing forward-looking fiscal polici
148、es today can help countries to be better prepared and protected against future crises.3.Mobilize revenue without hurting the poor.This can be accomplished through property and carbon taxes and by making personal and corporate income taxes more progressive.Ifindirect taxes need to be raised,cash tran
149、sfers can be simultaneously used to offset their effects on the most vulnerable households.Reforming fiscal policy will be an essential element of correcting course,but we must be realistic about how much we can expect it to do.Despite the promise of fiscal reforms,simulations suggest it will take h
150、eroic efforts toward more effective fiscal policy choices to restore the pandemic-related losses in the next four to five years.Successful fiscal reform will require the support of sufficiently powerful domestic coalitions interested in pursuing these types of policy goals,as well as stepped-up glob
151、al cooperation.Accelerating global poverty reduction,and progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals,will require more comprehensive policy action.This will involve a broader set of policies to stimulate the kind of growth that can benefit people across all income levelsbut particularly those
152、at the bottom.Correcting course is both urgent and difficult.Even if the course correction proves insufficient to end extreme poverty by 2030,it must begin nowfor the sake of a lasting recovery from the overlapping crises of today.xxvAbbreviationsBPS business pulse surveysCCT conditional cash transf
153、erCEA cost-effectiveness analysisCEQ Commitment to EquityCIT corporate income taxCPHS Consumer Pyramids Household SurveyGDP gross domestic productGDSP Global Database of Shared ProsperityGIC growth incidence curveGMD Global Monitoring DatabaseHFPS high-frequency phone surveysHIC high-income countryI
154、MF International Monetary FundLIC low-income countryLMIC lower-middle-income countryMCPF marginal cost of public fundsMEB marginal excess burdenMIC middle-income countryMPM multidimensional poverty measureMSME micro,small,and medium enterprisesMVPF marginal value of public fundsNCD noncommunicable d
155、iseaseNSS National Sample SurveyOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentPALE poverty-adjusted life expectancyPDI pensions as deferred incomePFP pay-for-performance(program)PGT pensions as government transferPIP Poverty and Inequality PlatformPIT personal income taxPPP purchasing p
156、ower paritiesR&D research and developmentSPP shared prosperity premiumxxviPOVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2022SPL societal poverty lineTCC tax compliance costsUCT unconditional cash transferUMIC upper-middle-income countryVAT value added taxWHO World Health Organization1IntroductionThe COVID-19 pandem
157、ic triggered a pronounced setback in the fight against global povertylikely the largest setback since World War II.Many low-and middle-income countries have yet to see a full recovery.High indebtedness in many countries has hindered a swift recovery,while rising food and energy pricesfueled in part
158、by the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine and climate shocks among the worlds biggest food producershave made areturn to progress on poverty reduction more challenging than ever.These setbacks have altered the trajectory of poverty reduction in large and lasting ways,sending the world even furt
159、her off course on the goal of ending extreme poverty by 2030.The year 2020 marked a historic turning pointan era of global income convergence gave way to global divergence as the worlds poorest people were hardest hit.The richest people have recovered from the pandemic at a faster pace,further exace
160、rbating differences.These diverging fortunes between the global rich and poor ushered in the first rise in global inequality in decades.COVID-19,along with surging relative hikes in food and energy prices,have affected every economy around the world.Yet the impact has not been uniform across countri
161、es.In fact,it has been a function of the policy choices made during the crisis.Similarly,a range of policies and actions today will be critical to a resilient recovery tomorrow.This report focuses on fiscal policy:how governments raise revenue and spend public resources.Fiscal policy is a main instr
162、ument used by governments to address immediate needs and pro-mote long-term growth,with wide-ranging impacts on poverty and inequality.For many coun-tries,fiscal policy is currently under considerable pressure.The fiscal demands of responding to a sustained crisis have left little fiscal space for a
163、dditional spending,given that many countries already had little fiscal space at the onset of the pandemic(a result of years of lower growth and high debt).History shows that the fiscal choices that governments make in these moments can act as a lifeline for poor and vulnerable householdsor they can
164、further impoverish and increase inequality.This report offers new analysis of how fiscal policy was used during the first year of the pandemic.It also sheds light on the impact of taxes,transfers,and subsidies on poverty and inequality in 94 countries before 2020,providing important new insights int
165、o the impacts of fiscal policy not only during crises but also under normal conditions.The analysis shows that the ability of fiscal policy to protect welfare during crises is limited in poorer countries.Fiscal policies fully offset the impact of COVID-19 on poverty in high-income countries(HICs),bu
166、t they offset barely a quarter of the impact in low-income countries(LICs)and lower-middle-income countries(LMICs).Improving support to households as crises continue will require reorienting protective spending away from generally regressive and inefficient subsidies and Overview2POVERTY AND SHARED
167、PROSPERITY 2022toward a direct transfer support systema first key priority.Reorienting fiscal spending toward sup-porting growth should be a second key priority.Some of the highest-value public spendingsuch as investments in the human capital of young citizens or investments in infrastructure and re
168、search and development(R&D)often pays out decades later.Amid crises,it is difficult to protect such investments,but it is essential to do so.Finally,it is not enough just to spend wiselywhen addi-tional revenue does need to be mobilized,it must be done in a way that minimizes reductions in poor peop
169、les incomes.Exploring underused forms of progressive taxation(such as property,health,or carbon taxes)and increasing the efficiency of tax collection can help in this regard.What follows is a description of the two parts of this report,the first part painting in broad strokes the poverty and inequal
170、ity trends since 2020,and the second part describing the possible role of fiscal policy in addressing the current crisis and putting poverty reduction back on track.Part 1.Progress on poverty and shared prosperityThree decades of successful global poverty and inequality reductionhit the pandemic wal
171、l in 2020The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 marked a turning point in the 30-year pursuit of successful poverty reduction.Global poverty had declined from more than one in three persons(38 percent of the global population)in 1990 to less than one in 10 persons(8.4 percent)by 2019.1 The pande
172、mic,delivering a broad-based shock to the global economy,triggered the first increase in extreme poverty in more than two decades(figure O.1).Because of a lack of official FIGURE O.1The COVID-19 pandemic triggered a historic shock to global povertySources:World Bank estimates based on Mahler,Yonzan,
173、and Lakner,forthcoming;World Bank,Poverty and Inequality Platform,https:/pip.worldbank.org;World Bank,Global Economic Prospects database,https:/databank.worldbank.org/source/global-economic-prospects.Note:Panel a shows the global poverty headcount rate at the US$2.15 a day poverty line for 19502020.
174、“Historical data”for the period 19902019 are from the Poverty and Inequality Platform.“Backcast”estimates are extrapolated backward from the 1990 lineup using growth in national accounts.National accounts data before 1990 are from World Bank,World Development Indicators database,https:/databank.worl
175、dbank.org/source/world-development-indicators;International Monetary Fund,World Economic Outlook,https:/www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLs/world-economic-outlook-databases;Bolt and van Zanden 2020.“Current projection”uses the nowcast methodology outlined in chapter 1 and a variety of data sources t
176、o project the latest 2019 lined-up estimate to 2020.“Pre-COVID-19 projection”extrapolates the 2019 lineup to 2020 using per capita gross domestic product(GDP)growth forecasts from the January 2020 Global Economic Prospects database.Panel b shows the annual percentage point change in the global pover
177、ty headcount rate.Pre-COVID-19 projectionCurrent projectiona.Poverty rate (at the US$2.15 a day poverty line)BackcastHistorical dataBackcastHistorical datab.Annual changePercentage pointsPercent002060002089620020
178、8.49.38.1Percent3oVeRVieWsurvey data in many countries,uncertainty does exist around the poverty estimates for2020,and they will continue to be updated as more information becomes available.The survey work on which poverty numbers rely was halted or conducted by phone(rather than via the usual in-pe
179、rson interviews)during the peak of the crisis in the second quarter of 2020.Nevertheless,survey-informed assessments are now possible for an increasing number of countries.Taken together,they point to an increase in poverty that is large by historic standards.The incomes of the poorest 40 percent of
180、 the worlds population likely fell by 4 percent in 2020.As a result,the number of people living in extreme poverty likely increased by 11 percent in 2020from 648 million to 719 million.This increase pushed the extreme poverty rate 1.2 percentage points higher than projections going into the year(ext
181、reme poverty had been expected to fall).This is a historic setback in the fight against global poverty.Although data prior to 1990 are largely imputed based on national growth rates,and thus are more uncertain,the global scale of the pandemic shock likely renders the current shock the largest since
182、1945.Typically,past shocks(such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis,which resulted in a 0.2 percentage point increase in global poverty)tended to affect particular countries or regions.The current economic shock has led to widespread losses in employment and income as people stopped working and reduc
183、ed consump-tion in every region of the world.Data collected by the World Bank using high-frequency phone surveys during the COVID-19 crisis found that,on average,23 percent of respondents in the coun-tries surveyed reported that they stopped working from April to June 2020,and 60 percent reported lo
184、sing income.This report documents these trends using new poverty lines based on the 2017 round of International Comparison Program(ICP)price data collected to generate estimates of purchasing power parity(PPP)(see box O.1).All poverty estimates in this report use the 2017 PPP-based BOX O.1Introducin
185、g the new 2017 PPP-based poverty linesThe 2019 poverty numbers are the first to adopt the new estimates of global prices from the 2017 round of purchasing power parities(PPPs)that enable international comparisons of living standards across countries.With the new PPPs,the international poverty lines
186、were revised.International poverty lines are calculated as the median of national poverty lines in low-income countries(LICs),lower-middle-income countries(LMICs),and upper-middle-income countries(UMICs),converted to US dollars using PPP exchange rates.The extreme poverty line of US$1.90(2011 PPP)in
187、creased to US$2.15(2017 PPP).The higher poverty line typically used to measure poverty in LMICs was updated from US$3.20(2011 PPP)to US$3.65(2017 PPP)and in UMICs from US$5.50(2011 PPP)to US$6.85(2017 PPP).This change,however,does not mean the new extreme poverty line is now higher,and therefore mor
188、e people will be counted as living in extreme poverty.The increase in the international poverty line from US$1.90 to US$2.15 primarily reflects the difference between 2017 and 2011 nominal dollar values.The change in the global poverty rate due to these updated poverty lines is thus negligible.As a
189、result,the new extreme poverty line does not dramatically change the number of people living in extreme poverty in 2019.Extreme poverty decreases slightly,by 0.3 percentage point,to 8.4 percent,reducing the global count of the extreme poor by 20 million.This is also true of the increase from US$3.20
190、 to US$3.65 for LMICs,and thus the poverty rate also increases slightly at the global level by 0.5 percentage point.In UMICs,the national poverty lines have increased in real terms,on average,so the change in the international poverty line from US$5.50 to US$6.85 represents an increase in real as we
191、ll as nominal terms.The global poverty rate at this line increased from 43 percent to 47 percent.4POVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2022FIGURE O.2Recent global inequality trends were reversed in 2020Sources:World Bank estimates based on Mahler,Yonzan,and Lakner,forthcoming;World Bank,Poverty and Inequal
192、ity Platform,https:/pip.worldbank.org;World Bank,Global Economic Prospects database,https:/databank.worldbank.org/source/global-economic-prospects.Note:Panel a shows the global Gini index for 1950 to 2020.“Historical data”for the period 19902019 are from the Poverty and Inequality Platform.“Backcast
193、”estimates are extrapolated backward from the 1990 lineup using growth in national accounts.National accounts data before 1990 are from World Bank,World Development Indicators database,https:/databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators;International Monetary Fund,World Economic Outloo
194、k,https:/www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLs/world-economic-outlook-databases;Bolt and van Zanden 2020.“Current projection”uses the nowcast methodology outlined in chapter 1 and a variety of data sources to project the latest 2019 lined-up estimate to 2020.“Pre-COVID-19 projection”extrapolates the 2
195、019 lineup to 2020 using per capita gross domestic product(GDP)growth forecasts from the January 2020 Global Economic Prospects database.Panel b shows the annual change in the global Gini Index,in Gini points.Pre-COVID-19 projectionCurrent projection6360666972a.Global inequality(Gini index)BackcastH
196、istorical dataBackcastHistorical datab.Annual percentage change in global inequality0020102020Gini indexAnnual change(Gini points)1.00.50.501.0002002062.062.661.9Gini indexpoverty lines.This updated approach changes the spe
197、cification of the extreme-poverty line from US$1.90(2011 PPP)to US$2.15(2017 PPP),as well as the specification of other international poverty lines.The rise in global poverty is not limited to extreme poverty measured at the international pov-erty line.At the US$3.65 poverty line,the line for the ty
198、pical LMIC,global poverty increased by about 1.3 percentage pointsfrom 23.5 percent in 2019 to 24.8 percent in 2020.At the US$6.85 poverty line,the line for the typical upper-middle-income country(UMIC),the poverty head-count rate also increased by 1.2 percentage points in 2020(equivalent to 134 mil
199、lion more poor people).The pandemic also increased global inequality.In terms of lost income,the worlds poor paidthe highest price for the pandemic:the percentage income losses of the poorest were estimated to be double those of the richest.The global Gini coefficient increased by a little over 0.5
200、points during the pandemic,from 62 points in 2019 to an estimated 62.6 points in 2020(figure O.2).By contrast,earlier years had seen a shrinking gap between the global poor and others.For example,the global Gini coefficient dropped by around 0.5 points every year between 2003 and 2013.The Asian fina
201、ncial crisis previously brought a cumulatively large increase in global inequality in the late 1990s.It is yet to be seen what the full impact of the current crisis will be on global inequality,but diverging recoveries since 2020 suggest the impact may be large.5OverviewBOX O.2Measuring poverty in I
202、ndiaThis report publishes global and regional estimates based on new data for India available for 201519.The source of the data is the Consumer Pyramids Household Survey(CPHS),conducted by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy,a private data company.India has not published official survey data on
203、 poverty since 2011.Given the countrys size and importance for global and regional poverty estimates,the CPHS data help fill an important gap.The household consumption data used for poverty monitoring is based on an analysis by SinhaRoy and van der Weide(2022)in which the CPHS sample is re-weighted
204、to more closely resemble a nationally representative survey and the consumption aggregate is adjusted to more closely matchthe consumption aggregate used in the official series.Other methods have been used to estimate the evolution of poverty in India since 2011.The methodological differences betwee
205、n the national accountsbased approach of Bhalla,Bhasin,and Virmani(2022)and SinhaRoy and van der Weide(2022)have been outlined elsewhere(Ravallion 2022;Sandefur 2022).Given widespread agreement that microdata from household surveys are necessary for credibly measuring poverty,this report uses the CP
206、HS.The CPHS was also conducted during 2020.Although the full analysis required to ensure consistency between this survey and previous surveys has not been completed,initial analysis indicates that the CPHS serves as a useful source of data on the trends in consumption in 2020.Most countries experien
207、ced increases in poverty,but not always higher inequalityThe estimated increase in global poverty of 71 million people is heavily influenced by the most populous countries because each individual in the world is weighted equally.Although large,China is home to a small share of the global extreme poo
208、r and had a moderate economic shock in 2020;as a result,China does not contribute to the global increase in extreme poverty in 2020.The global and regional poverty estimates presented in this report include new data for India for 201519(seebox O.2).This represents an improvement over the previous ed
209、ition of this report,in which the absence of recent data for India severely limited the measurement of poverty in South Asia.In 2020,India experienced a pronounced economic contraction.Because 2020 pov-erty estimates from household survey data for India are still being finalized,there is considerabl
210、e uncertainty over the estimates of poverty increases in India in 2020.A national accountsbased projection implies an increase of 23 million,whereas initial estimates using the data described in box O.2 suggest an increase of 56millionthis latter number is used for the global estimate.While the fina
211、l number could be higher or lower,all indications suggest the global shock to poverty reduction as a result of the pandemic was historically large.Although smaller in popula-tion,Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo are still relativelylarge countries and home to a large share of the global
212、extreme poor;however,they had relatively mild economic shocks in 2020 and so contribute less to the global increase in extreme poverty,about three million and half a million,respectively.Another way to explore the global scope of this crisis period is to note the number of coun-tries that experience
213、d substantive changes in poverty and inequality.Poverty increases were widespread across regions and income groups(figure O.4).With the exception of 19 countries that reduced poverty through generous transfers,nearly all countries saw poverty increases,often quite large,at the poverty line relevant
214、to their income group.The effects were much larger in some countries than in others,highlighting the fact that a countrys economic structure and policy response mediated the welfare effects of the common global crisis.In aggregate,in terms 6POVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2022of extreme poverty,the la
215、rgest increases were observed in LICs and LMICs.In UMICs,poverty actually fell in 2020,driven in part by fiscal support in large UMICs,such as Brazil and South Africa,that mitigated the impact of the crisis on poverty(and even reduced poverty in some cases).Although global inequality rose,this rise
216、did not stem from widespread within-country increases in inequality.In fact,within-country inequality actually fell in many countries,thereby somewhat mitigating the increase in global inequality.The increase in global inequality would be 37 percent higher if within-country inequality changes are no
217、t taken into account.Because the change in inequality at the national level is mixed as well as small in most cases,the increase in country poverty rates is largely driven by declines in average income at the country level.The nonmonetary dimensions of the pandemic and its impacts may ultimately pro
218、ve to be more costly than the monetary dimensionsThe costs of the pandemic go beyond monetary impacts.These broader costs principally include the lost learning of students unable to attend school and significantly higher global mortality rates.In fact,the world experienced the first decline in globa
219、l life expectancy since the end of World War II:life expectancy fell by almost two full years(Heuveline 2022).Significant increases in pandemic-related mortality,both directly from COVID-19 infections and indirectly from factors such as declines in health care use,have afflicted every region of the
220、world.The countries with the largest mortality burdens were middle-income countries(MICs)that confronted large economic shocks and social disruptions,but also had a relatively high share of older adults in the population who were more vulnerable to COVID-19(WHO 2022).As for the learning of young stu
221、dents today,many countries enforced social distancing mea-sures to curtail the spread of the illness.Measures included closing schools for extended periods.From the onset of the pandemic until October 2021,the formal school system was closed for an entire school year,on average,across all countries,
222、and even for a longer period in MICs.As a result,multidimensional poverty,which includes an educational dimension,increased in the short run.Perhaps more important,the learning loss will have significant long-term con-sequences for todays students and even the wider society if students are unable to
223、 make up their losses.This is because the growth potential of economies over the long term will be lower.Poverty will be prolonged for millions of people,especially the students of today who have borne the brunt of extended school closures and are now likely to earn less over their lifetime.A compar
224、ison of the poverty shock in 2020 and 2021 with the impact of the current learn-ing losses on long-run poverty simulations suggests that the persistence of poverty from learn-ing losses will exceed the contemporaneous crisis-induced poverty shock for many countries.2 The reason is that the drag on g
225、rowth could persist for decades if unaddressedeven though the implications of learning loss for aggregate growth may appear modest within any one year.In LICs,the crisis increased the number of years spent in poverty by 6.1 per 100 persons for the two-year period 202021,whereas the loss in learning
226、may lead to an additional total of 13.3years in poverty per 100 persons,distributed over the longer 202250 period.The same metrics for LMICs and UMICs are 6.6 and 4.5 years in poverty now(202021)and 11.8 and 12.9 years in poverty over the future(202250),respectively.In 80 percent of the countries st
227、ud-ied,the simulated future poverty increase due to learning loss exceeds the measured short-run increase in poverty.These simulations are a point-in-time comparison that projects current conditions into the future.To the extent that the losses of 2020 can be reversed through policies addressing lea
228、rning loss,the projected declines can be corrected and a comeback could even be quite rapid.But such outcomes will depend in part on the policy choices of today,including those discussed in this report and in the World Banks forthcoming report Collapse and Recovery:How the COVID-19 Pandemic Eroded H
229、uman Capital and What to Do About It(World Bank,forthcoming b).7oVeRVieW202122:The great divergence and a stalled recoverySince 2020,progress in poverty reduction has been slow.Poverty estimates for 2021 and 2022 have been“nowcasted”that is,gross domestic product(GDP)growth rates have been used to f
230、orecast household incomes,assuming all households experience equal growth.Nowcast esti-mates suggest that poverty reduction resumed in 2021,but only at the slow rate of progress seen prior to the crisis(figure O.3).Projections for 2022 are that the pace of poverty reduction will further stall as glo
231、bal growth prospects dim with the war in Ukraine,a growth slowdown in China,and higher food and energy prices.High food price inflation can in the short run have especially detrimental impacts on poorer households,which spend a larger share of their income on food.To highlight the additional nega-ti
232、ve impact of food prices in the short run,poverty simulations are also presented for a downside scenario that assumes maximum impact,as reflected by the price data and consumption choices of poorer households.3 In the long run,households may adapt to higher prices by changing their con-sumption patt
233、erns to at least partly lessen the impacts,and wages in certain sectors can adjust.For many poor rural households engaged in agriculture,higher food prices can be a source of income growth.World Bank poverty assessments conducted after the 2008 and 2011 food price crises in Bangladesh,Cambodia,Ethio
234、pia,India,and Uganda showed the important role that higher food prices,which led to higher agricultural income growth and higher agricultural wages,played in raising the incomes of poor households.However,increases in food prices will hurt some poorsuch as poor urban householdsmuch more than others.
235、The impacts on the urban poor can lead to unrest in cities(as in earlier food price crises)and require a strong policy response.At least 667 million people were expected to be in extreme poverty by 2022.That is 70 million more than the forecast would have been without the lingering effects of COVID-
236、19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.In a worst-case scenario,up to 685 million people could be inextreme poverty89 million more than would have otherwise been the case.At these levels,thenumber of people forecasted to move out of poverty in 2022 could be as low as 5 million.FIGURE O.3Poverty redu
237、ction resumed slowly in 2021 but may stall in 2022Sources:World bank estimates based on mahler,Yonzan,and Lakner,forthcoming;World bank,Poverty and inequality Platform,https:/pip.worldbank.org;World bank,global economic Prospects database,https:/databank.worldbank.org/source/global-economic-prospect
238、s.Note:the figure shows the number of poor at the us$2.15 a day poverty line.For 2022,nowcasts are reported for the“Current projection”and for the“Current projection(allowing for food price impacts on poor).”56068002020212022Historical dataNumber of poor(millions)Pre
239、-COVID-19 projectionCurrent projectionCurrent projection(allowing for food price impacts on poor)64862966676858POVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2022This finding places 2022 on track to be the second-worst year for poverty reduction in the last 22years(after 2020).Global poverty rates are pro
240、jected to be just as high in 2022 as they were in 2019,indicating several years of lost progress.The pathways countries have followed since the pandemic have exacerbated global inequality,with richer countries recovering faster than poor countries.Figure O.4 shows the change in the number of extreme
241、 poor,by year,for three income groups.Recovery is estimated to have been lower in LICs,with 11 of 27 countries still estimated to have poverty increases in 2021 and full recovery expected in only six.Although recovery was more widespread in LMICs in 2021,it is estimated that most countries had not r
242、eversed the substantial increase in poverty seen in 2020.In UMICs,recovery was stronger but not bymuch.From 2020 to 2022,because of differences in between-country growth rates,the incomes of the worlds richest 20 percent likely grew by 3.3 percent.By contrast,the rate for the bottom four quintiles w
243、as 2.1 percent to 2.5 percent.Taken together,the threats to poverty reduction noted in this report have set back progress by at least four years(figure O.5).By 2030,the global extreme poverty rate will be 7 percent.The goal of reducing global poverty to 3 percent by 2030 was difficult enough to achi
244、eve before the current crises.The recent setbacks have put this target nearly out of reachand there is an urgent need to correct course.These projections mask substantial differences in projections between regions.Extreme poverty is projected to become increasingly concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa
245、.Other regions will likely reach the 2030 target of less than 3 percent extreme poverty by 2030,but poverty is projected to remain well above target in Sub-Saharan Africa.Achieving the 3 percent goal by 2030 would require Sub-Saharan Africa to achieve growth rates about eight times higher than histo
246、rical rates between 2010 and 2019.The compounding pressure of the overlapping crises experienced over the past two years has created an elevated risk profile for the world.Government policies play a critical role in shielding societies from the worst outcomes of crises.Fiscal policy is a key instrum
247、ent of such policies.Unfortunately,many countries,especially LICs,entered the pandemic with fiscal systems unable to fully confront or deal with the challenges they faced.The coming years present new opportu-nities and challenges.The second part of this report discusses how fiscal policy can be empl
248、oyed to promote a robust and inclusive recovery.FIGURE O.4A widespread reduction in poverty across countries in 2020,followed by a nascent and uneven recoverySources:World bank estimates based on mahler,Yonzan,and Lakner,forthcoming;World bank,Poverty and inequality Platform,https:/pip.worldbank.org
249、;World bank,global economic Prospects database,https:/databank.worldbank.org/source/global-economic-prospects.Note:the figure shows the share of economies where the poverty rate has decreased or increased relative to the prior year and relative to 2019,by income group.economies where poverty increas
250、ed include those where poverty did not change.LiCs=low-income countries;LmiCs=lower-middle-income countries;umiCs=upper-middle-income countries.020406080100Share of economies(%)Share of economies(%)Share of economies(%)a.LICs(US$2.15 a day)202020212022 b.LMICs(US$3.65 a day)0204060802022c
251、.UMICs(US$6.85 a day)0204060802022Poverty lower than 2019Poverty fell,but still higher than 2019Poverty increased9oVeRVieWPart 2.Fiscal policy for an inclusive recoveryDuring the COVID-19 crisis,various public health policiessuch as stay-at-home directives as well as new and existing mone
252、tary,financial,and fiscal policiesaffected the dynamics of disease transmission and altered growth,poverty,and learning outcomes.These outcomes were also shaped by the economic and social conditions of the country and the particular mix FIGURE O.5Progress in poverty reduction has been altered in las
253、ting ways Sources:World bank estimates based on mahler,Yonzan,and Lakner,forthcoming;World bank,Poverty and inequality Platform,https:/pip.worldbank.org;World bank,global economic Prospects database,https:/databank.worldbank.org/source/global-economic-prospects.Note:two growth scenarios are consider
254、ed:the“Current projection”uses growth rates from the June 2022 global economic Prospects(geP)database to project poverty up to 2024.the“Pre-CoViD-19 projection”uses the January 2020 geP growth rate to project poverty to 2022.both scenarios use the country-level average annual historical(201019)growt
255、h rate to project poverty in the remaining years.the”3percent target”line in panel b is based on the estimate of the number of poor in 2030255 million.Pre-COVID-19 projectionCurrent projection0246862002020224202520262027202820292030Historical data3 percent target3 pe
256、rcent target00500600700800MillionsPercent9002000224202520262027202820292030a.Poverty rateb.Number of poorHistorical data6.58.49.38.88.46.8556757410POVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2022ofpolicies chosen.Many of these policies were adopted in an envi
257、ronment of economic stress,with great uncertainty about the ultimate impacts they might have.The effects of some of those policy choices are now on view amid the current food and energy price crisis.Today,food-export bans risk further exacerbating food price volatility,as they did during the 200608
258、food price crisis(Martin and Anderson 2011).Monetary,trade,and fis-cal policies(such as lower food tariffs and protective cash transfers)tailored to specific coun-try conditions offer the potential to soften the impacts.However,the dominant policy choice has been subsidies,implemented by 93 percent
259、of the countries that took early fiscal action in response to the food and energy price crisis,even though such subsidies are often not well tar-geted to need and can be detrimental in the long run.The second part of this report starts with the recognition that the same policy can have very differen
260、t effects in different countries.Higher-income economies are more resilient in the face of shocks(World Bank 2013)because their households and firms are endowed with wealth and superior health and education systems and thus are able to adapt to changing circumstances.Governments in LICs and MICs fac
261、e policy options with more limited effectiveness during a crisis than richer countries because of the structure of their economies(Loayza 2020).A stay-at-home order will be largely futile if people are compelled by necessity to work outside the home.Financial sector policy is less effective when it
262、cannot reach a large informal sector.And fiscal policy cannot achieve much if fiscal space is constrained and the structure of an economy limits the reach of standard fiscal policy instruments.Various features of an economy can amplify the impact of any shock and limit the impact of policies to addr
263、ess it.This interplay of shocks,policy impact,and poverty is well illustrated in figure O.6(Aminjonov,Bargain,and Bernard 2021).The figure depicts average workplace mobility(based on smartphone data)across 43 low-and middle-income countries.Stay-at-home directives and private decisions to avoid expo
264、sure to COVID-19 drove a dramatic reduction in mobility in March 2020.Reductions in mobility were large in both high-as well as low-poverty regions in countries.The reductions in mobility,however,were larger in the regions with lower poverty and in those that received income support.Mobility fell fu
265、rther in those areas that were better able to accommodate a stay-at-home order by virtue of the prevailing nature of work and the relative ability of the well-off to stay home.The difference in mobility in places with and without income support exceeds the difference in mobility in places with low a
266、nd high poverty rates.As a result,income support policies also had a larger impact on mobility in higher-poverty areas than in lower-poverty areas.This finding underscores the fact that policies that promote development enable more resilience in the face of crises.The focus on fiscal policyFiscal po
267、licy consists of the decisions governments make on how to raise revenue and spend public resources.Part 2 of this report focuses on how fiscal policy affects poverty and inequality.Fiscal choices affect growth,employment,and wages,as well as the services available,the prices people pay,and the incom
268、e people have left after taxes are paid and transfers are received.In many countries,fiscal policy is currently under considerable pressure.Even as govern-ments decide which fiscal policies are the most suitable for achieving an inclusive recovery and long-run growth,they must deal with rising fisca
269、l deficits and debt burdens and with little space for fiscal policy to support the recovery and prepare for ongoing and future crises.LICs and MICs are significantly more indebted today than two years ago.In 2020,more emerging econ-omies experienced credit rating downgrades than over the entire 2010
270、19 period(Kose et al.2022).Even as countries saw their revenues drop because of the COVID-19 crisis,they had to pursue expansionary fiscal policy if they wanted to mitigate the worst impacts of the downturn.Many countries now need to raise revenue,reduce spending,or both to escape debt distress.Hist
271、orically,such fiscal policy decisions have often hurt the poornot only in the immediate 11oVeRVieWterm,but also limiting the longer-term opportunities available to them.Policy makers must nav-igate the current challenges in ways that do not further impoverish the poor today or reduce the opportuniti
272、es they might enjoy tomorrow.4 Fiscal policy,poverty,and inequality:Three findings1.In low-and middle-income countries,fiscal policy can protect peoples welfare in a crisisbut with limitsDuring the early stages of the pandemic,fiscal policy effectively prevented some vulnerable house-holds from slip
273、ping into poverty.Microsimulations in LICs and MICs suggest poverty would have been,on average,2.4 percentage points higher without a fiscal response(figure O.7).However,even though fiscal policy nearly fully offset the impact of the pandemic on poverty in HICs,it offset only half of the impact in U
274、MICs and just over a quarter of the impact in LICs and LMICs.There are some lessons to learn from this global experiencenot only how to improve fiscal policy in the years to come but also how to be clear-eyed about the limits of protecting poor FIGURE O.6The interplay of shocks,policy,and poverty af
275、fects workplace mobilitySource:based on data from Aminjonov,bargain,and bernard 2021.Note:the figure depicts workplace mobility in 2020(based on smartphone data)across subnational regions with high and low poverty rates and with and without income support in 43 low-and middle-income countries.the da
276、ta points reflect the calculations by Aminjonov,bargain,and bernard(2021)based on google mobility data(change in visits to workplaces relative to the daily median from January 3 to February 6,2020);poverty data from national statistical offices and estimates by Aminjonov,bargain,and bernard(2021)usi
277、ng household surveys;and oxfordCoViD-19 government Response tracker data on CoViD-19 income support.the figure shows the local polynomial fit with a 95 percent confidence interval of daily mobility across regions,weighted by 1 divided by the number of regions in the corresponding country.Poverty is
278、measured as the share of people living below national or international poverty lines in a subnational region.Poverty is defined as lower(higher)if a regions poverty rate is below(above)the countrys median regional poverty rate.CoViD-19 income support shows the daily status of whether the government
279、provides any income support to those who cannot work or who have lost their jobs because of the CoViD-19 pandemic(country-day variation in income support).First COVID-19 income support5060708090100Workplace mobility indexFeb 17Mar 16Apr 13May 112020Jun 8Jul 6Aug 3Aug 31Higher poverty and no income s
280、upportLower poverty and no income supportHigher poverty and income supportLower poverty and income support12POVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2022FIGURE O.7Fiscal policy reduced the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on poverty but less so in poorer economiesSources:Estimates collected from published and Wor
281、ld Bank microsimulation studies.See chapter 4 of the report for a full list.Note:The figure shows the results of two simulations from each economy study:one showing the increase in poverty that would have occurred had no fiscal response been present(no mitigation),and one showing the increase in pov
282、erty taking into account the fiscal response(mitigation).The increase in poverty is measured against the national poverty line or the global poverty line appropriate to the economy income category.For some economies,more than one study is available,as indicated by the use of“1”or“2”after the economy
283、 name in the figure.Full details of the data used are in chapter 4 online annex,annex 4A,table 4A.1,available at http:/ mitigationMitigation5.33.91.312.812.610.510.18.88.78.57.57.26.76.36.35.45.35.14.64.23.02.82.61.97.67.27.17.06.95.43.73.32.92.82.72.52.42.21.71.20.30.31.61.41.00.2High-in
284、comeChile-2High-income averageChile-1UruguayUpper-middle-incomeArmeniaSouth AfricaPeruGeorgiaColombia-1Dominican RepublicPanamaArgentina-2GuatemalaUpper-middle-income averageArgentina-1TrkiyeCosta RicaEcuadorParaguayColombia-2MexicoBrazil-1Brazil-2MoldovaRussian FederationLower-middle-incomePhilippi
285、nesTunisiaBoliviaKenyaHondurasEl SalvadorLower-middle-income averageNicaraguaHaitiWest Bank and GazaEgypt,Arab Rep.Sri LankaZambia-2Zambia-1IndonesiaGhanaTanzaniaVietnamLow-incomeMozambiqueUgandaLow-income averageMalawiPercentage point change in poverty13oVeRVieWand vulnerable households through fis
286、cal policy.High borrowing costs limited the scale of the COVID-19 fiscal response in many low-and lower-middle-income countries.In survey results reported in World Development Report 2022:Finance for an Equitable Recovery(World Bank 2022b),83 percent of LIC policy makers indicated they were concerne
287、d about debt sustainabil-ity or access to external borrowing for financing their fiscal response to the crisis.ManyLIC and LMIC policy makers were even more concerned about access to international financial support.LICs relied almost entirely(95 percent)on international support to finance a fiscal r
288、esponse.Such financing was also a major source of support for LMICs(73 percent)and for UMICs(50 percent).Going into the crisis,more than half of International Development Association(IDA)countries were in debt distress,so could not borrow much.Their main source of external finance was highly-concess
289、ional flows from multilateral development banks.This highlights the importance of access to finance in a crisis response.The structure of the economy also limited the type and impact of fiscal policy tools that could be used.Providing firms with the support needed to save jobs was almost impossible
290、in countries with large informal sectors.The share of workers at firms receiving wage subsidy support was larger in countries with a greater share of formal workers in the economy prior to the crisiseven when controlling for the overall level of spending and GDP per capita.This finding is trou-bling
291、 because emerging evidence suggests that spending to protect jobs may have been more impactful in hastening economic recovery,increasing employment,and reducing poverty than income support measures(World Bank,forthcoming a).Faced with widespread uncertainty about the impact of the crisis on househol
292、d incomes and the widespread losses across poor,vulnerable,and middle-class households,most countries were under considerable political pressure to quickly provide broad income support.HICs and UMICs were more likely to provide this support through universal transfers,whereas LMICs and LICs were mor
293、e likely to implement subsidies alongside targeted transfers.Although subsi-dies were similarly universal and often rapidly introduced,they came with several disadvantages.A greater share of subsidy support went to the better-off,and subsidies distorted the prices that households faced.On average,al
294、most three months passed after lockdowns began before transfers reached recipients in LICs and MICs,even though income losses and rising food insecurity took hold immediatelysee Beazley,Marzi,and Steller(2021)and figure O.8.Delivery was much quicker when digital payment systems were present.Transfer
295、s did target poorer households in general.However,reaching vulnerable households with income losses who were not the usual benefi-ciaries of social protection systems proved more challenging,especially in LICs and LMICs.Nevertheless,there are standout examples of innovation in reaching well-targeted
296、 beneficia-ries during challenging times,such as South Africa and Togo(discussed in further detail in the report).In summary,the experience of delivering support during the pandemic highlights the importance of investing in delivery systems for transfers thatwhen neededcan deliver timely support bey
297、ond a narrowly targeted group.2.In poorer countries,poor households often have less income after taxes are paid and transfers are receivedThe lack of fiscal space in many poorer countries going into the COVID-19 crisis and the lim-ited delivery systems available to deliver direct transfers to poor a
298、nd vulnerable households reflected fiscal choices made in the run-up to the crisis.This report brings together for the first time analysis of the impact of taxes,transfers,and subsidies on household income in 94 LICs and MICs(including 55 LICs and LMICs).This analysis assesses the degree to which ta
299、xes are raised equitably and transfers and subsidies reach poor and vulnerable households.Taken together,taxes,transfers,and subsidies reduce inequality in all countries while financing spending on security,health,education,and investments for growth and poverty reduction.HICs are effective at ensur
300、ing that taxes,transfers,and subsidies do not reduce the disposable income of 14POVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2022poor households.However,this is not the case for LICs and MICs.In two-thirds of those countries,the income of poor households falls by the time taxes have been paid and transfers and sub
301、sidies have been received(figure O.9).In LICs the income of all households is lower after taxes,transfers and subsidies.The informal sector accounts for a large share of the economy in LICs and MICs.As a consequence,taxes are predominantly collected indirectly,and income transfers are often too low
302、to compensate for the offsetting impact of indirect taxes on poor and vulnerable households.Encouragingly,though,across all income levels some countries are able to reduce both inequality and poverty.The highest performers in each category tend to reduce poverty by 6 to 8 percentage points at the po
303、verty line relevant to their income category.On average,however,reducing poverty becomes much less likely for countries in lower income categories.All HICs reduce poverty by FIGURE O.8Delivering support on time and to those in most need was challenging Source:World bank estimates based on data from
304、World bank CoViD-19 high-frequency phone surveys.Note:Panel a shows the share of households in each income group that lost income and the share of households that received support across three periods during the pandemic(averaging across economies in each income category).Panel b shows the differenc
305、e between the share of households that received support and lost income or a job and the share of households that received support but did not lose income or a job(each dot represents an economy).economies are weighted equally.hiCs=high-income countries;LiCs=low-income countries;LmiCs=lower-middle-i
306、ncome countries;umiCs=upper-middle-income countries.a.Income losses from the pandemic and support received,202021b.Availability of public assistance for households with job or income losses versusthose with no losses Countries where householdsWITH job or income losseswere more likely to receive supp
307、ortCountries where householdsWITHOUT job or income losseswere more likely to receive supportWith losses more likelyWithout losses more likelyEqual likelihoodTwice as likelyTwice as likelyHICsUMICsLMICsLICs020406080Share of households(%)Share of households(%)Share of households(%)AprJun 20JulDec 20Ja
308、nAug 21020406080AprJun 20JulDec 20JanAug 21020406080AprJun 20JulDec 20JanAug 21UMICsLMICsLICsReceived supportLost incomeReceived supportLost incomeReceived supportLost income15oVeRVieWFIGURE O.9In poorer economies,poorer households are more likely to be left with less money after taxes have been pai
309、d and transfers received Sources:original estimates based on data from CeQ institute,CeQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution,https:/commitmentoequity.org/datacenter;organisation for economic Co-operation and Development data;World bank data.Note:the figure shows consumable income(income after direc
310、t and indirect taxes have been paid and cash transfers and subsidies have been received)as a percentage of market income(income before any taxes have been paid or transfers or subsidies received),by market income decile,aggregated by income group using the median.the sample includes 5 hiCs,19 umiCs,
311、16 LmiCs,and 3 LiCs.hiCs=high-income countries;LiCs=low-income countries;LmiCs=lower-middle-income countries;umiCs=upper-middle-income countries.809000Consumable income as a share of market income(%)Market income decileHICsUMICsLMICsLICsmore than 1 percentage point,c
312、ompared with only six of the 23 UMICs and only one of the 24 LICs and LMICs.It is thus a challenge to raise revenue without increasing poverty in a country with a large informal sector and limited safety net coverage.Poorer countries collect less tax revenue and primarily collect taxes in the least
313、progres-sive way64 percent of taxes are from indirect taxes(value added,excise,and trade taxes).By contrast,just 28 percent of tax revenue in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)member countries is derived from these sources(figure O.10).In richer countries,more taxes are col
314、lected from direct taxes:personal income tax and other taxes on income such as social security contributions.Direct taxes are typically more progressive because they can be designed to increase with income,unlike taxes on goods that everyone must pur-chase regardless of income level.In informal econ
315、omies where income is not easily observed,recorded,and taxed,there is a greater reliance on indirect taxes.Because of this reliance,a signif-icant share of revenue is collected from the poor.5 In LICs and LMICs,spending on direct transfers is low on average,and it is dwarfed by spending on subsidies
316、.Figure O.11 compares spending on energy and agricultural subsidies with all social protection spending.In HICs,spending on social protection far exceeds spend-ing on subsidies.In UMICs,spending on energy and agricultural subsidies is equal to spend-ing on social protection,whereas in LMICs and LICs
317、 social protection spending is less than one-half and one-tenth of spending on energy and agricultural subsidies,respectively.Only 20 percent of spending on subsidies reaches the bottom 40 percent in each country,and this,combined with low spending on transfers,means there is little compensation for
318、 the reduction in income and consumption brought about by indirect taxes.Subsidies are widespread,in part,because they are popular,providing support to many interest groups on whom governments 16POVERTY AND SHARED PROSPERITY 2022FIGURE O.10Poorer economies rely more on indirect taxes,which are less
319、progressiveSources:international Centre for tax and Development,https:/www.ictd.ac/;CeQ institute,CeQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution,https:/commitmentoequity.org/datacenter;oeCD data;World bank data.Note:Panel a shows each type of government revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product(gD
320、P),aggregated by income group.Panelb shows direct and indirect taxes as a percentage of total market income by market income decile,aggregated by income group.indirect tax incidence is not available for oeCD countries.Cit=corporate income tax;gDP=gross domestic product;hiCs=high-income countries;LiC
321、s=low-income countries;LmiCs=lower-middle-income countries;oeCD=organisation for economic Co-operation and Development;Pit=personal income tax;ssC=social security contribution;umiCs=upper-middle-income countries;VAt=value added tax.a.Tax revenue as a share of GDP Indirect taxesDirect taxes010203040L
322、ICsLMICsUMICsNon-OECDHICsOECDShare of GDP(%)Nontax revenuePropertyCITPayroll and SSCPITExciseTradeVAT051015202530 Share of market income(%)15101510Income decileb.Direct and indirect taxes as a share of market income,by income decile OECDLMICs1510HICs1510UMICs1510LICsFIGURE O.11Poorer economies spend
323、 less on transfers than on subsidies,which benefit the poor less Sources:Agricultural subsidies:international organisations Consortium for measuring the Policy environment for Agriculture database,http:/www.ag-incentives.org/;energy subsidies:international institute for sustainable Development,https
324、:/www.iisd.org/;social protection:World bank,boost open budget Portal,https:/www.worldbank.org/en/programs/boost-portal,and international monetary Fund,government Finance statistics database,https:/data.imf.org/gfs;cash transfers and subsidies as a share of total benefits:CeQinstitute,CeQ Data Cente
325、r on Fiscal Redistribution,https:/commitmentoequity.org/datacenter;oeCD data;World bank data.Note:Panel a compares spending on energy and agricultural subsidies with spending on social protection(excluding pensions)as a share of gross domestic product(gDP),aggregated by income group.Panel b shows tr
326、ansfers and subsidies as a share of total benefits by market income decile,aggregated by income group.subsidy incidence is not available for oeCD countries.gDP=gross domestic product;hiCs=high-income countries;LiCs=low-income countries;LmiCs=lower-middle-income countries;oeCD=organisation for econom
327、ic Co-operation and Development;umiCs=upper-middle-income countries.b.Cash transfers and subsidies as a share oftotal benefits,by income decile SubsidiesCash transfersIncome decileLMICs1510HICs1510Share of total benefits(%)OECD00UMICs1510LICs7HICsUMICsLMICsLICsShare of GDP(%)En
328、ergy and agricultural subsidiesSocial protection(excluding pensions)a.Subsidy and social protectionspending as a share of GDP 17oVeRVieWBOX O.3Tools that help to prioritize fiscal policiesAnyone assessing the impact of any given fiscal policyboth tax and spendingon poverty and equity must seek answe
329、rs to two key questions:1.Who is benefiting from or paying for a given fiscal policy and to what degree?Answering this question is an essential first step in assessing the distributional implications of fiscal policy.In this report,the results from the Commitment to Equity(CEQ)methodology used to co
330、nduct fiscal incidence analysis are collated and analyzed for 94 countries.2.What is the value of this spending in terms of its long-term benefits for beneficiaries,nonbeneficiaries,and government revenue?The concept of the marginal value of public funds(MVPF),a systematic way of determining this va
331、lue,has resurfaced in recent years and is being applied to a vast range of policies in the United States.It is now also being used more broadly,and in this report it is applied to selected interventions in low-and middle-income settings.Often,a discussion of the impacts of fiscal policies on poverty
332、 and inequality focuses only on answering the first question,but answers to both questions are needed to properly assess the full set of welfare impacts.This information helps governments choose policies.A welfare judgment is needed as well:how much does a society value an additional dollar in the h
333、ands of the beneficiaries of one policy versus the beneficiaries of another?In some cases,the trade-off appears quite straightforward:it is between a policy with a high MVPF appropriately targeting the poor versus a policy with a low MVPF targeting the rich.The choice is not always this clear,but even when it is the high-MVPF policy is not always chosen,perhaps reflecting the challenge of incorpor